01a05517
11-09-2000
Alexander J. Dalonas, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Southwest), Agency.
Alexander J. Dalonas v. United States Postal Service
01A05517
November 9, 2000
.
Alexander J. Dalonas,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service
(Southwest),
Agency.
Appeal No. 01A05517
Agency No. 4G-780-2736-99
Hearing No. 360-AO-8033X
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final action
concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful
employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. <1>
The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant
alleges he was discriminated against on the bases of race (Caucasian)
and national origin (Greek American), when: (1) on March 10, 1999,
he was subjected to street supervision; and (2) on May 3, and May 4,
1999, he was subjected to office and street supervision, and the agency
refused to give him documentation reflecting the supervision. For the
following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the agency's final action.
The record reveals that complainant, a Carrier Technician at the
agency's Coronado Station, El Paso, Texas facility, filed a formal EEO
complaint with the agency on June 17, 1999, alleging that the agency
had discriminated against him as referenced above. At the conclusion
of the investigation, complainant received a copy of the investigative
report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).
The AJ issued a decision without a hearing, finding no discrimination.
The AJ concluded that complainant established a prima facie case of race
and national origin discrimination because complainant established that
similarly situated employees, not in his protected classes, were treated
differently than he was under similar circumstances.
The AJ further concluded that the agency articulated legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. Complainant's Supervisor
averred that complainant's route was observed because prior analyses
indicated that there were some discrepancies between complainant's
workload and hours, and complainant's street time showed an increase
compared to the average street time. Furthermore, complainant's manager
averred that complainant's work performance was not up to the standard
of other carriers. Even on �light� days, when other carriers completed
their work in eight hours, complainant requested auxiliary help. In sum,
complainant's manager averred that complainant's performance was observed
in order to determine why complainant was unable to complete his route
in eight hours, and why he could not follow the set delivery route,
even after instructions to do so. Complainant's supervisor denied that
he refused complainant copies of paperwork generated by the performance
assessment.
The AJ found that complainant did not establish that more likely
than not, the agency's articulated reasons were a pretext to mask
unlawful discrimination. In reaching this conclusion, the AJ found that
complainant failed to provide any evidence from which a trier of fact
could conclude that the agency's reasons for its actions were a pretext
for discrimination.
On July 18, 2000, the agency issued a final action that implemented the
AJ's decision.
On appeal, complainant argues that his route takes longer to deliver
because his route has a higher mail volume than other carriers.
He disputes management's contention that he was not refused documentation
from the route inspection. Complainant also claims that he only delivered
the route out of sequence on one occasion.
The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a
hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material
fact. This regulation is patterned after the summary judgment procedures
set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Summary
Judgment is proper when "material facts are not in genuine dispute."
29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). Only a dispute over facts that are truly
material to the outcome of the case should preclude summary judgment.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (only disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law, and not irrelevant or unnecessary disputes, will preclude the entry
of summary judgment). For example, when a complainant is unable to
set forth facts necessary to establish one essential element of a prima
facie case, a dispute over facts necessary to prove another element of
the case would not be material to the outcome. Celotex v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). EEOC Management Directive 110 (MD-110), at 7-15
( November 9, 1999). The Commission will apply a de novo standard of
review when it reviews an AJ's decision to issue a decision without a
hearing pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g). See EEOC MD-110, at 9-16.
After a careful review of the record, the Commission finds that the
AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and referenced the
appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. We note that complainant
failed to present any evidence that any of the agency's actions were
motivated by discriminatory animus toward complainant's race or national
origin. In addition, complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence
that the agency's reasons for its actions lacked credence. We discern no
basis to disturb the AJ's decision. Therefore, after a careful review of
the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal, the agency's
response, and arguments and evidence not specifically addressed in this
decision, we AFFIRM the agency's final action.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
November 9, 2000
__________________
Date
1 On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's
federal sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations
apply to all federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in
the administrative process. Consequently, the Commission will apply
the revised regulations found at 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at www.eeoc.gov.