0120070991
03-10-2009
Alfred L. Thompson, Complainant, v. Eric K. Shinseki, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.
Alfred L. Thompson,
Complainant,
v.
Eric K. Shinseki,
Secretary,
Department of Veterans Affairs,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0120070991
Hearing No. 570-2006-00486X
Agency No. 200400472006103467
DECISION
On December 7, 2006, complainant filed an appeal from the agency's
November 8, 2006 final order concerning his equal employment opportunity
(EEO) complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42
U.S.C. � 2000e et seq., Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehabilitation Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. �
621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a).
For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final
order.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, complainant worked
as an Information Technology Specialist, GS-12, at the agency's Office
of Financial Systems and Operations in Washington, D.C. On September
20, 2005, complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that he was
discriminated against on the bases of his sex, disability (arthritis in
knees and back), and age (57 at the relevant time) when, on August 19,
2005, his employment was terminated during his probationary period.
At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was provided with a
copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right to request
a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). Complainant timely
requested a hearing. Over complainant's objections, the AJ assigned to
the case granted the agency's motion for a decision without a hearing
and issued a decision on October 23, 2006, finding no discrimination.
The AJ found that, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to complainant, a decision without a hearing was appropriate as there
were no genuine issues of material fact in dispute. Specifically, the
AJ found that assuming, arguendo, complainant established a prima facie
case of sex, age, and disability discrimination, the agency nonetheless
articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions that
complainant failed to show were a pretext for unlawful discrimination.
The agency subsequently issued a final order adopting the AJ's finding
that complainant failed to prove that he was subjected to discrimination
as alleged. On appeal, complainant contends that the AJ erred in issuing
a decision without a hearing as there are material facts in dispute.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
As an initial matter we note that, as this is an appeal from a FAD
issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(b), the
agency's decision is subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405(a). The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a
decision without a hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine
issue of material fact. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). This regulation is
patterned after the summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held
that summary judgment is appropriate where a court determines that, given
the substantive legal and evidentiary standards that apply to the case,
there exists no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary
judgment, a court's function is not to weigh the evidence but rather
to determine whether there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249.
The evidence of the non-moving party must be believed at the summary
judgment stage and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the
non-moving party's favor. Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if
the evidence is such that a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of
the non-moving party. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986);
Oliver v. Digital Equip. Corp., 846 F.2D 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988).
A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome
of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting
evidence, it is not appropriate for an AJ to issue a decision without
a hearing. In the context of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may
properly issue a decision without a hearing only upon a determination
that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.
Petty v. Defense Security Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11,
2003); Murphy v. Dept. of the Army, EEOC Appeal No. 01A04099 (July 11,
2003).
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that a decision
without a hearing was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material
fact exists. To prevail in a disparate treatment claim such as this,
complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary scheme fashioned
by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). He must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating
that he was subjected to an adverse employment action under circumstances
that would support an inference of discrimination. Furnco Construction
Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie inquiry may be
dispensed with in this case, however, since the agency has articulated
legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See United
States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711,
713-17 (1983); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request
No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, complainant must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the agency's explanation
is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 134 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502, 519 (1993); Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Request No. 05950842 (November 13, 1997); Pavelka v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (December 14, 1995).
Here, we concur with the AJ's finding that the agency articulated
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The record
reflects that complainant entered into service with the agency on October
3, 2004, and was serving a one-year probationary period at the time of
his termination. (Report of Investigation, Exhibit C-2). The record
also reflects that within the first six months of his being hired,
complainant had incurred charges of over $3,000.00 on his government
credit card. The record shows that, although complainant had been
reimbursed for these charges by the agency, he failed to pay the debt
to the credit card issuer despite written notice of his indebtedness
and the suspension of his account. Complainant stated, by e-mail dated
May 13, 2005, that the "entire balance should be paid within 2 weeks,"
but at the time of his termination the debt was still outstanding and
the agency had begun docking complainant's pay. (R.O.I., Exhibit C-5).
The record also reflects that complainant was charged Absent Without
Leave (AWOL) on May 17-18, 2005, when he ignored a direct order from
his supervisor to leave a training course and return to the office
after it was discovered that he had reported to the training despite
being told, in writing, on several occasions that his attendance was
not approved. Id. Complainant's second-line supervisor stated that
he requested that complainant's employment be terminated because of
complainant's failure to pay his government credit card debt and his
failure to follow directions which resulted in him being charged AWOL.
(R.O.I., Exhibit C-2). We concur with the AJ's finding that complainant
proffered no evidence from which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude
that the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus toward
complainant's sex, age, or disability.
We find that viewing the record evidence in the light most favorable to
complainant, there are no genuine issues of material fact. We further
find that the AJ appropriately issued a decision without a hearing
finding no discrimination. Therefore, we discern no basis to disturb
the AJ's decision and the agency's final order is affirmed.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1208)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the
policies, practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960,
Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request
to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0408)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the
defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1008)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that
the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also
permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other
security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,
29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within
the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with
the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.
Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time
limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 10, 2009
Date
2
0120070991
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P. O. Box 77960
Washington, D.C. 20013
5
0120070991