Alma B. Hinton, Appellant,v.Togo D. West Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 14, 1999
01972714 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 14, 1999)

01972714

09-14-1999

Alma B. Hinton, Appellant, v. Togo D. West Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs,) Agency.


Alma B. Hinton, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01972714

v. ) Agency Nos. 95-1178, 1179, 1482

) 1865, 96-0002, 0687

) Hearing Nos.110-96-8165X, 8166X

Togo D. West Jr., ) 8167X, 8168X, 8169X,

Secretary, ) 8271X

Department of Veterans Affairs,)

Agency. )

)

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination on the bases of reprisal (prior EEO activity),

and age (55), in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; and the Age Discrimination in

Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues on appeal were defined by the AJ as follows:

Whether appellant was a victim of discrimination on the bases of reprisal

and in some incidents (as specifically noted below) on the basis of

age when:

(1) she received a memorandum concerning her blood collection on or

about January 20, 1995;

(2) she received an interim performance appraisal on February 2, 1995;

(3) her second line supervisor (S2) spoke to her in an aggressive manner;

(4) the agency charged appellant with being absent without leave (AWOL)

on February 16 and 17, 1995;

(5) appellant was issued a proposed 14-day suspension on March 10, 1995;

(6) appellant was given less duty hours than other part-time employees

and was not trained for advancement;

(7) appellant was issued a counseling letter concerning her sick leave

usage on July 31, 1995;

(8) appellant was reassigned to the agency's Uptown facility during or

about November 1995; and

(9) appellant alleges that she was subjected to a hostile work environment

on almost a daily basis to include the following dates: May 10, 16-19,

and June 1, and 7, 1995; October 3, 1994, until July 6, 1995, September 8,

1995, until December 6, 1995. Appellant also alleged age discrimination

as a basis regarding this claim.

BACK GROUND

During the time her complaints arose, appellant was a veteran with

over twenty years employment with the federal government. She held

a part-time, GS-4 position as a phlebotomist.<1> Appellant filed six

separate complaints alleging discrimination as set forth above under

�Issues Presented.� All six complaints were consolidated. At the

conclusion of the investigation, appellant requested a hearing before an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge (AJ).

A hearing was held on July 10, October 30, 31, and November 1, 1996.

On January 7, 1997, the AJ issued a recommended bench decision finding

no discrimination. Subsequently, on January 31, 1997, the agency issued

a FAD concurring with the AJ and adopting the recommended decision as

its own.

In his RD, the AJ found that appellant established a prima facie case

of reprisal discrimination but failed to establish an inference of age

discrimination. The AJ further found that the agency rebutted appellant's

prima facie case of discrimination. Specifically, regarding the January

20, 1995, memorandum, appellant's supervisor explained that usually she

would verbally counsel a phlebotomist but because of appellant's history

of disruption, when the supervisor attempted to counsel appellant,

she believed it was necessary to issue a written memorandum instead.

Regarding the appraisal, the AJ noted that the appraisal was fully

successful and that the preponderance of the testimony concerning this

incident was that appellant created a commotion. Furthermore, the Chief

denied appellant's assault allegations and explained that he came near

appellant in order to retrieve her appraisal. All agency officials and

co-workers denied harassing appellant. Moreover, the AJ concluded that

other than appellant's testimony there was no evidence indicating that

a hostile work environment or ongoing harassment took place as alleged

by appellant.

Regarding appellant's AWOL charge, agency officials explained that it

was the agency's policy to charge employees AWOL when they were in jail.

The AJ also noted contrary to appellant's contentions, that the record

showed that appellant received training. Also, agency officials testified

that appellant received the March 10, 1995 proposed suspension because

of her misconduct during the issuance of her performance appraisal on

February 2, 1995. According to the record, appellant was issued her

performance appraisal on February 2, 1995. Subsequently, appellant's

discussion with her supervisor regarding appellant's appraisal resulted

into a verbal altercation. Thereafter, appellant refused to return her

appraisal (signed) to her supervisor.

Regarding appellant's sick leave certification, agency officials testified

that appellant was abusing her sick leave by being sick near holidays and

weekend periods. The AJ noted that appellant's own testimony corroborated

the agency's representation of her sick leave usage.

According to the record, appellant was reassigned because the Resident

Support Team took over phlebotomist duties in the morning. Moreover,

the reassignment proved beneficial to appellant because it reduced or

eliminated her having to work a split shift. Finally, agency officials

testified that appellant was allowed to work as much overtime as other

employees and that a list or note was placed in a conspicuous place when

an absence made overtime available.

The AJ noted that appellant appeared to have a problem not only in

mis-perceiving testimony but also with understanding the EEO process.

The AJ concluded that appellant's behavior justified the agency's

discipline. He further noted that there were no inconsistencies or

contradictions apparent with respect to the testimony provided by agency

officials. Therefore, the AJ concluded that appellant did not prove,

by a preponderance of the evidence, that she was discriminated against

as alleged.

After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the

AJ's RD summarized the relevant facts and referenced the appropriate

regulations, policies, and laws. We find, as did the AJ, that the

agency rebutted any prima facie case appellant may have established

by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for all of

its actions. We further agree, that appellant failed to show that the

explanations provided regarding her discipline was pretext for unlawful

discrimination. Moreover, we note that the gist of appellant's complaint

is that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. It appears that

the incidents set forth in her complaint were examples of the ongoing

harassment that appellant alleges she suffered from agency officials

and co-workers. We find as did the AJ that the record does not support

appellant's contentions. While it is clear that appellant�s relationship

with her co-workers and supervisors was tainted with problems, the record

does not support a finding that appellant was subjected to adverse acts

that were severe or pervasive enough as to constitute a hostile work

environment. Moreover, the evidence supports the agency's contentions

that appellant's behavior was the reason she received memoranda from

her supervisor. Also, appellant received a suspension and restrictions

on her sick leave usage because her behavior also warranted this form

of discipline. We find that appellant's voluminous statement on appeal

offered no new or persuasive evidence in support of her contentions.

Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb the AJ's findings of no

discrimination which were based on a detailed assessment of the record.

Accordingly, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in the

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your civil action is

considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision or to consult an attorney

concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction in which your

action would be filed. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE

DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD

OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND

OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file

a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

9/14/99

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations1 Phlebotomists draw

blood from individuals.