Alltel Kentucky Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Mar 28, 2005

09-CB-011065 (N.L.R.B. Mar. 28, 2005)

JD-22-05
Lexington, KY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
DIVISION OF JUDGES

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF
AMERICA, LOCAL 3372, AFL-CIO
(Alltel Kentucky, Inc.)

and Case 9-CB-11065

BRADY J. BROOKS, An Individual

Johathan D. Duffey, Esq., for the General Counsel
William C. Moul, Esq., for the Charging Party
John L. Quinn, Esq., for the Respondent

DECISION

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Jane Vandeventer, Administrative Law Judge. This case was tried on October 19,
2004, in Cincinnati, Ohio. The complaint alleges Respondent Union (herein also called
Respondent or the Union) violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by imposing internal
fines on four employees who crossed a picket line and worked during a strike after
having resigned from Respondent. The complaint also alleges Respondent violated
Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by maintaining in its collective bargaining agreement with
Alltel Kentucky, Inc., the Employer, a provision describing registered mail as the method
by which employees shall resign from the Union.1 The Respondent filed an answer
denying the essential allegations in the complaint. After the conclusion of the evidence,
the parties presented oral arguments which I have considered.

Based on the testimony of the witnesses, including particularly my observation of
their demeanor while testifying, the documentary evidence, and the entire record, I make
the following

1 This allegation was amended into the complaint at the trial herein. Furthermore, it was
stipulated at the trial that the General Counsel sought a remedy prohibiting the enforcement of the fines, but
did not seek as a remedy any costs or attorney fees associated with the internal union proceedings or the
Board proceedings.
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FINDINGS OF FACT

I. JURISDICTION

The Employer is a corporation with an office and place of business in Lexington,
Kentucky, where it is engaged in the provision of telephone and communications services
to retail and business customers in the Lexington, Kentucky, area and surrounding
counties. During a representative one-year period, Respondent sold and provided from
its Lexington, Kentucky, facility services valued in excess of $50,000 directly to points
outside the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Accordingly, I find, as Respondent admits, that
the Employer is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.

The Respondent is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.

II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

A. The Facts

1. Background

The Employer provides telephone services in Lexington, Kentucky and the
surrounding areas. Respondent represents some 270 employees of the Employer in the
Lexington area, as well as employees at two other employers. The bargaining
relationship with the Employer and its predecessors encompasses many years. There is a
current collective bargaining agreement between the parties according to representations
of counsel, but the collective bargaining agreement itself was not introduced into
evidence.

It is undisputed that Respondent’s local By-Laws and Constitution provide no
explicit guidance or limitation on resignation of members, and that the International
Union’s Constitution, as amended in August 2002, governs membership resignations.
There is no allegation that there is anything unlawful about these provisions.

On June 8, 2003, Respondent began a strike against the Employer with lasted
until a settlement was reached in October 2003. According to undisputed testimony of
Respondent’s president, Michael Garkovich, only about 16 of the 270 bargaining unit
members resigned from Respondent or attempted to resign during the strike, and that of
those, thirteen gave appropriate notice. Respondent made no attempt to fine 12 of those
individuals, as Respondent deemed it had received appropriate resignations from them.
Respondent did assess a fine against one individual, Fred Hill, from whom it received a
resignation, but Respondent now states it was mistaken in so doing, and represented on
the record that it did not seek to enforce a fine against Hill. Respondent contends that the
fines assessed against the other three individuals were valid, as no resignations were
received from them. These three individuals were Brady Brooks, Carl Justice, and
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Timothy Woodall. After the end of the strike, the four named individuals were charged
by Respondent with violating its internal rule against crossing a legitimate picket line
while still members. There is no dispute that the picket line in question was legitimate
and that the strike was a legitimate economic strike. The charges were heard by
Respondent’s Executive Council on January 17, 2004, and all four individuals were
found to have violated the internal rule. They were informed by letter in late January
2004 of the result and of their fines.

