Alan G. Woolsey, Appellant,v.Richard J.Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 11, 1999
01973582 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 11, 1999)

01973582

03-11-1999

Alan G. Woolsey, Appellant, v. Richard J.Danzig, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Alan G. Woolsey, )

Appellant, ) Appeal No. 01973582

v. ) Agency No. SON 95-41273-001

Richard J.Danzig, ) Hearing No. 360-96-8742X

Secretary, )

Department of the Navy, )

Agency. )

DECISION

Appellant timely initiated an appeal to this Commission from a final

agency decision ("FAD") concerning his complaint of unlawful employment

discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,

as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq., which is accepted pursuant to the

provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

The issue presented is the relief to which appellant is entitled as a

result of the finding that he was subjected to retaliation when he was

issued a performance evaluation with a summary rating of �Exceeds Fully

Successful� rather than �Outstanding.�

Appellant was employed by the agency in Corpus Christi, Texas.

In January 1994, he first engaged in protected EEO activity by seeking

EEO counseling, and he later filed a formal complaint alleging that

the Manager of the Human Resources Office (the �Manager�) discriminated

against him by not selecting him for a supervisory position. In April

1994, appellant sought EEO counseling, and he later filed a formal

complaint alleging that he had been subjected to harassment by his

supervisor due to retaliation, and requested a temporary reassignment

elsewhere. In January 1995, appellant sought EEO counseling, and he later

filed a formal complaint challenging his placement on a reduction-in-force

register and a letter of caution.

On May 22, 1995, appellant received a performance evaluation wherein the

Manager gave him a summary rating of �Exceeds Fully Successful.� On May

24, 1995, appellant sent a memorandum to the Manager which contended

that his performance merited a summary rating of �Outstanding.� In a

postscript, appellant stated that earlier in the morning, he had been

offered and had accepted �the Puerto Rico job.� While the Manager

subsequently raised appellant's rating on one element, he did not raise

the summary rating. Believing that the failure to give him a summary

rating of �Outstanding� was due to retaliation for his protected EEO

activity, appellant sought EEO counseling on June 26, 1995, and filed

his instant formal EEO complaint on October 10, 1995.

With respect to the position in Puerto Rico, the record reflects that,

on May 11, 1995, appellant submitted an application for a position in

Puerto Rico. Appellant states that he had already informed an agency

official that he was not interested in this position, but the official

persuaded him to submit an application in case appellant changed his mind.

In his affidavit, the official states that appellant expressed interest

in the position. Attached to the official's affidavit are copies

of e-mail messages, including: a message to appellant dated April 17,

1995, inquiring whether appellant was still interested in the position; a

message dated April 19, 1995, from the official to appellant's supervisor,

stating that appellant confirmed his interest in the position in a

conversation on the previous day; and a message dated May 25, 1995, from

appellant to the official, expressing thanks for selecting him. (However,

when the agency attempted to introduce evidence of other positions outside

of Corpus Christi for which appellant had submitted applications since

1991, the AJ refused to permit its introduction, ruling that it was

outside the relevant time frame. See Hearing Transcript at 292-294.)

Appellant's last day of work in Corpus Christi was June 30, 1995.

In his instant complaint, filed on October 10, 1995, appellant requested

as relief that his summary rating be changed to �Outstanding.� The

EEO Counselor's Report indicates that appellant also sought $300,000

in compensatory damages. After the agency accepted and processed the

complaint, he timely requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative

Judge (�AJ�). After the hearing, the AJ issued a recommended decision

(�RD�) which found that appellant's summary rating was due to retaliation

for his protected EEO activity. As relief, the AJ recommended that:

appellant's summary rating be changed to �Outstanding;� he receive any

awards to which such a rating would entitle him; he receive attorney's

fees; he be awarded compensatory damages; the Manager attend 20 hours

of EEO training; and the posting of a notice. While the AJ directed

the agency to determine the amount of compensatory damages which should

be awarded to appellant, the AJ recommended that the agency reassign

appellant to the Corpus Christi office and award him �one-third of

all pecuniary damages which he can prove as a result of his decision

to move to Puerto Rico.� In this regard, the AJ found that appellant

�felt compelled to move away from the retaliatory work environment in

Corpus Christi.�

In its FAD, the agency adopted the RD insofar as it found that the

Manager had retaliated against appellant by giving him a summary rating

of �Exceeds Fully Successful� rather than �Outstanding.� However, the

agency modified the relief recommended by the AJ. The agency awarded

appellant $3,000 in nonpecuniary compensatory damages, but declined

to award any damages with respect to appellant's move to Puerto Rico.

The agency noted that appellant's instant complaint challenged only

the summary rating he received on May 22, 1995, and disputed the AJ's

finding that his receipt of the summary rating was partially the cause

of him accepting the position in Puerto Rico. (The FAD reflects that

appellant's previously filed complaint alleging that he had been subjected

to a hostile environment based on retaliation since November 1994 was

still in processing and scheduled for a hearing before an AJ.)

Appellant timely appeals and argues that the AJ properly awarded him

damages with respect to his move to Puerto Rico. Among other damages,

appellant seeks: front pay for the next five and one-half years until he

is retirement eligible; compensation for his loss of income for playing

in two symphonic orchestras in Corpus Christi and compensation for

his wife's loss of her position as a Church hostess in Corpus Christi;

transportation expenses for his daughter, who was in college in Corpus

Christi, plus payment for telephone calls to her and her living expenses

in Corpus Christi; expenses for storing and insuring two automobiles in

Corpus Christi; payment of the mortgage on his house in Corpus Christi

for 12 months and the cost of its upkeep and any repairs needed to restore

it to the condition it was in prior to its rental. (The record reflects

that appellant's position in Corpus Christi was scheduled as a rotational

assignment with return rights from Puerto Rico and that he returned to

Corpus Christi in approximately November 1997. In a letter submitted

after his return from Corpus Christi, appellant also expresses doubt that

the agency ever posted the notice called for in the RD and the FAD.)

Appellant also challenges the agency's award of $3,000 in nonpecuniary

damages, and argues that he is entitled to an award of $300,000.<1>

In its comments on the appeal, the agency notes that the only issue

accepted and processed in the instant case concerned appellant's summary

rating received in May 1995, and not whether the environment in Corpus

Christi was hostile. In any event, the agency contends that appellant

began looking for positions outside of Corpus Christi in 1991, long

before issuance of the rating. In this regard, the agency notes that

appellant submitted paperwork for the position in Puerto Rico prior to

his receipt of the summary rating in issue in his instant complaint.

The agency points to appellant's hearing testimony and argues that it

establishes that he developed a dislike for the Puerto Rican community

and culture after moving there; thus, the agency argues that he is now

trying to obtain an award for a decision that he later regretted making.

After a thorough review of the record (including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed herein), it is the decision of the

Commission to AFFIRM the FAD. In this regard, the Commission believes

that the agency correctly contends that appellant's instant complaint

challenged only the summary rating received in May 1995, and that the

issue of whether appellant reasonably sought a transfer out of the Corpus

Christi area is more appropriately addressed by the AJ hearing appellant's

complaint that, since 1994, he had been subjected to a hostile environment

based on retaliation in the Corpus Christi facility.<2>

In order to ensure that the agency has implemented all of the corrective

relief awarded in this matter, this matter is REMANDED to the agency so

that it may take the corrective actions set forth in the following ORDER.

ORDER (D1092)

To the extent it has not already done so, the agency is ORDERED to take

the following remedial actions within thirty (30) days after the date

that this decision becomes final:

The agency shall revise all applicable records to reflect

that appellant received a summary rating of �Outstanding� on his

performance evaluation for the period ending April 30, 1995, and shall

grant him any awards to which such a rating entitles him.

The agency shall issue a check to appellant in payment of

the $3,000.00 in compensatory damages awarded under the FAD.

(3) The agency shall take corrective measures to prevent the recurrence

of the discriminatory actions in this case, including mandatory training

for its applicable supervisory personnel regarding their obligations

under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42

U.S.C. �2000e et seq.

(4) The agency shall award appellant reasonable attorney's fees incurred

in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e).<3> The

attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the agency --

not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal

Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming

final. The agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in

accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

(5) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying

that the foregoing corrective actions have been implemented.

POSTING ORDER (G1092)

The agency is ORDERED to post at its Corpus Christi, Texas, facility

copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being

signed by the agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted

by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision

becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty (60) consecutive days,

in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are

customarily posted. The agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that

said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.

The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer

at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the

Commission's Decision," within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration

of the posting period.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS-ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request

containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United

States District Court. It is the position of the Commission that you

have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you

receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that courts in some

jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner

suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR

DAYS from the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your

civil action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision

or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the alternative,

you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR

DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your

appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME

AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY

HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME

AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work.

Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of

your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 11, 1999

________________ ___________________________

DATE Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

1Appellant also seeks damages for the agency's allegedly bad faith

rejection of the AJ's recommendation that he be immediately returned

to Corpus Christi and awarded one-third of the pecuniary damages sought

for the move to Puerto Rico, as well as $250 per day for its refusal to

mitigate damages by returning him to Corpus Christi. However, this is

a request for punitive damages which, under the provisions of Section

102(a)(3) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, are not allowed against a

government entity.

2The Commission's records do not reflect that appellant has filed any

appeal from a FAD addressing the issue of whether he was subjected to

a hostile environment based on retaliation in the Corpus Christi facility.

3The Commission notes that appellant is not a prevailing party for

purposes of any attorney's fees incurred in connection with his instant

appeal.