Allison Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 28, 2000

330 N.L.R.B. 1363 (N.L.R.B. 2000)

ALLISON CORP. 1363
Allison Corporation and Furniture Workers Division,
I.U.E. Local 282. Cases 26–CA–16943, 26–CA–
16986, and 26–CA–17259
April 28, 2000
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN TRUESDALE AND MEMBERS FOX AND
HURTGEN
On April 8, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Robert C.
Batson issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions,
only to the extent consistent with this Decision and Or-
der.
The Respondent excepts to the judge’s findings and
conclusions that it: (1) violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by unilaterally subcontracting unit work which
resulted in the layoff of unit employees, without giving
the Union prior notice and affording it an opportunity to
bargain with respect to the decision to subcontract and its
effects on unit employees; and (2) violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to furnish the Un-
ion with certain information requested by the Union on
May 18, 1995, regarding the subcontracting.2
As discussed more fully below, we reverse the judge’s
conclusion that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) by subcontracting unit work without providing
the Union with prior notice and an opportunity to bargain
about the decision to subcontract. We nevertheless con-
clude, for reasons discussed below, that the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing to give the
Union notice and affording it an opportunity to bargain
with respect to the effects of the subcontracting on bar-
gaining unit employees. Finally, for reasons set forth
below, we agree with the judge that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by failing and refusing to
supply the Union with requested relevant information
regarding the effects of such subcontracting.3

n.6

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
2 The judge also found that the following conduct by the Respondent
violated Sec. 8(a)(5): (1) conditioning contract negotiations on the
Union agreeing to the following proposals: (a) no negotiations regard-
ing piecework rates or the arbitrability of piecework rates; (b) loser
pays all arbitration costs; and (c) increasing the probationary period for
employees; (2) failing to furnish the Union with requested information
regarding piecework rates; (3) withdrawing recognition from the Un-
ion; and (4) implementing a unilateral wage increase. There were no
exceptions to these findings.
I. FACTS
The Respondent manufactures and imports a wide
range of automobile accessory items. In October 1990,
the Respondent purchased a competitor located in
Somerville, Tennessee. The Somerville facility, which
manufactured seat covers and cushions for automobiles,
is the subject of this litigation.
The Respondent recognized the Union as the represen-
tative of its production, shipping, and janitorial employ-
ees, at the Somerville facility in early 1991. Also in
early 1991 the parties entered into a collective-bargaining
agreement. That agreement was due to expire in Sep-
tember 1995.4 In June 1994, the parties had agreed to
early contract negotiations, and in the following year,
between January and August, the parties met for four
bargaining sessions.5 In late 1994 the Respondent began
to import products from Italy and on May 5 and 12 the
Respondent laid off a number of employees without
notifying the Unio
By letter to the Respondent’s Manager Tommy Wil-
liams, dated May 8, the Union’s Vice President Ida
Leachman noted that the Union had learned of the layoff
which occurred on May 5. The letter requested informa-
tion regarding the reason for the layoff and information
regarding affected employees. By letter dated May 10,
the Respondent, through Plant Manager Frank Dolan,
responded to Leachman’s request. Dolan stated that the
layoff was due to business conditions and provided the
requested information.
At the parties’ bargaining session on May 16, regard-
ing a new contract, the Union’s president, William Rudd,
inquired about the layoffs of May 5 and 12. Gregory
Ball, the Respondent’s director of corporate develop-
ment, stated that the Respondent had to be competitive.
Ball also stated that the Respondent had to import be-
cause its customers wanted the fabric from Italy and the
Respondent’s competitors were importing. Ball stated
that business was down for the retailers and that they had
a “terrible last three months.” Ball also noted that the
Respondent’s employees had the skills and ability to
make the products at the Somerville plant but that the
Respondent could not afford to make them there. Ball
3 As noted above, there is no exception to the judge’s conclusion that
the Respondent violated Sec. 8(a)(5) and (1) by withdrawing recogni-
tion from the Union. Nor is there any exception to the judge’s Remedy
which requires the Respondent to recognize and bargain in good faith
with the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. We find the record
insufficient to support the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated
Sec. 8(a)(1) by the participation of its supervisors in the circulation of a
petition to decertify the Union. Accordingly, we shall dismiss that
allegation.
4 All dates hereafter are 1995 unless otherwise specified.
5 The Respondent withdrew recognition from the Union in August.
6 This importation is the subcontracting involved herein.
330 NLRB No. 190
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1364
refused to give the Union specific information regarding
the Italian imports.7
On May 18 Leachman again wrote to Ball. Leachman
noted that Ball had informed the Union that one reason
for the layoff was importing products and that the deci-
sion to import was based on the cost of producing the
product at Somerville. Leachman requested a meeting on
May 24, “due to the seriousness of this matter and jeop-
ardy it is placing on the jobs of the bargaining unit . . . .”
Leachman wished to “discuss the effects of these imports
on the jobs of Somerville employees.” Leachman also
requested that the Respondent provide enumerated in-
formation so that the Union could be prepared “to dis-
cuss this matter intelligently and in good faith.”8 On
May 23, Ball, by letter, responded to Leachman’s re-
quests. He stated that he would not be available to meet
with her at the date and time stated in her letter. Ball
also provided answers to items 1 and 2 of the request for
information. Ball concluded by noting that the other
items requested had been “referred to counsel and a re-
sponse will be forthcoming.” By “fax,” dated May 25
and addressed to Ball, Rudd noted that the Union was
“available to meet and resume contract negotiations on
July 20, and 21, 1995, as you suggested.” Rudd also
stated that the Union requested to meet with a representa-
tive from the Respondent “to discuss the effects of im-
porting finished products at the Somerville Plant” and the
layoffs. In another letter to Leachman dated May 24,
Ball referred Leachman to Dolan’s May 10 letter citing

7 In his statement of the facts regarding the above discussion, the
judge implicitly credited the testimony of Rudd and that of the Union’s
Vice President Leachman. Thus, in support of his statement of the facts
regarding this discussion, the judge cited certain transcript pages and
certain pages of GC Exh. 5. We note that the transcript pages which
the judge cited contain Rudd’s and Leachman’s testimony regarding
this discussion and that GC Exh. 5 includes the Union’s bargaining
notes taken on May 16 by Leachman. The evidence cited supports the
judge’s statement of the facts. Thus, the judge implicitly discredited
Ball’s testimony denying that he had indicated that the importing of
products was related to the layoffs. Further, the judge explicitly cred-
ited Rudd where Ball’s and Rudd’s testimony conflicted.
8 The information requested included: (1) Names, addresses, job ti-
tles, departments, and seniority dates of all employees laid off on or
about May 12, 1995, and the same information for those retained; (2)
list of all jobs being performed and products that were being produced
at the Somerville Plant on May 12, 1994, and the same information for
May 15, 1995, and thereafter; and (3) copies of all orders, invoices,
etc., placed with companies outside of America, for products which
were, still are produced, or could have been produced, at the Somerville
plant; (4) the quantity of each product being ordered and the amount
paid for each piece; (5) names and addresses of all companies that
Allison imports products from that were, still are produced or could be
produced in Somerville; (6) detailed comparison and breakdown of the
cost of producing each imported item in Somerville versus producing
them overseas; (7) copies of shipping invoices, records, etc., that show
total cost of shipping each order to America; (8) copies of shipping
invoices, records, etc., that show total cost of transporting each order by
truck and rail from the location it is docked from overseas, to the
Somerville plant; and (9) a list of all steps taken by Allison to reduce its
operating and production cost at the Somerville plant, prior to deciding
to import the volume of products now being imported.
business conditions as the reason for the layoffs. Ball
noted that some “Fabulamb” covers are made at Somer-
ville and others are procured from the Italian supplier.
Ball concluded his letter by stating:

As the premise for your request for information
is based on your incorrect belief that there would be
no layoffs at the Somerville, TN. factory if Allison
was not importing products from Italy, I fail to see
the relevance of your request to collective bargain-
ing.
In view of the above, I see no reason to meet re-
garding this subject on May 31, 1995, as requested
by Mr. Rudd in his letter of May 25, 1995.9

Leachman, on June 2, sent a “fax” to Ball renewing the
Union request to meet with the Respondent “regarding
the effects of the company’s imports on the Somerville
bargaining unit and the recent major layoff at the Somer-
ville Plant.” Leachman also advised Ball that the Union
was renewing its requests of May 18 “for information
relative to imports and its effects thereof [sic].” There is
no evidence that the Respondent responded to Leach-
man’s June 2 “fax.”
II. ANALYSIS
A. The Respondent’s Alleged Obligation to Bargain Re-
garding the Decision to Subcontract
The judge found, inter alia, that the language contained
in the collective-bargaining agreement’s management-
rights clause was not sufficient to waive the Union’s
right to bargain over the Respondent’s decision to sub-
contract. He therefore found that the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to provide the Union with
notice and an opportunity to bargain about the decision
to subcontract. We do not agree.
The management-rights clause in the parties’ contract
reads as follows:

SECTION 13. MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
A. The Company has, retains, and shall possess
and exercise all management rights, functions, pow-
ers, privileges and authority inherent in the Com-
pany as owner and operator of the business, except-
ing only such rights that are specifically and ex-
pressly relinquished or restricted by a specific Arti-
cle or Section of this Agreement.
B. The Company shall have the exclusive right
to manage the business and operation of its facilities;
to schedule and require the performance of overtime
work; to discipline or discharge employees for just
cause; to adopt, modify or rescind reasonable work
rules, quality and production standards and to disci-
pline or discharge employees for violation of such
9 We note the discrepancies in dates as this letter from Ball, dated
May 24, referred to Rudd’s request, which was dated May 25.
ALLISON CORP. 1365
rules and standards; to determine, implement, mod-
ify or eliminate techniques, methods, processes,
means of production; to subcontract; to transfer
work or materials from one Company operation to
another, as now may exist or as may hereafter be es-
tablished; to utilize labor saving devices; to deter-
mine the location of the business, including the es-
tablishment of new facilities and the relocation, clos-
ing, selling, merging or liquidating of any facility,
department, division or subdivision thereof either
permanently or temporarily; and generally to control
and direct the Company in all of its operations and
affairs. [Emphasis added.]

Under the standard set forth in Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983), a waiver of
statutory rights must be clear and unmistakable. To meet
the “clear and unmistakable” standard, the contract lan-
guage must be specific, or it must be shown that the mat-
ter claimed to have been waived was fully discussed by
the parties and that the party alleged to have waived its
rights consciously yielded its interest in the matter. See
Trojan Yacht, 319 NLRB 741, 742 (1995).
The Board finds a waiver of the statutory right to bar-
gain based on language contained in the contract if the
contract language is specific regarding the waiver of the
right to bargain regarding the particular subject at issue.
Thus, the Board looks to the precise wording of the rele-
vant contract provisions in determining whether there has
been a clear and unmistakable waiver.10 See Kiro, Inc.
317 NLRB 1325, 1327 (1995).
Here, the cases relied upon by the judge in finding that
the language in the management-rights clause was insuf-
ficient to waive the Union’s right to bargain over the
decision to subcontract unit work are distinguishable. In
Public Service Co., 312 NLRB 459 (1993), the Board
found that a contractual provision regarding certain con-
ditions to be met in all instances of subcontracting did
not relieve the respondent of its statutory obligation to
bargain regarding specific instances of subcontracting.11
In Reece Corp., 294 NLRB 448 (1989), the Board found
that the management-rights clause and the severance

10 For example, in Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 NLRB 180 (1989), the
Board held that the management-rights clause which permitted the
issuance of “company rules” was too general to constitute a waiver of
the union’s right to bargain regarding the respondent’s implementing a
drug and alcohol testing requirement, because there was no specific
reference to drug/alcohol testing. On the other hand, in United Tech-
nologies Corp., 287 NLRB 198 (1987), supplemental decision and
order 292 NLRB 249 (1989), enfd. 884 F.2d 1569 (2d Cir. 1989), the
Board held that a management-rights clause permitting the respondent
to “make and apply rules and regulations for production, discipline,
efficiency and safety” was specific enough to constitute a waiver of the
right to bargain over the elimination of a step in the progressive disci-
pline procedures for absenteeism.
11 Specially the provision provided that subcontracting would not be
for the purpose of laying off or demoting regular employees and that
the respondent would require that certain conditions be met by the
subcontractor.
allowance clause did not specifically give the respondent
the right to transfer bargaining unit work from one of its
plants to another. The Board in each of these cases
found that the contractual language was insufficiently
specific to constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of
a bargaining right. Therefore, as the union had not
waived its right to bargain regarding the matter at issue,
the employer had violated Section 8(a)(5) by failing to
bargain regarding the matter.
Here, on the other hand, the management-rights clause
specifically, precisely, and plainly grants the Respondent
the right “to subcontract” without restriction. We there-
fore find a “clear and unmistakable waiver” by the Union
of its statutory right to bargain regarding the Respon-
dent’s decision to subcontract.12 We therefore conclude
that the Respondent did not violate Section 8(a)(5) by
unilaterally subcontracting unit work.13
B. Effects Bargaining
While a contract clause may constitute a waiver of a
bargaining right, it does not automatically follow that the
same contract clause waives a party’s right to bargain
over the effects of the matter in issue. As the Board has
stated:
An employer has an obligation to give a union notice
and an opportunity to bargain about the effects on unit
employees of a managerial decision even if it has no
obligation to bargain about the decision itself.

Kiro, Inc., supra (citing First National Maintenance
Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681–682).14
The Respondent contends that its subcontracting “did
not result in a layoff or have a substantial adverse impact
on the bargaining unit.” However, as noted earlier, the
judge credited testimony of the Union’s representatives
that Respondent’s Director of Corporate Development
Ball had made statements linking the layoffs to the sub-
contracting during contract negotiations on May 16.15
12 We also note that in each of its three bargaining requests the Un-
ion did not request bargaining regarding the subcontracting itself—only
bargaining regarding the effects of the subcontracting on the bargaining
unit. Further the Union knew, by January 11, that the Respondent had
begun to import product but did not request bargaining until there was
an effect from such subcontracting—i.e., the layoffs. (See fn. 15, in-
fra.) Thus, it appears that, the Union did not request bargaining regard-
ing the decision to subcontract. At the very least, this evidence indi-
cates that the Union was aware of the waiver.
13 Member Hurtgen reaches the same result via his “contract cover-
age” analysis. See Dorsey Trailers, Inc., 327 NLRB 835 (1999).
14 Effects bargaining can include such topics as layoffs, severance
pay, health insurance coverage and conversion rights, preferential hir-
ing at other of the employer’s operations, and reference letters for jobs
with other employers. See Los Angeles Soap Co., 300 NLRB 289, 295
(1990).
15 Further, Ball testified that in the January 11 negotiation session, he
had indicated to the Union that there was an increased demand for
Italian product, that the Company had begun to import Italian products
and that the Respondent’s competitors were selling many Italian prod-
ucts and that there was pressure in the marketplace. Ball also stated
that he told the Union that the Company was trying very hard to protect
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1366
To the extent that the Respondent argues that the Un-
ion waived its right to bargain regarding the effects of the
decision to subcontract bargaining unit work,16 we dis-
agree. First, as noted above, in determining whether or
not the Union waived its right to bargain by agreeing to
certain contractual language the Board looks to the pre-
cise wording of the relevant contractual provisions. See
Kiro, supra. Here, the contractual language does not
address the effects of any subcontracting. Thus, the lan-
guage is insufficient to waive the Union’s right to bar-
gain over the effects of subcontracting. Second, we note
that a waiver may be inferred from extrinsic evidence of
contract negotiations and/or past practice.17 The record
here contains no evidence regarding contractual negotia-
tions pertaining to the subject of effects bargaining in
general, or bargaining regarding the effects of subcon-
tracting specifically. Further, while Ball testified that the
Respondent had subcontracted in the past, his testimony
does not establish that the Union had waived its right to
bargain about the effects of subcontracting. The testi-
mony does not establish that past subcontracting had any
effect on the bargaining unit or that the parties under-
stood that the Respondent had a right to make unilateral
changes without bargaining about the effects. Accord-
ingly, we do not find any past practice of the parties that
might constitute a “clear and unmistakable” waiver by
the Union of its statutory right to bargain regarding the
effects on the bargaining unit of the decision to subcon-
tract.18 We therefore find that the Union has not waived
its statutory right to bargain regarding the effects on the
bargaining unit of the decision to subcontract.
Thus, once the Respondent had made the decision to
lay off unit employees, the time was ripe for effects bar-
gaining. The Respondent then had a “duty to give pre-
implementation notice to the union” to allow for mean-
ingful effects bargaining. See Los Angeles Soap Co., 300
NLRB 289, 295 fn. 1 (1990); Willamette Tug & Barge,
300 NLRB 282, 282–283 (1990). The Respondent failed
to meet its obligations. Thus, by failing to give the Un-
ion prior notice and an opportunity to engage in mean-
ingful negotiations regarding the effects of its lawful
decision to subcontract unit work, the Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act. See East Coast

the bargaining unit’s jobs and a very austere budget was needed—that
he “hoped that the [Union’s] proposals would take that into considera-
tion and we could have a fair, but restrain, economic package.” Thus,
Ball in January, prior to the layoffs, had acknowledged a connection
between the importing of products from Italy, the cost of wages and
benefits, and the protection of bargaining unit jobs.
16 On brief, the Respondent does not separately address the issue of
effects bargaining.
17 See Kiro, supra at 1328.
18 Chairman Truesdale and Member Fox note, in any event, that a
union’s failure to demand bargaining on a particular subject on past
occasions when the employer had acted unilaterally would not neces-
sarily establish that the union had waived bargaining rights on that
subject in the future. Johnson-Bateman Co., supra, 295 NLRB at 188,
and cases there cited.
Steel Inc., 317 NLRB 842, 846 (1995).19 Further, as
noted above, on May 18 the Union’s Vice President
Leachman wrote to Respondent’s Director of Corporate
Development Ball and requested, inter alia, a meeting to
“discuss the effects of these imports on the jobs of
Somerville employees.” On May 23 Ball, by letter, re-
sponded to Leachman’s letter. He stated, inter alia, that
he would not be available to meet with her at the date
and time stated in her letter. The Union’s president,
Rudd sent a “fax” dated May 25 to Ball requesting,
among other things, to meet with the Respondent “to
discuss the effects of importing finished products at the
Somerville Plant” and the layoffs. In another letter ad-
dressed to Leachman, dated May 24, Ball referred to
Dolan’s May 10 letter which had cited business condi-
tions as the reason for the layoffs. Ball further stated that
“plant layoffs are totally unrelated to products imported
from Italy” and that he therefore failed to see how the
imports placed the bargaining unit jobs in jeopardy. Ball
concluded his letter by stating that “[i]n view of the
above, I see no reason to meet regarding this subject on
May 31, 1995, as requested by Mr. Rudd in his letter of
May 25, 1995.”20 Leachman, on June 2, sent a “fax” to
Ball renewing the Union request to meet with the Re-
spondent regarding the effects of the imports on the bar-
gaining unit and the layoffs. As noted earlier there is no
evidence that the Respondent ever responded to the June
2 “fax.”
Despite the Union’s repeated requests to meet and dis-
cuss the effects of the subcontracting, the Respondent
never met with the Union to discuss this matter. We
therefore conclude that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing to bargain about the
effects of its subcontracting unit work.21
C. Information Request
The judge found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by not providing certain infor-
mation that the Union requested in its letter of May 18.
19 We note that the contract contained a provision regarding seniority
which provided: that in the event of layoffs that the layoffs would be by
departments and that “the employee having the longest service, pro-
vided he has the skill and ability of performing the work, in the opinion
of the Company, shall be the last to be laid off and the first to be re-
hired.” This appears to be the only benefit granted in the seniority
provision of the contract.
20 We again note the discrepancies in the date of this letter. See fn.
9, supra.
21 In regard to the Respondent’s obligation to bargain about the ef-
fects of its subcontracting, Member Hurtgen concurs in the result.
However, in doing so, he applies a “contract coverage” analysis, rather
than a “waiver” analysis. The contract requires Respondent, in the
event of a layoff, to follow certain criteria in determining which em-
ployees should be laid off. See fn. 19, supra. Implicitly, this provision
gives Respondent the right to lay off, provided that those criteria are
met. However, the contract is silent with respect to other matters that
may be attendant to a layoff. See fn. 14, supra. Member Hurtgen
agrees that Respondent refused to bargain with respect to these other
matters.
ALLISON CORP. 1367
The Respondent excepts. The Respondent’s argument in
support of its exception is two-fold. First, the Respon-
dent essentially argues that the information was not rele-
vant. Thus, the Respondent repeats the assertion that
Ball made in his response to Leachman’s initial request
for information. The Respondent asserts that the import-
ing of products from Italy was not the cause of the lay-
offs, and thus the requested information was not relevant
to collective bargaining. Further, the Respondent notes
that Ball testified that he did not receive a response to
this letter and thus assumed that the Union had accepted
that there was no connection between the layoffs and the
importation of products.22 Second, the Respondent also
asserts that even relevant information does not have to be
furnished if a union’s predominant purpose in making a
request is to force the employer to give up its right to
subcontract to nonunion companies, citing, NLRB v. Wa-
chter Construction, Inc., 23 F.3d 1378 (8th Cir. 1994).
For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the judge
that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by
failing to provide the requested information.
An employer’s duty to bargain includes the duty to
provide requested information that is needed by the bar-
gaining representative for the proper performance of its
statutory duties and responsibilities. NLRB v. Acme In-
dustrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967). Information per-
taining to bargaining unit employees is deemed to be
presumptively relevant and necessary and must be pro-
duced. But where the requested information involves
matters outside the bargaining unit the union has the bur-
den of establishing the relevancy of and necessity for
such information. The burden consists of a showing of a
probability that the desired information is relevant, and
that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities. See Shoppers Food
Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 258–259 (1994), and cases
cited therein.23
In this case, most of those items of information re-
quested by the Union, which information the Respondent
made no attempt to provide, related to the relationship
between the Respondent and its subcontractors. There-
fore, the information was not presumptively relevant.24

22 As noted, however, in his discussion of the facts of this case, the
judge found that a “fax” from the Union, addressed to Ball, and dated
June 2, renewed the Union’s request to meet with the Respondent re-
garding the effects of the imports and “for information relative to im-
ports and its effects thereof [sic].”
23 We also note that an employer is obligated to furnish requested in-
formation where the circumstances should put the employer on notice
of a relevant purpose which the union has not specifically spelled out.
Brazos Electric Power, 241 NLRB 1016, 1018 (1979), enfd. in relevant
part 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Beverly Enterprises, 310
NLRB 222, 227 (1993), enfd. in relevant part sub nom. Torrington
Employees Assn. v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580 (2d Cir. 1994).
24 As stated earlier the Respondent provided information regarding
items 1 and 2 of the information request. (Rudd testified that the Re-
spondent provided the information requested in item 1 of the request.)
It is not clear from the evidence in the record, however, whether the
Thus, the General Counsel was required to show that
when the Union made its request it had a reasonable ba-
sis for believing that the information would be necessary
to it in carrying out its statutory obligations.25 See Provi-
dence Hospital, 320 NLRB 790, 793–794 (1996), enfd.
93 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 1996), and cases cited therein.
Here, the Respondent, in negotiations for a new con-
tract, made statements that linked labor costs to its deci-
sion to subcontract, and linked the subcontracting to the
two recent layoffs. In addition to the statements made
during contract negotiations on May 16, the Union’s
minutes for the contract negotiation session on January
11 reflect that Ball connected labor costs to importing
activities. Further, this statement was supported by
Ball’s own testimony. Thus, according to Ball, he told
the Union that the Company had begun to import Italian
products. He also told the Union that the Company was
trying to protect the jobs in Somerville and that it needed
to have a very austere budget and that he hoped that the
Union’s proposals would take that into consideration.26
The May 18, 1995 letter to Ball from Leachman—
requesting information—noted that Ball had informed
the Union that one of the main reasons for the layoffs
was the importing of products from Italy and that the
decision to import the products was due, in part, to the
cost of producing them in Somerville. Leachman there-
fore wrote:

[D]ue to the seriousness of this matter and jeopardy it is
placing on the jobs of the bargaining unit represented
by this Union, we are requesting to meet with you or
your designee on May 24, 1995 at 3:00 p.m. to discuss
the effects of these imports on the jobs of Somerville
employees.
Please provide the information requested . . . so
the Union can be prepared to discuss this matter in-
telligently and in good faith.

In this letter, the Union suggested to the Respondent a
concern not just with the two layoffs that had already
occurred but also a concern that the subcontracting was
placing the jobs of the bargaining unit in “jeopardy.”
Subsequent communications to the Respondent from the
Union also expressed concern regarding the role of sub-
contracting in both the recent layoffs and the future job
security of bargaining unit employees. Both Union
President Rudd’s fax to Ball on May 25, and Leachman’s
fax to Ball dated June 2 requested a meeting to discuss

information provided regarding item 2 of the request was fully respon-
sive to the request. As the information requested in item 2 pertains to
the bargaining unit, it is presumptively relevant. We therefore leave to
compliance the determination as to whether the information provided in
response to item 2 of the request was adequate.
25 Leachman testified that the purpose of requesting the information
was so that the Union “could be prepared, better prepared, to intelli-
gently discuss and negotiate the effects and possibly the cause of im-
porting this product.”
26 See fn. 15, supra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1368
both the effects of the imports on the bargaining unit and
the layoffs. As noted, the communications took place in
a context on ongoing negotiations for a new contract.
Thus, the Union explained—and reasonably conveyed to
the Respondent—two separate and legitimate reasons
why the nonunit information was relevant and necessary
to the Union to carry out its duties as bargaining repre-
sentative. First, it needed the information so it could
effectively administer the existing contract and engage in
meaningful effects bargaining regarding the recent lay-
offs. Second, it needed the information to formulate
proposals to protect jobs in the ongoing negotiations for
a successor contract.
As noted, much of the information that the Union re-
quested, but did not receive, involved the Respondent’s
practice of subcontracting. The Union had multiple du-
ties to fulfill as collective-bargaining representative for
the unit. It needed to determine to what extent the Re-
spondent’s practice of subcontracting had had an impact
on the bargaining unit, what future effects upon the bar-
gaining unit could be anticipated, whether, in the ongo-
ing contract negotiations, the Union should negotiate
over the terms of subcontracting or retain a right to nego-
tiate over that issue. Some of the information requested
would show the comparative cost of importing products
versus producing them at the Somerville plant.27 The
information requested regarding the cost cutting meas-
ures the Respondent had already implemented at the
plant would help the Union in determining whether the
Respondent had options to cut costs other than labor
costs at its Somerville plant.28 Thus, the Union requested
information that would be useful for two purposes. It
would help the Union in administering the current con-
tract. It would also help the Union to formulate new con-
tract proposals that would be the most beneficial to the
bargaining unit employees while also providing the Re-
spondent with economic incentive not to subcontract the
unit work. Although the Union had waived its right to
bargain regarding a decision to subcontract under the
existing contract, the parties were in the process of nego-
tiating a new contract. Therefore, the Union could use
the requested information to propose changes for the
successor agreement.
As noted, the Respondent contends that even relevant
information does not have to be furnished to the Union if
the Union’s “predominant purpose in making the request
is to force the employer to give up its right to subcontract
to nonunion-companies.” In Wachter, supra, the case
cited by the Respondent here, the court found that the
union’s purpose in requesting voluminous amount of
information was to force the employer to stop subcon-

27 See items lists in numbers 6–8 of the information request in fn. 8,
supra.
28 See Pratt & Lambert, Inc., 319 NLRB 529, 533 (1995), and
Somerville Mills, 308 NLRB 425, 441 (1992), enfd. sub. nom NLRB v.
I. Appel Corp., 19 F.3d 1433 (6th Cir. 1994).
tracting. The court ultimately concluded that the union’s
information requests were made in bad faith. Here, we
have not found, and the Respondent has not pointed to,
any evidence that the information requested in the instant
case was for any improper purpose. To the contrary, we
note that the Union here made numerous requests to bar-
gain regarding the effects of the subcontracting29 but
never demanded that the Respondent halt the subcon-
tracting. There is no basis for concluding that the Un-
ion’s information requests were made in bad faith. As
the requested information was necessary and relevant to
the Union fulfilling its role as collective-bargaining rep-
resentative, the Respondent’s refusal and failure to pro-
vide the requested information violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the Act.30
AMENDED REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in cer-
tain unfair labor practices, we shall order it to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act, including the posting of
an appropriate notice to employees. As a result of the
Respondent’s unlawful failure to bargain in good faith
with the Union about the effects of its decision to sub-
contract bargaining unit work on the terms and condi-
tions of employment of unit employees—including the
layoffs of May 5 and 12, 1995—the bargaining unit em-
ployees have been denied an opportunity to bargain
through their collective-bargaining representative. A
bargaining order alone, therefore, cannot serve as an
adequate remedy for the unfair labor practices commit-
ted.
Accordingly we deem it necessary, in order to effectu-
ate the purposes of the Act, to require the Respondent to
bargain with the Union concerning the effects of subcon-
29 We reject the Respondent’s argument that it did not have to pro-
vide the requested information because it reasonably believed that the
Union accepted the Respondent’s position that there was no connection
between the layoffs and the importing of seat covers. After the Re-
spondent’s May 24 letter setting forth its position, the Union renewed
its information request in its subsequent June 2 “fax.” Though Ball
denied receiving the “fax,” the judge, in his statement of facts, found
that the “fax” was sent and received. Even if Ball did not receive the
Union’s “fax,” we could not conclude in these circumstances that “si-
lence was acceptance.” In any event, to the extent that the Union ex-
plained that the information would be useful in the ongoing negotia-
tions for a successor agreement, the Respondent was obligated to pro-
vide the information. The Respondent’s May 24 letter did not address
the point that the information might be useful in the ongoing negotia-
tions for a new contract.
30 Member Hurtgen notes that the requested information related
principally to the relationship between the Respondent and its subcon-
tractors. Inasmuch as the instant decision to subcontract was not bar-
gainable, Member Hurtgen concludes that the requested information
need not be supplied on the basis of its relationship to that decision.
However, Member Hurtgen agrees that the information was relevant to
the negotiation for a new contract. For example, based on information
regarding the nature, frequency and extent of subcontracting the Union
may wish to propose modifications to the management-rights clause as
it relates to subcontracting.
ALLISON CORP. 1369
tracting bargaining unit work, including the layoffs of
May 5 and 12, 1995, on its employees, and shall accom-
pany our order with a limited backpay requirement de-
signed both to make whole the laid-off employees for
losses suffered as a result of the violation and to recreate
in some practical manner a situation in which the parties’
bargaining position is not entirely devoid of economic
consequences for the Respondent. We shall do so by
ordering the Respondent to pay backpay to the laid-off
employees in a manner similar to that required in Trans-
marine Navigation Corp., 170 NLRB 389 (1968).
Thus, the Respondent shall pay the laid-off employees
backpay at the rate of their normal wages when last in the
Respondent’s employ from 5 days after the date of this
Decision and Order until occurrence of the earliest of the
following conditions: (1) the date the Respondent bar-
gains to agreement with the Union on those subjects per-
taining to the effects of the subcontracting of bargaining
unit work on the bargaining unit employees; (2) a bona
fide impasse in bargaining; (3) the Union’s failure to
request bargaining within 5 business days after receipt of
this Decision and Order, or to commence negotiations
within 5 business days after receipt of the Respondent’s
notice of its desire to bargain with the Union;31 (4) the
Union’s subsequent failure to bargain in good faith; but
in no event shall the sum paid to these employees exceed
the amount they would have received as wages from the
date on which they were laid off or terminated, to the
time they secured equivalent employment elsewhere, or
the date on which the Respondent shall have offered to
bargain in good faith, whichever occurs sooner; provided
however, that in no event shall this sum be less than the
employees would have earned for a 2-week period at the
rate of their normal wages when last in the Respondent’s
employ. Backpay shall be based on earnings which the
terminated or laid-off employees would normally have
received during the applicable period, less any net in-
terim earnings, and shall be computed in accordance with
F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289 (1950), with inter-
est as described in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283
NLRB 1173 (1987).
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondent, Allison Corporation, Somerville, Tennessee,
its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Unlawfully withdrawing recognition from, and re-
fusing to bargain in good faith with Furniture Workers
Division, I.U.E. Local 282 as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the follow-
ing appropriate unit:

31 Melody Toyota, 325 NLRB 846 (1998).
INCLUDING: All production employees, shipping em-
ployees and janitorial employees employed at the Re-
spondent’s Somerville, Tennessee location.

EXCLUDING: All clerical and office employees, ex-
ecutives, maintenance employees, chauffeurs, engi-
neers, quality control supervisors, professionals, fore-
men, supervisory employees, watchmen, salesmen and
guards.

(b) Conditioning contract negotiations on the Union
agreeing that the following items are not negotiable:
piecework rates and the arbitrability of piecework rates;
requirement that the loser pay all costs of arbitration; and
increasing the probationary period for employees.
(c) Failing or refusing to give timely notice to and an
opportunity to bargain to the Furniture Workers Division,
I.U.E. Local 282 as the exclusive collective-bargaining
representative of the employees in the appropriate unit
set forth above, with respects to the effects on its unit
employees of its decision to subcontract bargaining unit
work.
(d) Failing or refusing to furnish the Union with in-
formation it requests which is necessary and relevant to
the Union in the performance of its duties as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees in the appropriate unit.
(e) Unilaterally granting wage increases to its employ-
ees without prior notice to the Union and affording the
Union an opportunity to bargain.
(f) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize and bargain in good faith with, Furniture
Workers Division, I.U.E. Local 282 as the exclusive col-
lective-bargaining representative of the employees in the
appropriate unit and, if an understanding is reached, re-
duce the agreement to writing and execute it.
(b) Bargain with the Union over the effects on unit
employees of its decisions to subcontract bargaining unit
work and to lay off unit employees; and pay the laid-off
employees their normal wages for the period set forth in
the remedy portion of the Decision and Order.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make
available to the Board or its agents for examination and
copying, all payroll records, social security payment re-
cords, timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of back-
pay due under the terms of this Order.
(d) Furnish the Union with the information it requested
on March 2 and 18, 1995.32
32 To the extent that the Respondent has since furnished information,
that information need not be refurnished. Those matters can be deter-
mined in the compliance stage.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1370
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its facility in Somerville, Tennessee, copies of the at-
tached notice marked “Appendix.”33 Copies of the no-
tice, on forms provided by the Regional Director for Re-
gion 26, after being signed by the Respondent’s author-
ized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent
immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other mate-
rial. In the event that, during the pendency of these pro-
ceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or
closed the facility involved in these proceedings, the Re-
spondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current and former employees
employed by the Respondent at any time since January
11, 1995.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all other allegations per-
taining to this case are dismissed.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to
post and abide by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.

To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives
of their own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected
concerted activities.

WE WILL NOT unlawfully withdraw recognition from,
and refuse to bargain in good faith with Furniture Work-
ers Division, I.U.E. Local 282 as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the employees in the
following appropriate unit:

33 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
INCLUDING: All production employees, shipping em-
ployees and janitorial employees employed at the Re-
spondent’s Somerville, Tennessee location.

EXCLUDING: All clerical and office employees, execu-
tives, maintenance employees, chauffeurs, engineers,
quality control supervisors, professionals, foremen, su-
pervisory employees, watchmen, salesmen and guards.

WE WILL NOT condition contract negotiations on the
Union agreeing that the following items are not negotia-
ble: piecework rates and the arbitrability of piecework
rates; requirement that the loser pay all costs of arbitra-
tion; and increasing the probationary period for employ-
ees.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to give timely notice to and
bargain with the Union with respects to the effects on
employees of our decision to subcontract bargaining unit
work.
WE WILL NOT fail or refuse to furnish the Union with
information it requests which is necessary and relevant to
the Union in the performance of its duties as the exclu-
sive collective-bargaining representative of the employ-
ees and the appropriate unit.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally grant wage increases to em-
ployees in the appropriate bargaining unit without giving
prior notice to the Union and without affording the Un-
ion an opportunity to bargain regarding such increases.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, bargaining in
good faith with Furniture Workers Division, I.U.E. Local
282 as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of the employees in the appropriate unit and, if an under-
standing is reached, reduced the agreement to writing and
execute it.
WE WILL bargain with the Union regarding the effects
on unit employees of our decisions to subcontract bar-
gaining unit work including the layoffs of May 5 and 12,
1995.
WE WILL pay the laid-off employees their normal
wages for the period set forth in the remedy portion of
the Board’s Decision and Order.
WE WILL furnish the Union with the information it re-
quested on March 2 and 18, 1995.

ALLISON CORPORATION

Jack L. Berger, Esq., for the General Counsel.
John P. Scruggs and Heather C. Webb, Esqs. (Allen, Scruggs,
Sossman & Thompson, P.C.), of Memphis, Tennessee, for
the Respondent.
Willie Rudd, Esq., of Memphis, Tennessee, for the Charging
Party.
ALLISON CORP. 1371
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ROBERT C. BATSON, Administrative Law Judge. The allega-
tions of unlawful conduct by Allison Corporation (Respondent
or Employer) are its failure to bargain in good faith with Furni-
ture Workers Division, I.U.E. Local 282 (the Union or the
Charging Party), the duly designated and recognized collective-
bargaining representative under Section 9(b) of the Act of the
employees in the following appropriate unit:

INCLUDING: All production employees, shipping employ-
ees and janitorial employees employed at the Employer’s
Somerville, Tennessee, location.

EXCLUDING: All clerical and office employees, executives,
maintenance employees, chauffeurs, engineers, quality control
supervisors, professionals, foremen, supervisory employees,
watchmen, salesmen and guards.

The complaint alleges and I find that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by: informing the Union that
it was no longer interested in negotiations because the Union
had filed grievances on behalf of employees, this allegation is
barred by Section 10(b) of the Act; by conditioning bargaining
on the Union’s not insisting on negotiating regarding piece
work rates; the arbitrability of piece work rates; the Union’s
agreement that the loser pay all costs of arbitration and the
Union agreeing to increase the probationary period for some
employees from 60 to 90 days.
It is further alleged and found that the Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing the Union’s request for;
copies of all piece work rates that were in effect at the begin-
ning of the contract and all rates that had been changed since
the effective date and the reasons therefor, and further, the an-
nual gross earnings of all current employees for the past 5
years. Such information is necessary and relevant to the Un-
ion’s performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representatives of the unit. Furthermore about May
1, 1995, Respondent subcontracted unit work which resulted
the layoff of unit employees without notifying the Union and
affording it as opportunity to bargain with Respondent with
respect to such subcontract.
Additional request were made about May 18, 1995, the Un-
ion, by letter, requested that Respondent furnish the Union with
the following information: Copies of all orders, invoices, et
cetera, that have been placed with companies outside America,
for products which was, still is, or could have been produced at
the Somerville Plant. If not stated on the form, the Union
would request that the Company attach to each order, the num-
ber of each product being ordered and the amount paid by Alli-
son for each piece. Names and addresses of all companies,
businesses, et cetera, that Allison import products from that
once was, still is or could be produced in Somerville. Copies of
shipping invoices, records, et cetera, that show total cost of
transporting each order by truck and rail from the location it is
docked from overseas, to the Somerville Plant. List in details
all steps taken by Allison to reduce its operating and production
cost at the Somerville Plant, prior to deciding to import the
volume of products now being imported.
The information requested above is necessary and relevant to
the performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the employees in the unit and Re-
spondent’s failure to provide it violates the Act.
Further violations alleged includes the participation of admit-
ted Supervisor Nancy Avent in July in the circulation of a de-
certification petition. In January 1996, Respondent imple-
mented a wage increase to its employees without giving the
Union an opportunity to bargain. Wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining.
The charge in Case 26–CA–16943 was filed on July 27,
1995,1 in Case 26–CA–16986 on August 16, and in Case 26–
CA–17259 on January 29, 1996. All charges were filed by the
Union and timely served on the Respondent. On February 14,
1996, the Acting Regional Director for Region 26 issued a sec-
ond order consolidating cases, consolidated complaint and no-
tice of hearing alleging the above-mentioned violations of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151, et. seq. (the
Act).
All parties were afforded full opportunity to examine and
cross-examine witnesses and present all relevant evidence and
to file posttrial briefs. Briefs were filed by the General Counsel
and Respondent and have been duly considered.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. BACKGROUND
Allison Corporation was founded about 1960 by Sam Seltzer
and a partner in Newark, New Jersey, in a factory making wire
spring cushions for automobiles. After some years the Com-
pany expanded to include a wide range of automobile accessory
items most of which were imported from foreign sources. At
the time of the hearing, Director of Corporate Development
Gregory Ball testified some 900 accessory items such as tissue
dispensers, makeup mirrors, blind spot mirrors, tire pressure
gages, et cetera. The Company moved to Garwood, New Jer-
sey, for a few years and about 1970 moved to Livingston, New
Jersey, where its main factory is still located.
According to Ball, about 1960, shortly after founding the
Company, Local 76-B of the Furniture Workers was recognized
as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in Livingston and have negotiated successive collective
bargaining contracts, the most recent of which, expires in 1998.
Ball testified they had always had an excellent relationship with
Local 76-B and during more than 30 years had only one arbitra-
tion.
In October 1990, Allison purchased a competitor, Farber
Brothers, located at Somerville, Tennessee, which manufac-
tured seat covers and cushions. The Somerville facility is the
subject of this litigation.
As noted above, it appears that the Respondent and Local 76-
B of The Furniture Workers Division had an amicable and suc-
cessful working relationship. With each other for more than 30
years at the Livingston, New Jersey facility. Sam Seltzer, one
of the founders of the Company, became a trustee of the United
Furniture Workers Pension Fund and was appointed to the Fi-
nance Committee and also held the position of secre-
tary/treasurer of the fund. Later Greg Ball, Seltzer’s son-in-
law, replaced Seltzer in those positions.
It appears that Willie Rudd the current president of the Un-
ion and his predecessor, Carl Scarbrough had an excellent rela-
tionship with Seltzer. At a meeting of pension fund trustees, in

1 All dates are 1995 unless otherwise indicated.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1372
June 1990, Rudd asked Seltzer if he would consider voluntarily
recognizing the Union at the Somerville Plant upon proof of
their majority status. Seltzer said he would give it some
thought and let Rudd know. Apparently nothing else with re-
spect to recognition occurred until another Trustee’s meeting in
January 1991 at Biloxi, Mississippi. Seltzer and Rudd arranged
a meeting in New Jersey where they worked out a collective-
bargaining agreement, which brought about recognition and
was ratified by the employees at Somerville in March 1991. It
appears the parties had a good relationship until March or April
of 1994.
In March or April 1994, the Union found that it had appar-
ently made an error in its calculations of the multiplies and the
insurance benefits provided to the employees of Respondent
were increasing.
The Union felt the Respondent was, at least, partially respon-
sible because it had not provided the information the actuaries
needed to make the proper calculations. Rudd contacted Selt-
zer about increasing the companies’ contributions by $5 per
month per employee to offset the increased benefits. Seltzer
appeared not to have a problem with that but said he would
prefer to reopen the entire contract early for negotiations of the
entire contract. Rudd did not have a problem with that and
Seltzer suggested that since a trustees meeting was coming up
in June, that the matter he discussed with Greg Ball, Seltzer’s
son-in-law, who had replaced him on the pension fund board.
In June at the pension fund trustees’ meeting, Rudd and Ida
Leachman, union vice president discussed with Greg Ball early
reopening of negotiation. Ball agreed and stated that he would
like a new contract by September 1994. When Rudd returned
to his office he wrote a memo to Leachman outlining plans to
begin early negotiations.
II. UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
During late June and July, Respondent contacted the Union
concerning various problems such as vacations, work repri-
mands, and probation period. As a result Leachman filed about
eight grievances. As a result of filing these grievances, Ball
called Rudd and stated he was no longer interested in early
negotiations for a new contract if Leachman was going to con-
tinue to file grievances. According to Rudd’s credible testi-
mony Ball was adamant about this position. However, in mid-
December 1994, Rudd and Leachman met with Ball and Frank
Dolan, general operations manager on the pending grievances
which were set for arbitration. During this meeting all but two
of the grievances were settled and Ball agreed to go forward
with early negotiations for a new contract. The parties agreed
to meet, and did so, on January 11, 1995, some 6 months after
first agreeing to early bargaining.
This 6-month delay in commencing early negotiations be-
cause the Union was fulfilling its duty as the exclusive collec-
tive-bargaining representative of the unit employees by giving
what it considered to breach the contract. This incident is
barred by Section 10(b) of the Act.
Between January 11, 1995, and August the parties met for
four bargaining sessions to no avail since the Respondent with-
drew recognition of the Union in August 1995, prior to the
expiration of the current agreement.
At the first January meeting, the Union was represented by
Rudd and International Representative Aletha Johnson and a
five-member negotiating committee of unit employees. The
Respondent was represented by Ball, Frank Dolan, and Human
Resources Manager Gloria Kelley. The Union gave Respon-
dent a comprehensive proposal. After caucusing, the Respon-
dent’s representative returned and Ball expressed surprise and
disappointment that the Union wanted so many changes and
stated that he had expected only a few economic changes.
Rudd testified, and the Union’s contemporaneously made
notes of the meeting reflect that, among other things, Ball
stated that there were four areas or items about which Respon-
dent would not negotiate and conditioned further negotiation on
the union’s agreeing to those items. These conditions were that
Respondent would not negotiate regarding piece work rates for
the unit; it would not negotiate regarding the arbitration of
piece work rates, the Union must agree that any contract agreed
upon would provide that the loser pay all costs for arbitration
including all travel and other expenses for the arbitration, and
that the probationary period for some new employees be in-
creased from 60 calendar days to 90 working days. Rudd testi-
fied that these were “musts” and that Respondent would not
negotiate with respect to these proposals.
Where Ball and Rudd’s testimony is in conflict, I credit
Rudd. Based not only on demeanor and consistency, but upon
Balls’ testimony to the affect that the Respondent welcomed the
Union, pointing out that it had voluntarily recognition the Un-
ion. While it is true that Sam Seltzer, cofounder of the Com-
pany had voluntarily recognized the Union about 1991, as
found and more fully discussed below Respondent’s agents
participated in obtaining employee support for a decertification
petition and unlawfully withdrew recognition prior to the expi-
ration of the collective-bargaining agreement.
General Counsel’s Exhibit 9, a notice posted in the plant to
all employees, demonstrates that Respondent supported decerti-
fication of the Union and urged the employees to win a victory
by a big “NO UNION” vote.
I find the General Counsel has sustained his burden of proof
that the Respondent refused to bargain in good faith about the
four items set fourth above, which are mandatory subject of
bargaining and maintained that position throughout bargaining
in violation of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The parties next met for bargaining on March 1, with the
same negotiators except Ida Leachman who replaced Althea
Johnson. On January 12, the Union had mailed Respondent a
revised proposal. (Jt. Exh. 3.) According to the testimony of
Rudd and Leachman and the contemporaneous notes made by
the Union [GC Exh. 4(a) and (b)]2 the meeting began with
Ball’s asking the Union’s position on the items Respondent had
stated it must have, and were not negotiable before an agree-
ment could be consummated. The Union’s position was the
same as at the first meeting, insisting it could not waive bar-
gaining over these mandatory bargaining items. Rudd ques-
tioned the legality of Ball’s insistence that piece rates were not
subject to grievance and arbitration. Ball responded that he did
not see anything illegal since they had never negotiated piece
rates at the Livingston, New Jersey plant and that Respondent
had the right to control its costs. Rudd responded that he was
not trying to take away Respondent’s right to set or change
piece work rates, but was merely seeking the right to challenge
such acts through the grievance-and-arbitration provision if it
believed such rates to be unfair or wrong.

2 It appears that Respondent did not make notes of what transpired at
the bargaining sessions. If it did they were not offered into evidence or
referred to in any manner.
ALLISON CORP. 1373
They discussed insurance and apparently compared the Un-
ion’s plan which was then in effect, and near the end of the
meeting, the Respondent gave the Union some private insur-
ance proposals that it had obtained. It appears there was some
discussion and comparison of these proposals. No agreement
was reached on any contract provision. There was an agree-
ment that the parties would meet again on May 16, 1995.
On March 2, 1995, the Union, by letter, requested that Re-
spondent furnished it with information regarding piece work
rates. Specifically, piece work rates in effect at the beginning
of the contract; rates that had been changed since that time and
the reasons therefore; and the annual gross earnings of current
employees for the years 1990 through 1994. On May 16, the
parties met for negotiation where this issue was discussed but
no agreement. The following sequence of events occurred with
respect to the request. On April 18, more than 6 weeks later,
the Respondent requested assurances of confidentiality stating
“as soon as I receive this assurance I will be able to reply to
your request.” On May 1, the Union provided a letter of assur-
ance that the information would be confidential.
On May 2, 1995: Company writes to describe the volumi-
nous nature of documents comprising the requested piecework
data and that only the originals are available, maintained in NJ
office. Company offers to permit inspection at the New Jersey
office, or copying by the Union at $12.50/hr. plus 10 cents per
page [J–19].
On May 18, 1995: Union writes to request Company ship
the requested documents to the Somerville plant for the Union’s
review and copying [J–23].
On May 24, 1995: The Company writes to state it “is now
and always was prepared to make this information available to
the union” and only asks the Union to reimburse the expenses
for labor and copying, or, as an alternative, the Union can re-
view the documents in the New Jersey headquarters where they
are maintained. The Company states the requested documents
are irreplaceable and the Company cannot allow them to leave
the New Jersey office without a backup copy having been
made. The Company invites the Union to submit alternative
suggestions to address these concerns [J–29].
On June 2, 1995: The Union writes to renew its request for
piecework rates, stating it is willing to review the data at the
Somerville plant [J–36].
On June 30, 1995: The Company responds to Union’s June
2 letter by referring the Union back to Exhibit J-29, the Com-
pany’s letter of May 24 [J–43].
On July 6, 1995: The Union writes and requests that the
Company pay the Union’s travel expenses to New Jersey, or
furnish the documents for review at the Somerville plant [J–
46].
On July 11, 1995: The Company writes to say the Union’s
July 6 proposal [J–46] would increase, not decrease, the Com-
pany’ costs, and does not address the Company’s concern about
maintaining a copy of its original documents in its New Jersey
headquarters office [J–50].
On July 26, 1995: The Company offers to provide a copy of
the year end piecework rates (800–1000 pp.) at the Somerville
plant, and the Union can copy whatever it wants on the Com-
pany copy machine at 10 cents per page [J–57].
On July 28, 1995: The Union requests “at least 6 copies” of
the documents offered by the Company in J–57 [J–61].
On August 10, 1995: The Company writes to again offer the
Union the opportunity to review the 800–1000 pages of docu-
ments at the Somerville plant, at which time the Union could
make however many copies they wished at 10 cents per page
[J–63].
On August 16, 1995: The Union writes and states “As you
suggested in your letter of August 10, 1995, the Union review
the time studies . . . at the Somerville Plant.” [J–66.] The
Company letter of August 10 [J–63] referred to the data origi-
nally offered by the Company in Exhibit J-57, which pertained
to piece work rates, not timestudies.
On August 21, 1995: After withdrawal of recognition the
Company writes that it is preparing the piece work incentive
rates described in J–57, and would advise the Union when it
was available [J–69]. Ball testified “We were relieved that he
finally accepted our offer and we decided to send the docu-
ments directly to his office” [Ball at Tr. 286].
On August 1995: The Company sends the Union one copy
of the year-end piecework rates for each year of the contract [J–
70].
As discussed below, on August 14, 1995, the Respondent
withdrew recognition of the Union. It was not until August 25,
almost 2 weeks after it withdrew recognition that Respondent
supplied some of the information requested and it was not
nearly as voluminous as Respondent had represented it to be,
why? The General Counsel argues that Respondent was trying
to remedy its failure to do so earlier. It is still perplexing that
Respondent would wait until after it withdraws recognition to
supply the information.
It is clear that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act by failing to timely supply the information sought. The
Supreme Court has long held that an Employer has the obliga-
tion to provide the Union all information for collective bargain-
ing that is relevant and necessary. NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co., 385 U.S. 432, 435–436 (1967). The information sought by
the Union was clearly information that has a direct bearing on
wages and is, therefore, a mandatory subject of bargaining.
Antelope Valley Press, 311 NLRB 459, 460 (1993); Dynamic
Machine Co., 221 NLRB 1140, 1142 (1975); Food Employer
Council, Inc., 197 NLRB 651 (1972).
The next issue in sequence is that the Respondent subcon-
tracted unit work which resulted in the layoff of Somerville
employees. On May 5 and 12, Respondent laid off a number of
employees. The Respondent, in the past, has seasonal layoffs
of two or three people for a week or so, but had never laid off
as many as this time since the Union had represented the em-
ployees at the Somerville plant. They had never requested
Respondent bargain over these layoffs because of an in balance
in the production line.
The parties came to the May 16, 1995 bargaining session and
the Union was concerned over the May 5, 1995 layoff as well
as the layoff of May 12, 1995, of which the Union was again
not advised of prior to the event. Rudd inquired about the lay-
offs and Ball said that they have to be competitive and they
have to import because the customers want the fabric from Italy
and their competitors are importing (GC Exh. 5, p. 1, 10, pp. 1–
2; Tr. 35–36, 103–104). He said that business was down for
the retailers and that they had a terrible last three months there-
fore they had to have a layoff and Frank Dolan said that they
were down from about 72 employees to about 40 employees
(GC Exh. 5). Ball also said that they have the skill and ability
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1374
to make them here but it is too costly and he is in business to
make a profit. Rudd requested information on the specifics of
the Italian imports and Ball refused to disclose that information.
Ball replied in addition to denying the information that they
would import more because the Union antagonized him (GC
Exh. 5). The parties then discussed 16 proposals that the Re-
spondent had put on the table and they were not accepted by the
Union. The Respondent maintained its position on the must
items for they were contained in the proposal presented by the
Respondent (Jt. Exh. 12; GC Exh. 5, pp. 6–7; Tr. 34, 104). In
discussing insurance the Respondent wanted to know the rates
for insurance and Rudd tried to explain that due to so much
downsizing in the industry the percentage of payroll was no
longer being accepted by the insurance fund. Ball wanted the
insurance rates and stated unless he had the information he
could not give a raise (GC Exh. 5, pp. 15–16; Tr. 35). Rudd
suggested that Ball tell the Union what they could afford for
insurance and a pay raise and Ball rejected that idea (GC Exh.
5, p. 16; Tr. 35). There was not any agreement reached by the
parties at this meeting.
On May 18, 1995, the Union requested, from the Respon-
dent, information on the piece work rates and information about
the imports the Respondent disclosed at the January 11 and
May 16 negotiating sessions (Jt. Exhs. 23 and 24). There was
another plethora of correspondence between the parties from
this session until the next negotiating session (Jt. Exhs. 25–55).
Of importance among these letters is the May 24, 1995 letter
from the Respondent saying that the layoffs were not due to the
imports; the May 24, 1995 letter from the Respondent to the
Union making another excuse for not providing the information
requested by the Union on March 2, 1995; the June 2, 1995
letter from the Union requesting again the information on im-
ports and how it affected the employees originally requested on
May 18, 1995; the June 2, 1995 letter from the Union renewing
its request for timestudies and piece work rates; the July 6,
1995 letter from the Union confronting Respondent’s new ex-
cuse for not providing the information requested; and the July
11, 1995 letter from the Respondent with another excuse for not
providing the Union with the material it is entitled to in order to
represent its members (Jt. Exhs. 29, 30, 35, 36, 46, and 50).
The collective-bargaining contract provides that the Respon-
dent shall have the right to subcontract (Jt. Exh. 1, pp. 17, sec.
138). The Respondent relies on this provision and its past prac-
tice of importing to refuse to notify the Union that it was im-
porting seat covers from Italy. As noted above, Respondent has
a history through most of its existence of importing up to 900
types of automobile accessory products.
However it appears that these were items which it did not
produce in its plants in the United States and did not result in
loss of work for any Somerville employees. However, the im-
portation of seat covers sewn in Italy bears a direct relationship
to loss of work at the Somerville plant and thus contributed to
the layoff of employees.
The Respondent contends that the importation of finished
seat covers from Italy was not the cause of the layoffs here.
Rather it contends a slump in orders was the reason. This posi-
tion is not tenable as Respondent was filling the orders it had
with the imported seat covers.
The Respondent’s position that it has an unrestricted right to
subcontract based on its contract is misplaced (Tr. 292). The
minimal language in the collective-bargaining agreement’s
management-rights clause is not sufficient to waive the Union’s
right to bargain over this mandatory subject of bargaining.
Accordingly, the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of
the Act by unilaterally subcontracting bargaining unit work
which led to the layoff of unit employees. Reece Corp., 294
NLRB 448 (1989), and Public Service Co., 312 NLRB 459
(1993).
What turned out to be the last negotiating session took place
on July 20, 1995 (GC Exh. 6; Tr. 54, 109). Rudd was not pre-
sent for the Union nor was Alma Logan, who resigned from the
Union and therefore was no longer a member of the bargaining
committee (GC Exh. 7; Tr. 118–119). The Union had sent a
letter to Respondent after the March 1, 1995 negotiating session
regarding confusion at the meeting and suggested that to allevi-
ate that problem in the future the negotiating sessions be tape
recorded (GC Exh. 9; Tr. 32). The Respondent rejected that
proposal (Tr. 32). A large part of the negotiating session of
July 20, 1995, was taken up with the Respondent questioning of
Leachman if she or any member of her committee were secretly
tape recording the session (GC Exh. 6). The Union rejected the
Respondent’s economic proposal and the Respondent continued
to say that it could not make any wage proposals until the in-
surance issue was resolved and Ball repeated his position that
the Respondent was considering replacing the union’s insur-
ance program with another plan (GC Exh. 6, p. 3; Tr. 113).
Also Respondent in this session withdrew a proposal it had
made in its March 15, 1995 proposal and took the position that
the employees be allowed to get out of the Union anytime (GC
Exh. 6, p. 5; Tr. 112–113). This was a regressive proposal and
further showed the bad faith of the Respondent as well as
showed that the Respondent wanted to make it easier for the
members to get out of the Union. Ball said that the employees
would have to be a Philadelphia lawyer to understand how to
get out of the Union as provided in the check-off authorization
card (GC Exh. 6, p. 5).
There were no agreements reached at the July 20, 1995 nego-
tiating session (Tr. 113). It is patently clear that the Respon-
dent has been engaging in bad-faith bargaining in these few
bargaining sessions from January 11 to July 20, 1995. While
the Respondent did not have to begin these early negotiating
sessions but it thought it provided an opportunity and would be
to its advantage to do so (Tr. 303). However, once it had
agreed to enter into early negotiations normal bargaining obli-
gations attached to these negotiations. The first evidence of the
Respondent’s bad faith was when Ball refused to begin early
negotiations in 1994 after it proposed them because the Union
was filing and processing grievances. This conduct cannot be
alleged as an unfair labor practice because it is 10(b), but is
evidence of the thought process of Ball and evidence of the
unlawful mind set of the Respondent as the parties prepared to
enter into negotiations.
On May 18, the Union requested information relating to the
Respondent’s subcontracting such as copies of Orders, in-
voices, et cetera, it had placed with companies outside America
for products that could have been produced at the Somerville
plant. Names and addresses of companies that Allison had
imported goods that could have been produced in this plant as
well as comparison and breakdown of costs of producing them
in Somerville and overseas. The Union also requested much
other data about to products relating to imports. The Respon-
dent has refused to timely supply this information which is
necessary and relevant to the Union performance of its duties as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representatives of the Unit.
ALLISON CORP. 1375
For the reasons set forth above with respect to Respondent’s
refusal to supply information relating to its piece work rates.
Respondent had a duty to supply this information and its failure
to do so violates Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
The complaint alleges that Respondent through its supervisor
and agent participated in the circulation of a petition to decer-
tify the Union. The General Counsel concedes that the events
set forth below might not establish conclusively Respondent’s
involvement with the decertification petition but that the accu-
mulation of the events is sufficient to find that Respondent was
involved in the solicitation of the decertification petition.
Former employee Timmy Worles who was not a member of
the Union testified that on July 28, 1995, Paula Logan, a sister
of Alma Jan Logan, who works there thought was still chief
union steward and a member of the bargaining committee,
brought a petition to him and asked him to sign it to get a vaca-
tion and a raise. He signed the petition which was in a red spi-
ral notebook. Worler later learned that what he had signed was
a petition to get a vote to vote the Union out. Worles further
testified that the following Monday while at work, he saw
Cushion Department Supervisor Nancy Avent get a red spiral
notebook from Alma Jane Logan, the former union chief stew-
ard, in the sewing department and carry it toward the ware-
house. A few minutes later she returned without the notebook
and talked with Logan a while. She then went back to the
warehouse and returned with the notebook which she gave back
to Logan. Worles was adamant that it was the same notebook
Paula Logan had which contained the petition to vote to get the
Union out. Avent denied that she ever got a red spiral notebook
from Alma Jane Logan.
Maxine Whitaker testified that prior to July 20, 1995 she saw
Plant Manager Tommy Williams talking to Alma Jane Logan at
Logan’s work station. Logan then left her work station and
went into Williams office where she remained for about an
hour. Logan denied that she was ever in Williams office during
that period of time.
Another incident the General Counsel would argue in sup-
port of his theory that the chain of circumstantial evidence link-
ing the Respondent to the decertification petition was testimony
given by former employee Donell Whitley. Whitley testified
that in late July Paula Logan talked to her about getting out of
the Union. Whitley further testified that about the same time
Human Resources Manager Gloria Kelley asked if he had any
problems and if so to let her know. Whitley further testified
that Kelley asked him if he wanted to get out of the Union and
if so to come to her and let her know. Whitley further testified
that Kelly asked him if he wanted to get out of the Union and if
so to come to her and let her know. This incident was not al-
leged in the complaint. However, Kelley testified and denied
the incident.
I find that the totality of this conduct by Respondent’s super-
visor and agents is sufficient to find Respondent was aware of
the Petition and actively supported it.
Withdrawal of Recognition
Alma Jane Logan testified that she initiated the drive to ob-
tain a sufficient number of signatures on a petition to have an
election to vote on whether the Union represented a majority of
the employees. She testified that her sister, Linda, who worked
at another company instructed her on how to do this. She and
another sister who worked at Allison along with a couple of
other employees obtained the signatures of employees in a cou-
ple of days during lunch and break periods. She then took the
petition to the Labor Board in Memphis where a Board agent
told her she needed six more signatures to file a petition. She
apparently obtained these and filed a petition.
On receipt of the petition by Respondent, it wrote a letter to
the Union stating that it was withdrawing recognition of the
Union. Logan admitted being in Plant Manager Tommy Wil-
liams office on a number of occasions, but denies she was ever
there for an hour or that Williams had anything to do with the
petition. William did not testify.
The General Counsel argues that the letter withdrawing rec-
ognition of the Union dated August 14, 1995, is a violation of
the Act because it occurred during the life of the current collec-
tive-bargaining agreement (Jt. Exhs. 1, 65). BASF-Wyandotte
Corp., 276 NLRB 498 (1985); Burger Pitts, Inc., 273 NLRB
100 (1984). The collective-bargaining agreement was not to
expire until the first Monday in September 1995 (Jt. Exh. 1, p.
21, sec. 16). The withdrawal of recognition is illegal because
the agreement is still in effect but also because it took place in
the face of unremedied unfair labor practices, e.g., the bad-faith
bargaining, not to mention the tainted petition on which Re-
spondent relied.
The Respondent contends that a withdrawal of recognition is
lawful if supported by a majority of bargaining unit employees,
or if an employer has a reasonably grounded good-faith doubt
concerning the Union’s majority status. Atwood & Morrill
Cork, A. W. Schlesinger Geriatric Center, 304 NLRB 296
(1991).
Contracts with fixed terms of more than 3 years will act as
bars to election petitions only during the first 3 years of the
contract. General Cable Corp., 139 NLRB 1123 (1962); Van-
ity Fair Mills, 256 NLRB 1104 (1981). In this case, the con-
tract, Exhibit J–2, had a 4-year term and the Company with-
drew recognition after 3 years had expired.
I find the withdrawal of recognition here to violate Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act since it occurred in an atmosphere of
unremedied unfair labor practices and is tainted by supervisory
participation and assistance.
The pay raise
Respondent admits that in January it granted a pay raise to
all its unit employees. The Respondent never made an eco-
nomic proposal to the Union during negotiations. It argues that
it did not make such a proposal during negotiations because the
Union refused to give it cost proposals for it pension and insur-
ance plans and it therefore could not determine the total cost of
an economic package proposal.
Accordingly, Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act as found above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Allison Corporation, is an employer en-
gaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
2. The Union, Furniture Workers Division, I.U.E. Local 282
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. The unit described herein is a unit appropriate for pur-
poses of collective bargaining.
4. By conditioning negotiations on the Union’s first agreeing
that the following items were not negotiable. Piece work rates
for the unit; regarding the arbitribility of piece work rates; that
the loser pay all costs including expenses for arbitration, and
agreeing to increase the probationary period for certain new
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 1376
employees from 60 calendar days to 90 working days Respon-
dent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to timely furnish the Union the in-
formation it requested on March 2, 1995, relevant to piece work
rates, which information is necessarily and relevant for the
Union performance of its duties as the exclusive collective-
bargaining representative of the unit employees. Respondent
has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. By subcontracting out unit work which resulted in the lay-
off of unit employees without giving the Union prior notice and
affording it an opportunity to bargain with respect to such sub-
contracting and its affect on unit employees. Respondent has
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
7. By failing and refusing to timely furnish the Union with
the information it requested about May 18, 1995, with respect
to such subcontracting which information is necessary and
relevant to the Union’s performance of its duties as the exclu-
sively collective-bargaining representative of the unit employ-
ees. Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act.
8. By participation of supervisor personal in the circulation
of a petition to decertify the Union, Respondent has violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
9. By on or about August 14, 1995, withdrawing recognition
of the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of employees in an appropriate unit. Respondent has vio-
lated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
10. By unilaterally, and without notice to the Union and af-
fording it an opportunity to bargain during the first week of
January 1996 and implementing a unilateral wage increase to
unit employees Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1)
of the Act.
11. The unfair labor practices set forth above affect com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent, Allison Corporation, has
engaged in certain unfair labor practices, set forth above, it
shall be ordered to cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
Because Respondent withdrew recognition of the Union as
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of employees
in an appropriate unit and failed and refused to furnish the Un-
ion with certain information requested by the Union which is
necessary and relevant to the Union in the performance of its’
duties as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of
the unit employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
Act, it is ordered to within 14 days of this order restore recogni-
tion to the Union and furnish the union with the information it
has heretofore requested which is necessary and relevant to the
Union in the performance of its duties as the exclusive collec-
tive bargaining of the employees in the above-described unit,
and on request bargain in good faith with the Union as the ex-
clusive representative of the employees in the appropriate unit.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]