Alamo Express, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 9, 1972

200 N.L.R.B. 178 (N.L.R.B. 1972)

178 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Alamo Express, Inc., Alamo Cartage Company and
General Drivers , Warehousemen & Helpers Local
Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen & Helpers of America. Case
23-CA-4007
November 9, 1972
DECISION, ORDER, AND ORDER
REMANDING PROCEEDING TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE
BY MEMBERS FANNING, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On June 22, 1972, Administrative Law Judge'
Lowell Goerlich issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Respondent and General
Counsel filed exceptions and supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,
and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt his recommended Order, with the
following modifications.
The Respondent excepts to the Administrative Law
Judge's recommended backpay order on behalf of
employee Floyd Coleman. That order was based on
the Administrative Law Judge's construction of the
Respondent's First Amended Answer which admit-
ted that Respondent discharged Coleman and
further stated that "Coleman has been offered full
reinstatement, and Respondent has and does offer to
make Coleman whole for any loss under Board
procedures." The Administrative Law Judge read
this as an admission of a discriminatory discharge.
We disagree. Nowhere in Respondent's First
Amended Answer does there appear any admission
of the allegation; i.e., that Coleman was discharged
because of his union activities or sympathies. On the
contrary, Respondent's First Amended Answer
further' goes on to deny specifically that any of its
employees were discriminated against because of
their union activities. Moreover, the record clearly
indicates that, while Respondent admitted both the
discharge and reinstatement of Coleman, the reason
1 The title of "Trial Examiner" was changed to "Administrative Law
Judge" effective August 19, 1972.
2 TRIAL EXAMINER: Is there any issue that the employee started back at
his old job or substantially equivalent?
MR LEVY (General Counsel): No sir.
TRIAL ExA[ruriER: And as far as he is concerned the only matter for the
for the discharge was understood to be in issue and
was in fact litigated.2 Accordingly, we shall remand
this portion of the case to the Administrative Law
Judge in order that he may make specific findings of
fact and conclusions of law concerning whether or
not Coleman's discharge was violative of Section
8(a)(3) of the Act.
The General Counsel has excepted to the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's failure to find that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing
to reinstate employees Ben Walker, Elmo Thornton,
and Veanes Jenkins on January 6, 5, and 5, 1971,
respectively. Inasmuch as Respondent has not
excepted to the Administrative Law Judge' s recom-
mending backpay for these employees, we shall grant
the General Counsel's exception and find, as we must
to order backpay for employees whom Respondent
discriminatorily refused to reinstate for union activi-
ties, that Respondent in that regard violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge as
modified below and hereby orders that the Respon-
dent, Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage
Company, San Antonio, Laredo, and Houston,
Texas, its officers, agents, successors , and assigns,
shall take the action set forth in the Administrative
Law Judge's recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Delete "Floyd Coleman" from paragraph 2(a)
of the recommended Order.
2. Substitute the attached notice for the Adminis-
trative Law Judge's notice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this proceeding be,
and it hereby is, remanded to Administrative Law
Judge Lowell Goerlich for the purpose of making
findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether
or not Floyd Coleman was discharged by Respon-
dent in violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the said Administra-
tive Law Judge shall prepare and serve on the parties
a supplemental decision containing findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and recommendations in accord-
ance with this Order, and that, following service of
such supplemental decision on the parties, the
provisions of Section 102.46 of the Board's Rules and
Trial Examiner is whether by reason of his discharge he is entitled to
backpay for that period.
MR. LEVY: That's correct.
MR SCHOOLFIELD (Respondent ): That's right , in other words, whether
the discharge was discriminatory.
TRIAL EXAMINER: Yes.
200 NLRB No. 32
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 179
Regulations, Series 8, as amended, shall be applica-
ble here.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a trial in which all parties were permitted to
introduce testimony and other evidence it has been
decided that we violated the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, and among other things
discharged employee Veanes Jenkins in order to
discourage membership in the Union.
We were ordered to assure our employees that:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
with General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers,
Local Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, in
the appropriate unit by unlawfully granting wage
increases to our employees without bargaining
with the Union in regard to such wage increases
prior to the institution of the same; by unlawfully
refusing to furnish to the Union names of
employees receiving wage increases and the
amount of the increases; by unlawfully refusing
to furnish the Union with the Anthony B. Cassidy
report; and by refusing to bargain with the Union
with respect to the institution of 600 pounds of
freight per man per hour production quota at our
Laredo terminal or any other terminal as long as
such Union remains our employees' lawful
collective-bargaining agent.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that employ-
ees will not get a wage increase or vacations
because of the Union.
WE WILL NOT tell our employees that we will
never sign a union contract.
WE WILL NOT discriminate against employees
who participated in the strike of May 1968 by
giving them less hours than nonstriking employ-
ees and we will restore lost wages to the following
strikers: Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher,
W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J.
Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder,
M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton, whom we
were found to have discriminated against.
WE WILL rescind the 600-pound per man per
hour production quota established at our Laredo
terminal.
WE WILL give Veanes Jenkins back his job or, if
his job no longer exists, a substantially equivalent
job.
WE WILL restore his seniority and pay him the
backpay he lost because we discharged him.
WE WILL reimburse Ben Walker, Elmo Thorn-
ton, and Veanes Jenkins for loss of earnings due
to our refusal to reinstate them upon their request
after the strike.
WE WILL NOT discharge employees for engaging
in union activities or for the purpose of discourag-
ing membership in a labor organization.
The Act gives all employees these rights:
To organize themselves
To form, join, or help unions
To bargain as a group through a representative
they choose
To act together for collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refuse to do any or all of these things.
All of you are free to become or remain, or refrain
from becoming or remaining, members of any labor
organization.
The appropriate unit is:
All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and
deliverymen, dockmen, helpers, checkers
and mechanics, at all of the employer's
Texas terminals, excluding office clerical
employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen,
solicitors and supervisors, as defined in the
Act.
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC.
AND ALAMO CARTAGE
COMPANY
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
We will notify immediately Veanes Jenkins, if
presently serving in the Armed Forces of the United
States, of the right to full reinstatement, upon
application after discharge from the Armed Forces,
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the
Universal Military Training and Service Act.
This is an official notice and must not be defaced
by anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive
days from the date of posting and must not be
altered, defaced or covered by any other material.
Any questions concerning this notice or compli-
ance with its provisions may be directed to the
Board's Office, Dallas-Brazos Building, 1125 Brazos
Street, Houston, Texas 77002, Telephone
713-226-4296.
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
LowEL.L GoERLICH, Trial Examiner: A charge was filed
by General Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local
180 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Unions Nos. 657 and 988, affiliated with International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen &
Helpers of America, herein collectively called the Union,
on June 21, 1971, and was served on Alamo Express, Inc.
and Alamo Cartage Company, the Respondent herein, by
registered mail on the same date. A complaint' and notice
of hearing was issued on November 10, 1971, in which it
was alleged that the Respondent had violated Section
8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, herein referred to as the Act.
The Respondent filed a timely answer admitting certain
allegations of the complaint and denying others.
The case came on for hearing on February 28 and 29 at
San Antonio, Texas, March 1 at Laredo, Texas, and March
3 and April 7, 1972, at Houston, Texas. Each party was
afforded a full opportunity to be heard, to call, examine,
and cross-examine witnesses, to argue orally on the record,
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions, and
to file briefs. All briefs have been carefully considered by
the Trial Examiner. Upon the whole record, and upon his
observation of the witnesses, the Trial Examiner makes the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
Conclusions and Reasons Therefor
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
Alamo Express, Inc., is, and has been at all times
material herein, a Texas corporation with its principal
office and place of business in San Antonio, Texas. It
operates terminals in San Antonio, Laredo, Houston,
Galveston, and other cities in the State of Texas, and is
engaged in interstate transportation of freight by motor
vehicle within the State of Texas under licenses issued by
the Interstate Commerce Commission and the Railroad
Commission of Texas. Alamo Cartage Company is and has
been at all times material herein a Texas corporation,
having its principal office and place of business in San
Antonio, Texas. It operates terminals located in San
Antonio, Laredo, Houston, Galveston, and other cities in
the State of Texas, where it is engaged in the pickup and
delivery of local freight under authority granted to Alamo
Express, Inc.
Alamo Express, Inc., employs all of the over-the-road
truckdrivers and dock employees used in Respondent's
common carrier motor transportation operation. Alamo
Cartage Company employs all local pickup and delivery
drivers utilized in Respondent's common carrier transpor-
tation operation.
Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo Cartage Company are,
and have been at all times material herein, affiliated
businesses with common offices, ownership, directors, and
officers, and constitute a single integrated enterprise. Said
directors and officers formulate and administer a common
labor relations policy for the aforesaid enterprise, affecting
the employees of said companies.
During the past 12 months, a representative period,
Respondent's gross revenue was in excess of $500,000 and
1 On April 7, 1972, an amendment was allowed, to wit: "On or about
January 27, 1972, Respondent discharged its employee, Veanes Jenkins"
of this amount in excess of $100,000 was received for
interchanging and interlining freight that was destined or
shipped from points outside the State of Texas.2
Respondent is, and has been at all times herein, an
employer as defined in Section 2(2) of the Act engaged in
commerce and in operations affecting commerce as
defined in Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act, respectively.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Union is now, and has been at all times material
herein, a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Pertinent Facts
The parties stipulated as follows:
All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and deliverymen,
dockmen, helpers, checkers and mechanics at all of the
Employer's Texas terminals, excluding office clerical
employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen, solicitors and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
On or about July 29, 1965, a majority of the employees of
Respondent, in the unit described in the paragraph above,
by secret ballot election conducted under the supervision
of the Regional Director for Region 23 of the National
Labor Relations Board, designated and selected the Union
as a representative for the purposes of collective bargaining
with Respondent, and on or about May 20, 1966, said
Regional Director certified the Union as the exclusive
bargaining representative of the employees in the said unit.
At all times since July 29, 1965, and continuing to date,
the Union has been the representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining for the employees in the unit
described above, and by virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act
has been, and is now, the exclusive representative of all the
employees in said unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment.
On May 21, 1968, the employees in the unit described
above ceased work concertedly and went out on strike.
On or about December 17, 1970, the Union, on behalf of
the employees described in the unit above, offered the
return of all said employees to the employment of the
Respondent.
Since on or about December 17, 1970, and continuing to
date, the Union has requested and is requesting Respon-
dent to bargain collectively with respect to the rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other terms and
conditions of employment as the exclusive bargaining
representative of all the employees of the Respondent in
the unit described above.
On May 28, 1971, the Union requested that Respondent
furnish the names of employees in the bargaining unit
2 The foregoing findings are drawn from stipulations entered into by the
parties
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC.
described above who had received raises, the amount of
said raises, and when said raises were granted.
Respondent informed the Union that 45 men had
received raises in 1971, but did not state when the raises
were granted, the names of the persons receiving the raises,
or the amounts of said increases.
Respondent, however, furnished the Union, pursuant to
its request, weekly payroll records commencing January
1971, which, inter alia, would demonstrate changes in the
wage structure for employees in the unit.
Respondent did not, however, discuss or bargain with
the Union concerning the drafting of these raises prior to
the implementation of the same.
Since August 1971, Respondent has notified the Union
of its intent to grant pay increases for bargaining unit
employees in advance of said raises being implemented.
On February 12, 1971, and again on March 9,1971, the
Union requested a production study known as the
Anthony B. Cassidy report. This report was not furnished
to the Union by Respondent. On January 20, 1972, by
letter, Respondent offered to furnish and discuss said
report with the Union.
Benjamin J. Walker began working for Respondent at its
San Antonio, Texas, operation in March 1967. Walker
worked as a truck helper and dockman.
On January 6, 1971, Walker, who had taken part in the
strike of May 1968, reported to Terminal Manager Pat
Meyers that he was ready to return to work.
Meyers stated that Walker was supposed to have
reported on January 4, 1971, and refused to allow Walker
to return to work. Meyers further refused to consider
Walker for employment as openings and vacancies
occurred thereafter.
Elmo Thorton began working for Respondent at its
Houston, Texas, terminal sometime in the 1950's.
As of the time of the strike in May 1968 called by the
Union and in which Thorton participated, he was a bobtail
driver on the west-end run and had been so for about 8
years prior to that date.
During the first week of January 1971 Thorton reported
back to Respondent's Houston, Texas, terminal and spoke
with Mr. A] Crawford, general manager of Respondent.
Thorton told Crawford that he was reporting back to
work and was told by Crawford that he had come in too
late and that Crawford would not accept Thorton for
employment.
Thorton left his name and telephone number pursuant to
Crawford's request, and also pursuant to Crawford's
instructions returned a few days thereafter to speak with
the Respondent's vice president, H. D. Walker. When
Thorton spoke with Walker, he was told by Walker that
Respondent would not reinstate Thorton because he had
reported too late to be accepted for employment.
Veanes Jenkins was hired by Respondent in 1967 as a
bobtail driver at its Houston, Texas, terminal. Jenkins
honored and supported the picket line established in May
1968.
3 The foregoing facts are drawn from a stipulation entered into by the
parties.
4 The Respondent makes no contention that the Cassidy report should
not have been furnished to the Union upon its request. Counsel for the
181
In December 1970 Jenkins and fellow employees
reported to Respondent's Houston, Texas, terminal and
left their names and addresses.
Thereafter, Jenkins received a letter from Alamo which
had Jenkins' correct address but did not have Jenkins'
apartment number on it. Jenkins physically received said
letter on January 5, 1971, and immediately reported to
Respondent and spoke with Mr. A] Crawford, general
manager of Respondent, in order to secure his job back.
Crawford told Jenkins that he was supposed to have
been there on January 4, 1971, and would not accept
Jenkins as an employee. Jenkins explained to Crawford as
to the time he actually received the letter and the fact that
the apartment number was not on the address, to which
Crawford replied that Jenkins was not to be considered for
employment as a returning striker due to the fact that he
reported 1 day late.
Respondent has offered reinstatement to all the employ-
ees; to wit: Benjamin J. Walker, Elmo Thorton, and
Veanes Jenkins and here and now stands ready to make
said employees whole for any amount of money which may
be owing to them as a result of the Respondent's refusal to
reinstate them as hereinabove enumerated. Each of said
employees were employees of Respondent prior to the May
1968 strike called by the Union and were unfair labor
practice strikers. Each of these employees was the subject
of the Union's December 17, 1970, letter offering the
return of the striking employees to Respondent's employ.3
The Cassidy report, which deals with the methods of
operation, was furnished to the Union by the Respondent
in January 1972.4
On November 24, 1969, a 600-pound per man-hour
production quota was set for employees at the Respon-
dent's Laredo, Texas, terminals and has been in effect
since such date. The 600-pound per man-hour production
quota was not discussed during negotiations with the
Union-6
Floyd Coleman, an employee of the San Antonio
terminal, was a member of the Union and had picketed
during the strike; he returned to work after the strike on
December 27, 1970. He was discharged on May 27, 1971.
He commenced work in January 1964. Coleman's dis-
charge resulted from an accident in which he was involved
on May 27, 1971. In the accident report signed by Coleman
there appeared: "pulled into Graybar Electric to check on
pickup when trailer hit shed over dock." Coleman
explained, "I stopped the trailer, I pulled my brakes out, I
pulled . . . the brakes on the trailer . . . and the trailer
lunged forward and hit the building." Damage to the
trailer amounted to $528. There was no damage to the
Graybar Electric building.
Coleman did not report the accident when it occurred
but continued with the pickup. When he returned to the
terminal about one-half hour later he reported the accident
to L. W. Stephens, vice president and general manager of
the Respondent. Stephens told Coleman to see Clyde
Crawford, operations manager, who instructed Dock
Respondent stated, "I agree there is no issue on the Anthony Cassidy plan
itself."
5 Testimony of Donaciano Aldrete, Jr, Laredo terminal manager.
6 The parties so stipulated.
182 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Foreman Badgett to make out an accident report.
Crawford also instructed Badgett to keep Coleman on the
dock for 3 days. In the meantime Crawford checked the
Graybar Electric building and found no damage. After the
report was finished, according to Coleman, Crawford said,
"that he couldn't use [him] any more because [he] didn't
call in, call the accident in." According to Crawford, after
Stephens had directed him "to let Mr. Coleman go because
of the accident, the damage to the trailer," he toad
Coleman that he was firing him "because he tore up a
trailer."
The Respondent's relevant published rules in respect to
the reporting of accidents are as follows:
Damage to any customer's property or the property of
the Company shall be reported immediately to the
Dispatcher or Terminal Manager.
Any motor accident, no matter how small shall be
reported by the employee in charge of the motor
vehicle involved to his superior immediately. This rule
applies to accidents of any kind with another vehicle or
involving any damage to property of others.
Coleman didn't dispute the rule except he maintained
that if the accident occurred on private property the
employee need not report the accident unless there was
some injury to property.
Pedro de Alva, an employee at the Laredo terminal, was
discharged on September 2, 1971. Like Coleman he had
been a striker. Prior to his discharge de Alva had been
suspended on four occasions. De Alva persisted in
reporting late and on Thursday, May 20, 1971, Dock
Foreman Francisco Alvarado told him to take the rest of
the week off; he was told to report on the following
Monday. De Alva did not report on Monday. In the
meantime Alvarado was informed that de Alva was
working at Brown Express. Alvarado reached de Alva by
phone at Brown Express on Tuesday. Alvarado asked de
Alva why he had not reported to work on Monday. He
responded that "he would work for Brown Express for the
rest of the week." 7 Alvarado told de Alva that before he
reported he "needed to talk to us" and if he were needed he
would be given work. De Alva's earnings were higher at
Brown Express.
De Alva returned on Friday and was told by Aldrete that
his job was terminated.
According to the Respondent it discharged employee
Veanes Jenkins on January 31, 1972, because he did not
report his absence during the week commencing January
23, 1972.8
A published company rule on absences was as follows:
7 De Alva admitted the phone call. De Alva testified that he replied,
"They had given me a week off . . I had to take the eight days to work."
Whereupon Alvarado said, "I didn't give you the week. I gave you the rest
of the week off " Alvarado then asked De Alva whether he would report
that day. De Alva replied, No I am going to wait until Friday." Alvarado
said, "If you are going to wait until Friday to come back to work don't
come to work, just come to talk to us "
8 Dudley testified: "Due to not hearing from him, being absent for one
week, this we felt was reason enough for termination."
9 The penalty for violating this rule, as well as 30 others, was:
Violation of, or failure to comply with, any of the following rules and
policies shall be grounds for disciplinary action or discharge of the
employee, at the discretion of the Company
10 Dailey admitted a phone call from Jenkins but fixed it on Monday,
January 31. According to Dailey, Jenkins' message was : "When [Colley]
Frequent or habitual tardiness or absenteeism will not
be permitted. Employees are required to call in to a
supervisor if either is anticipated on scheduled work.9
Jenkins was ill on Monday, January 24, 1972, and visited
a doctor. Jenkins "called in" and talked with the dock
foreman and six-wheel dispatcher, Dewey Dailey. He told
Dailey that he was sick and would be unable to attend
work. He asked Dailey to inform bobtail dispatcher Walter
C. Culley. Dailey said that he would speak to Culley.10
Employee Lester Boone "come by to pick up" Jenkins on
Monday morning and was told that he had gone to the
doctor. He was asked by his informant to give such
information to Culley. When Boone arrived at work he
told Dailey that Jenkins would be absent, that he was sick
and he had gone to the doctor. Later he gave Culley the
same message."
Employee Willie Fletcher also stopped at Jenkins'
residence on Monday, January 24, 1972. A lady there told
him Jenkins had gone to the doctor and asked him to tell
the dispatcher. About 9 o'clock Fletcher reported to Culley
that he "came by [Jenkins'] house and he was gone to the
doctor, that the lady told [him] he was gone to the
doctor." 12 According to Culley, he informed Douglas
Bruce Dudley, Houston terminal manager, that Fletcher
had told him that Jenkins "might have went by the doctor's
office and wanted to know if he had come to work."13
According to Culley, he and Dudley discussed Jenkins'
absence several times during the week. Dudley was
"wondering what happened to him, because he hadn't
showed up for work. Didn't know whether he quit or
what." 14 Jenkins remained under the doctor's care until
January 27, 1972, when he returned to work. On January
25, 1972, Jenkins "called in" and asked to speak to Culley.
Dailey, who answered the phone, said that Culley was not
there. Jenkins informed Dailey that he was sick and "had
to go back to the doctor." Dailey told Jenkins to "tell"
Dudley and gave him a telephone number for such
purpose. Jenkins called the number but was unable to
reach Dudley.
On Thursday, January 27, 1972, Jenkins reported to
work. Culley sent him to Dudley. Dudley told him "to go
back home and call him later." Jenkins phoned Dudley
around 2 o'clock in the afternoon. Dudley informed him
that he "couldn't use [him] any more."
Jenkins, who had first been employed in 1967, except for
the period of the strike, had not been absent from work
prior to January 24, 1972.15
On January 2, 1971, Laredo Terminal Manager Aldrete
contacted employee Baldomero Pena Garcia in order to
comes in will you tell him that I will be at work this mormng ." The Trial
Examiner is convinced that Jenkins phoned Dailey but the message was as
described by Jenkins . Dailey is discredited.
1 1 Boone's testunony is credited.
12 Culley testified that Fletcher asked him whether Jenkins had come to
work and then said that "he thought he was going by the doctor's office"
13 Dudley testified that he had no inkling that Jenkins had been ill.
Dudley is not credited.
14 Dudley testified that he inquired of Dailey and Culley as to Jenkins'
"whereabouts"; that he was "concerned as to why he [hadn't] been
working" and conducted an investigation.
1s The Respondent claims that Jenkins did not return to work until
Monday, January 31 , 1972. The facts do not support this contention. Not
only was Culley unable definitely to fix the date of Jenkins' return as
Monday but the Trial Examiner credits Jenkins, whom he considers to be
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC.
ascertain whether he desired to return to work after the
conclusion of the strike. He said to Pena that "as a friend
he would recommend that [he] would stay where [he] was
because the Union would not come into the Alamo
Express." He further stated that "as a friend he was giving
[him] this advice, that the lady wouldn't sign." The lady
was also referred to as Mrs. Walker. (Mrs. J. L. Walker is
president of the Respondent.) About a month and a half
before employee de Alva was discharged, Aldrete, referring
to "the fact that the work was very little," again "told
[Pena] that as a friend he would advise [him] to go back to
work for International Bonded Warehouse"; and that
"there was no future there for [him], that there was
nowhere to do, and that there was no future for anybody."
He added "That there was no future there, that Mrs.
Walker wouldn't sign for the Union."
While Aldrete was discussing production with de Alva in
August 1971, among other things, Aldrete said that "there
was nothing here, that if we were waiting for something,
that nothing would result of what we were waiting for
.... because he told [him ] that the old lady had told him
that there were not going to be any vacations, there would
be no raise in salaries, and that a contract was not going to
be signed with the Union."
Attachments no. 1 through no. 6 are a breakdown of
bobtail drivers, six-wheel drivers, and dock workers
employed by the Respondent at its Houston and San
Antonio terminals compiled by the General Counsel for
the period of January 16 through July 17, 1971. The
breakdown is by name, rate of pay, hours worked, average
hours per week, and the hours difference. The attachments
provide a comparison between the strikers as a group and
the nonstrikers as a group. The Trial Examiner finds that
the attachments are a fair representation of what they
purport to be.
B. Conclusions and Reasons Therefor
First: The granting of wage increases without discussion or
bargaining with the Union. According to the stipulation set
out above, the Employer did grant wage increases to its
employees commencing on or about December 17, 1970,
without discussion or bargaining with the Union in regard
to such wage increases prior to the institution of the same.
Such unilateral action on the part of the Respondent was
in violation of the Respondent's duty to bargain and
constituted a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
According to the stipulation, Respondent also refused to
furnish to the Union when the aforesaid raises were
granted the names of the persons receiving the raises and
the amount of the increases and also refused to furnish to
the Union a copy of the study known as the Anthony B.
Cassidy report. Since the Employer's refusal, it has
complied with the Union's request. Since the information
sought was necessary to provide information that was
needed by the Union for the proper performance of its
duties as exclusive bargaining representative, the Employer
violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by its refusal. N.L.R.B.
v. Acme Industrial Company, 385 U.S. 432,435-436.
183
In respect to the General Counsel's contention that the
production quota system at the Laredo terminal was
established at 600 pounds of freight per man-hour without
notice or consultation with the Union, it was stipulated
that the Union was certified on May 20,1966, and that the
Respondent did not negotiate with the Union in regard to
the establishment of the 600-pound quota. Since the 600-
pound quota became effective on November 24, 1969, at a
time when the Union's bargaining rights were current, it
follows, therefore, that the Employer did not fulfill its
obligation to bargain with the Union about this condition
of employment and thus violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
The General Counsel claims in the complaint that the
Respondent, by Terminal Manager Don Aldrete, told
employees that the Respondent was never going to sign a
union contract; that employees were not going to get wage
raises because of the Union; and that there would be no
vacations because of the Union. These claims are support-
ed by the credited testimony of employees Pena and de
Alva. The Trial Examiner finds that by reason of the
foregoing representations the Respondent interfered with,
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and thereby the
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Second- The Respondent's refusal to reinstate employees
Ben Walker, Elmo Thornton, and Veanes Jenkins after the
cessation of the strike. The Respondent in its first amended
answer admitted the allegations of paragraph 13(a) of the
complaint, to wit:
On or about the following dates set opposite their
respective names, Respondent did refuse to reinstate
the following employees: Ben Walker-January 6,
1971; Elmo Thorton-January 5, 1971; Veanes Jenk-
ins-January 5, 1971.
Further answering the Respondent states that
... Respondent has fully reinstated the named
employees or 'offered reinstatement to same, and
hereby offers to make said,employees whole from the
dates set forth in paragraph 13(a) to the date of the
offer of reinstatement.
Since each of the above employees was reinstated to his
former position, except for the computation of backpay,
the matter is now moot. A backpay order is recommended
pursuant to the Respondent's offer.
Third: The discharge of Floyd Coleman. In its first
amended answer the Respondent admits it discharged
Floyd Coleman on May 27, 1971, but "would show that
Floyd Coleman has been offered full reinstatement, and
Respondent has and does offer to make Coleman whole for
any loss under the Board procedures." Since employee
Coleman has been reinstated to his former position, except
for the computation of backpay, the matter is now moot. A
backpay order is recommended pursuant to the Respon-
dent's offer.
Fourth: The discharge of Pedro de Alva. Pedro de Alva
was a constant offender and on at least four occasions was
suspended for his objectionable work habits. It appears
from the credible record that de Alva brought about his
an honest and forthright witness. Moreover, Respondent's counsel stated
that Jenkins "was discharged on the 27th of January, according to our
records."
184 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
own discharge when he preferred staying with Brown
Express rather than returning to his job with the Respon-
dent. The' action of the Respondent in terminating him
under these circumstances was not unreasonable and was
for cause. While the Respondent's antiunion disposition
may raise a suspicion of reprisal against de Alva, the Trial
Examiner deems it insufficient to support a discriminatory
motive as to de Alva. Accordingly, the Trial Examiner
grants the Respondent's motion to dismiss those allega-
tions in the complaint which refer to de Alva's discharge.
Fifth: The discharge of Veanes Jenkins on January 27,
1972. An employer may in the absence of a contract
"discharge an employee for good cause, bad cause or no
cause at all." Portable Electric Tools, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 309
F.2d 423 (C.A. 7). "An employer has the right to discharge
an employee for any reason whether it is just or not, and
whether it is reasonable or not, as long as the discharge is
not in retaliation for union activities or support." N.L.R.B.
v. Ogle Protection Services, Inc., 375 F.2d 497 (C.A. 6), cert.
denied 389 U.S. 843. An arbitrary decision as well as one
based on just cause is acceptable absent improper motive.
Hagopian & Sons, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 395 F.2d 947,950-951
(C.A. 6). If, however, "the real motive for the firing is
discrimination against [an employee] because of his union
activities or affiliations there is a violation of the Act."
N. L R. B. v. Challenge-Cook Brothers of Ohio, Inc., 374 F.2d
147, 152 (C.A. 6). The Supreme Court has said in the case
of NLRB. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S.
1,45-46:
The Act does not interfere with the normal exercise of
the right of the employer to select its employees or
discharge them. The employer may not, under cover of
that right, intimidate or coerce its employees with
respect to their self-organization and representation,
and, on the other hand, the Board is not entitled to
make its authority a pretext for interference with the
right of discharge when that right is exercised for other
reasons than such intimidation and coercion.
The burden, of course, of proving an unlawful discharge is
on the General Counsel. Kellwood Company, Ottenheimer
Bros. Mfg. Division v. N.L.RB., 411 F.2d 493, 498 (C.A. 8).
The Respondent's union animus is well established in the
credible record.16 Moreover, in January 1971 the Respon-
dent seized on a technical pretext to bar Jenkins from
reinstatement after he had engaged in an unfair labor
practice strike. This time the Respondent asserts that it
discharged Jenkins because he was absent a whole week
without notifying the Respondent. The reason stated was
false. Jenkins was neither absent for a whole week nor did
he fail to notify the Respondent of his absence. There is no
doubt in the Trial Examiner's mind that the Respondent
knew at the time it discharged Jenkins that he had reported
16 In this regard see also the following prior unfair labor practice cases
involving this Respondent and this Union: 119 NLRB 6, enfd. 45 LRRM
2052 (1959, CA. 5), 127 NLRB 1203, enfd. 395 F.2d 481 (1968, C.A. 5); 170
NLRB 315, enfd. 430 F.2d 1032 (1970, C.A. 5), cert dewed 76 LRRM 2272
(1971).
17 The court said in N.LR B. v. Bird Machine Co, 161 F 2d 589, 592
(C.A. 1), that support for a finding of unlawful motivation "is augmented
[when I the explanation for the discharge offered by the Respondent [does ]
not stand up under scrutiny."
1E The unreasonable and unnatural discharge of an employee by an
employer justifies the inference that the assigned reason was a pretext
out sick. Its fabrication of the facts in this proceeding is
strong evidence of its unlawful motivation and the attempt
to conceal its true reason for discharging Jenkins. "Proof
... that the reason given [for a termination] was false
warrants the inference that some other reason was being
concealed. . . . If the employer is independently shown to
have an antiunion animus which the discharge would
gratify, it may be a fair inference that this was the true
reason ." N.L.R.B. v. JosephAntell, 358 F.2d 880, 883 (C.A.
1). Indeed when Dudley informed Jenkins that the
Respondent "couldn't use [him] any more" he did not
reveal the reason for his discharge. An employer's failure
to give the employee a reason for his discharge "alone
would be enough to support an inference that the
[termination] was discriminatory." NLRB. v. Griggs
Equipment, Inc., 307 F.2d 275, 278 (C.A. 5). See also
Virginia Metalcrafters, Incorporated, 158 NLRB 958, 962.
Furthermore, the reason advanced by the Respondent was
not only a false reason but it does not withstand scrutiny.17
Indeed, if the Respondent's reasons were credited, Jenkins'
discharge was an unreasonable and unnatural act18 for the
Respondent, having been admittedly put on notice that
Jenkins had visited a doctor, incredulously discharged
Jenkins (a good employee with a spotless record of job
attendance from the day he commenced work in 1967
except for participation in an unfair labor practice strike)
for his first absentee offense19 and without making a
reasonable effort to verify the true reason for his absence.
While Dudley claimed he was "concerned" with Jenkins'
absence , he neither tried to contact Jenkins at his residence
nor to query employee Fletcher who had produced
information as to why Jenkins was absent. Dudley's
investigation which was confined to shallow inquiries of
Culley and Dailey suggests that his "concern" as well as
the claim of an investigation were afterthoughts utilized in
this proceeding to detract attention from the real motive of
the Respondent and to enhance its defense in this action.
"If one can show that every other alternative except the
fact sought to be proven is not true, you indirectly prove
the fact is true. By excluding every other reasonable
hypothesis that fact is left standing above as proved."
N.LR.B. v. Melrose Processing Co., 351 F.2d 693, 698 (C.A.
8). The Trial Examiner is convinced that the Respondent
concealed the true reason for Jenkins' discharge which was
inextricably related to his union affection 20 Accordingly,
the Trial Examiner finds that the "real 'motive" 21 of the
Respondent in discharging Jenkins on January 27, 1972,
was to discourage membership in a labor organization and
thereby the Respondent violated Section ^8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
Sixth: The alleged discrimination against returned strikers.
The General Counsel asserts that a finding of unlawful
Magic Chef, Inc., 181 NLRB No. 1136.
19 It is significant that Jenkins had not been guilty of "frequent" or
"habitual" absenteeism which was the kind barred by the rule.
20 "[W]hen every other plausible motive has been eliminated and the
reasons advanced are not persuasive the [protected I activity may well
disclose the real motive behind the employer's action." NLRB. v. Melrose
Processing Co, supra, 699
21 "It is the `true purpose' or `real motive ' in hiring or firing that
constitutes the test." Local 357, International Brotherhood of Teamsters [Los
Angeles-Seattle Motor Express] v. N.L.R B, 365 U.S. 667, 675 See also
N.LR B v. Brown Food Stores, 380 U.S. 278, 287.
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC.
discrimination in the treatment of returning strikers is
supported by the disparity of hours which persisted
between the strikers as a group and the nonstrikers as a
group. The General Counsel urges that "[t]here is absolute-
ly no explanation for Respondent's disparity of hours, save
and except discriminatory intent to retaliate against
strikers, simply because they had observed and honored
the picket line of May 21, 1968." Discriminatory intent, of
course, is bottomed on the Respondent's past demonstra-
tion of union animus. However, the General Counsel has
not explained, if the Respondent's motive was discrimina-
tory, why, in the assignment of hours, many of the strikers
appear to have been treated no differently than the
nonstrikers. "Discrimination consists of treating like cases
differently." Frosty Morn Meats, Inc. v. N.LRB.,296 F.2d
617, 621 (C.A. 5). For example: In the case of the Houston
bobtail drivers (32 in number, see attachment no. 1) the
Respondent is claimed to have allegedly discriminated
against 8 strikers, 2 of whom worked more hours than the
average nonstriker, yet 6 nonstrikers worked less hours
than the average striker and 11 worked less hours than the
average nonstriker, 1 of whom worked less hours than any
striker; in the case of the Houston six-wheel drivers (20 in
number, see attachment no. 2) the Respondent is claimed
to have discriminated against 5 strikers, yet 1 nonstriker
worked less hours than the average striker and 4 nonstrik-
ers worked less hours than the average nonstriker; in the
case of the Houston dock workers (31 in number, see
attachment no. 3) the Respondent is claimed to have
discriminated against 8 strikers, 5 of whom worked as
many or more hours than the average nonstriker, yet 12
nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and
13 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average
nonstriker; 22 in the case of the San Antonio bobtail drivers
(17 in number, see attachment no. 4) the Respondent is
claimed to have discriminated against 3 strikers, yet 6
nonstrikers worked less hours than the average striker and
8 nonstrikers worked less hours than the average nonstrik-
er, 6 of whom worked less hours than any striker; in the
case of the San Antonio six-wheel drivers (15 in number,
see attachment no. 5) the Respondent is claimed to have
discriminated against 2'strikers, yet 5 nonstrikers worked
less hours than the average striker and 7 nonstrikers
worked less hours than the average nonstriker, 5 of whom
worked less hours than any striker; and in the case of the
San Antonio dockworkers (19 in number, see attachment
no. 6) the Respondent is claimed to have discriminated
against 4 strikers, yet 6 nonstrikers worked less hours than
the average striker and 8 nonstrikers worked less hours
than the average nonstriker, 4 of whom worked less hours
than any striker. Thus, based on these employment
statistics' it is difficult to ascertain with any degree of
certainty where the discrimination actually lies. Hence the
22 The average weekly hours of the strikers was 39, the average weekly
hours of the nonstrikers was 39.1. Thus, as to Houston dockworkers, the
General Counsel's theory lacks support.
23 There were 8 bobtail drivers and 5 six-wheel drivers who returned to
work after the strike; 13 in all. Boone in his testimony referred to around 15
returned strikers Hence the Trial Examiner concludes that he was referring
to both the bobtail drivers and the six-wheel drivers.
24 Additional proof of discrimination is found in the following testimony
of Boone:
I asked him [Dudley] when I first went back in there, I said, "How
185
Trial-Examiner considers the General Counsel's theory to
be at most tenuous and lacking in sufficient probative
value, without other substantiating evidence, to support a
finding of unlawful discrimination by the preponderance
of the evidence. However, in the case of the Houston
bobtail and six-wheel drivers 23 other substantiating evi-
dence does exist in the credited testimony of bobtail driver
Lester Boone.