2. Fred Hill

The parties stipulated that Fred Hill sent a registered letter to Respondent on June
13, 2003,2 resigning for the Union. It is undisputed that Respondent received Hill’s
resignation on June 16. It is further undisputed that Hill did not return to work until after
Respondent’s receipt of his resignation, on June 17. According to Garkovich, a person
who was assisting in Respondent Union’s office signed the return receipt for the letter,
but failed to record its receipt appropriately. Garkovich became aware in early January
2004 that Hill had indeed sent in a timely resignation, and that Respondent had made an
error. This was because Hill faxed Garkovich a message telling him about his June 2003
resignation, and attaching copies of the letter and the return receipt.

At the Executive Council hearing on the charges in January 2004, Garkovich
stated that Hill had actually resigned in a timely fashion. He did not, however, withdraw
the charge against Hill. Apparently ignoring Garkovich’s statement that Hill had indeed
resigned in a timely fashion, the Union’s committee found Hill in violation of the rule
and fined him along with the other individuals. No further explanation for the failure to
withdraw the charges against Hill and the fine assessed against him was offered by
Respondent. While Respondent, according to its representation at trial, “does not seek to
enforce any fine against” Hill, Respondent, as of the date of the trial herein, still had not
withdrawn the charges and fine against Hill, either orally or in writing.

3. Carl Justice and Timothy Woodall

Carl Justice and Timothy Woodall, two bargaining unit employees, agreed to go
to work together on the morning of June 9, the first morning of the strike that they were
scheduled to work. They arrived at the Employer’s premises and crossed the picket line
without incident. They inquired of their supervisor, Mike Adair, what they should do if
they wanted to go to work. Adair informed them that they should resign their union
memberships and send copies of their resignations to Respondent as well as to the
Employer’s Human Resources department. Justice, Woodall, and Adair all testified that
the two employees wrote out resignations, and Adair sent them both by facsimile
transmission to Respondent’s facsimile (fax) machine number. Adair also sent the
resignations to the Employer’s Human Resources department by the same method. The
two employees did not return to work until this was done.

2 All dates hereafter will be 2003, unless otherwise specified.
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The evidence included copies of the two resignations Adair sent to the Employer,
showing the times and date sent. No receipt or record of the transmissions to
Respondent’s facsimile phone number was printed from the sending facsimile machine at
the time of transmission. Garkovich testified that Respondent did not receive the
facsimile transmissions of these two resignations, despite the fact that it is Respondent’s
normal business practice to keep the facsimile machine turned on at all times and to
check it regularly for incoming data fax transmissions. Both Justice and Woodall were
found to have violated Respondent’s rule, and were informed that they had each been
fined $13,671.76.

4. Brady Brooks

Brady Brooks testified that he typed and signed two identical resignations from
Respondent Union on Sunday evening, June 8, and, along with his brother, John Brooks,
drove to the post office and deposited one of the resignations in the mailbox, retaining the
other resignation. J. Brooks testified that he accompanied his brother to the post office
and, in fact, deposited his own handwritten resignation letter, also by regular mail and
supported his brother Brady’s testimony as to the mailing of B. Brooks’ resignation letter
on Sunday evening.

Both returned to work the following day, Monday, June 9. J. Brooks, however,
went on to say that on Monday, he sent another resignation to the Union by certified mail.
It is undisputed that Respondent Union honored J. Brooks’ resignation. He was never
charged or fined for working during the strike.

B. Brooks further testified that he went to work at the Employer on Monday, June
9, and asked his supervisor, Charles Mateyoke, to fax his resignation letter to the Union.
Mateyoke told him that he couldn’t do it, but gave B. Brooks permission to use the fax
machine himself. According to both B. Brooks’ testimony and Mateyoke’s testimony,
Mateyoke sent B. Brooks to the data fax machine by himself. B. Brooks testified he had
never operated the fax machine before, but that he faxed the resignation to the Union at
its posted fax telephone number. Mateyoke testified that he saw Brooks go into the
adjoining room where the fax machine was located, but that he did not witness anything
B. Brooks did there. Subsequently, Mateyoke himself faxed a copy of B. Brooks’
resignation to the Employer’s Human Resources department (HR). A copy of the faxed
resignation received by the Employer was in evidence.

According to the testimony of Mateyoke, B. Brooks had called him on Sunday,
June 8, and asked what he had to do to come to work on the following day. Mateyoke
testified that he told B. Brooks that he had to fill out some forms, and that he could do
that on Monday morning. Mateyoke stated that he did not tell B. Brooks that he would
have to resign from the Union during the telephone conversation. According to
Mateyoke, the Employer’s policy was that an employee who wished to return to work
during the strike would have to resign from the Union, and submit a copy of his or her
resignation to the Employer.

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On Monday morning, Mateyoke first spoke with J. Brooks, who informed
Mateyoke that he had already sent in a letter of resignation to the Union. Mateyoke
testified that he was given a copy of J. Brooks’ resignation, which he faxed to the
company’s HR office. As noted above, J. Brooks was one of the 12 individuals
Respondent did not fine.

Mateyoke states that after that, when B. Brooks arrived to work on Monday
morning, he asked what he had to do to return to work. Mateyoke told B. Brooks that he
needed a copy of his resignation from the Union. According to Mateyoke, something B.
Brooks said led him to believe that B. Brooks had not yet sent his resignation to the
Union. Mateyoke therefore advised B. Brooks to fax a resignation to the Union. When
B. Brooks requested Mateyoke’s assistance in doing so, Mateyoke told him that he would
have to do it on his own. B. Brooks left Mateyoke’s presence for five or ten minutes.
When he returned, Mateyoke faxed the resignation and a form he himself had filled out to
the Employer’s HR department.

Garkovich testified that Respondent Union did not receive a fax transmission of
B. Brooks’ resignation on June 9, or any other date. On July 17, Respondent notified B.
Brooks by letter that charges had been filed against him for working during the strike
while still a member of Respondent Union. B. Brooks testified that upon receipt of this
letter, he made a copy of his June 8 resignation, and sent it by certified mail, return
receipt requested, to Respondent Union on July 25. There is no dispute that Respondent
Union received this resignation, and treated it as a valid resignation from the time it was
received by the Union in late July. B. Brooks, too, was tried and fined in January 2004
by Respondent Union, but his fine was assessed only through late July, and so was a
lesser amount, $5,600.48.

5. Credibility

With regard to Respondent Union’s witness, Garkovich, I generally credit his
testimony. His demeanor was impressive, and he testified in a careful, conscientious, and
consistent manner.

Witnesses Adair and Mateyoke had no apparent interest in the proceeding, and
may be considered neutral witnesses. The demeanor of each impressed me as credible,
and I have credited their testimony. B. Brooks did not, by his demeanor, appear to be a
credible witness. His testimony was at times hasty and did not appear to be a careful
recitation of facts. His demeanor lacked a sense of the seriousness of the proceedings, at
times approaching flippancy. He was admonished on at least one occasion for speaking
at an inappropriate moment.

I do not credit B. Brooks’ testimony that he mailed a letter of resignation to the
Union on Sunday night. J. Brooks’ support of his brother’s testimony is likewise
discredited. I find that his story of sending one letter of resignation on Sunday night by
regular mail and a second one on Monday morning by certified mail to be incredible as
well as contradictory. There was no reason for J. Brooks to mail two letters of
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resignation on his own behalf within less than 24 hours. His mailing of a letter to the
Union on Monday is corroborated both by Mateyoke’s testimony and by the fact that the
Union apparently received the certified letter. His account of mailing a regular mail
resignation with B. Brooks on Sunday night is not credible in light of these other
demonstrated facts.

In addition, there is no reason Mateyoke, on Monday, June 9, would have treated
J. Brooks and B. Brooks differently if they had indeed both mailed letters of resignation
to the Union on Sunday night. Mateyoke specifically testified that J. Brooks told him
that he had mailed a resignation to the Union, and that he therefore simply sent the
necessary paperwork to the company’s HR office. I find that J. Brooks was referring to
his Monday letter of resignation which is not in controversy. By contrast, B. Brooks did
not tell Mateyoke that he had mailed a resignation to the Union; if he had, Mateyoke
would have followed the same procedure he did with J. Brooks. Mateyoke followed a
different procedure with regard to B. Brooks. He told B. Brooks to go to the room
containing the fax machine and send a resignation by fax before he sent in the
Employer’s paperwork. This difference in Mateyoke’s treatment of the two employees
supports the finding that B. Brooks did not mail in his resignation on Sunday night prior
to returning to work, and did not tell his supervisor that he had done so.

Furthermore, I do not credit B. Brooks’ testimony that he successfully faxed a
letter of resignation to the Union on Monday, June 9. That assertion rests solely on his
own testimony, as no one witnessed his asserted use of the fax machine. I have found
that B. Brooks is not a credible witness, and therefore do not credit his unsupported
assertion that he sent a resignation to the Union by fax on Monday, June 9.

B. Discussion and Analysis

1. The Collective Bargaining Agreement Provision

The allegation concerning the collective bargaining agreement’s restriction on
members’ rights to resign, that resignations must be submitted by registered mail, with a
return receipt requested, to Respondent’s president, was amended into the complaint at
the trial. The proffered complaint amendment purported to quote the language of the
collective bargaining agreement. Respondent Union entered its denial of the proffered
allegation on the record.

While Respondent Union’s counsel stated on the record that “the contract makes
reference to giving notice by Certified mail,” the contract itself was not introduced into
the record.3 In addition, no formal stipulation as to the actual contract language was
offered into evidence. There was no other evidence concerning this allegation adduced at
the trial. Other than the proffered complaint allegation itself, which was denied, there is
no evidence in this record of the specific language of the collective bargaining agreement

3 At another point, counsel for Respondent stated on the record that “the contract says what it
says.”
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which is alleged to be a violation of the Act. Finally, the Employer who is equally a
party to the collective bargaining agreement was not joined in the proceeding in any way.

It is undisputed that Respondent’s Constitution sets forth a less restrictive
requirement for resignation, requiring only that resignations be submitted in writing.
Garkovich’s assertion that Respondent follows the method set forth in the Constitution,
not the requirement set forth in the collective bargaining agreement, was not contradicted.
Garkovich testified that during the strike, Respondent accepted and gave effect to any
written resignation which it received, including hand-delivered resignations and faxed
resignations. There were about twelve of these received and accepted during the strike.
Garkovich testified that the non-recording of Hill’s resignation was Respondent’s
mistake. Garkovich further testified that the faxed resignations of Justice and Woodall
were not received, but had they been received, they would have been given effect. Thus,
it appears that Respondent’s practice was in accord with the lawful procedure contained
in its Constitution, rather than in accord with the overly restrictive formulation in the
collective bargaining agreement alleged as a violation.

In view of the failure of the General Counsel to introduce the collective
bargaining agreement itself, or at least of the actual language of the provision alleged to
violate the Act, I find that the record evidence does not support the allegation, and that no
finding of a violation can be made. I shall recommend that this allegation be dismissed.
In view of the failure of proof, I find it unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the
Employer herein is a necessary party to the finding of a violation based on language in
the collective bargaining agreement.

2. Fred Hill

Board law holds that, while a Union may make and enforce its own internal rules,
it may not fail to accept a proper resignation. The General Counsel has proved, and
Respondent Union has admitted, that Hill duly resigned his membership before returning
to work. The fact that Respondent Union made an error does not excuse its conduct or
nullify its violation of the Act. Furthermore, the fact that Respondent Union stated on the
record that it does not intend to collect the fine it assessed against Hill does not render its
assessment of the fine harmless. I find Respondent Union did violate Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act by assessing a fine against Hill and that it must remedy that violation in the
manner set forth in the Remedy and Order herein. See, e.g., Operating Engineers Local
12 (Associated Engineers), 282 NLRB 1337 (1987); Typographical Union (Register
Publishing), 270 NLRB 1386 (1984).

3. Carl Justice and Timothy Woodall

The situation of Justice and Woodall presents a slightly different question. Justice
and Woodall never sent their resignations by any sort of mail, whether regular mail or
certified mail; neither did they deliver them in person. Their supervisor, Adair, sent their
resignations by fax machine to Respondent Union’s posted fax number. Respondent
Union contends that it never received the faxes of the resignations of Justice and
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Woodall. I have credited Garkovich to this effect. This presents the novel issue of
whether a faxed resignation should be effective when sent, or when – and if – received.
Board law holds that a mailed resignation, whether sent by regular or certified mail, is
effective on the day following the date of its mailing. Furthermore, a resignation which
is delivered in person is effective at the time of its delivery. The issue of the timing of
the effectiveness of a resignation is easy to resolve as to a facsimile transmission, since
the time of its sending and the time of its receipt are normally within moments of one
another.

In view of the practicalities of facsimile machines, such as whether they are
operating properly, whether they are supplied with adequate amounts of paper, and other
such details, the question arises how best to evaluate evidence that a facsimile
transmission was sent, and evidence that it was received. General Counsel cites one case,
Clow Water Systems Co., 317 NLRB 126 (1995), on the treatment of facsimile
transmissions by the Board. It is, unfortunately, not apposite or helpful in the analysis in
this case. The General Counsel argues incorrectly that the cited case holds that a faxed
document must be found to have been received, if it was shown to be sent. In Clow
Water Systems, a fax transmission was found to have been sent based on a transmission
receipt from the sending machine which was introduced into evidence. In addition, the
receipt of the faxed document was not in dispute. In the present case, there is no such
evidence of transmission, and there is a dispute as to whether the faxed documents were
ever received. Although the Employer’s fax machines admittedly had the capability to
produce transmission receipts, none were secured in this case. We do, however, have
other non-documentary evidence concerning the sending of the resignations by fax. In
view of the facts that employees Justice and Woodall witnessed Adair’s operation of the
fax machine, and Adair credibly testified that he had sent the resignations by fax
machine, I find that there is corroborated evidence that the Justice and Woodall
resignations were indeed sent to Respondent Union by data fax.

There is, however, no evidence on the issue of the receipt of the resignations by
Respondent Union. I have found that Garkovich credibly testified that the resignations
were not received by the Union. The question then becomes whether a resignation which
was sent by fax machine, but which was not received, must be given effect by the Union.
To find that Respondent Union violated the Act by not giving effect to the faxed
resignations, even assuming that it did not receive them, may seem to put an undue
burden upon the Union. I find that Respondent Union does have the burden, before
fining a member, of investigation his defenses, at least to the extent of learning that he
had in fact sent a resignation. Such an investigation would have uncovered Adair’s
testimony, which would show that the resignations had, in fact, been sent to Respondent
Union on June 9. In so finding, I draw an analogy to cases dealing with regular mail. On
occasion a letter of resignation sent by regular mail may be lost, but it is still considered
to be an effective resignation. I find that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A)
by failing to give effect to the resignations of Justice and Woodall.

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4. Brady Brooks

I have found that B. Brooks did not resign from the Union until July 26, 2003.
His letter, dated and mailed July 25, would be effective on the following day, July 26,
and the evidence shows that the Union did in fact give effect to B. Brooks’ July 25 letter
of resignation. Respondent Union fined B. Brooks for working behind the picket line
while a member of the Union. At the time of his resignation in late July 2003, the fine
ceased. Therefore, I find that the Union’s fine of B. Brooks falls within the proviso
which permits a union to impose internal discipline pursuant to a properly adopted union
rule which reflects a legitimate union interest, impairs no overriding public policy, is
reasonably enforced, and does not affect a member’s employment status. See, e.g.,
Scofield v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S.
175 (1967); Plumber’s Local 314 (American Fire Sprinkler), 295 NLRB 426 (1989). I
recommend the allegation relating the fining of Brady Brooks be dismissed.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. By charging, trying, and fining Fred Hill, Carl Justice, and Tim Woodall,
because of their post resignation conduct in working for Alltel Kentucky, Inc.,
Respondent has restrained and coerced the named employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act in violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act.

2. Paragraph 7(d) of the complaint, alleging that language in the collective
bargaining agreement unlawfully restricts Section 7 rights and violates Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act, is dismissed.

3. The allegation that Respondent Union violated Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act by
fining Brady Brooks is dismissed.

4. The violations set forth above in paragraph 1 are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of the Act.

THE REMEDY

Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I
shall recommend that it be required to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

I shall recommend that Respondent be ordered to rescind the fines assessed
against Hill, Justice and Woodall. I shall also recommend that Respondent be ordered to
remove from its records any references to the unlawful actions taken against the three
above-named employees and former members.

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On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue
the following recommended4

ORDER

The Respondent, Communication Workers of America, Local 3372, AFL-CIO, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall

1. Cease and desist from

(a) Restraining and coercing Fred Hill, Carl Justice, and Tim Woodall in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, by charging, trying, and
fining them because of their post resignation conduct in working for Alltel Kentucky,
Inc., or any other employer with whom the Union has a labor dispute.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing
employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the
Act.

(a) Rescind the fines levied against Fred Hill, Carl Justice, and Tim Woodall, as
well as the future membership prohibition, because of their post resignation work for
Alltel Kentucky, Inc., or any other employer with whom the Union has a dispute and
refund to them any moneys they may have paid as a result of such fines with interest.

(b) Remove from its records all references to the internal charges, trials, and fines
of Fred Hill, Carl Justice, and Tim Woodall for performing post resignation work for
Alltel Kentucky, Inc., or any other employer with whom the Union has a dispute, and
notify them in writing that this has been done and that these records will not be used
against them in the future.

(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such additional time as the
Regional Director may allow for good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place
designated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of such records if stored in electronic form, necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.

(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its Lexington, Kentucky,
location copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.” Copies of the notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 9, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and

4 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the
findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted
by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
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11
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where
notices to members and employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material.

(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a
sworn certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.

Dated at Washington, D.C., March 28, 2005.

_____________________________
Jane Vandeventer
Administrative Law Judge

JD–22-05
APPENDIX

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES AND MEMBERS
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this notice.

WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce Fred Hill, Carl Justice, or Tim Woodall in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act, by charging, trying, and fining them because of
their post resignation conduct in working for Alltel Kentucky, Inc., or any other employer with
whom the Union has a labor dispute.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.

WE WILL rescind the fines levied and future membership proscription against Fred Hill, Carl
Justice, and Tim Woodall because of their post resignation work for Alltel Kentucky, Inc., or any
other employer with whom the Union has a dispute and refund to them any moneys they may
have paid as a result of such fines with interest.

WE WILL remove all records of the internal charges, trials, and fines of Fred Hill, Carl Justice,
and Tim Woodall for performing post resignation work for Alltel Kentucky, Inc., or any other
employer with whom the Union has a dispute, and WE WILL notify them in writing that this
has been done and that these records will not be used against them in the future.

COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA,
LOCAL 3372, AFL-CIO
(Employer)

Dated By
(Representative) (Title)

The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations
Act. It conducts secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and
remedies unfair labor practices by employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a
charge or election petition, you may speak confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may
also obtain information from the Board’s website: www.nlrb.gov.
550 Main Street, Federal Office Building, Room 3003
Cincinnati, Ohio 45202-3271
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
513-684-3686.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 513-684-3750.