Alcatel LucentDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMar 18, 20212019006717 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 18, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/232,455 08/09/2016 Subhasis Laha 4100-819398-US 3203 46363 7590 03/18/2021 Tong, Rea, Bentley & Kim, LLC Nokia 12 Christopher Way Suite 105 Eatontown, NJ 07724 EXAMINER DANIEL JR, WILLIE J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2462 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 03/18/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@trbklaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte SUBHASIS LAHA, PADMAVATHI SUDARSAN, RANGA TOTA, RUTH GAYDE, and SUBRAMANIAN VASUDEVAN Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 Technology Center 2400 Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges. CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8 and 15–17, all of the claims under consideration.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 “Appellant” refers to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Nokia Technologies Oy. Appeal Brief filed March 18, 2019 (“Appeal Br.”) at 1. 2 Appellant has withdrawn claims 9–16. Appeal Br. 14, 15. Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Summary Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “supporting discontinuous reception by user equipment in wireless communication systems.” Spec. ¶ 1.3 Appellant explains that user equipment in the IoT (Internet of Things) “typically implement power savings techniques including extended idle mode discontinuous reception (eDRX) that allows the user equipment to cycle between a sleep mode in which the user equipment cannot receive transmissions and a paging window in which the user equipment wakes up to listen for paging messages transmitted by the network.” Id. ¶ 2. Appellant further explains that the “duration of the paging window is configurable on a per-user equipment basis.” Id. According to Appellant, “[i]nformation can be efficiently transmitted to a logical grouping of user equipment that includes one or more user equipment operating in” a eDRX mode “by identifying a time interval that encompasses paging windows for the user equipment that are operating in the eDRX mode and transmitting messages to the user equipment in corresponding paging windows during the time interval.” Id. ¶ 19. Exemplary Claim Claims 1 and 15 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below with limitation at issue italicized, exemplifies the claimed subject matter: 1. A method comprising: 3 In addition to the Appeal Brief noted above, we refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed August 9, 2016 (“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed November 30, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (3) the Examiner’s Answer mailed July 18, 2019 (“Ans.”); and (4) the Reply Brief filed September 12, 2019 (“Reply Br.”). Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 3 identifying, at a broadcast manager, a first time interval that encompasses paging windows for a plurality of user equipment, wherein the plurality of user equipment operate according to a plurality of different discontinuous reception cycles that include sleep intervals of different durations separated by the paging windows; and generating, at the broadcast manager, messages for wireless transmission to the plurality of user equipment in the paging windows during the first time interval, wherein the messages include information indicating a transmission time at which the plurality of user equipment are to receive at least one of broadcast and multicast data, wherein the transmission time is subsequent to the first time interval. Appeal Br. 12. REFERENCES AND REJECTION The Examiner rejects claims 1–8 and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious over the combined teachings of Terry (US 7,197,323 B2, published March 27, 2007) and Sarkar et al. (US 6,728,300 B1, published Apr. 27, 2004) (“Sarkar”). Final Act. 3–8. OPINION We review the appealed rejection for error based upon the issues identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). Appellant does not persuade us that the Examiner errs, and we adopt as our own the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner to the extent consistent with our analysis herein. Final Act. 3–6; Ans. 3–9. We add the following primarily for emphasis. Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 4 Appellant argues claims 1–4, 6–8, 15, and 16 as a group. Appeal Br. 10. We, thus, select independent claim 1 as exemplary of the group. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2018). Independent claim 1 recites “identifying, at a broadcast manager, a first time interval that encompasses paging windows for a plurality of user equipment.” Appeal Br. 12. The Examiner finds Terry teaches or suggests identifying a first time interval as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 3 (citing Terry 2:8–12, 3:26–30, 4:4–10, 4:20–23, 4:44–50, 6:9–19 and Figs. 1–4); Ans. 11–12. In particular, the Examiner finds Terry’s “system provides paging of a group of users” and “the system provides different paging occasions and different DRX cycle length” within a time interval. Final Act. 3. Appellant argues that “Terry discloses that the paging windows for user equipment and groups of user equipment are consolidated so that PtP [(Point-to-Point)] paging messages and PtM [(Point-to-Multipoint)] paging messages are transmitted in the same paging windows, which ‘results in a reduction of UE power consumption.’” Appeal Br. 6 (citing Terry 4:7–10). According to Appellant, “Terry therefore discloses a particular use or configuration of the paging windows but Terry does not disclose identifying a particular time interval that encompasses a set of paging intervals.” Id. (emphasis omitted); Reply Br. 4. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument. Initially, we note that Appellant’s argument is not commensurate with the scope of claim 1 because the claim does not recite “a set of paging intervals.” Limitations not appearing in the claim cannot be relied upon for patentability. In re Self, 671 F.2d 1344, 1348 (CCPA 1982). Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 5 However, even assuming Appellant intended to argue that Terry fails to teach “identifying . . . a first time interval that encompasses paging windows,” rather than a set of paging intervals, we remain unpersuaded. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Terry’s Figure 2 and corresponding text teaches “identifying . . . a first time interval that encompasses paging windows for a plurality of user equipment,” as recited in claim 1. In Particular, Terry’s Figure 2 illustrates a plurality of UE specific paging occasions 105 and a plurality of User Group paging occasions 110, which teach “paging windows for a plurality of user equipment,” as recited in claim 1. Furthermore, the time interval (“TIME”) spanning the X axis in Terry’s Figure 2 illustrates a first identified interval and that first interval encompasses paging windows 105 and 110. In addition, the Examiner relies on Terry’s discussion of identifying a defined paging period that encompasses paging occasions, which discloses: On the PCH [(Paging Transport Channel)] are paging occasions where, for a certain paging period, the paging mechanism only has to wake up once within that period to look for a paging message. This results in a reduction of UE power consumption because the paging mechanism does not have to continuously monitor the PCH separately for the PtP and PtM paging occasions. Terry 4:4–8. We agree with the Examiner’s finding that Terry’s paging occasions within a certain identified paging period teaches or suggests “identifying . . . a first time interval that encompasses paging windows,” as recited in claim 1. Ans. 12 (citing Terry 2:8-12, 4:4–10, 4:20–23, 4:44–50). Appellant further argues that “Terry discloses that the UE only uses a single DRX cycle length and Terry does not disclose a set of user equipment Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 6 that use different DRX cycle lengths.” Reply Br. 2 (emphasis omitted); Appeal Br. 7. We are unpersuaded. First, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Terry discloses UEs that use different DRX cycle lengths. Final Act. 3 (citing Terry 2:8–12, 4:44–50). One portion of Terry cited by the Examiner discloses that “[t]he UE may be attached to different Core Network (CN) domains with different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths. The UE stores each CN domain specific DRX cycle length for each CN domain the UE is attached to and use the shortest of those DRX cycle lengths.” Terry 2:8–12. Appellant in turn fails to argue with particularity why Terry’s disclosure of different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths fails to teach or suggest “sleep intervals of different durations,” as recited in claim 1. Appellant next argues that “Terry does not disclose any time interval that encompasses the different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths.” Appeal Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). Appellant’s argument is not persuasive because claim 1 does not recite a “time interval that encompasses the different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths” as Appellant alleges (id.) but instead recites “a first time interval that encompasses paging windows.” This argument is, therefore, not commensurate with the scope of claim 1. Claim 1 further recites: generating, at the broadcast manager, messages for wireless transmission to the plurality of user equipment in the paging windows during the first time interval, wherein the messages include information indicating a transmission time at which the plurality of user equipment are to receive at least one of broadcast and multicast data, wherein the transmission time is subsequent to the first time interval. Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 7 Appeal Br. 12. Appellant argues “Terry does not disclose any time interval that encompasses multiple different paging windows. Consequently, Terry does not disclose generating messages for wireless transmission during any such time interval” and “therefore cannot disclose a message that includes information indicating a transmission time that is subsequent to any such time interval.” Id. at 7. These arguments rely on Appellant’s argument that “Terry does not disclose any time interval that encompasses multiple different paging windows.” Because we find that argument unpersuasive, as discussed above (supra pgs. 5–7), we find Appellant’s additional arguments unpersuasive for similar reasons. Accordingly, Appellant does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. We, therefore, sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the rejections of claims 2–4, 6–8, 15, and 16, which Appellant does not argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 10. Dependent claim 5 recites, in part: identifying a first time interval that is equal to or greater than a longest discontinuous reception cycle of the plurality of different discontinuous reception cycles; or identifying a first time interval based on an amount of time that will elapse before a latest paging window from among the paging windows of the plurality of user equipment.” Appeal Br. 13. The Examiner finds “the combination of Terry and Sarkar discloses every limitation claimed, as applied above (see claim 1), in addition Sarkar Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 8 further discloses” the additional limitations recited in claim 5. Final Act. 5– 6 (citing Sarkar 3:26–30; col. 4:4–10, 20–23; 6:9–19 and Figs. 1–4); Ans. 14–15. Appellant argues that: Terry discloses that “[the] UE may be attached to different Core Network (CN) domains with different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths.” See Terry, col. 2, lines 8-11. Terry also discloses that “[groups] of the users that are associated with this PtM group are associated with respective ones of the PtM occasions.” However, Terry does not disclose or suggest identifying a longest discontinuous reception cycle among the different CN domain specific DRX cycle lengths, nor does Terry disclose or suggest determining an amount of time that will elapse before a paging window. Terry therefore does not disclose or suggest all the features set forth in claim 5. Sarkar is similarly silent with regard to discontinuous reception cycles. Appeal Br. 9–10. We find Appellant’s arguments regarding Terry unpersuasive because the Examiner relies on Sarkar, rather than Terry, to suggest the identifying of a first time interval, as recited in claim 5. Therefore these arguments are not responsive to the rejection. Moreover, Appellant’s single sentence assertion regarding Sarkar is unpersuasive. Id. at 10. Such a conclusory statement, amounting to little more than a paraphrasing of the claim language (discontinuous reception cycles) and a general denial, is unpersuasive to rebut the Examiner’s findings. Cf. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“A statement which merely points out what a claim recites will not be considered an argument for separate patentability of the claim.”); see also In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e hold that the Board reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to Appeal 2019-006717 Application 15/232,455 9 require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.”). Appellant, therefore, does not persuade us of error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of dependent claim 5. We sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the rejection of claim 17, which Appellant does not argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 10. CONCLUSION We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–8 and 15–17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103. DECISION SUMMARY In summary: Claim(s) Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1–8, 15–17 103 Terry, Sarkar 1–8, 15–17 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation