All Phase Consulting, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 23, 2020

2019000860 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 23, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/971,979 12/16/2015 Elvis Abreu APC001 5704
66068 7590 06/23/2020
RICHARD A. BAKER, JR.
New England Intellectual Property, LLC
291 Main Street
WEST NEWBURY, MA 01985
EXAMINER
HUA, QUAN M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2645
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/23/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
RICHARD_A_BAKER_JR@YAHOO.COM
USPTO@dockettrak.com
rbaker@newenglandip.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ELVIS ABREU and OSVALDO RODAMEZ ABREU
____________

Appeal 2019-000860
Application 14/971,979
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, and
LARRY J. HUME, Administrative Patent Judges.

COURTENAY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1–6, 9–12, 14–17, 20–26, 28, and 31–43, which
constitute all the claims pending in this application. Claims 7, 8, 13, 18, 19,
27, 29, and 30 are canceled. We have jurisdiction over the pending claims
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). An oral hearing was conducted on May 21, 2020.
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). According to Appellant, the real party in interest is All
Phase Consulting, Inc. See Appeal Br. 3.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE2
Introduction
Embodiments of Appellant’s invention relate generally to
“simultaneously managing an incoming call while playing media on the
electronic device, without interrupting the playing of the media on the
electronic device.” (Spec. ¶ 11).
Representative Independent Claim 14
14. An electronic device employing an uninterrupted media
play and call management system for managing an incoming call
during playing of a viewable media on the electronic device
without interrupting the playing of the media on the electronic
device, the electronic device further employing a single
translucent screen that is configured to simultaneously allow
uninterrupted playing of the viewable media and at least one or
more of managing calls or text messaging, the electronic device
comprising:
a non-transitory computer readable storage medium
configured to store computer program instructions defined by the
uninterrupted media play and call management system;
at least one processor communicatively coupled to the
non-transitory computer readable storage medium, the at least
one processor configured to execute the defined computer
program instructions;
a display screen configured to display a graphical user
interface provided by the uninterrupted media play and call
management system; and
the uninterrupted media play and call management system
comprising:

2 We herein refer to the Final Office Action, mailed Mar. 26, 2018 (“Final
Act.”); Appeal Brief, filed Aug. 23, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s
Answer, mailed Oct. 4, 2018 (“Ans.”); and Reply Brief, filed Nov. 13, 2018
(“Reply Br.”).
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a data reception module configured to receive an
indication of the incoming call during the playing of the
media on the electronic device via the graphical user
interface;
a notification generation module configured to
generate a notification object with one or more of a
plurality of call management options for the incoming call
in one of a plurality of configurable formats based on
preconfigured criteria, wherein the preconfigured criteria
comprises a text only mode for allowing communication
using text messages while supporting the continued
playing of the media on the user device via the graphical
user interface without the interruption by the incoming
call;
a notification overlay module configured to overlay
the generated notification object with the one or more of
the call management options as the single translucent
screen on the graphical user interface, while supporting
continued playing of the media on the electronic device
via the graphical user interface without interrupting the
incoming call, wherein the single translucent screen
allows viewing of the media being played on the graphical
user interface;
the data reception module further configured to
receive a selection of one of the one or more of the call
management options through the overlaid notification
object from the electronic device and process the received
selection of the one of the one or more of the call
management options; and
an action module configured to perform one or
more executable actions on one or more of the incoming
calls and the playing of the media on the electronic device
based on the processed selection of the one of the one or
more of the call management options, the call
management options comprising:
accepting the incoming call while supporting the
continued playing of the media on the user device; and
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sending a message indicating an availability of the
user device only for the text communication for the
duration of the playing of the media.
Appeal Br. 33–36, CLAIMS APPENDIX (Disputed limitations emphasized).

Evidence
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence:
Name Reference Date
Luehrig et al. US 2003/0039339 A1 Feb. 27, 2003
Hannum et al. US 2006/0020993 A1 Jan. 26, 2006
Ort et al. US 7,342,594 B1 Mar. 11, 2008
Eide et al. US 2008/0209480 A1 Aug. 28, 2008
Carion et al. US 2009/0036105 A1 Feb. 5, 2009
Vendrow US 2009/0086953 A1 Apr. 2, 2009
Sommer US 2009/0187956 A1 July 23, 2009
Yeh et al. US 2010/0261505 A1 Oct. 14, 2010
Dorcey US 2013/0254708 A1 Sept. 26, 2013
“Incoming Mail” Non-Patent Literature Oct. 6, 2013
Cannon et al. US 2014/0018049 A1 Jan. 16, 2014
Kim et al. US 2014/0215401 A1 July 31, 2014
Kim et al. US 2015/0121278 A1 Apr. 30, 2015

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Rejections
Rej. Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis
A 43 112(a) Written description
B 14, 15,
21–23, 28
103 Cannon et al. (“Cannon”), Eide et al.
(“Eide”), Ort et al. (“Ort”), Kim et al.
(US 2015/0121278 A1) (“Kim ’278”),
Luehrig et al. (“Luehrig”)
C 1–4, 9, 20,
32, 40–42
103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig
D 5, 33, 36 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig, Kim
et al. (US 2014/0215401 A1) (“Kim
’401”)
E 16, 24 103 Cannon, Eide, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Kim ’401
F 6, 31 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig, Kim
’401, Carion et al. (“Carion”)
G 17 103 Cannon, Eide, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Kim ’401, Carion
H 11, 34 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Sommer
I 25 103 Cannon, Eide, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Sommer
J 10 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Hannum et al. (“Hannum”)
K 12, 35 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Dorcey
L 26 103 Cannon, Eide Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Dorcey
M 37, 38 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Incoming Mail
N 39 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig, Yeh
et al. (“Yeh”)
O 43 103 Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, Luehrig,
Vendrow

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ANALYSIS
Rejection A of claim 43 under
35 U.S.C. § 112(a), written description

Claim 43 recites: “The method of claim 42, wherein the plurality of
incoming calls includes a first incoming call and a second incoming call, the
first incoming call being accepted, the second incoming call occurring
during the accepted first incoming call.”
Appellant notes the Examiner relies upon paragraph 47 of the
Specification in his analysis. See Final Action 30: “The Specification
merely mention calls being handled in a generic sense, such as shown in
¶ 0047 for example denying all calls.” However, Appellant contends:

the best description of the Claim 43 term “the plurality of
incoming calls includes a first incoming call and a second
incoming call, the first incoming call being accepted, the second
incoming call occurring during the accepted first incoming call”
is in paragraph [0042] and the snippet of code included therein
(the description of this term can be found elsewhere in the
Specification as well). Paragraph [0042] discusses a “stack of
calls” and then provides the PhonecallReceiver class code
snippet to show how the plurality of calls is handled. The initial
comments say that the receiver is recreated randomly, indicating
that it is created whenever a call is received. The code also
includes a lastState and a current state. This indicates that the
code handles the lastState==CALL_STATE_OFFHOOK and
the state==CALL_STATE_RINGING, which is the situation
described in Claim 43, where the first incoming call is accepted
(lastState == CALL_STATE_OFFHOOK) and a second call
occurring.
As such, claim 43 is enabled by, at a minimum,
paragraph [0042], and the Applicants respectfully request that
the Examiner's rejection under 35 USC § 112, ¶ 1 be overturned.
Appeal Br. 28 (emphasis added).
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Our reviewing court guides the written description “must clearly
allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor]
invented what is claimed.” Ariad Pharm., Inc. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d
1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation and quotations omitted). The
test is whether the disclosure “conveys to those skilled in the art that the
inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”
Id. “[A]ctual ‘possession’ or reduction to practice outside of the
specification is not enough. Rather, . . . it is the specification itself that must
demonstrate possession.” Id. at 1352; see also PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile
USA, Inc., 522 F.3d 1299, 1306–07 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 112,
¶ 1 “requires that the written description actually or inherently disclose the
claim element”).
Our reviewing court provides further guidance:
[I]t is “not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be
able to construct the patentee’s device from the teachings of the
disclosure. . . . Rather, it is a question whether the application
necessarily discloses that particular device.” . . . A description
which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing
date is sought is not sufficient.

Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536 (CCPA 1963)).
Thus, under the controlling authority of Lockwood, the requisite
written description support for dependent claim 43 “is a question [of]
whether the application necessarily discloses that particular device . . . A
description which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing
date is sought is not sufficient.” Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (emphasis
added).
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Applying this reasoning here, we have reviewed the code listing
(including the embedded comments), as described in paragraph 42 of
Appellant’s originally-filed Specification. At best, we find the code listing
and embedded comments in paragraph 42 of the Specification merely
describe plural calls (e.g., “by identifying a stack of calls is implemented as
a wrapper for a ‘PhonecallReceiver’ class . . . .”).
In particular, Appellant has not shown written description support for
the temporal limitation recited in claim 43: i.e., “the first incoming call being
accepted, the second incoming call occurring during the accepted first
incoming call.” (Emphasis added).
We note the listing in paragraph 42 of the Specification (on pages 19
and 20) indicates (in the code listing comment) that the “Incoming call- goes
from IDLE to RINGING when it rings, to OFFHOOK when it’s answered,
to IDLE when it is hung up.” However, we find nothing in the subsequent
“switch (state)” case statement that necessarily discloses a “second incoming
call occurring during the accepted first incoming call,” as recited in
dependent claim 43 (emphasis added). See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.
To the extent that Appellant’s code listing (Spec. ¶ 42) might
arguendo suggest the temporal limitation recited in claim 43 (and thus
render it obvious), we find Appellant has not identified sufficient written
description support, as required to show possession of the invention under
35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph, because Lockwood (107 F.3d at 1572)
guides that a “description which renders obvious the invention for which an
earlier filing date is sought is not sufficient.” (emphasis added). Therefore,
on this record, we find Appellant has not shown the originally-filed
Specification “conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had
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possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.” Ariad Pharm.
598 F.3d at 1351. See claim 43.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s Rejection A of claim 43
under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a), as lacking adequate written description to
demonstration possession of the dependent claim 43 limitation added by
amendment during the prosecution. Cf. Original claims 1–20.

