Alok Mehta

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 2, 2019

13428557 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/428,557 03/23/2012 Alok Mehta 006591.00330 5995
71823 7590 08/02/2019
BANNER & WITCOFF , LTD
ATTORNEYS FOR CLIENT NUMBER 006591
71 SOUTH WACKER DR.
SUITE 3600
CHICAGO, IL 60606
EXAMINER
KAZIMI, HANI M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3691
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTO-71823@bannerwitcoff.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALOK MEHTA
____________

Appeal 2018-006001
Application 13/428,557
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ERIC B. CHEN, HUNG H. BUI, and MICHAEL M. BARRY,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–9, 21, 25, 27, and 30, which are all the pending
claims.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellant identifies Allstate Insurance Company as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
2 The Final Office Action mailed Dec. 30, 2016 (“Final Act.”) rejected then-
pending claims 1–10, 16–18, and 20–36. Final Act. 1. After filing the
Appeal Brief on May 30, 2017 (“App. Br.”) and contemporaneous with
filing the Reply Brief on January 29, 2018 (“Reply Br.”), Appellant filed an
amendment to cancel claims 10, 16–18, 20, 22–24, 26, 28, 29, and 31–36.
The Examiner entered the amendment in an advisory action mailed April 27,
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Introduction
Appellant explains that “[w]ith emerging technologies and
communication channels, the ease with which financial coverage may be
obtained has improved significantly,” but “some may still have a perception
that obtaining insurance is a long and tedious process that requires
significant effort.” Spec. ¶ 1.
For example, a user may be required to download multiple
documents, complete forms and submit the information for
approval, all of which may take a substantial amount of time.
Additionally, current processes may require a user to maintain
many documents, either physical or electronic, and locate the
appropriate documents through various databases or websites.
Moreover, many insurance coverage processes require the
user to wait to receive a final confirmation of coverage including
a final cost. This wait is due to the need to engage in an
underwriting process that may require significant amounts of
time to complete. In cases where a user wishes to obtain
immediate coverage, such a process may represent unacceptable
delays. In view of the foregoing, improving the accessibility,
speed and mobility of acquiring financial product coverage is
thus needed.
Id. ¶¶ 1–2 (emphasis added). Claim 1 is illustrative, shown here with
technological elements emphasized in italics:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by an insurance-product system having at least
one processor, information regarding at least one individual;
determining, by the insurance-product system, at least one
type of insurance product matching an insurance need of the at
least one individual;

2018. We also refer herein to the Examiner’s Answer mailed November 27,
2017 (“Ans.”) and Appellant’s Specification filed March 23, 2012 (“Spec.”).
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identifying, by the insurance-product system, a computer-
executable insurance-product application from a plurality of
computer-executable insurance-product applications based on
the determined at least one type of insurance product, wherein
each of the plurality of computer-executable insurance-product
applications corresponds to a distinct one of a plurality of
insurance-product types; and
providing, by the insurance-product system, the computer-
executable insurance-product application for download to a
mobile communication device.
App Br. 44 (Claims App’x).
The Pending Rejection
The Examiner rejected claims 1–9, 21, 25, 27, and 30 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as ineligibly directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 2–4; see also
Ans. 4–10.3
ANALYSIS
Appellant argues the independent claims together as a group. App.
Br. 35–42. We select claim 1 as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellant’s
contentions of reversible error. We disagree with Appellant’s conclusions.
Instead, as consistent with our discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s
findings and reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this
appeal is taken and as set forth in the Answer. We highlight the following
for emphasis.

3 In response to Appellant’s arguments in the Appeal Brief, the Examiner’s
Answer withdraws the Final Actions’ rejections of claims 1–10, 16–18, and
20–36 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). See Ans. 3 and supra note 2.
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§ 101 General Legal Framework and the USPTO Guidance
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus
Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework,
we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573
U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent
ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as
fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S.
at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95
(1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69
(1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and
chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” in Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
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elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In early 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the application
of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look,
in step one of the Alice/Mayo analysis, to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (“prong one”); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (“prong two”) (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–
(c), (e)–(h)).4
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52, 55–56. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds “significantly more”
under step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, i.e., whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
are not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.

4 All references to the MPEP are to the 9th Ed, Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
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See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Alice/Mayo Step One, Guidance Step 2A, Prong One
(Does Claim 1 Recite a Patent-Ineligible Concept?)
Under the prong one of the Guidance, we determine whether claim 1
recites a patent-ineligible concept. It does. The first three steps of claim 1
recite “receiving . . . information regarding at least one individual,”
“determining . . . at least one type of insurance product matching an
insurance need of the at least one individual,” and “identifying . . . [an]
insurance-product application5 from a plurality of . . . insurance-product
applications based on the determined at least one type of insurance product,
wherein each of the plurality of . . . insurance-product applications
corresponds to a distinct one of a plurality of insurance-product types.”
These limitations describe identifying an insurance product application
based on an individual’s insurance requirement. Determining an insurance
product application based on individual’s need for insurance, as recited in
claim 1, is a fundamental economic practice which, as the Guidance
explains, constitutes one of certain methods of organizing human activity
that the courts have deemed abstract and, thus, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed.

5 Claim 1 recites “insurance-product application” and the Specification
describes an “insurance product application” (i.e., without hyphenation).
Spec. ¶¶ 30, 45. At this stage of our analysis, in view of the plain meaning
of the terms and Appellant’s Specification, we consider that an “insurance-
product application,” i.e., without the “computer-executable” qualifier,
encompasses a process for applying for an insurance product, which is an
activity that humans can perform (using only pen and paper). This is
consistent with how the Specification describes insurance product
applications. Spec. ¶ 44 (explaining such applications “generate contracts,
determine/recommend coverages, perform underwriting and the like).
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Reg. at 52 (specifically identifying insurance as a sub-category of
fundamental economic principles or practices).
Claim 1 also recites steps that may be performed in the human mind.
In particular, the first three steps encompass longstanding basic, activities of
insurance agents, such as (1) asking a customer (actual or prospective) for
basic information, such as about car and property ownership, (2) realizing
the customer may require a certain type of offered insurance products (e.g.,
car insurance, homeowners insurance, etc.), and (3) deciding which of the
agent’s multiple available application processes are appropriate for the
customer in order to apply for the needed and offered insurance product(s).
Thus, as the Guidance explains, claim 1 also recites mental processes and,
thus, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Accordingly, because claim 1 recites a judicial exception, we proceed
to the second prong of step 2A of the Guidance, in which we consider if the
claims integrate the recited exception into a practical application. See 84
Fed. Reg. at 54.
Alice/Mayo Step One, Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two
(Does Claim 1 Integrate the Abstract Idea into a Practical Application?)
To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those
elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (emphasis added);
see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, claim 1 recites limitations for a “processor,” for insurance
product applications to be “computer-executable,” and for the identified
application to be “for download to a mobile communication device.” The
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following three steps from claim 1 illustrate how claim 1 combines the
limitations reciting the judicial exception these three high-level technology
limitations (shown in italics):
receiving, by an insurance-product system having at least
one processor, information regarding at least one individual;
identifying, by the insurance-product system, a computer-
executable insurance-product application from a plurality of
computer-executable insurance-product applications based on
the determined at least one type of insurance product, wherein
each of the plurality of computer-executable insurance-product
applications corresponds to a distinct one of a plurality of
insurance-product types; and
providing, by the insurance-product system, the computer-
executable insurance-product application for download to a
mobile communication device.
These computerization-type limitations add some specificity to the
claim, but none of them serves to improve a technology or technical field.
Instead, the technological recitations constitute routine uses of computer and
mobile device technology, in order to automate the underlying method of
determining an insurance product that matches an insurance need of an
individual. Thus, they do not constitute an improvement to “the functioning
of the computer itself” or “‘any other technology or technical field.’” See
MPEP § 2106.05(a) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). Neither do these
limitations qualify as applying the judicial exception with “a particular
machine,” because these recited technological components provide their
conventional functions and require no more than general purpose equipment.
See MPEP § 2106.05(b); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d
709,716–17 (Fed. Cir. 2014); SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601
F.3d 1319, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“In order for the addition of a machine to
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impose a meaningful limit on the scope of a claim, it must play a significant
part in permitting the claimed method to be performed, rather than function
solely as an obvious mechanism for permitting a solution to be achieved
more quickly.”).
Thus, these uses of device limitations for implementing the abstract
idea do not serve to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
The Supreme Court has “rejected the argument that ‘implementing a
principle in some specific fashion’ will ‘automatically fall within the
patentable subject matter of § 101.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 222 (quoting Flook,
437 U.S. at 593) (brackets omitted). The claims do not effect a particular
transformation of the recited articles, which are simply used for their
ordinary purposes, or that it adds any other meaningful (technological)
limitations, i.e., limitations beyond simply “linking the use” of the abstract
idea to generic technology. See MPEP § 2106.05 (c), (e)–(f); see also id. at
(g)–(h) (use of well-known limitations beyond the judicially excepted matter
constitutes “insignificant extra-solution activity” (g) and claim limitations
“merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in which to
apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more” (h)).
The Federal Circuit routinely determines claims that recite basic
computerization technology to automate performance of abstract ideas, such
as insurance-related processing, to be ineligible under § 101. See, e.g.,
Bancorp Services, L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assur. Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d
1266, 1270–72, 1277–80, (Fed. Cir. 2012) (determining claims to automate
management of life insurance policies to be patent-ineligible); see also
FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Systems, Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir.
2016) (determining claims ineligible in which general-purpose computer
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technology increased the speed and efficiency of the underlying abstract
idea).
Appellant contends the Examiner’s determination of the abstract idea
is “untethered from the language” of claim 1, which is “directed to a process
designed to achieve an improved technological result in the operation of the
computer itself.” App. Br. 36 (quoting Enfish6), 37. This argument is
unpersuasive. Certainly, we must not oversimplify claims by disregarding
their specific requirements. McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016); see also Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337. As
our prong one analysis above illustrates, however, the steps of claim 1
explicitly recites limitations that describe a process for identifying an
insurance product application based on an individual’s insurance need, and
otherwise includes only high-level computerization limitations. Thus the
identified abstract idea is tethered to the claim language. McRO, 837 F.3d at
1313; Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1337.
Appellant does not persuade us that claim 1 is similar to the claims
issue in cases such as Enfish, McRO, Finjan,7 and DDR Holdings.8 See
App. Br. 38–42 and Reply Br. 4–8.9 Claim 1 is inapposite to the claims at
issue in all of those cases. For example, whereas claim 1 recites high-level
computer limitations in support of a business method, the claims at issue in
Enfish, which did not recite any business method limitations, instead focused
on relational database technology, reciting a “self-referential table” that

6 Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
7 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
8 DDR Holdings, LLC v. Hotels.com, L.P., 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
9 The Reply Brief focuses primarily on claim 21, which we discuss below.
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provided specific technological advantages over the prior art. See Enfish,
822 F.3d at 1330–33, 1336–37. Similarly, the claim at issue in McRO
“focused on specific asserted improvement in computer animation.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314. Unlike claim 1’s high-level recitations of generic
technology the claim at issue in McRO “focused on a specific asserted
improvement in computer animation.” Id. at 1316.
The claim at issue in Finjan was “directed to a method of providing
computer security by scanning a downloadable and attaching the results of
that scan to the downloadable itself in the form of a ‘security profile.’”
Finjan, 879 F.3d at 1303. All recited steps of the claim at issue in Finjan
included limitations that processed “a Downloadable” in order to provide a
technological improvement in the use of security technology on the web for
handling suspicious code in the Downloadable. Id. Appellant’s claim 1, by
comparison, includes a “download” limitation as a general computer means
to send a “computer-executable” insurance application to a mobile device.
A computer-executable insurance product application is simply the routine
automation of the otherwise abstract idea of applying for an insurance
product. See supra note 5. Thus, claim 1’s recited step of “providing, by the
insurance-product system, the computer-executable insurance-product
application for download to a mobile communication device” does not serve
to integrate the abstract idea into a practical application.
Appellant’s reliance on DDR Holdings is similarly unavailing. The
patent-eligible claims in DDR Holdings recited a solution directed to
Internet technology “that overrides the routine and conventional sequence of
events ordinarily triggered by the click of a hyperlink.” DDR Holdings,
773 F.3d at 1258; see also id. at 1257 (explaining the claims at issue were
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“necessarily rooted in computer technology”). Appellant’s claim 1 does not
arise from a challenge with Internet technology—it uses basic computer
technology to address a need for “improving the accessibility, speed and
mobility of acquiring financial product coverage.” Spec ¶ 2.
Thus, unlike the patent-eligible claims in cases such as Enfish, McRO,
Finjan, and DDR Holdings, Appellant’s claim 1 simply uses technology for
its ordinary purposes in providing a solution directed to a business problem,
i.e., it does not recite a solution directed to technological problem.
Accordingly, because the recited judicial exception (abstract idea) is
not integrated into a practical application, in accordance with the Guidance,
claim 1 is directed to that judicial exception (abstract idea). See 84 Fed.
Reg. at 54 (“If the additional elements do not integrate the exception into a
practical application, then the claim is directed to the judicial exception.”).
Thus, we proceed to step two of the Alice/ Mayo analysis (step 2B of the
Guidance). Id.
Alice/Mayo Step Two; Guidance Step 2B
In step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we consider whether there are
additional limitations that, individually or as an ordered combination, ensure
the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73, 77–79). As stated in the
Guidance, many of the considerations to determine whether the claims
amount to “significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are
already considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has
been integrated into a practical application. Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56.
Thus, at this point of our analysis, we determine if the independent claims
add a specific limitation, or combination of limitations, that is not well-
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understood, routine, conventional activity in the field; or whether, in
addition to the recited judicial exception, they recite only well-understood,
routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. Id.
Here, Appellant’s claims do not recite specific limitations (or a
combination of limitations) that are beyond what was well-understood,
routine, and conventional. Here, the Examiner finds, and we agree, that
beyond the recited limitations for the judicial exception, the technological
limitations recited in the independent claims constitute routine use of
technology that was well known to those of ordinary skill prior to the
invention. Final Act. 4; see also Ans. 9–12. Appellant’s Specification
confirms this by its disclosure of the claimed technological features at a
generic level. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 19–21 (cited at Ans. 10), 44–45 (describing
the computer-executable insurance product applications functionally, with
no specific details for how they are implemented). There is no discussion of
any special functionality or considerations for a technological aspect of any
technological component recited in the independent claims.
We disagree with Appellant that claim 1 recites significantly more
than an abstract idea because the recited “downloadable mobile-device
applications are not ‘some business practice known from the pre-Internet
world.’” App. Br. 40 (citing DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1257); see also
Reply Br. 7–8. Including a requirement to download a “computer-
executable” insurance product application does not solve a problem arising
from the Internet; rather, it constitutes routine use of technology to automate
the business method functionality involved in the application for an
insurance product.
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We also disagree with Appellant that claim 1 recites significantly
more in a manner similar to Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016). App. Br. 40–42. The patent
in Bascom described a particular arrangement of Internet server filtering
software that enables individually customizable filtering at a remote ISP
server by taking advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to
identify individual accounts and associate a request for Internet content with
a specific individual account. Bascom ’606 patent, 4:35–38. The Federal
Circuit recognized that Bascom’s installation of an Internet content filter at a
particular network location is “a technical improvement over prior art ways
of filtering such content” that advantageously allows the Internet content
filter to have “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the
benefits of a filter on the ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to
customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” There is no
evidence in the record to support the contention that Appellant’s claimed
system provides a similar technical solution through an unconventional
arrangement of technological components in a manner similar to Bascom.
Claim 1 Conclusion
Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error in the
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Independent Claim 21
In the Appeal Brief, Appellant presents no arguments for claim 21
separate from the arguments for claim 1. See App. Br. 3–42. In the Reply
Brief, however, Appellant presents new arguments for why the Examiner
erred the § 101 rejection of claim 21. See Reply Br. 3–7. Appellant
provides no explanation for not raising this argument in the Appeal Brief,
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such as a new point in the Examiner’s Answer or any other circumstance
constituting “good cause” that justifies this new argument. Thus, we find
this argument untimely and waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2); see also
Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1473–74 (BPAI 2010). Moreover,
regardless, as explain below, with reference to our analysis for claim 1, these
new claim 21 arguments are unpersuasive.
Claim 21, Guidance Step 2A Prong One Analysis
Claim 21 recites “generat[ing] a [] financial-coverage application
preconfigured for at least one type of financial-coverage product,”
“provid[ing] the [] financial-coverage application,” and “wherein the []
financial-coverage application is specific to a financial-product type and a
financial-coverage level.” App. Br. 47 (Claims App’x). These limitations
describe generating and providing a preconfigured financial-coverage
product application, which is considered, according to the Guidance, a type
of fundamental economic practice and, thus, an abstract idea. See 84 Fed.
Reg. at 52. For the same reasons discussed above for claim 1, claim 21 also
recites an abstract idea in the category of a mental process. Id.
Claim 21, Guidance Step 2A Prong Two and Alice/Mayo Step Two Analysis
In addition to the foregoing abstract idea, claim 21 recites
technological imitations for “non-transitory computer-readable media
comprising computer-readable instructions” (in the preamble), for a
financial-coverage application to be “computer-executable,” for “a contract-
generation module and an underwriting interface,”10 and for retrieving the

10 The recitation of a “module” for contract generation essentially claims
any software implementation of the fundamental economic practice of
contract generation, and the recitation of an “interface” for underwriting
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financial coverage application “through an application marketplace.” App.
Br. 47 (Claims App’x). All of these limitations constitute high-level,
functionally recited technology requirements. Claim 21 combines the
limitations reciting the judicial exception these technology limitations
(shown in italics) as follows:
generate a computer-executable financial-coverage
application pre-configured for at least one type of financial-
coverage product, wherein generating the computer-executable
financial-coverage application comprises configuring a contract-
generation module and an underwriting interface of the
computer-executable financial-coverage application; and
provide the computer-executable financial-coverage
application for retrieval by one or more users through an
application marketplace,
wherein the computer-executable financial-coverage
application is specific to a financial-product type and a financial-
coverage level.
Id.
For the same reasons discussed above in our analysis of claim 1 under
prong two of the Guidance and step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we
determine these high-level technological limitations, considered alone and in
combination, neither integrate the recited abstract idea into a practical
application (under prong two of the Guidance) nor recite significantly more
than the abstract idea (under step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis).

essentially claims any software interface for underwriting, which similarly is
a fundamental economic practice. Modules and interfaces are basic, high-
level, generic technological building blocks for computerization.
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Claim 21 Conclusion
Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us of Examiner error in the
rejection of claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
The Dependent Claims
Appellant contends the Examiner errs in rejecting the dependent
claims as follows:
The Examiner does not provide any detailed discussion of
any claim other than claim 1 the 101 rejection. See Office
Action, 3-4, 21. Nevertheless, claims 2-10, 16-18, and 20-36,
are also patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, at least because
they are not directed to an abstract idea-much less the abstract
idea alleged by the examiner and furthermore recite significantly
more than the abstract idea alleged by the examiner. Therefore,
the rejections under 35 U.S.C. § 101 should be reversed, and are
appealed on at least this reasoning.
App. Br. 42.
The Examiner responds:
[The] dependent claims do not include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the
judicial exception because the additional elements are simply
steps performed by a generic computer. Examiner respectfully
disagrees. It is not clear what computer technology problem the
claims are intended to solve. Determining an insurance product
matching an insurance need of an individual and identifying an
insurance product application for download to a mobile device is
not considered a technological solution to a technological
problem. The claims merely amount to the application or
instructions to apply the abstract idea on a processor, and is
considered to amount to nothing more than requiring a generic
processor to merely carry out the abstract idea itself.
Ans. 12.
Appellant’s Reply brief provides no further argument regarding the
dependent claims. See Reply Br. passim. We have reviewed the pending
Appeal 2018-006001
Application 13/428,557

18
dependent claims and, on the record before us, do not identify any reversible
error by the Examiner in their rejection.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of reversible
error in the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–9, 21, 25, 27, and 30 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
DECISION
We affirm the rejection of claims 1–9, 21, 25, 27, and 30 under 35
U.S.C. § 101.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED