Allis-Chalmers Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Apr 21, 1977

229 N.L.R.B. 190 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Allis-Chalmers Corporation and James D. Poston.
Case 25-CA-5824
April 21, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENELLO AND WALTHER
On January 5, 1977, Administrative Law Judge
Eugene George Goslee issued the attached Decision
in this proceeding. Thereafter, the General Counsel
filed limited exceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs, and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings,' and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order,2 as
modified herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and orders that the Respondent,
Allis-Chalmers Corporation, LaPorte, Indiana, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the said recommended Order, as so
modified:
i. In paragraph 1(a) add the words "or any other
labor organization" at the end of the sentence.
2. In paragraph 1(b) delete the words "like or
related," and substitute the word "other."
3. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
' General Counsel's motion to correct typographical errors in the
Administrative Law Judge's Decision is hereby granted.
2 We find merit in both of General Counsel's exceptions. Therefore, we
shall add the words "or any other labor organization" after the name of
Local 1319 in par. I(a) of the recommended Order. In addition, we shall
substitute the word "other" for "like or related" in par. I(b) of the
recommended Order, as warranted by the extent and nature of Respon-
dent's discriminatory and coercive actions. A-Z Manufacturing & Sales Co.,
Inc., 177 NLRB 254 (11969). We shall also substitute a new notice to
employees for that of the Administrative Law Judge. reflecting the
aforementioned changes.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT transfer or demote James D.
Poston or any other employee because he has
utilized the grievance procedures in the collective-
bargaining agreement between Allis-Chalmers
Corporation and Local 1319, United Automobile,
Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, or any other labor organization.
WE WILL NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section
7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make James D. Poston whole for any
loss of earnings he may have incurred because we
discriminatorily transferred him from his job on
Z-bar production to a job on the cornhead
production line, and because of our subsequent
failure to reinstate him to his former job, together
with interest thereon at the rate of 6 percent per
annum.
ALLIS-CHALMERS
CORPORATION
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
EUGENE GEORGE GOSLEE, Administrative Law Judge:
This case came on to be heard before me at LaPorte,
Indiana, on November 22 and 23, 1976, upon a complaint
issued by the General Counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board and an answer filed by Allis-Chalmers
Corporation, hereinafter sometimes called the Respon-
dent.' The issues raised by the pleadings relate to whether
or not the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended. Briefs
have been received from the General Counsel and the
Respondent, and have been duly considered.
Upon the entire record in this proceeding, and having
observed the testimony and demeanor of the witnesses, I
hereby make the following:
I The complaint in this proceeding was issued on August 31, 1976, upon
a charge filed by James D. Poston on September 18, 1973, and duly served
on the Respondent on the same date.
229 NLRB No. 41
190
ALLIS-CHALMERS CORP.
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PRELIMINARY MATTERS (COMMERCE, JURISDICTION,
AND LABOR ORGANIZATION)
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that
(1) the Respondent is engaged at its facility at LaPorte,
Indiana, in the manufacture and sale of farm equipment;
(2) its sales of equipment and purchases of goods and
materials in interstate commerce meet the Board's stand-
ards for the assertion of jurisdiction; and (3) the Respon-
dent is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. The complaint
also alleges, the answer admits, and I find that Local 1319,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, hereinafter called the Union, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ALLEGED
The original complaint in this matter alleged two counts
of 8(a)(l) violations and one count of an 8(a)3) violation.
As to the 8(a)(1), the original complaint alleged that, in
March and June 1973, the Respondent's agents threatened
employees with demotions and other unspecified reprisals
if they persisted in filing grievances or engaging in other
union or concerted activities. With respect to the 8(aX3),
the original complaint alleged that on May 29, 1973, the
Respondent transferred James D. Poston to a less desirable
and less lucrative job because Poston filed grievances with
the Union and engaged in other protected concerted
activities. In addition, however, on November 15, 1976, 7
days before the scheduled hearing in this matter, the
General Counsel issued an amendment to the complaint
alleging that, on several unknown dates between June and
August 1973, the Respondent's agent "threatened its
employees with demotion if they did not refrain from
staying away from union representatives."
By its answer, and again by motion made at the outset of
the hearing, the Respondent contends that all allegations of
the complaint as amended, except for the 8(aX3) allegation
of the discriminatory demotion of Poston, should be
dismissed. More particularly, the Respondent argues that
on November 29, 1973, the Regional Director administra-
tively closed all portions of the charge, save the allegation
of discrimination against Poston, and therefore, the 8(aX1)
allegations of the complaint and the amendment are not
based upon any charge filed within the 6-month period
specified in Section 10(b) of the Act. For the reasons
related below, I have found merit in the Respondent's
motion.
The record reflects that the charge in this case was filed
on September 18, 1973, and alleged, inter alia, the
demotion of Poston, and certain 8(a)(1) conduct arising as
a result of the activities of Foreman Kenneth Johnson with
respect to threats of discharge and comments he made to
other employees concerning Poston's use of the grievance
machinery in the collective-bargaining agreement. On
2 Collver Insulated Wire, A Gulf and Western Systems Co., 192 NLRB 837
(1971).
November 28, 1973, the Charging Party, James D. Poston,
sent a telegram to Region 25 with the following request:
In reference to charges 25-CA-5824 filed by me against
Allis Chalmers Corporation I hereby withdraw all
allegations therein except the allegation that I was
removed from a piece work job because I filed a
grievance earlier [over] my back injury.
On the following day, November 29, 1973, the Regional
Director for Region 25 sent a letter to the Respondent in
which he advised that pursuant to the Board's arbitration
deferral policy under Collyer,2 he had administratively
determined that the matter of the alleged discriminatory
demotion of James D. Poston should be deferred for
arbitration. In addition to the foregoing, the Regional
Director also informed the Respondent:
All allegations of the charge except the claim the
Charging Party was discriminatorily transferred from
piece work on May 29, 1973 have been withdrawn.
On June 5, 1973, Poston filed a grievance under the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement alleging
willful discrimination by Foreman Kenneth Johnson. More
particularly, Poston alleged in the grievance that on May
29, 1973, Johnson transferred him to another job because
Poston had filed a grievance on May 25 concerning the
Respondent's nonpayment of medical bills. Poston's
grievance was not resolved under the preliminary steps of
the grievance procedure, and on May 21, 1974, the matter
was heard before Arbitrator Arlen Christenson. On July 21,
1974, Christenson handed down his arbitration award,
finding that discrimination for union activities was not
encompassed within the terms of nondiscrimination clause
in article II of the bargaining agreement, and he according-
ly denied the grievance.
There is literally no record evidence of any activities with
respect to this case between the date of July 21, 1974, when
the arbitrator issued his award, and August 31, 1976, the
date on which the original complaint in this matter was
issued. The most the record reflects is that on some
unidentified date after July 21, 1974, Poston requested the
Regional Director to revoke his decision to defer and to
resume processing of the charge. There is no evidence,
however, that Poston's request to proceed encompassed
any allegation in the original charge other than the matter
of his discriminatory transfer and demotion. There is
similarly no evidence that either upon Poston's request, or
sua sponte, the Regional Director gave notice to the
Respondent of intent to reactivate those allegations of the
charge which were withdrawn on November 28, 1973.
On the basis of the foregoing evidence, and in accord-
ance with the provision of Section 10(b) of the Act. I
granted the Respondent's motion to dismiss all allegations
of the complaint and its amendment, save the allegation of
discrimination against Poston. Under the rule of Bryan
Manufacturing, 3 however, the General Counsel was permit-
ted to adduce evidence in support of the 8(aX 1) allegations,
3 Local Lodge 1424, International Association of Machinists, AFL-CIO, et
al. [Bryan Manufacturing Company] v. N.LR.B. 362 U.S. 411, 416 (1960).
191
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
limited to the extent such evidence would shed light on
Poston's transfer and demotion.
James D. Poston was hired by the Respondent on
November 13, 1972, in the classification of assembler.
Poston worked in Departments 25, 42, and 8 1. As a general
rule Poston worked in Department 81, the cornhead line,
for the greater portion of the year, but was transferred to
other departments when the cornhead line was not in
operation. Poston's immediate foreman was Kenneth
Johnson, an acknowledged supervisor and agent of the
Respondent.
Poston testified that in May 19734 he was appointed by
the Union as a replacement steward, and continued in this
position until August 16. I do not find, however, that
Poston's stewardship was any motivating factor in the
discrimination he alleges was practiced against him. Under
the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
Union is obligated to notify the Company in writing of the
names of those employees appointed as stewards and other
union functionaries. Notice of Poston's appointment was
not given to the Respondent until June 8, after the date of
the alleged discrimination, and in the absence of any other
credible evidence of knowledge to the Respondent, the
record is insufficient to support a finding that Poston was
discriminated against because of his appointment or
activities as a steward.
The record leaves no doubt, nevertheless, that Poston
assiduously took advantage of the grievance procedure in
the collective-bargaining agreement, and there is equally
no lack of credible record evidence that Poston's grievanc-
es were resented by Foreman Kenneth Johnson. The
record reflects that, on April 25, Poston filed three
grievances alleging violations of the collective-bargaining
agreement on grounds of (1) Johnson's failure to credit
Poston for work performed; (2) misassignment of employ-
ees; and (3) by changing the shift starting time for second
shift employees in Department 81. Poston testified that
after he filed the grievance relating to the change in shift
time, he and other employees reported to work at 3:30
p.m., and Johnson put them to work sweeping floors. There
was some discussion among the employees and Johnson
told Poston, "Poston, you hillbilly, you instigated this
whole damned thing." Poston denied that he had instigated
anything, but wrote the grievance because the shift change
violated the union contract. On April 26, Poston filed a
fourth grievance relating to the change in shift times, and
demanded pay at time-and-one-half for lost time. Johnson
commented to Poston that he did not like the hours, but
acknowledged the filing of the grievance with his signature.
On May 15, Poston filed a further grievance alleging that
Johnson had failed to give him credit for 35 to 40 units he
had produced.
In the interim, on the night of April 26, Poston was
allegedly injured on the job when Johnson started the line
while Poston was attempting to remove a blower unit.
Poston told Johnson that he had injured his back. Johnson
replied that there was no nurse on duty, but that he
intended to file an accident report. At the beginning of the
shift on April 27, Poston again told Johnson that his back
was bothering him, and he wanted to see a doctor. After
commenting, "I made out a report, what the hell else do
you want me to do," Johnson walked off.
On the following Monday, Poston obtained insurance
papers and was sent to see the plant nurse. The nurse
commented that she wondered where Poston had been
because Johnson had filed an accident report, and he
explained that he had been trying to get information as to
the procedures to follow to see a doctor. A Mr. Bier, safety
director, directed Poston to return to work until Bier could
consult with Johnson. Later on the same day Poston asked
Johnson if Bier had contacted him about seeing a doctor,
and Johnson answered, "What the hell you doing working
here Friday and Saturday if your back is bothering you so
bad." Poston protested that no arrangements had been
made for him to see a doctor, and told Johnson that he
intended to see his own doctor.
Poston did visit his own physician, who took him off
work for one or more days. When he returned to work
about May 6 or 7, Johnson assigned Poston to the Z-bar
assembly line, to replace employee Phil Bonasiak, who
wanted another assignment. Poston accepted the assign-
ment to make right-hand Z-bars, while employee James
Brown was assigned to the second table making left-hand
Z-bars. A week or more later a third table was set up on the
Z-bar line.
Having attended his own doctor, Poston attempted to
collect the doctor's charges from the Company, but after
several consultations his request was refused. On May 25
Poston filed a further grievance alleging that Johnson's
unsafe conduct had caused the accident, and additionally
grieved the Respondent's refusal to pay his doctor's bill.
On or about May 26, Poston reported to work on the Z-
bar line, but was told by employee Charles Bunch not to
rush setting up his work table. Poston asked why and
Bunch replied that on the previous evening Johnson had
stated that he was going to take Poston off Z-bar work. A
short time later Johnson came up and told Poston that he
was taking him off the job and putting him on the
cornhead line. Poston asked why and Johnson replied,
"Because I need you over there." Poston accused Johnson
of transferring him to the cornhead line because of his
grievances, and Johnson countered, "Why don't you write
a few more."
Poston reported to work on the cornhead line on the
following workday, and was assigned by Johnson to
Station No. 1. Approximately 1-1/2 weeks later while
Poston was preparing a grievance, Johnson came up and
told Poston that he didn't have to write up the grievance
because Johnson was going to put him back on Z-bars.
When Poston returned to the Z-bar assembly he was
assigned to the third table, which had been started shortly
after his initial assignment to Z-bar production. The
employee assigned to the third Z-bar table made both right
and left hand products, and unlike the employees assigned
to tables I and 2, the third assembler had to walk a
considerable difference to obtain the necessary component
parts.
4 All dates hereinafter are in 1973, unless specified to the contrary.
192
ALLIS-CHALMERS CORP.
Poston continued to work at the third table on Z-bars for
about 1-1/2 weeks. Johnson made some comment to
Poston about his work and Poston replied that if he had to
work on the third table, he might just as well return to the
cornhead line. Johnson replied, "That can be arranged."
On the following workday Poston was reassigned to the
cornhead line, and employee Jerry Dolan took over the Z-
bar work at the third table.
Poston remained on the cornhead line until about
September 23, and was usually assigned to Station No. 1.
On September 23 Night Shift Superintendent Schultz told
Poston to report to Production Manager DeGray. DeGray
told Poston that there was a leadman's opening in
Department 43, and because Poston and Johnson were
having a lot of trouble, DeGray wanted to transfer him to a
new job. Poston questioned whether DeGray wanted him
to take the job, or only wanted to get him out of
Department 81. DeGray answered that he wasn't sending
Poston to a new job because he was a troublemaker, but
because there was a job to be done. Poston accepted the
transfer, and apparently continued to work in this position
as long as he was in the Respondent's employ. However, in
the interim Poston filed the grievance of June 5, alleging
that the transfer accomplished by Foreman Johnson was a
willful act of discrimination.
The background evidence in this proceeding material to
Johnson's motivation for the transfer of Poston from Z-bar
production to the cornhead line is not limited to the latter's
testimony as reviewed above. Employee Marion G. Hayes
testified that on the night before Poston was transferred to
the cornhead line, he was present in the concession area of
Department 81 with Foreman Johnson and a number of
other employees. Speaking to the employees in general,
albeit to no particular employee, Johnson stated that
Poston had stuck it into him that day and he was going to
get him where it hurt, in his back pocket. Hayes testified
that he was present on other occasions when Johnson
signed grievances filed by employees, and that Johnson
threatened that if Hayes ever filed a grievance he would
lose his leadman's job. Hayes further testified that after
Poston filed the grievance of June 5, Johnson told him that
Poston was nothing but an instigator and troublemaker,
and that if Hayes associated with him in any way he would
get himself in trouble. On other occasions, when discussing
Poston's grievances, Johnson threatened that if Hayes
didn't stay away from Poston he would lose his leadman's
job.
Hayes' testimony concerning Foreman Johnson's re-
marks on the evening before Poston's transfer to the
cornhead line was corroborated in major part by employ-
ees Herman Howard and James Howard. Both of these
witnesses agreed that Johnson did not name Poston
specifically, but that he did threaten to put it to Poston
where it hurt, and identified that place as Poston's back
pocket or billfold. While there are minor variations in the
versions of Johnson's specific remarks concerning what he
intended to do to Poston, the variations are insignificant,
and no reason exists to discredit these employee witnesses.
Similarly, while I credit the evidence that Johnson did not
specifically name Poston as the target for his reprisal, the
chain of events which immediately followed constitutes
uncontroverted proof that Johnson was referring specifical-
ly to James Poston.
Kenneth Johnson testified in this proceeding and
summarily denied that he had ever threatened Poston to
hurt him financially because he filed grievances or acted as
a union steward. Johnson also summarily denied that he
made any statement to other employees that he would get
Poston financially because he had filed grievances or acted
in the capacity of a steward. Johnson did confirm,
however, that in a pretrial statement given to the Board, he
acknowledged having told other employees to be cautious
with regard to Poston. Johnson claimed to have no
recollection of what the conversations were about, or what
prompted his comments about Poston.
Johnson also acknowledged that he assigned Poston to
Z-bar production, and placed the time of the initial
assignment as occurring in May or June. According to
Johnson, after 5 or 6 weeks he transferred Poston to the
cornhead line because a third man was not needed for Z-
bar production. Johnson additionally testified that at a
later time he reestablished the third table for Z-bars,
offered Poston a transfer back, but Poston refused and
stated that he was happy on the cornhead line.
I do not credit any of Kenneth Johnson's testimony in
this proceeding, except where it is corroborated by other
testimonial or documentary evidence. Johnson's summary
denial that he ever threatened Poston or other employees
with retribution because of the filing of grievances is far too
simplistic. This record is replete with evidence of remarks
made by Johnson to Poston and others about the filing of
grievances and the reprisals likely to be visited on those
who did. Johnson was not questioned concerning the
details of any of these conversations, and the inference is
required that his testimony would have corroborated the
evidence that he was vehemently opposed, and took
personal affront, to the employee's utilization of the
grievance machinery. Because of the partial withdrawal of
the charge in this matter and the limitations imposed by
Section 10(b) of the Act, Johnson's threats of reprisal
against Poston cannot serve as the basis of finding of
independent violations of Section 8(aXI). There is, nev-
ertheless, evidence of Johnson's motive for the transfer and
demotion of Poston. The finding is supported in relevant
part, moreover, by the evidence that DeGray explained
Poston's September 23 transfer on grounds of the trouble
between Johnson and Poston. Insofar as this record
reflects, the only trouble between Johnson and Poston was
the latter's frequent utilization of the grievance machinery,
and DeGray's explanation of the reasons for Poston's
transfer is at least a tacit acknowledgment that Johnson
engaged in willful discrimination.
Similarly, I place no credit in Johnson's testimony that
he transferred Poston to the cornhead line because a third
man was not needed on the Z-bar tables. It is uncontrovert-
ed that when Poston was initially assigned to Z-bars only
two employees were assigned to production of that
component part. Shortly after the initial assignment a third
table was established, and employee Charles Bunch was
assigned to that job. When Johnson transferred Poston to
the cornhead line, Bunch was transferred to Table No. 2,
193
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and employee Pete Hall was assigned to take over Table
No. 3.
The Respondent contends that no discrimination has
been proved in this case because there is no evidence that
Poston suffered any loss by reason of his transfer to the
cornhead line. The Respondent has cited no precedent, and
I am aware of none, wherein proof of discrimination
necessitates proof that the object of the discrimination
suffered economic loss. It is clear from Foreman Johnson's
remarks to the employees that his motive in transferring
Poston was to hurt him in the pocket book, and with the
proscribed motive established the issue of the extent to
which he succeeded in hurting Poston financially is a
matter for compliance, not a matter for determination in
this underlying unfair labor practice proceeding.
Even if, however, I could find merit to the Respondent's
contention, the record here amply supports the General
Counsel's theory that Poston's assignment on the cornhead
line was a less desirable job than his assignment on Z-bar
production. Concededly, as the Respondent asserts, both
jobs have the classification of assembler, both paid the
same guaranteed hourly rate, and both provided for
incentive pay if the employee achieved an established
production rate. Further, as the Respondent asserts, the
majority of its employees at the LaPorte facility are
classified as assemblers, there is no contractual prohibition
against transferring employees from job to job within the
classification, and all employees are frequently transferred
from one assembler's job to another, both incentive and
nonincentive, as production needs require.
Considering all of these factors, I find, nevertheless, that
work on the cornhead line is less desirable than work on Z-
bars in terms of both the difficulty of the work and the pay
it is possible to earn. An employee assigned to Z-bar
production works by himself in the complete and final
assembly of that component part. An employee assigned to
the cornhead line works with 30 or more other employees,
so that the production level reached, which is the condition
for incentive pay, requires the performance of multiple
tasks by a large crew. Upon the uncontradicted testimony
of Poston and other employee witnesses in this proceeding,
I find that work on the cornhead line was more difficult
and dangerous than work on Z-bar assembly, and I further
find that the potential for incentive pay on the latter job
was greater than on the cornhead line. The credited
evidence is that at times material to Poston's transfer the
cornhead line achieved only about 80 percent of the
production required for incentive pay, while those assigned
to Z-bar production achieved 140 to 145 percent. This
credited evidence is urgently supported by Johnson's threat
that Poston's transfer to the cornhead line would result in a
financial loss.
In summary I find and conclude that Poston's transfer
from Z-bar production to the cornhead line was motivated
by reasons prohibited by the Act, and that the transfer
violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act. I further find
that the discrimination against Poston was not remedied
when Johnson subsequently transferred him back to the
5 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
third table in the Z-bar production area. Because of the
location of the table and the necessity to walk some
distance for parts, Poston was unable to achieve the
production he had previously obtained when assigned to
Table No. 2. Moreover, Johnson's continuing discrimina-
tion against Poston is exemplified by the evidence that
employee Charles Bunch was assigned to Table No. 3, but
when Poston was transferred back to Z-bar production,
Bunch was moved up to Table No. 2, Poston's former
assignment.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, I shall recommend that it be
ordered to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain
affirmative actions to remedy the unfair labor practices
and to effectuate the policies of the Act.
James D. Poston is no longer employed by the Respon-
dent, there is no evidence that his leaving the Respondent's
employ was other than voluntary, and, accordingly, no
reinstatement remedy is required. I will order, however,
that the Respondent make Poston whole for any loss of
earnings he may have incurred by reason of the discrimina-
tion practiced against him, by payment to him of the
amount of money he would have earned had he not been
transferred from Z-bar production to the job on the
cornhead line, plus interest thereon as prescribed in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716 (1962).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. The Respondent, Allis-Chalmers Corporation, is an
employer within the meaning of Section 2(2) of the Act,
and is engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Local 1319, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, is
a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
3. By transferring James D. Poston from his job on Z-
bar production to a job on the cornhead line and by
thereafter failing to reinstate Poston to his former position
of employment because Poston filed grievances under the
provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, the
Respondent violated Section 8(aX3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and upon the entire record in this proceeding, and
pursuant to the provisions of Section 10(c) of the Act, I
hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER s
The Respondent, Allis-Chalmers Corporation, LaPorte,
Indiana, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
I. Cease and desist from:
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions, and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
194
ALLIS-CHALMERS CORP.
(a) Transferring or demoting its employees because they
have utilized the grievance procedures of the collective-
bargaining agreement between Allis-Chalmers Corporation
and Local 1319, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the National Labor
Relations Act.
2. Take the following affirmative actions to remedy the
unfair labor practices and to effectuate the policies of the
Act:
(a) Make whole its employee James D. Poston for any
loss of earnings he may have incurred by reason of his
discriminatory transfer from Z-bar production to the
cornhead production line, and the subsequent failure to
reinstate him to his former job, together with interest
thereon as prescribed in the Remedy section hereof.
(b) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
6 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
payroll records, production records, social security pay-
ment records, timecards, personnel records and reports,
and all other records necessary to analyze and compute the
amount of backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(c) Post at its plant at LaPorte, Indiana, copies of the
attached notice marked "Appendix." 6 Copies of said
notices on forms to be provided by the Regional Director
for Region 25, after being duly signed by the Respondent's
duly authorized representative, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken to
insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered
by other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 25, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps have been taken to comply herewith.
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
195