Rejection B of Independent Claim 14, and
Rejection C of Independent Claims 1, 20, and 40

Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, we focus our analysis on the following argued
limitations regarding Rejection B of independent claim 14, and also on
Rejection C of independent claims 1, 20, and 40, which recite similar
limitations.
Issue: Did the Examiner err by finding that the cited references
collectively teach or suggest the disputed limitations:

an action module configured to perform one or more executable
actions on one or more of the incoming calls and the playing of
the media on the electronic device based on the processed
selection of the one of the one or more of the call management
options, the call management options comprising:
[A] accepting the incoming call while supporting
the continued playing of the media on the user device; and
[B] sending a message indicating an availability of
the user device only for the text communication for the
duration of the playing of the media[,]
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within the meaning of independent claim 14?3 (Emphases added). See Final
Act. 34–35.
Appellant contends Cannon does not teach an action module
accepting a call. Appeal Br. 25. In particular, Appellant urges:
Each of claims 1-6, 9-12, 14-17, 20-26, 28, and 31-43
contain the term “an action module . . . accepting the incoming
call while supporting the continued playing of the media on the
user device”. The Office Action looks to Cannon for this term
(as well as Kim at [0033]), in particular looking to paragraph
[0004]: “As a specific example, assume that a user watches a
television program. In response to detecting occurrence of a
phone call, conventional technology can be used to initiate
display of a phone number, and possibly a name associated with
the person making the phone call, on a television screen.
Accordingly, based on information about the call displayed on
the display screen, the subscriber can decide whether to answer
or ignore the call.”
Appeal Br. 25 (emphasis added).
However, Appellant is incorrect. Only claims 14, 23–26, and 40
positively recite “an action module” (emphasis added). This list includes
independent claims 14 and 40. Claims 15–17, 21, 22, and 28 also include
an “action module” by virtue of their dependency from independent claim
14. Independent claim 40 has no dependent claims. Therefore, the argued
“action module” is only pertinent to claims 14–17, 21–26, 28, and 40.

3 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
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Rejection C of Independent Claims 1 and 20
Regarding independent claims 1 and 20, and the claims which depend
therefrom, these claims are silent regarding any mention of “an action
module” as recited in independent claims 14 and 40. However, claims 1 and
20 recite the same call management options, identified herein as limitations
A and B:
performing one or more executable actions on one or more of
the incoming calls and the playing of the media on the user
device by the uninterrupted media play and call management
system based on the processed selection of the one of the one
or more of the call management options, the call management
options comprising:

[A] accepting the incoming call while supporting the
continued playing of the media on the user device; and

[B] sending a message indicating an availability of the
user device only for the text communication for the duration of
the playing of the media.
Claim 1 (emphasis and bracketed labeling added).
We emphasize the claim 1 language that merely requires: “performing
one or more executable actions . . . based on the processed selection of the
one of the one or more of the call management options” A and B. (emphasis
added).
Independent claim 20 also recites: “performing one or more
executable actions . . . based on the processed selection of the one of the one
or more of the call management options A and B. (emphasis added).
See independent claim 20, in pertinent part:
a fifth computer program code for performing one or more
executable actions on one or more of the incoming calls and the
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playing of the media on the user device based on the processed
selection of the one of the one or more of the call management
options, the call management options comprising:

[A] accepting the incoming call while supporting the
continued playing of the media on the user device; and

[B] sending a message indicating an availability of the
user device only for the text communication for the duration of
the playing of the media.
Claim 20 (emphasis and bracketed labeling added).
As an initial matter of claim construction for independent claims 1
and 20, we conclude claims 1 and 20 merely require the cited combination
of references to teach or suggest performing one or more executable actions
on one or more of the incoming calls based on the “processed selection” of
either call management option A or call management option B, but not both
A and B.
When a claim covers several alternatives, the claim may be
unpatentable if any of the alternatives within the scope of the claim are
taught by the prior art. See Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2001); see also Schumer v. Lab. Computer Sys., Inc., 308 F.3d 1304, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d at 1352).
This reasoning is applicable here. Therefore, for independent claims 1
and 20 (which do not include an “action module”) the Examiner need only
show one of call management options A or B. We note Appellant has not
traversed the Examiner’s specific findings regarding the “sending a
message” call management option B for independent claims 1 and 20. See
Final Act. 44 (citing Luehrig, TABLE 2, chat option). Arguments not made
are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Because Appellant also argues that “Cannon does not teach an action
module accepting a call” with respect to independent claims 1 and 20, which
do not recite an “action module,” we find Appellant’s argument for claims
1 and 20 is not commensurate with the scope of the claims, and is therefore
unpersuasive. See Appeal Br. 25 (emphasis added).

Rejection B of Independent Claim 14 and
Rejection C of Independent Claim 40

Independent claims 14 and 40 identically recite, in pertinent part:
an action module configured to perform one or more
executable actions on one or more of the incoming calls and the
playing of the media on the electronic device based on the
processed selection of the one of the one or more of the call
management options, the call management options comprising:

[A] accepting the incoming call while supporting the
continued playing of the media on the user device; and

[B] sending a message indicating an availability of the
user device only for the text communication for the duration of
the playing of the media.

For the reasons discussed infra regarding independent claims 14 and
40, which recite an “action module,” we find the Examiner has provided a
teaching or suggestion of the disputed call management option A
(“accepting the incoming call while supporting the continued playing of the
media on the user device.”).
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Claim Construction of an “Action Module”
We note that Figure 6 of Appellant’s drawings depicts the claimed
“action module” merely as a box labeled “action module.” Our reviewing
court has articulated a new standard of review for claim language that relies
on “nonce” words (such as “module”), instead of express means-plus-
function language (using the word “means”), as follows:

The standard is whether the words of the claim are
understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a
sufficiently definite meaning as the name for structure.
Greenberg, 91 F.3d at 1583. When a claim term lacks the word
“means,” the presumption can be overcome and [pre-AIA] § 112,
para. 6 will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the claim
term fails to “recite sufficiently definite structure” or else recites
“function without reciting sufficient structure for performing
that function.” Watts, 232 F.3d at 880.

Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(emphasis added).
Here, Appellant appears to have substituted the “nonce” word
“module” in place of “means for” —i.e., independent claims 14 and 40 recite
an “action module” that we conclude connotes a generic “black box” for
“performing one or more executable actions . . . based on the processed
selection of the one of the one or more of the call management options,
the call management options comprising:” the recited functions A and B
(emphasis added).
Therefore, a question arises as to whether Appellant has established in
the Specification or Drawings (or by other evidence of record) that the
“action module” recited in independent claims 14 and 40, would have been
understood by persons of ordinary skill in the art to have a sufficiently
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definite meaning as the name for a specific structure capable of performing
the intended functions.
“Structure disclosed in the specification qualifies as ‘corresponding
structure’ if the intrinsic evidence clearly links or associates that structure to
the function recited in the claim.” Williamson LLC, 792 F.3d at 1352 (citing
B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
Although Appellant’s Specification at paragraph 108 (as discussed by
Appellant during the May 21, 2020 oral hearing — See RECORD OF ORAL
HEARING Transcript 7, ll. 5–12, 19) describes various functions performed
by the “action module” according to several different embodiments, our
reviewing court guides: “the fact that one of skill in the art could program a
computer to perform the recited functions cannot create structure where
none otherwise is disclosed.” Williamson LLC, 792 F.3d at 1351 (citing
Function Media, L.L.C. v. Google, Inc., 708 F.3d 1310, 1319 (Fed. Cir.
2013)) (emphasis added).
The Federal Circuit has held “the corresponding structure for a § 112
¶ 6 claim for a computer-implemented function is the algorithm disclosed in
the specification.” Aristocrat Techs. Austl. Party Ltd. vs. Int’l Game Tech.,
521 F.3d 1328, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
417 F.3d 1241, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added).
Additionally, specific portions of the specification must clearly link or
associate a computer program or algorithm to the function corresponding to
the claimed means. See Medical Inst. & Diag. Corp. v. Elektra AB, 344 F.3d
1205, 1211 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
Paragraph 108 of Appellant’s Specification describes functional
language, in pertinent part: “The action module 607 performs one or more
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executable actions on the incoming call and/or the playing of the media on
the user device 601 based on the received and processed selection of the call
management options.” (Emphasis added).
In particular, paragraph 108 of the Specification describes: “In an
embodiment, the action module 607 configures the GUI 610a into a
configurable number of interface sections to allow a recipient of the
incoming call to execute one of the call management options during the
playing of the media on the user device 601.” Spec. ¶ 108 (emphasis
added).
Regarding the “recipient of the incoming call” (i.e., a person) who
executes “one of the call management options” as described in paragraph
108 of the Specification (emphasis added), our reviewing court provides
precedential authority that “a human being cannot constitute a ‘means.’”
Default Proof Credit Card Sys., Inc. v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 412 F.3d
1291, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1398
(CCPA 1969)).
Because we find paragraph 108 of the Specification does not provide
a supporting algorithm that is clearly linked to the function(s) corresponding
to the claimed means (i.e., an “action module” — which cannot be a human
being), a question arises as to whether any patentable weight should be
accorded to the disputed “action module” and associated functions A and B
(call management options), as recited in independent claims 14 and 40
(emphasis added).
In the event of further prosecution, we leave it to the Examiner to
determine whether Appellant’s Specification describes sufficient structure
corresponding to the claimed “action module” for performing the recited
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functions to the extent that at least independent claims 14 and 40 (and the
claims which depend therefrom) may be indefinite under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b)
(emphasis added). “If there is no structure in the specification
corresponding to the means-plus-function limitation in the claims, the claim
will be found invalid as indefinite.” Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Techs. Corp.,
490 F.3d 946, 950 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although the Board is authorized to
reject claims under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn
when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (“MPEP”) § 1213.02 (9th ed., Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018)).4
Moreover, we agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings regarding
the claimed disputed call management option A, as recited in independent
claims 14 and 40: “accepting the incoming call while supporting the
continued playing of the media on the user device.” See Final Act. 34.
In particular, the Examiner (id.) points to paragraph 27, inter alia, of
Cannon which describes, in pertinent part: “a subscriber can manage
incoming calls via input with respect to visual prompts simultaneously
displayed on a display screen along with concurrently displayed streaming
content.”

4 In the alternative, if Appellant’s claimed “action module” is merely
software per se (see Specification, Figure 6, box 607 labeled “ACTION
MODULE,” wherein if the element is not a “means” to which 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, sixth paragraph analysis is applicable, then the claimed “action
module” is simply an element defined solely by the function to be
performed (i.e., the claimed “action module” is a purely functional element
unlimited by any particular structure for performing the recited function).
As such, the claim would be unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, for lack of an enabling disclosure commensurate with the scope
of the claim. In the event of further prosecution, we leave such
determination to the further consideration of the Examiner.
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We emphasize that “the question under 35 USC 103 is not merely
what the references expressly teach but what they would have suggested to
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made.” Merck
& Co. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis
added) (quoting In re Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)); see also
MPEP § 2123.
This reasoning is applicable here. Therefore, for at least the
aforementioned reasons, on this record, and based upon a preponderance of
the evidence, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred regarding
the disputed “action module” claim limitation that is “configured to
perform one or more executable actions on one or more of the incoming
calls and the playing of the media on the electronic device based on the
processed selection of the one of the one or more of the call management
options, the call management options comprising:” functions A and B (as
identified above), as recited in independent claims 14 and 40.

