Alfred Asterjadhi et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 31, 2019

14531907 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 31, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/531,907 11/03/2014 Alfred ASTERJADHI 140657US 3401
15055 7590 07/31/2019
Patterson & Sheridan, L.L.P.
Qualcomm
24 Greenway Plaza, Suite 1600
Houston, TX 77046
EXAMINER
THAI, CAMQUYEN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2465
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/31/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PAIR_eOfficeAction@pattersonsheridan.com
ocpat_uspto@qualcomm.com
qualcomm@pattersonsheridan.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ALFRED ASTERJADHI and AMIN JAFARIAN
____________

Appeal 2018-008674
Application 14/531,907
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before JOSEPH L. DIXON, JAMES W. DEJMEK, and
STEPHEN E. BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judges.

BELISLE, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants1 appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from a Final Rejection of
all pending claims, namely, claims 1–22. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction
under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 Appellants identify QUALCOMM Incorporated as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 3.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Claimed Invention
Appellants’ invention generally relates to “wireless communications
and, more specifically, to traffic classification (TCLAS) element classifier
parameters” for short frames. Spec. ¶¶ 2, 23.
According to the Specification, an exemplary method for wireless
communication includes:
[G]enerating a frame with an element (e.g., a TCLAS element)
that contains one or more fields (e.g., a frame classifier type
field), wherein the one or more fields identify at least one
medium access control (MAC) packet data unit (MPDU) and
identify a type of parameters (e.g., protocol version MPDU MAC
header parameters or non-down protocol version MPDU MAC
header parameters) in the element based, at least in part, on one
or more fields in the at least one MPDU (e.g., a PV field, Type
field, and/or From DS field).
Spec. ¶ 49. This frame then is “output for transmission (e.g., transmitted or
output to an RF front end for transmission).” Id.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the claimed subject
matter on appeal:
1. An apparatus for wireless communication, comprising:
a processing system configured to generate a frame with
an element that contains one or more fields, wherein the one or
more fields identify at least one medium access control (MAC)
packet data unit (MPDU) and identify a type of parameters in the
element based, at least in part, on one or more fields in the at least
one MPDU; and
an interface to output the generated frame for
transmission.
App. Br. 12 (Claims Appendix).

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References
The Examiner relied on the following references as evidence of
unpatentability of the claims on appeal:
Seok US 2011/0007692 Al Jan. 13, 2011

Matthew Fischer et al., Published Article IEEE P802.11-13/0876r1,
Proposed resolution for LB193mc CID 78, 309, and 310 (July 11, 2013)
(“Fischer ’76”).

Matthew Fischer, Published Article IEEE 802.11-14/1138rl, LB203
TCLAS element CIDs (Sept. 3, 2014) (“Fischer ’38”).

Rejections
The Examiner made the following rejections of the claims on appeal:
Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, and 22 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Seok and Fischer ’76. Final Act. 5–8.
Claims 3–7, 10–14, and 17–21 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as being unpatentable over Seok, Fischer ’76, and Fischer ’38. Id. at 8–11.

ANALYSIS2
Claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 15, 16, and 22
Appellants argue the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1, 2, 8, 9, 15,
16, and 22 as obvious over Seok and Fischer ’76. See App. Br. 7–10; Reply
Br. 2–3. Appellants argue these pending claims as a group. See App. Br.

2 Throughout this Decision, we have considered Appellants’ Appeal Brief
filed April 6, 2018 (“App. Br.”); Appellants’ Reply Brief filed September 5,
2018 (“Reply Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer mailed August 7, 2018
(“Ans.”); the Final Office Action mailed October 20, 2017 (“Final Act.”);
and Appellants’ Specification filed November 3, 2014 (“Spec.”).
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7–10. Thus, for purposes of our analysis, we select independent claim 1 as
the representative claim, and any claim not argued separately will stand or
fall with our analysis of the rejection of claim 1. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
Appellants argue “Fischer’76 is completely silent with respect to one
or more fields of the TCLAS element identifying a type of parameters in the
TCLAS based on one or more fields in an MPDU.” App. Br. 8; Reply Br. 2.
We find Appellants’ argument unpersuasive.
Our reviewing court has held the relevant inquiry in an obviousness
analysis is whether the Examiner has set forth “some articulated reasoning
with some rational underpinning to support the legal conclusion of
obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (cited with
approval in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007)).
The test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light
of the combined teachings of those references. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 425 (CCPA 1981); In re Burckel, 592 F.2d 1175, 1179 (CCPA 1979)
(“[A] reference must be considered not only for what it expressly teaches,
but also for what it fairly suggests.”). One of ordinary skill can use his or
her ordinary skill, creativity, and common sense to make the necessary
adjustments and further modifications to result in a properly functioning
device. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 418 (“[A] court can take account of the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ.”).
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Here, the Examiner explains:
Fischer’76 first teaches the frame classification is based on MAC
header content (see Introduction) and various kinds of PDU are
identified using parameters values specified in TCLAS element
(see 8.4.2.33), wherein TCLAS element includes a frame
classifier, which comprises classifier type subfield, classifier
mask, and classifier parameters (table 8-111). Classifier type
subfield taught by Fischer ’76 specifies the type of classifier
parameters in TCLAS, which associates with one or more fields
of MAC header. For example, classifier type is defined as “6”
or classifier parameter “IEEE 802.11 MAC header parameter” is
defined along with frame control field specified in MAC header
(see 8.4.2.33). Thus, classifier type subfield taught by
Fischer ’76 does identify a type of parameters in the TCLAS
element based on one or more fields, e.g., control field, in at least
one MPDU.
Consequently, Seok in view of Fisher76 teach “generate a frame
with an element that contains one or more fields, wherein the one
or more fields identify at least one medium access control (MAC)
packet data unit (MPDU) and identify a type of parameters in the
element based, at least in part, on one or more fields in the at least
one MPDU.”
Ans. 3–4. Appellants argue:
[E]ven if Fischer’76 does teach that [the] classifier type subfield
specifies the type of classifier parameters in TCLAS, which
associates with one or more fields of MAC header, that is still
not the same as identifying a type of parameters in the TCLAS
element based on one or more fields in an MPDU.
Reply Br. 3. But the issue here is not whether Fischer ’76 discloses the
“same” features as in representative claim 1, rather, the issue is whether
Fischer ’76 at least fairly suggests to the skilled artisan “a frame with an
element that contains one or more fields, wherein the one or more fields
identify at least one medium access control (MAC) packet data unit (MPDU)
and identify a type of parameters in the element based, at least in part, on
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one or more fields in the at least one MPDU.” We agree with and adopt as
our own the Examiner’s explanation of obviousness reproduced above, and
find Appellants do not persuasively explain why Fischer ’76 does not at least
fairly suggest such broad features.
Furthermore, Appellants’ Specification describes the invention in
representative claim 1 in connection with (1) a table of classifier types and
classifier parameters that includes nearly verbatim all such types and
parameters expressly disclosed in Fischer ’76 (compare Spec. Fig. 7 with
Fischer ’76, Table 8-111 (“Frame classifier type”)); and (2) a “Type”
subfield of a “Frame Control” field that indicates “Control” type, which
mirrors Fischer ’76’s expressly disclosed “Classifier Type” subfield of a
“Frame Classifier” field that indicates the type of classifier parameters
(compare Spec. Figs. 5–6, ¶¶ 51–52 with Fischer ’76, Figs. 8-199, 8-200,
§ 8.4.2.33). Again, we find Appellants do not persuasively explain why such
express disclosures in Fischer ’76 do not at least fairly suggest the broadly
claimed features at issue in representative claim 1, namely:
a frame with an element that contains one or more fields, wherein
the one or more fields identify at least one medium access control
(MAC) packet data unit (MPDU) and identify a type of
parameters in the element based, at least in part, on one or more
fields in the at least one MPDU.
To the extent that Appellants argue the invention recited in claim 1 arranges
the known classifier types and parameters data into a field or subfield
different than Fischer ’76, Appellants provide no persuasive explanation for
why such an arrangement patentably distinguishes over the combination of
Seok and Fischer ’76. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417 (A claim is obvious where
it “‘simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it
had been known to perform’ and yields no more than one would expect from
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such an arrangement.”) (internal citation omitted); In re Mayne, 104 F.3d
1339, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Because the applicants merely substituted one
element known in the art for a known equivalent, this court affirms [the
rejection for obviousness].”).
Based on the foregoing, we find Appellants do not show persuasively
that the Examiner erred in finding that Seok and Fischer ’76 at least fairly
suggest the limitations of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
As noted above, Appellants do not separately argue patentability of
independent claims 8, 15, and 22 and dependent claims 2, 9, and 16, but
instead rely only on their arguments for patentability of independent claim 1.
Accordingly, for the same reasons set forth above for independent claim 1,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 2, 8, 9,
15, 16, and 22. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
Claims 3–7, 10–14, and 17–21
Appellants provide no separate substantive arguments for patentability
of claims 3–7, 10–14, and 17–21, and instead rely only on their arguments
for patentability of independent claim 1. See App. Br. 10; Reply Br. 3–4. In
addition, the Examiner finds that “[l]imitations ‘PV fields, Type field values’
and ‘type of parameters’ [as variously recited in claims 3–7, 10–14, and
17–21] were not disclosed in the provisional application dated November
04, 2013; hence, these limitations have priority date as [of] the non-
provisional filing date, which is November 03, 2014,” and therefore,
Fischer ’38, dated September 3, 2014, qualifies as prior art against these
claims. Final Act. 3. Appellants do not challenge the Examiner’s finding
here, other than to argue claim 1 is supported by the provisional application.
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See App. Br. 10 (“[A]t least with respect to the subject matter of claim 1,
Appellant submits that the present application has a priority date of
November 04, 2013. That said, at least with respect to the subject matter of
claim 1, Appellant submits that Fischer ’38 does not qualify as prior art to
the present application.” (emphases added)); Reply Br. 3–4. Accordingly,
for the same reasons set forth above for independent claim 1, we sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 3–7, 10–14, and 17–
21. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejections of claims 1–22.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED