Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 23, 2020

2020002890 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/538,718 11/11/2014 QUAN BINH TO 5924-89900 5227
35690 7590 12/23/2020
KOWERT, HOOD, MUNYON, RANKIN & GOETZEL, P.C.
1120 S. Capital of Texas Hwy
Building 2, Suite 300
Austin, TX 78746
EXAMINER
BYRD, UCHE SOWANDE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
patent_docketing@intprop.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte QUAN BINH TO, CHRISTOPHER WHITAKER,
SHESHADRI SUPREETH KOUSHIK, BENJAMIN DAVID NEWMAN,
JULIEN JACQUES ELLIE, and ZACHARY THOMAS CROWELL
___________

Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ALLEN R. MACDONALD, ERIC B. CHEN, and
MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judges.

CHEN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–23. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a service provider system to implement an
enterprise catalog service that manages catalogs or portfolios of software
products on behalf of service provider customer organizations. (Abstract.)
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter, with bracketing added:
1. A system, comprising:
a plurality of computing nodes that collectively provide
services to an organization that is a customer of a service
provider, each of the computing nodes comprising at least one
processor and a memory,
wherein one or more of the plurality of computing nodes
implement an enterprise catalog service; and
an administrator interface through which an administrator
within the customer organization interacts with the enterprise
catalog service to manage server products on behalf of end
users in the customer organization;
wherein the enterprise catalog service is configured to:
[i] receive, through the administrator interface, a
request from the customer organization to create a
portfolio for server products hosted by the service

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Amazon Technologies, Inc. (Appeal Br. 2.)
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

3
provider that are to be made available to the end users in
the customer organization;
[ii] create, in response to the request, a portfolio to
store one or more server products;
[iii] receive, through the administrator interface,
input from the customer organization indicating selection
of one or more server products to be added to the
portfolio, wherein the one or more server products are
configured to execute on service provider resources to
perform a service, and wherein the one or more server
products comprise at least one server product that is
sourced by an entity other than the customer organization
or the service provider;
[iv] add, in response to the input, the one or more
server products to the portfolio;
[v] associate one or more access or usage policies
with the portfolio and make the portfolio available to one
or more end users in the customer organization, but not
available to other users or customers of the provider
network;
[vi] receive a request to launch one of the one or
more server products in the portfolio; and
[vii] in response to receiving the request to launch
one of the one or more server products, initiate execution
of the one of the one or more server products on one or
more of the plurality of computing nodes of the service
provider in accordance with the one or more access or
usage policies associated with the portfolio,
[viii] wherein the one of the one or more server
products provides one or more services to one or more
end users in the customer organization or to other users.

REJECTION
Claims 1–23 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter.
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

4
OPINION
We are unpersuaded by Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 14–25; see
also Reply Br. 4–6, 16) that independent claims 1, 6, and 19 are directed to
patent-eligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
With respect to independent claims 1, 6, and 19, the Examiner
determined that “[t]hese claim elements are considered to be abstract ideas
because they are directed to a method of organizing human activity [as in
Alice].” (Ans. 4.) In particular, the Examiner determined that “[t]he legal
interaction is entered into when the users . . . sign up for the enterprise
services and there [is] a cost associated with the use of the services, which
[services] are monitored [and] implemented” and “[t]he managing personal
behavior is entered into when the user activities within the enterprise
services are monitored, in which rules are implemented to make sure the
user products and policies are followed.” (Id. at 4–5.) Moreover, regarding
the additional elements of these claims (e.g., computing nodes, processor,
and memory) the Examiner determined that “claims 1, 6, [and] 19 merely
include[] instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer (or
merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea) while the
additional elements do no more than generally link the use of a judicial
exception to a particular technological environment or field of use (such as a
server).” (Final Act. 7.) We agree with the Examiner’s determinations and
ultimate conclusion that the claims are directed to patent-ineligible subject
matter.
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

5
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

6
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook); see also, e.g., id. at 187
(“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO published revised guidance on the application of § 101.
USPTO’s 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE,
84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019); see also USPTO, October 2019 Update:
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

7
Subject Matter Eligibility, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 17, 2019). Under that
guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th
ed. 2019)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field
(see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See 84 Fed. Reg. 56.

Are the claims at issue directed
to a patent-ineligible concept?
Step One
Claim 1 is a system claim, and claim 19 is a computer-readable
storage medium, which fall within the “manufacture” category of 35 U.S.C.
§ 101. Claim 6 is a method claim, which falls within the “process” category
of 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, each of claims 1, 6, and 19 falls within one
of the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35
U.S.C. § 101.
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

8
Although claims 1, 6, and 19 fall within the statutory categories, we
must still determine whether the claims are directed to a judicial exception,
namely an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 216. Thus, we must
determine whether the claims recite a judicial exception and whether the
exception is integrated into a practical application. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–
55. If a claim recites a judicial exception without integrating the judicial
exception into a practical application, the claim is directed to a judicial
exception under the first step of the Alice/Mayo test. See id.

Step 2A, Prong One
Independent claim 1 recites the following limitations: “[i] receive,
through the administrator interface, a request from the customer organization
to create a portfolio for server products hosted by the service provider that
are to be made available to the end users in the customer organization,” “[ii]
create, in response to the request, a portfolio to store one or more server
products,” “[iii] receive, through the administrator interface, input from the
customer organization indicating selection of one or more server products to
be added to the portfolio,” and “[iv] add, in response to the input, the one or
more server products to the portfolio.” Such limitations of claim 1 recite a
patent-ineligible abstract idea of certain methods of organizing human
activity, such as creating of a contractual relationship between a vendor and
an information technology (IT) administrator of a customer organization to
acquire a software portfolio for a computer system. See, e.g., Alice, 573
U.S. at 220 (concluding that “a method of organizing human activity” is an
abstract idea); see also buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (holding that “creating a contractual relationship—a
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

9
‘transaction performance guaranty’” is an abstract idea). As further
evidence that the claims are directed to certain methods of organizing human
activity, in the “Background” section, Appellant’s Specification discloses
that “[m]any companies and other organizations operate computer networks
that interconnect numerous computing systems to support their operations,
such as with the computing systems being co-located (e.g., as part of a local
network)” (Spec. ¶ 1) and “within a large enterprise, individual business
units often procure their own software and services” (id. ¶ 3 (emphasis
added)).
Moreover, independent claim 1 further recites: “[v] associate one or
more access or usage policies with the portfolio and make the portfolio
available to one or more end users in the customer organization, but not
available to other users or customers of the provider network,” “[vi] receive
a request to launch one of the one or more server products in the portfolio,”
“[vii] in response to receiving the request to launch one of the one or more
server products, initiate execution of the one of the one or more server
products on one or more of the plurality of computing nodes of the service
provider in accordance with the one or more access or usage policies
associated with the portfolio,” and “[viii] wherein the one of the one or more
server products provides one or more services to one or more end users in
the customer organization or to other users.” Such limitations of claim 1
recite a patent-ineligible abstract idea of certain methods of organizing
human activity, such as the IT administrator following the rules and policies
of the software vendors. See, e.g., Alice, 573 U.S. at 220 (concluding that “a
method of organizing human activity” is an abstract idea); see also In re
Smith, 815 F.3d 816, 818 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (concluding that “[a]pplicants’
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

10
claims, directed to rules for conducting a wagering game” are abstract). As
further evidence that the claims are directed to certain methods of organizing
human activity, in the “Background” section, Appellant’s Specification
discloses that “[d]ifferent organizations have taken a variety of approaches
to increase standardization and enforce compliance.” (Spec. ¶ 3 (emphasis
added).)
Accordingly, claim 1 recites a judicial exception. Claims 6 and 19
recite limitations similar to those discussed with respect to claim 1. Thus,
claims 6 and 19 also recite a judicial exception.

Step 2A, Prong Two
Because claim 1 and, similarly, claims 6 and 19 recite a judicial
exception, we next determine if the claims recite additional elements that
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application.
Independent claim 1 recites “a plurality of computing nodes that
collectively provide services to an organization that is a customer of a
service provider, each of the computing nodes comprising at least one
processor and a memory, wherein one or more of the plurality of computing
nodes implement an enterprise catalog service” (emphases added).
The additional elements recited in claim 1, including “node,”
“processor,” and “memory” are merely tools for performing the abstract
idea. See Affinity Labs v. DirecTV, 838 F.3d 1253, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(“[T]he claims are directed not to an improvement in cellular telephones but
simply to the use of cellular telephones as tools in the aid of a process
focused on an abstract idea.”).
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

11
Accordingly, claim 1 does not recite additional elements that integrate
the judicial exception into a practical application. Claims 16 and 19 recite
similar limitations.

Is there something else in the claims
that ensures that they are directed to significantly
more than a patent ineligible concept?
Step 2B
Because claims 1, 6, and 19 are directed to a judicial exception, we
next determine, according to Alice, whether these claims recite an additional
element, or combination of elements, that is enough to ensure that the claim
is directed to significantly more than a judicial exception.
Claim 1 is a system claim, which includes the following additional
elements: “node,” “processor,” and “memory.” Likewise, method claim 6
and computer-readable storage medium claim 19 recite a “computer.”
With respect to the claimed additional elements, Appellant’s
Specification discloses the following:
In various embodiments, computer system 1500 may be a
uniprocessor system including one processor 1510, or a
multiprocessor system including several processors 1510 (e.g.,
two, four, eight, or another suitable number). Processors 1510
may be any suitable processors capable of executing instructions.
For example, in various embodiments, processors 1510 may be
general-purpose or embedded processors implementing any of a
variety of instruction set architectures (ISAs), such as the x86,
PowerPC, SPARC, or MIPS ISAs, or any other suitable ISA.
(Spec. ¶ 155.)
System memory 1520 may be configured to store
instructions and data accessible by processor(s) 1510. In various
embodiments, system memory 1520 may be implemented using
any suitable memory technology, such as static random access
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

12
memory (SRAM), synchronous dynamic RAM (SDRAM),
nonvolatile/Flash-type memory, or any other type of memory. In
the illustrated embodiment, program instructions and data
implementing one or more desired functions, such as those
methods, techniques, and data described above for managing and
deploying desktop applications and services through an
enterprise catalog service, are shown stored within system
memory 1520 as code 1525 and data 1526. For example, data
1526 . . . may be stored in any of a variety of data structures or
database tables within memory 1520 on one or more computing
nodes of a service provider system and/or client computing
device used in managing and deploying desktop applications and
services through an enterprise catalog service, as described
herein.
(Id. ¶ 156.)
The generalized functional terms by which the additional elements are
described reasonably indicate that Appellant’s Specification discloses:
(i) conventional computer system 1500 (id. ¶ 155) or conventional
computing nodes (id. ¶ 156); (ii) conventional processors 1510 (e.g.,
PowerPC, SPARC, or MIPS ISAs) (id. ¶ 155); and (iii) conventional system
memory 1520 (e.g., SRAM, SDRAM, or nonvolatile/Flash-type memory)
(id. ¶ 156).
Moreover, Appellant’s Figure 15 illustrates a block diagram of
computer system 1500 (or node), which includes processor 1510a–1510n,
system memory 1520. Accordingly, Appellant’s Specification, including
Figures 15, discloses that: (i) conventional computer system 1500 (or
computing node); (ii) conventional processors 1510; and (iii) conventional
system memory 1520, function cooperatively as an ordered combination.
In view of Appellant’s Specification, the claimed “computer” (or
“node”), “processor,” and “memory” reasonably may be determined to be
generic, purely conventional additional elements.
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

13
Thus, claims 1, 6, and 19 do no more than require generic additional
elements to perform generic computer functions, rather than improve
computer capabilities.
First, Appellant argues that “[t]he Office Action does not go beyond a
cursory explanation regarding how the claimed subject matter recites
concepts that amount to ‘Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activity’”
and “[t]here are no contracts or business relations that are managed in the
presented claims.” (Appeal Br. 14; see also Reply Br. 4–6.) Contrary to
Appellant’s arguments, the Examiner has identified the appropriate judicial
exceptions as “certain methods of organizing human activity” and the
Examiner has compared the claimed concepts of independent claim 1 to the
appropriate Supreme Court decision (i.e., Alice). Accordingly, the Examiner
has met the burden of a general prima facie notice requirement. See In re
Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A]ll that is required of the
[Patent] [O]ffice to meet its prima facie burden of production is to set forth
the statutory basis of the rejection and the reference or references relied
upon in a sufficiently articulate and informative manner as to meet the notice
requirement of [section] 132.” ).
Second, Appellant argues the following:
The inventive focus of the claim is technical in nature,
and is dependent upon the technical environment of an
enterprise catalog service. Among other things, the claims recite
an enterprise catalog service using specific technical elements
that perform specific tasks and communicate in a specific way.
(Appeal Br. 15.)

Here, the plain focus of the claims is directed to an
improvement on computer functionality, i.e., various
embodiments of providing an enterprise catalog service using a
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

14
plurality of computing nodes. The recited improvements
represent computer functionality, and they are patent eligible
under Enfish.
(Id. at 16.) However, Appellant has not adequately explained why the claim
“purport[s] to improve the functioning of the computer itself” or “any other
technology or technical field.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225. In particular,
Appellant has not explained why “providing an enterprise catalog service
using a plurality of computing nodes,” which executes the steps of forming a
contractual relationship to acquire software and following the rules of a
software vendor, improves the function of a computer or other technology.
Third, Appellant argues the following:
Like Finjan and Ancora, the claimed subject matter of the
current application also “make[s] non-abstract improvements to
computer technology.” The Specification [at paragraph 20]
teaches and the claims recite a “particular way” of implementing
an enterprise catalog service. As one example, this particular
way includes “to create catalogs and portfolios of software
products (e.g., enterprise-wide catalogs, portfolios, and/or other
catalogs containing desktop applications and/or server products)
and to share them with specific sets of users.”
(Appeal Br. 17–18.)
Similarly, Appellant argues the following:
In particular, an enterprise catalog service [as disclosed in
paragraph 20] can “offer a standard set of products for common
use cases to the end users.” “The enterprise catalog service may
allow administrators (e.g., IT administrators or buyers) to
discover software products, provision service provider resources
on which to deploy those software products, and manage those
software products through a service provider management
console.” Accordingly, . . . this feature, among others, integrates
the claimed subject matter into a “practical application.”
Therefore, the claims should not be rejected under § 101.
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

15
(Id. (citations omitted).) However, Appellant has not adequately explained
how the features of “create catalogs and portfolios of software products . . .
and to share them with specific sets of users” or “enterprise catalog service”
improves computer technology. The features of “create catalogs and
portfolios of software products” relates to forming a contractual relationship
to acquire software from a vendor, rather than improving the function of a
computer or other technology. Similarly, as discussed previously, the
“enterprise catalog service” executes the steps of forming a contractual
relationship to acquire software and following the rules of a software
vendor, rather than improving the function of a computer or other
technology.
Fourth, Appellant argues the following:
In this case, however, the recited computer elements are
not being used simply for their “conventional” function in a
“general computer.” Rather, the computer elements of the claims
recite the computerize context for which the claimed invention is
designed for. In particular, the claimed solutions in this case are
designed to address problems that stems from the computerized
context.
. . .
As one example [from paragraph 2 of the Specification], the
claims solve one or more of the technical problems of “deploying
and managing applications at scale,” deploying updates and
patches “without affecting user productivity,” deploying
“applications on-demand” and deploying a company’s “own line
of business applications.” Because of the focus of the recited
subject matter, it is necessarily “rooted” in computer technology.
(Appeal Br. 23.)
Appellant respectfully submits that claim 1 in this case is
similar to the Federal Circuit’s 2014 decision in DDR Holdings
v. Hotels.com.
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

16
(Id. at 25.) However, in DDR, the Federal Circuit articulated that “the
claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to
overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.”
DDR, 773 F.3d at 1257. Even if Appellant is correct that the claims are
“necessarily rooted in computer technology,” Appellant has not
demonstrated that the claims “overcome a problem specifically arising in the
realm of computer networks,” as required by DDR.
Fifth, Appellant argues the following:
The Specification [at paragraph 20] teaches an
improvement (the enterprise catalog service) to an existing
computer system (typical data centers), comprising, in some
embodiments, “to create catalogs and portfolios of software
products (e.g., enterprise-wide catalogs, portfolios, and/or other
catalogs containing desktop applications and/or server products)
and to share them with specific sets of users.” These features are
similar to the features found “significantly more” in the
Berkheimer decision.
(Appeal Br. 25 (citations omitted); see also Reply Br. 16.) Again, as
discussed previously, the “enterprise catalog service” executes the steps of
forming a contractual relationship to acquire software and following the
rules of a software vendor, rather than improving the function of a computer
or other technology.
Last, Appellant argues that “while it may be true that ‘computing
nodes’ and ‘server products’ are known components in the prior art, here the
combination of recited elements describes an unconventional enterprise
catalog service, which was not known in the prior art and improves the
operation of typical data centers.” (Appeal Br. 25 (emphases omitted).)
However, Appellant improperly conflates the requirements for eligible
subject matter with the independent requirements of novelty and non-
Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

17
obviousness. “The ‘novelty’ of any element or steps in a process, or even of
the process itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject
matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable
subject matter.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 188–89.
Thus, we agree with the Examiner that claims 1, 6, and 19 are directed
towards patent-ineligible subject matter. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of independent claims 1, 6, and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Claims 2–5, 7–18, and 20–23 depend from independent claims 1, 6,
and 19, and Appellant has not presented any additional substantive
arguments with respect to these claims. We sustain the rejection of claims
2–5, 7–18, and 20–23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the same reasons discussed
with respect to independent claim 1.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.

DECISION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–23 101 Eligibility 1–23

Appeal 2020-002890
Application 14/538,718

18
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED