Albro, Douglas R. et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 3, 2019

14283399 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Sep. 3, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/283,399 05/21/2014 Douglas R. Albro PAT-236 4819
29129 7590 09/03/2019
TOM TILDEN
C/O WEST CORPORATION
11808 MIRACLE HILLS DR.
MAIL STOP: W11-LEGAL
OMAHA, NE 68154
EXAMINER
REICHERT, RACHELLE LEIGH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3686
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/03/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
TNTILDEN@WEST.COM
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
mzarinelli@proactivepatents.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DOUGLAS R. ALBRO, KENNETH A. DARBY,
ROBERT J. DUDZINSKI, MICHAEL J. MASCHING,
PAMELA ANN MORTENSON, BRUCE POLLOCK,
and HENDRYANTO RILANTONO
____________

Appeal 2018–0077771
Application 14/283,399
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before HUNG H. BUI, ADAM J. PYONIN, and MICHAEL M. BARRY,
Administrative Patent Judges.

BARRY, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–16, and 18–21.2 App. Br. 11; Final Act. 1.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

1 Appellants identify West Corporation as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 3.
2 Claims 3, 10, and 17 have been cancelled. See Final Act. 2.
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Introduction
Appellants describe their invention as “relat[ing] to assisting patients
with continuing health care management via a computer-based application,
and more specifically to optimizing patient appointments, insurance payment
options, medical facility treatment and other aspects of medical patient
interactions.” Spec. ¶ 2. Appellants describe various health care service
issues and that “the number of options available for the patient may be
numerous,” which “can often lead to overwhelming decisions for otherwise
sensitive concerns related to the well-being of oneself or loved ones.” Id.
¶¶ 3, 5. Claims 1, 8, and 15 are independent, of which claim 1 is
representative of the claims on appeal:
1. A method comprising:
receiving, by a processing device, patient diagnostic
measurements associated with a patient on a periodic basis from
a patient computing device;
compiling the patient diagnostic measurements, by the
processing device, as a medical report stored in memory;
processing, by the processing device, the medical report,
wherein the processing by the processing device comprises
identifying from the compiled patient diagnostic measurements
in the medical report whether actual measurements exceed
threshold measurements and are indicative of a health concern,
and determining a present course of treatment for the patient
based on the medical report and whether the actual
measurements exceed the threshold measurements; and
transmitting the medical report and the determined course
of treatment to a device of an interested party.
App. Br. 72 (Claims App’x).
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Rejections3 and References
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11–16, and 18–21 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 as ineligibly directed to a judicial exception. Final Act. 2–4.
The Examiner rejected claims 1, 2, 4, 7–9, 11, 15, 16, and 18 under 35
U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Cosentino et al. (US 2012/0041775 A1;
pub. Feb. 16, 2012, hereinafter “Cosentino”) and Rosenfeld et al. (US
2006/0271407 A1; pub. Nov. 30, 2006, hereinafter “Rosenfeld”). Final Act.
6–9.
The Examiner rejected claims 5, 6, 12–14, 19 and 20 are rejected
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being unpatentable over Cosentino, Rosenfeld, and
Dicks (US 2008/0183502 A1; pub. July 31, 2008, hereinafter “Dicks”).
Final Act. 9–11.
The Examiner rejected claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Cosentino, Dicks et al., and Berlin et al. (US
2006/0136142 A1; pub. June 22, 2006, hereinafter “Berlin”). Final Act. 11–
12.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’
arguments. See Final Act. 2–12; see also App. Br. 12–71; Ans. 3–14; and
Reply Br. 2–12. We disagree with Appellants’ conclusions. Instead, as
consistent with our discussion below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and
reasons as set forth in the Final Office Action from which this appeal is

3 In response to a post-Final Action Response and Amendment, the
Examiner withdrew a rejection of claims 19 and 20 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 112(d). See Ans. 3.
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taken and as set forth in the Answer. We highlight the following for
emphasis.
The 35 U.S.C. § 101 Rejection
For the 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection, Appellants argue all pending claims
together based on claim 1, which therefore is representative for this
rejection. See App. Br. 26–45; see also 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).4

General Legal Framework and the USPTO Guidance
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. The
Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573
U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept

4 Independent claims 8 and 15 include limitations commensurate with those
of claim 1 (and stand similarly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101). See App.
Br. 74–76.
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of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract
ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing
human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at
219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook,
437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson,
409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include
physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” in
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim
that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that
the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the
[abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing]
generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into
a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
The PTO recently published revised guidance on the application of 35
U.S.C. § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. 50–57 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Revised Guidance.”). Under the Guidance,
we first look, in step one of the Alice/Mayo analysis, to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes) (“prong one”); and
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (“prong two”) (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–
(h)).5
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52, 54–55. Only if a claim (1) recites a
judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical
application, do we then look to whether the claim adds “significantly more”
under step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, i.e., whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that are not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.
The Examiner’s Determinations and Appellants’ Contentions
The Examiner determined claim 1 recites “receiving patient diagnostic
information, compiling the information as a report, processing the
information to identify a present course of action and transmitting the
medical report and the determined course of treatment,” which is considered
as an abstract idea. Final Act. 2, 3 (citing Electric Power Group, LLC v.
Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (additionally determining claim
1 “include additional limitations that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception”).
Appellants contend the Examiner erred because, consistent with Alice,
Finjan,6 Enfish,7 and McRO,8 claim 1 is directed to a non-abstract software

5 All references to the MPEP are to Rev. 08.2017 (Jan. 2018).
6 Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Systems, Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
7 Enfish LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
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invention. Final Act. 26–37; see also id. at 37–45 (also arguing claim 1
“does [s]ubstantially [m]ore than any [a]lleged [a]bstract [i]dea”).
Appellants contend claim 1 is directed to an unconventional approach
for optimizing patient treatment that can automatically compile and process
a medical report, determine a course of treatment, and transmit the report to
a device of an interested party, so that “a pertinent medical professional can
rapidly be notified of a potential issue before this would otherwise be
possible, and in time to act in many cases.” App. Br. 28. Appellants also
argue the Examiner characterizes claim 1 overly broadly, and that “[t]he
claimed invention provides a novel process for performing threshold-based
analysis of patient data, determining whether a medical condition may be
present, and alerting appropriate medical staff. Conventional approaches do
not determine appropriate staff members to notify based on a determined
condition, for example.” App. Br. 31. “Computer technology is at the root
of the claimed invention. As disclosed in paragraph [0002] of the subject
application, for instance, a computer-based software application is at the
heart of the claimed invention.” App. Br. 32.
Analysis—Alice/Mayo Step One, Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong One
In determining whether a claim recites a judicial exception, we must
“‘be careful to avoid oversimplifying the claims’ by looking at them
generally and failing to account for the specific requirements of the claims.”9
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313 (quoting In re TLI Commc’ns LLC Patent Litig.,

8 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc., 837 F.3d 1299
(Fed. Cir. 2016).
9 At this stage of our analysis under the Guidance, we put aside the claim
recitations of “a processing device,” a “computing device,” “stored in
memory” and “a device.”
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823 F.3d 607, 611 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Here, at prong one of step 2A of the
Guidance, the Examiner’s determination complies with that caveat, and
Appellants do not persuade us of error.
In particular, the first step recites “receiving . . . patient diagnostic
measurements associated with a patient on a periodic basis from a patient
computing device.” This describes the activity of periodically reading the
display of a medical device attached to a patient, an entirely routine activity
for medical caregivers that requires only human perception. The second step
recites “compiling the patient diagnostic measurements . . . as a medical
report.” This describes the human activity of recording measurements in a
patient’s chart, another entirely routine practice, an activity which may be
done entirely with pencil and paper.10 The third step recites “processing . . .
the medical report” to identify “from the compiled patient diagnostic
measurements in the medical report whether actual measurements exceed
threshold measurements and are indicative of a health concern,” which is
used “for determining a present course of treatment for the patient.” This
encompasses a routine mental process caregivers routinely perform:
(1) identify a health concern is indicated when a periodically observed and
recorded measurement (e.g., body temperature) falls outside normal values
(i.e., exceeds a threshold); and (2) use that abnormal measurement as a basis
for determining a treatment course (e.g., an antipyretic for an elevated body
temperature). The fourth step recites “transmitting the medical report and
the determined course of treatment to . . . an interested party.” This step

10 Appellants’ Specification and claims do not define or otherwise limit the
scope of the claim term “medical report.” See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 16–17, and
108–11. Artisans of ordinary skill would have understood “medical report,”
as recited, encompasses charted medical measurements for a patient.
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encompasses routine human activity, such as caregiver showing or giving a
patient’s chart to another person.
The Revised Guidance identifies “managing personal behavior or
relationships or interactions between people (including . . . following rules
or instructions)” as one of certain methods of organizing human activity that,
when recited in a claim, may constitute an abstract idea. See 84 Fed. Reg
52. The above-discussed limitations in steps one, two, and four of claim 1
fall into this category. The Revised Guidance also identifies “concepts
performed in the human mind (including an observation, evaluation,
judgment, opinion)” as mental processes that, when recited in a claim, may
constitute abstract ideas. Id. The limitations in step three fall into this
category. Thus, in accordance with the Guidance, because “receiving patient
diagnostic information, compiling the information as a report, processing the
information to identify a present course of action and transmitting the
medical report and the determined course of treatment,” as recited, is a
combination of one of “certain methods of organizing human activity” and
“mental processes,” Appellants do not persuade us the Examiner erred in
determining that claim 1 recites a judicial exception (abstract idea). See 84
Fed. Reg. at 52. “Adding one abstract idea . . . to another abstract idea . . .
does not render the claim non-abstract.” RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co.
LTD., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Because claim 1 recites a
judicial exception, we next determine whether it integrates the judicial
exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
54.
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Analysis—Alice/Mayo Step One, Guidance Step 2A, Prong Two
To determine whether the judicial exception is integrated into a
practical application, we identify whether there are “any additional elements
recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s)” and evaluate those
elements to determine whether they integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. 84 Fed. Reg. 54–55 (emphasis added); see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h).
Here, the additional elements recited in claim 1 beyond the abstract
idea are the computer-related recitations, i.e.: (1) that “a processing device”
performs the recited functionality of the first three steps; (2) that
measurement data is received “from a patient computing device;” (3) that
compiled diagnostic measurement data is “stored in memory” (as a medical
report); and (4) that the medical report and determined course of treatment
are transmitted “to a device.” Although these computer-related recitations
add a certain level of specificity to the claim, they do not constitute an
improvement to “the functioning of the computer itself” or “any other
technology or technical field;” rather, they constitute use of generic
components for automating otherwise routine human activities. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(a) (quoting Alice, 573 U.S. at 225). Neither do these computer
limitations qualify as applying the judicial exception with “a particular
machine,” because these components provide their conventional functions
and require no more than general purpose computer equipment. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(b); see also Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709,716-17
(Fed. Cir. 2014); and TLI Communications LLC v. AV Automotive LLC, 823
F.3d 607, 613 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that mere recitation of concrete
or tangible components is not an inventive concept).
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Appellants’ arguments similarly do not persuade us that claim 1
effects a particular transformation of the recited articles, which are simply
used for their ordinary purposes, or that it adds any other meaningful
(technological) limitations, i.e., limitations beyond simply “linking the use”
of the abstract idea to generic technology. See MPEP § 2106.05 (c), (e)–(f),
(g)–(h) (Use of well-known limitations beyond the judicially excepted
matter constitutes “insignificant extra-solution activity” (g) and claim
limitations “merely indicating a field of use or technological environment in
which to apply a judicial exception do not amount to significantly more”
(h).).
Appellants unpersuasively argue that claim 1 is akin to patent eligible
claims in cases Finjan. App. Br. 17–19, 26–29; see also Reply Br. 2–3. The
claim at issue in Finjan was “directed to a method of providing computer
security by scanning a downloadable and attaching the results of that scan to
the downloadable itself in the form of a ‘security profile.’” Finjan, 879 F.3d
at 1303. All recited steps of the claim at issue in Finjan included limitations
that processed “a Downloadable” in order to provide a technological
improvement in the use of security technology on the web for handling
suspicious code in the Downloadable. Id. Appellant’s claim 1, by
comparison, simply recites generic technology components for
implementing the recited abstract idea. Claim 1 does not, as Appellants
argue, provide an improvement to software technology (see, e.g., App. Br.
26–33); rather, claim 1 recites an abstract idea combined with generic
hardware technology for carrying out the abstract idea. Beyond the mention
of the invention being “computer-based,” Appellants’ discussion of the
technical field and background of the application do not identify any
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technological issues addressed by the claimed invention. See Spec. ¶¶ 2–5.
Appellants’ characterization of claim 1 as non-abstract because it
present[s] a specific, threshold-based approach to identifying
from the compiled patient diagnostic measurements in the
medical report whether actual measurements exceed threshold
measurements and are indicative of a health concern and
determining a present course of treatment for the patient based
on the medical report and whether the actual measurements
exceed the threshold measurements.
(Reply Br. 5) is unpersuasive because that characterization describes
the abstract idea.
Appellants’ arguments based on Enfish are similarly unpersuasive.
See App. Br. 29–32; see also Reply Br. 3–4. The claims at issue in Enfish
focused on relational database technology, reciting a “self-referential table”
that provided specific technological advantages over the prior art. See
Enfish, 822 F.3d at 1330–33, 1336–37. In contrast, Appellants disclose (and
claim) only generic technology. See, e.g., Spec. ¶¶ 52, 123–25. Appellants
do not persuade us with the argument that “computing systems are improved
by the claimed invention at least by using threshold-based analysis to match
patients with the best suited healthcare professionals in an automated
fashion” and, as such, “improve[s] the functionality of such networked
computing systems by providing automated processing and linking.” Reply
Br. 8. As discussed supra, the non-computer claim limitations for a
“threshold-based analysis” describe (recite) an abstract idea. Claim 1 recites
a method that uses networked computing systems technology to carry out an
abstract idea, not an improvement to networked computing systems
technology.
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Appellants’ McRO-based arguments are also unpersuasive. See App.
Br. 34–35; see also Reply Br. 6. The claim at issue in McRO “focused on a
specific asserted improvement in computer animation.” McRO, 837 F.3d at
1314. Unlike claim 1’s high-level recitations of generic technology to
automate the organization of human activity and mental processes, the claim
at issue in McRO “focused on a specific asserted improvement in computer
animation.” Id. at 1314. DDR Holdings is similarly unhelpful for
Appellants. See App. Br. 39–40. The patent-eligible claims in DDR
Holdings recited a solution directed to Internet technology “that overrides
the routine and conventional sequence of events ordinarily triggered by the
click of a hyperlink.” See DDR Holdings, 773 F.3d at 1258. Appellant’s
claim 1 does not arise from a challenge with Internet or computer
technology. Instead, it uses routine technology to carry out an abstract idea
to address the challenge of “optimizing patient appointments, insurance
payment options, medical facility treatment and other aspects of medical
patient interactions.” Spec. ¶ 2.
Thus, unlike the patent-eligible claims in cases such as Finjan, Enfish,
McRO, and DDR Holdings, Appellant’s claim 1 simply uses technology for
its ordinary purposes in providing a solution directed to an abstract idea, i.e.,
it does not recite a technical solution directed to technological problem.
Accordingly, because the recited judicial exception is not integrated
into a practical application, the Examiner did not err in determining claim 1
is directed to an abstract idea.

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Alice/Mayo Step Two (Revised Guidance Step 2B)
In step two of the Alice/Mayo analysis, we consider whether there are
additional limitations that individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure
the claims amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Alice, 573
U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc.,
566 U.S. 66, 72–73, 77–79 (2012)). As stated in the Revised Guidance,
many of the considerations to determine whether the claims amount to
“significantly more” under step two of the Alice framework are already
considered as part of determining whether the judicial exception has been
integrated into a practical application. Revised Guidance, 56. Thus, at this
point of our analysis, we determine if claim 1 includes additional elements,
or combination of additional elements, that are not well-understood, routine,
conventional activity in the field; or whether it simply recites well-
understood, routine, conventional activities at a high level of generality. Id.
Here, Appellants’ claim 1 does not recite specific limitations (or a
combination of additional elements) that are beyond what was well-
understood, routine, and conventional. The Examiner finds, and we agree,
that beyond the limitations for the judicial exception, the technological
limitations recited in claim 1 constitute the use technology that was well
known to those of ordinary skill prior to the invention. Final Act. 3–4; see
also Ans. 8–10.
In arguing claim 1 recites significantly more than a judicial exception,
Appellants contend claim 1 is patent eligible because it is akin to the claims
at issue in Bascom Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827
F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“BASCOM”). App. Br. 37–39. We disagree.
The patent in BASCOM described a particular arrangement of Internet server
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filtering software that enables individually customizable filtering at a remote
ISP server by taking advantage of the technical ability of the ISP server to
identify individual accounts and associate a request for Internet content with
a specific individual account. BASCOM ’606 patent, 4:35–38. The Federal
Circuit recognized that BASCOM’s installation of an Internet content filter at
a particular network location is “a technical improvement over prior art ways
of filtering such content” that advantageously allows the Internet content
filter to have “both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the
benefits of a filter on the ISP server” and “give[s] users the ability to
customize filtering for their individual network accounts.” BASCOM, 827
F.3d at 1350, 1352. The record here, however, does not support a
determination that claim 1 provides a technical solution through an
unconventional arrangement of technological components in a manner
similar to BASCOM.
Lastly, regarding Appellants’ arguments related to preemption (App.
Br. 24, 41; see also Reply Br. 9):
To be clear, the proper focus is not preemption per se, for some
measure of preemption is intrinsic in the statutory right granted
with every patent to exclude competitors, for a limited time,
from practicing the claimed invention. See 35 U.S.C. § 154.
Rather, the animating concern is that claims should not be
coextensive with a natural law, natural phenomenon, or abstract
idea; a patent-eligible claim must include one or more
substantive limitations that, in the words of the Supreme Court,
add “significantly more” to the basic principle, with the result
that the claim covers significantly less. See Mayo 132 S.Ct. at
1294. Thus, broad claims do not necessarily raise [35 U.S.C.]
§ 101 preemption concerns, and seemingly narrower claims are
not necessarily exempt.
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CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269, 1281 (Fed. Cir.
2013); see also Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“While preemption may signal patent ineligible
subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate
patent eligibility.”). Because we find the claimed subject matter covers
patent-ineligible subject matter, the preemption concern is necessarily
addressed. “Where a patent’s claims are deemed only to disclose patent
ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, [] preemption concerns
are fully addressed and made moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, 788 F.3d at 1379.
We acknowledge Appellants’ point that there is ample precedent for
determining disputed claims are patent-eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
App. Br. 42–44, nn. 73–104. We note there also is ample precedent to the
contrary. Appellants do not persuade us that claim 1 is patent eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
35 U.S.C. § 101 Conclusion
For the reasons discussed supra, we are unpersuaded of Examiner
error. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9,
11–16, and 18–21 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.

The 35 U.S.C. § 103 Rejections
Appellants argue error in the § 103 rejection of claim 1 and offer no
substantive arguments separate from claim 1 for claims 2, 4–7, 8, 9, 11–15,
16, and 18–21; thus for the 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections, claim 1 is
representative for all pending claims. See App. Br. 45–70; see also 37
C.F.R. 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
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Appellants contend the Examiner erred in the rejection of claim 1 by
finding Rosenfeld teaches or suggests “processing, by the processing device,
the medical report, wherein the processing by the processing device
comprises identifying from the compiled patient diagnostic measurements in
the medical report whether actual measurements exceed threshold
measurements and are indicative of a health concern,” as recited. See App.
Br. 51–54. Appellants’ argument is unpersuasive. See Ans. 12.
Rosenfeld discloses receiving data from patient monitoring equipment,
compiling it, and analyzing it “to determine whether a patient’s condition is
deteriorating.” Rosenfeld ¶¶ 18–19. Ordinarily skilled artisans would have
understood Rosenfeld’s collected patient data to be a “medical report” that
includes “compiled patient diagnostic measurements.” Such artisans also
would have understood that determining whether the patient’s condition is
deteriorating (or improving) teaches the recited threshold test (which also
teaches identifying whether the compiled measurements “are indicative of a
health concern”). See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418, and
421 (2007) (“A person of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton.”).
Appellants contend the skilled artisans “would not construe various
saved patient information as a ‘medical report’ in the context of the subject
application.” Reply Br. 9–10. We disagree. Attorney arguments and
conclusory statements that are unsupported by factual evidence are entitled
to little probative value. See In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir.
1997). We discern no discussion in the record, e.g., in the Specification or
in the claims, that limits the ordinary meaning of “medical report.” Nor do
Appellants identify any such discussion. To the contrary, paragraph 16 of
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the Specification broadly explains that “patient diagnostic measurements”
are compiled (in some unspecified format) “in memory” and “as a medical
report.”
Appellants contend the Examiner erred because Rosenberg “also fails
to disclose determining a present course of treatment for the patient based on
the medical report and whether the actual measurements exceed the
threshold measurements.” App. Br. 53 (quoting claim 1). This argument is
also unpersuasive. See Ans. 12–13. Rosenberg discloses algorithms that
“determine whether the current treatment plan is viable or should be
amended” based on data that includes patient diagnostic measurements,
which are monitored and updated periodically. Rosenberg ¶¶ 38, 104.
Artisans of ordinary skill plainly would have understood Rosenberg’s
decision whether to alter a patient treatment plan based on monitored patient
data teaches “determining a present course of treatment for the patient based
on the medical report,” as recited. Those of ordinarily skill likewise would
also have well understood that threshold-checking is a fundamental
programming tool with regard to coding algorithms that decide whether
changes to measured data trigger a treatment plan change. KSR, 550 U.S. at
418, 421.
Appellants further contend the Examiner erred in relying upon
Rosenfeld, which “fails to disclose the claimed transmitting.” App. Br. 55;
see also Reply Br. 11–12. In particular, Appellants argue “Rosenfeld
discusses that it is the patient treatment plan, not the saved patient data, that
is transmitted to the remote command center. As such, Appellant
respectfully submits that Rosenfeld fails to disclose transmitting a medical
report to a device of an interested party.” Reply Br. 11. Appellants further
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argue that “an ‘interested party’ would be construed to be a device of a
medical professional in the context of the subject application” and “the
remote command center 150 of Rosenfeld appears to be multiple devices.”
Id. at 12 (emphasis omitted).
Appellants’ arguments are unpersuasive. Appellants read Rosenfeld
too narrowly. Regarding Rosenfeld’s transmitting of saved patient data to
the remote command center, Figure 1 of Rosenfeld is instructive:

“FIG. 1 illustrates a block diagram of the components of a monitored
patient care system (HPCS) according to embodiments of the present
invention.” Rosenfeld ¶ 49.
The system 100 of Rosenfeld gathers (compiles) patient data from
monitoring device(s) 115 on General Purpose Computer 110 and transfers
such patient data to “[t]he remote command center [that] receives the
monitoring data from all patient monitoring” systems. Rosenfeld ¶ 18. “The
stored monitoring data is sent from general purpose computer 110 to the
remote command center 150 along with patient data.” Rosenfeld ¶ 94. In
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view of these disclosures of Rosenfeld, we disagree with Appellants that “it
is the patient treatment plan, not the saved patient data, that is transmitted to
the remote command center.” Reply Br. 11. Rosenfeld plainly states the
remote center receives “all patient monitoring” data. Rosenfeld ¶ 18.
Regarding Appellants’ contention “that an ‘interested party’ would be
construed to be a device of a medical professional in the context of the
subject application,” we also disagree. Reply Br. 12; see also In re Geisler,
116 F.3d at 1470. The Specification and claims provide no limiting
definition of interested party. The Specification otherwise broadly refers to
various interested parties, not just medical professionals. See Spec. ¶¶ 16–
17, 104, 107, 109, 115–16. Regardless, the remote command center, which
interfaces with and controls the patient care system, includes a “display and
control system 165 [that] provides the human interface.” Rosenfeld ¶ 96,
and Fig. 1. Rosenfeld’s technology in general is geared towards medical
professionals. Artisans of ordinary skill would have understood Rosenfeld
teaches an interface for a medical professional at the remote command
center. Thus, even assuming arguendo Appellants’ limitation on the claim,
i.e., “that an ‘interested party’ would be construed to be a device of a
medical professional in the context of the subject application,” Appellants do
not persuade us of Examiner error in the relevant findings of the teachings of
Rosenfeld. Reply Br. 12.
On this record, Appellants do not persuade us of Examiner error in the
§ 103 rejection of claim 1 and, therefore, also in the rejections of claims 2,
4–7, 8, 9, 11–15, 16, and 18–21.
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DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101 of claims
1–3, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 12–19.
We affirm the Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims
1–3, 5, 6, 9, 10, and 12–19.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED