Airport Limousine Service, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 31, 1977

231 N.L.R.B. 932 (N.L.R.B. 1977)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Airport Limousine Service, Inc., and Jay McNeill,
Esq. as Receiver for Airport Limousine Service,
Inc. and Local 462, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Help-
ers of America. Case 22-CA-6589
August 31, 1977
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, MURPHY, AND
WALTHER
Upon a charge duly filed by Local 462, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America (hereinafter
referred to as the Union) on September 16, 1975, as
amended on October 1, 1975, the General Counsel of
the National Labor Relations Board, by the Regional
Director for Region 22, issued a complaint on
October 6, 1975, against Airport Limousine Service,
Inc., and Jay McNeill, Esq., as Receiver for Airport
Limousine Service, Inc., hereinafter referred to
jointly as Respondents, and individually as Respon-
dent Airport and Respondent Receiver, respectively.
Such complaint alleges that Respondents have
engaged in, and are engaging in, unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended.
On August 2, 1976, all parties to the proceeding
executed a stipulation of facts; waived a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge and the is-
suance of an Administrative Law Judge's Decision;
and submitted the case to the National Labor
Relations Board for findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and an Order, based on a record consisting of
the charges, the complaint and notice of hearing, the
formal documents, and the stipulation of facts.
On October 21, 1976, the Board approved the
parties' stipulation; ordered that the proceedings be
transferred to the Board; and granted permission
and set the time for the filing of briefs. Thereafter,
the General Counsel and Respondent Receiver filed
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Upon the basis of the stipulation of facts, the
briefs, and the entire record in this proceeding, the
Board makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent Airport, a New Jersey corporation
with its principal office and place of business at
677-683 Frelinghuysen Avenue, Newark, New
Jersey, is engaged in the business of providing and
performing transportation and related services. Dur-
ing the 12 months preceding the entering into of the
stipulation, Respondent Airport's gross annual reve-
nue, which is representative of its operations at all
times material herein, exceeded $500,000, of which at
least $2,000 was derived from the transportation of
passengers and cargo directly to States other than the
State of New Jersey.
The parties stipulated and we find that Respondent
Airport is engaged in commerce within the meaning
of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act and that it will
effectuate the purposes of the Act to assert jurisdic-
tion herein.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The parties stipulated and we find that the Union
is a labor organization within the meaning of Section
2(5) of the Act.
Ill. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Facts
At all times since 1968, and continuing to date, the
Union has been the collective-bargaining representa-
tive of the following unit of Respondent Airport's
employees at its Newark, New Jersey, terminals:
All drivers, mechanics, car washers and polishers
. . . but excluding all managerial employees,
dispatchers, office clerical employees, guards and
supervisors as defined in the Act.
Respondent Airport's most recent contract with the
Union covered the period September 9, 1974, to
September 10, 1977.
Sometime during the last week of March 1975,1
Joseph DeAngelis, Respondent Airport's president,
and an admitted agent of Respondent Airport, met
with James Tavaglione, the Union's secretary-trea-
surer. During this meeting, DeAngelis indicated that
Respondent Airport was planning to institute a
franchising system. Tavaglione asked to review a
copy of the franchising agreement and DeAngelis
agreed to send him a copy. Thereafter, a copy of the
franchising agreement was given to the Union's shop
steward.
I All dates are 1975 unless noted otherwise.
231 NLRB No. 149
932
AIRPORT LIMOUSINE SERVICE
On April 1, Respondent Airport implemented the
franchising agreement by bargaining directly and
individually with unit employees Benjamin Adragna,
Samuel Gaskin, and Oscar Taylor. In addition, on
that same date, Respondent Airport subcontracted
work then being performed by its drivers to Robert
Bloom, an independent subcontractor.
In late April, Tavaglione telephoned DeAngelis
and protested the franchising system. DeAngelis met
with Tavaglione and the Union's shop stewards on
May 2 to discuss the franchising system. DeAngelis
indicated at that time that he had no objection to the
franchise drivers continuing as members of the
Union. Tavaglione indicated that he would consider
the proposal and speak to his attorney. However, in
late May, Tavaglione again protested the continua-
tion of the franchising system whereupon it was
immediately discontinued.
During the first week of June, Tavaglione again
met with DeAngelis over the franchising issue.
Tavaglione maintained that the system violated the
collective-bargaining agreement; DeAngelis dis-
agreed and indicated that he intended to resume it.
Respondent Airport and the Union reaffirmed their
respective positions in a telephone conversation in
late June.
On July 7, Respondent Airport followed through
on its intention to resume the franchising system and
entered into franchise agreements with approximate-
ly 14 unit employees. On July 7, Respondent also
subcontracted work then being performed by unit
drivers to individual independent contractors with
whom it also entered into franchise agreements.
Since July 22, the Union has sought to arbitrate
Respondent Airport's conduct in entering into the
franchise agreements.
On August 30, Respondent Airport filed a petition
in bankruptcy with the United States district court.
On September 2, Jay Scott McNeill, Esq., was
appointed receiver in bankruptcy. Following his
appointment, Respondent Receiver made the follow-
ing decisions: (I) on September 2, refused to
guarantee Respondent Airport's employees the op-
portunity to work 10 hours at overtime premium
rates each week as required by the collective-bargain-
ing agreement; (2) on September 8, refused to
arbitrate the issue of Respondent Airport's entering
into the franchise agreements with its employees; (3)
on September 10, refused to pay the employees a 20-
cent-per-hour wage increase as required by the
collective-bargaining agreement; and (4) on Septem-
ber 26. sought in the bankruptcy proceeding referred
to above to disavow the entire collective-bargaining
agreement.
The parties further stipulated that on August 30,
the date the petition in bankruptcy was filed,
Respondent Airport was experiencing $12,000 per
month in operating losses. It had a gross income of
approximately $40,000 per week and a payroll of
approximately $17,000 per week. In September 1974,
Respondent Airport had lost a contract with United
Airlines for the transportation of airline crews, with a
resultant gross loss of revenue of approximately
$600,000 per year.
B. Contention of the Parties
The General Counsel contends that Respondents
have violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act by: (1)
unilaterally instituting a franchising system on July
7; (2) unilaterally subcontracting unit work on July
7; (3) unilaterally refusing to guarantee employees
the opportunity to work 10 hours of overtime at
premium pay on September 2; (4) refusing to
arbitrate a grievance concerning the franchising
system on September 8; (5) refusing to grant
employees a 20-cent-per-hour wage increase as
required by the collective-bargaining agreement on
September 10; and (6) seeking to disavow a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement in the bankruptcy court
on September 26.
Respondent Receiver argues that his review of the
financial condition existent at the time of the
receivership indicated that Respondent Airport
could not continue to operate under the existing
collective-bargaining agreement and that all his
actions were economically motivated.
C. Analysis and Conclusions
I. Respondents herein do not deny that, prior to
filing the petition in bankruptcy, Respondent Airport
bargained directly and individually with unit em-
ployees on July 7 by instituting and entering into a
franchising system and also on July 7 that Respon-
dent Airport subcontracted out unit work. At the
time of the establishment of the franchising system,
and the subcontracting of unit work, there was in
existence a collective-bargaining agreement between
Respondent Airport and the Union which was not to
expire until September 10, 1977. As Respondent
Airport admittedly embarked on the franchise
system and the subcontracting without the agree-
ment and consent of the Union, Respondent Airport
thereby violated Section 8(a)(5) of the Act since such
a unilateral change constituted direct bargaining
with unit employees in derogation of the Union's
status as the employees' exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative. Borden, Inc., 181 NLRB 109
(1970). Also, by entering into the individual franchise
agreements with unit employees thereby modifying
its existing collective-bargaining agreement with the
Union without complying with the requirements of
933
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Section 8(d), Respondent Airport further violated
Section 8(a)(l) and (5) of the Act. Carnation
CompanY, 172 NLRB 1882 (1968). Similarly, with
respect to Respondent Airport's decision to subcon-
tract out unit work, its failure to bargain over this
matter with the Union beforehand also constitutes a
violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Fibreboard
Paper Products Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 379 U.S. 203
(1964): Pats 'N Save Corporation, 210 NLRB 311
(1974).
2. With the appointment of Respondent Receiver
on September 2, further actions in contravention of
the contract and in violation of the Act occurred. 2
On September 2, Respondent Receiver refused to
guarantee the employees the opportunity to work 10
hours at overtime premium rates each week as
required by the still effective collective-bargaining
agreement. Then, on September 10, Respondent
Receiver refused to pay the employees the 20-cent-
per-hour wage increase as also required under the
contract. We note that Section 8(d) of the Act forbids
a party to a contract to make midterm modifications
of that contract without the consent of the other
party'. Clearly, the Union here did not give its
consent to the actions of Respondent Receiver and,
in such circumstances, Respondent Receiver violated
the Act by refusing to guarantee overtime and by
refusing to pay a wage increase as called for by the
contract. C & S Industries, Inc.,. 158 NLRB 454
(1966).
Respondent Receiver, however, argues that the
above actions, which, in effect, modified the con-
tract, were taken only to alleviate the dire financial
position of Respondent Airport. We have noted such
contentions before, and, however appealing they may
be, we have concluded in the past that they are
ultimately irrelevant to our considerations here. In
Oak Cliff-Gohnan Baking Company,3 the Board was
faced with a situation where an employer had cut
contract wages without the consent of the union but
had done so for financial reasons. The employer
argued that its motive-attempting thereby to save
employee jobs-should prompt the Board to find no
Respondent Receiver argues that he never assumed the contract
between Respondent Airport and the Union and thus cannot be found in
violation of the Act. We conclude otherwise. In his capacity as trustee.
Respondent Receiver became guardian of Airport's assets, with full
;authority to continue the operation of' the business and to exercise all
powers necessary to the administration of that business. In Marion Simcor,
Trustee of Wagner Shipyard and Marina, Inc.. and Stateside Senrvice, Inc.
d h sa Stateside Shiprard and Marina, Inc., 178 NLRB 516, 518 (1969). the
Board stated:
Section 2t l ) of the Act defines the word "person," as used in the statute,
I) include "trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers," and Section
2(2) defines an "employer" as including "any person acting as an agent
of an employer, directly or indirectly." [Emphasis supplied.l It seems
clear from these provisions that Congress has not foreclosed the Board
from exercising jurisdiction over trustees such as Simcox. See N.L.R.B.
v. 14'. C Bachelder. 120 F.2d 574 (C.A. 7). And, on the evidence in the
8(a)(5) violation in its actions. The Board assumed
the employer's financial plight and its forthrightness
but nevertheless concluded at 1064:
We have no doubt that Respondent's description
of its motive and its object is a truthful one. But
we have here a situation where these considera-
tions are irrelevant. The unambiguous language
of Section 8(d) of the Act explicitly: (I) forbade
Respondent's midterm modification of the con-
tract's wage provisions without the Union's
consent; and (2) granted the Union the privilege
it exercised to refuse to grant consent. Nowhere in
the statutory terms is any authority granted to us
to excuse the commission of the proscribed action
because of a showing either that such action was
compelled by economic need or that it may have
served what may appear to us to be a desirable
economic objective. To borrow the words of the
Supreme Court, what must here be recognized is
that "[t]he law is its own measure of right and
wrong, of what it permits, or forbids, and the
judgment of the courts [and of the Board] cannot
be set up against it in the supposed accommoda-
tion of its policy with the good intention of the
parties, and, it may be, of some good results."
Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. U.S., 226 U.S. 2049.
The conclusions reached in Oak Cliff-Golman are
equally applicable here and, accordingly, we reject
Respondent Receiver's contentions based on eco-
nomic necessity and find the September 2 and 10
actions, noted above, violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act.
3. On September 8, Respondent Receiver refused
to arbitrate the issue of Respondent Airport's
entering into the franchise agreements with unit
employees. The Union had sought such arbitration
on July 22 pursuant to the contract. We note that the
Board has held that a refusal to arbitrate is not, in
itself, a refusal to bargain in violation of the Act. 4
However, in the instant case, Respondent Receiver
has done more than just refuse to arbitrate a
present case, it seems similarly clear that when Simcox became trustee
of the Wagner assets. he also became Wagner's legal successor for
purposes of collective-bargaining. and by operation of law, was bound
to honor any bargaining obligations owed by Wagner to the Union
In fact, Respondent Receiver was Respondent Airport's alter ego. See, e.g.,
Cagle's, Inc., 218 NLRB 603, 604 (1975). As such, he was bound by the
collective-bargaining agreement entered into by Respondent Airport. The
Bell Company, Inc., et al., 225 NLRB 474 (1976). Thus, we reject his
contention to the contrary.
207 NLRB 1063 (1973).
Central Illinois Public Service Company, 139 NLRB 1407, 1418 (1962);
United Telephone Company of the West and United Utilities, Incorporated, 112
NLRB 779. 781 (1955); Textron Puerto Rico (Tricot Division), 107 NLRB 583
(1953).
934
AIRPORT LIMOUSINE SERVICE
grievance. By his action of refusing to grant increases
and benefits called for under the contract, as noted
above. Respondent Receiver has demonstrated his
desire to effectively repudiate the contract between
the Union and Respondent Airport. This action of
Respondent Receiver in refusing to arbitrate under
the contract is part and parcel of that unlawful
scheme and, accordingly, in this context, Respondent
Receiver's refusal to arbitrate violated Section 8(a)(5)
of the Act. Cf. Chevron Oil Company, 168 NLRB 574
(1967).5
4. On September 26, Respondent Receiver sought
the disavowal of the collective-bargaining agreement
between Respondent Airport and the Union in
bankruptcy court. The General Counsel alleges this
action as a violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.
However, while we have some reservations concern-
ing the power of a bankruptcy court to permit a
receiver lawfully to disavow a collective-bargaining
agreement., we do not find a violation of the Act
simply in a receiver's procedurally valid attempt to
have the court allow this.7 Accordingly, we shall
dismiss this allegation of the complaint.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The acts of Respondents set forth in section III,
above, occurring in connection with their operations
as described in section I, above, have a close,
intimate, and substantial relationship to trade,
traffic, and commerce among the several States, and
tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of com-
merce.
V. REMEDY
Having found that Respondents have engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, we shall order that they
cease and desist therefrom, and take certain affirma-
tive action to effectuate the policies of the Act.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. Respondent Airport and Respondent Receiver
are employers engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 462, International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, is a labor organization within the meaning
of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Member Murph3 ordinarily would not find a refusal-to-bargain
violation in a refusal-to-arbhitrate situation. She joins her colleagues in
linding such a iolation here because of the unusual circumstances involved
in this case, the Respondent Receiver's unlawful conduct overall, and the
tact that court action b) the lUnion to compel arbitration would be to little
or nil aail in light it the bankrupt status of Respondent Airport.
3. All drivers, mechanics, car washers, and
polishers employed at Respondent Airport's Newark
terminals, but excluding all managerial employees,
dispatchers, office clerical employees, guards, and
supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute a unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. Since 1968, the above-named labor organiza-
tion has been, and now is, the exclusive representa-
tive of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By refusing to bargain collectively with the
above-named labor organization as the exclusive
bargaining representative of all the employees of
Respondent Airport in the aforesaid appropriate
unit, by the following actions: unilaterally entering
into franchise agreements with unit employees,
unilaterally subcontracting out unit work, refusing to
grant contractually called-for wage increases and
overtime privileges, and refusing to arbitrate a
grievance concerning the entering into of the
franchise agreements, Respondents have engaged in
and are engaging in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act.
6. Respondent Receiver did not engage in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5)
by seeking to disavow the collective-bargaining
agreement in bankruptcy court.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor
Relations Board hereby orders that the Respondents,
Airport Limousine Service, Inc., and Jay McNeill,
Esq. as Receiver for Airport Limousine Service, Inc.,
Newark, New Jersey, their officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively concerning
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment with Local 462, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and
Helpers of America, as the exclusive bargaining
representative of its employees in the following
appropriate unit:
6 See Shopmen's Local Union Vo. 445 v. Kenlm Steel Productr, Inm . 519
F.2d 698 (C.A. 2. 1975).
? Cf. C!/de Taolor. d ba C!i-de Taylor Companl. 127 NL RB 103. 109
(1960).
935
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
All drivers, mechanics, car washers and polishers
employed at Airport's Newark terminals, but
excluding all managerial employees, dispatchers,
office clerical employees, guards and supervisors
as defined in the Act.
(b) Continuing or giving effect to any franchise
agreement with employees in the previously de-
scribed appropriate unit.
(c) Dealing individually with any of its employees
in the aforesaid unit in derogation of their bargaining
representative.
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization by unilaterally subcon-
tracting work from the aforesaid bargaining unit.
(e) Refusing to bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization by declining to arbitrate
the grievance concerning the issue of entering into
franchise agreements with unit employees.
(f) Refusing to bargain collectively with the above-
named labor organization by refusing to accord
employees a benefit of 20-cent-per-hour as specified
in the applicable bargaining agreement and refusing
to guarantee employees 10 hours of overtime at
premium rates.
(g) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of
their rights protected under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which
the Board finds is necessary to effectuate the policies
of the Act:
(a) Upon request, bargain collectively with the
Union as the exclusive bargaining representative of
Respondent Airport's employees in the appropriate
unit with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment.
(b) Notify individually, and by the posting of the
attached notice, all employees in the appropriate unit
with whom Respondent has made franchise agree-
ments that it will no longer offer, solicit, enter into,
continue, or enforce such agreements or arrange-
ments, but without prejudice to the assertion by the
employees affected of any legal rights they may have
acquired under such agreements or arrangements.
(c) Offer to all unit employees with whom Respon-
dent has made franchise agreements immediate and
full reinstatement to their former or substantially
equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or other rights and privileges, and make
each of them whole for any loss of pay he may have
suffered by reason of employment under franchise
agreements, with interest, in accordance with our
decisions in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB
289 (1950); Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB
716 (1962); and Florida Steel Corporation.8
(d) Upon request, arbitrate the grievance concern-
ing the issue of entering into franchise agreements
with unit employees.
(e) Make the employees whole for any loss of
earnings they may have suffered by reason of
Respondent Receiver's unilateral action in refusing
to pay employees a 20-cent-per-hour wage increase
and refusing to guarantee employees 10 hours of
overtime at premium rates as required by the
collective-bargaining agreement, with interest com-
puted in accord with our decisions in Isis Plumbing &
Heating Co., and Florida Steel Corporation, supra.
(f) Preserve and, upon request, make available to
the Board or its agents, for examination and copying,
all payroll records, social security payment records,
timecards, personnel records and reports, and all
other records necessary to analyze the amount of
backpay due under the terms of this Order.
(g) Post at their facility in Newark, New Jersey,
copies of the attached notice marked "Appendix." 9
Copies of said notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 22, after being duly
signed by Respondents' representatives, shall be
posted by Respondents immediately upon receipt
thereof, and be maintained by them for 60 consecu-
tive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by Respon-
dents to insure that said notices are not altered,
defaced, or covered by any other material.
(h) Notify the said Regional Director for Region
22, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondents have taken to comply herewith.
$ In accordance with our decision in Florida Steel Corporation, 231
NLRB 651 (1977), we shall apply the current 7-percent rate for periods prior
to August 25, 1977, in which the "adjusted prime interest rate" as used by
the Internal Revenue Service in calculating interest on tax payments was at
least 7 percent.
9 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals. the words in the notice reading "Posted by Order
of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively
concerning wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment with Local 462, Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
WE WILL NOT enter into, continue, or enforce
any franchise agreements with our employees.
936
AIRPORT LIMOUSINE SERVICE
WE WILL NOT deal individually with our
employees concerning their terms and conditions
of employment in derogation of their collective-
bargaining representative.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally subcontract work
from the bargaining unit the Union represents.
WE WILL NOT unilaterally refuse to pay employ-
ees a 20-cent-per-hour wage increase and guaran-
tee them 10 hours of overtime at premium rates
without prior notice to, and consultation with, the
Union.
WE WILL NOT refuse to arbitrate the grievance
conerning the issue of entering into franchise
agreements with employees in the unit the Union
represents.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner
interfer with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of your rights protected under Section 7
of the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with Local
462, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America, as the exclusive representative of all the
employees in the bargaining unit described below
with respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other terms and conditions of
employment. The bargaining unit is:
All drivers, mechanics, car washers and
polishers employed at Airport's Newark
terminals, but excluding all managerial
employees, dispatchers, office clerical em-
ployees, guards and supervisors as defined in
the Act.
WE WILL, upon request, arbitrate the grievance
concerning the issue of entering into franchise
agreements with unit employees.
WE WILL pay employees for any loss of
earnings due to our unilateral refusal to pay
employees a 20-cent-per-hour wage increase and
to guarantee them 10 hours of overtime at
premium rates, with interest.
WE WILL offer to all employees with whom we
have franchise agreements immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent positions,
without prejudice to their seniority or other rights
and privileges, and WE WILL make each whole,
with interest, for any loss of pay suffered by
reason of the unfair labor practices found by the
Board.
AIRPORT LIMOUSINE
SERVICE, INC.
JAY MCNEILL, ESQ. AS
RECEIVER FOR AIRPORT
LIMOUSINE SERVICE, INC.
937