Alec J. Kuracina, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 29, 2005
01a42911 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 29, 2005)

01a42911

07-29-2005

Alec J. Kuracina, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Alec J. Kuracina v. United States Postal Service

01A42911

July 29, 2005

.

Alec J. Kuracina,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A42911

Agency Nos. 1F-931-1011-95, et al.

Hearing Nos. 340-1998-03392X, et al.

DECISION

On April 25, 1995, complainant filed a formal EEO complaint (Agency

No. 1F-931-1011-95) wherein he claimed that he was discriminated against

on the bases of his color (white), sex (male), national origin (Slovak),

age (43), disability (perceived) and in reprisal for his previous EEO

activity under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the

Rehabilitation Act when he was denied a reasonable accommodation; issued

a Notice of Removal effective March 31, 1995, and he was not afforded a

second opinion of his fitness for duty examination. The record indicates

that four other complaints were filed and were consolidated with Agency

No. 1F-931-1011-95. Subsequent to an investigation, complainant requested

a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). At a pre-hearing

conference, complainant stated that the only unresolved issue in this

matter was whether he was subjected to reprisal when he was terminated

by the agency in March 1995.

On or about September 20, 2000, complainant filed a civil action wherein

he claimed discrimination as to his 1994 fitness for duty exam and

the finding that he was unfit for duty. On March 4, 2002, the United

States District Court for the Central District of California granted

the agency's Motion for Summary Judgment. The United States District

Court ruled that complainant failed to establish a prima facie case of

reprisal because a requirement to undergo psychological testing is not

an adverse employment action. The United States District Court further

stated that even if complainant had established a prima facie case,

his numerous grievances were unreasonably disruptive in the workplace

and provided a legitimate reason to send him for a fitness for duty

examination as well as take disciplinary action against complainant.

On January 22, 2004, the AJ dismissed the termination claim pursuant

to the collateral estoppel doctrine. The AJ noted that complainant's

termination was caused by the alleged unreasonably disruptive behavior

that led to his fitness for duty examination. The AJ reasoned that

complainant had the opportunity to address his termination in the civil

action and therefore the collateral estoppel doctrine is applicable.

By final action dated February 19, 2004, the agency adopted the AJ's

decision and dismissed the instant complaints.

The Commission has previously held that the doctrine of collateral

estoppel is applicable to discrimination claims. See Fitz-Gerald

v. Tennessee Valley Authority, EEOC Request No. 05910573 (January

16, 1992). Furthermore, in Magnallenes v. Department of Justice, EEOC

Request No. 05900176 (July 13, 1990), the Commission noted, �collateral

estoppel or issue preclusion recognizes that suits addressed to particular

claims may present issues relevant to suits on other claims. Thus,

issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues actually adjudicated and

necessary to the judgment in a prior litigation between the parties.� In

the civil action complainant alleged that he was terminated as a result

of the fitness for duty examination. In the civil action complainant

requested reinstatement with the agency. The Commission finds that

adjudication of the fitness for duty examination claim, which was

adjudicated in the civil action, was necessary to a determination of the

termination issue. Therefore, we find that complainant is collaterally

estopped from raising the fitness for duty examination issue in the

instant complaint and also the inextricably intertwined issue of the

termination.

The agency's dismissal of the instant matter is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court

appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you

to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security.

See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �

2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��

791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 29, 2005

__________________

Date