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Combinability of the References
Appellant contends the Examiner has not presented a prima facie case
for combining Cannon, with the secondary teachings of Ort, Luehrig, and
Eide, based upon the following arguments:
1. The respective teachings of each of Ort, Luehrig, and Eide cannot
be relied on to provide the motivation for combining each with
the Cannon reference.
2. The earlier disclosure dates of the Ort, Luehrig, and Eide
reference clearly demonstrates that it is not obvious to combine
each with the later disclosed Cannon reference.
3. The Examiner has not specified the person skilled in the art, as
required for an obviousness analysis.
4. The different patent classes under which Ort, Luehrig, and Eide
are organized constitutes additional evidence of non-
obviousness.
5. Cannon teaches rejecting calls, not ways of accepting calls, and
thus teaches away from the claimed invention.
6. The present invention fills a long felt need, as articulated by the
Declaration of Alejandra Martinez Cuevas.
See Appeal Br. 15–25.
We note independent claims 1, 20, and 40 were rejected by the
Examiner under Rejection C, based upon the collective teachings and
suggestions of Cannon, Ort, Kim ’278, and Luehrig.
In contrast, Rejection B of independent claim 14 was rejected by the
Examiner over the collective teachings of Cannon, Eide, Ort, Kim ’278, and
Luehrig.
We note Appellant appears to be contesting the combinability of the
references of independent claims 1, 20 and 40 (as rejected under Rejection
C) on the basis of independent claim 14, which is rejected under
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Rejection B. However, under our procedural rule, it is improper to argue
claims as a single group if some of the claims were rejected by the Examiner
under a different ground of rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
We nevertheless address Appellant’s combinability arguments
seriatim:
1. The respective teachings of each of Ort, Luehrig, and Eide
cannot be relied on to provide the motivation for combining each with
the Cannon reference.
Appellant argues that each of Ort, Luehrig, and Eide merely teaches
an embodiment of the invention and there’s no reason or hint as to why one
of ordinary skill in the art would combine each teaching with Cannon. See
Appeal Br. 16–22.
The Examiner disagrees, and states: “obviousness may be established
by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the
claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge
generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Fine, 837 F.2d
1071 (Fed. Cir. 1988), In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 (Fed. Cir. 1992), and
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See Ans. 17.
The Examiner finds that modifying “Cannon’s non-interruption
viewing system to include Eide’s features of simultaneously sending texts,
instant messages on the content they are viewing on their mobile devices
without stopping the content on a graphical user interface” would be
“advantageous . . . [to] support multi-tasking users” (emphasis added).
Final Act. 35.
The Examiner additionally finds that modifying “Cannon’s non-
interruption viewing system to include Ort’s features of rendering
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overlapping graphical objects on a mobile device wherein the ‘blocking’
object is rendered as translucent to avoid a non-blocking display” would
“advantageously avoid irritating obstruction of other content.” Final Act.
36 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the Examiner also finds that “includ[ing] the plurality of
call handling options of Cannon with the specific options of Luehrig to
advantageously provision interactive communications in manners that
overcome various limitations [as] discussed in Luehrig- ¶0004-0006,
[would] allow alternative means for communication in inconvenient
situations.” Final Act. 37 (emphasis added).
We note that an obviousness inquiry is not limited to the prior art’s
preferred embodiment. See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348,
1370 (Fed. Cir. 2007). “Combining two embodiments disclosed adjacent to
each other in a prior art patent does not require a leap of inventiveness.”
Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 554 F.3d 982, 991 (Fed. Cir.
2009). “[I]n a section 103 inquiry, ‘the fact that a specific [embodiment] is
taught to be preferred is not controlling, since all disclosures of the prior art,
including unpreferred embodiments, must be considered.’” Merck & Co. v.
Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting In re
Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (CCPA 1976)).
Appellant does not point to any evidence of record that shows
combining the teachings of Cannon, Eide, Kim ’278, and Luehrig in the
manner proffered by the Examiner (Final Act. 35) would have been
“uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill in the art” or
would have “represented an unobvious step over the prior art.” Leapfrog
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Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
Therefore, based upon our review of Rejection B, (modifying Cannon
with the teachings and suggestions of Eide, Ort, Kim ’278, and Luehrig),
and Rejection C (modifying Cannon with the teachings and suggestions of
Ort, Kim ’278, and Luehrig), we find the Examiner has provided sufficient
“articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
See Final Act. 35–37 (Rejection B, including three motivation statements),
and Final Act. 43–44 (Rejection C including two motivation statements).
Hindsight
Appellant also repeatedly argues that “[u]sing the present application
as a roadmap is improper hindsight reconstruction.” Appeal Br. 17, 19,
and 21.
The Examiner disagrees and explains that “‘[a]ny judgement on
obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based on hindsight
reasoning, but so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was
within the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time the claimed invention
was made and does not include knowledge gleaned only from Appellant’s
disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper.’” In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d
1392, 1395 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013). See Ans. 19–20, 23, and 25.
We note Appellant has not identified knowledge gleaned only from
the present application that was not within the level of ordinary skill at the
time the claimed invention was made. See McLaughlin, 443 F.2d at 1395.
Moreover, Appellant has not provided any objective evidence of secondary
considerations (e.g., unexpected results), which our reviewing court guides
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“operates as a beneficial check on hindsight.” Cheese Sys., Inc. v. Tetra Pak
Cheese & Powder Sys., Inc., 725 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
2. The age (earlier disclosure dates) of the Ort, Luehrig, and Eide
references is insufficient to show non-obviousness.
Appellant argues with respect to Ort that “the history of the
technology in this area clearly demonstrates that it is not obvious to combine
Ort with Cannon. Ort was filed in 2000, a dozen years before Cannon
(2012). If it were obvious, then Cannon would have incorporated Ort’s
work from years before in his patent application. Cannon did not include
Ort, because it was not obvious to Cannon to do so.” Appeal Br. 17.
Additionally, Appellant repeats the same argument regarding the age of the
references against both Luehrig and Eide. See Appeal Br. 19 and 21–22.
The Examiner disagrees and explains that “there is no specific MPEP
provision or case law that specifies history of technology or the chronological
order among qualified prior art[] as an indicia of nonobviousness.” Ans. 18,
22, and 23.
We agree with the Examiner’s response because In re Wright (569
F.2d 1124, 1127 (CCPA 1977)) guides: “The mere age of the references is
not persuasive of the unobviousness of the combination of their teachings,
absent evidence that, notwithstanding knowledge of the references, the art
tried and failed to solve the problem.”
3. The Examiner has not specified the person skilled in the art, as
required for an obviousness analysis.
Appellant argues that “[w]ithout an analysis of a person of ordinary
skill in the art, the Examiner has not presented a prima faci[e] case for
obviousness.” Appeal Br. 17.
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In response, we note the level of skill in the art is “a prism or lens”
through which we view the prior art and the claimed invention. Okajima v.
Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“the level of skill in the art
is a prism or lens through which a judge, jury, or the Board views the prior
art and the claimed invention”). Factors pertinent to a determination of the
level of ordinary skill in the art include: (1) educational level of the inventor;
(2) type of problems encountered in the art; (3) prior art solutions to those
problems; (4) rapidity with which innovations are made; (5) sophistication
of the technology, and (6) educational level of workers active in the field.
Environ. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693, 696–697 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (citing Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appl., Inc., 707 F.2d
1376, 1381–82 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Not all such factors may be present in
every case, and one or more of these or other factors may predominate in a
particular case. Id. Moreover, these factors are not exhaustive but are
merely a guide to determining the level of ordinary skill in the art. Daiichi
Sankyo Co. Ltd., Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
In determining a level of ordinary skill, we also may look to the prior
art, which may reflect an appropriate skill level. Okajima, 261 F.3d at 1355.
Additionally, the Supreme Court informs us that “[a] person of ordinary skill
is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.” KSR, 550 U.S. at
421.
Here, Declarant Alejandra Martinez Cuevas attests that a “Bachelor’s
Degree in Computer Science” plus relevant experience qualifies the
Declarant “as an expert in the field of media play and call management
systems.” Declaration 1. We accept this general level of
education/experience as representative of the level of ordinary skill in the art
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as applicable to this appeal.
4. The different patent classes under which Ort, Luehrig, and Eide
are organized constitutes additional evidence of non-obviousness.
Appellant also argues that the classification system differences
amongst the Cannon, Ort, Luehrig, and Eide patent references are additional
evidence of non-obviousness. Appeal Br. 17–19 and 21–22.
The Examiner disagrees (Ans. 20), and asserts that while Patent
Office classification of references and the cross-references in the official
search notes of the class definitions are some evidence of “nonanalogy” or
“analogy” respectively in determining what is analogous prior art for the
purpose of analyzing the obviousness of the subject matter at issue, the
predecessor to our reviewing court has found “the similarities and
differences in structure and function of the inventions disclosed in the
references to carry far greater weight.” In re Ellis, 476 F.2d 1370, 1372
(CCPA 1973). See Ans. 20.
The evidence of classification in different categories by the PTO “is
inherently weak . . . because considerations in forming a classification
system differ from those relating to a person of ordinary skill seeking
solution for a particular problem.” In re Mlot-Fijalkowski, 676 F.2d 666,
670 n. 5 (CCPA 1982). “Whether a reference in the prior art is ‘analogous’
is a fact question.” In re Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (citing
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1568 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1987)).
We agree with the Examiner because we find the cited references are
reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is
involved. Although diverse classifications amongst the cited references can
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constitute some evidence of “non-analogy,” we find this evidence is far
outweighed by the references’ structural and functional similarities that
render them analogous art.
On this point, Appellant has not proffered any additional argument or
evidence showing why the cited references do not possess any structural and
functional similarities to the claimed invention. Nor has Appellant
explained why these references are not reasonably pertinent to the problem
faced by the inventor, assuming arguendo that a particular reference is not in
the same field of endeavor as the claimed invention. 5
5. Cannon teaches rejecting calls, not ways of accepting calls, and
thus teaches away from the claimed invention.
Appellant also argues that “Cannon, in its abstract, teaches against the
claims articulated in the present patent application. As such, one of ordinary
skill in the art, looking at Cannon would have stopped reading further in
Cannon, and could not have been inclined to create the current invention.”
Appellant specifically asserts that “Cannon teaches rejecting calls, not ways
of accepting calls.” Appeal Br. 22 (emphasis added).
Additionally, Appellant also looks to support in the Declaration of
Alejandra Martinez Cuevas (“Declarant”), dated February 16, 2018 and
submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 1.132, in which the Declarant opined that

5 Two separate tests define the scope of analogous prior art: (1) whether the
art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed
and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor's endeavor,
whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem
with which the inventor is involved. In re Deminski, 796 F.2d 436, 442
(Fed. Cir. 1986); see also In re Wood, 599 F.2d 1032, 1036 (CCPA 1979)
and In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004).

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“Cannon teaches against answering the call. Cannon focuses on blocking
calls and not displaying notifications.” Decl. ¶ 12 (emphasis added).
Appellant’s argument in substance appears to be that Cannon
essentially “teaches away” from the claimed invention. The Examiner
disagrees and points to paragraph 114 of Cannon as permitting “accepting
calls.” Ans. 29. See Cannon ¶ 114: i.e., “If the user 108 does not
answer the phone device 115, the call may be forwarded to voice mail. In
each case, the subscriber 108 can continue to view a rendition of the
streaming content displayed on the display screen 130 after providing
different types of input 505.” (emphasis added).
We agree with the Examiner’s findings. (id.) We note “[a] finding
that two inventions were designed to resolve different problems . . . is
insufficient to demonstrate that one invention teaches away from another.”
Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). Teaching an alternative or equivalent method, however, does not
teach away from the use of a claimed method. In re Dunn, 349 F.2d 433,
438 (CCPA 1965). Moreover, “the prior art's mere disclosure of more than
one alternative does not constitute a teaching away from any of these
alternatives because such disclosure does not criticize, discredit, or
otherwise discourage the solution claimed.” In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195,
1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (emphasis added).
Here, Cannon describes receiving user input (in response to receiving
an incoming call) and “[i]f the user 108 does not answer the phone device
115, the call may be forwarded to voice mail.” Cannon ¶ 114 (emphasis
added). Therefore, we find Cannon is at least suggestive of permitting the
acceptance (i.e., answering) of calls. Accordingly, we are not persuaded that
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Cannon “teaches away” from the claimed invention.

6. The present invention fills a long felt need, as articulated by the
Declaration of Alejandra Martinez Cuevas (“Declarant”).
Appellant also submits that the Declarant’s expert opinion, in the
Declaration dated February 16, 2018, and submitted under 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.132, is evidence of the long felt need “to selectively prevent the
interruption of television (or other devices) viewing by telephone calls.”
Decl. ¶ 3.
The Declarant states that Appellant’s patent application “solves the
unwanted phone call interruption problem, as related to watching television
or other media, by placing the call information on the screen in a translucent
screen and providing the user with the option to accept the call, reject the
call, send a text message, or other options.” Decl. ¶ 6.
The Declarant further states that “[b]efore the 14/971,979 patent
application, if a user [was] watching the news from their smartphone, and
someone calls, the video will stop, and the call would take place. There is
no logical need to stop watching the news to answer a call, only the prior
technology’s failure requires the video to stop.” Decl. ¶ 8 (emphasis added).
Further evidencing the purported long-felt need of the claimed
invention, the Declarant points to legislative history and refers to the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 to show that “the need to avoid
the interruption of television and other media by unwanted calls existed
since at least 1991.” Decl. ¶ 4 (see Exhibit A).
Additionally, the Declarant refers to a 2017 NBC story by Jennifer
Schlesinger and Andrea Day that reported robo-calling was soaring in spite
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of the Federal Trade Commission’s “Do Not Call” registry. Decl. ¶ 5 (see
Exhibit B).
The Examiner finds the expert opinion (Declaration) insufficient to
establish the long-felt need of the claimed invention. Ans. 12. The
Examiner identifies, inter alia, two deficiencies with respect to the expert
opinion:
First, the Examiner finds the “evidence[] listed by the Exhibits [is]
simply related to the broad issue of telemarking calls/robot calls without
specifically targeting a particular context (i.e. while watching television)
. . . The complaints as detailed in the Exhibits at best express the
undesirability of telemarking calls/robot calls and a general wish to
block/halt such calls [altogether], regardless of what specifically the callee
might be doing/viewing at the time of receiving such calls.” Ans. 12.
Second, the Examiner finds that with respect to Appellant’s claims,
“there is no means to prevent/block/halt the arrivals of telemarketing/robot
calls because the claimed invention does not filter calls but only appear[s] to
notify and present the call handling options regardless of who the caller is.”
Ans. 12 (emphasis added).
Establishing a long-felt need requires objective evidence showing the
existence of a persistent problem recognized by those of ordinary skill in the
art for which a solution was not known. In re Gershon, 372 F.2d 535, 538–
39 (CCPA 1967). See Ans. 28 (citing Gershon). Hence, the Appellant must
present affidavits or other factual evidence of “a failure of others to provide
a feasible solution to [a] long-standing problem” and evidence “that experts
did not foresee” the solution claimed. See In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1475 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Finally, the invention must satisfy the long-felt need.
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In re Cavanagh, 436 F.2d 491, 496 (CCPA 1971).
Here, the Examiner finds Declarant’s statements and supporting
exhibits merely establish a long-felt interest to block “unwanted,”
“intrusive,” and “nuisance” phone calls in ways that balance[]
“[i]ndividuals’ privacy rights, public safety interests, and commercial
freedom[] of speech.” Exhibit A (Title 47 U.S.C. § 227 - Restrictions on use
of telephone equipment), page 2. See Ans. 12. This interest or need is
purportedly different than the “problem” identified by the Appellant.
In the Specification (¶ 9), Appellant identifies six needs and problems
addressed by the claimed invention:
1. “[to] simultaneously manage an incoming call during
performance of an activity, for example, playing of media such as a video on
. . . [an] electronic device by a user, without interrupting the playing of the
media on the electronic device.” (Emphasis added).
2. “[to] generate[] non-intrusive notification objects with detailed
information in different configurable formats based on user preferences to
notify the user about the incoming call without interrupting the playing of
the media on the electronic device.” (Emphasis added).
3. “[to] allow[] a user to configure a text only mode on the user
device for managing an incoming call from a caller during the playing of the
media on the user device, where the text only mode allows the caller to
communicate with the user only through text messages for the duration of
the playing of the media.” Spec. ¶ 11 (Emphasis added).
4. “[to] allow the user to communicate with a sender of the
incoming call, that is, a caller through text messages or social media while
continuing the playing of the media uninterrupted on separate sections of a
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display screen of the electronic device.” Spec. ¶ 9 (Emphasis added).
5. “[to] handle audio of an incoming call without interrupting any
video component of the media being played on the electronic device, for
example, by continuing display of the video component while muting the
audio component of the media being played for a duration of the incoming
call.” (Emphasis added).
6. “[to] automatically record any media being played on the
electronic device and/or in a cloud computing environment when the user
chooses to accept an incoming call.” (Emphasis added).
To be given substantial weight in the determination of obviousness,
objective evidence of non-obviousness (including factors such as
commercial success, industry praise, and long-felt need) must be relevant to
the subject matter as claimed, and therefore it must be determined whether
there is a nexus between the merits of the claimed invention and the
evidence of secondary considerations. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Delta Resins
& Refractories, Inc., 776 F.2d 281, 305 n.42 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Based upon our review of the Declaration evidence, we do not find a
strong relevance or correlation (“nexus”) between the long-felt need sought
to be established by the Declarant and the subject matter as claimed.
Declarant’s expert opinion merely establishes a long-felt interest to
block undesired calls. In contrast, Appellant’s claimed invention solves the
problem of managing incoming calls without interrupting the playing of
media (e.g., a video). Appellant’s invention also manages the playing of the
media while accepting or responding to incoming calls, e.g., texting.
Accordingly, we do not find Declarant’s statement and supporting
Exhibits A and B are sufficiently persuasive to establish the purported long-
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felt need of the claimed invention.

On the totality of this record, and based upon a preponderance of the
evidence, we are not persuaded of error regarding the Examiner’s underlying
factual findings and ultimate legal conclusion of obviousness.
For at least the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s
Rejection B of independent claim 14. We separately affirm Rejection C of
independent claims 1, 20 and 40, which recite similar limitations. See Final
Act. 40–54.
The remaining dependent claims also rejected under Rejections B and
C (and not argued separately) fall with the respective independent claim
from which they depend. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection B of claims
14, 15, 21–23, and 28, and we sustain the Examiner’s obviousness Rejection
C of claims 1–4, 9, 20, 32, and 40–42.6

6 We note the Examiner omitted claims 41 and 42 from the heading of
Rejection C on page 40 of the Final Action. However, the Examiner
provided a detailed statement of rejection for claims 41 and 42 under the
Rejection C heading on page 56 of the Final Action. We have made
appropriate correction herein.
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Rejections D–O of the Remaining Dependent Claims under § 103
In view of the lack of any substantive, separate arguments directed to
Rejection D of claims 5, 33, and 36; Rejection E of claims 16 and 24;
Rejection F of claims 6 and 31; Rejection G of claim 17; Rejection H of
claims 11 and 34; Rejection I of claim 25; Rejection J of claim 10; Rejection
K of claims 12 and 35; Rejection L of claim 26; Rejection M of claims 37
and 38; Rejection N of claim 39; and Rejection O of claim 43, under § 103
(see Appeal Br. 14–15), we sustain the Examiner’s Rejections D–O of the
remaining dependent claims. Arguments not made are waived. See 37
C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
CONCLUSIONS
The Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1–6, 9–12, 14–17, 20–26,
28, and 31–43 as being obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, over the cited
combinations of references, and the Examiner did not err in rejecting claim
43 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as lacking written description support.
DECISION SUMMARY
Rej Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
A 43 112(a) Written
Description
43
B 14, 15,
21–23,
28
103 Cannon,
Eide, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig
14, 15, 21–23,
28

C 1–4, 9,
20, 32,
40–42
103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig
1–3,4, 9, 20, 32,
40

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Rej Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
D 5, 33, 36 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig, Kim
’401
5, 33, 36
E 16, 24 103 Cannon,
Eide, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig, Kim
’401

16, 24
F 6, 31 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig, Kim
’401, Carion
6, 31
G 17 103 Cannon,
Eide, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig, Kim
’401, Carion
17
H 11, 34 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
Sommer
11, 34
I 25 103 Cannon,
Eide, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
Sommer
25
J 10 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
Hannum
10
K 12, 35 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
12, 35
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Rej Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
Dorcey
L 26 103 Cannon, Eide
Ort, Kim
’278,
Luehrig,
Dorcey
26

M 37, 38 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
Incoming
Mail
37, 38
N 39 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig, Yeh
39
O 43 103 Cannon, Ort,
Kim ’278,
Luehrig,
Vendrow
43
Overall
Outcome
1–6, 9–12,
14–17, 20–26,
28, 31–43

FINALITY AND RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED