2020003954 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 1, 2021)

Ahmad Glover

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 1, 2021

2020003954 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 1, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 15/582,719 04/30/2017 Ahmad L. D. Glover 1194-003 5481 78519 7590 02/01/2021 DALE JENSEN PLC 606 BULL RUN STAUNTON, VA 24401 EXAMINER MAI, TRI M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3733 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/01/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): DALERJENSEN@GMAIL.COM djensen@dalejensenlaw.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte AHMAD L. D. GLOVER Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 Technology Center 3700 Before JILL D. HILL, LEE L. STEPINA, and ARTHUR M. PESLAK, Administrative Patent Judges. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–13. See Final Act. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as the inventor, Dr. Ahmad Glover. Appeal Br. 2. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Appellant’s invention relates to systems, devices, and methods for storing sports coaching objects. Claims 1, 12, and 13 are independent. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter: 1. A system comprising: a frame; a coach’s sporting bag coupled to and supported by the frame, wherein the coach’s sporting bag comprises: a plurality of divided chambers; a plurality of pockets; a built-in wireless device recharging station; a blue tooth transceiver; a speaker coupled to the blue tooth transceiver; and a drink holder. REFERENCES The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is: Name Reference Date Leitzel US 4,136,724 Jan. 30, 1979 Darnell US 4,361,934 Dec. 7, 1982 Joh US 5,505,300 Apr. 9, 1996 Gray US 7,619,884 B1 Nov. 17, 2009 Sabbah US 7,971,764 B2 July 5, 2011 Quarry US 8,820,522 B2 Sept. 2, 2014 Soracco US 9,545,549 B2 Jan. 17, 2017 Hawkins US 2008/0029562 A1 Feb. 7, 2008 Reali US 2010/0059322 A1 Mar. 11, 2010 Nguyen US 2010/0084848 A1 Apr. 8, 2010 Ferber US 2012/0262117 A1 Oct. 18, 2012 Pond US 2014/0053315 A1 Feb. 27, 2014 Williams US 2014/0274204 A1 Sept. 18, 2014 Gierke US 2015/0173472 A1 June 25, 2015 Minten US 2017/0238663 A1 Aug. 24, 2017 Miller US 2017/0262884 A1 Sept. 14, 2017 Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 3 REJECTIONS I. Claims 1, 4, 5, and 7–11 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Quarry and any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond. II. Claims 2 and 6 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Quarry, any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond, and either of Reali or Chen. III. Claims 3, 12, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Quarry, any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond, and Darnell. IV. Claims 12 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Hawkins, Nguyen, and either of Ferber or Gray. V. Claims 12 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Sabbah, Hawkins, and either of Ferber or Gray. VI. Claims 12 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over either of Leitzel or Joh, Darnell, and either of Saracco or Gray. OPINION Rejection I; Obviousness of Claims 1, 4, 5, and 7–11 The Examiner finds that Quarry discloses many of the limitations of claim 1, including a sports bag having a frame and pockets, but does not disclose a charging station, a Bluetooth transceiver, and a speaker. Final Act. 2. The Examiner considers that it would have been obvious to include a charging station, a Bluetooth transceiver, and a speaker, as disclosed by Williams, in Quarry’s bag in order to use electronic device capabilities. Id. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 4 at 3. The Examiner also relies on Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond to disclose a charging station, a Bluetooth transceiver, and a speaker. Id. Analogous Art Appellant includes the heading: “Pond, Esses, Miller, Minton, Gierke, Hawkins, and Sabbah Each are NonAnalogous Art to the Claimed Subject Matter.” Appeal Br. 11. Because Appellant does not include Williams in this heading it is not apparent whether Appellant considers Williams to be analogous art. Nonetheless, because Appellant includes Williams as a reference that Appellant asserts is not pertinent to the inventor’s problem (see Appeal Br. 13; see also Reply Br. 5), we address the issue of whether Williams is analogous art below. In determining whether a reference is analogous prior art: we look to “(1) whether the art is from the same field of endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed and, (2) if the reference is not within the field of the inventor’s endeavor, whether the reference still is reasonably pertinent to the particular problem with which the inventor is involved.” In re Bigio, 381 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The invention relates to a bag, specifically, a coach’s sporting bag that “allows items to be organized and stored in specific sections.” Spec. ¶ 12. The Specification defines a coach’s sporting bag as “a container with at least one flexible side that is constructed to hold sports equipment and/or sports paraphernalia.” Spec. ¶ 38 [15]. The Specification further defines “sports coaching equipment” as “paraphernalia associated with supervising an athletic endeavor; sports coaching equipment can comprise one or more of balls, bats, gloves, sticks, pucks, clipboards, notepads, rule books, uniforms, logos, first aid supplies, calculators, pens, pencils, inflation needles, and/or air pumps, etc.” Id. [52]. Given that Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 5 Williams discloses “a portable apparatus such as bag, purse, backpack” (Williams ¶ 7), we agree with the Examiner that Williams’ bag or backpack is a container for holding at least notepads, rule books, calculators, pens, or pencils, is thus in the same field of endeavor, and therefore is analogous art. See Ans. 5. Similarly, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, and Pond each disclose various containers or bags that hold sports or other equipment including notepads, calculators, pens, pencils. See e.g., Gierke ¶ 11 (“portable component carrier (‘carrier’) 100”), Miller ¶ 84 (“backpack 400 may have generally any suitable size, shape, and configuration”), Minten ¶ 5 (“tote bag . . . provides ease of storage/transport”), Esses ¶ 13 (“a bag such as a backpack, suitcase, purse, etc.”), Pond ¶ 18 (“all types of purses, bags”); see also Ans. 11.2 We agree with the Examiner that each of Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, and Pond is in the same field of endeavor as Appellant’s invention, and therefore is analogous art. See Ans. 11. Teaching Away Appellant argues that because combining “Pond, Esses, Miller, Minton, Williams, Gierke . . . with the applied portions of Quarry would render” those references “‘inoperable for its intended purpose’ and/or change the principle of operation of at least one of those references, ‘such references teach away from the combination and thus cannot serve as predicates for a prima facie case of obviousness.’” Appeal Br. 13. 2 We refer to the Examiner’s Answer mailed April 9, 2020. Although this is designated “2nd or Subsequent Examiner’s Answer,” it appears to be the same as the Examiner Answer mailed March 3, 2020, except that it includes the correct date (11/18/2019) on which Appellant’s Appeal Brief was filed. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 6 We disagree for two reasons. First, the Examiner proposes to modify the bag disclosed by Quarry, not Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond. See Final Act. 2–3. Thus, Appellant’s argument regarding a proposed modification to the disclosures of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, and Pond does not address the rejection of claim 1. Second, Appellant does not identify any portion of Quarry that criticizes, disparages, discourages or otherwise would lead a person of ordinary skill in the art away from pursuit of the claimed arrangement. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Appellant’s contention on this point appears to be based on the unsupported contention that Quarry’s bag could not be worn as a backpack. See Appeal Br. 13–14. Factual Determination Appellant asserts that the Examiner 1) “fails to present any explicit factual determinations of the scope and contents of the prior art as required under Graham3; 2) “fails to even identify what ‘the pertinent art’ is;” and 3) “fails to present any explicit factual determinations of the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art.” Appeal Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 8–9. Appellant does not apprise us of error in the Examiner’s findings or reasoning. As for the argument that the Examiner did not determine the scope and content of the prior art, the Examiner identified the differences between Quarry and claim 1 and specifically cited Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, and Pond to remedy any deficiencies in Quarry. See e.g., Ans. 4–7 (citing Quarry, 1:16–19, 11:60–63; Williams ¶¶ 138, 144, 179; Gierke ¶¶ 11, 13, 20; Miller ¶¶ 72, 84, 153). This analysis required 3 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966) Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 7 determining the scope and content of the prior art, as well as identifying the pertinent art. As for determining the level of skill in the art, although the Examiner did not make a specific finding regarding the level of skill in the art, Appellant has not made any specific proposal regarding what the level of ordinary skill in the art is (or argued that the proposed modification was beyond the level of skill in the art), and we consider the applied prior art to be reflective of the level of skill in the art. See In re GPAC Inc., 57 F.3d 1573, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The person of ordinary skill in the art is a hypothetical person who is presumed to know the relevant prior art.”) (citing Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 962 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)). See also Okajima v. Bourdeau, 261 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he absence of specific findings on the level of skill in the art does not give rise to reversible error ‘where the prior art itself reflects an appropriate level and a need for testimony is not shown.”’) (citation omitted). Against this background, the Examiner determined the obviousness of the subject matter of claim 1. Ans. 4–7. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the Examiner analyzed claim 1 in light of the factual inquires set forth in Graham. Reason to Combine Appellant argues that the Examiner provides no reason why one having ordinary skill in the art would have combined the references to arrive at the claimed subject matter. Appeal Br. 15–16. According to Appellant, the rejections are based on conclusory assertions that do not evidence obviousness. Id. at 16; see also Reply Br. 9. Appellant asserts that because the Examiner fails to provide an art-recognized reason for making the Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 8 particular claimed combination, “the stated reason must be based on hindsight.” Id. at 17. We do not agree with Appellant’s allegations of improper hindsight because the Examiner’s reasoning (to enable charging and using electronic device easily) is supported by the explicit disclosure in Williams. “The personal e-port apparatus 28 described herein includes a portable apparatus such as bag, purse, backpack, etc. with specific portions for protecting, organizing displaying and charging plural electronic devices such as smart phones, book readers, game consoles and tablet computers.” Williams ¶ 179; see also Id. ¶ 4; Ans. 11. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s finding that the use of a charger integrated into a bag as disclosed by Williams makes charging easier. Similarly, the Examiner provided reasons for combining Quarry with Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, and Pond, including: a) enable the display of sport scores, advertisement, team logo and/or b) to charge a personal device and/or c) to provide music/entertainment or to provide an effective presentation via a speaker that is connected via Bluetooth and/or d) to prevent loss via Bluetooth tracking a charger and/or e) for convenience when travel or when at a game and/or f) to handle a telephone call such as through a microphone and speaker. Ans. 12. Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings as to any of the references. Like Williams, the Examiner’s reasons come directly from the references and are not based on Appellant’s disclosure. See e.g., Gierke ¶ 20 (“components that facilitate charging the wireless communication devices”); Miller ¶ 153 (“a speaker may be provided such that music and/or sound may be played”); Esses ¶ 2 (“portable device may provide a convenient way for a user to enjoy audio or visual entertainment such as music.”). Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 9 In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), the Court stated that a sufficient rationale to support a conclusion that the claim would have been obvious is that all the claimed elements were known in the prior art and one skilled in the art could have combined the elements as claimed by known methods with no change in their respective functions, and the combination yielded nothing more than predictable results to one of ordinary skill in the art. KSR, 550 U.S. at 416. Appellant does not provide evidence or persuasive argument that any of the combinations proposed by the Examiner would change the function of Quarry’s sports bag, or would have been unpredictable. In the Reply Brief, Appellant also takes issue with the Examiner’s citation to previously uncited portions of the references and asserts that inclusion of these new portions is a new ground of rejection. Reply Br. 2–3. We find these contentions unpersuasive. First, any request to seek review of the Primary Examiner’s failure to designate a rejection as a new ground of rejection in an Examiner’s Answer must be by way of a petition to the Director under 37 C.F.R. § 1.181 filed within two months from the entry of the Examiner’s Answer and before the filing of any Reply Brief. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.40(a). Appellant opted to file a Reply Brief and not a Petition; thus any issue as to whether the Answer contains a new ground has been waived. Moreover, if the Examiner’s Answer cites a different portion of an applied reference which goes no farther than, and merely elaborates upon, what is taught in the previously cited portion of that reference, then the rejection does not constitute a new ground of rejection. See In re DBC, 545 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Here, the Examiner relies on additional portions of Quarry, for example, that expand upon the frame and pockets that are Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 10 shown in Figures 2 and 4, cited in the Final Action, and relies on additional portions of Williams that describe the charger cited in the Final Action. See Final Act, 2; see also MPEP 1207.03(a)II.5. Third, Appellant takes issue with whether the art is analogous, and the Answer’s reference to portions of the prior art countering that argument does change the thrust of the rejection. See In re Hedges, 783 F.2d 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1986). We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the patentability of claim 1, but find them unavailing. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1. Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claims 4, 5, and 7–11 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal Br. 17. Accordingly, for the same reasons, we sustain the rejection of claims 4, 5, and 7–11 as unpatentable over Quarry and any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond. Rejection II; Obviousness of Claims 2 and 6 Claims 2 and 6 depend from claim 1. Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claims 2 and 6 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal Br. 17. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed regarding claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claims 2 and 6 as unpatentable over Quarry, any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond, and either of Reali or Chen. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 11 Rejection III; Obviousness of Claims 3, 12 and 13 Claim 3 depends from claim 1. Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claim 3 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal Br. 17. Accordingly, for the same reasons discussed regarding claim 1, we sustain the rejection of claim 3 as unpatentable over Quarry, any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond, and Darnell. In rejecting independent claims 12 and 13, the Examiner relies on similar findings of fact and reasoning as set forth in the rejection of claim 1. See Final Act. 4. Appellant does not make arguments for the patentability of claims 12 and 13 aside from those discussed above regarding claim 1. See Appeal Br. 11–17. Although Appellant asserts that “the references” do not establish prima facie obviousness, Appellant does not identify any Examiner error with respect to Darnell. See Appeal Br. 11–18. “[T]he Board [has] reasonably interpreted Rule 41.37 to require more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652 F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Because Appellant does not substantively argue the rejection of claims 12 and 13 as unpatentable over Quarry, any one of Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, or Pond, and Darnell, we sustain this rejection. Rejection IV; Obviousness of Claims 12 and 13 In rejecting independent claims 12 and 13, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that Hawkins discloses most of the limitations of claim 12 and 13. See Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 12 Final Act. 3. The Examiner relies on Nguyen, and either Ferber or Grey for any limitations not taught by Hawkins. Final Act. 3–4. In support of the patentability of claims 12 and 13, Appellant makes essentially the same arguments discussed above regarding claim 1. Appeal Br. 11–17. Specifically, Appellant states that Hawkins is non-analogous art because “Hawkins is directed toward a ‘portable backpack workstation for holding tools and the like.’” Appeal Br. 12 (citing Hawkins, Abstract). Although the Abstract of Hawkins mentions tools, Hawkins defines “tools” as “any item, article, equipment, object, utensil, ingredient, material or supply useful for a particular purpose.” Hawkins ¶ 17. In particular, Hawkins discloses that “the present invention has application in a number of fields and for a variety of uses,” and that anyone having a need for a mobile workstation could benefit, including professional or amateur bicyclists. Hawkins ¶ 23. Given that Hawkins discloses a backpack made of a flexible, light weight, yet durable material that holds equipment for the sport of cycling, we agree with the Examiner that Hawkins is in the same field of endeavor, and therefore is analogous art. Regarding Appellant’s teaching away arguments (Appeal Br. 13–15), we are unpersuaded for two reasons. First, these arguments are directed to the rejections based on Quarry, which is not relied on in Rejection IV. Second, Appellant does not identify any portion of Hawkins that teaches away from the claimed arrangement, e.g., by criticizing, disparaging, or discouraging pursuit of the claimed arrangement. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. Regarding Appellant’s factual determination arguments (Appeal Br. 14), we find no error in the Examiner’s findings. As for the argument that Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 13 the Examiner did not determine the scope and content of the prior art, the Examiner identified the differences between Hawkins (citing Hawkins ¶ 18) and claims 12 and 13, and then specifically cited Nguyen, Ferber, and Grey to remedy the deficiencies in Hawkins. See Ans. 9 (citing e.g., Nguyen ¶¶ 2, 4, 16; Grey, 1:16, 3:4–9). This analysis required determining the scope and content of the prior art, as well as identifying the pertinent art. As for determining the level of skill in the art, as noted above, Appellant has not made any specific proposal regarding what the level of ordinary skill in the art is or argued that the proposed modification was beyond the level of skill in the art, and we consider the applied prior art to be reflective of the level of skill in the art. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the Examiner analyzed claim 1 in light of the factual inquires set forth in Graham. Regarding Appellant’s allegations of improper hindsight (Appeal Br. 15–17), we do not agree that the Examiner’s reasoning is merely conclusory because the Examiner’s reasoning (to enable writing and to enable charging electronic devices) is supported by the explicit disclosure in Nguyen, Ferber, and Grey. “[A] foldable and compact clipboard that can be carried in a pocket . . . that provides a flat surface for writing or drawing” (Nguyen ¶¶ 2, 4) and “[d]ocking station employing a solar energy charge system for electronic devices” (Grey, 1:18–20). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings. We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the patentability of claims 12 and 13, but find them unavailing. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 13 as unpatentable over Hawkins, Nguyen, Ferber, and Grey. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 14 Rejection V; Obviousness of Claims 12 and 13 In rejecting independent claims 12 and 13, the Examiner finds, inter alia, that Sabbah discloses most of the limitations of claim 12 and 13. See Final Act. 4. The Examiner relies on Hawkins, and either Ferber or Grey for any limitations not taught by Sabbah. Id. In support of the patentability of claims 12 and 13, Appellant makes essentially the same arguments discussed above regarding claim 1. Appeal Br. 11–17. Specifically, Appellant states that Sabbah is non-analogous art because “Sabbah is directed toward a ‘backpack shell construction.’” Appeal Br. 12 (citing Sabbah, Abstract). Sabbah discloses, “The state of the backpack art is well-developed and includes teachings of various sizes, shapes, and carrying strap configurations to accommodate specific loading situations and particular equipment to be transported including sporting goods and the like.” Sabbah, 1:9–13. Given that Sabbah discloses a backpack for transporting sporting equipment, Sabbah’s backpack is “a container with at least one flexible side that is constructed to hold sports equipment and/or sports paraphernalia,” consistent with the Specification. See Spec. ¶ 38 [15]. Thus, Sabbah is in the same field of endeavor, and therefore is analogous art. Regarding Appellant’s teaching away arguments (Appeal Br. 13–15), we are unpersuaded for two reasons. First, these arguments are directed to the rejections based on Quarry, which is not relied on in Rejection V. Second, Appellant does not identify any portion of Sabbah that teaches away from the claimed arrangement, e.g., by criticizing, disparaging, or discouraging pursuit of the claimed arrangement. See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d at 120. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 15 Regarding Appellant’s factual determination arguments (Appeal Br. 14) we find no error in the Examiner’s findings. As for the argument that the Examiner did not determine the scope and content of the prior art, the Examiner identified the differences between Sabbah and claims 12 and 13, and then specifically cited Hawkins, Ferber, and Grey to remedy the deficiencies in Sabbah. See Final Act. 4. This analysis required determining the scope and content of the prior art, as well as identifying the pertinent art. As for determining the level of skill in the art, as noted above, Appellant has not made any specific proposal regarding what the level of ordinary skill in the art is or argued that the proposed modification was beyond the level of skill in the art, and we consider the applied prior art to be reflective of the level of skill in the art. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the Examiner analyzed claim 1 in light of the factual inquires set forth in Graham. Regarding Appellant’s contentions of improper hindsight (Appeal Br. 15–17), we do not agree that the Examiner’s reasoning is simply conclusory, because the Examiner’s reasoning (to add rigidity and to enable charging electronic devices) is supported by the explicit disclosure in Hawkins, Ferber, and Grey. “[T]he backpack 10 includes an internal rigid, yet lightweight frame 70.” (Hawkins ¶ 18) and “docking station employing a solar energy charge system for electronic devices” (Grey, 1:18–20). Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s findings. See Ans. 8–9. We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the patentability of claims 12 and 13, but find them unavailing. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 12 and 13 as unpatentable over Sabbah, Hawkins, Ferber, and Grey. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 16 Rejection VI; Obviousness of Claims 12 and 13 In rejecting independent claims 12 and 13, the Examiner relies on either of Leitzel or Joh to disclose most of the limitations. See Final Act. 4. The Examiner relies on Darnell, and either Soracco or Grey for any limitations not taught by Leitzel or Joh. Final Act. 4–5. In support of the patentability of claims 12 and 13, Appellant relies on the same arguments discussed above regarding claim 1. Appeal Br. 11–17. Although Appellant asserts that “the references” do not establish prima facie obviousness, Appellant does not point to any specific Examiner error with respect to Leitzel or Joh. See Appeal Br. 11–18; see also Ans. 13. Because Appellant does not substantively argue Rejection VI, we sustain this rejection. See In re Lovin, 652 F.3d at 1357. CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed. Appeal 2020-003954 Application 15/582,719 17 DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed 1, 4–5, 7–11 103 Quarry, Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, Pond 1, 4–5, 7–11 2, 6 103 Quarry, Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, Pond, Reali, Chen 2, 6 3, 12, 13 103 Quarry, Williams, Gierke, Miller, Minten, Esses, Pond, Darnell 3, 12, 13 12, 13 103 Hawkins, Nguyen, Ferber, Grey 12, 13 12, 13 Sabbah, Hawkins, Ferber, Grey 12, 13 12, 13 103 Leitzel, Joh, Darnell, Saracco, Grey 12, 13 Overall Outcome 1–13 TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED