Alexandre GONTHIER et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardJan 28, 20212020006001 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 28, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 16/108,860 08/22/2018 Alexandre GONTHIER PW-120720C 1097 23662 7590 01/28/2021 ROBERT M. MCDERMOTT, ESQ. 1824 FEDERAL FARM ROAD MONTROSS, VA 22520 EXAMINER NORMAN, SAMICA L ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3697 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 01/28/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): claudia@artlover.com patents@lawyer.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ALEXANDRE GONTHIER, MARIO DELAS, and MICHAEL KONTOROVICH Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 Technology Center 3600 Before HUBERT C. LORIN, MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. LORIN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the Examiner’s final decision to reject claims 1–14.1 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies PayWithMyBank, Inc. as the real party in interest. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claimed subject matter “relates to the field of electronic financial transaction systems, and in particular to a system that effects the transfer of funds from a user's bank account to a vendor's bank account without disclosing any user bank account information to the vendor.” Spec., para. 1. Claim 1, reproduced below with emphasis added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A method of protecting disclosure of a customer's account information to a vendor, comprising: at a transaction server that is independent of the customer and the vendor: receiving a transaction request that identifies the vendor, a vendor account, and a transaction amount; receiving, from the customer, credentials to access a banking system; accessing the banking system using the customer's credentials to obtain the customer's account information, including identification of a customer account at the banking system; executing a funds transfer of the transaction amount from the customer account to the vendor account; and notifying the vendor that the transfer has been executed, without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. Appeal Br. 12 (Claims Appendix). REJECTION Claims 1–14 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to judicially-excepted subject matter. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 3 OPINION The rejection of claims 1–14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to judicially-excepted subject matter. The Appellant argues these claims as a group. See Appeal Br. 5–11. We select claim 1 as the representative claim for this group, and the remaining claims 2–14 stand or fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). 35 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor.” In that regard, claim 1 covers a “process” and is thus statutory subject matter for which a patent may be obtained.2 This is not in dispute. However, the 35 U.S.C. § 101 provision “contains an important implicit exception: Laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable.” Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 589 (2013)). In that regard, notwithstanding claim 1 covers statutory subject matter, the Examiner has raised a question of patent eligibility on the ground that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. 2 This corresponds to Step 1 of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance which requires determining whether “the claim is to a statutory category.” 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50, 53 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Revised 101 Guidance”). See also id. at 53–54 (“consider[] whether the claimed subject matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter identified by 35 U.S.C. 101.”). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 4 Alice identifies a two-step framework for determining whether claimed subject matter is directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217. Alice step one — the “directed to” inquiry: According to Alice step one, “[w]e must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 218 (emphasis added). The Examiner determined, inter alia, that claim 1 “is directed to an abstract idea” because it recite(s) receiving a transaction request that identifies the vendor, a vendor account, and a transaction amount; receiving, from the customer, credentials to access a banking system; accessing the banking system using the customer's credentials to obtain the customer's account information, including identification of a customer account at the banking system; executing a funds transfer of the transaction amount from the customer account to the vendor account; and notifying the vendor that the transfer has been executed, without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. Final Act. 3. The Examiner classified said concept to which the claim is directed to within the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” grouping of abstract ideas set forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance3, specifically “a fundamental economic practice.” Id. (“The limitations, under 3 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the [2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 5 its broadest reasonable interpretation, covers a fundamental economic practice but for the recitation of a generic computer component.”) Appellant disagrees. Appeal Br. 5 ([T]he applicants respectfully maintain that claim 1, as a whole, does not claim a fundamental economic practice.”) Rather, Appellant argues the claim is directed to “a technological solution to [a] security problem” (Appeal Br. 6). According to Appellant, the interjection of a transaction server to manage an online transaction between a purchaser and vendor is a novel method of isolating the purchaser from the vendor with regard to effecting a transfer of funds from the purchaser's account to the vendor's account, and differs substantially from the conventional (fundamental) economic practice of providing the purchaser's account information to the vendor so that the vendor can execute the funds transfer. Id. at 6. In particular, the applicants have recognized a significant security problem associated with the conventional techniques of "completing a financial transaction", and have devised a technological solution to this security problem. The applicants' claims are directed to the use of a transaction server that isolates the purchaser from the vendor during the financial transaction to prevent disclosure of the purchaser's account information to the vendor. Id. Accordingly, there is a dispute over whether claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. Specifically, is claim 1 directed to receiving a transaction request that identifies the vendor, a vendor account, and a transaction amount; receiving, from the customer, credentials to access a banking system; accessing the banking system using the customer's credentials to obtain the customer's account information, including identification of a customer account at the banking system; executing a funds Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 6 transfer of the transaction amount from the customer account to the vendor account; and notifying the vendor that the transfer has been executed, without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor (Final Act. 3) or “a technological solution to [a] security problem” (Appeal Br. 6)? Claim Construction4 We consider the claim as a whole giving it the broadest reasonable construction as one of ordinary skill in the art would have interpreted it in light of the Specification at the time of filing.5,6,7 4 “[T]he important inquiry for a § 101 analysis is to look to the claim.” Accenture Glob. Servs., GmbH v. Guidewire Software, Inc., 728 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2013). “In Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can., 687 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), the court observed that ‘claim construction is not an inviolable prerequisite to a validity determination under § 101.’ However, the threshold of § 101 must be crossed; an event often dependent on the scope and meaning of the claims.” Internet Patents Corp. v. Active Network, Inc., 790 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 5 “In determining the eligibility of respondents’ claimed process for patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as a whole.” Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981). 6 “First, it is always important to look at the actual language of the claims . . . . Second, in considering the roles played by individual limitations, it is important to read the claims ‘in light of the [S]pecification.’” Smart Sys. Innovations, LLC v. Chicago Transit Auth., 873 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (J. Linn, dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2016)), among others. 7 See 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52 n.14 (“If a claim, under its broadest reasonable interpretation.”) (emphasis added). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 7 Claim 1 is a method comprising five steps employing a “transaction server that is independent of the customer and the vendor.” Regarding the “transaction server,” we have reviewed the Specification but have been unable to find any mention of a “server.” In the Summary section of the Appeal Brief, the “transaction server” is described as referring to element “150” on Figures 1 and 2 of the Specification. Appeal Br. 4. According to the Specification, element “150” is a “transaction system.” It is presented in the context of a transaction system for transferring funds from a bank account to another bank account. Terms such as Automated Clearing House (ACH), Open Financial Exchange (OFX), and the like are also to be interpreted in a generic sense, to include systems and formats of similar functionality in the United States and other nations. Spec., para. 12 (emphasis added). Thus, consistent with the Specification’s interpretation of the phrase “transaction system” as covering generic systems for transferring funds, the claim phrase “transaction server” is similarly interpreted as covering a generic server for transferring funds. The claim calls for the “transaction server” to be “independent of the customer and the vendor.” We have reviewed the Specification but have been unable to find any mention of the term “independent.” Given the ordinary meaning of “independent” as not being dependent, we reasonably broadly construe “independent of the customer and the vendor” as requiring the “transaction server” not being dependent on “the customer and the vendor.” Also, the five steps are performed “at” the “transaction server.” Strictly–speaking, the claim does not necessarily require the “transaction server” to perform the steps. The term “at,” ordinarily and customarily, Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 8 means “near.” Thus, the claim reasonably broadly covers performing said steps “near” the “transaction server.” The first step calls for “receiving” a first information; that is, “a transaction request that identifies the vendor, a vendor account, and a transaction amount.” The second step calls for “receiving” a second information from a customer; that is, “credentials to access a banking system.” The third step calls for “accessing the banking system” using said second information “to obtain the customer's account information, including identification of a customer account at the banking system.” The fourth step calls for “executing a funds transfer of the transaction amount” [based on said first information] from “the customer account to the vendor account.” The last step calls for “notifying the vendor that the transfer has been executed, without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor.” Together, the five steps are reasonably broadly construed as a scheme for transferring funds from a customer account to a vendor account without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. Looking to the Specification, it describes the invention in “business relations” (see 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52) terms, explaining that an objective of the claimed invention is to “effect[ ] the transfer of funds from a user's bank account to a vendor's bank account without disclosing any user bank account information to the vendor.” Spec., para. 1. The Specification describes, inter alia, various difficulties customers have in sharing financial information. For example, “potential Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 9 customers may be reluctant to communicate their credit card information over the Internet, for fear of identity theft by a third party breaking into the vendor's systems, … .” Id. at para. 4. Given the method as claimed as reasonably broadly construed above and in light of the Specification’s description of the problem of customer distrust in communicating financial information, we reasonably broadly construe claim 1 as being directed to solving that problem; that is, transferring funds from a customer account to a vendor account without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. The Abstract Idea8 Above, where we reproduce claim 1, we identify in italics the limitations we believe recite an abstract idea.9 Based on our claim construction analysis (above), we determine that the identified limitations describe a scheme for transferring funds from a customer account to a vendor account without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. Transferring funds, per se, is a fundamental economic practice and, as such, a commercial interaction. It falls within the enumerated “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” as grouping of abstract ideas set 8 This corresponds to Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. Step 2A determines “whether a claim is ‘directed to’ a judicial exception,” such as an abstract idea. 84 Fed. Reg. at 53. Step 2A is two prong inquiry. 9 This corresponds to Prong One (a) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners are now to: (a) Identify the specific limitation(s) in the claim under examination (individually or in combination) that the Examiner believes recites an abstract idea.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 10 forth in the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance.10 Accordingly we are unpersuaded by Appellant’s argument that “claim 1, as a whole, does not claim a fundamental economic practice.” Appeal Br. 5. Technical Improvement11 (Appellant’s Argument) Our characterization of what the claim is directed to is similar to the Examiner’s, albeit the Examiner adds several claim limitations to the 10 This corresponds to Prong One [“Evaluate Whether the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception”] (b) of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “To determine whether a claim recites an abstract idea in Prong One, examiners are now to: . . . (b) determine whether the identified limitation(s) falls within the subject matter groupings of abstract ideas enumerated in Section 1 of the [2019 Revised 101 Guidance].” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. This case implicates subject matter grouping “(b):” “(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental economic principles or practices (including hedging, insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions (including agreements in the form of contracts; legal obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people (including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).” Id. at 52. 11 This corresponds to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 11 characterization and thus characterizes it at a lower level of abstraction. “An abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240, 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“The Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.”). We have reviewed the record and are unpersuaded as to error in our or the Examiner’s characterization of what claim 1 is directed to. As can be seen from a plain reading of the claim, the method as claimed is not focused on improving technology. Cf. Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“The claims are focused on providing information to traders in a way that helps them process information more quickly, ’556 patent at 2:26–39, not on improving computers or technology.”). Rather than being directed to any specific asserted improvement in computer capabilities, the claim supports the opposite view — that the claimed subject matter is directed to a scheme for transferring funds from a customer account to a vendor account without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor. As we discussed, the Specification evidences the generic nature of the “transaction server” “at” which the process is performed. Cf. Alice, 573 U.S. at 223 (“[T]he mere recitation of a generic computer cannot transform a patent-ineligible abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”) Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 12 The claim provides no additional structural details that would distinguish any device required to be employed to practice the method as claimed from its generic counterparts.12 Also, the Specification attributes no special meaning to any of the recited operations, individually or in the combination, as claimed. In our view, notwithstanding the method do not even specifically require using the generic “transaction server” to practice it, the “receiving,” “receiving,” “accessing the banking system,” “executing a funds transfer,” and, “notifying” steps are common computer processing functions that one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have known generic severs were capable of performing and would have associated with generic servers. Cf. OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2015): Beyond the abstract idea of offer-based price optimization, the claims merely recite “well-understood, routine conventional activit[ies],” either by requiring conventional computer activities or routine data-gathering steps. Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294) . . . . For example, claim 1 recites “sending a first set of electronic messages over a network to devices,” the devices being “programmed to communicate,” storing test results in a “machine-readable medium,” and “using a computerized system . . . to automatically determine” an estimated outcome and setting a price. Just as in Alice, “all of these computer functions are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the industry.” Alice, 134 S.Ct. at 2359 (quoting Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294) 12 Cf. Move, Inc. v. Real Estate Alliance Ltd., 721 F. App’x 950, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (non-precedential) (“Claim 1 is aspirational in nature and devoid of any implementation details or technical description that would permit us to conclude that the claim as a whole is directed to something other than the abstract idea identified by the district court.”). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 13 (alterations in original); see also buySAFE[, Inc. v. Google, Inc.], 765 F.3d [1350,] 1355 [(Fed. Cir. 2014)] (“That a computer receives and sends the information over a network—with no further specification—is not even arguably inventive.”). By so broadly defining the inventive method, that is, by setting out what it is aspiring to accomplish without any means for achieving it (other than via a generic “transaction server”), let alone any purported technological improvement, the claim is in effect presenting the invention in purely result-based functional language, strengthening our determination under Alice step one that the claim is directed to an abstract idea. Cf. Two- Way Media Ltd. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, LLC, 874 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Claim 1 recites a method for routing information using result-based functional language. The claim requires the functional results of ‘converting,’ ‘routing,’ ‘controlling,’ ‘monitoring,’ and ‘accumulating records,’ but does not sufficiently describe how to achieve these results in a non-abstract way.”). See also Uniloc USA v. LG Elecs. USA, 957 F.3d 1303, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2020): The claims we held ineligible in Two-Way Media similarly failed to concretely capture any improvement in computer functionality. In Two-Way Media, the claims recited a method of transmitting packets of information over a communications network comprising: converting information into streams of digital packets; routing the streams to users; controlling the routing; and monitoring the reception of packets by the users. 874 F.3d at 1334. Two-Way Media argued that the claims solved data transmission problems, including load management and bottlenecking, but the claimed method was not directed to those improvements. Id. at 1336–37. We therefore held the claims ineligible because they merely recited a series of abstract steps (“converting,” “routing,” “controlling,” “monitoring,” and “accumulating records”) using “result-based functional Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 14 language” without the means for achieving any purported technological improvement. Id. at 1337. We have reviewed Appellant’s technical-improvement arguments and find them unpersuasive as to error in the Examiner’s or our characterization of what the claim is directed to because the record evidence fails to adequately support them. Such arguments alone cannot take the place of evidence in the record. See generally In re Glass, 474 F.2d 1015, 1019 (CCPA 1973); see also In re Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974); and In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984); and In re Schulze, 346 F.2d 600, 602 (CCPA 1965). A principle argument13 Appellant makes is that the claimed subject matter is directed to a “technological solution to [a] security problem.” Appeal Br. 14. It is unpersuasive because the method as claimed fails to adequately support it. We are unable to point to any claim language suggestive of an improvement in technology. 13 Such an argument corresponds to Prong Two [“If the Claim Recites a Judicial Exception, Evaluate Whether the Judicial Exception Is Integrated Into a Practical Application”] of Step 2A of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance. “A claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 54. One consideration, implicated here, that is “indicative that an additional element (or combination of elements) may have integrated the exception into a practical application” is if “[a]n additional element reflects an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field.” Id. at 55 (footnote omitted). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 15 Appellant argues, for example, that the “interjection of the claimed transaction server to isolate the purchaser from the vendor to prevent the purchaser's account information from being disclosed to the vendor cannot reasonably be said to be merely a generic computer component” (Appeal Br. 7). But the difficulty is that the claim does reflect what Appellant is arguing. The claim calls for the “claimed transaction server to be independent of the customer and vendor.” It does not call for “isolat[ing] the purchaser from the vendor” as Appellant argues. Nor does the claim require the server to function so as “to prevent the purchaser's account information from being disclosed to the vendor” as Appellant argues. As it now stands, all that is necessary to practice the claimed method is for the vendor to be notified “that the transfer has been executed, without disclosing the customer account information to the vendor.” This can be accomplished by, for example, simply making the transfer. Appellant further argues that the claims are directed to interrupting, by a transaction server, a conventional remote-purchase transaction by providing the purchaser with direct access to the purchaser's bank account while the transaction with the vendor is in process, without disclosing the purchaser's bank account information to the vendor. This is the key aspect that the applicants' claims are directed to, and is a practical application that provides a substantial improvement to the technology of online purchasing. Appeal Br. 8. This argument is not commensurate in scope with what is claimed, which makes no mention of “interrupting, by a transaction server, a conventional remote-purchase transaction.” Appellant “identifies deficiencies in the conventional use of credit cards for on-line purchases.” Appeal Br. 9. But there is no mention of Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 16 credit cards or on–line purchases in the claim. Accordingly, this cannot be a persuasive argument as to error in the rejection. According to Appellant, one of ordinary skill in the art would immediately recognize that the applicants' solution significantly reduces, or eliminates, the risk that a purchaser's account information will be disclosed if the vendor's system is compromised, and eliminates the risk of the purchaser's account information being used illicitly by the vendor, or employees of the vendor. One of skill in the art would also recognize that the applicants' invention substantially reduces the accounting-overhead associated with conventional on-line purchases via credit cards. Appeal Br. 10. We are unpersuaded. There is insufficient evidence that, for example, “eliminat[ing] the risk of the purchaser’s account information being used illicitly by the vendor” is a technical improvement. We have reviewed the Reply Brief. It is replete with arguments not commensurate in scope with what is claimed. For example, Appellant argues that In a conventional online transaction, the purchaser is directed to the vendor's payment page when the user clicks on the "Pay" button. The vendor's payment page then solicits the purchaser's financial information to secure payment from the purchaser, which leads to one of the problems that this invention solves: the risk of a breach of the vendor's database that contains this provided financial information. Reply Br. 2. But there is no mention of a page or a button in the claim. We make no comment about subject matter, supported by the Specification, which would more clearly describe a technical improvement. As it now reads, the claim does not do that. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 17 We have reviewed the Specification to discern a technical improvement associated with the method as presently claimed. We find that the Specification does not describe the claimed method, as broad as it is now claimed, as providing any improvement to technology. Rather, the Specification discloses only non-technical aspirations; that is, the invention may improve confidence in financial transactions by not revealing customer information. Accordingly, within the meaning of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, we find there is no integration of the abstract idea into a practical application. We have considered Appellant’s other arguments challenging the Examiner’s determination under step one of the Alice framework and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, the record supports the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 is directed not to an improvement in technology but to an abstract idea. Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 18 Alice step two — Does the Claim Provide an Inventive Concept?14 Step two is “a search for an ‘inventive concept’—i.e., an element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the [ineligible concept] itself.’” Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (alteration in original) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012)). In that regard, the Examiner determined, inter alia, that “[t]he claim(s) does/do not include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial exception. As discussed above, the additional elements being used to perform the steps amounts to no more than mere instructions to apply the exception using generic computer components. Mere instructions to apply an exception using generic computer components cannot provide an inventive concept.” Final Act. 3. We agree. We addressed the matter of whether the claim presented any purported specific asserted technical improvements in our analysis above under step one of the Alice framework. This is consistent with the case law. See Ancora Techs., Inc. v. HTC Am., Inc., 908 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2018) 14 This corresponds to Step 2B, of the 2019 Revised 101 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 56 (“[I]f a claim has been determined to be directed to a judicial exception under revised Step 2A, examiners should then evaluate the additional elements individually and in combination under Step 2B to determine whether they provide an inventive concept (i.e., whether the additional elements amount to significantly more than the exception itself).”). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 19 (“We have several times held claims to pass muster under Alice step one when sufficiently focused on such improvements.”). We cited the Specification in our earlier discussion. It is intrinsic evidence that the claimed “transaction server” as claimed is generic and that said generic “transaction server” is conventional. In doing so, we have followed “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP Inc.[, 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018)],” USPTO Memorandum, Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner For Patent Examination Policy, April 19, 2018 (the “Berkheimer Memo”)). While it is true that specific technological advancements, when claimed, can render claimed subject matter not directed to an abstract idea, for the reasons discussed, here the record does not adequately support an argument that the claimed system provides an improvement in computer functionality. Cf. Bridge and Post, Inc. v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 778 Fed.Appx. 882, 891 (Fed. Cir. 2019) But as this court noted in DDR, “not all claims purporting to address Internet-centric challenges are eligible for patent.” Id. at 1258. In that case, the court distinguished problems “necessarily rooted in computer technology,” like the visual presentation of a website, from claims that “recite the performance of some business practice known from the pre-internet world.” Id. The ’594 patent is the latter, as evidenced by its acknowledgement that tracking users in order to display advertisements was known in the pre-Internet world, and that its steps for accomplishing this on the Internet were conventional. We therefore hold that the asserted claims of the ’594 patent are unpatentable. No other persuasive arguments having been presented, we conclude that no error has been committed in the determination under Alice step two that claim 1 does not include an element or combination of elements Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 20 circumscribing the patent-ineligible concept it is directed to so as to transform the concept into a patent-eligible application. We have considered all of the Appellant’s arguments (including those made in the Reply Brief) and find them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because we are unpersuaded as to error in the determinations that representative claim 1, and claims 2–14, which fall with claim 1, are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an “inventive concept,” we sustain the Examiner’s conclusion that they are directed to patent-ineligible subject matter for being judicially-excepted from 35 U.S.C. § 101. Cf. LendingTree, LLC v. Zillow, Inc., 656 F. App’x 991, 997 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“We have considered all of LendingTree’s remaining arguments and have found them unpersuasive. Accordingly, because the asserted claims of the patents in suit are directed to an abstract idea and do not present an ‘inventive concept,’ we hold that they are directed to ineligible subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101.”); see, e.g., OIP Techs., 788 F.3d at 1364; FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1098 (Fed. Cir. 2016). DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–15 101 Eligibility 1–14 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). Appeal 2020-006001 Application 16/108,860 21 AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation