Alexander Medrano, Complainant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 3, 2000
01977101 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 3, 2000)

01977101

08-03-2000

Alexander Medrano, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (S.E./S.W. Region), Agency.


Alexander Medrano v. United States Postal Service

01977101

August 3, 2000

Alexander Medrano, )

Complainant, )

) Appeal No. 01977101

v. ) Agency No. 4G-770-1450-96

)

William J. Henderson, )

Postmaster General, )

United States Postal Service, )

(S.E./S.W. Region), )

Agency. )

)

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal of a final agency decision (FAD)

concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination on the

bases of national origin (Hispanic), race (Caucasian), sex (male), age

(51), physical disability (carpal tunnel syndrome, bad ankle, diabetes,

and hypertension) and reprisal (prior EEO activity), in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29

U.S.C. �621 et seq.; and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,<1> as amended,

29 U.S.C. �791, et seq.<2> Complainant alleges he was discriminated

against when, on June 6, 1996, two blocks of walking deliveries were

added to his postal delivery route. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. �

1614.405). For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a PS-05 City Letter Carrier at the agency's North Shepherd Station

in Houston, Texas. Complainant alleged that although the agency was

aware of his injuries as he requested accommodation beginning in 1995,

two blocks of walking deliveries were added to his delivery route as

a means of forcing him off the route. Believing he was a victim of

discrimination, complainant sought EEO counseling and, subsequently, filed

a complaint on August 3, 1996. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing before an

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) Administrative Judge,

or request a final decision by the agency. After complainant failed to

respond within the appropriate time frame, the agency issued its FAD.

The FAD concluded that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of race, age and national origin discrimination because he presented no

evidence that similarly situated individuals not in his protected classes

were treated differently under similar circumstances. In so finding,

the FAD noted that similar walking deliveries were added to the routes

of similarly situated employees not in complainant's protected classes.

The FAD also found that even if complainant had established a prima

facie case of discrimination, the agency articulated a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for the action taken, namely, that the Manager,

Customer Services (MCS) of the North Shepherd Station, made the additions

without considering whether the territory involved walking or riding.

The MCS further stated that he was not aware that complainant had any

medical limitation at the time the new routes were added.

The FAD also found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of physical disability discrimination. The FAD found that complainant

failed to demonstrate that any of his injuries (bad ankle, wrist injury)

were permanent in nature or that they substantially limited a major life

activity. The FAD further found that complainant failed to establish

that he had carpal tunnel syndrom, diabetes or hypertension, or that, if

he did, that they substantially limited a major life activity. Finally,

the FAD found that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case

of retaliation, as although the MCS was aware of complainant's prior EEO

activity, there was no causal connection between the EEO activity and the

route adjustment. The FAD found that complainant failed to demonstrate

that �but for� his prior EEO activity, he would not have had the walking

deliveries added to his route. Complainant has made no arguments on

appeal.

After a careful review of the record, based on McDonnell Douglas

v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Commission initially finds that the

agency correctly found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case of race, age or national origin discrimination. The record

reflects that there were no similarly situated City Letter Carriers not in

complainant's protected groups who were treated differently under similar

circumstances. In determining whether complainant was discriminated

under the Rehabilitation Act, he must show that he is an individual with

a disability within the meaning of the regulations. EEOC Regulation 29

C.F.R. �1630.2(g) defines an individual with a disability as one who:

1) has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more of that person's major life activities, 2) has a history of

such impairment, or 3) is regarded as having such an impairment. EEOC

Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(i) defines "major life activities" as

including the functions of caring for one's self, performing manual tasks,

walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.

Complainant also must show that he is a "qualified" individual with a

disability within the meaning of 29 C.F.R. �1630.2(m). That section

defines qualified individual with a disability as meaning, with respect

to employment, an individual with a disability who, with or without

reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the

position in question.

The medical evidence of record shows that while complainant suffered

injuries to his right wrist in 1993, and sprained his right ankle in

1995, the physicians who examined him authorized him to return to his

usual position immediately without limitations. In addition, there is

no evidence that complainant has carpal tunnel syndrome, diabetes or

hypertension, or that if he did, that these conditions substantially

limited his performance of any major life activities. Further, the

testimony of the MCS and the record reflect that complainant did not

have a record of, nor was he regarded as, having an impairment which

substantially limited a major life activity when the additions were

made to his route. We note that the record is devoid of evidence that

complainant requested a reasonable accommodation as early as 1981.

As a result, we agree with the FAD that complainant failed to establish

that he is an individual with a disability within the meaning of the

Rehabilitation Act.

Finally, we disagree with the FAD and find that complainant has

established a prima facie case of retaliation. The record reflects

that the MCS was aware of complainant's prior EEO activity and added the

walking streets to complainant's route within such a period of time that

a retaliatory motive may be inferred. Hochstadt v. Worchester Foundation

for Experimental Biology, 425 F.Supp. 318 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222

(1st Cir. 1976). We further find that the agency articulated legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons for its action, namely that management made a

decision to add additional territory to the routes of several carriers,

as close to the original route regardless of the type of delivery.

Having carefully reviewed the record, we find that complainant has failed

to establish that the foregoing reasons were pretextual. The weight

of the evidence establishes that although the MCS knew of complainant's

protected EEO activity, the additions were uniformly made to the routes of

various postal carriers, and were not motivated by discriminatory animus.

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Moore v. USPS,

EEOC Appeal No. 01950134 (April 17, 1997). Therefore, for the reasons

stated above and after a careful review of the record and evidence not

specifically addressed in this decision, the FAD is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0300)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED

WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS OF

RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See 64

Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter referred

to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405); Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter

referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604). The request or opposition must

also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive the decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive the decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive the decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS

THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY

HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

August 3, 2000

_______________ _________________________

Date Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1 The Rehabilitation Act was amended in 1992 to apply the standards in the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to complaints of discrimination by

federal employees or applicants for employment. Since that time, the ADA

regulations set out at 29 C.F.R. Part 1630 apply to complaints of disability

discrimination. These regulations can be found on EEOC's website at

www.eeoc.gov.

2 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal

sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all

federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative

process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations

found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the

present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the

Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.