Albertsons, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 21, 1990

300 N.L.R.B. 1013 (N.L.R.B. 1990)

1013
300 NLRB No. 142
ALBERTSONS, INC.
1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility findings.
The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an administrative law judge’s
credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance of all the relevant evi-
dence convinces us that they are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products, 91
NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully ex-
amined the record and find no basis for reversing the findings.
The Respondent has excepted to the judge’s failure to comply with Sec.
10274.2 of the Board’s Casehandling Manual, Part One. In this regard, the Re-
spondent asserts that the judge amended the complaint at the hearing in the
absence of a motion to amend. We find this exception to be without merit.
While the judge stated that the ‘‘essence of the complaint’’ was amended at
the hearing, in fact, at the hearing, the counsel for the General Counsel simply
clarified the allegations contained in the original complaint. The complaint was
not amended to include any additional allegations.
2 We find no merit in the Respondent’s contention that the judge erred in
recommending that the notice to employees be posted at all stores in the Re-
spondent’s Western Washington Division. The Respondent asserted in its de-
fense that its ‘‘union button’’ ban was initially posted at all of its Western
Washington Division stores following the Board’s decision in Albertsons, Inc.,
272 NLRB 865 (1984), although not all the division’s stores were involved
in that proceeding. The Respondent also conceded at the hearing in this case
that its ‘‘union button’’ prohibition was in effect at all of its Western Wash-
ington Division stores. In these circumstances, we deem it appropriate as a re-
medial measure to require that posting of the notice be coextensive with the
Respondent’s application of its union button prohibition.
1 The name of the Charging Party appears as amended.
2 Unless otherwise shown, all dates refer to the 1989 calendar year.
3 In the representative 12-month period preceding issuance of the complaint,
Respondent’s gross sales and direct inflow from its State of Washington oper-
ations exceeded the discretionary standards set by the Board for exercising its
statutory jurisdiction over retail enterprises. Accordingly, I find that it would
effectuate the purposes of the Act for the Board to resolve this labor dispute.
4 Respondent admits that the Union is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Sec. 2(5) of the Act. That admission is consistent with the evidence.
Albertsons, Inc. and United Food and Commercial
Workers Union, Local 381, affiliated with
United Food and Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 19–CA–
20304
December 21, 1990
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS CRACRAFT, DEVANEY, AND OVIATT
On June 29, 1990, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam L. Schmidt issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, and
the General Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated
its authority in this proceeding to a three-member
panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the
record in light of the exceptions and briefs and has de-
cided to affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and con-
clusions and to adopt the judge’s recommended
Order.2
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Albertsons, Inc., Brem-
erton, Poulsbo, and Port Orchard, Washington, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the ac-
tion set forth in the Order.
Scott F. Burson, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Bruce P. Paolini, Esq., of Boise, Idaho, for the Respondent.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM L. SCHMIDT, Administrative Law Judge. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union, Local 381, affiliated
with United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, AFL–CIO, CLC (Union or UFCW Local 381),1 filed
a charge against Albertsons, Inc. (Respondent or Employer)
on May 5, 1989,2 alleging Respondent violated Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act).
On June 22, the Regional Director for Region 19 of the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) issued a
complaint alleging Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act and noticed the matter for hearing before an administra-
tive law judge (ALJ). The essence of the complaint as
amended at the hearing is that Respondent applies its dress
code rules at three northern Washington locations to prohibit
employees from wearing union dues buttons.
Respondent filed a timely answer denying that it had en-
gaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint.
I heard this matter on November 2 at Seattle, Washington.
Having now reviewed the record, considered the credibility
of the witnesses who appeared before me and studied the
posthearing briefs of General Counsel and Respondent, I
conclude that Respondent engaged in certain unfair labor
practices based on the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background
Respondent, a Delaware corporation headquartered in
Boise, Idaho, is engaged in the retail sale of groceries at nu-
merous locations in the western United States including the
State of Washington.3 The only stores involved here are lo-
cated in Bremerton, Port Orchard, and Poulsbo, Washington,
all located in Respondent’s Western Washington Division.
The Union is the exclusive representative of all organized
employees at the three involved stores.4 Respondent is a
member of a multiemployer organization (Allied Employers,
Inc.) which maintains a collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union applicable to supermarkets located in Kitsap and
northern Mason Counties, Washington, where these three
stores are located.
In the spring of 1989 when this dispute arose, the Union
and the employer-association were engaged in negotiations
for a successor collective-bargaining agreement. By late
April or early May 1989, the Union stated its intention to
strike on May 7 in support of its collective-bargaining de-
mands. Later the Union did commence a strike which lasted
into August 1989 when the terms of a successor agreement
were concluded.
1014 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
5 Respondent introduced a second, larger emblem with a white background
and the logo ‘‘The Union For Concerned Women.’’ The initial letters of the
last four words are printed in red and all remaining letters are printed in blue
so that the letters UFCW, the initials of the Union, stand out. No evidence
connects this button with any aspect of this dispute and no judgment is in-
tended concerning this emblem.
6 This finding is based both on the testimony of Union President Vern Gor-
don in the present case and the Board decision in Albertsons I discussed
below.
B. The Supervisory Structure at Affected Stores
Each of Respondent’s stores are under the direction and
control of a store director. Respondent acknowledges that
store directors are responsible for applying company policy
at the store level.
There is specific evidence that store directors hire employ-
ees, establish weekly work schedules taking into account the
seniority provisions of the existing collective-bargaining
agreement and employee preferences, authorize employees to
leave early or work late, and call employees to work when
not scheduled. On this basis, I find—as alleged in the com-
plaint—that Respondent’s store directors are supervisors and
agents within the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13) of the
Act.
The store management hierarchy also includes assistant
store directors and individuals called third man or person.
The complaint alleges—and Respondent denies—that the
Port Orchard and Poulsbo assistant store directors are super-
visors and agents of Respondent and that the third men at
the same two locations are agents of Respondent.
Assistant store directors are in charge at the stores in the
absence of the store director and, in the absence of both the
director and assistant director, the third man is in charge.
Such absences are frequent. In addition to vacation and ill-
ness, the extended store hours—7 a.m. to midnight 7 days
each week—dictate regular absences by ranking store man-
agement employees.
Employee witnesses credibly asserted that, when in charge,
the disputed assistant directors and third men perform the
same functions store directors perform when present. These
functions include oversight of money transfers, granting time
off, recalling unscheduled employees to work, authorizing
overtime, and giving on-the-spot employee direction. James
Schoettler, the Poulsbo store director, expects the third man
to enforce the union button ban at issue here in his absence.
Respondent has compiled an extensive, written list of
third-man duties (G.C. Exh. 6). Among the listed responsibil-
ities are assuring compliance with company, division, and
store policies; acting in place of the store’s absent assistant
director; instructing employees in proper work performance;
effectively recommending personnel actions such as hiring,
firing, and discipline; preparing written instructions for the
night stock person; and administering checker tests.
Based on the foregoing, I find that the assistant store di-
rectors and third men are both supervisors and agents within
the meaning of Section 2(11) and (13). Although evidence
pertaining to the assistant directors is less detailed than the
third men, it is reasonable to assume that assistant store di-
rectors are vested with responsibility at least equal to the
third men whom they outrank.
C. The Disputed Union Insignia
The union dues insignia at issue is a nickle-size pin button
bearing the union logo in the center with the inscription
‘‘AFL–CIO CLC’’ at the top, the month at the bottom, and
the year on the outside edges of the logo. From month to
month the background and print color as well as the name
of the month changes but otherwise the size and design of
the button remains the same. Large quantities of buttons are
furnished to the Union by its parent for distribution to mem-
bers.5
Conceived and used for 40 to 50 years, the dues button
was originally designed for distribution to a member upon
payment of monthly dues. This practice is no longer fol-
lowed; instead, the buttons are routinely distributed by union
agents during store visits and are available without regard to
financial standing in the Union at public areas of the union
office.
Until the 1983 controversy described below, Respondent
did not restrict the distribution and wearing of union insignia
in any manner.6 Union dues buttons are still worn without
restriction by employees of area competitors associated with
Respondent for collective bargaining.
D. Respondent’s Dress Code
All of Respondent’s employees are required to wear a pre-
scribed uniform which it furnishes. When hired each em-
ployee is required to read and sign a document summarizing
Respondent’s personnel policies. (See G.C. Exh. 3.) The
overall tenor of listed appearance and grooming requirements
shows that Respondent’s prime interest is neatness, cleanli-
ness, and avoidance of extreme styles. The pertinent portion
of the dress code involved here reads:
3. All store employees must wear uniforms or aprons
as provided, with name badges on the left chest. No
other badges shall be worn unless authorized by the
Store Director.
4. Employees working in service facilities, ware-
houses, manufacturing plants, etc., will observe cor-
responding rules of neatness and cleanliness in groom-
ing and attire in accordance with the job requirements.
Store directors historically exercised their discretion under
the ‘‘other badges’’ rule liberally so as to permit employees
to wear a variety of tasteful insignia, pendants, and jewelry
on their uniforms, including the union dues button, charity
drive emblems, political issue buttons of significance to Re-
spondent’s business, and product promotion emblems.
At various times when the present dispute arose and in the
months following, several employees wore charitable cam-
paign insignia, holiday pendants, humor emblems, jewelry,
and, at Poulsbo, buttons promoting a civic celebration of the
area’s Norwegian heritage called Viking Fest. Respondent’s
50th Anniversary pins were distributed in June with instruc-
tions that they be worn on personal clothing but not store
uniforms. Nevertheless, most employees attached that em-
blem to their uniforms without objection from store directors.
One union emblem fueled a controversy between Respond-
ent and two sister locals of the Union in the spring of 1983.
At the time, negotiations for a successor agreement at Re-
spondent’s Western Washington Division stores in King and
Snohomish Counties were in progress. The two sister locals
1015ALBERTSONS, INC.
7 Union President Gordon, however, apparently saw the notice and the modi-
fied rule when it was posted at the Port Angles store in 1984. At that store,
the grocery employees are represented by the Union Gordon heads and the
meat department employees are represented by a sister local involved in the
Albertsons I dispute. Respondent makes no claim that this dispute is barred
by Sec. 10(b) of the Act.
8 However, this assertion was based solely on information counsel obtained
in the course of the present hearing from a limited number of management
officials and employees on hand.
9 The foregoing account concerning Baisa is based on her credited testi-
mony. Certain elements in the scenario Baisa depicted are corroborated by
Union President Gordon. Schoettler admitted that he instructed Baisa to re-
move the dues button at or about this particular time but his testimony is sub-
stantially less detailed and arguably implies that the incident arose when union
agents appeared at the store out of the blue to distribute the dues buttons. Con-
sidering all the circumstances, I find Baisa’s account more probable.
10 Loop’s testimony is credited. At the time of the hearing, Loop was no
longer employed by Respondent and neither Boyle nor the Port Orchard third
man testified.
distributed large insignia to employees bearing a bargaining
slogan, ‘‘Equity in 83, No take aways’’ and the local union
inscriptions. Some employees wore the badges while at work
throughout the affected stores while local union agents
handbilled customers outside the stores seeking public sup-
port.
Shortly thereafter, Respondent published a rule which pro-
vided that employees ‘‘are [not] allowed to wear buttons pro-
vided by any union.’’ The rule specifically banned the Equity
in 83 insignia. There is no evidence that this rule was pub-
lished at the stores involved in this dispute.
This ban led the affected UFCW local unions to file unfair
labor practice charges against Respondent. In Albertsons,
Inc., 272 NLRB 865 (1984)—Albertsons I herein—the Board
held that Respondent’s union button prohibition was overly
broad because it applied to nonselling areas of the stores in-
volved and to nonwork times. The Board’s holding was
rationalized as a reasonable balance between employees’
Section 7 right to wear union emblems at work and the em-
ployer’s right to operate its business with considerations for
production, discipline, and customer relations.
Following Albertsons I, Respondent posted the required
Board notice and its own notice which read:
The NLRB . . . found our rule against wearing
union buttons in this store ‘‘unlawfully broad because
it applies to nonselling as well as selling areas of the
stores and applies to employee breaktime as well as
time when employees are working.’’
Accordingly, we are modifying that rule so that it
prohibits the wearing of union buttons by employees
only in selling areas of the store when employees are
working. Wearing of union buttons, which do not ham-
per production or offend decency, in the non-selling
areas, such as the backroom, lounge or restrooms, or on
breaktime, is no longer prohibited. [Emphasis in origi-
nal.]
The Charging Party was not involved in the 1983 dispute
and was not given specific notice of the modified rule by Re-
spondent.7 Respondent’s counsel asserted that the modified
union button ban was posted at least for a period of time fol-
lowing the 1984 decision at all Western Washington Division
stores8 and the evidence establishes that it was posted for a
time following the 1984 decision at least in the Bremerton
and Poulsbo stores.
E. The 1989 Dues Button Dispute
The present dispute came to a head when Virginia Baisa,
a checker at the Poulsbo store, appeared for work at a cus-
tomer checkout counter in late April with a union dues but-
ton pinned to a sweater worn over her uniform. Schoettler
instructed Baisa to remove the button. Baisa protested be-
cause the button was on her personal clothing. Schoettler
then requested Baisa to at least remove the button while Dis-
trict Manager Dan Weaver was in the store that day. Though
reluctant to do so, Baisa removed her sweater when she ob-
served Weaver in the store.
The following day Schoettler called Baisa’s attention to
Section 3 of the personnel policy dress code signed by her
when hired and reported that he had spoken to Weaver about
union buttons the previous day. Weaver, Schoettler told
Baisa, said that union pins could not be worn at work.
Schoettler then asked Baisa to remove the pin again. Baisa
complied but told Schoettler she intended to contact the
Union about the matter.
Before the following workday, Baisa spoke with a union
agent concerning the dues emblem and was told that she
could wear the button. The following day Baisa again wore
the union dues emblem and Schoettler repeated his instruc-
tion to remove the union button. Baisa complied.
Baisa was never told that she could wear the union button
off the selling floor while at lunch or on break nor was she
ever told that she could wear the button during the time that
the ongoing collective-bargaining negotiations were in
progress.9
At about the same time, Laverne Loop, a clerk at the Port
Orchard store whose job required frequent trips between the
selling floor and the back room, wore a union dues button
to work on his uniform. Shortly after Loop began wearing
the dues emblem, John Boyle, the Port Orchard assistant
store director, spoke to Loop concerning it while Loop was
on break in the back room. In sum, Boyle told Loop that the
store director had observed the button and that he should re-
move it or he could be sent home.
Loop also said that the third man at the store later told
him the same thing. Loop ignored both admonitions and con-
tinued to wear the dues emblem a couple of weeks until it
broke.10
Velma Smith, a customer service supervisor at the Brem-
erton store, observed some employees in that store wearing
union dues emblems on their uniforms for about 2 weeks in
May. Smith had no firsthand knowledge about why employ-
ees in that store discontinued wearing the union buttons.
F. Union-Employer Exchanges Over the 1989
Button Ban
Union President Gordon and one or two subordinate
agents visited the Poulsbo store after receiving Baisa’s report
about Schoettler’s request to remove the dues button. Gordon
chided Schoettler about the dues button and pointed out sev-
eral employees wearing Viking Fest emblems on their uni-
forms. When Schoettler stood his ground concerning the dues
button, Gordon threatened to picket the store. This threat
prompted Schoettler to telephone Attorney Paolini at Re-
spondent’s Boise, Idaho headquarters.
1016 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Gordon argued with Paolini over the phone about the dues
button ban especially while so many employees wore Viking
Fest buttons. After Paolini refused to retreat on the dues but-
ton issue and offered to bar Viking Fest emblems also—a re-
sult not desired by Gordon who is a Poulsbo resident—Gor-
don repeated his threat to picket. Paolini responded by threat-
ening, in effect, to sue the Union for breaching the collective
agreement if Gordon carried out his threat. Ultimately, the
two agreed to discuss the matter further at a May 1 bar-
gaining session which had been scheduled.
In the course of discussions at the May 1 bargaining ses-
sion, Jed Pritchett, Respondent’s labor relations director, of-
fered to permit employees at the Poulsbo store to wear the
dues button until negotiations for a successor agreement were
concluded. Gordon claims that because Pritchett refused to
extend this concession to the Bremerton and Port Orchard
stores where similar problems had been reported and limited
the duration of the privilege, discussion of the issue ended
inconclusively and he filed the present charge.
Paolini claims that Gordon agreed to the Pritchett offer
concerning Poulsbo and, hence, the issue was settled by col-
lective bargaining. Schoettler asserted that Paolini telephoned
to advise him of the adjustment and that he, in turn, told sev-
eral employees that the dues button could be worn until ne-
gotiations were concluded.
G. Further Findings and Conclusions
In general, the wearing of union insignia by employees is
protected by Section 7 of the Act. Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945). Employer rules prohibiting
employees from wearing union emblems while at work vio-
late Section 8(a)(1) of the Act absent evidence of special cir-
cumstances showing that such rules are necessary to maintain
production and discipline, diffuse employee dissension, in-
sure employee safety, protect machinery and products from
damage, assist employee concentration, or project a certain
image to the public. Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 137
NLRB 1484 (1962); Pay’N Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d
697 (9th Cir. 1981), and cases cited therein. Where an em-
ployer bars employees from wearing union emblems at work,
the employer has the burden of proving the existence of the
special circumstances which justify the ban. Brunswick Food
& Drug, 284 NLRB No. 28 (1987) (not reported in Board
volume); Pay’N Save v. NLRB, supra at 702.
Restrictions against wearing of any union emblem to fur-
ther an employer’s public image are occasionally approved.
However, such cases appear against a backdrop of evidence
showing that the employer strictly limits the wearing of any
other emblems by employees coming in contact with the
public. See, e.g., NLRB v. Harrah’s Club, 337 F.2d 177 (9th
Cir. 1964); Burger King Corp. v. NLRB, 725 F.2d 1053 (6th
Cir. 1984).
Here, the Respondent argues that its sales-floor union but-
ton ban was ‘‘mandated’’ by the Board’s decision in
Albertsons I and disputes the General Counsel’s claim that
Respondent has disparately enforced its dress and appearance
code to bar only union buttons. In addition, Respondent
claims, in effect, that the Union waived employees’ right to
wear union emblems by the May agreement with Pritchett.
In my judgment, Respondent’s assertion that a complete
sales-floor ban against all union emblems is ‘‘mandated’’ by
Albertsons I misreads the meaning of that case. To be sure,
the Board’s 1984 decision implies that a sales-floor ban
might have been lawful but that implication cannot be read
into that case without regard to the total fact and precedent
context of the case.
Albertsons I gives no hint that the Board intended to de-
part from existing union emblem precedent. Only 2 years
earlier the Board decided that a selling floor ban of a nearly
innocuous union steward button was unlawful. Nordstrom,
Inc., 264 NLRB 698 (1982). The compatibility between
Albertsons I and Nordstrom plainly rests on the nature of the
emblem and the setting.
Unlike the Nordstrom button, the disputed emblem in
Albertsons I—Equity in 83—was designed in conjunction
with the handbilling to embroil store patrons in bargaining
table differences between Respondent and its employees.
Such activity would likely produce a divisive customer at-
mosphere both inside and outside the store. That effect could
have been minimized by barring the Equity in 83 button in
public store areas. Hence, the Board had no reason to go fur-
ther in its 1984 decision after concluding that a total ban was
overly broad.
Read in this fashion the decisions in Albertsons I and
Nordstrom are consistent. The unlawful conduct in
Albertsons I resulted solely from the banishment of the Eq-
uity in 83 button from all areas of the store at all times. Al-
though it is true that Respondent’s original 1983 union but-
ton ban included all union-provided buttons, the Albertsons
I decision gives no indication that the union dues button at
issue here had ever been barred from any area of the store
or that the Board intended to treat it in the same fashion as
the Equity in 83 button.
I am satisfied that the disputed union dues button and the
present circumstances more nearly approximates the situation
in Nordstrom than the Equity in 83 button and situation in
Albertsons I. To be sure, both disputes involving this Re-
spondent arose in the context of ongoing contract negotia-
tions. But the similarity between the Equity in 83 button and
the union dues button ends there. The Equity in 83 button
message promoted active consumer pressure to affect the
outcome of those negotiations and, hence, Respondent could
rationally intervene to prevent such appeals on its selling
floor.
The dues button bears no consumer appeal message con-
nected with the concurrent 1989 negotiations and no showing
was made that it had any other divisive effect. To the extent
that the dues button bore any message related to the 1989
negotiations, it is subtle and solely employer-directed; the
dues button might very well suggest the strength of the wear-
er’s union allegiance and the likelihood that the employee
would join in the threatened strike to support union bargain-
ing demands. Respondent, faced with a strike deadline, likely
would make such an assessment in any event but, suffice it
to say, such symbolism could be read only by very rare con-
sumers well informed about the status of these particular ne-
gotiations and extremely sophisticated in labor relations mat-
ters. This consumer passive employee communication sup-
porting their bargaining representative at a critical negotia-
tions stage is activity protected by Section 7 of the Act.
For the foregoing reasons, I find that Respondent has
failed to establish any basis for barring the union dues button
even from its selling floor based on its potential to interfere
with production, discipline, safety, or customer relations.
1017ALBERTSONS, INC.
11 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules
and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as
provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objec-
tions to them shall be deemed waived for all purposes.
12 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of ap-
peals, the words in the notice reading ‘‘Posted by Order of the National Labor
Relations Board’’ shall read ‘‘Posted Pursuant to a Judgment of the United
States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations
Board.’’
Nor has Respondent established a basis related to its dress
and appearance policies to assert that all union buttons may
be banned from its sales floor. Although Respondent’s dress
and appearance standards on paper appear somewhat strict,
its practice is a different matter altogether. The number, vari-
ety, and frequency with which other types of emblems ap-
pear on employee uniforms without objection—both before
and after the 1984 decision—is simply too overwhelming to
justify banning all union emblems from its sales floors.
Respondent’s claim that there has been a bargained waiver
of the statutory right to wear union emblems also lacks
merit. Such waivers must be clear and unequivocal language.
Food & Commercial Workers Local 1439 (Rosauer’s Super-
markets), 293 NLRB 26 (1989). Here, even the existence of
the purported verbal agreement is hotly disputed. Because
Pritchett did not testify and the Union filed the charge short-
ly after the May 1 bargaining session, I am inclined to accept
Gordon’s claim that no agreement was reached concerning
the union button issue that day. At the very least, I cannot
find that there is a clear and unequivocal agreement by the
Union to waive employees’ statutory right to wear union em-
blems following negotiations as claimed by Respondent.
These conclusions do not suggest that anything goes, any-
time or any place. The special considerations rule in this area
is designed to assure reasonable judgments in each cir-
cumstance with due consideration for employee Section 7
rights as well as Respondent’s right to operate its business.
As Respondent presently enforces its dress and appearance
policies, Respondent could in the future be justified in plac-
ing some limits on certain union emblems such as any simi-
lar to the Equity in 83 button but not others such as the
union dues button. This result is not unusual. See Reynolds
Electrical Co., 292 NLRB 947 (1989).
Turning to the specific conduct alleged to be unlawful, I
conclude that Respondent, by maintaining and applying a
rule in the circumstances found above which bars employees
from wearing any union button on its selling floors during
worktime, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. I further find
that Schoettler’s various directions to employee Baisa to re-
move her union dues button also violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act. Finally, I find that Boyle’s threat that Loop could
be sent home if he did not remove his union dues button vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. Nordstrom, Inc., supra.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce within
the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By maintaining and enforcing its rule which bars em-
ployees from wearing any union emblem on its selling floors
during worktime; by instructing employees to remove their
union dues buttons; and by threatening to send employees
home for failing to remove union dues buttons, Respondent
engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
4. The unfair labor practices of Respondent in paragraph
3, above, affect commerce within the meaning of Section
2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, the recommended Order requires Re-
spondent to cease and desist therefrom and to take the fol-
lowing action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
The recommended Order provides that Respondent cease
maintaining and enforcing its rule banning all union buttons
from its selling floors during worktime. The Order also pro-
vides that Respondent cease directing employees to remove
their union dues button while at work on its sales floors and
threatening to send employees home if they do not comply
with such direction. The Order also requires Respondent gen-
erally to permit employees to wear union emblems con-
forming to its dress and appearance practices on its selling
floors as long as they do not interfere with production, dis-
cipline, safety, or customer relations.
Finally, the Order provides for the posting of a notice to
employees to inform them of their rights and the outcome of
this dispute.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on
the entire record, I issue the following recommended11
ORDER
The Respondent, Albertsons, Inc., Bremerton, Poulsbo, and
Port Orchard, Washington, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Maintaining and enforcing its rule barring employees
from wearing any union emblem while at work on its selling
floor.
(b) Directing employees to remove their union dues button
while at work on the selling floor.
(c) Threatening to send employees home if they refuse to
remove their union dues button.
(d) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guar-
anteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to ef-
fectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Permit employees to wear union emblems which con-
form to current dress and appearance practices concerning
other emblems while working on its selling floors so long as
such union emblems do not interfere with production, dis-
cipline, safety, or customer relations.
(b) Post at all of its Western Washington Division stores,
including its stores in Bremerton, Poulsbo, and Port Orchard,
Washington, copies of the attached notice marked ‘‘Appen-
dix.’’12 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the Re-
gional Director for Region 19, after being signed by the Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
1018 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
able steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that
the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material.
(c) Notify the Regional Director in writing within 20 days
from the date of this Order what steps the Respondent has
taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated the National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us
to post and abide by this notice.
WE WILL NOT maintain and enforce a rule which prohibits
employees from wearing all union emblems while at work on
the selling floor.
WE WILL NOT direct employees to remove union dues em-
blems while at work on the selling floor.
WE WILL NOT threaten to send employees home if they
refuse to remove their union dues emblem.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL permit employees to wear union emblems which
conform to our dress and appearance practices concerning
other emblems while working on the selling floor so long as
union emblems do not interfere with production, discipline,
safety, or customer relations.
ALBERTSONS, INC.