Air Reduction Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Feb 27, 1953

103 N.L.R.B. 64 (N.L.R.B. 1953)

64 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
or condition of employment against any employee because of membership in
or activity on behalf of any such labor organization.
HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION
(Employer)
By ------------------------------
(Representative ) t (Title)
Dated--------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof , and must
not be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC., AIR REDUCTION SALES COMPANY
DIVISION and JOHN M. O'NEIL I
LOCAL 375, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS,
WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL and JOHN M.
O'NEIL. Cases Nos. 3-CA-496 and 3-CB-127. February 27, 1953
Decision and Order
On July 22, 1952, Trial Examiner Herman Marx issued his Inter-
mediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the Re-
spondents had engaged in and were engaging in certain unfair labor
practices, and recommending that they cease and desist therefrom
and take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the In-
termediate Report attached hereto. Thereafter, the Respondents
filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting briefs,
and requested oral argument. The General Counsel also filed a brief.
The Respondents' request for oral argument is denied, as the record
and briefs, in our opinion, adequately present the issues and the posi-
tions of the parties.
The Board has reviewed the rulings made by the Trial Examiner
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the In-
termediate Report, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record in
the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner, but only insofar as they are con-
sistent with our decision herein.
1. The Trial Examiner found that employee O'Neil was not bound
by the union-security provision in the agreement between the Respond-
ents, because he had no actual knowledge of such clause. Accordingly,
I The Intermediate Report contains two typographical errors, which are corrected as
follows : ( 1) The spelling of O'Neil's name is corrected to conform to the spelling on the
charge and complaint ; ( 2). O'Neil's last payment of dues was on February 2&, 1954, not
1952 as stated in the report.
103 NLRB No. 8.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 65
he concluded that the Respondent Union, in causing O'Neil's dis-
charge in reliance on such clauses, had violated Sections 8 (b) (2) and
8 (b) (1) (A), and the Respondent Company, by discharging O'Neil,
had violated Section 8 (a) (3) and 8 (a) (1). We do not agree.
On June 26, 1951,2 the Union expelled O'Neil from membership be-
cause of persistent dues delinquency. (He was then 5 months in
arrears.) Invoking the union-security clause in its then existing con-
tract with the Company, the Union thereupon requested O'Neil's
discharge, and the Company discharged him on or about August 7.
However, upon being advised by a Board agent that the union-shop
clause was invalid, the Union promptly asked the Company to rein-
state O'Neil, and he was reinstated within a few days after his dis-
charge.
Soon after his reinstatement, O'Neil told Fritts, his supervisor,
that he would like to reestablish his good standing in the Union.
Fritts suggested that he pay his dues to the Union, whereupon O'Neil
sent a money order to the Union covering the total amount of his
back dues. By letter dated August 10, the Union returned the
money order, stating, "This is to inform you that you have been sus-
pended from Local Union No. 375, therefore we cannot accept your
dues." Fritts subsequently learned that O'Neil's dues had been re-
turned. After O'Neil's reinstatement, the Company and the Union
executed a new agreement, which became effective on September 21,
providing for a wage increase and containing an amended and valid
union-security clause.
Belles, the Union's president, testified without contradiction that
lie read the terms of the new contract, including the amended union-
security provision, to three different meetings of employees. Notices
of these meetings, directed to all employees, were posted in the plant;
the meetings were conducted on company premises. O'Neil attended
none of the above meetings and testified that he was unaware of the
existence of the amended union-shop clause at any time prior to his
discharge. Although admitting that he received a raise at about this
time and that it was "through the Union getting it for us," O'Neil dis-
claimed knowledge of any other terms of the contract. O'Neil testified
that he had heard "the guys talking about a contract but . . . I paid
no attention to it because-that has been going on for years and years
up there, and I paid no attention to it." (Emphasis supplied.) He
was not requested to pay dues by, nor did he make a second tender to,
the Union either before or after the valid union-security provision
took effect.
The Trial Examiner found that the union-shop clause was not
available to the Respondents as a defense to the discharge because
3 All dates occurred in 1951.
66 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
O'Neil had not received actual notice thereof. Distinguishing the
Board's decision in Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,' the Trial Examiner held
further that notice of the clause might not properly be imputed to
O'Neil.
Without deciding whether in every case the Board would impute
to employees notice of a union-security clause executed by the duly
designated representative of such employees, we find, contrary to the
Trial Examiner, that, on the facts in this case, O'Neil had adequate
notice of the amended and valid union-security provision. As stated
above, notices of the meetings at which the amended clause was read
were posted on the bulletin board in the plant. These notices were not
addressed to members of the Union but to all employees, and the
meetings were held at a time and place convenient to O'Neil.4 Thius,
it is clear that every reasonable effort was made by the Respondents
to bring the new union-security clause to the attention of the em-
ployees, including O'Neil. Assuming that, as found by the Trial
Examiner, O'Neil had no actual knowledge of the amended clause,
O'Neil's testimony clearly shows that this was due to his own in-
difference and neglect.
In view of the foregoing, and upon the entire record, we find that
the Respondents were entitled to avail themselves of the valid union-
security clause as a defense to the discharge of O'Neil.
2. The General Counsel urges as an alternative basis for sustaining
the allegations in the complaint that O'Neil's discharge was requested
for reasons other than his failure to tender his periodic dues. While
conceding that O'Neil had not, in fact, tendered any dues accruing
after the effective date of the valid union-security clause, the General
Counsel contends that such tender should be excused as futile, in view
of the fact that the Union had rejected O'Neil's tender on August 10,
more than a month before the new contract was signed.
While the Board has held that a tender of dues accruing after
the execution of a union-security clause is excused where the circum-
stances indicate that such a tender would be futile,' we do not believe
that it has been established by the preponderance of the evidence in
this case that a tender by O'Neil of dues accruing after the effective
date of the new union-security clause would have been futile. There
is no evidence that after that date O'Neil made any new tender, or
3 75 NLRB 106&.
* Fritts, O ' Neil ' s supervisor , testified without contradiction that "we go out of our way"
to make it possible for anyone to attend the union meetings, that union meetings were
conducted when most of the employees could attend , and that those who were working
would be given time o8 to attend Although the meetings were conducted during O'Neil's
working hours , Fritts stated that the company policy was to delay the drivers such as
O'Neil "so that they could attend those meetings."
6The Eclipse Lumber Company , Inc., 95 NLRB 464, enfd . 199 F. 2d 684 ( C. A. 9);
Westinghouse Electric Corporation , 96 NLRB 522 ; Baltimore Transfer Company of Balti-
more City, Inc., 94 NLRB 1680; Namm's Inc., 102 NLRB 466
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY , INC. 67
that the Union after that date gave him any cause to believe that a
new tender would not be accepted.'
In view of these facts , and the fact that the Union waited until about
6 weeks after the expiration of the grace period in the union -security
clause before requesting O'Neil 's discharge , we find that the Union
requested his discharge solely because he had failed to make a proper
tender of dues, that no circumstances existed which would excuse
such a tender, and that the Company had no reason to believe that
the Union 's request was made for any reason other than nonpayment
of dues.
Accordingly, we find, contrary to the Trial Examiner , that neither
Respondent violated the Act in connection with O'Neil 's discharge,
and we shall dismiss the complaint.
Order
Upon the entire record in these cases , and pursuant to Section 10
(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National
Labor Relations Board hereby orders that the complaint against the
Respondent , Air Reduction Company, Inc., Air Reduction Sales Com-
pany Division , and the Respondent , Local 375, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs , Warehousemen and Helpers of
America , AFL, be, and it hereby is, dismissed.
Chairman Herzog took no part in the consideration of the above
Decision and Order.
9 While O'Neil testified that he made some unsuccessful efforts after his abortive tender
of dues in August to secure reinstatement in the Union, the precise dates on which such
efforts were made do not appear in the record, and we are not free to conjecture, nor does
the General Counsel contend, that they occurred after the effective date of the new contract.
Intermediate Report and Recommended Order
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 21, 1952, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board issued two complaints, one alleging that the Respondent Company, and
the other that the Respondent Union, had engaged and was engaging in unfair
labor practices within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended (61 Stat. 136-163), referred to herein as the Act.' Each complaint is
based upon a charge and amendments thereto respectively applicable to it.
The charges and amendments were filed by John M. O'Neill. The cases in which
the complaints were respectively issued were duly consolidated by an order,
dated February 21, 1952, issued by the Regional Director for the Third Region
of the Board. Copies of the complaints, charges, and amendments thereto, and
order of consolidation have been duly served upon each of the Respondents to
whom they are respectively applicable.
' Air Reduction Company, Inc , Air Reduction Sales Company Division is also referred
to herein as the Respondent Company or the Company ; Local 3715, International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL, as the
Respondent Union or the Union ; and the National Labor Relations Board as the Board.
68 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The complaints, as consolidated, allege, in material substance, that the Union
denied O'Neill membership for reasons other than a failure "to tender periodic
dues and initiation fees uniformly required" of members ; that on or about Decem-
ber 3, 1951, the Union, in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the
Act, required the Company to discharge O'Neill "because he was not a member
of the Respondent Union" ; that the Company, for that reason and at the Union's
request and insistence, discharged O'Neill on or about December 5, 1951, in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) ; and that at the time of the
discharge, the Company knew or had reason to believe that membership in the
Union was not available to O'Neill on the same terms and conditions "generally
applicable to other members or that membership in the Union was denied [O'Neill]
for reasons other than the failure to tender periodic dues or initiation fees uni-
formly required" of other members.
The Respondents filed separate answers. That of the Company, in essence,
denies the commission of any unfair labor practices or that it knew or had reason
to believe that membership in the Union was not available, or was denied, to
O'Neill for the reasons alleged in the complaint, and asserts that it discharged
O'N'eill because the Union wrote a letter to the Company stating that he "had not
paid his dues in the Union" and requesting his discharge under a collective-
bargaining agreement in effect between the Company and the Union. In sub-
stance, the Union's answer, as amended at the hearing, admits that O'Neill was
discharged on or about December 5, 1951, and that he was not a member of the
Union at that time, but denies the commission of any unfair labor practices.
Pursuant to notice duly served upon all parties, a bearing was held on April
28 and 29, 1952, at Buffalo, New York, before me as duly designated Trial Exam-
iner. All parties were represented by counsel, participated in the hearing, and
were afforded a full opportunity to be heard, adduce evidence, examine and
cross-examine witnesses, submit oral argument, and file briefs. The Respondent
Union made a motion to require the General Counsel to answer interrogatories
previously served upon him. The application was denied. Upon motion of the
Union, its answer was amended to admit a purported allegation of the complaint
that O'Neill was not a member of the Union at the time of his discharge. Each
Respondent moved to dismiss the proceeding at the close of the General Counsel's
case-in-chief. The motions were denied. Both Respondents renewed their appli-
cations for dismissal after the close of all the evidence. Decision was reserved
on the motions. They are denied for the reasons contained in the findings and
conclusions set out below. The General Counsel moved, without opposition, to
amend the pleadings to conform to the proof with respect to matters of form not
affecting the cause of action stated in each complaint. The motion was granted!
All parties waived oral argument on the evidence. The General Counsel and the
Respondent Union have filed briefs which have been read and considered. The
Respondent Company waived its right to file a brief.
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses,
I make the following :
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE NATURE OF THE RESPONDENT COMPANY ' S BUSINESS
Air Reduction Company, Inc., is a New York corporation and maintains its
principal office and place of business in the City of New York. The concern is
engaged in the manufacture, sale, and distribution of various types of gases and
2 The transcript contains a number of errors, but these do not affect the meaning of any
significant aspect of the proof . Accordingly , no order correcting the record is necessary.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 69
related products. In the course of its business it maintains and operates office,
manufacturing, and warehouse facilities in many of the States. A division of Air
Reduction Company, Inc., is known as Air Reduction Sales Company (also
described in the complaints as Air Reduction Sales Company Division).' The
division also maintains offices, plants, and warehouses in many States. Its
facilities include a branch establishment in Buffalo, New York. During the calen-
dar year of 1950 the sales volume of Air Reduction Company, Inc., exceeded $90,-
000,000. The parties stipulated at the hearing that the Respondent Company is
engaged in interstate commerce. I find that at all times material to the issues
in this proceeding, the Respondent Company was engaged in interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Act.
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
The Respondent Union admits to membership persons employed by the Respond-
ent Company and is, and has been at all times material to this proceeding, a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act.
III. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The discharge and its background
The Union has been for a substantial period the collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of truckdrivers (and apparently other employees as well) employed by
the Company at its Buffalo establishment. On March 1, 1950, the Company and
the Union entered into a collective-bargaining agreement affecting the truck-
drivers .4 The agreement contained a union-shop provision which subsequently
underwent some modification. Later reference will be made both to the original
union-security clause and its amendment.
Under the Union's procedures, members are required to pay dues on the
first of each month . Those in arrears for 90 days are subject to expulsion from
® I have treated the name of the Respondent Company as "Air Reduction Company, Inc.,
Air Reduction Sales Company Division" simply because that is the way it is stated in the
complaints and because the description appears to be accepted by implication, at least,
in both answers. However , there does not appear to be any corporate entity by that
name. Paragraphs I, II, and III of both complaints suggest that Air Reduction Sales
Company or Air Reduction Sales Company Division (whichever name is correct ) is only a
division of a corporate entity bearing the name of Air Reduction Company, Inc. (or Air
Reduction Company, Incorporated , as the Respondent Company's letterhead suggests).
It would seem that the Respondent Company's name should be stated as Air Reduction
Company, Inc., or Air Reduction Company, Incorporated , whichever is correct, instead of
using a compound of a corporate name and an operating division of the corporation as the
name of a respondent. Of course, it may be that the division is a corporate or other sub-
sidiary of the New York corporation , but such does not appear in the pleadings , nor has
the division been joined as a separate respondent . I point out all of the foregoing
because inaccuracy in the statement of a respondent 's name may on occasion make for
uncertainty in the enforcement of an order or decree , if such becomes necessary . In view
of the record before me, I am unable to enter an order amending the pleadings to state
the Respondent Company's name with precision , but I have set out my view of the matter
to encourage the practice of setting forth the names of parties with accuracy.
The evidence does not specifically define the bargaining unit, nor does it establish the
method by which the employees in the unit designated the Union as their bargaining rep-
resentative . The sense of the evidence as a whole is that truckdrivers are included in
the bargaining unit covered by the agreement and that the Union has represented such
employees at all times material to this proceeding . It may be noted, as a matter of
interest , that on September 23, 1944, upon the petition of the Union (then known by a
different name ), the Board directed an election among "production and maintenance"
employees in a number of the Company's Buffalo divisions, including the "distribution
division ," to determine a question of representation . See Air Reduction Sales Company,
58 NLRB 522.
257965-54-vol. 103-6
70 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the organization! Since about April 1950, membership dues for those classified
as truckdrivers have been fixed at $4 per month.
O'Neill became a member of the Union in or about 1945. Throughout the
period of his membership he was, with rare exceptions, in arrears in the pay-
ment of his dues, often for approximately 2 months, and sometimes longer e He
was summoned before the Union's executive board in 1948 and 1949 in connection
with charges that he was in arrears with his dues. Upon his explanation on
each occasion that illness in his family was the cause of his arrearages, he was
not subjected to discipline.
O'Neill's last payment of dues occurred on February 26, 1952. The payment
covered dues which were due on December 1, 1950, and January 1, 1951. He paid
no dues for the months of February, March, April, May, and June in 1951.
Because of his arrearages, he was summoned by the executive board to appear be-
fore it on June 26, 1951. He appeared and, as he had done previously, he offered
the explanation that illness in his family was responsible for his arrearages.
Ernest G. Belles, president of the Union and a member of the executive board,
told O'Neill that he would be informed of the decision if he called the Union's
office the next morning. After O'Neill left, the executive board expelled him 7
from membership. He called the office of the Union the following day, and
Belles informed him of his expulsion e
At the time of his expulsion, O'Neill was employed as a truckdriver at the
Company's Buffalo plant. He had been working in that classification since
sometime in January 1951. His supervisor was Wallace M. Fritts, the Coin-
pany's district shipping manager.
In or about the first week in August 1951, the Union requested the Company
to discharge O'Neill because, as Belles put it, "he had paid no dues." The re-
6 According to John N. Brown, business agent and recording secretary of the Union,
delinquency for 90 days results in "automatic suspension or expulsion " As noted later,
the Union's officials seem to use the terms "suspension" and "expulsion" interchangeably
when they speak of expulsion from the organization Whether the Union provides a
penalty of suspension from membership as distinguished from expulsion does not appear.
It does not affect the result in this proceeding, but the meaning of the term "automatic,"
as used by Brown, is somewhat uncertain. The record suggests that the executive board
exercises discretion in applying the disciplinary power of expulsion.
6 See an abstract of O'Neill's dues-paying record introduced in evidence as Union's
Exhibit No. 3. The accuracy of the abstract is undisputed.
IIn a letter dated August 10, 1951, addressed to O'Neill by the Union, there appears
a statement that O'Neill had been "suspended" from the Union. Belles testified that
O'Neill had been expelled and that he does not distinguish between suspension and expul-
sion. The minutes of the meeting describe a motion that O'Neill "stands expelled for
nonpayment of dues." Moreover, at least after he received the letter, O'Neill appears to
have regarded the Union's action as one of expulsion. In the light of the record as a
whole, it would appear that the term "suspended" was not used in the letter as a word
of art, and it may be noted that the Union's answer, as amended, purports to admit that
O'Neill was not a member at the time of his discharge. In any event, I do not accord
decisive weight to the use of the word "suspended" and find that the Union expelled
O'Neill.
8 O'Neill denies that Belles was at the meeting and he claims that Recording Secretary
Brown told him that he would be notified by mail of the Board's decision. Belles, Brown,
and John P. Buscani, another member of the executive board, testified that Belles was
present and that O'Neill was told to call the Union's office on the following day. The
minutes of the meeting contain a note that all members of the executive board were
present. Belles testified to his conversation with O'Neill on the morning after the
meeting. O'Neill was a nervous, and on occasion a confused, witness and evidenced a
faulty recollection at times. The record presents no reason to question the authenticity of
the minutes and they corroborate the claim that Belles was present. On the whole, the
weight of the evidence supports Belles, Buscani, and Brown, and I have made my findings
accordingly.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 71
quest was based upon the union-shop clause of the collective-bargaining agree-
ment which provided: "All employees are required to become an [sic] remain
members of the Union as a condition of employment and of continued employ-
ment. New employees are required to become members of the Union within
30 days after the date of employment and thereafter remain members of the
Union in good standing as a condition of continued employment." Upon re-
ceipt of the Union's request, the Company discharged O'Neill.
Claiming that his discharge was unlawful, O'Neill complained to the Board's
Regional Office in Buffalo. A representative of the General Counsel commu-
nicated with both Belles and Fritts and expressed the view that the union-shop
clause was invalid and that O'Neill's discharge therefore violated the Act.
Belles thereupon called Fritts and requested O'Neill's reinstatement. The
Company reemployed O'Neill.'
Soon after his reinstatement, O'Neill discussed his dues arrearages with
Fritts, telling the latter that he would like to reestablish his good standing in the
Union. Fritts suggested that O'Neill pay his dues and provided typing as-
sistance for the preparation of some material (not clearly described in the rec-
ord) relating to the arrearages.10 O'Neill then purchased a postal money order
and had it mailed to the Union, together with his dues book, by registered mail.
The Union returned the money order to him with a covering letter dated Au-
gust 10, 1951, stating, "This is to inform you that you have been suspended from
Local Union No. 375, therefore we cannot accept your dues." On a number of
occasions thereafter, O'Neill spoke to the Union's shop steward and requested
the latter's intervention with a view to the reestablishment of O'Neill's "good
standing."
There is conflict in the evidence concerning the amount of the money order.
O'Neill testified that it was for $28; 11 that he was in arrears for 4 months at the
time; and that the $28 money order was designed to pay the 4 months' arrearages
and 1 months' dues in advance. O'Neill also expressed the belief at the hearing
that he still had the money order in his possession at home. According to Belles
and Elizabeth Boll, a clerk employed by the Union, the money order sent by
O'Neill was for $16. As will appear later, the question of the amount has no
controlling effect upon the results in this proceeding. However, a resolution
of the issue is appropriate because it has relevance to the background of
O'Neill's discharge on December 5 and to the general question of the reliability of
the testimony of O'Neill and Belles on a more basic issue to be described later.
O'Neill's computation of the number of months of dues the money order
would cover is manifestly erroneous. As the dues were $4 per month, $16 was
too small, and $28 too large, for payment for a 5-month period. O'Neill was a
nervous and, at times confused, witness and impressed me as a person of marked
educational limitations. With respect to his claim that he paid for a month in
9 The view that the union-shop clause was invalid appears to have been based on the
fact that the 30-day grace period applied only to "new employees" and not to those already
in the Company's employ (see Lever Bros., 97 NLRB 1240). The validity of the quoted
union-security provisions and the legality of O'Neill's discharge in August are not in
issue and need not be decided.
10 The record does not clearly establish what was typed. Fritts' account indicates that
it was a letter. O'Neill's testimony suggests that it was a computation of his arrearages.
He stated that his wife, whom he instructed to mail a money order for him to the Union,
prepared a covering letter. The Union denies that a letter accompanied the money order.
Whether it did so is of little consequence, if any.
u O'Neill testified at one or more points that the money order was for $28.35. However,
the sense of his testimony as a whole was that the amount was $28 and that the addi-
tional $ 35 was the sum he "probably" paid at the post office to defray the cost of the
money order.
72 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
advance, it may be recalled that dues are payable in advance on the first of each
month and that he sent the money order early in August; it is thus not unlikely,
in the light of his limitations, that he had the month of August in mind in
stating this his money order included payment for a month in advance. It is
also well to note that other phases of the evidence suggest that O'Neill is ac-
customed to rely upon his dues book as an aid in computing his arrearages and
that he gave his testimony without the aid of his book. All things considered,
I am inclined to believe that his testimony that the money order covered a
5-month period was the product of his limitations rather than of a design to
deceive, and I attach no particular importance to the computation he made under
the pressures to which a witness such as he is subject.12
The Union stresses the fact that O'Neill did not produce the money order,
nor did he explain his failure to do so, although he expressed the belief that he
had it at home. The hearing was not concluded until the morning after the day
on which O'Neill testified and he thus had time to search for and produce the
money order. The failure to recall him to the stand for the production of the
money order or to explain its absence is a circumstance to be considered in eval-
uating his testimony, although, to be realistic about it, one should note, without
passing on the matter, that the responsibility for the omission to recall O'Neill
for the production of the money order or to explain its absence may rest with
the General Counsel rather than with O'Neill. Be that as it may, the Union's
evidence with respect to the disputed issue also reflects some infirmities. It may
be observed that the organization's letter of August 10 makes no reference to any
insufficiency of amount, although that may be explained by the fact that O'Neill
had been expelled and there would, consequently, be no real necessity to advert
to the amount of the money order. More important, some of the Union's testi-
mony on the subject has a vague complexion. According to Miss Boll's account
she received the money order in the mail, placed it on Belles ' desk, and did not
thereafter see it again. Yet she appended her own initials and signed Belles'
name to the letter of August 10, with which the money order was thereafter
returned to the mail to O'Neill, thus at least suggesting, if not establishing, that
she saw the money order after she placed it on Belles' desk. Although she readily
acknowledged that she had signed the letter, her demeanor reflected some sur-
prise when it was exhibited to her after she had already testified that she did
not see the money order after she had put it on Belles' desk. Her testimony as
a whole left me with the impression that her recollection of the amount of the
money order was not as firm as she professed. Belles asserted that the money
order was for $16, but gave no details of the circumstances under which he saw
it. In the light of Miss Boll's testimony that it was she who received the money
order and signed the letter returning it, even if she did put it on Belles' desk as
she claims, I am not at all certain that Belles has a firm basis for recalling the
amount. I do not believe that Belles and Miss Boll intended to testify falsely
with respect to the disputed issue. Perhaps O'Neill's arithmetical errors while
a witness stimulated a train of erroneous recollection in them, but such a view
is sheer speculation. The fact is that I am not satisfied that the recollection of
Belles and Miss Boll is any better than that of O'Neill. I must be guided by what
seems reasonably probable in the evidence as a whole. Despite the deficiencies
in O'Neill's testimony, against the background of his discussion with Fritts, the
availability of his dues book when he computed his arrearages to assist his
u O'Neill's intimation that he paid $.35 for the money order is apparently also erro-
neous. It may be judicially noticed that it costs $.25 to send a money order either in the
sum of $16 or $28.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 73
computation , his evident concern for the reestablishment of his good standing,
the pains taken to send the money order by registered mail, and the fact that
$28, and not $16, was the sum necessary to pay his dues to the date of mailing,
it is much more probable than not that he would send the amount necessary to
pay his arrearages in full. Accordingly, I credit the testimony that the money
order was in the sum of $28.
On September 21, 1951, the Company and the Union put certain amendments
to their contract into effect. Among these was a new union-shop clause which
provides : " Dlembership in the Union on or after the 30th day following the
beginning of employment, or the effective date of this section of the agreement,
whichever is later, shall be a condition of continued employment to the extent
consistent with law . It is the intent and purpose of this clause to accord to all
employees subject to the coverage of this contract, the statutory 30-day grace
period, i. e. all employees including new employees, old employees who were not
union members when this clause became effective and to employees who were
members of the Union when this clause became effective and this clause shall
be so construed and interpreted."
Basing its position on the amended union-shop clause, the Union wrote a letter
dated December 3, 1951, to the Company, requesting the latter to discharge
O'Neill "for nonpayment of dues." The Company complied with the Union's
request and discharged O'Neill on December 5, 1951, informing him by letter
bearing that date that the dismissal was "at the request of the Union, for non-
payment of Union dues."
O'Neill testified that he was unaware of the existence of the new union-shop
provisions at any time prior to his discharge. According to the testimony of
Belles and Buscani, however, O'Neill was informed of the terms of the clause
prior to his discharge. Belles testified that it had been his intention , after the
amendments became effective, to direct O'Neill's attention to the new union-
security provision and that he availed himself of an opportunity to do so when
he and Buscani saw O 'Neill on the Company's premises when they had occasion
to drive by on October 23, 1951, while en route from grievance negotiations at
another plant. Both Belles and Buscani testified in substance that on the oc-
casion in question they stopped to talk to O'Neill and that Belles read him the
new union-security clause and gave him an opportunity to rejoin the Union.
According to Belles' testimony at one point, O'Neill told him to "go to hell."
At another place in his testimony, Belles stated that O'Neill replied that "he
hadn't paid dues previous to that and that he wasn't going to start paying now,
the hell with it." Buscani quoted O 'Neill as stating , "the hell, I am not paying
dues now, and I am not going to start paying now." O'Neill entered a specific
denial that the incident in question occurred and that anybody, after his ex-
pulsion, asked him to join the Union.
If one credits Belles and Buscani , a number of accidental circumstances com-
bined to provide the occasion for Belles to read the amendment to O'Neill.
However, one need not rest any conclusion on the fortuitous aspects of the claim
that the Union 's officials rode past the plant at a given time, that O 'Neill was
at that time at a location where they could notice him, and that Belles had a
copy of the amendment available on his person . The heart of the matter is
that the accounts of the alleged conversation with O'Neill have an improbable
flavor . Belles is over 6 feet in height and weighs more than 200 pounds. In
the light of his dimensions and my observation of O'Neill , I deem it unlikely
that the latter would reply to an invitation to rejoin the Union by telling
Belles "to go to hell." Even if one ignores the literal phrasing of this portion of
74 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Belles' testimony and assumes that he intended a colloquial paraphrase of a
rejection by O'Neill of the invitation to rejoin the Union, I am unconvinced that
O'Neill would reply in the other terms attributed to him by Belles and Buscani.
The evidence is undisputed that O'Neill had on a previous occasion been dis-
charged because of his failure to pay dues ; that he had regained his job through
the fortuitous circumstance that a belief existed that the old union-shop clause-
was invalid ; that he had solicited advice from Fritts concerning a restoration
of his membership ; that even though he had been advised that the clause was
invalid, he had taken pains to send the Union a money order by registered mail
in an effort to reestablish his standing in the organization ; and that he had
on several occasions, after the return of the money order, solicited the help of
the shop steward to reestablish his "good standing." All this suggests that
he was concerned for his job and had at least some interest in repairing his
membership status. It may be assumed that O'Neill is not schooled in the re-
finements of the law pertaining to union-shop agreements, but in the light of
his previous experience with one and his evident concern for his job tenure, it
seems improbable that he would attach no meaning to the fact that the union-
shop clause had been revised, particularly if the president of the Union gave
point to its significance by reading it to him. Yet, according to Belles and
Buscani, O'Neill displayed a cavalier disregard of the risk to his job by re-
jecting an opportunity to rejoin the Union, insisting that he would not pay dues
and couching his attitude in apparently insolent terms. Such an attitude is
not quite consistent with O'Neill's concern for his job and his previous abortive
effort to pay dues, nor does it accord with my impression of O'Neill as a some-
what diffident person, at least in the presence of such authority as Belles rep-
resented. The remarks attributed to O'Neill on the occasion in question have an
improbable cast and detract substantially from the plausibility of the claim
that Belles read O'Neill the union-shop clause. I credit O'Neill's denial that
Belles did so.
The question remains whether O'Neill learned about the terms of the clause
on any other occasion prior to his discharge. Belles' testimony is undisputed,
and I find, that the Union's procedures require ratification by the employees
of the various amendments ; that in order to familiarize them with the revisions,
with Fritts' consent he convened several meetings of employees at the plant on
occasions when they would be most likely to be available; and that on such
occasions he read the terms of the amendments to those present at the meetings.
Belles also testified that he did not know whether O'Neil was present.
The meetings were generally held after the end of the day shift and during
the early part of the night shift which began at about 5 p. in. Belles stated
that the meetings usually were held some time between 7 and 9 p. in., while
Fritts estimated that they took place between 6 and 7: 30 in the evening. Out-
of-town drivers on the night shift usually leave the plant about 9 p. in., although
they may do so earlier. City drivers such as O'Neill begin their routes at 5 p. in.
According to Fritts, the departure of drivers would often be delayed so that
they could attend a meeting.
There are several reasons why the record will not support a finding that O'Neill
learned about the union-shop amendment at a meeting. First, as a city driver,
unless instructed to the contrary, he would be more likely than not to begin
his route before the time when the meetings were held ; second , the sense of the
evidence is that the relevant meetings were held after O'Neill was expelled from
the Union, and it seems probable that be would have less occasion to attend than
if he were a member ; and finally there is no evidence that he attended any meet-
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 75
ing at which the terms of the union-shop clause were made known. Viewing the
record as a whole, I find that O'Neill had no knowledge of the terms of the
union-security amendment prior to his discharge''
B. Concluding findings
There is no question that O'Neill had a long record of dues delinquency while
a member, and the evidence supports the Union's claim that it acted leniently
toward O'Neill on two occasions when it had a right to discipline him. There
is also no doubt, upon the basis of the evidence presented, that the Union was
within its legal rights in expelling O'Neill and that he was expelled because
of nonpayment of dues.14 But all such factors, while relevant to the background
of O'Neill's relationship with the Union and his discharge, are not the decisive
guides to decision in this proceeding. The operative facts are that a new union-
shop clause became effective on September 21, that, as the Union admits, O'Neill
was not then nor later a member of the organization, and that he was unaware
prior to his discharge, of the terms of the union-security clause. The basic issue
thus presented is whether O'Neill was obligated to rejoin the Union in order
to retain his job even though he was unaware of the revised union-shop require-
ments 1'
The Board has had occasion to consider comparable issues under Section 8 (3)
of the Wagner Act, the predecessor of Section 8 (a) (3) of the present Act,
which recognized the validity of closed-shop agreements conforming to the
statutory requirements then in effect" Although the union-shop provisions of
Section 8 (a) (3) wrought substantial changes in Section 8 (3), the amendments
have no bearing on the question at issue and the cases arising under Section 8 (3)
are relevant to the problem at hand. Of the cases which bear on the subject"
18 One of the amendments to the contract provided for a wage increase for truckdrivers.
O'Neill agreed that he heard talk from other employees "about a contract" at the time be
received the increase , but I am unable to infer from the fact that O'Neill had reason to
believe that his increase was attributable to contract negotiations that he thereby learned
about the amendment of the union -security clause.
14 There is testimony that O'Neill was "involved in a fight or brawl" at the plant
shortly before his discharge and that he received a beating at the hands of a person or
persons not identified by the record. There is no evidence of any kind to connect the
Union with the matter, and I base no findings upon it. It may also be noted that there
is no evidence to support the claim expressed in both complaints that O'Neill was denied
membership in the Union for reasons other than his "failure to tender periodic dues
or initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
1s The briefs deal at length with the question whether O'Neill, after the return of his
money order , was relieved of any obligation to make a tender of dues, the General Counsel
maintaining that he was not obliged to make a tender because it would have been futile.
and the Union contending that there is no reason to assume the futility of another tender
and that in the absence of a proper offer, the Union had a right to request his discharge.
Both viewpoints miss the real issue. As already pointed out , O'Neill was not a member
after June 26 (in fact, the Union insists that he was not a member ), and before one
reaches the question of O'Neill's obligation to make a proper tender, it must be determined
whether he had an opportunity to become a member after the revisions went into effect
and whether his failure to do so , even though he was unaware of the new union -security
clause, gave the Union a right to request his discharge and obligated the Company to
discharge him.
16 Section 8 (3) provided, in part, "that nothing in this Act . . . shall preclude an
employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a con-
dition of employment membership therein, if such a labor organization is the representative
of the employees as provided in Section 9 (a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit
covered by such agreement when made."
17 See Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 75 NLRB 1068; Electric Vacuum Cleaner Company, Inc.,
18 NLRB 591, enforced 315 U. S. 685 (reversing 120 F. 2d 611 ( C. A. 6)) ; and Selig
Manufacturing Company, Inc., 79 NLRB 1144 . The Gamble case is analyzed elsewhere
76 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the only one which requires more than passing reference is Gamble-Skognw, Ise..
75 NLRB 1068, because of certain language used by the Board in its decision.
The Gamble case involved an agreement, which contained closed-shop provisions,
between an employer and an authorized union. Although employment had pre-
viously been "predicated" upon union membership, prior agreements had not
provided for a closed shop. The union announced the execution of the contract
at a membership meeting a few days after it was signed, but the existence of
the closed-shop provisions was not disclosed at the meeting. Shortly thereafter,
two employees were expelled from the union and later discharged, purportedly
for nonmembership. There was no "official" disclosure to the company's em-
ployees of the existence of the closed-shop provisions until some weeks after
the expulsion of the two employees. The General Counsel contended that the
discharges were discriminatory and that the contract under which they were
purportedly made was invalid, among other reasons, "because it was never
publicized to the Respondent's employees." The Trial Examiner rejected the
claim of discrimination and found that the discharges were based upon a valid
closed-shop agreement. He also found that both before and after the execution
of the agreement "it was generally known" among the employees that continued
employment was "predicated" on union membership and as the contract "was
executed in the normal manner under the provisions of the Union's constitution
it cannot be said that these employees had no notice that a closed shop agreement
was in existence."
In sustaining the finding of unlawful discrimination, the Board held : "With re-
spect to the employees' alleged lack of knowledge of the closed shop provi-
sions . . ., these . . . were set forth in the written agreement which was signed
by the exclusive representatives of the Respondent's workers. In such circum-
stances, notice to the majority representatives is tantamount to notice to the
employees in the unit. Consequently we conclude that Anderson and Berres
[the discharged employees] had adequate notice of the closed shop requirements
contained in the . . . contract."
The Board's language would seem, on the surface, to be decisive of the question
of the legality of O'Neill's discharge. In this proceeding, as in the Gamble case,
the Union is the duly authorized representative of the bargaining unit involved
and, as such, entered into a valid contract conforming to applicable statutory
requirements. However, some dissimilarities may be noted. It may first be
in this report . In the Electric Vacuum decision , the Board held (p. 614 ), with respect to
a valid oral closed-shop agreement that "the [statutory closed shop provision] does not
permit the imposition of the penalty [of discharge] in a case where no notice has been
given of the existence of the agreement" The quoted language has application to the
instant proceeding, but careful analysis of the case reveals that in dealing with the right
of certain employees to reinstatement after a strike and a lockout, the basic rationale of
the decision is that the oral agreement had been abandoned and replaced by two invalid
agreements ( one oral and a later one written) with some assisted affiliated labor organi-
zations and that it was thus unlawful to condition reinstatement upon membership in
such unions . It is unnecessary to determine here whether it was necessary to rely on
the fact that certain employees entitled to reinstatement had had no knowledge prior to
the strike of the existence of the first oral closed-shop agreement . In the Selig case, the
Trial Examiner pointed out (p. 1160) that certain employees purportedly discharged under
a closed-shop agreement had no knowledge of the contract and therefore could not "be
considered bound" by its terms. However, the basic reasons for the holding by the Board
that the discharges were discriminatory were that the employees were dismissed for union
activity and that the closed -shop proviso of Section 8 (3), for reasons which need not be
set out here , did' not protect the employer 's conduct . Moreover, the Board did not ex-
pressly touch on the effect of lack of notice to the employees involved of the existence
of a closed-shop agreement.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 77
observed that, unlike the situation here, there is no definitive, express finding in
the Gamble case that the two employees involved were actually unaware of the
existence of the closed-shop provisions. Whether that was the general intend-
ment of the findings need not be determined, for even if one assumes that the two
employees had no actual knowledge, other distinctive differences appear. The
closed-shop provisions were in effect a codification of a "generally known" pre-
existing practice, although the custom had had no contractual stature. The
two employees were active union members, and it is thus at least probable that
they knew what had been "generally known." As the Trial Examiner pointed out,
the union signed the contract in the normal exercise of its constitutional powers.
In this case, however, O'Neill was not a union member when the new union-shop
clause came into existence ; he had been told that the old one was invalid ; and
the credible evidence presents no reason for him to believe, after he had received
such information, that continued employment depended upon membership in the
Union.
The language of the Gamble decision, it may be contended, seems broad enough
to embrace the principle that because a duly-designated collective bargaining
agent represents all of the employees in the unit, irrespective of their membership,
a nonmember is therefore chargeable, without more, with knowledge of all of
the terms of an agreement which his agent negotiates. It is one thing to hold,
as the Board did in effect in the Gamble case, that a member of a union, bound by
the organization's constitution and bylaws, is chargeable with knowledge of the
terms of an agreement which the union signs ; it is quite a different matter with
respect to one who is not a member, has no occasion to attend meetings, and is
represented by a collective-bargaining agent not by reason of membership or
express authorization by him but as a result of a statutory prescription that a
lawfully designated collective-bargaining representative of an appropriate unit
may contract for all employees in the unit, whether members or not. I do not
construe the Gamble decision as intending so sweeping a result.
The right of a union to contract collectively on behalf of nonmembers in the
represented unit arises by operation of law. So far as nonmembers are con-
cerned, the agency is not rooted in the mechanics of actual authorization. Non-
members and their collective-bargaining agent are not bound by contractual ties.
The very nature of the relationship dictates caution in grafting conventional
doctrines of respondeat superior to it.
By providing that a majority in an appropriate unit may select a bargaining
agent who may bargain and contract collectively for all within the unit, the Act
gives practical implementation to the statutory purpose of maintaining indus-
trial peace and stability. But the special agency relationship so created does
not inevitably mean that knowledge gained by the agent in the performance of its
duties is automatically imputable to all the represented employees, whether mem-
bers of the bargaining union or not. To hold that nonmembers are chargeable
with knowledge of the requirements of a union-shop agreement simply as a result
of the agency the Act creates is to adopt a view that is unrealistic and unfair to
the employees concerned. Moreover, without reference to the particular facts
of this proceeding, such a result would be contrary to sound public policy because
it might, in given situations, tend to discourage full disclosure of contractual
terms to persons who are directly affected by them. Thus I hold that because
O'Neill had no knowledge of the union-shop clause , be was not bound by its
terms, and that, in the circumstances, the Union acted unlawfully in requesting
his discharge.
78 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Since O'Neill was discharged because he was not a member of the Union or,
as the Company's letter of December 5 puts it, "for nonpayment of dues,"1e
his discharge was discriminatory within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3). In
fairness to the Company, it should be noted that it discharged O'Neill for the
sole reason that it felt obligated in good faith to do so under its contract with
the Union. However, it was a party to the contract and it should share equal
responsibility with the Union for administering its union-shop provisions. In
that aspect, the Company was under as much of an obligation not to discharge
O'Neill for noncompliance with a union-shop agreement of which he was ignorant
as the Union was not to request the discharge in such circumstances.
In sum, I find that the Union's request that O'Neill be discharged violated
Section 8 (b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the Act, and that by complying with
the request and discriminatorily discharging O'Neill, the Company contravened
Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
W. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The respective activities of the Respondents set forth in section III, above,
occurring in connection with the operations of the Respondent Company, de-
scribed in section I, above, have a close, intimate, and substantial relation to
trade, traffic, and commerce among the several States and tend to lead to labor
disputes burdening and obstructing commerce and the free flow of commerce.
v. THE REMEDY
It has been found that the Respondent Company has engaged in unfair labor
practices violative of Section 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) of the Act, and that the
Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices in violation of Section 8
(b) (1) (A) and 8 (b) (2) of the said statute. In view of the findings, I shall
recommend that the Respondents cease and desist from their respective unfair
labor practices and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
As it has been found that the Respondent Union caused the Respondent Com-
pany to discharge John M. O'Neill on December 5, 1951, and that such discharge
violated Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act, I shall recommend that the said Respond-
ent Company offer John M. O'Neill immediate and full reinstatement to his
former or a substantially equivalent position" without prejudice to his seniority
and other rights and privileges, and that the Respondent Company and Re-
spondent Union jointly and severally make the said John M. O'Neill whole for
any loss of pay he may have suffered by reason of the Respondent Company's
discrimination against him, by payment to him of a sum of money equal to the
amount of wages he would have earned, but for his discharge, between Decem-
ber 5, 1951, and the date of a proper offer of reinstatement to him as aforesaid.
Loss of pay shall be computed on the basis of each separate calendar quarter
Is In the light of the findings made above, the Union had no lawful right to request
O'Neill's discharge , whether because he had not paid his dues , as the Union 's letter of
December 3 states, or because of his nonmembership . Similarly , I deem it immaterial
that the Company's letter describes the basis for O'Neill' s discharge as the "nonpayment
of dues" rather than the fact that he was not a member of the Union . Compliance with
the Union's request on either ground would constitute a violation of the Act.
391n accordance with the Board 's past interpretation , the expression "former or sub-
stantially equivalent position" is intended to mean "former position wherever possible,
but if such position is no longer in existence, then to a substantially equivalent position."
See The Chase National Bank of the City of New York , an Juan, Puerto Rico, Branch,
65 NLRB 827.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. 79
or portion thereof during the period from the date of the discharge to the date
of a proper offer of reinstatement. The quarterly periods shall begin with
the respective first days of January, April, July, and October. Loss of pay
shall be determined by deducting from a sum equal to that which O'Neill nor-
mally would have earned, but for the discrimination , in each such quarter or
portion thereof, his net earnings,20 if any, in any other employment during that
period. Earnings in one quarter shall have no effect upon the back-pay liability
for any other quarter." Both Respondents will be required, upon reasonable
request, to make available to the Board and its agents all records pertinent to
an analysis of the amount due as back pay and to the order for reinstatement.
As it has been found that the Respondent Company, in violation of Section
8 (a) (1) of the Act, has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in
the exercise by them of rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the said statute, and
that the Respondent Union, in violation of Section 8 (b) (1) (A), has restrained
and coerced employees in the exercise of such rights, I shall recommend that
the Respondent Company and the Respondent Union be directed to cease and
desist in the future from committing their said respective violations of the Act.
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and of the entire record in
this proceeding, I make the following :
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Local 375, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-
housemen and Helpers of America, AFL, is, and has been at all times material to
this proceeding, a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the
Act.
2. Air Reduction Company, Inc., Air Reduction Sales Company Division is, and
at all times material to this proceeding has been, an employer within the meaning
of Section 2 (2) of the Act.
3. By discriminating in regard to the tenure of employment of John M. O'Neill
the Respondent Company has engaged in unfair labor practices within the mean-
ing of Section 8 (a) (3) of the Act.
4. By interfering with, restraining, and coercing employees in the exercise
of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, the Respondent Company
has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
of the Act.
5. By causing the Respondent Company to discriminate in regard to the
tenure of employment of John M. O'Neill in violation of Section 8 (a) (3), the
Respondent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (b) (2) of the Act.
6. By restraining and coercing persons employed by the Respondent Company
in the exercise of rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act, the Respond-
ent Union has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8 (b) (1) (A) of the Act.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
[Recommendations omitted from publication in this volume.]
'0 See Crossett Lumber Company , 8 NLRB 440, for the applicable construction of "net
earnings."
a The method of computation recommended herein follows the formula described in
P. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289.
80 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Appendix A
NOTICE To ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, we hereby notify our employees that :
WE WILL NOT encourage membership by our employees in LocAL 375,
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL, or any other labor organization, or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization, by discriminatorily discharg-
ing or in any other manner discriminating against them in regard to their
hire, tenure or any term or condition of employment except as authorized
by Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner interfere with, restrain, or
coerce our employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization; to
form, join or assist labor organizations ; to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing ; to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ; and
to refrain from any or all of such activities ; except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor
organization as a condition of employment, as authorized in Section 8 (a)
(3) of the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL jointly and severally with LOCAL 375, INTERNATIONAL BROTHER-
HOOD OF TEAMSTERS, CHAUFFEURS, WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS OF AMERICA,
AFL, make JOHN M. O'NEILL whole for any loss of pay he suffered as a re-
sult of discrimination against him.
All of our employees are free to become, remain, or refrain from becoming,
members of any labor organization, except to the extent that this right may be
affected by an agreement, in conformity with Section 8 (a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC.
Dated_______________________ AIR REDUCTION SALES COMPANY DIVISION
(Employer)
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not
be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Appendix B
NOTICE TO MEMBERS OF THIS LOCAL AND EMPLOYEES OF AIR REDUCTION
COMPANY, INC. AIR REDUCTION SALES COMPANY DIVISION
Pursuant to the recommendations of a Trial Examiner of the National
Labor Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National
Labor Relations Act, we hereby give notice that :
WE WILL NOT cause or attempt to cause AIR REDUCTION COMPANY INC.
AIR REDUCTION SALES COMPANY DIVISION, or any other employer, except in
accordance with Section 8 (a) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, to
discharge employees or in any other manner discriminate against them
in regard to their hire, tenure or any other term or condition of employment,
because such employees are not members of LOCAL 375, INTERNATIONAL
BROTHERHOOD OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN AND HELPERS
OF AMERICA, AFL, or are members of any other labor organization.
GILLCRAFT FURNITURE COMPANY 81
WE WILL NOT in any like or similar manner restrain or coerce employees
of AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. AIR REDUCTION SALES COMPANY DIVISION,
or of any other employer, in the exercise of the right to self-organization; to
form, join or assist labor organizations ; to bargain collectively through rep-
resentatives of their own choosing ; to engage in concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and to
refrain from any or all of such activities ; except to the extent that such right
may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organi-
zation as a condition of employment , as authorized in Section 8 (a) (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL jointly and severally with AIR REDUCTION COMPANY, INC. AIR
REDUCTION SALES COMPANY DIVISION make JOHN M. O'NEILL whole for any
loss of pay he suffered as a result of discrimination against him.
LOCAL 375, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD
OF TEAMSTERS , CHAUFFEURS , WAREHOUSEMEN
AND HELPERS OF AMERICA, AFL
(Labor Organization)
By ------------------------------------------------
Dated --------------------
This notice must remain posted for 60 days from the date hereof, and must not
be altered , defaced, or covered by any other material.
WILMA M. MORAN, R. L. MASON AND STEWART MASON, A PARTNERSHIP,
D/B/A GILLCRAFT FURNITURE COMPANY and FURNITURE WORKERS,
UPHOLSTERERS AND WOODWORKERS UNION, LOCAL 576, INDEPENDENT.
Cases Nos. 21-CA-1381 and 31-CA-1425. February 27, 1953
Decision and Order
On October 3, 1952, Trial Examiner Maurice M. Miller issued his
Intermediate Report in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that,
except for certain activities of Cecil Chacon, the Respondent had not
engaged in the unfair labor practices alleged in the complaint. With
respect to certain of Chacon's activity, the Trial Examiner found
that the Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in unfair labor
practices and recommended that it cease and desist therefrom and take
certain affirmative action, as set forth in the copy of the Intermediate
Report attached hereto. Thereafter the General Counsel and the
Union filed exceptions to the Intermediate Report and supporting
briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3 (b) of the Act, the Board
has delegated its powers in connection with this case to a three-
member panel [Members Houston, Murdock, and Styles].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner and
finds that no prejudicial error was committed. The rulings are hereby
103 NLRB No. 5.