Boone testified that the returned strikers were told that if
they "got through breaking out before [they] got 8 hours"
they should "hit the clock." On the other hand nonstrikers
were permitted to "help somebody else or piddle around
his own truck" to make the extra hours.24 Boone testified
that this practice ceased after the filing of the unfair labor
practice charge in this case . The charge was filed on June
21, 1971.25 Accordingly, the Trial Examiner finds that
commencing on the date of their respective reinstatements
after the cessation of the strike of May 1968 and
continuing until June 21, 1971, the Respondent unlawfully
discriminated against returned strikers Lester Boone, M.
Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E.
Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J.
Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton by giving
them less hours than those employees who did not go out
on strike in May 1968, or who were hired between May
1968 and January 4, 1971, and thereby the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of the Act.
2. The Respondent is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and it will
effectuate the policies of the Act for jurisdiction to be
exercised in this case.
3. By refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union,
the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining , and coercing its
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by
Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent has engaged in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a)(1) of the
Act.
5. By unlawfully discharging Veanes Jenkins on Janu-
ary 27, 1972, the Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of
the Act.
6. By discriminating against employees who returned
from the strike of May 1968 on January 4, 1971, and
thereafter by giving them less working hours than those
employees who did not go out on strike in May 1968, or
were hired between May 1968 and January 4, 1971, the
about me, I've got years at Alamo ." I said , "I might have went out on
strike but I have got years more seniority than most of these fellows
got"
And he said, "Well, you have to take it like it come now " [Emphasis
supplied.]
25 Among other things it was alleged in the charge that the Respondent
had violated Sec. 8(a)(3) of the Act by discriminating against employees
who had engaged in an unfair labor practice strike "[b ]y denying available
work to such employees.
186 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
7. All over-the-road drivers, city pickup and delivery-
men, dockmen, helpers, checkers and mechanics, at all of
the Employer's Texas terminals, excluding office clerical
employees, guards, watchmen, salesmen, solicitors and
supervisors, as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
RECOMMENDED REMEDY
It having been found that the Respondent has engaged in
certain unfair labor practices, it is recommended that it
cease and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative
action designed to effectuate the policies of the Act.
It having been found that the Respondent unlawfully
discharged Veanes Jenkins, it is recommended in accord-
ance with Board policy26 that the Respondent offer
Veanes Jenkins immediate and full reinstatement to his
former position or, if such position no longer exists, to a
substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to his
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for any loss of earnings he may have suffered as a
result of the discrimination against him by payment to him
of a sum of money equal to the amount he would have
earned from the date of his discriminatory discharge to the
date of an offer of reinstatement, less net earnings during
said period to be computed on a quarterly basis in the
manner established by the Board in F. W. Woolworth
Company, 90 NLRB 289, and including interest at the rate
of 6 percent per annum in the manner set forth in Isis
Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
It is further recommended that, in accordance with the
above formulae and the Respondent's offer, loss of
earnings be paid by the Respondent to Ben Walker from
January 6, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former
position; to Elmo Thorton from January 5, 1971, until he
was reinstated to his former position; to Veanes Jenkins
from January 5, 1971, until he was reinstated to his former
position; and to Floyd Coleman from May 27, 1971, until
he was reinstated to his former position.
It is further recommended in accordance with the above
formulae that loss of earnings caused by the Respondent's
discrimination be paid by the Respondent to those strikers;
viz: Lester Boone, M. Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T.
Henderson, S. McGregor, E. Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L.
Tolder, A. Adams, J. Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and
L. Lofton, who were discriminatorily given less working
hours than nonstrikers commencing on the dates of their
respective reinstatements after the May 1968 strike and
continuing thereafter until June 21, 1971.
It is further recommended that the Respondent be
ordered to rescind the 600 pounds of freight per man per
hour production quota established at its Laredo terminal.
26 See Rushton Company, 158 NLRB 1730, 1740.
27 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions, and recommended Order herem shall, as provided in Sec.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and
conclusions of law and the entire record, and pursuant to
Section 10(c) of the Act, the Trial Examiner hereby issues
the following recommended: 27
ORDER
The Respondent, Alamo Express, Inc. and Alamo
Cartage Company, its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with General
Drivers, Warehousemen & Helpers Local Unions Nos. 657
and 988, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of
America, in the appropriate unit by unlawfully granting
wage increases to its employees without bargaining with
the Union in regard to such wage increases prior to the
institution of the same ; by unlawfully refusing to furnish to
the Union names of employees receiving wage increases
and the amount of said increases ; by unlawfully refusing to
furnish the Union with the Anthony B. Cassidy report; and
by refusing to bargain with the Union with respect to the
institution of a 600 pounds of freight per man per hour
production quota at its Laredo terminal or any other
terminal as long as the Union remains the Respondent's
employees' lawful collective-bargaining agent.
(b) Unlawfully representing to employees tat it would
never sign a union contract; that employees were not going
to get a wage increase because of the Union; and that there
would be no vacations because of the Union.
(c) Discouraging membership in the General Drivers,
Warehousemen & Helpers Local Unions Nos. 657 and 988,
affiliated with International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of America, or any
other labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging
any of its employees or discriminating in any other manner
in respect to their hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment.
(d) Unlawfully discriminating against employees who
returned from the strike of May 1968 by giving them less
hours than those employees who did not go out on strike in
May 1968 or who were hired between May 1968 and
January 4, 1971. These employees are Lester Boone, M.
Dunn, Willie Fletcher, W. T. Henderson, S. McGregor, E.
Milford, R. J. Richards, R. L. Tolder, A. Adams, J.
Crowder, M. Crowder, R. Glenn, and L. Lofton.
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights to self-organization, to form, join, or assist the
aforesaid Union, or any other labor organization, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection as guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act or to
refrain from any or all such activities.
2. Take the following affirmative action which will
effectuate the policies of the Act:
102 48 of the Rules and Regulations, be adopted by the Board and become
its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 187
(a) Offer Veanes Jenkins immediate and full reinstate-
ment to his former job or, if his former job no longer exists,
to a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice to
his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him
whole for any loss of pay that he may have suffered by
reason of the Respondent's discrimination against him in
accordance with the recommendations set forth in the
section of this Decision entitled the "Recommended
Remedy," and also fully comply with the recommenda-
tions for payment of lost earnings to Ben Walker, Elmo
Thornton, Veanes Jenkins, Floyd Coleman, and those
named employees who returned from the strike of May
1968 as set forth in the section of this Decision entitled the
"Recommended Remedy."
(b) Rescind the 600-pound per man per hour production
quota established at its Laredo terminal.
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, timecards,
personnel records and reports, and all other records
necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due under the
terms of this recommended Order.
(d) Notify immediately Veanes Jenkins, if presently
serving in the Armed Forces of the United States, of the
right to full reinstatement, upon application after discharge
from the Armed Forces, in accordance with the Selective
Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act.
(e) Post at its Houston, San Antonio, and Laredo, Texas,
terminals copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."28 Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 23, after being duly signed
by the Respondent's representative, shall be posted by it
immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained by it
for 60 consecutive days thereafter , in conspicuous places,
including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(f) Notify the Regional Director for Region 23, in
writing, within 20 days from the date of the receipt of this
Decision, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith.29
IT Is FURTHER RECOMMENDED that the complaint be
dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act other
than those found in this decision.
28 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall be changed to read
"Posted pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
enforcing an Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
29 In the event that this recommended Order is adopted by the Board
after exceptions have been filed, this provision shall be modified to read:
"Notify the Regional Director for Region 17, in writing, within 20 days
from the date of this Order, what steps the Respondent has taken to comply
herewith."
188 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ATTACHBENT NO. 1
Houston Bobtail
Strikers
Rate of
Pay
Gross
Wastes
Hours
1/16 - 7/17
Avg./
Week
Hour
Diff.
Boone ,L. 2.80/hr. $3301.95 1179.8 45.1 .9
Dunn, M. 2.80 2600.81 928.2 35.2 11.8
Fletcher, W. C. 2.80 2974.07 1062.5 40.2 --
Henderson , W. T. 2.80 2380.98 851.0 32.2 14.8
McGregor, S. 2.80 3914.92 1398.5 53.2
Milford, E. 2.80 3572.48 1275.3 49
Richards, R. J. 2.80 2489.13 888.3 34 13
Tolder, R. L. 2.80 2944.46 1051.2 40.1 6.9
8/329.0
Avg. 41.0
Non-Strikers
Starting
Or Quit Date
[Gross
Wa es
[Hours
1/16 - 7/171
[Avg./
Week
Carter, D. C. 2.85 2023.74 710.2 50.1
4-12-71 (14 wk)
Bernol , F. R. 2.80 1717.66 613.1 47
4-20-71 (13 wk)
Chriesman , Be 2.80 4441 .32 1586.5 61
Concha, J. Jr. 2.80 1494.70 533.2 41
6-17-71 (13 wk)
Daehler, W. H. 2.80 2745.18 980.1 44.1
2-17-71 (22 wk)
Davis, R. K. 2.80 3429.26 1224.2 47
Dibello, S. 2.80 3947.01 1409.2 54
Elias , M. X. 2.80 4322.40 1543.2 59
Espinosa , R. S. 2.80 4340.65 1550.7 59.2
Flores, R. R. 2.80 989.61 335.2 41
5-26-71 (8 wk)
Fergerson, R. E. 2.80 1670.07 596.1 39.1
(15 wk)
Gutierrez , D. 2.80 1019 .13 363.3 40
5-17-71 (9 wk)
7-24-71
Lowe , L. D. 2.80 3085.48 1101.3 42
Linscombe, J. D. 2.80 1973.66 704.3 50
4-17-71 (14 wk)
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 189
Starting
Or Quit Date
(Gross
Wages]
[Hours
1/16 - 7/171
[Avg./
Week]
Morales, M . 2.80 3555 . 63 1269.2 48.2
Muro , S. L. 2.85 5175 . 65 1816.1 69.2
Perez , M. M. 2.80 3320 .90 1186.1 45.2
Rodriguez , F. 2.80 3696 . 97 1320.9 50.2
Stahl , W. 2.80 1284 . 10 458.2 38
4-21 71 (12 wk)
Teague, D. 2.80 3193 . 41 1140.1 51.2
2-24-71 (22 wk)
Villeareal , E. 2.80 3687 . 95 1317.4 50.2
Wilkins , M. Jr. 2 .80
5 wks off (23 wk)
2305 .12 823.7 35.2
Williams , L. 2.80 544 . 04 194.8 32.0
6-12-71 (6 wk)
Witt , J. N. 2.80 1506.33 537.3 38.1
4-17-71 (14 wk)
24 1132.0
Avg. 47.0
ATTACIISENT NO. 2
Houston 6-Wheel
Strikers
Rate of
Pay
Gross Hours
Wanes 26 wks
Avg./
Week
Hour
Diff.
Adams, A. 2.85/hr $3530 . 07 1238 . 2 47.2 7.9
Crowder, J. 2.85 3941.89 1383 .3 53.1 2.0
Crowder , M. 2.85 3937 .38 1381.2 53.0 2.1
Glenn, R. 2.85
(20 wks)
2856 .79 11002.1 50.0 5.1
Lofton , L. 2.85 3675.05 1289 . 1 49.2 5.9
5/252.5
Non-Strikers
Avg. 50.0
Andrus , N. 2.85
(8 wks)
1222 . 23 428.2 53.0
Brooks , R. L. 2.85 4170 . 25 1463.7 56.0
Burton, H. L. 2.85 4540 . 02 1592.3 61.1
Davis , J. 2.85
(25 wks)
3570 . 67 1252.3 50.0
Gann, B. J. 2.85 1896 . 45 665.1 55.1
(12 wks)
ii
190 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
[Rate of
Pa
Goetz , G. C. 2.85
Gray, J. E. 2.85
(17 wks)
Henderson , T. R. 2.85
(4 wks)
Johnson, J. C. 2.85
Pawkett, G. S. 2.85
(16 wks)
Roberts, W. B. 2.85
Ross , S. 2.80/2.85
4 3 71
Snyder, A. W. 2.85
Thompson, J. 2.85
Williams,
M. A. 2.85
(Gross [Hours
Waxes] (26 wks
4061.08 1424.3
2332.30 818.1
644.00 226.3
4127.11 1448.3
2559.38 898.1
4235.81 1486.7
4352.55 1538,0*
4510.71 1582.2
4191.48 1470,2
4241.14 1488.3
* 935.8 hrs at 2.85/hr.
602.2 hrs at 2.80/hr.
1538 . 0 total hours
Rate of
pay
Bartlett , R. 2.75/hr
Davis, J. 2.75
(25 wks)
Hampton , H. 2.75
Hard , G. 2.75
Jones , L. H. 2.75
Lewis , L. 2.75
Nugent , C. 2.75
Picken, D. 2.75
ATTACHMENT NO. 3
Houston Dock
Strikers
Gross Hours
Wages (26 wks
Avg. /
Week
54.2
48.0
56.0
55.2
56.0
57.1
59.0
60,2
56.1
57.1
15 834.1
Avg. 55.1
Avg.
Week
$2947.34 1071.2
3333.75 1212.8
3126.33 1136.2
2531.72 920.2
3291.28 1196.2
2841.61 1033.9
2302.88 837.1
2201.09 800.1
41.0
48.1
43.2
35.1
46.0
39.2
32.1
30.2
8/ 314.9
Avg. 39.0
iii
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 191
Non-Strikers
Rate of
pay.
Gross
Wages
Hours
(26 wks
Avg./
Week
Andrews, L. 2.75 2613.75 950.1 36.1
Carlisle, H. E. 2.85 4187.72 1469.1 56.1
Chavez, G. F. 2.75
(22 wks)
2273.63 826.2 37.1
Dailey, D. M. 2.75
(3 wks)
323.08 119.2 39.2
Dailey, R. W. 2.75
(13 wks)
1359.11 494.6 38.0
Estrada , R. 2.75 3171.50 1153.8 44.1
Fontenot , R. J. 2.75
(7 wks)
700.46 254.2 36.0
Guidry, C. 2.85 3499.90 1228.1 47.1
Lara , J. M. 2.75 2879.96 1047.7 40.1
Longoria, J. P. 2.75
(6 wks)
562.19 204.1 34.0
Luna, E. R. 2.85 3278.86 1150.1 44.1
Morales, J. C. 2.75
(14 wks)
1546.02 562.5 40.0
Ramirez , 0. V. 2.75 2627.39 955.1 36.2
Ramirez , B. J. 2.75
(20 wks)
2180.80 793.1 39.1
Ritter, S. J. 2.50/2.75 3027.96 1141.5* 43.2
4-4-71
Rodriguez, A. 2.75
(10 wks)
995.55 362.1 36.2
Rodriguez, E. G. 2.75
(17 vks)
1772.08 644.1 37.2
Rodriguez, M. 2.75
(8 wks)
753.83 274.3 34.0
Salinas, B. S. 2.75
(18 wks)
1897.16 689.2 38.1
Stover , J. A. 2.75
(7 wks)
699.05 254.5 36.0
Tyler, P. 2.85
(24 wks)
3024.34 1061.5 44.1
Valencia, J. A. 2.75 3039.21 1105.5 42.1
Valencia, R. L. 2.75 1067.41 388.4 35.0
23/913.1
Avg. 39.2
*441.3 hrs. at 2.50/hr.
700.2 hrs at 2.75/hr.
1141.5 total hours
iv
192 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ATTAC} 4ENT NO. 4
SAN ANTONIO BOBTAIL
STRIKERS
Wage Gross Hours Avg./ Hours
Rate Wastes ( 26 weeks) Week diff.
Flores, R. M. 2.30/2 .40* 2939 . 79 1242.3 47.8 1.2
Torres, A. G. 2.30/2 .40 2923 . 31 1236.1 47.1 1.9
Williams, L. 1.95/2.05 2466 . 10 1227.3 47.2 1.8
2/142.1
NON-STRIKERS
Avg. hr. 47.0
Beef-*. 1449
(5 wks)
489r8H H44.4 48TH Need 10 wks
Cantu, R. G. 1.87/1.97
(20 wks)
1658.71 864.3 43.2
Dilworth, T. H. 2.30/2.40
(20 wks)
2818 . 94 1200.9 60.0
0area -My- .
(3 wks)
+98rH3 "6T4 38r?^ Need 10 wks
Gil, M. N. 2.05/2.15 2744 . 13 1300.4 50.0
Hilliard, J. A. 1.97/2.05 2293.49 1135.5 43.2
Howard, M. 2.30/2.40 3238.10 1455.5 56.0
Jambers, W. B. 1.97/2.05
(16 wks)
2695 . 29 1469.0 56.1
Johnston, W. S. 1.87/1.97
(25 wks)
1485.68 777.2 48.1
Kosub, 0. M. 1.87/1.97 2332 .25 1208.0 48.1
McLemore, R. A. 1.87/2.00
(25 wks)
2617.40 1338.3 51.1
Meneses, R. L. 2.05/2.10 2166.36 1040.8 41.2
Muth, E. D. 1.97/2.05 2288.54 1132.5 43.2
Sanchez, E. C. 1.87/2.00 2289 . 02 1173.3 45.0
Schneider, V. A. 2.10/2.20 2525.09 1165.4 44.2
White, A. L. 2.30/2.40 3458 . 03 1463.1 56.1
14685.5
*Actual hours computed for
each wage rate.
Avg./hr 49.0
v
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC.
ATTACHMENT NO. 5
SAN ANTONIO 6 -WHEEL
STRIKERS
193
Wage
Rate
Gross Hours Avg./
Waves (26 weeks) Hour
Hours
Diff,
Coleman, F. 2.05/2.15*
(20 wks)
2183.70 1039.6 52.0 2.8
Trtado, J. C. 2.30/2.40 3141.82 1328.4 51.0 3.8
2/103.0
Avg./hr 51.0
NON-STRIKERS
Anderson, T. 2.30/2.40 3200.64 1354.3 52.0
Coffall, E. B. 2.30/2.40 4090.48 1730.7 66.2
Gonzales , W. R. 1.70/1.87
(18 wks)
1277.07 725.7 40.1
"peterA-w 9. 4-^8
(3 wks)
84§vff 144,4 48x8 Need 10 wks
Dior, F. 1.70/1.87
(21 wks)
2008.25 1121.7 53.1
Galindo , J. D. 2.07/2.15 3183.24 1502.0 57.2
Hernandez , J. R. 2.00/2.10 1578.56
(19 wks)
772.1 40.1
Davis, N. 1.70/1.87
(12 wks)
976.12 544.9 45.1
IE+^t^gr-1i. 3s'39
(5 wks)
33 4 03 "fiva 39 Q need 10 wks
Jordan, J. L. 2.30/2.40 4911.18 2077.8 79.2
Kraus , R. E. 1.70/1.87
(12 wks)
1225.29 684.8 57.0
Puente, F. T. 1.70/1.87*
(22 wks)
1895.08 1025.3 46.1
Rios, T. F. 2.07/2.15 2721.13 1282.9 49.1
Sanchez, J . M. 2.18/2.25
(22 wks)
2755.68 1241.3 56.1
Brown , D. L. 2.30/2.40 4451.50 1882.9 72.1
13 713.4
Avg./ hr 54.8
*Actual hours computed for
each wage rate.
vi
194 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
ATTACHMENT NO. 6
SAN ANTONIO DOCK
STRIKERS
Wage
Rate
Gross
Wages
Hours
(26 weeks )
Avg./
Hour
Hours
Diff.
Barbosa , W. H. 1.90/2.00 2247.73 1144.4 44.0 8.0
Guzman , F. M. 1.90/2.00 2255.91 1148.2 44.0 3.0
Sauceda , A. V. 1.90/2.00 2386.43 1214.3 46.2 1.8
Vivier, J. L. 1.90/2.00 2465.34 1253.9 47.2 .8
4/181.1
Avg. /hr 45.0
NON-STRIKERS
Anderson, J. C. 1.90 2287.37 1203.2 47.1
Bosquez, E. 1.85/1.90* 2697.77 1423.6 54.2
Cabrellero, D. W. 2.06/2.16* 2875.40 1339.3 51.1
6ee1-eeeesr-9,-6r 4-160
(3 wks)
148:48 144T8 3749 need 10 wks
Castaneda, R. A. 1.60/1.70 2110.67 1468.2 56.1
Dena, D. 1.60/1.70
(16 wks)
991.31 706.0 44.0
Espaza, E. 1.60
(4 wks)
263.12 164.7 41.0 need 10 wks
eamwr-3s-b. 1968
(2 wks)
49v6S EFL 44rG need 10 wks
Gil, A. 1.60
(15 wks)
1079.67 674.1 44.1
Gil, A. N. 2.00 2683.13 1341.1 51.2
ebrier-!t. 1•:'39
(5 wks)
435x1:6 99918 4318 need 10 wks
Hermand, P. 1.60/1.65
(18 wks)
1651.67 1006.7 55.2
Johnson, E. 2.14 2580.19 1205.2 46.1
Lisera, V. M. 1.60
(18 wks)
1232.26 770.3 42,1
Lopez, P. R. 1.60
(5 wks)
251.44 157.2 31.0 need 10 wks
Me63teeber;-3,-P. 1.168
(9 wks)
63LI,87. 395r9 44,9 need 10 wks
Mann, J. L. 1.60/1.75
(18 wks)
1253.29 766.2 42.1
Martinez, R. 1.60
(17 wks)
1185.13 740.1 43.1
Abi^rereer-J,-b. 8,88 244466 1.3843 38,8 need 10 wks
(4 wks)
vii
ALAMO EXPRESS, INC. 195
Wage Gross Hours Avg./ Hours
Rate Wages (26 weeks ) Hour Diff.
Hank, iis3 . 4 ,68
(6 wks)
363x33 ,336s7< 3741- need 10 wks
per-Rz-hv 4s74
(3 wks)
38$03 143:1• 49T9 need 10 wks
Perez, J. E . 1.90/2.00 2734.12 139.30 53.2
Peres,RtrI4s : ^T60
(4 wks)
LL41•:10 -i gs1- 37-sg need 10 wks
Salas, M. 1.60/1.70
(25 wks)
1873.87 1121.3 44.2
Valdez, D. 1.60 966.08 603.1 50.0
-Yel errs-3s-6. : •VfiO3sgg* 3-03-A3 1.66V8 33:3 need 10 wks
15 723.8
Avg./hr 48.0
*Actual hours computed for
each wage rate.
viii