Amadeus S.A.S.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

May 13, 2021

2020000705 (P.T.A.B. May. 13, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/789,086 07/01/2015 Yoann Audo PT1291US00 1040
132326 7590 05/13/2021
Thompson Hine LLP
10050 Innovation Drive
Suite 400
Dayton, OH 45342-4934
EXAMINER
NGUYEN, KATHLEEN V
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2486
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/13/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdocket@thompsonhine.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte YOANN AUDO, CARINE DAOUK, KAMIL GRZEBIEN,
NIKOLAUS SAMBERGER, and JALAL MIFTAH
Appeal 2020-000705
Application 14/789,086
Technology Center 2400

Before MARC S. HOFF, JASON J. CHUNG, and BETH Z. SHAW,
Administrative Patent Judges.

SHAW, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–15 and 17–23. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Amadeus S.A.S.
Appeal Br. 3.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to an image based baggage tracking system.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system for baggage tracking, the system comprising:
one or more processors in communication with a first
camera; and
a memory coupled to the one or more processors, the
memory storing data comprising a database and program code
that, when executed by the one or more processors, causes the
system to:
receive a first request to check-in a first item of baggage;
in response to receiving the first request, capture, with the
first camera, a first image depicting an exterior surface of the first
item of baggage; and
store the first image in a first record of the database for the
first item of baggage.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
McClelland US 2002/0176531 A1 Nov. 28, 2002
Wilke US 2009/0308918 A1 Dec. 17, 2009
McQueen US 2010/0158310 A1 June 24, 2010
Baheti US 2012/0011142 A1 Jan. 12, 2012
Rayner US 2014/0002239 A1 Jan. 2, 2014
Vercollone US 2015/0287130 A1 Oct. 8, 2015
Kawamura US 2016/0270753 A1 Sept. 22, 2016
Dinkelmann US 2017/0008644 A1 Jan. 12, 2017

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–15 and 17–23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because
the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature,
a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. Final
Act. 6.
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Claims 1, 7, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Wilke. Final Act. 8.
Claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 17, and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being unpatentable over Wilke and McClelland. Final Act. 13.
Claim 1 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Wilke and Rayner. Final Act. 19.
Claims 3 and 9 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Wilke, McClelland, and Kawamura. Final Act. 21.
Claims 4–6, 10–12, 13, 19, 21, and 22 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 as being unpatentable over Wilke, McClelland, and Baheti. Final Act.
24.
Claims 14 and 15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Wilke, McClelland, and McQueen. Final Act. 35.
Claim 18 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Wilke, McClelland, and Vercollone. Final Act. 38.
Claim 23 is rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over
Wilke, McClelland, and Dinkelmann. Final Act. 40.

OPINION
101 Rejection
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–15 and 17–
23 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is in
error. Appeal Br. 6–19. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate,
substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments
are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). “A statement which merely
points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for
separate patentability of the claim.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Given our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we select
claim 1 as representative of claims 1–15 and 17–23, and we decide the § 101
rejection of claims 1–15 and 17–23 based on representative claim 1.
Principles of Law
“Whether a claim is drawn to patent-eligible subject matter is an issue
of law that we review de novo.” SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to
include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-part framework, described in Mayo and Alice.
Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first
determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219
(“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
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mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second part
of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of
the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient
to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract
idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more
than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id.
(alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent
Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019), now
incorporated in the Manual of Patent Examination Procedure (9th Ed., Rev.
10.2019, June 2020) (“MPEP”) in sections 2103 through 2106.07(c)
(“2019 Revised Guidance”).2

2 In response to received public comments, the Office issued further
guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the 2019 Revised Guidance.
USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October
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Under the 2019 Revised Guidance and the October 2019 Update, we
first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One”); and

(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(“Step 2A, Prong Two”).3

2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, under
Step 2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or

(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.

2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52–56; MPEP § 2106.04.

