A.J. Myers and Sons

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Mar 27, 2015

362 NLRB No. 51 (N.L.R.B. 2015)

362 NLRB No. 51
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
bound volumes of NLRB decisions. Readers are requested to notify the Ex-
ecutive Secretary, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C.
20570, of any typographical or other formal errors so that corrections can
be included in the bound volumes.
A.J. Myers and Sons, Inc. and Amalgamated Transit
Union, Local 1738, AFL–CIO, CLC. Case 06–
CA–119505
March 27, 2015
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN PEARCE AND MEMBERS MISCIMARRA
AND MCFERRAN
On October 3, 2014, Administrative Law Judge David
I. Goldman issued the attached decision. The Respond-
ent filed exceptions and a supporting brief, the General
Counsel filed an answering brief, and the Respondent
filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, A.J. Myers and Sons, Inc.,
Kittanning, Pennsylvania, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.
Dated, Washington, D.C. March 27, 2015
______________________________________
Mark Gaston Pearce, Chairman
______________________________________
Philip A. Miscimarra, Member
______________________________________
Lauren McFerran, Member
(SEAL) NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

1 Regarding the Respondent’s argument that there was insufficient
continuity in the business to render the Respondent a successor em-
ployer under NLRB v. Burns Security Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972),
Member Miscimarra agrees that the judge properly found that the in-
stant case is factually distinguishable from Nova Services Co., 213
NLRB 95 (1975); Atlantic Technical Services Corp., 202 NLRB 169
(1973), enfd. sub nom. Machinists v. NLRB, 498 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir.
1974); and Lincoln Private Police, Inc., 189 NLRB 717 (1971). How-
ever, Member Miscimarra does not adopt or rely on the judge’s com-
mentary that these cases depart from the Board’s successorship doc-
trines or should be deemed inapplicable because they were decided
prior to Fall River Dyeing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27 (1987).
Emily M. Sala, Esq. and Patricia J. Daum, Esq., for the General
Counsel.
Kenneth S. Kornacki, Esq. and John B. Bechtol, Esq. (Metz
Lewis Brodman Must O’Keefe LLC), of Pittsburgh, Penn-
sylvania, for the Respondent.
Timothy G. Hewitt, Esq., of Latrobe, Pennsylvania, for the
Charging Party.
DECISION
DAVID I. GOLDMAN, Administrative Law Judge. This case
involves an employer that provides bus transportation for sev-
eral school districts in western Pennsylvania. For the 2013–
2014 school year, the Employer was awarded a contract to pro-
vide schoolbus transportation for the Latrobe, Pennsylvania-
area school district. In previous years the Latrobe schools had
been serviced by another bus transportation employer. This
predecessor employer serviced the Latrobe school district with
union represented employees who worked at the predecessor’s
bus terminal in Latrobe. In order to service its new contract
with the Latrobe schools, the new Employer hired almost ex-
clusively from the predecessor’s union represented bargaining
unit. The new Employer purchased a terminal near the prede-
cessor’s terminal and within the school district. The employees
it hired to service the school district reported to work at this
new terminal. At the request of the school district, to the extent
possible, the employees drove the same bus routes that they had
driven for the predecessor employer.
The Government alleges that the new Employer is a succes-
sor employer with an obligation to recognize and bargain with
the Union as the representative of the bargaining unit of em-
ployees servicing the school district from the new terminal.
The new Employer rejects this claim and has refused to recog-
nize or bargain with the Union, contending that it is not a suc-
cessor employer and that the unit is not appropriate for bargain-
ing. The new Employer also claims that it was not required to
honor the Union’s bargaining demand based on its claim that
the Union originally sought recognition and bargaining for a
unit of employees larger than that alleged appropriate by the
Government, and one in which only a minority of predecessor
employees worked.
As discussed herein, I find that under existing precedent,
there can be little doubt but that the new Employer is a succes-
sor employer with an obligation to recognize and bargain with
the Union as representative of the terminal’s employees. As
further discussed herein, the precedent also compels rejection
of the Employer’s claim that the Union’s bargaining demand
was deficient. In short, I find merit in the Government’s allega-
tions in all respects.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On December 23, 2013, the Amalgamated Transit Union,
Local 1738, AFL–CIO, CLC (the Union) filed an unfair labor
practice charge alleging violations of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (the Act) by A.J. Myers and Sons, Inc. (A.J. Myers),
docketed by Region 6 of the National Labor Relations Board
(the Board) as Case 06–CA–119505. Based on an investigation
into the charge, on April 30, 2014, the Board’s General Coun-
sel, by the Acting Regional Director for Region 6 of the Board,
2 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
issued a complaint alleging that A.J. Myers violated the Act.
A.J. Myers filed an answer denying all alleged violations of the
Act.
A trial was conducted in this matter on July 23, 2014, in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Counsel for the General Counsel and
counsel for A.J. Myers filed excellent posttrial briefs in support
of their positions by August 26, 2014. On the entire record, I
make the following findings, conclusions of law, and recom-
mendations.
Jurisdiction
A.J. Myers is a corporation with its headquarters located in
Kittanning, Pennsylvania. It is engaged in furnishing school
student transportation services to school districts located in
western Pennsylvania, including the Greater Latrobe Area
School District. In conducting its operations, during the 12-
month period ending November 30, 2013, A.J. Myers derived
gross revenues in excess of $250,000 and during this same
period in conducting its operations purchased and received
goods valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points outside
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. At all material times A.J.
Myers has been an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. At all material
times the Union has been a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Based on the foregoing, I find that this dispute affects com-
merce and that the Board has jurisdiction of this case, pursuant
to Section 10(a) of the Act.
Unfair Labor Practices
Respondent A.J. Myers is in the business of contracting with
school districts for transportation of students to and from school
and for other school-related events. The Company currently
operates a total of approximately 500 buses from six terminals,
and serves a number of school districts in the Greater Pitts-
burgh region of Pennsylvania. According to counsel’s repre-
sentation, this Employer has had no collective-bargaining histo-
ry with any union in the 65-year history of the Company.
In or about November 2012, the Latrobe school district noti-
fied A.J. Myers that it was the successful bidder for and was
being awarded the contract to provide student transportation
beginning with the 2013–2014 school year. Effective on or
about July 1, 2013, A.J. Myers entered into a 7-year contract
with the Latrobe schools to provide student transportation ser-
vices through 2020. This contract was for regular schoolbus
service transporting children from home to school and back. It
did not include special needs services or services for parochial
schools.
For a number of previous school years, transportation for the
Latrobe school district was provided by First Student Inc. (First
Student). The record suggests that First Student’s contract also
included special needs and parochial school services for the
Latrobe district.
First Student operated a terminal located on Route 981 in
Latrobe, from which it serviced the Latrobe school district.
Pursuant to a representation election and Board certification,
the Union (and/or its predecessor) has represented employees
working at the Route 981 terminal since 1996, originally for an
employer (or perhaps two) that preceded First Student. The
Union and First Student were parties to a collective-bargaining
agreement—in effect from August 15, 2010, to August 14,
2013—covering the terms and conditions of employees work-
ing at the Route 981 facility, as well as a yard located in
Greensburg, Pennsylvania, and a “small park” in the Jeanette,
Pennsylvania area.1
During the time that First Student maintained the contract to
provide transportation services for the Latrobe school district,
the employees providing this transportation worked from First
Student’s Route 981 facility.2
The record is not specific, but approximately 150 employees
worked under the First Student labor agreement covering the
Route 981 facility and the associated Greensburg yard and
Jeanette park. By way of comparison, the Jeanette park had
approximately eight buses. The Route 981 facility had approx-
imately 100 buses.
At the request of the Latrobe school district, near the end of
the 2012–2013 school year, A.J. Myers provided job applica-
tions to the school district which provided them to the First
Student drivers transporting the district’s students. That sum-
mer A.J. Myers received those applications back from prospec-
tive drivers and conducted interviews. Approximately “70-
plus” First Student employees left First Student—
approximately 51 were hired by A.J. Myers and the remainder,
quit or retired, or otherwise moved on.
There was no interruption in school transportation services
provided to the Latrobe schools between the time that it was
serviced by First Student and July 1, 2013, when A.J. Myers
entered into the contract and commenced provision of services
to the school district.
As of about August 19, 2013, A.J. Myers had hired nearly all
of the employees that it would need to service its contract with
the Latrobe School District, including supervisors, bus opera-
tors and mechanics. Of the approximately 52 operators hired to
service its contact with the Latrobe schools, all but 1 had
worked as a bargaining unit driver for First Student at the Route
981 terminal during the previous school year. Six additional
drivers were hired in fall 2013 and winter 2014. Five had pre-
viously worked for First Student at the Route 981 terminal. In
addition to the drivers, two mechanics have been employed
since at least November 2013. There is also office staff per-

1 The union recognized bargaining unit set forth in the labor agree-
ment was as follows:
All full-time, and Regular part-time bus Employees, Spare bus Em-
ployees, Van Employees, Utility Worker, and Monitors, employed by
the Employer at its Latrobe facility, 5947 Route 981, Latrobe, Penn-
sylvania, 15650, and all other facilities under the direction of or re-
placement of the Latrobe facility; excluding mechanics, dispatchers,
laborers, office clerical employees, guards, professional employees,
supervisors as defined in the act, for the purpose of Collective Bar-
gaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and all
other conditions of employment and agrees to deal with it as hereinaf-
ter provided.
2 In addition, employees working under this labor agreement provid-
ed transportation for the Greensburg Salem school district, the Jean-
nette City school district, Seton Hill University, an area Catholic
school, as well as servicing approximately five to eight special needs
contracts that First Student maintained.
3
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
forming general office work and work related to bus dispatch-
ing.
All of these employees work out of a terminal on property
A.J. Myers purchased for its new Latrobe school contract, at
163 Menasha Lane, Latrobe, Pennsylvania, in 2013. This new
A.J. Myers terminal is approximately 2.6 miles from the First
Student Route 981 terminal. A.J. Myers purchased buses for
the new terminal through a schoolbus dealer that it works with
and began receiving the buses in June 2013. The buses were a
different make than the First Student buses.
As of the time of the hearing, A.J. Myers maintained six bus
terminals. It is standard business practice for A.J. Myers to
open a new terminal when it secures a new school contract, as it
did in the case of the Latrobe school district contract. At the
hearing, William Myers, A.J. Myers’ part-owner and secretary-
treasurer, agreed that one of the reasons for the separate termi-
nals is to maintain a location close to the school district for
which service is provided. Each of the facilities maintains
busdrivers and mechanics who report to that terminal. Each
terminal maintains its own buses and other equipment. Each
terminal has its own terminal manager and assistant manager,
or administrative assistant.
With the exception of the Latrobe terminal, A.J. Myers has
operated these terminals for many years. As the brochure from
the company website introduced into evidence demonstrates,
each terminal is dedicated to servicing a different school district
with which A.J. Myers has a transportation contract. As set
forth on its website, on a page reproduced and entered into the
record, A.J. Myers maintains the following schoolbus termi-
nals, each generally dedicated to the servicing of a school dis-
trict for which A.J. Myers transports students. (The year A.J.
Myers began operating each terminal is also listed below.):
Kittanning Terminal (servicing Armstrong School District) in
Kittanning, Pa., Armstrong County. (1950).
Export Terminal (servicing Franklin Regional School Dis-
trict) in Export, Pa., Westmoreland County. (1983).
Mars Terminal (servicing Mars Area School District) in Va-
lencia Pa., Butler County. (1984).
Harmony/Zelienople Terminal (servicing Seneca Valley
School District), in Harmony, Pa., Butler County. (1991).
Turtle Creek Terminal (servicing Woodland Hills School Dis-
trict) in Turtle Creek, Pa., Allegheny County. (1995 or 1997).
Latrobe Terminal (servicing the Greater Latrobe School Dis-
trict) in Latrobe, Pa., Westmoreland County. (August 2013).
As stated, the Company’s website lists each terminal and the
school district with which it is affiliated, and for each terminal,
lists the names, telephone and fax numbers, and addresses of
the manager and assistant manager/administrative assistant at
each location.
In terms of approximate driving distances from the Latrobe
terminal: the Mars terminal is 51 miles; the Harmo-
ny/Zelienople terminal is 64 miles; the Turtle Creek terminal is
33 miles; the Export terminal is 17 miles. The record evidence
shows that the Kittanning terminal is a 45-minute to 1 hour
drive from the Latrobe terminal.
The A.J. Myers Latrobe terminal consists of two garages, a
bathroom, a driver’s room, offices, a van shop, and a wash bay.
The First Student terminal had similar facilities. The Latrobe
terminal manager is Tom Oleyar. Oleyar, who worked as the
main dispatcher for First Student at the Route 981 facility, is
responsible for overseeing day-to-day operations at the Latrobe
terminal. Michelle Murphy is the assistant manager. She
worked as a driver and trainer at First Student’s Latrobe facili-
ty. Oleyar and Murphy serve as dispatchers, and occasionally a
driver named Diane Poche assists them in the office. For the
Latrobe employees, there is no opportunity to choose regular
runs out of other A.J. Myers’ terminals other than the Latrobe
facility. As with First Student, in addition to the employee’s
regular runs, employees can pick up additional “charter” work
for the Latrobe school district—transporting students to sport-
ing events, or band events. This charter work is voluntarily,
and employees can choose it in order of seniority, each week.
Charter work from other A.J. Myers’ terminals is generally not
available to the Latrobe employees.
As is typical, the Latrobe school district supplies the routes
needed for the work to A.J. Myers. In addition, the Latrobe
school district transportation director asked the A.J. Myers
Latrobe terminal manager to keep drivers on the previous
routes to “make the transition smoother.” A.J. Myers con-
curred in this request. An A.J. Myers employee working at the
new Latrobe terminal testified that the routes under A.J. Myers
for the Latrobe school district are “similar” to what they were
the year before under First Student.
A.J. Myers and the drivers driving the Latrobe school district
are required to take steps to insure that the drivers’ regular daily
routes for the school district are not impinged upon by other
work opportunities. The contract between the Latrobe schools
and A.J. Myers requires that drivers not accept charter routes
unrelated to the Latrobe school district if it will interfere with
their regular daily routes. In addition, based on its contract
with the school district, A.J. Myers is required to enforce the
school district’s policies, such as its no smoking policy on or
around schoolbuses at anytime. The terminal manager is the
primary person charged by A.J. Myers with ensuring compli-
ance with these district requirements.
A.J. Myers’ central office is maintained at its Kittanning lo-
cation. In his testimony, Secretary-Treasurer William Myers
stressed that “[i]t’s all one company, and everything comes
from the terminals to the central office at Kittanning.” Budget-
ing is centralized at Kittanning, and bills, including insurance
are paid there for all the terminals. However, records are main-
tained distinguishing the expenses for each terminal. While
William Myers stressed in his testimony that company policies,
including personnel policies, emanate from the central office in
Kittanning, and that the terminals “work as a team,” he also
testified that “[t]he terminal managers are given a lot of lati-
tude.” He testified that the terminal managers are expected to
communicate among themselves to make sure all required ser-
vices are provided to customers. Myers testified that terminals
are “told from the very get-go . . . if you need extra help for any
4 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
given day or if you’re short on drivers, you are to work within
the other terminals.” Payroll work is done by each terminal and
then turned into a payroll service for completion. Purchasing
necessary to maintain the fleet is done by the individual termi-
nal, but overseen by the main office in Kittanning. Prospective
employees submit applications at the terminal at which they
seek to work, not at the Kittanning main office. When the
Latrobe terminal began operations, the drivers hired by A.J.
Myers at the Latrobe terminal were working, generally, under
the same terms and conditions that A.J. Myers applied to its
drivers in its other terminals. However, drivers are paid differ-
ently based on the terminal at which they work:
Latrobe—$70 for up to 5.5 hours (a morning and afternoon
run, or $35 if the driver makes only a morning or an afternoon
run).
Franklin Regional—$68 for up to 5 hours (a morning and af-
ternoon run, or $34 if the driver makes only a morning or an
afternoon run).
Woodland Hills—$15/hour (no daily rate) (4–5 hours in a
typical day).
Mars—$59.50 for up to 5 hours (a morning and afternoon
run, or $29.75 if the driver Makes only a morning or an after-
noon run).
Seneca Valley—$59.50 for up to 5 hours (a morning and af-
ternoon run, or $29.75 if the driver makes only a morning or
an afternoon run).
Kittanning—$58 for up to 5 hours (a morning and afternoon
run, or $29 if the driver makes only a morning or an afternoon
run).
At the hearing, A.J. Myers went to some lengths to document
the instances where a driver assigned to one terminal performed
work typically carried out by another terminal. However, in all,
the evidence shows that during the 2013/2014 school year there
were approximately 30 instances (i.e., days) of Latrobe termi-
nal-stationed drivers making a trip that would normally be the
responsibility of another location. Approxi-mately 20 of those
30, involved 2 employees stationed at the Latrobe terminal who
were concurrently employed by both the Respondent and My-
ers Coach Line, the separate but commonly owned coach line
operated by the Myers family. Both appear to have been em-
ployees of Myers Coach Line before and at the time they were
employed by A.J. Myers. The 20 runs at issue that they made
from the Latrobe terminal were for Myers Coach Line, so it is
unproven how that translates into employee interchange outside
of normal assignments. In addition, in approximately 12 in-
stances, a driver from a terminal other than Latrobe—in 10 of
the instances it was an employee from Turtle Creek—
performed a run usually the responsibility of a Latrobe terminal
employee. There was also a field trip on May 29 to the John-
stown Flood Museum in which two drivers from the Franklin
terminal transported Latrobe school students.
This is out of a total of 52 drivers of the Latrobe terminal
working approximately 177 schooldays for the year. That
equals to over 9000 day trips a year. Accordingly, out of over
9000 trips, approximately 12 were performed by non-Latrobe
based employees of A.J. Myers. As a percentage, between 0.1
and 0.2 percent of the work performed for the Latrobe-school
system was performed by A.J. Myers employees stationed other
than at the Latrobe terminal. Even including the 20 trips made
for Myers Coach Line by the two employees concurrently em-
ployed by Myers Coach Line and the Respondent, the 30 trips
made through the school year by Latrobe terminal-stationed
employees on behalf of other terminals (or entities, i.e., Myers
Coach Line) equal approximately 0.3 percent of the Latrobe
terminal’s workload.
Drivers are paid by their home terminal at home terminal
rates, even if they make a run for another terminal.
The Union’s Demands for Recognition and Bargaining
On or about October 25, 2013, David Merrill, then acting
president and business agent for the Union, sent two certified
letters to A.J. Myers directed to A.J. Myers’ president, David
Myers. One letter was sent to the new Latrobe Menasha Lane
location and the other to A.J. Myers’ Export, Pennsylvania
terminal. Merrill testified that the letters were “restricted let-
ters” that could only be signed for by David Myers. For rea-
sons unexplained in the record, neither letter was signed for and
they were returned unopened to the sender approximately 3
weeks later.
Merrill tried again, mailing the same letter by regular first
class mail to A.J. Myers at its Menasha Lane location on or
about November 25, 2013. This letter was sent from Merrill on
union letterhead with a post office box address but no phone
number on the envelope. This November 25, 2013 letter from
Merrill, and addressed to David Myers at A.J. Myers, congratu-
lated Myers on
winning the contract to operate the transit system of Latrobe
Area School District, Westmoreland County Pennsylvania.
[The Union] has represented Latrobe School Bus Operators
since 1999, and our members look forward to many more
years of dedicated service to Latrobe, PA riding public.
[The Union] entered into successive agreements with First
Student, Inc., Latrobe, PA. A majority of A.J. Myers and
Sons Transportation compl[e]ment of Latrobe Area School
District Westmoreland County, PA were formerly employed
as operators, park outs and monitors by First Student. A.J.
Myers and Sons is therefore obligated to recognize [the Un-
ion] as the bus operators, part outs and monitors collective
bargaining representative, and bargain with [the Union] in
good faith. By this letter Local 1738 demands that A.J Myers
and Sons recognize [the Union] as the collective-bargaining
representative of all full-time and regular part-time bus opera-
tors, park outs and monitors providing transit services in and
about Westmoreland, Pennsylvania who are employed by A.J.
Myers and Sons Transportation, and further demands that A.J.
Myers and Sons provide dates which they and the union can
meet to engage in· collective bargaining over employees’
wages, hours, and terms and condition of employment.
The members at A.J. Myers and Sons Transportation and I
look forward to working with you in the course of collative
bargaining. Please contact me within seven days so that we
can make the arrangements necessary to begin bargaining.
5
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
The Union received no response to this letter. William My-
ers testified that the Employer received this letter. According
to Myers, “[w]e determined that we do not fall under those
charges by the Union, and we felt especially that [‘]in and
about Westmoreland[’] County did not apply here, so I tried to
call their local office to talk to them and tell them what our
position was on it.”3
Rather than responding in writing to the Union, Myers testi-
fied that he found a phone number for the Union on the internet
and called three or four times a day for 2 or 3 days but it “just
kept ringing and ringing.” After that Myers said he stopped
calling, and abandoned the effort to respond to the Union’s
letter or to otherwise “talk to them and tell them what our posi-
tion was.” Neither Myers nor anyone else from A.J. Myers
contacted the Union.
On December 23, 2013, the Union filed its unfair labor prac-
tice charge against A.J. Myers alleging that the Employer un-
lawfully failed to recognize and bargain with the Union. The
charge was directed to the Employer at its Latrobe terminal
address, listing the location of the dispute as Latrobe, and esti-
mating 60 workers at the location. A copy of this charge was
served the same day on the Employer. The charge contained
the Union’s phone number and address. The Employer did not
attempt to contact the Union in response to this charge.
On April 13, 2014, Merrill sent letters to A.J. Myers similar
to the ones sent to A.J. Myers in November 2013, but with a
change—these letters described the applicable bargaining unit
as covering employees employed at 163 Menasha Lane. The
letters stated:
Congratulations on winning the contract to operate the transit
system of Latrobe Area School District, Westmoreland Coun-
ty, Pennsylvania. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1738
has represented Latrobe School Bus Operators since 1999,
and our members look forward to many more years of dedi-
cated service to The Latrobe School District.
Local 1738 entered into successive agreements with First
Student, Inc, Latrobe, PA. A majority of A.J. Myers and Sons
Transportation compl[e]ment of Latrobe Area School District
Westmoreland County, PA were formerly employed as opera-
tors, park outs and monitors by First Student. A.J. Myers and
Sons is therefore obligated to recognize Local1733 as the bus
operators, part outs and monitors collective-bargaining repre-
sentative, and bargain with Local 1738 in good faith. By this
letter, Local 1738 requests that A.J Myers and Sons recognize
Local 1738 as the collective-bargaining representative of all
full-time and regular part-time bus operators, park outs and
monitors who are employed by A.J. Myers and Sons Trans-
portation at 163 Menasha Lane, Latrobe, PA 15650, and fur-
ther requests that A.J. Myers and Sons provide dates which

3 Myers’ statement that “‘in and about Westmoreland’ County did
not apply here” is a reference to an argument, advanced by the Re-
spondent on brief, that the letter’s demand for recognition “in and about
Westmoreland, Pennsylvania,” constituted an invalid request for recog-
nition in a unit composed of not only the Latrobe terminal, but also the
Export terminal, a facility devoted to servicing the Franklin Regional
School District. This argument is discussed at length below.
they and the union can meet to engage in collective bargain-
ing over employees’ wages, hours, and terms and condition of
employment.
The members at A.J. Myers and Sons Transportation and I
look forward to working with you in the course of collative
bargaining. Please contact me within seven days so that we
can make the arrangements necessary to begin bargaining. I
can be reached by telephone at [xxx-xxx]-4738, email at
[xxx]@yahoo.com, or at Local 1738, PO Box 128, Latrobe,
PA 15650.
This time A.J. Myers responded to the Union. In a letter dat-
ed April 25, 2013, William Myers wrote:
A.J. Myers and Sons received your April 13, 2014, let-
ter in which Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1738
(“ATU Local 1738”) claimed it represented “Latrobe
School Bus Operators” who drive for contractors that ser-
vice the busing operations of the Latrobe Area School Dis-
trict (the “School District”). Now that A.J. Myers has se-
cured the School District’s busing contract, ATU Local
1738 requested that A.J. Myers recognize it as the collec-
tive-bargaining representative for all bus operators, park
outs, and monitors that A.J. Myers employs at its Latrobe
location. A.J. Myers respectfully denies your request.
A.J Myers employs over 470 drivers, all of whom
share a community of interests such that it is improper to
treat drivers at each individual A.J. Myers location as a
separate bargaining unit. Because ATU Local 1738 does
not represent a majority of A.J. Myers bus operators’ park
outs and monitors, A.J. Myers is not obliged to bargain
with the union. On November 30, 2013, ATU Local 1738
made a similar request on A.J. Myers to recognize it as the
collective bargaining agent for all A.J. Myers bus opera-
tors, park outs, and monitors “in and about Westmoreland
Pennsylvania.” A.J. Myers denied that request on the
same grounds, and the circumstances have not changed.
The Union did not have further correspondence or contact
with A.J. Myers. A.J. Myers continues to refuse to recognize
the Union as the exclusive collective-bargaining representative
of its Latrobe terminal employees.
Analysis
The complaint alleges that the Respondent’s refusal and fail-
ure to recognize and bargain with the Union violates Section
8(a)(5), and, derivatively, Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.4
Specifically, the General contends that A.J. Myers is a suc-
cessor employer to First Student with an obligation under the
Act to recognize and bargain with the Union as the collective-
bargaining representative of the bargaining unit of its drivers
and monitors working at the Latrobe terminal. The Respondent
rejects these claims, contending that it is not a successor em-
ployer and that the A.J. Myers’ Latrobe terminal employees do

4 An employer’s violation of Sec. 8(a)(5) of the Act is also a deriva-
tive violation of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act. Tennessee Coach Co., 115
NLRB 677, 679 (1956), enfd. 237 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1956). See ABF
Freight System, 325 NLRB 546 fn. 3 (1998).
6 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not constitute an appropriate unit for bargaining. In addition,
the Respondent claims that it does not have to recognize the
Union on grounds that the Union’s demand for bargaining was
for a unit that encompassed its Latrobe and Export facilities, a
multisite unit in which the Union cannot claim majority sup-
port.
I. SUCCESSORSHIP
A. Background
The Board’s successorship doctrine is rooted in the Act’s
policy emphasis on industrial peace and stability and the ac-
ceptance of a presumption of a union’s majority support as a
means to vindicate this policy. As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained, “[t]he object of the National Labor Relations Act is
industrial peace and stability, fostered by collective-bargaining
agreements providing for the orderly resolution of labor dis-
putes between workers and employers.” Auciello Iron Works,
Inc. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 781, 785 (1996). “To such ends, the
Board has adopted various presumptions about the existence of
majority support for a union within a bargaining unit, the pre-
condition for service as its exclusive representative.” Id. at
785–786. As the Board explained in Levitz Furniture Co. of the
Pacific, 333 NLRB 717, 720 (2001):
Absent specific statutory direction, the Board has been guided
by the Act’s clear mandate to give effect to employees’ free
choice of bargaining representatives. The Board has also rec-
ognized that, for employees’ choices to be meaningful, collec-
tive-bargaining relationships must be given a chance to bear
fruit and so must not be subject to constant challenges. There-
fore from the earliest days of the Act, the Board has sought to
foster industrial peace and stability in collective-bargaining
relationships, as well as employee free choice, by presuming
that an incumbent union retains its majority status.
In Fall River Dyeing Corp., 482 U.S. 27 (1987), the Supreme
Court considered the union’s rebuttable presumption of majori-
ty support where there has been a change in employer. The
Court held that a union’s rebuttable presumption of majority
support “continues despite the change in employers. And the
new employer has an obligation to bargain with that union so
long as the new employer is in fact a successor of the old em-
ployer and the majority of its employees were employed by its
predecessor.” 482 U.S. at 41 (1972); NLRB v. Burns Security
Services, 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
In Fall River Dyeing, the Supreme Court recognized that the
rationale for the presumption of an incumbent union’s majority
support is not only in effect but “particularly pertinent in the
successorship situation”:
During a transition between employers, a union is in a peculi-
arly vulnerable position. It has no formal and established bar-
gaining relationship with the new employer, is uncertain
about the new employer’s plans, and cannot be sure if or
when the new employer must bargain with it. While being
concerned with the future of its members with the new em-
ployer, the union also must protect whatever rights still exist
for its members under the collective-bargaining agreement
with the predecessor employer. Accordingly, during this un-
settling transition period, the union needs the presumptions of
majority status to which it is entitled to safeguard its mem-
bers’ rights and to develop a relationship with the successor.
The position of the employees also supports the application of
the presumptions in the successorship situation. If the em-
ployees find themselves in a new enterprise that substantially
resembles the old, but without their chosen bargaining repre-
sentative, they may well feel that their choice of a union is
subject to the vagaries of an enterprise’s transformation. This
feeling is not conducive to industrial peace. In addition, after
being hired by a new company following a layoff from the
old, employees initially will be concerned primarily with
maintaining their new jobs. In fact, they might be inclined to
shun support for their former union, especially if they believe
that such support will jeopardize their jobs with the successor
or if they are inclined to blame the union for their layoff and
problems associated with it. Without the presumptions of ma-
jority support and with the wide variety of corporate trans-
formations possible, an employer could use a successor enter-
prise as a way of getting rid of a labor contract and of exploit-
ing the employees’ hesitant attitude towards the union to elim-
inate its continuing presence.
Fall River, supra at 41 (footnote omitted).
In addition to recognizing the importance of the presumption
of a union’s majority support during this transition period, the
Supreme Court also stressed that the Act’s successorship doc-
trine “safeguard[s] the rightful prerogative of owners inde-
pendently to rearrange their businesses.” Fall River, supra at
40 (internal quotations omitted). As the Court explained, refer-
encing its seminal successorship decision in NLRB v. Burns,
supra, “the successor is under no obligation to hire the employ-
ees of its predecessor, subject, of course, to the restriction that
it not discriminate against union employees in hiring.” The
result is that
to a substantial extent the applicability of Burns rests in the
hands of the successor. If the new employer makes a con-
scious decision to maintain generally the same business and to
hire a majority of its employees from the predecessor, then the
bargaining obligation of § 8(a)(5) is activated. This makes
sense when one considers that the employer intends to take
advantage of the trained work force of its predecessor.
Fall River, 482 U.S. at 40–41 (court’s emphasis; footnote and
citations omitted).
Accordingly, the Respondent’s bargaining obligation turns
on whether a majority of its employees in an appropriate bar-
gaining unit were employed by the predecessor, and if there
exists substantial continuity between the enterprises. Specialty
Hospital of Washington-Hadley, LLC, 357 NLRB No. 77, slip
op. at 2 (2011); Van Lear Equipment, 336 NLRB 1059, 1063
(2001).
B. Substantial Continuity
In this case, there is no dispute, and the Respondent con-
cedes (R. Br. at 12 fn. 11), as it must, that a majority—virtually
the entirety—of the unit alleged appropriate in the complaint
7
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
was composed, at all relevant times, of former First Student
employees from the First Student Latrobe terminal.
Turning to substantial continuity, with regard to that factor
“the focus is on whether there is a ‘substantial continuity’ be-
tween the enterprises.” Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43.
Under this approach, the Board examines a number of factors:
whether the business of both employers is essentially the
same; whether the employees of the new company are doing
the same jobs in the same working conditions under the same
supervisors; and whether the new entity has the same produc-
tion process, produces the same products, and basically has
the same body of customers. [Id.]
Most importantly, the question of the substantial continuity
of the enterprises is to be analyzed primarily from the “employ-
ees’ perspective.” Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43. In its analysis,
the Board is mindful of whether “those employees who have
been retained will understandably view their job situations as
essentially unaltered.” Id. (internal quotation omitted); Ver-
mont Foundry Co., 292 NLRB 1003, 1008 (1989) (calling this
“the core question”); Derby Refining Co., 292 NLRB 1015
(1989), enfd. 915 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1990).
In the case at hand, basic and important similarities between
the two enterprises are not in dispute and compel a finding of
A.J. Myers’ successor status.
Thus, the Respondent and the predecessor operate the same
general business: bus driving. “While there are some differ-
ences in the way [the successor] operates . . . it is self evident
that both are involved in the same employing industry and that
the employees essentially do the same work. They drive school
buses.” Montauk Bus Co., 324 NLRB 1128, 1134–1135 (1997)
(finding successorship).
The employees possess the same licensing requirements as
they did for First Student. And more specifically, the unit in
question transports the same body of students for the same
customer—the Latrobe school district’s students—as did the
unit operated by the predecessor First Student. In many cases,
pursuant to the school district’s request, the A.J. Myers Latrobe
terminal drivers are driving the same routes and therefore, the
same individual students as they did when they drove for First
Student. By all evidence, the employees are doing the same
job, in the same manner, as before, without any hiatus in opera-
tions (beyond the normal summer break), only now their em-
ployer is A.J. Myers instead of First Student. They drive
school buses both to and from school for the Latrobe school
district from a terminal located in the school district and only a
few miles from the First Student terminal at which they previ-
ously worked. As before they have an opportunity to do extra
charter work, but it is limited to charter work assignments for
the Latrobe school district—the employees do not have access
to charter work available to the Respondent’s employees work-
ing from other terminals.
It is true that they drive a different model of bus, but this has
not been shown to be of significance to their work or represen-
tational desires. See Van Lear Equipment, Inc., 336 NLRB at
1064 (not significant that “under the Respondent, the drivers
are driving newer buses than before” and parking them in a
different part of the parking lot—more important is that “[t]he
bus drivers follow the same ‘production processes’ and serve
the same body of customers in that the drivers continue to drive
daily routes taking school children to and from the same . . .
schools”).
It is true that the Latrobe employees work out of a terminal
located 2.6 miles from their old First Student terminal. But this
too does not amount to a change likely to affect their work life
or the presumption of majority support: “if the succeeding
company takes over the operations of the terminal, continues to
operate in a similar fashion with a complement consisting of a
majority of the predecessor’s employees, then a mere relocation
of the facility (either before or after the takeover), would not
undermine the successorship obligation because there would
continue to be a presumption that the Union continues to repre-
sent a majority of the work force in the relocated unit.” Mon-
tauk Bus Co., supra at 1135 (finding successorship where suc-
cessor schoolbus serviced the predecessor’s school contract
with drivers from a different terminal located 4 miles from the
predecessor’s terminal).
The supervision has changed, somewhat—the main dis-
patcher for the First Student unit is now the terminal manager.
A driver/trainer for First Student is now the assistant terminal
manager. But while these familiar faces have new authority
and roles, they also held leadership positions at First Student.
Van Lear Equipment, 336 NLRB at 1064 (“While [the succes-
sor’s employees] do not have the same supervisor, a former
fellow . . . bus driver, . . . has become their supervisor as the
Respondent’s . . . district supervisor.”).
It is hard to see how, from the “employees’ perspective”
(Fall River, supra) A.J. Myers can be anything but a successor.
From the employees’ perspective, there was no change in the
scale of the operation or their job situations that would support
the belief “that their views on union representation had
changed.” Bronx Health Plan, 326 NLRB 810, 812 fn. 8
(1998) (explaining that this is the chief issue in determining
“substantial continuity”), enfd. 203 F.3d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
In opposition to a finding of successorship, the Respondent
stresses that it did not assume the entirety of the work of the
First Student bargaining unit, which, in addition to the Latrobe
school district, serviced some other schools and was part of a
bargaining unit that had auxiliary locations.
The claim miscomprehends the essence of successorship,
which is not premised on an identical re-creation of the prede-
cessor’s customers and business, but rather, on the new em-
ployer’s “conscious decision to maintain generally the same
business and to hire a majority of its employees from the prede-
cessor” in order “to take advantage of the trained work force of
its predecessor.” Fall River Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 41.
Contrary to the assertions of the Respondent, the Board has
repeatedly held that the operation of just a portion of a prede-
cessor’s business is consistent with successorship—as long as
the new unit is an appropriate one (discussed below). Van Lear
Equipment, Inc., 336 NLRB at 1064 (“Additionally, even
though the Respondent did not take over all the operations and
functions of the prior PVSD bargaining unit—the custodians,
maintenance workers, and secretaries remained with PVSD—a
finding of successorship is not precluded. Indeed, the Board
8 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
has frequently found substantial continuity where the successor
employer has taken over only a discrete portion of the prede-
cessor’s heterogeneous bargaining unit.”); Bronx Health Plan,
326 NLRB at 812 (“It is well established that the bargaining
obligations attendant to a finding of successorship are not de-
feated by the mere fact that only a portion of a former union-
represented operation is subject to a sale or transfer to a new
owner so long as the unit employees in the conveyed portion
constitute a separate appropriate unit and comprise a majority
of the unit under the new operation.”); Simon DeBartelo Group,
325 NLRB 1154, 1155 (1998) “([A] change in scale of opera-
tion must be extreme before it will alter a finding of
successorship”) (internal quotations omitted), enfd. 241 F.3d
207 (2d Cir. 2001); Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 222
NLRB 1052, 1054 fn. 13 (1976) (“The successor unit, . . . alt-
hough a division of the multischool unit existing under [the
predecessor], is also appropriate since it may be an inde-
pendently appropriate unit”), enfd. in relevant part 549 F.3d
873, 876 (2d Cir. 1977).
The fact that the First Student unit was a larger unit and
somewhat more diverse in its customer base than the A.J. My-
ers Latrobe unit does not advance the Respondent’s case
against successorship. See NLRB v. Simon DeBartelo Group,
241 F.3d 207, 213 (2d Cir. 2001) (“The Board’s holding here is
consistent with a long line of Board decisions finding substan-
tial continuity when the successor employer has taken over only
a discrete portion of its predecessor’s heterogeneous bargaining
unit.”); Bronx Health Plan, supra (substantial continuity found
where successor hired 16 of 3500 of the predecessor’s employ-
ees (0.5 percent) in just a few of the predecessor’s hundreds of
job classifications).
Notably, the instant quintessential successorship situation
here easily can be distinguished from the only cases relied upon
by the Respondent in its brief: Atlantic Technical Services
Corp., 202 NLRB 169 (1973), enfd. 498 F.2d 680 (D.C. Cir.
1974); Nova Services Co., 213 NLRB 95 (1974); and Lincoln
Private Police, Inc., 189 NLRB 717 (1971).
In fairness, these three cases should be overruled by the
Board. It has been many years since these cases accurately
represented Board policy on successorship. They stand as mis-
leading outliers—repeatedly questioned, distinguished or ig-
nored, and out of line with longstanding Board successorship
doctrines. These cases, from the dawn of the Board’s
successorship doctrine, were issued long before Fall River Dye-
ing ushered in the modern era of successorship precedent
stressing that the question of substantial continuity of the em-
ploying enterprise is analyzed primarily from the “employees’
perspective” and mindful of whether “those employees who
have been retained will understandably view their job situations
as essentially unaltered.’” Fall River, 482 U.S. at 43 (internal
quotations omitted). And indeed, without formally being over-
ruled, the vitality of two of these cases (Atlantic Technical Ser-
vices, supra, and Nova Services, supra) has been explicitly
questioned. See Simon DeBartelo, 241 F.3d at 213 fn. 10.5 The

5 As the court pointed out in Simon DeBartelo Group, supra:
In view of this authority, we find unpersuasive respondent’s reliance
on two other Board decisions, both over twenty-five years old, declin-
third (Lincoln Private Police, Inc., supra) was, tellingly, cited
by the dissent in both Burns, 406 U.S. at 307, and Fall River
Dyeing, 482 U.S. at 57, and thereafter ignored—the case has
not been cited in any published Board decision since 1991.
However, without regard to these cases’ vitality, they are dis-
tinguishable from the situation at bar here.
Thus, in Atlantic Technical Services Corp. (ATS), 202 NLRB
169 (1973), the Board found that “under the peculiar circum-
stances here presented,” a small contractor employer that as-
sumed the mail and distribution services for the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) from TWA airlines was not a successor employ-
er. In reaching its conclusion, the Board determined that there
had been a substantial change in the nature of the employing
industry in large part because the putative successor employed
a unit of employees that amounted to less than 4 percent of the
unit employed by TWA at the KSC. Moreover, in ATS, the
Board also relied on the fact that “TWA was a large company
engaged primarily in transportation,” and “regulated under the
Railway Labor Act . . . [with] contracts throughout the country.
In contrast, Respondent is a small organization, just recently
organized for the purpose of performing small technical support
service contracts, whose only contract, as of the time of the
hearing in this case, was that involved herein. There is obvious-
ly a substantial difference between the employer-employee
relationship in a large corporation and that characteristic of a
small operation such as Respondent’s.” 202 NLRB at 170.
Finally, the Board in ATS questioned the validity of the pre-
sumption of majority support in that case because the portion of
the former unit assumed by the new employer “was originally
accreted to the larger unit” of the predecessor. Id.
None of these factors that the Board relied upon to defeat the
claim of successorship are at play here. Thus, the proposed
A.J. Myers unit represents a significant portion of the First
Student unit—far beyond the 4 percent found in ATS—as the
Latrobe School District that the A.J. Myers unit services repre-
sented the major client for the First Student bargaining unit.
There is no history of accretion in the predecessor unit—rather,
the First Student unit was the product of a Board election and
Board certification. See Bronx Health Plan, supra at 813, dis-
tinguishing ATS on these grounds. More generally, A.J. Myers
is in the same employing industry as First Student: i.e., student
bus transportation. Nothing has changed in that regard. There
is no change in legal regime, and no change from a large na-
tional transportation employer to a small one-contract technical
support service employer as in ATS.

ing to find successorship in circumstances that were, in some respects,
similar to those present here. See Nova Servs. Co., 213 NLRB 95
(1974); Atlantic Technical Servs. Corp., 202 NLRB 169 (1973), enfd.
498 F.2d. 680 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Board has both persuasively ex-
plained why those cases are factually distinguishable and pointed out
their doubtful precedential value in light of its own subsequent deci-
sions. See, e.g., Lincoln Park Zoological Soc’y., 322 NLRB 265 (dis-
tinguishing Nova Services and noting that it “is of questionable prece-
dential value since it has been limited to its own facts [by Hydrolines,
Inc., 305 NLRB 416, 423, n 43 (1991)],” and also distinguishing At-
lantic Technical Services); Louis Pappas’ Homosassa Springs Restau-
rant, 275 NLRB [1519,] 1526 [(1985)] distinguishing Atlantic Tech-
nical Services).
9
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
Similarly, Nova Services, 213 NLRB 95 (1974), is easily dis-
tinguishable. That case involved a situation where the new
employer assumed the cleaning services for a few banks in the
Worcester, Massachusetts area, work which had previously
been performed as a part of the predecessor’s statewide janito-
rial bargaining unit. As in ATS, supra, the enormous disparity
between the predecessor’s statewide bargaining unit and the
new employer’s proposed local bargaining unit led the Board to
conclude that substantial continuity in the employing enterprise
had not been demonstrated. 213 NLRB at 97. Unlike the situa-
tion in Nova Services, in the instant case, a substantial portion
of First Student’s Latrobe-confined bargaining unit was as-
sumed by the Respondent which commenced operation of its
own Latrobe terminal as a result of the assumption of the
Latrobe school district work.
Finally, the Respondent relies on Lincoln Private Police,
Inc., supra, 189 NLRB 717. However that case is also readily
distinguishable. The animating factor in the Board’s decision
was the radical difference in the scope of the bargaining unit
between old and new employer which led the Board to con-
clude that there was not substantial continuity in the employing
enterprise. In Lincoln Private Police, the predecessor’s em-
ploying enterprise operated with a union certified as the em-
ployees’ representative at numerous locations throughout the
San Juan metropolitan area. This employing entity was carved
up—acquired by a number of guard service companies includ-
ing the putative successor—and thus, in Lincoln, unlike here
“the employing industry in this case has thus been materially
fragmented and, in effect, split asunder.” 189 NLRB at 720.
Here, First Student’s Latrobe-based bargaining unit was a dis-
tinct unit, and part of a larger employer that maintained other
facilities. The same is true of A.J. Myers’ Latrobe unit. It is a
distinct grouping of employees, and part of a larger employer.
Both units work as school bus drivers—the only distinction is
that the A.J. Myers unit, to date, sticks to driving the Latrobe
school district, while the First Student bargaining unit had addi-
tional contracts it serviced. However, no one disputes that the
Latrobe school district work composed a significant part of the
First Student unit’s work.
The foregoing three cases—distinguishable, and of question-
able vitality—are all that the Respondent cites on the issue. In
doing so, its brief advances a standard for proving substantial
continuity that has long faded from Board precedent, if it ever
existed. The Respondent simply ignores the veritable mountain
of precedent that demonstrates, on the facts present here, that
from the employees’ perspective, there is substantial continuity
between the old and new employing enterprise.
C. The Latrobe Terminal’s Appropriateness as a
Bargaining Unit
The remaining successorship issue, related to but discrete
from the issue of the substantial continuity of the employing
enterprise, is the appropriateness of the bargaining unit. This
is, indeed, the central thrust of the Respondent’s defense. It
argues that the Latrobe terminal employees do not constitute an
appropriate unit for bargaining. Rather, the Respondent con-
tends that an appropriate unit must include all of the Respond-
ent’s six bus terminals located in four counties and six towns.
It argues that the Board’s “community-of-interest” principles
render the Latrobe terminal—the only unit in which the Union
may presume majority support—inappropriate for collective
bargaining.
The Respondent’s defense is without force.
First of all, the employees servicing the Latrobe school dis-
trict formed a significant portion of the historic First Student
bargaining unit. “Both the Board and the courts have long
recognized not only that the traditional factors, which tend to
support the finding of a larger or single unit as being appropri-
ate, are of . . . lesser cogency where a history of meaningful
bargaining has developed” but also that “this fact alone sug-
gests the appropriateness of a separate bargaining unit” and that
“compelling circumstances” are required to overcome the sig-
nificance of bargaining history.” Children’s Hospital of San
Francisco, 312 NLRB 920, 929 (1993) (internal quotations
omitted), enfd. 87 F.3d 304 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, “[u]nits
with extensive bargaining history remain intact unless repug-
nant to Board policy or interfere with the rights guaranteed by
the Act.” SFX Target Center Area Management, LLC, 342
NLRB 725, 734 (2004), quoting P.J. Dick Contracting, 290
NLRB 150, 151 (1988) (footnote omitted).
The Respondent points out that, in terms of history, the First
Student unit included a yard in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, and
a “small park” in the Jeanette, Pennsylvania area—in addition
to the main Latrobe facility. Based on this, the Respondent
contends that “history” supports a multifacility unit. As the
Respondent puts it, “If a multi-location bargaining unit is prop-
er for First Student . . . it is likewise appropriate for A.J. My-
ers”).
This is far afield. For one thing, as reflected in the First Stu-
dent contract’s unit description, the main locus of the unit was
the Latrobe facility, with the addition of facilities “under the
direction of” the Latrobe facility. There was no companywide
integration of terminals. But more to the point, collective-
bargaining history is relevant to continuing historic representa-
tion. The Respondent proposes a new merger with five other
A.J. Myers’ terminals in four other counties that have no col-
lective-bargaining history with this unit or any unit at all. Bar-
gaining history does not support such a unit.
Putting aside issues of history, the Respondent’s position that
the Latrobe terminal unit is inappropriate—and the appropriate
unit is a six-terminal companywide unit—also faces the
Board’s “long recognized [ ] presumption that a single plant or
store unit is appropriate for purposes of collective bargaining
unless it has been so effectively merged into a comprehensive
unit, or is so functionally integrated, that it has lost its separate
identify.” Dean Transportation, Inc., 350 NLRB 48, 58 (2007),
enfd. 551 F.3d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “The party opposing the
single-facility unit has the heavy burden of rebutting its pre-
sumptive appropriateness” (Trane, 339 NLRB 866, 867
(2003)), a burden that the Respondent acknowledges (R. Br. at
20, fn. 17).
In response to the single-site presumption, the Respondent
offers little to counter the presumption of appropriateness of the
unit. It asserts (R. Br. at 19) that all six of its terminals are
“functionally integrated such that a single-facility unit is inap-
10 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
propriate.” However, the record evidence for this contention is
nil.
It argues on brief, as it stressed at trial, that the Kittanning
central office maintains central control of the enterprise, and
this is true, as far as it goes. But the day-to-day operation of
the facility is vested in the terminal managers who, according to
William Myers, “are given a lot of latitude.” The terminals do
their own payroll, their own purchasing of fleets, they com-
municate with the school district to which their terminal is as-
signed, and prospective employees submit applications directly
to the terminals. Each terminal has its own wage scale. Em-
ployees are hired to work for specific locations. See Van Lear,
supra at 1063 (noting same and contrasting that situation with
facts in case where successorship was not found, e.g., P.S. El-
liott Services, 300 NLRB 1161 (1990), where employees were
“not hired to staff a particular jobsite”).
I do not doubt the power of the owners and top managers in
Kittanning over the terminal managers. But the terminal man-
ager manages the terminal. The terminal manager is the prima-
ry person charged by A.J. Myers with making sure that there is
compliance with each school district’s requirements.
Significantly, the Respondent’s internet page makes the
point vividly: it lists each terminal and the school district with
which it is affiliated, and prominently lists for the public, for
each terminal, the names, telephone and fax numbers, and ad-
dresses of the managers and assistant manager/administrative
assistant for each terminal. (See GC Exh. 6.) This internet
“brochure” reflects the opposite of a situation where the indi-
vidual terminal “has been so effectively merged into a compre-
hensive unit, or is so functionally integrated, that it has lost its
separate identify.” Dean Transportation, supra.
The situation is far cry from the centralized control of the
type demonstrated in the Board precedent to which the Re-
spondent compares itself. See, e.g., Trane, supra at 866 (in
representation case, single-site presumption rebutted where,
among other things, at one of two employing sites there was
“no management stationed” there and “no separate supervisor
assigned to oversee” employees at the second site, and employ-
ees at both locations received their assignments from a common
dispatcher located at main facility, and calls to secondary facili-
ty were automatically forwarded to primary site dispatcher).
The Respondent places great emphasis on its argument that
there is a “high degree” of employee interchange among the
terminals. However, the contention does not survive scrutiny.
I accept William Myers’ testimony that the terminals “work as
a team” and that terminal managers contact other managers to
make sure that runs are covered. But in practice, what does it
mean?
As summarized above, far less than 1 percent—perhaps 1/5
or 1/10 of 1 percent—of the trips made for the Latrobe School
District were made by drivers affiliated with a terminal other
than the Latrobe terminal. Perhaps 1/3 of 1 percent of the trips
made by Latrobe terminal-based employees were for another
terminal, and 20 of 32 of these trips—a decisive majority—
were made for Myers Coach Line by two employees whom the
Respondent described as being concurrently employed by the
Respondent and Myers Coach line. Thus, it has not been
demonstrated that these 20 trips were anything other than a
Myers Coach Line employee performing a job for Myers Coach
Line. Moreover, there is no evidence that any of these instanc-
es of interchange involved supervision of the employees by
another terminal’s supervisory staff.
This is truly infinitesimal levels of employee interchange, far
removed from the quantity or caliber of interchange necessary
to provide evidence rebutting the single-facility presumption.6
Finally, the Respondent argues that there were over 1100 in-
stances in the 2013–2014 school year of an A.J. Myers (or My-
ers Coach Line) employee driving a run for a terminal other
than the one to which he or she was assigned. But as the Re-
spondent’s counsel conceded at trial (Tr. 125–126) almost none
of this involved the Latrobe terminal. It involved drivers for
other terminals making a run for another terminal. As such, I
agree with the General Counsel that evidence of interchange
between terminals other than the Latrobe terminal cannot un-
dercut the appropriateness of the Latrobe terminal as a single-
site bargaining unit. Indeed, were it true that the other five
terminals engaged in extensive employee interchange—from
which the Latrobe unit was excluded—it might be said to rein-
force the case for the appropriateness of the Latrobe bargaining
unit. However, in fact, even the 1100 instances of “inter-
change” unrelated to the Latrobe terminal do not amount to
much. Based on the testimony and representations of counsel,
1062 of the incidents of “interchange” are the product of the
fact that the Harmony terminal, which services the Seneca Val-
ley school district, regularly used six drivers stationed at three
other terminals. But this interchange does not reflect the kind
of interchange where a large segment of drivers at any terminal
regularly performed work for other terminals. The Harmony
terminal employed upwards of 90 drivers and so, using the
Respondent’s figures of 177 school days, the total number of
runs at Harmony terminal would be nearly 16,000 for the
school year. In other words, far less than 1 percent of the runs

6 New Britain Transportation Co., 330 NLRB 397, 398 (1999) (em-
phasizing that the number of alleged instances of employee inter-
change—in that case 200—is “of little evidentiary value” unless placed
in context by the percentage of routes and percentage of employees
involved in the interchange—“Employee contact of the kind described
here may be considered ‘interchange’ where there is evidence that a
significant portion of the work force is involved and the work force is
actually supervised by the local branch”), citing as examples “the de-
gree of interchange typically present in cases where the Board has
found it to be significant,” e.g., Purolator Courier Corp., 265 NLRB
659, 661 (1982) (interchange factor met when 50 percent of work force
came within the jurisdiction of other branches on a daily basis and there
existed a greater degree of supervision from supervisors at other termi-
nals than from the supervisors at their own terminals); Dayton
Transport Corp., 270 NLRB 1114 (1984) (Board found the presump-
tion rebutted where in 1 year there were approximately 400–425 tempo-
rary employee interchanges between terminals among a work force of
87, often on trips where more than 450 miles is necessary to complete
the job and the temporary employees were directly supervised by the
terminal manager from the point of dispatch). See also P.S. Elliott
Services, 300 NLRB 1161, 1162 (1990) (single-facility presumption
rebutted in successor case involving multibuilding cleaning service
company where, among other factors “[e]mployees are freely trans-
ferred between jobsites and at least 50 percent of the Respondent’s
employees have been transferred from building to building”).
11
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
performed for the Seneca Valley school district were performed
by employees stationed other than at Harmony.
Or, put another way, in context, as discussed by the Board in
New Britain Transportation Co., supra, this is not much inter-
change at all. The situation here is very much like that de-
scribed by Administrative Law Judge Raymond Green, in rea-
soning adopted by the Board in Montauk Bus Co.:
There is, however, very little interchange of bus drivers from
one terminal to another. (From time to time, when a terminal,
due to illness or other circumstances runs out of its own re-
serve drivers, it may use reserve drivers stationed at another
terminal). That is, although the company advises its drivers
that it has the right to assign them wherever it wants, the fact
is that most drivers stick to the terminals and routes to which
they are assigned and this is not unreasonable because routes
are more efficiently run by drivers who are familiar with their
routes. In my opinion, this lack of substantial interchange of
employees between the terminals is a factor favoring a single
location unit.
324 NLRB at 1135 (footnote omitted). See also Van Lear,
supra at 1061 (successorship found, notwithstanding that “driv-
ers were interchanged a total of 1909 times” during school year
to cover absences and activity runs at other districts where em-
ployer drives buses for six school districts and maintains six
district facilities).
In sum, there is no basis for the Board to override the pre-
sumptive appropriateness of a single-facility bargaining unit of
employees composed of those employed at the Respondent’s
Latrobe terminal.
II. THE RESPONDENT’S DUTY TO BARGAIN
As discussed above, on October 25, 2013, the Union sent let-
ters by certified mail to the president of the Respondent, at two
locations (the Latrobe facility and the Export facility). These
were returned unopened to the Union. The General Counsel
makes nothing of this, instead, alleging that the Respondent’s
duty to bargain arose with the Union’s subsequent November
25, 2013 submission of the very same correspondence to the
Respondent, correspondence which the Respondent admits
receiving.
As a general matter, such a demand for bargaining imposes a
duty to bargain in—as I have found this to be—a successorship
situation.
However, the Respondent advances the position that the Un-
ion’s bargaining demand was ineffective to create a duty to
bargain. According to the Respondent (R. Br. at 18–19), the
Union did not seek recognition in the unit alleged appropriate
in the complaint in this case, but rather, in a larger unit com-
prised of the Respondent’s Latrobe terminal and its Export
terminal. The latter services the Franklin Regional School
District, a school district with which the Union has never had a
relationship. As the Respondent points out, there is (and was)
no evidence of majority support for the Union in a unit that
included the Export facility. On this basis, the Respondent
argues that it has no duty to recognize or bargain with the Un-
ion.
A.J. Myers’ contention is without merit. For one, the prem-
ise is invalid: the record does not demonstrate that the Union
sought recognition of a unit that included the Export terminal.7
At most the evidence supports the conclusion that the Un-
ion’s demand shows that the Union did not know the contours
of the appropriate unit at the time it made its demand.8
And, that, is the relevant point. Without regard to what the
Respondent argues the demand meant, or what unit the Union
intended to describe, it is settled Board precedent that in a
successorship situation the union’s bargaining demand need not
be made with precision. It is the obligation of the Respondent
to respond to the Union’s demand and seek clarification. A
vague, ambiguous, or erroneous unit description in the bargain-
ing demand does not relieve the Respondent of its duty to bar-
gain.

7 The Respondent points to the wording of the Union’s recognition
demand, which requests recognition as representative of the Respond-
ent’s employees “providing transit services in and about West-
moreland, Pennsylvania.” There is no municipality of Westmoreland in
the area, only a county of Westmoreland, which contains both the city
of Latrobe and the borough of Export. The Respondent argues this
demonstrates that the Union was seeking recognition of a combined
unit composed of the Latrobe terminal and the Export terminal, which
services Franklin Regional School District.
However, the Union’s demand, read as a whole—and in context—
does not support the Employer’s claim. The Union’s letter refers re-
peatedly to its years of representation of the employees performing
transportation services for the Latrobe school system (and nowhere
else) as the basis for the employer’s duty to bargain. Thus, the Union’s
letter congratulates the Respondent on “winning the contract to operate
the transit system of Latrobe Area School District, Westmoreland
County Pennsylvania” and asserts that the Union “has represented
Latrobe School Bus Operators since 1999, and our members look for-
ward to many more years of dedicated service to Latrobe, PA riding
public.” The Union’s letter then references its “successive agreements
with First Student, Inc., Latrobe, PA” and contends, correctly, that “[a]
majority of A.J. Myers and Sons Transportation compl[e]ment of
Latrobe Area School District Westmoreland County, PA were formerly
employed as operators, park outs and monitors by First Student.”
Thus, the letter is studded with references to (and only to) the Un-
ion’s years of representation of the employees who transport the
Latrobe school district. There is nothing about the Franklin Regional
School District, or any school district other than the Latrobe school
district. This certainly suggests that the next sentence of the letter, in
which, solely on the basis of its representation of First Student’s
Latrobe school district operators, the Union asserts that the Respondent
is obligated to recognize and bargain with the Union as the representa-
tive of the Respondent’s employees “in and about Westmoreland,
Pennsylvania” is not a demand for a unit covering all employees at the
Latrobe terminal and at the Export terminal.
8 Union Representative Merrill’s testimony palpably illustrated that
uncertainty. He agreed on cross-examination with the Respondent’s
counsel’s vaguely-worded suggestion that Merrill wanted A.J. Myers to
recognize the Union with the “same scope of the bargaining unit as was
your experience with First Student.” This is not, as the Respondent
urges, an admission that the demand sought recognition of all A.J.
Myers’ employees in Westmoreland County. Rather, as Merrill ex-
plained on redirect: “[W]e were only looking to seek recognition for the
ones that were formerly at the First Student location.”
12 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the rationale for ex-
tending the union’s presumption of majority support to the
successorship situation “is particularly pertinent” because
[d]uring a transition between employers, a union is in a pecu-
liarly vulnerable position. It has no formal and established
bargaining relationship with the new employer, is uncertain
about the new employer’s plans, and cannot be sure if or
when the new employer must bargain with it. . . . According-
ly, during this unsettling transition period, the union needs the
presumptions of majority status to which it is entitled to safe-
guard its members rights and to develop a relationship with
the successor.
Fall River Dyeing, supra at 39.
In light of this, the Board has rejected any suggestion, such
as that of the Respondent here, that would make the union’s
bargaining rights—and the successor’s legal obligation to bar-
gain—turn on whether the union understood the precise con-
tours of the successor’s new operation or the wording to use in
demanding bargaining. Hydrolines, Inc., 305 NLRB 416, 420
(1991); Erica, Inc., 344 NLRB 799, 803 (2005), enfd. 200 Fed.
Appx. 344 (5th Cir. 2006); Dean Transportation, 350 NLRB
48, 49 fn. 5 (2007), enfd. 551 F.3d 1055, 1068 (2009); Paramus
Ford, 351 NLRB 1019, 1029 (2007).
Board precedent
has provided a union with leeway as to the specificity of its
bargaining demand pertaining to the bargaining unit to a suc-
cessor because of the vagaries inherent in the change of the
operation as to [the] ultimate unit where bargaining obligation
inures to the union.
Specialty Hospital of Washington-Hadley, LLC, 357 NLRB No.
77, slip op. at 11 (2011).
Indeed, in contrast to the situation where a union demands
initial recognition and bargaining based on a card majority or
election, the Board has recognized that “[a] bargaining demand
in a successorship situation is made in a different context.” As
the Board explained in Hydrolines Inc., 305 NLRB at 420,
rejecting an argument remarkably similar to the one advanced
by the Respondent here:
When a union demands bargaining based on a card majority,
the union is aware of which group of employees it has been
organizing and wishes to represent; the employer may not.
On the other hand, in a successorship situation, the union, by
making a bargaining demand, is attempting to preserve its sta-
tus as the bargaining representative of an already defined unit,
or that portion of the unit which has been conveyed or pre-
served. The successor, however, may add employees. It may
add, eliminate, or change job classifications. It may have
plans to expand or change its operations. The union may be
unaware, or at least uncertain, as to the successor’s plans for
its hiring and operations. Therefore, the union’s bargaining
demand may be made before it is clear which of the succes-
sor’s employees belong in the unit, and the union cannot be
expected or required to take all possible contingencies into
account in making its demand to bargain.
As the Board held in Hydrolines: “[a]t the very least, the Un-
ion’s demand shifted the burden to the Respondent to contact
the Union and seek clarification of the bargaining demand.”
Hydrolines, supra at 420. In the instant case, as in Hydrolines,
“any doubt that the Respondents had regarding the bargaining
unit that the Union sought to represent was removed when the
complaint issued setting forth the unit alleged to be appropri-
ate.” Id. at 420 fn. 29.9
Thus the Union’s demand, under the conditions of
successorship, was adequate. Notably, the Respondent’s argu-
ment about the deficiencies in the Union’s demand letter is
weaker still—it might even be considered disingenuous—given
that it continued to fail to recognize or respond to the Union
even after receiving an unfair labor practice charge over the
matter December 23, 2013, which not only contained a phone
number and address for the Union, but also identified the loca-
tion of the dispute as Latrobe, at the Latrobe terminal’s address,
for a unit of about 60 employees.10 The Respondent continued
to refuse to bargain with the Union, even after April 13, 2014,
when the Union altered its bargaining demand to explicitly
cover only the Latrobe terminal. Thus, in a very real sense, any
bargaining demand by the Union was a futile gesture, and it is a
red herring for the Respondent to rely upon a lack of clarity in
the November 2013 bargaining demand as a defense to its fail-
ure to bargain.
What was inadequate was not the Union’s November bar-
gaining demand, but the Respondent’s response to it.

9 See also, Erica, Inc., 344 NLRB at 803 (“If the Respondent had
questions concerning the demand it could have punctually brought
those to the attention of the Union.”); Dean Transportation, 350 NLRB
at 49 fn. 5 (“we do not expect perfect precision from a union bargaining
demand in a successorship situation (such as this one), as the union
may be unaware or uncertain of a successor’s plans for its hiring and
operations. Accordingly, GRESPA’s demand for recognition was not
infirm merely because its unit description deviated slightly from that in
the complaint. In any event, the appropriate unit was set forth in the
complaint, thus removing any doubt as to the identity of the unit
sought, and [the respondent] has still refused to recognize [the union]”);
Paramus Ford, 351 NLRB at 1029 (although bargaining demand con-
tained incomplete description of unit, “as in Hydrolines, the Union
clearly sought to preserve its status as the former employees’ repre-
sentative, and also sought to represent the Respondent’s employees. I
accordingly find and conclude that on February 2, the Union effectively
demanded recognition and bargaining of the Respondent, and that the
Respondent made no reply thereto”). See also Nazareth Regional High
School v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 873, 880 (2d Cir. 1977) (“Petitioner contends
that its refusal to recognize the Union was justified because Local 1261
claimed to represent a bargaining unit that included supervisors. Ad-
mittedly, this was an inappropriate demand and an order requiring
bargaining with such a unit would not be enforced. Nazareth, however,
never informed the Union that its refusal to bargain was based upon its
belief that the unit was inappropriate and the NLRB’s order has reme-
died the defective demand by eliminating supervisors from the unit.
Under these circumstances the bargaining order should not be denied
enforcement”).
10 By itself, this unfair labor practice charge constitutes a demand for
bargaining that was unlawfully ignored. IMS Mfg. Co., 278 NLRB 538,
541 (1986), enfd. 813 F.2d 113 (6th Cir. 1987). However, as I find that
the failure and refusal to bargain began (and has continued) since No-
vember 25, 2013, I do not make an independent finding on the refusal
to bargain based on the service of the unfair labor practice charge.
13
A.J. MYERS & SONS, INC.
I suppose that had the Respondent written or otherwise con-
tacted the Union in response to the bargaining demand, but
been unable to obtain a response from the Union, we would
have a situation where, despite a valid bargaining demand, the
subsequent lack of bargaining would be excused by the Union’s
nonresponsiveness. However, the Respondent’s response to the
Union’s bargaining demand was insufficient. That Myers
claims he attempted to reach the Union is an implicit demon-
stration of the reasonableness of the Board’s requirement that a
successor not ignore a bargaining demand, even one it believes
flawed. But Myers’ claim that he repeatedly called an un-
known phone number found on the internet and then abandoned
the matter after the phone repeatedly rang without answer, is an
inadequate response to a written bargaining demand that con-
tains no phone contact information, but ample information to
respond by mail.11
Confronted with the November 25, 2013 bargaining demand,
the Respondent had a duty—which it failed to satisfy—to con-
tact the Union. Having failed to do so, it cannot take shelter in
the claim that the wrong unit was sought by the Union. Ac-
cordingly, the Respondent violated the Act as of November 25,
2013, by failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the
Union in response to the Union’s bargaining demand.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, A.J. Myers and Sons, Inc., is an employ-
er within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, Amalgamated Transit Union, Local
1738, AFL AFL–CIO, CLC (the Union) is a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. The following employees of the Respondent, A.J. Myers
and Sons, Inc., constitute a unit appropriate for purposes of
collective bargaining with the meaning of Section 9(b) of the
Act:
All full-time time and regular part-time bus operators, park
outs and monitors servicing the Greater Latrobe Area School
District from Respondent’s 163 Menasha Lane, Latrobe,
Pennsylvania facility and excluding mechanics, dispatchers,
laborers, office clerical employees, guards, professional em-
ployees and supervisors as defined in the Act.

11 While I assume the truth of Myers’ claim that he attempted but
was unsuccessful in contacting the Union by telephone, I have my
doubts. No record of the calls was introduced. There was no evidence
as to what number he called or any reproduction of the internet site
from which it came. His claim, in other words, is uncorroborated in
any way. The context is an employer that had earlier mailings returned
to the union unopened because the employer did not sign for them, and
an employer that, upon the failure of its alleged phone calls to contact
the Union, did not take the natural next step and write the Union at the
address listed on the letter it received from the Union. It similarly
made no effort to contact the Union after the unfair labor practice
charge—with ample contact information, including a telephone phone
number provided by the Union—was served on it in December 2013.
Having said that, assuming the truth of Myers’ testimony about his
effort to telephone the Union does not affect the analysis or outcome of
the case.
4. Since on or about November 25, 2013, the Respondent vi-
olated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act by failing and refusing
to recognize and bargain collectively with the Union as the
collective-bargaining representative of the above-described unit
of employees.
5. The unfair labor practices committed by Respondent affect
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act.
REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain unfair
labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and desist
there from and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5)
and (1) of the act by failing and refusing to recognize and bar-
gain collectively with the Union as the collective-bargaining
representative of an appropriate bargaining unit of employees,
the Respondent shall recognize, and, upon request, bargain with
the Union as the exclusive representative of the designated unit
of employees (described above), and, if an understanding is
reached, embody the understanding in a signed agreement.
The Respondent shall further be ordered to refrain from in
any like or related manner abridging any of the rights guaran-
teed to employees by Section 7 of the Act.
The Respondent shall post an appropriate informational no-
tice, as described in the attached appendix. This notice shall be
posted in the Employer’s facility or wherever the notices to
employees are regularly posted for 60 days without anything
covering it up or defacing its contents. In addition to physical
posting of paper notices, notices shall be distributed electroni-
cally, such as by email, posting on an intranet or an internet
site, and/or other electronic means, if the Respondent customar-
ily communicates with its employees by such means. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by the Respondent at
any time since November 25, 2013. When the notice is issued
to the Employer, it shall sign it or otherwise notify Region 6 of
the Board what action it will take with respect to this decision.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondent, A.J. Myers and Sons, Inc., Latrobe, Penn-
sylvania, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to recognize and collectively bargain
with the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1738, AFL–CIO,

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be adopt-
ed by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for
all purposes.
14 DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
CLC (the Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of its employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time time and regular part-time bus operators, park
outs and monitors servicing the Greater Latrobe Area School
District from Respondent’s 163 Menasha Lane, Latrobe,
Pennsylvania facility and excluding mechanics, dispatchers,
laborers, office clerical employees, guards, professional em-
ployees and supervisors as defined in the Act.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Recognize, and on request, collectively bargain with the
Union as the exclusive representative of the above-described
unit of employees and, if an understanding is reached, embody
the understanding in a signed agreement.
(b) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its fa-
cility in Latrobe, Pennsylvania, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 6, after being signed by the
Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted by the
Respondent and maintained for 60 consecutive days in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to employ-
ees are customarily posted. In addition to physical posting of
paper notices, notices shall be distributed electronically, such as
by email, posting on an intranet or an internet site, and/or other
electronic means, if the Respondent customarily communicates
with its employees by such means. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event
that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent
has gone out of business or closed the facility involved in these
proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its
own expense, a copy of the notice to all current employees and
former employees employed by the Respondent at any time
since November 25, 2013.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director for Region 6 a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to
the steps that the Respondent has taken to comply.
Dated, Washington, D.C. October 3, 2014

13 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your be-
half
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activi-
ties.
WE WILL NOT fail and refuse to recognize and bargain with
the Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1738, AFL–CIO, CLC
(the Union) as the exclusive collective-bargaining representa-
tive of our employees in the following appropriate unit:
All full-time time and regular part-time bus operators, park
outs and monitors servicing the Greater Latrobe Area School
District from Respondent’s 163 Menasha Lane, Latrobe,
Pennsylvania facility and excluding mechanics, dispatchers,
laborers, office clerical employees, guards, professional em-
ployees and supervisors as defined in the Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights listed above.
WE WILL recognize and, on request, collectively bargain with
the Union and put in writing and sign any agreement reached
on terms and conditions of employment for our employees in
the bargaining unit.
A.J. MYERS AND SONS, INC.
The Administrative Law Judge’s decision can be found at
http://www.nlrb.gov/case/06-CA-119505 or by using the QR
code below. Alternatively, you can obtain a copy of the deci-
sion from the Executive Secretary, National Labor Relations
Board, 1099 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20570, or by
calling (202) 273-1940.