Al Massera, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 8, 1952

101 N.L.R.B. 837 (N.L.R.B. 1952)

AL MASSERA, INC. 837
10. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting
commerce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
AL MASSERA, INC.; J. J. CROSETTI AND WARREN E. SCARBOROUGH, CO-
PARTNERS , D/B/A J. J. CROSETTI CO.; E. J. RUSSELL, AN INDIVIDUAL,
D/B/A INDEPENDENT GROWERS CO.; WALTER M. CHRISTENSEN, HAR-
OLD S. CHRISTENSEN, AND ANDREW H. CHRISTENSEN, JR., COPARTNERS,
D/B/A CHRISTENSEN BROS.; PETER A. STOLICH, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A
PETER A. STOLICH Co.; R. T. ENGLUND, AN INDIVIDUAL , D/B/A R. T.
ENGLUND CO.; AND H. E. CREAN, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A GROWERS
PRODUCE DISPATCH and LOCAL INDUSTRIAL UNION No. 78, CIO
K. R. NUTTING, AN INDIVIDUAL, D/B/A K. R. NUTTING Co. and LORETTA
HIGUERA
FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE WORKERS' LOCAL No. 78 and LOCAL INDUS-
TRIAL UNION No. 78, CIO
FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE WORKERS' LOCAL No. 78 and GROWERS-
SHIPPER VEGETABLE ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL CALIFORNIA. Cases
Nos. 20-CA-436,456,461,467,490,491,495,20-CA-496, 2O-CB-150,
158, and 20-CB-161. December 8,1952
Amended Decision and Order
On May 28, 1951, Trial Examiner Wallace E. Royster issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceedings, finding that
Respondents Local 78, Christensen, Stolich, and Englund had engaged
in and were engaging in certain unfair labor practices, and recom-
mending that they cease and desist therefrom and take certain
affirmative action, as set forth in the Intermediate Report. The Trial
Examiner further found that Respondents Massera, Crosetti, Inde-
pendent, Growers, and Nutting had not engaged in any unfair labor
practices, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with
respect to them. Thereafter, Christensen, Stolich, Englund, and the
General Counsel filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and
supporting briefs. Respondent Local 78 filed no exceptions.
On December 28, 1951, the Board issued its Decision and Order, to
which a copy of the Intermediate Report was attached, in which it
found that each Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in
certain unfair labor practices.'
n 97 NLRB 712.
101 NLRB No. 143.
838 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On September 22, 1952, the Board issued a notice to show cause,
returnable October 13, 1952, why it should not reopen the case, set
aside the finding in its Decision and Order that the Act does not
sanction the union-security provisions of the contract between the
Association and Respondent Local 78, and reconsider the case on the
Intermediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record.
Thereafter, Local Industrial Union No. 78, CIO, one of the charging
parties herein, filed its "Response to Notice to Show Cause." We have
considered the contentions set forth in this response and find that they
are without merit.2
1. We now find unanimously,3 in agreement with the Trial Exam-
iner, that the union-security provision of the 1950 contract is valid.
The provision, set forth in full in the Intermediate Report, requires
that employees "shall, within 30 days after commencing work," apply
for union membership or be subject to discharge. The contract was
signed on April 8, 1950, before the opening of the 1950 season, and the
provision became effective at that time.' A reasonable construction
of the provision is that 30 days are to be given to employees from the
date they are to begin work for the new season.
2. We also agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons stated
in the Intermediate Report, that the discharges of Beatrice and
Christine Gordon, Floyd Kimbriel, Margaret Sims, Loretta Higuera,
and Grace Thurman were made in accordance with the union-
security provision, and that the Respondent Union in requesting
them, and the respective Employers in effectuating them, did not
violate the Act .5
3. We agree with the Trial Examiner, for the reasons stated in his
Intermediate Report, that Respondent Local 78, by requesting the
2 Local No. 78, CIO , bases its response solely on the alleged untimeliness of the Board's
action . Section 10 ( d) of the Act, however , provides : "Until a transcript of the record
In a case shall have been filed in a court , as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any
time, upon reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper , modify or set
aside, in whole or in part , any finding or order made or issued by it." Thus, explicit
authorization exists in the statute itself for the Board 's action . The Board 's ruling in
Harcourt and Co., 100 NLRB 1383, cited in this Response , is not germaine to, nor does
it derogate from , the Board 's power on its own motion to alter its findings and orders as
prescribed by Section 10 (d).
3 The Board is unanimous on all matters except that discussed in paragraph 4, infra,
where separate views are explicitly set forth.
4 The evidence relied upon by the General Counsel to support his contention that April 8
was not the effective date evinces at most an agreement between the Association and
Respondent Local 78 to postpone enforcing the union-security provision . None of the dis-
charges effectuated pursuant to this provision occurred within 30 days after April 8, 1950,
and no claim is made of any violation based on the ground of failure to accord an employee
30 days after April 8, 1950, to become a member.
Z We reject the General Counsel 's contention that certain of the Respondent Employers
and the Respondent Union further violated the Act by any alleged refusal to employ previ-
ously discharged employees who thereafter tendered dues to the Union . The evidence
shows that no employee sought new employment Although Higuera and other employees
may have sought reinstatement to their old employment , a belated tender justifying dis-
charge can hardly be said to require reinstatement . Standard Brands, Incorporated, 97
NLRB 737.
AL MASSERA, INC. 839
discharge of Clarence M. Horton, and Respondent Stolich, by dis-
charging him, violated the Act.
4. A majority of the Board, consisting of Members Houston, Styles,
and Peterson, in disagreement with the Trial Examiner, find that the
discharges of Brubaker, Brookover, and Papangellin did not violate
the Act.
As set forth in the Intermediate Report, the Union's letters re-
questing their discharge indicated failure to apply for membership
or failure to pay dues as one reason for their nonmembership, and
dual unionism as another. The Trial Examiner concluded that the
mere existence in the requests of two reasons required each Respondent
involved to "disentangle" the legitimate reason from the unlawful
reason, and affirmatively "establish, if it could, that it was motivated
in its action by the former."
In our opinion, however, the evidence shows that in fact the Union's
real reason for requesting these discharges, and the Employer's motive
in effectuating them, was nonpayment of dues and not "dual union-
ism."6 We base our opinion on (1) the lack of any record evidence
to show that any of the three employees were engaged in activities
on behalf of another labor organization; 7 (2) uncontradicted testi-
mony to the effect that the Union's letters were form letters, used
without regard to the inapplicability of the "dual" reason; and (3)
the evidence that the Employers investigated, and ascertained in each
case, that the employee was in fact delinquent `in dues or failed to
apply for union membership.
Accordingly, we reverse the Trial Examiner's finding that the Re-
spondent Union and Respondent Employers Christensen and Eng-
lund violated the Act in connection with the discharges of Brubaker,
Brookover, and Papangellin, and shall dismiss the complaint insofar
as it alleges these violations.8
B Indeed , as to employee Papangellin , the evidence affirmatively establishes that she was
not engaged in "dual unionism ," and that the Respondent Union knew , even before it
requested her discharge , that she was not so engaged.
' Chairman Herzog agrees with the Trial Examiner that the Respondents had the burden
of disentangling the lawful from the unlawful reasons for the discharges of Brubaker,
Brookover , and Papangellin, and that they failed to sustain the burden He would there-
fore affirm the Trial Examiner in finding the violations as to them.
8 Members Houston and Styles would not find a violation by these Respondent Employers,
even absent any investigation by them as to the Union 's reason for requesting the dis-
charges . The employees were not members in good standing because of either nonpay-
ment of dues or failure to make proper application for membership. Each was thus vulner-
able to discharge because of his own improper conduct. The Act gives the Union an abso-
lute right in these circumstances to request their discharge . Congress intended to elimi-
nate "free riders" under a valid union -security provision such as existed in this case, and
permitted the ultimate sanction of discharge to prevent employees from "taking a free
ride." The Congressional Record and the various committee reports on the amendments
to the Act are replete with references that emphasize a man 's right to remain at work in
a union shop only so long as he pays his union dues , no matter how reprehensible to the
union his conduct in other respects might be.
In this case, the Employer in each instance , when confronted by a request that gave him
"reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons
840 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Order
Upon the entire record in the case, and pursuant to Section 10 (c)
of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that :
A. Respondent Peter A. Stolich, an individual, d/b/a Peter A.
Stolich Co., its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Encouraging membership in Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Workers"
Local No. 78, or in any other labor organization, by discharging or
refusing to reinstate any of its employees.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, except to the extent permitted by Section 8 (a) (3)
of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act :
(a) Offer Clarence M. Horton immediate and full reinstatement
to his former or a substantially equivalent position, without prejudice
to his seniority or other rights and privileges, and make him whole
in the manner described in the section of the Intermediate Report
entitled "The Remedy."
(b) Upon request, make available to the National Labor Relations
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all payroll records,
social security payment records, time cards, personnel records and
reports, and all other records, necessary for a determination of the
amount of back pay due under the terms of this Order.
other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues . ," acted at his peril.
In his own interest and to save himself from violating the statute in the event that the
belief engendered by the letter should turn out to be the fact , he would have been
prudent to investigate. But a failure to investigate , although risky , clearly would not
entail a violation if in fact, as is the case here, nonpayment of dues alone caused the
employees' loss of membership in the Union . The statute does not penalize an employer's
failure to investigate , nor does it save an employer from a violation , merely because he
does investigate . Having some grounds for believing that nonpayment of dues was not
the reason for an employee 's loss of membership in a union, an employer would still not
be guilty of a discriminatory discharge if the union 's real reason for the expulsion was
nonpayment of dues.
As for the Respondent Union , the language of Section 8 (b) (2) itself precludes a finding
that it violated that section . In pertinent part , 8 (b) (2) proscribes causing an employer
to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom "membership " has been denied
or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender periodic dues or initiation
fees There is no showing in this case that the membership of Brubaker, Brookover, or
Papangellin was denied or terminated for any reason other than their failure to tender
timely dues and initiation fees Whatever motivation the Union may have had for there-
after requesting their discharge is not relevant in determining whether or not it violated
the Act.
For these reasons , Members Houston and Styles would dismiss the complaint insofar as
it alleges violations with respect to Brubaker , Brookover, and Papangellin , even apart
from the ground expressed in the body of this decision, as to which they concur with
Member Peterson.
AL MASSERA , INC. 841
(c) Post at its plant in Salinas, California, copies of the notice
attached hereto as Appendix A." Copies of such notice, to be fur-
nished by the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region, shall, after
being duly signed by an authorized representative, be posted immedi-
ately upon receipt thereof, and maintained by it for sixty (60) con-
secutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps
shall be taken to insure that such notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material.
B. Respondent Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Workers' Local No. 78,
its officers, agents, representatives, successors, and assigns, shall :
1. Cease and desist from :
(a) Causing or attempting to cause Peter A. Stolich, its officers,
agents, successors, or assigns, to discharge or otherwise discriminate
against its employees in violation of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner restraining or coercing employees
of Peter A. Stolich in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section
7 of the Act, except to the extent permitted by Section 8 (a) (3) of the
Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action, which the Board finds
will effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Notify Respondent Peter A. Stolich in writing that it with-
draws its objection to the employment of Clarence M. Horton.
(b) Notify Clarence M. Horton in writing that it has withdrawn
its objection to his employment by Peter A. Stolich.
(c) Make whole,10 in the manner described in the section of the
Intermediate Report entitled "The Remedy," Clarence M. Horton.
(d) Post at its branch or business offices in the Salinas-Watsonville-
Hollister area in conspicuous places, including all places where notices
to members are customarily posted, copies of the notice attached
hereto as Appendix B.11 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by
the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region, shall, after being
duly signed by a representative of Respondent Local 78, be posted by
it immediatly upon receipt thereof, and maintained for sixty (60)
days thereafter. Reasonable steps shall be taken to insure that such
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
9In the event this Order is enforced by decree of a United States Court of Appeals,
there shall be inserted before the words "A Decision and Order" the words "A Decree of
the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing, an Order."
" In accordance with our usual policy, the Respondent Union may terminate its liability
for further accrual of back pay to Horton by notifying Respondent Stolich in writing that
it has no objection to Horton 's employment . The Union shall not thereafter be liable for
any back pay accruing after 5 days from the giving of such notice. afundet Cork Corpo-
ration, 96 NLRB 1142.
11 See footnote 9.
842 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(e) Mail to the Regional Director for the Twentieth Region signed
copies of the notice for posting, Respondent Employer Peter A.
Stolich willing, at its place of business where notices to employees are
customarily posted.
C. Each Respondent shall notify the Regional Director for the
Twentieth Region in writing, within ten (10) days from the date of
this Order, what steps it has taken to comply herewith.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that Respondent Employers Christensen
Bros., R. T. Englund, Al Massera, Inc., J. J. Crosetti Co., Independ-
ent Growers Co., Growers Produce Dispatch, and K. R. Nutting Co.
violated the Act by discharging respectively Velma Brubaker and
Virginia Papangellin, Louise Brookover, Beatrice and Christine
Gordon, Margaret Sims, Floyd Kimbriel, Grace Thurman, and
Loretta Higuera.
IT Is FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it hereby is, dis-
missed insofar as it alleges that Respondent Fresh Fruit & Vegetable
Workers' Local No. 78 violated the Act by causing or attempting to
cause Respondent Employers Christensen Bros., R. T. Englund, Al
Massera, Inc., J. J. Crosetti Co., Independent Growers Co., Growers
Produce Dispatch, and K. R. Nutting Co. to discriminate against,
respectively, Velma Brubaker and Virginia Papangellin, Louise
Brookover, Beatrice and Christine Gordon, Margaret Sims, Floyd
Kimbriel, Grace Thurman, and Loretta Higuera.
MEMBER MURDOCK, dissenting in part :
While in all other respects I join in the decision of my colleagues,
I believe that the majority opinion seriously errs insofar as it re-
verses the Trial Examiner and finds that no violation of the Act was
committed by the Employers in the discharges of employees Brubaker,
Brookover, and Papangellin. The circumstances of these discharges,
in my opinion, place them squarely within the zone of conduct pro-
hibited by the statute.
The factual background is uncontroverted and is substantially the
same in the case of each of the three employees. Brubaker, Brook-
over, and Papangellin all failed to make timely application for mem-
bership or payment of dues to the Union. Their discharges were re-
quested by the Union. The request for discharge forwarded to the
Employers by the Union states, in each instance, two grounds for
the request. First, that the employees had failed to make application
for membership or pay dues, and second, that the employee had
engaged in activity on behalf of a rival labor organization. The
Employers thereafter terminated the employment of the three
individuals.
AL MASSERA , INC. 843
The Act provides that a union may not request, nor an employer
grant, the discharge of an employee for dual union activities. In-
deed, the only authorized ground upon which such a request may be
made or granted is failure to tender the proper periodic dues and
initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of membership in
the labor organization. The requested discharges in this case were
therefore based, in the notice sent by the Union to the Employers,
on both an illegal and a legal ground. The majority of my colleagues
find that no violation occurred because (1) there was no evidence in
the record of this case to back up the charge in the Union's request
that the dischargees had engaged in dual unionism; (2) the Union's
letters were form letters presumptively used without attention to
their content; and (3) the Employers ascertained that each employee
was in fact delinquent in dues or had not applied for membership in
the Union. This position and these reasons, however, ignore the
strict mandate of the statute which, in Section 8 (a) (3), states that
"no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization . . . if he has reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for
reasons other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic
dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of ac-
quiring or retaining membership." (Emphasis added.) In the in-
stant case, it cannot be denied that the very notice sent to the Em-
ployers by the Union stated on its face "reasonable grounds" to cause
the Employer to believe that the discharges were being requested for
reasons other than those allowed by the statute.12 For the Employers
to proceed to consummate the discharges in full knowledge of these
reasonable grounds, as they did, was patently in violation of the Act.
The reasons urged by my colleagues for finding that no violation of
the Act occurred are unpersuasive in the light of the limited language
of the Act. The fact that no evidence supporting the Union's charge
of dual unionism was finally introduced at the hearing in this case
does not in any way alter the fact that the Employers, at the time of
the discharges, had before them the Union's written word that such
conduct was charged against the three individuals and was one of the
reasons for requesting the discharge. The statute does not state that
such discharges shall be lawful unless the employer, the union, or the
Board can prove that there were reasons other than nonmembership or
nonpayment of dues. It does command that an employer shall not act
on such a discharge where reasonable grounds for such belief exist
at the time of the request. In the presence of such reasonable grounds,
12 The majority , in part at least, appears to admit this when they state , "in this case,
the Employer in each instance , when confronted by a request that gave him `reasonable
grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than
the failure of the employees to tender the periodic dues .,' acted at his peiil
844 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
whether they may eventually be proven wrong or not, the Act enjoins
any discharge of the individual involved 13 The same answer applies
to the assertion that any possible violation was absolved because the
Employers here investigated to see if the dichargees were, in fact, non-
members or delinquent in dues and such investigation disclosed they
were. Such an investigation did nothing to remove the existing
grounds for belief that another and illegal reason was a basis for the
Union's request; and no investigation was made of the latter reason.
Finally, the assertion that the inclusion of the dual unionism charges
was only an inadvertency caused by use of a form letter, at most, only
would show that the Union did not deliberately attempt to cause the
discharges on those grounds. It does not, however, lessen the respon-
sible knowledge or culpability of the Employers in the absence of any
evidence that they disregarded the inclusion of the dual unionism
charge contained in the requests for that reasons. In this respect it is
interesting to note that these "form letters" were apparently not used
in the other requests for discharge where the Union's motivation was
also alleged to be based solely on nonmembership or dues delinquency
grounds.
Accordingly, as Respondent Employers Christensen and Englund
discharged employees Brubaker, Brookover, and Papangellin on de-
mand by the Respondent Union, while in the possession of reasonable
grounds for belief that the discharges were being requested for reasons
other than nonmembership or delinquency in dues, I would find that
Respondents Christensen and Englund thereby violated Section 8 (a)
(3) and 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
Appendix A
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT encourage membership in FRESIi FRUIT & VEGE-
TABLE WORKERS' LOCAL No. 78 or in any other labor organization
of our employees by discriminating against our employees in any
a The position taken by two of my colleagues , therefore , that "Having some grounds
for believing that nonpayment of dues was not the reason for an employee 's loss of mem-
bership in a union, an employer would still not be guilty of a discriminatory discharge if
the union's real reason for the expulsion was nonpayment of dues" is completely in con-
flict with the Act
AL MASSERA, INC. 845
manner in regard to their hire and tenure of employment, except to
the extent permitted by Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE wiLL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of rights guaran-
teed in Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer to Clarence M. Horton immediate and full rein-
statement to his former or substantially equivalent position
without prejudice to any seniority or other rights and privileges
previously enjoyed and make him whole for any loss of pay suf-
fered as a result of the discrimination against him.
PETER A. STOLICH Co.,
Employer.
Dated ---------------------- BY ---------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Appendix B
NOTICE TO ALL MEMBERS OF FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE WORKERS'
LOCAL No. 78 AND TO ALL EMPLOYEES OF PETER A. STOLICH CO.
Pursuant to a Decision and Order of the National Labor Relations
Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, we hereby notify you that :
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause Peter A. Stolich Co.,
its officers, agents, successors, or assigns, to discharge any em-
ployees or otherwise discriminate against its employees in viola-
tion of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL NOT restrain or coerce employees of Peter A. Stolich
Co., its successors or assigns, in the exercise of rights guaranteed
in Section 7 of the Act, except to the extent that such rights may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized by Sec-
tion 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
WE WILL make Clarence M. Horton whole for any loss of pay
he may have suffered because of the discrimination against him.
FRESH FRUIT & VEGETABLE
WORKERS' LOCAL No. 78,
Labor Organization.
Dated ------------------ By ------------------------------
(Representative ) (Title)
846 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof,
and must not be altered, defaced , or covered by any other material.
IRVING BERLIN AND DENNIS BERLIN, CO-PARTNERS, TRADING As DEN-
NIS-MITCHELL INDUSTRIES 1 and INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AIRCRAFT AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT W ORKERS OF
AMERICA, CIO, PETITIONER . Case No. 4-RC-1718. December 8,
1952
Decision and Order
Upon a petition duly filed under Section 9 (c) of the National
Labor Relations Act, a hearing was held before Morris Mogerman,
hearing officer. The hearing officer's rulings made at the hearing are
free from prejudicial error and are hereby affirmed?
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-mem-
ber panel [Chairman Herzog and Members Murdock and Peterson].
Upon the entire record in this case, the Board finds :
1. The Employers are engaged in commerce within the meaning
of the Act.
2. The labor organizations involved claim to represent certain em-
ployees of the Employer.
3. No question affecting commerce exists concerning the representa-
tion of employees of the Employers within the meaning of Section
9 (c) (1) and Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
The Employers and the Intervenor, Local 404, Upholsterers Inter-
national Union, AFL, contend that an existing contract is a bar to
the instant proceeding.
The Intervenor, an amalgamated local , has been the recognized bar-
gaining representative of the Employers' production and maintenance
employees since 1946. A previous agreement had expired in December
1951. The contract urged as a bar herein states that it was executed
on the 4th day of April 1952 and will not expire before October 31,
1953. The Petitioner filed its petition on the 21st day of August 1952.
The Petitioner asserts that the existing contract is not a bar because:
(1) The contract was not signed until after the Petitioner had made
its demand for recognition upon the Employers; (2) a schism has
occurred within the Intervenor among the employees at the Em-
The names of the Employers appear as amended at the hearing.
The Petitioner 's request for oral argument is hereby denied , as the record and brief
filed on behalf of the Petitioner , in our opinion , adequately present the issues and posi-
tions of the parties.
101 NLRB No. 149.