Amber Roy. Chowdhury et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Oct 2, 2019

13652810 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Oct. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/652,810 10/16/2012 Amber Roy Chowdhury 170108-1890 7824
71247 7590 10/02/2019
Client 170101 c/o
THOMAS HORSTEMEYER, LLP
3200 WINDY HILL RD SE
SUITE 1600E
ATLANTA, GA 30339
EXAMINER
DETWEILER, JAMES M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
docketing@thomashorstemeyer.com
uspatents@tkhr.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte AMBER ROY CHOWDHURY and
ALEXANDER Y. KALININ
________________

Appeal 2018-000316
Application 13/652,810
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, ERIC B. CHEN, and
JEREMY J. CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judges.

CURCURI, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 4–13, 21–27, and 29–31. Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
Claims 4–13, 21–27, and 29–31 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Final Act. 8–14.
Claims 4–6, 12, 13, 21–23, and 29–31 are rejected under pre-AIA 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over Sukornyk (WO 2012/088596 A1; July 5,
2012) and Cava (US 2007/0100803 A1; May, 3, 2007). Final Act. 15–45.

1 Appellants identify the real party in interest as Amazon Tech. Inc. App. Br.
2.
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Claims 7–11 and 24–27 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as obvious over Sukornyk, Cava, and Calabria (US 2005/0144064
A1; June 30, 2005). Final Act. 45–65.
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention relates to “[k]eyword bidding [which] allows
for advertisers to insert advertisements into network pages of search results.”
Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 4 is illustrative and reproduced below:
4. A system, comprising:
at least one computing device configured to at least:
determine a value for a plurality of keywords
based at least in part on a keyword history that comprises at
least one previously viewed item page selected from at least one
previous search result, the at least one previous search resulting
being generated in response to a previous search query being
executed with respect to at least one of the plurality of
keywords;
determine that at least one item page has been
selected from a search results page, the search results page
being generated from a search query comprising the at least one
of the plurality of keywords;
facilitate a purchase for at least one purchased
keyword and an optimized match tier for a time period as a
function of the value of the at least one of the plurality of
keywords, the optimized match tier indicating a subset of a
plurality of keyword variations from the at least one purchased
keyword, the subset of the plurality of keyword variations
exceeding a performance threshold;
insert an advertisement associated with a purchaser
of the at least one purchased keyword into the at least one item
page in response to the at least one item page being selected
from the search results page by a client, inserting the
advertisement for the time period as a function of at least one of
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a plurality of item page keywords associated with the at least
one item page satisfying the optimized match tier, wherein the
advertisement is inserted subsequent to the selection of the at
least one item page; and
wherein the value of the at least one of the
plurality of keywords with respect to the at least one item page
exceeds a threshold.

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellants, and in light of the arguments and evidence
produced thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential).

ANALYSIS
THE 35 U.S.C. § 101 REJECTION OF CLAIMS 4–13, 21–27, AND 29–31
The Examiner determines:
Claim 4 is directed to an abstract idea. The claim is
directed to determining a value for the keywords and
purchasing/bidding on keywords as a function of the value (see
“determine a value for a plurality of keywords based at least in
part on a keyword history that comprises at least one previously
viewed item page selected from at least one previous search
result, the at least one previous search resulting being generated
in response to a previous search query being executed with
respect to at least one of the plurality of keywords . . . facilitate
a purchase for at least one purchased keyword . . . for a time
period as a function of the value of the at least one of the
plurality of keywords . . . wherein the value of the at least one
of the plurality of keywords with respect to the at least one item
page exceeds a threshold”. While this abstract idea is not
identical to any of the specific concepts the courts have
identified as being abstract ideas, the abstract idea of the instant
case is similar in that it may be characterized as a method of
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organizing human activity, and/or “an ‘idea of itself’” and/or a
mathematical equation. The abstract idea is similar to the
abstract idea of “obtaining and comparing intangible data”
identified by the courts in Cybersource, which is categorized as
“an idea ‘of itself’”. For example, the instant claims comprise
obtaining intangible data (e.g., keyword history, ad request
data, value/purchase determination rules) and comparing
intangible data (e.g., comparing the data to determine values for
the keywords and keywords to purchase as a function of the
values). Furthermore, the abstract idea is similar to the abstract
idea of “collecting and comparing known information”
identified by the courts in Classen Immunotherapies. For
example, the instant claims comprise collecting information
(e.g., keyword history, ad request data, value/purchase
determination rules) and comparing known information (e.g.,
comparing the data to determine values for the keywords and
keywords to purchase as a function of the values). Furthermore,
the abstract idea is similar to the abstract idea of “determining a
price” identified by the courts in Versata. For example, the
instant claims comprise collecting/storing information (e.g.,
keyword history, ad request data, value/purchase determination
rules) and using rules to make a pricing determination (e.g.,
comparing the data to determine values for the keywords and
keywords to purchase as a function of the values). Furthermore,
determine a value for a plurality of keywords based at least in
part on a keyword history that comprises at least one previously
viewed item page selected from at least one previous search
result, the at least one previous search resulting being generated
in response to a previous search query being executed with
respect to at least one of the plurality of keywords amounts to a
mathematical relationship/formula. Mathematical relationships/
formulas have been identified by the courts as being abstract
ideas (e.g., a mathematical procedure for converting one form
of numerical representation to another in Benson, or an
algorithm for calculating parameters indicating an abnormal
condition in Grams).
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Final Act. 9–10; see also Final Act. 10–14 (discussing remaining claims
being directed to an abstract idea, and discussing “significantly more”), Ans.
16–25.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
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(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now
commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula
to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent
protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that
recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the
[claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract
idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic
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computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a
patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The USPTO recently published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO’s 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Memorandum”). Under that guidance, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2018)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Are the claims at issue directed
to a patent-ineligible concept?
Step One
Claim 4 is a system claim, which falls within the “manufacture”
category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 21 is a method claim, which falls within
the “process” category of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claim 30 is a computer-readable
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medium claim, which also falls within the “manufacture” category of 35
U.S.C. § 101.
Although these claims fall within the statutory categories, we still
must determine whether the claim is directed to a judicial exception, namely
an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18. Thus, we must determine
whether the claim recites a judicial exception, and fails to integrate the
exception into a practical application. See Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at
54–55. If both elements are satisfied, the claim is directed to a judicial
exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.
Step 2A, Prong One
Independent claim 4 is a method claim, and recites the following
limitations:
determine a value for a plurality of keywords based at
least in part on a keyword history that comprises at least one
previously viewed item page selected from at least one previous
search result, the at least one previous search resulting being
generated in response to a previous search query being executed
with respect to at least one of the plurality of keywords;
determine that at least one item page has been selected
from a search results page, the search results page being
generated from a search query comprising the at least one of the
plurality of keywords . . .
wherein the value of the at least one of the plurality of
keywords with respect to the at least one item page exceeds a
threshold.
These steps describe valuation and determination. Valuation and
determination as recited are processes that a human may perform by
considering information and arriving at a value or determination. Valuation
and determination include a combination of “observation, evaluation,
judgment, [and] opinion,” which are examples of “concepts performed in the
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human mind.” Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, these steps recite the
abstract concepts of “[m]ental processes.” Id.
Claim 4 further recites the following limitations:
facilitate a purchase for at least one purchased keyword
and an optimized match tier for a time period as a function of
the value of the at least one of the plurality of keywords, the
optimized match tier indicating a subset of a plurality of
keyword variations from the at least one purchased keyword,
the subset of the plurality of keyword variations exceeding a
performance threshold;
insert an advertisement associated with a purchaser of the
at least one purchased keyword into the at least one item page
in response to the at least one item page being selected from the
search results page by a client, inserting the advertisement for
the time period as a function of at least one of a plurality of
item page keywords associated with the at least one item page
satisfying the optimized match tier, wherein the advertisement
is inserted subsequent to the selection of the at least one item
page.
These steps describe “advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors,” which are examples of “commercial or legal interactions.”
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. Thus, these steps recite the abstract
concepts of “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.” Id.
Independent claims 21 and 30 recite limitations similar to those
discussed with respect to claim 4. Thus, claims 21 and 30 also recite an
abstract idea.
Step 2A, Prong Two
Because claims 4, 21, and 30 recite a judicial exception, we next
determine if the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application.
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In addition to the limitations of claim 4 discussed above that recite
abstract concepts, claim 4 further recites “at least one computing device.”
The Specification does not provide additional details about the “at least one
computing device” that would distinguish its implementation from a generic
implementation. See Spec. ¶¶ 13, 49.
We do not find the recited computer-related limitations are sufficient
to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. Specifically,
the “at least one computing device” is not improved in its functioning, but,
instead, merely perform the abstract idea. In this case, we do not see any
particular machine or manufacture that is integral to the claim; nor do we see
any transformation. We do not see any recited elements applying or using
the judicial exception in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the
judicial exception to the recited elements.
Accordingly, we determine that claim 4 is directed to a judicial
exception because it does not recite additional elements that integrate the
recited judicial exception into a practical application. Claims 21 and 30
recite similar limitations to those discussed with respect to claim 4, and
therefore also are directed to a judicial exception.
Is there something else in the claims
that ensures that they are directed to significantly
more than a patent ineligible concept?
Step 2B
Because claims 4, 21, and 30 are directed to a judicial exception, we
next determine, according to Alice, whether these claims recite an element,
or combination of elements, that is enough to ensure that the claim is
directed to significantly more than a judicial exception.
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The various hardware components recited by claims 4, 21, and 30
include “at least one computing device.”
The Specification does not provide additional details about the “at
least one computing device” that would distinguish its implementation from
a generic implementation. See Spec. ¶¶ 13, 49.
The conventional or generalized functional terms by which the
computer components are described reasonably indicate that Appellants’
Specification discloses conventional components. See Spec. ¶¶ 13, 49.
In view of Appellants’ Specification, the claimed hardware
components, including the “at least one computing device” reasonably may
be determined to be generic, purely conventional computer elements. Thus,
the claims do no more than require generic computer elements to perform
generic computer functions, rather than improve computer capabilities.
Accordingly, we determine that claims 4, 21, and 30 are not directed
to significantly more than a patent ineligible concept.
Appellants’ arguments
Appellants argue the claims are not directed to an abstract idea
because the Examiner failed to consider the claims as a whole. See App. Br.
17–20. For example, Appellants argue “the claims recite several specific
technical methods for dynamically constructing a web page by inserting
content (e.g. advertisements) into the web page after the web page has been
selected from a search results page and data (e.g. web page content)
associated with the selected web page has been analyzed.” App. Br. 18.
Appellants argue “the claims of the present application recite an ordered
combination of rules that are distinguishable from prior methods when at
least considered as a combination.” App. Br. 19. Appellants argue “the
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claims are directed to a specific technical solution for the problem of
dynamically inserting tailored content to into an item page selected from a
search results web page.” App. Br. 19–20. Appellants further argue the
claims are not directed to an abstract idea because the claims are not directed
to an idea of itself. See App. Br. 20–22.
Additionally, Appellants argue the claims recite elements that amount
to significantly more than the abstract idea. See App. Br. 22–27. For
example, Appellants argue “the present application has at least one inventive
concept, when considered as an ordered combination for a specific technical
solution for dynamically inserting customized content (e.g. an
advertisement) into an item page selected from a search results web page.”
App. Br. 23; see also App. Br. 26–27 (“the claims specify a specific,
practical, technical solution that involves the Internet and yields a tangible
result that is not routinely or conventionally performed on the Internet”),
Reply Br. 8–11.
These arguments do not show any error because, as we explain above,
the elements of claims 4, 21, and 30 are the abstract concepts of “[m]ental
processes” and “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity.”
Memorandum, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52. In addition, as we explain above, the
claims do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application, and are
not directed to significantly more than the abstract idea.
Although we do not dispute that the various hardware components
include specific logic for performing the recited steps, Appellants do not
persuasively explain why the claimed steps improve technology as a whole.
See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Rather, the claims merely adapt the method of
mental processes and advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors
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to an execution of steps performed by generic computing devices linked
together in a network. See Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake Services,
859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that
mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not
constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”); see also
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687
F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (A computer “employed only for its most
basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those
claims.”). Further, Appellants’ identified improvements are improvements to
the abstract idea, not improvements to a technology or computer
functionality. Thus, on the record before us, the cited claim limitations do
not improve the functionality of the various hardware components, nor do
they achieve an improved technological result in conventional industry
practice. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am., Inc., 837 F.3d 1299,
1316 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101
of claims 4–13, 21–27, and 29–31.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 4–6, 12, 13, 21–23, AND 29–31
OVER SUKORNYK AND CAVA
Contentions
The Examiner finds Sukornyk and Cava teach all limitations of claim
4. Final Act. 16–23.
In particular, the Examiner finds Sukornyk teaches:

insert an advertisement associated with a purchaser of the
at least one purchased keyword into the at least one item page
in response to the at least one item page being selected from the
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search results page by a client . . . the advertisement is inserted
subsequent to the selection of the at least one item page
as recited in claim 4. Final Act. 17–18 (citing Sukornyk 8:26–31, 14:5–21,
18:4–27); see also Ans. 8–9.
Among other arguments, Appellants present the following principal
arguments:
Next, Appellant asserts that Sukornyk does not show or
suggest “insert[ing] an advertisement associated with a
purchaser of the at least one purchased keyword into the at least
one item page in response to the at least one item page being
selected from the search results page by a client,” as recited in
claim 4. Instead, Sukornyk merely states, at page 9, lines 31-33,
that “dynamic display ads may be served to the consumer
audience segment in a targeted manner based on intersection
between the keywords and other attributes of the ad campaign
and the consumer audience segment.” Sukornyk is silent with
regard to when, where, and how these “dynamic ads” are
served. Accordingly, Sukornyk cannot show or suggest
“insert[ing] an advertisement associated with a purchaser of the
at least one purchased keyword into the at least one item page
in response to the at least one item page being selected from the
search results page by a client,” much less where “the
advertisement is inserted subsequent to the selection of the at
least one item page,” as recited in claim 4. Therefore, Sukornyk
fails to show or suggest at least these elements of claim 4.
App. Br. 7–8 (alterations in original); see also Reply Br. 4–5.

Our Review
The key limitation is
insert an advertisement associated with a purchaser of the
at least one purchased keyword into the at least one item page
in response to the at least one item page being selected from the
search results page by a client . . . the advertisement is inserted
subsequent to the selection of the at least one item page
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as recited in claim 4.
Sukornyk discloses:
Unlike traditional site retargeting, search retargeting in
accordance with the present invention enables the delivery of
new consumers to a website that the Internet users (such as
consumers) may not have visited before. Based on one or[]
more data collection methods, the present invention enables the
targeting of recent search activity of a large number of
consumers for example active on-line shoppers, by placing ads
in general web pages, without the requirement that the web
pages be associated with the operator of the platform.
Sukornyk 8:26–31. Thus, Sukornyk discloses targeting of recent search
activity.
Sukornyk further discloses:
The consumer’s web browser may be provided a JavaScript
code for example that enables the extraction of search data the
HTTP REFERRER header that is passed to the page from the
source of the traffic, i.e. the search engine page from which the
user was re-directed. The JavaScript code forwards the
“document.referrer” data to the web server 10. The client-side
JavaScript code allows for example sites with their own search
engine to specify search terms that are not part of a standard
search engine query to be collected by the platform of the
present invention.
Sukornyk 14:12–18. Thus, Sukornyk further discloses the collection of
HTTP Referer header data.
Finally, Sukornyk further discloses aspects of bidding for ad
impressions. Sukornyk 18:4–27.
Based on these disclosures, we find Sukornyk describes targeting a
specific individual user based on the user’s past search activity. Sukornyk
8:26–31. We further find Sukornyk collects the past search history of the
user, for example, by utilizing JavaScript code to collect HTTP Referer
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header data. Sukornyk 14:12–18. In addition, Sukornyk presents
advertisements to a consumer audience segment because Sukornyk discloses
“display advertising impressions associated with the consumer audience
segment so as to enable re-targeting of the consumer audience segment based
on the ad campaign data using display advertising.” Sukornyk Abstract
(emphasis added).
However, we are not persuaded by the Examiner that the relationship
between Sukornyk’s search terms in the HTTP Referer header data and
Sukornyk’s displayed advertisement is the same as recited in the key
limitation in claim 4. Rather, we are persuaded by Appellants’ arguments on
pages 7–8 of the Appeal Brief and pages 4–5 of the Reply Brief.
According to claim 4, the “advertisement [is] associated with a
purchaser of the at least one purchased keyword” and the purchased
keyword is directly related to the search query. See Claim 4.
In contrast, in Sukornyk, the displayed advertising is directed to the
consumer audience segment. Although the consumer audience segment is
based on collected search history information, we do not see the same direct
relationship between the HTTP Referer data and the subsequently displayed
advertisement. See Sukornyk Abstract, 9:18–22 (“The computer
implemented method . . . may be understood as including three distinct
phases: (A) data collection, (B) real-time bidding . . . resulting in serving of
targeted ads . . . (C) offline data processing”) (emphasis added).
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 5, 6, 12, and 13, which depend from
claim 4.
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Independent claims 21 and 30 recite the same key limitation. We,
therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 21 and 30, under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 22, 23, 29, and 31, which variously depend
from claims 21 and 30.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OF CLAIMS 7–11 AND 24–27 OVER SUKORNYK,
CAVA, AND CALABRIA
The Examiner does not find Calabria cures the deficiency of Sukornyk
and Cava. See Final Act. 45–65; see also Ans. 16.
We, therefore, do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) of clams 7–11 and 24–27.

ORDER
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 4–13, 21–27, and 29–31 is
affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1).

AFFIRMED