2019 Update”) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/peg_oct_2019_update.pdf).
3 This evaluation is performed by (a) identifying whether there are any
additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and
(b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to
determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a
practical application. See 2019 Revised Guidance - Section III(A)(2), 84
Fed. Reg. at 54–55.
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Abstract idea
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1, the claimed invention is for baggage
tracking. Claim 1 (with emphasis added) includes the following limitations:
one or more processors in communication with a first
camera; and
a memory coupled to the one or more processors, the
memory storing data comprising a database and program code
that, when executed by the one or more processors, causes the
system to:
receive a first request to check-in a first item of baggage;
in response to receiving the first request, capture, with the
first camera, a first image depicting an exterior surface of the
first item of baggage; and
store the first image in a first record of the database for the
first item of baggage.
Claim 1 recites an abstract idea grouping listed in the 2019 Eligibility
Guidance: “mental processes.” See MPEP § 2106.04 (listing mental
processes—concepts performed in the human mind (including an
observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion) as one of the “enumerated
groupings of abstract ideas”). “Mental processes” include acts that people
can perform in their minds or using pen and paper, even if the claim recites
that a generic computer component performs the acts. Id.; see also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (“[W]ith the exception of generic computer-implemented steps,
there is nothing in the claims themselves that foreclose them from being
performed by a human, mentally or with pen and paper.”); Mortg. Grader,
Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that computer-implemented method for “anonymous loan
shopping” was an abstract idea because it could be “performed by humans
without a computer”).
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The method recited in claim 1 executes steps that people can
practically perform in their minds or using pen and paper. A person can
perform the “receive a first request” step of claim 1 by using his or her mind
(or pen and paper) in the claimed manner. A person can perform the
“capture . . . a first image depicting an exterior surface of the first item of
baggage,” step by using his or her mind to memorize what the baggage looks
like (or pen and paper) in the claimed manner. Accordingly, claim 1 recites a
mental process, and thus an abstract idea.
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2, the remaining elements recited in claim
1 do not integrate the abstract idea into a practical application. In addition to
the steps discussed above, claim 1 recites “one or more processors,” a
“memory,” “a database and program code,” and a “first camera.” The
processor, memory, database, and camera encompass generic components.
See, e.g., Spec. Fig. 2, ¶¶ 32–39, 43. Simply programming a general-purpose
computer to perform abstract ideas does not integrate those ideas into a
practical application. See MPEP § 2106.04 (identifying merely including
instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer as an example of
when an abstract idea has not been integrated into a practical application).
In addition, to “store the first image in a first record of the database”
is considered insignificant post-solution activity, given the database’s high
level of generality and context in the claimed invention. With its high level
of generality and context in the claimed invention, the recited storage
function is insignificant post-solution activity.
We are not persuaded that the claimed invention improves the
computer or its components’ functionality or efficiency, or otherwise
changes the way those devices function, in the sense contemplated by the
Federal Circuit in Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corporation, 822 F.3d 1327
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(Fed. Cir. 2016), despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal Br.
9; Reply Br. 2). The claimed self-referential table in Enfish was a specific
type of data structure designed to improve the way a computer stores and
retrieves data in memory. Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1339. To the extent Appellant
contends that the claimed invention uses such a data structure to improve a
computer’s functionality or efficiency, or otherwise change the way that
device functions, there is no persuasive evidence on this record to
substantiate such a contention.
Nor is this invention analogous to the invention the court held patent-
eligible in McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America, Inc., 837 F.3d
1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) despite Appellant’s arguments to the contrary (Appeal
Br. 12). There, the claimed process used a combined order of specific rules
that rendered information in a specific format that was applied to create a
sequence of synchronized, animated characters. McRO, 837 F.3d at 1315.
Notably, the recited process automatically animated characters using
particular information and techniques—an improvement over manual three-
dimensional animation techniques that was not directed to an abstract idea.
Id. at 1316.
But unlike the claimed invention in McRO that improved how the
physical display operated to produce better quality images, the claimed
invention here merely uses generic computing components to receive a
request to check-in a first item of baggage and to capture and store an image.
This generic computer implementation is not only directed to a mental
process, but also does not improve a display mechanism as was the case in
McRO or make an improvement in an analogous way. See SAP Am., Inc. v.
InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (distinguishing
McRO).
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Appellant’s reliance on BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v.
AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 18–19) is
likewise unavailing. There, the court held eligible claims directed to a
technology-based solution to filter Internet content that overcame existing
problems with other Internet filtering systems by making a known filtering
solution—namely a “one-size-fits-all” filter at an Internet Service Provider
(“ISP”)—more dynamic and efficient via individualized filtering at the ISP.
BASCOM, 827 F.3d at 1351. This customizable filtering solution improved
the computer system’s performance and, therefore, was patent-eligible. See
id. Unlike the filtering system improvements in BASCOM that added
significantly more to the abstract idea in that case, the claimed invention
here uses generic computing components to implement an abstract idea, as
explained previously.
Thus, we conclude that the claims do not integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application. The claims do not (1) improve the
functioning of a computer or other technology, (2) are not applied with any
particular machine (except for a generic computer), (3) do not effect a
transformation of a particular article to a different state, and (4) are not
applied in any meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment, such that the
claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
exception. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). We, therefore, agree with
the Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea.
Inventive Concept
Because we determine claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
consider whether claim 1 recites an “inventive concept.” The Examiner
determined claim 1 does not recite an inventive concept. See Ans. 6–7.
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We agree with the Examiner’s determination. As noted above, the claimed
invention merely uses generic computing components to implement the
recited abstract idea. The additional elements recited in the claim include the
“one or more processors,” a “memory,” “a database and program code,” and
a “first camera.” The claim recites these elements at a high level of
generality, and the written description indicates that these elements are
generic computer components. See, e.g., Spec. Fig. 2, ¶¶ 32–39, 43. Using
generic computer components to perform abstract ideas does not provide the
necessary inventive concept. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere
recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract
idea into a patent-eligible invention.”). Thus, these elements, taken
individually or together, do not amount to “significantly more” than the
abstract ideas themselves.
Appellant contends that various elements recited in the claim provide
the necessary inventive concept. See Appeal Br. 18–19. But these elements
form part of the recited abstract ideas and thus are not “additional elements”
that “‘transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 217 (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 78); see also BSG Tech
LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (explaining
the Alice “Court only assessed whether the claim limitations other than the
invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was directed were well-
understood, routine and conventional” and “did not consider whether it was
well-understood, routine, and conventional to execute the claimed
intermediated settlement method on a generic computer”) (emphasis added).
Rather, the recited (1) processing unit; and (2) display are the additional
recited elements whose generic computing functionality is well-understood,
routine, and conventional. See Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Capital One
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Bank (USA), 792 F.3d 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that a recited user
profile, database, and communication medium are generic computer
elements); Mortgage Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d
1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that components such an “interface,”
“network,” and “database” are generic computer components that do not
satisfy the inventive concept requirement). Accord Ans. 4 (Concluding that
the claims’ additional generic computer components do not add significantly
more than the abstract idea.). Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us
claim 1 is “directed to” a patent-eligible concept.
Accordingly, we sustain the § 101 rejection of representative claim 1,
as well as claims 2–15, and 17–23, grouped therewith.

Obviousness Rejections
We are not persuaded of error in the Examiner’s rejections under 35
U.S.C. § 103. As a preliminary matter, we note that claim 1 stands rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over various combinations of references,
as detailed above and in the Final Office Action. See Final Act. 8–41.
Appellant disputes only certain rejections. See Appeal Br. 20–24. Only those
arguments actually made by Appellant have been considered in this decision.
Arguments which Appellant could have made but chose not to make in the
Briefs have not been considered.
First, Appellant argues that Wilke does not teach or suggest receiving
a request to check-in an item of baggage. Appeal Br. 20. In particular,
Appellant argues Wilke’s luggage item identifier is printed onto a physical
label that is attached to the luggage as part of the check-in process, and
therefore lacks relevancy to receiving a request to check-in. Id.
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The Examiner finds that Wilke teaches that an air passenger checks in
luggage items at a check-in desk at an airport. Ans. 8 (citing Wilke ¶ 40).
The Examiner finds that there is a request for check-in at the check-in desk,
where reading the luggage item identifier at the check-in desk teaches
receiving a request for check-in because after reading the identifier of the
luggage item, other information related to the luggage and the flight are
generated. Id.
Appellant also argues that Wilke does not teach or suggest capturing
an image depicting an exterior surface of an item of baggage, in response to
receiving a request to check-in that baggage. Appeal Br. 21. In particular,
Appellant argues that “[i]f Wilke takes images of luggage after the storage
medium is attached to the luggage – as part of the check-in process – those
images cannot be taken in response to receiving a request to check-in. Other
images taken by Wilke likewise occur after the luggage is checked in, such
as when the luggage is being screened. . . .” Id. We are not persuaded by this
argument because as the Examiner explains, Wilke’s data record is
complemented by images. Ans. 9. Moreover, Appellant does not show that
the Specification or claims limit “capturing” in a way that, under a broad but
reasonable interpretation, is not encompassed by Wilke’s image of the
luggage. See Ans. 9 (citing Wilke ¶¶ 52, 53, 55). Additionally, although
Appellant argues that the images in Wilke occur “after” the luggage is
checked in, Wilke teaches that the images “are produced while the luggage
item is being weighed.” Wilke ¶ 53.
Appellant argues Wilke does not teach or suggest storing an image
depicting an exterior surface of an item of baggage in a record of a database
for that item of baggage. Appeal Br. 21–22. Appellant argues that in Wilke,
“images of a luggage item are contained in a record for a transportation
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process – not a record for the luggage item.” Id. Yet, the Examiner finds the
stored image is a record for the item of baggage. Ans. 9 (citing Wilke ¶ 4,
Abstract). Moreover, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that McClelland
teaches storing a first image in a first record of a database for a first item of
baggage (see Ans. 10 (citing McClelland ¶¶ 8–10, 64)), a finding which
Appellant does not dispute. See Appeal Br. 20–24. Nor does Appellant argue
against the combinability of the references.
In the absence of sufficient evidence or line of technical reasoning to
the contrary, we find no reversible error in the Examiner’s obviousness
rejections of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejection of
claim 1.
We also sustain the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 2–15
and 17–23. Despite nominally arguing these claims separately, Appellant
reiterates similar arguments made in connection with claim 1, and alleges
that the additional cited prior art fails to cure those purported deficiencies.
Appeal Br. 24. We are not persuaded by these arguments for the reasons
previously discussed.

CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claim(s)
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–15, 17–23 101 Eligibility 1–15, 17–23
1, 7, 20 103 Wilke 1, 7, 20
1, 2, 7, 8,
17, 20
103 Wilke, McClelland 1, 2, 7, 8,
17, 20

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1 103 Wilke, Rayner 1
3, 9 103 Wilke,
McClelland,
Kawamura
3, 9
4–6, 10–12,
13, 19, 21,
22
103 Wilke,
McClelland, Baheti
4–6, 10–12,
13, 19, 21,
22

14, 15 103 Wilke,
McClelland,
McQueen
14, 15
18 103 Wilke,
McClelland,
Vercollone
18
23 103 Wilke,
McClelland,
Dinkelmann
23
Overall
Outcome:
1–15, 17–23

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED