Aero Corp.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 30, 1964

149 N.L.R.B. 1283 (N.L.R.B. 1964)

AERO CORPORATION 1283
bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act; and Local 2 is, and has
been at all material times, the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in
such unit, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
4. All plaster tenders employed by Arnold M. Hansen in the geographical area of
Los Angeles County, Orange County, Catalina Island, and the following offshore
islands if the point of embarkation is from Los Angeles or Orange County, namely,
Richardson Rock, Santa Cruz Island, Santa Rosa Island, Anacapa Island (Channel
Islands Monument), and Santa Barbara Island, but excluding executives, civil engi-
neers and their helpers, superintendents, assistant superintendents, master mechanics,
timekeepers, messenger boys, office workers, or any employees of the contractor above
the rank of craft foreman and supervisors, as defined by the Act, constitute; and have
at all material times constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bar-
gaining, within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act; and Local 300 is, and has
been at all material times, the exclusive bargaining representative of all employees in
such unit, within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. Progressive Association has been Arnold M. Hansen's representative for the
purposes of collective bargaining at all times material to the issues in this proceeding.
6. By encouraging individuals employed by Hansen to cease work for objects
proscribed by Section 8(b)(4) of the Act, as found above, Local 2 has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (A) and (B) of
the Act.
7. By threatening Arnold M. Hansen with work stoppages for such objects, as
found above, said Local 2 has engaged in unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.
8. By inducing and encouraging individuals employed by Arnold M. Hansen to
cease work for such objects, as found above, Local 300 has engaged in unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8(b)(4)(i)(A) and (B) of the Act.
9. By threatening Arnold M. Hansen with work stoppages, and by causing such a
stoppage, as found above, said Local 300 has engaged in unfair labor practices within
the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (A) and (B) of the Act.
10. By causing Arnold M. Hansen to discriminate against Clarence Greene in
violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act, as found above, Local 300 has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (2) of the Act.
11. By restraining and coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed them
by Section 7 of the Act, as found above, Local 300 has engaged in unfair labor prac-
tices within the meaning of Section 8(b) (1) (A) of the Act.
12. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Sections 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
13. The evidence does not establish that either Local 2 or Local 300 has restrained
or coerced Arnold M. Hansen in the selection of a representative for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances, or has unlawfully refused to
bargain with the said Arnold M. Hansen.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
Aero Corporation and Jessie R. Heard and International Union,
United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO. Cases Nos. 12-CA-2415
and 12-CA-92488(1-?). November 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On April 9, 1964, Trial Examiner William F. Scharnikow issued
his Decision in the above-entitled proceeding, finding that the
Respondent had engaged in and was engaging in certain unfair labor
practices and recommending that it cease and desist therefrom and
take certain affirmative action, as set forth in the attached Trial
149 NLRB No.'114.
1284 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Examiner's Decision. He further found that the Respondent had not
engaged in certain other unfair labor practices alleged in the com-
plaint and recommended that such allegations be dismissed. There-
after, the Respondent, the General Counsel, and the Charging Union
filed exceptions to the Trial Examiner's Decision and the Respondent
and the General Counsel filed supporting briefs.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act, the Board has delegated its powers in connection with
this case to a three-member panel [Chairman McCulloch and Mem-
bers Fanning and Brown].
The Board has reviewed the rulings of the Trial Examiner made,
at the hearing and finds that no prejudicial error was committed.
The rulings are hereby affirmed. The Board has considered the Trial
Examiner's Decision, the exceptions and briefs, and the entire record
in the case, and hereby adopts the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mendations of the Trial Examiner with the modifications noted
below.
We agree with the Trial Examiner's findings that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a) (1) and (3). In brief, the Trial Examiner found
the following: The Union held its first organizing meeting on
February 27.1 Respondent became aware that its employees were
organizing when its vice president happened to visit the bar where
this meeting, attended by 30 to 50 employees, was being held. The
first 8(a) (1) violation occurred the next day when a foreman inter-
rogated two employees about the meeting. The next union meeting,,
on March 27, as well as two meetings in April were subjected to sur-
veillance by Respondent's Superintendent Price, who, on each occa-
sion, drove slowly by the hall while employees were going to the
meeting, parked opposite or alongside the hall for periods of 20 and
30 minutes, and, while parked, leaned over from his position at the
wheel of the car to provide himself a better view of the entrance of
the hall and the employees who were there. In the weeks leading up
to the June 1 election, Respondent's foremen repeatedly voiced the
threat that the plant would close if the Union won the election.
Shortly before the election Respondent's vice president told an
employee that whether Respondent would obtain another contract
"depended on whether the union went in there or not."
Although, from the start of the Union's organizing campaign
until the first election on June 1, Respondent committed at least 22
violations of Section 8(a) (1), and discharged 2 employees in viola-
tion of Section 8(a) (3)-Monroe Lindsay, a member of the organiz-
ing committee, on May 21, and, on June 1, Jessie Heard, the employee
1 The events of this case occurred between February 1962 and October 1962.
AERO CORPORATION 1285
who had first contacted the Union. The first election, which the
Union lost, was set aside on July 13 by the Regional Director, who
found that Respondent's conduct had prevented a free election.
A second election was held August 10. Between the first and sec-
ond elections there were, as found by the Trial Examiner, five
8(a) (1) violations by Respondent, and after the second election,
which the Union also lost, and which the Regional Director set aside
on October 3, because he found that Respondent's conduct again had
prevented a free election, there were two discharges in violation of
Section 8 (a) (3) -Catherine Williams, a member of the Union's
organizing committee on August 13, and Garfield English on
October 17.
The Trial Examiner also found that Respondent refused to bargain
with the Union in violation of Section 8(a) (5). We agree with this
finding.2
On April 9, the Union, by letter, told Respondent that it had been
designated by a majority of Respondent's employees and demanded
recognition. The next day the Union also filed a petition for a Board
election. On April 16, Respondent, by letter, refused to recognize the
Union without a Board election, a position which it reaffirmed on
April 26 at the hearing on the Union's election petition.
As we shall discuss subsequently, the Trial Examiner was correct
in finding that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's
employees at this time. Thus, unless Respondent's refusal to recog-
nize was based on a good-faith doubt that a majority of the employees
had chosen it as their bargaining representative, Respondent violated
Section 8(a) (5).3
2 The Trial Examiner found that this case was distinguishable from Louis Aiello, at al.,
Co-Partners d/b/a Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 NLRB 1305 We agree with his reasoning,
but in any event our decision in Bernet Foam Products Co., Inc, 140 NLRB 1277, issued
subsequent to the Trial Examiner ' s Decision herein , is controlling.
3 Respondent argues that any 8 ( a) (5) finding is barred by 10 ( b), inasmuch as the first
day of the 10(b) period with respect to the 8(a) (5) charge is April 20 The Trial Ex-
aminer regarded the Union ' s demand as a continuing one, and found that an 8(a) (5)
finding was not barred by 10(b) We agree. Respondent had no doubt that all through
the 10 ( b) period the Union claimed a majority and was seeking recognition . N L R B v.
Burton-Diane Corporation, 210 F. 2d 199 (CA. 10) ; Scobell Chemical Company, Inc. v.
N L R B , 207 F 2d 922 ( C A 2) However , it is unnecessary to rely solely on the con-
tinuing nature of the Union 's demand in the abstract sense because on April 20 , 1902-a
date within the 10 ( b) period-the Respondent again declined to recognize the Union at
the hearing on the Union's petition for an election Moreover, even if the 10(b) period
of limitations were fatal to an 8(a ) ( 5) finding, an affirmative bargaining order would be
appropriate to remedy the 8(a) (1) violations found herein , and to restore the status
quo ante. No 10 ( b) problem is presented in this regard inasmuch as the initial 8(a) (1)
charge was filed on July 31, 1902 , and all the matters dealt with in this Decision are
included within its 10(b) period . D. H. Holmes Company, Ltd. v. N.L R B , 179 F 2d
876 (CA 5) , American Compressed Steel Corporation, 140 NLRB 1403.
For purposes of determining the Union 's majority status , we have considered the
April 29 payroll date ( which includes April 26, the first day of the 10 ( b) period) as
the critical date Ave note, however, our agreement with the findings of the Trial Ex-
aminer that the Union represented a majority of Respondent's employees on all the dates
found in the attached Decision
1286 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Respondent's overall conduct effectively rebuts its claim of a good-
faith doubt of the Union's majority status, and convincingly demon-
strates that it refused to recognize the Union in order to gain time in
which to destroy the Union's majority by engaging in unfair labor
practices during the election campaign. Thus, as the Trial Examiner
describes in detail in his Decision, Respondent's illegal interference
with the right of its employees to organize commenced the day after
it learned that they were organizing, and was so aggravated as to
make impossible the free expression of choice of a bargaining repre-
sentative by the employees in the' two elections conducted by the
Board. Respondent's patent unwillingness to rest the issue of
majority status upon a freely expressed choice of the employees made
in a fairly conducted election warrants the inference that its rejection
of the Union's demand for recognition was not, made in good faith 4
Respondent contends that in any event the Union lacked a valid
majority and that it was therefore under no duty to bargain.
It is argued that all the authorization cards relied on by the Union
were "fatally tainted and voided" because certain authorization cards
were obtained with the assistance of two minor supervisors, Lead-
women Bowman and Johnson. 'There is no evidence in the record,
however, that Bowman had anything to do with obtaining signatures
on cards, or that she did anything to assist the Union's organizing
campaign except to act as intermediary, relaying a small number of
cards between Johnson and Jessie Heard, an employee actively
engaged in the Union's organizing campaign.
Although there is conflicting-testimony on Johnson's role, the Trial
Examiner credited her testimony that she merely passed on the batch
of cards she received from Bowman to another employee and did not
solicit any signatures, and that she returned the signed cards to
Bowman. We see no reason to disturb the Trial Examiner's resolu-
tion of the conflicts in testimony. However, even if we were to find
that Johnson solicited signatures on union authorization cards, in the
circumstances herein we would find that employees signing those
cards nevertheless validly designated the Union as their bargaining
representative. Thus, although we have found Johnson to be a super-
visor at the time she allegedly solicited union authorization cards,5
she was at that time regarded by all parties as an employee and not
as a supervisor. And, although it is not determinative on the issue
of her supervisory status, the fact that Johnson was represented by
the Employer not to be a supervisor," does in the circumstances of
' Joy Silk Milla , Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D C.).
No view of the evidence in the record establishes more than a minimal amount of
solicitation by Johnson.
She was told by her foreman that she was not a supervisor ; she did not attend super-
visory meetings ; a letter circulated by Respondent during the election campaign pur-
portedly signed by all its supervisors did not contain her signature ; and she voted with-
out challenge in the election.
AERO CORPORATION 1287
this case rebut any presumption that her participation in distributing
cards might have coerced employees into designating the Union
against their wishes 7 Moreover, to permit Respondent now to rely
on Johnson's activities to justify its refusal to recognize the Union
designated by a majority of its employees, would encourage Respond-
ent to have just such marginal supervisors join in employees' organiz-
ing activity, secure in the knowledge that if the Union should gain
a majority, disclosure of the supervisor's real status would defeat
that majority.8
At the hearing the General Counsel introduced 12 union authoriza-
tion cards by means of a handwriting expert who testified that the
signature on the cards matched signatures on papers subpenaed from
Respondent's personnel files. Respondent refused to stipulate to the
authenticity of the handwriting samples in its files, and since the
General Counsel did not otherwise establish the genuineness of the
standard writings on which the expert based his opinion, the
Respondent argues that the 12 cards were not properly authenticated.
The Trial Examiner, however, accepted the specimens taken by
Respondent from its personnel files as authentic and counted the 12
authorization cards.
We agree with the Trial Examiner . Both the source of the hand-
writing specimens and the nature of the documents involved are
strong evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting thereon. Thus,
in every case the handwriting sample included an Employee's With-
holding Exemption Certificate, U.S. Treasury Department Form
W-4. The employee himself is required by statute to sign this cer-
tificate .9 The Respondent has relied on the authenticity of the sig-
natures on these forms in withholding Federal income tax from
employees' salaries . If Respondent wished to attack the genuineness
of the signatures on these forms, it could have come forward with
some evidence indicating that they are not genuine.10 Respondent
has not done this. Respondent also supplied, pursuant to subpena,
one of its own forms, an "Application for Employment," for 10 of
the employees in question. For one of the other two employees it
supplied an "Application for Test and Certification of Welding
Operator," signed by both the employee and his supervisor, and for
the last employee, Respondent's own form, an "Employees Resigna-
tion Form." All of these came from Respondent's own personnel
files and are documents on which Respondent has relied in the course
a For the foregoing reasons we find it unnecessary to rely on the Trial Examiner's find.
ing that all of the cards handled by Bowman and Johnson were among the group of cards
lost in the mail, and therefore were not among those relied on by the Union in this
proceeding.
8 Cf. Douglas County Electric Membership Corporation , 148 NLRB 559.
826 USCA 3402(f).
110 Reining v. U.S., 167 F. 2d 362, 364 (CA. 5).
1288 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
of its business . The Trial Examiner correctly inferred from both the
source and character of the documents that the handwriting samples
were genuine ,ll and properly relied upon these cards as evidence of
the Union 's majority status.12
Respondent also argues that the failure of the Trial Examiner to
order production of affidavits of five card signers'13 whose authoriza-
tion cards were introduced through the testimony of the handwriting
expert, violates the so-called Jencks rule . The Jencks rule, which the
Board follows in its proceedings ,14 affords parties the right to pro-
duction for purposes of cross-examination of pretrial statements
made by witnesses who have already testified in the proceeding. The
card signers did not testify , and therefore their affidavits do not
have "the value for impeaching purposes " " which underlies the
requirement in Jencks for their production . 16 In any event, the
Union's majority does not turn on these five cards since it had a
majority without them. Accordingly , we find no error in the Trial
Examiner 's refusal to order production of the affidavits in question.
The General Counsel offered to prove through a handwriting
expert that 13 other employees signed union authorization cards.
11 "Handwriting , admitted to be used as a basis of comparison under the act of Congress,
is not required to be proven genuine in any other way than is any other document offered
in evidence Proof of genuineness , under the act of Congress , may arise from infer-
ence . . . We do not think it can be said that the genuineness of a writing, for use as
the basis of comparison under the act of Congress , must be proven by any peculiar mode
of proof, or that it cannot be inferred from possession, where the circumstances and char-
acter of the possession and of the instrument itself are persuasive enough of its author-
ship." Deaic v. U.S., 246 F. 2d 568, 576-577 (CA. 5) ; "[ T]he focal point in identifica-
tion of the cards was the verity of the signature thereon , and . . they were admitted
subject to later comparison of signatures on the company records by counsel for Re-
spondent , with reservation of the ruling of the Examiner 'if it appears later that the
signatures don't agree' No company records of signatures was ever offered nor did
counsel for Respondent ever contend that Respondent had no such records nor was there
any contention that there was any difference in such signatures Obviously, such com-
parison of signatures would have been an effective method of proof ." N L.R B. v.
Hunter Engineering Company, 215 F. 2d 916, 923 (CA 8). [Emphasis supplied ]
L Particularly where these signers were no longer employed by Respondent and were
not available to testify at the hearing, there is no merit in Respondent 's contention that
proof of their signatures through a handwriting expert was secondary evidence and de-
prived Respondent of its right to cross-examine the card signers Economy Food Center,
Inc, 142 NLRB 901, 912; Philamon Laboratories , Inc., 131 NLRB 80, 87 , Combined
Metal Mfg Co) p., 123 NLRB 895, 897; Irving Taitel, et al, d/b /a 1. Taitel and Son, a
partnership , 119 NLRB 910 , 912 And see 3 "Jones on Evidence," sec 585 , where it is
stated that "there is no preferential rule requiring the testimony of the writer on the
ground that it is the best evidence , the fact that the best available evidence is not used
being significant only insofar as it affects the weight Thus, evidence of handwriting
may be admissible even though the person whose writing it is claimed to be is available
as a witness "
13 The General Counsel had affidavits from Coarsey , Fox, Giles , Olivent, and Weadon,
none of whom was called to testify , but whose cards were introduced through the hand-
writing expert
14 Ra-Rich Manufacturing Corporation, 121 NLRB 700.
15 Jencks v United States, 353 U S 657, 667.
ld The General Counsel offered to make the signatures on the affidavits available to the
handwriting expert for purposes of comparison with the authorization cards, but Re-
spondent insisted on the contents of the affidavits The contents of the affidavits are not
relevant to cross-examination of the handwriting expert.
AERO CORPORATION 1289
Inasmuch as these 13 were available, the Trial Examiner required
that they authenticate the cards by their own testimony. The Trial
Examiner called them as his own witnesses and 12 of the 13 testified
that they had signed the cards in question. The other testified that
he could not remember signing it, although the signature "looks like
my signature." The Trial Examiner accepted the 12 cards and
counted them toward the Union's majority. The Respondent argues
that the Trial Examiner committed error by calling these witnesses
to establish whether they signed the cards in question. We do not
agree. Section 102.35 of the Board's Rules and Regulations provides
that "It shall be the duty of the trial examiner to inquire fully into
the facts as to whether the respondent has engaged in or is engaging
in an unfair labor practice . . ." and that he shall have the authority
"to call, examine, and cross-examine witnesses and to introduce into
the record documentary or other evidence." _ The circumstances of
this case amply justify the Trial Examiner's decision to call these
employees to testify, and their testimony clearly supports his finding
that the 12 employees did validly designate the Union as their bar-
gaining agent.
The Respondent next urges that "the cards of at least fourteen
employees may not be counted because their individual testimony
indicates that their cards were executed only for the purpose of an
NLRB election-as represented to them by union representatives, and
because of such representations the cards failed to clearly manifest
designation of the Union as their bargaining representative."
Respondent's argument is without merit.
The authorization card is unambiguous and on its face is a clear
and effective bargaining authorization. At the top center of the card
there is printed in bold type (twice as large as anything else on the
card) the words "AUTHORIZATION TO UAW." Beneath this is
a space for the date, and then the words "I, the undersigned employee
of ---------------------------------------- (Name of Company)
authorize UAW to represent me in collective bargaining." This is
followed by a space for "Signature of Employee" and blanks for
other information such as his home address, class of work, badge, or
clock number. All of this is printed in type about the size of that on
an ordinary typewriter. At the bottom of the card, printed in small
type (about half the size of the type in the body of the card) is the
following : "This is not an application for membership. This card is
for use in support of the demand of (UAW), American Federation
of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) for
recognition or for an NLRB election."
Respondent would have us read the small print at the bottom of
the card as if it said that "the authorization card might be used only
for an NLRB election." We see no justification to so torture the
1 290 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
language on the card. It does not say this, but clearly states that the
card might be used for either purpose. Also, Respondent would have
us assume that the card signers disregarded the other statements on
the card in which the use to which the cards could be put is clearly
(and prominently) printed. On the contrary, any reasonable reading
of the card tells the employees the same thing that they were told by
Union Organizer Quatrini before he handed out the cards at the first
organizing meeting, which was that "we would have to get a majority
of the people to show that they wanted us to represent them and at
that point we would ask the company to recognize us and would
start negotiating with the company and if the company did not
recognize us, we would then have to go through National Labor Rela-
tions Board and go through an election." 17
In these circumstances we find that the signatures on the authoriza-
tion cards affirmed the intent of the signatory employees to authorize
the Union to represent them in collective bargaining. The validity of
such affirmation can be overcome only by establishing that the Union
obtained the signatures through coercion-and there is no hint of
such coercion in the record-or that the Union obtained the signa-
tures by representing to the employees that, despite the purpose
clearly and expressly stated on the cards themselves, the cards would
be used only for a different, more limited purpose. This must be done
on the basis of what the employees were told, not on the basis of their
subjective state of mind when they signed the cards.18 The Trial
Examiner, who credited testimony by Quatrini, concluded that the
evidence does not support the conclusion that employees were induced
to sign authorization cards by any representation that they would be
used only to obtain a Board election. We agree. There is, of course,
testimony by employees that they were told that signing the cards
could lead to an election. Their testimony, however, is not incon-
sistent with what Quatrini testified that he told the employees when
he solicited signatures to the cards. Nor is there any substantial evi-
dence in the record that any employee was told by the Union that the
authorization card he signed would be used only to obtain an election,
and not be used in furtherance of its stated purpose, i.e., to authorize
the Union to bargain for the employees.
17 Quatrini testified that he told employees at the March 27 meeting essentially the
same thing , and that at the April 5 meeting he told those in attendance that he planned
to write a letter to the Company demanding recognition Despite references to the fact
that the cards would be used to obtain an election (which in fact they were) we are un-
able to conclude that the employees were misled thereby
Is Peterson Brothers , Inc, 144 NLRB 679 Member Brown believes that the best evi-
dence of employees ' intent in signing cards is the statement on the cards to which they
put their signatures Accordingly , absent evidence of fraud or coercion , he would not
permit inquiry into the nature of the representations union solicitors may have made in
soliciting membership Accordingly , lie finds the cards here in question were properly
relied upon as evidence of majority status See his statement of a separate position in
Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268.
AERO CORPORATION 1291
Respondent objects to counting the cards of five employees on the
ground that the Trial Examiner improperly limited cross-examina-
tion of these employees. As to one of these witnesses, Witt, any pos-
sible error in sustaining an objection to a question on cross-
examination was cured when the same question was asked again and
answered without objection. The questions propounded to the other
witnesses were intended to go into the question of "why . . . [the
witness] signed the card." We agree with the Trial Examiner that
Respondent's counsel was inquiring into the subjective state of mind
of the employee at the time the card was signed, a matter which is
not material to a determination of the validity of the cards.
The Respondent objects to the inclusion in the unit of an employee,
Lashley, who was on military leave. This exception has merit. It is
the established practice of the Board not to count employees on mili-
tary leave as part of the unit when computing the Union's majority 19
Three employees, Monroe Lindsey, McKnight, and Taylor, testified
that they had signed authorization cards, and the Trial Examiner
specifically credited Lindsey's testimony that he had signed a card.
The Trial Examiner did not count these cards because the cards were
not produced at the hearing and the Trial Examiner regarded only
the cards themselves as acceptable in evidencing the Union's selection
as bargaining representative. The General Counsel and the Charging
Union except to this ruling. Their exception has met, at least as to
Lindsey. The testimony of the employees involved is itself probative
of the Union's majority status,20 and inasmuch as Respondent's fail-
ure to recognize the Union was in no way predicated on the fact that
the Union had lost any of the authorization cards it had secured, we
shall shall count Lindsey's authorization in determining the majority
status of the Union. We do not count McKnight and Taylor, how-
ever, because McKnight did not testify as to the date he signed the
card, and Taylor's testimony is too contradictory and confusing to
determine when he signed a card.
The Respondent objects to counting three cards, signed by Ben
Lindsey, Fox, and Olivent, on the ground that there is no testimony
to establish that they dated the cards themselves. This is without
merit inasmuch as the Trial Examiner credited testimony by Quatrini
that he had these cards in his possession on April 9 and turned them
over the next day to the Board's Regional Office as part of the
Union's showing of interest on that date., This is verified by the
Regional Office's April 10 date stamp on the back of each card .21
The Trial Examiner properly counted these cards as of April 9.
19 Greystone Knitwear Corp. and Donwood, Ltd., 136 NLRB 573, 575, footnote 3.
21 Howard-Cooper Corporation, 117 NLRB 287, 288.
21 Combined Metal Mfg. Corp., 123 NLRB 895, 896.
1292 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The Card signed by employee Bullard was dated April 12, 1961.
The Trial Examiner corrected this as an "obvious" error and counted
the authorization as of April 12, 1962. Respondent objects to making
such correction "in the absence of some evidentiary basis." Bullard's
card was entirely filled out in his own handwriting, including the
name of Respondent as his employer. Inasmuch as Respondent did
not begin its Lake City operation until November 1961, we agree
with the Trial Examiner that the date April 12, 1962, was meant.
Respondent objects to the Trial Examiner's correcting the date on
the card of employee McGhin, which was simply "5/10." The Trial
Examiner counted the card as of May 10, 1962. Respondent argues
that McGhin may have intended the date to be "5 October," and that
it therefore cannot be counted on the earlier date. We agree. In
view of the fact that a significant number of cards are dated by
placing the day first and month second (as is customarily done in the
military services) we are unable to determine that McGhin's card
should be counted prior to October 5, 1962.
The General Counsel and the Charging Union except to the Trial
Examiner's failure to count the card signed by B. Walker because, as
explained by the Trial Examiner, "in the absence of evidence" the
Trial Examiner could "make no finding as to when he signed it."
The record, however, contains testimony by Quatrini that Walker's
card was handed to him at least prior to April 26. Accordingly, we
shall count it from that date.
On the basis of the foregoing, we affirm the Trial Examiner's find-
ings and conclusions respecting the Union's possession of valid bar-
gaining authorizations from a majority of employees in the appro-
priate unit on the dates of April 9 and 26, 1962. Accordingly, and in
agreement with the Trial Examiner, we find that Respondent, by
failing and refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union on and
after April 26, 1962, committed unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8(a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, the Board hereby adopts as its Order the Order recom-
mended by the Trial Examiner and orders that Respondent, Aero
Corporation, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Trial Examiner's Recommended Order 22
2The Board includes as part of its order the "Armed Forces " provision now appearing
in the notice attached to the Trial Examiner's Decision
The new address of the Board ' s Twelfth Regional Office Is- Room 706 , Federal Office
Building , 500 Zack Street , Tampa, Florida , Telephone No. 228-7711.
AERO CORPORATION 1293
TRIAL EXAMINER'S DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As amended before and during the hearing, a consolidated complaint issued by the
Regional Director on behalf of the General Counsel in the above-entitled cases
alleges, but Respondent Aero Corporation in its answer denies, that the Respondent
committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce within the meaning of Sections
8(a)(1), (3), (4), and (5) and 2(6) and (7) of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, 61 Stat. 136, 73 Stat. 519, herein called the Act.'
Pursuant to notice, a hearing in the consolidated cases was held before Trial
Examiner William F. Scharnikow at Lake City, Florida, from February 18 to
March 22, 1963. The General Counsel, the Respondent, and the UAW appeared by
counsel and were afforded full opportunity to be heard , to examine and cross-examine
witnesses , and to introduce evidence bearing upon the issues . At the conclusion of
the hearing , the parties waived oral argument.
Following the hearing, counsel for the Respondent filed a motion and memorandum
of reasons for the dismissal of "all allegations in Case No. 12-CA-2488(1-2)" or, in
the alternative, for an order reopening the record or suspending the proceedings in all
three cases. Pursuant to an order to show cause, the General Counsel and the UAW
filed their oppositions to this motion, and, on July 13, 1963, 1 denied the motion in a
memorandum containing a full discussion of the motion, the responses, and the
reasons for my action. Since the hearing, I have also received and considered briefs
from the General Counsel and the Respondent and a memorandum from the UAW.2
Upon the entire record in the case, and from my observation of the witnesses, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. THE BUSINESS OF THE RESPONDENT
The Respondent, a Georgia corporation licensed to do business in the State of
Florida, is engaged, and has been engaged at all times material to the present case, at
its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia, and also at a place of business in
Lake City. Florida, in the repair, overhaul, modification, and fabrication of aircraft
and related components. In the course and conduct of its operations at Lake City,
Florida (which is the plant involved in these proceedings), the Respondent annually
furnishes these services to the United States Air Force in an amount in excess of
$50,000. In conducting its business at Lake City, the Respondent also annually
imports and procures delivery of goods and materials of a value in excess of $5,000
directly from points outside the State of Florida to its Lake City, Florida, plant.
I find that the Respondent is engaged in a business affecting commerce within the
meaning of the Act and that it will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to
entertain jurisdiction in the present cases.
i The charge by Jessie R. Heard in Case No 12-CA-2415 asserted violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act It was filed on July 31, 1962, and served on the Respondent
on August 3, 1962 A complaint alleging these violations was issued on September 14,
1962, and served upon the Respondent on September 17, 1962 The original charge by
International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers
of America, UAW, XI-CIO, herein referred to as the UAW, was filed In Case No. 12-CA-
2488(1) on October 25, 1962, was served on the Respondent on October 26, 1962, and
asserted violations of Section 8(a) (1), (3), and (5) of the Act The charge by the UAW
in Case No. 12-CA-2488(2) was filed on November 7, 1962, was served on the Respondent
on November 9, 1962, and asserted additional violations of Section 8(a) (1), (3), and (4)
of the Act On November 13, 1962, the Regional Director, acting on behalf of the General
Counsel, issued and served upon the Respondent an order consolidating the three cases
and a consolidated amended complaint alleging violations of Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of
the Act Then, on January 24, 1963, the Regional Director, acting on behalf of the
General Counsel, issued and served a second amended consolidated complaint alleging vio-
lations of Section 8(a) (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Act
2 Unopposed motions to correct the record were filed by the General Counsel and the
Respondent and are hereby granted with direction that the corrections requested be made
in the official transcript The following additional corrections are also necessary Al-
though correctly referred to in the transcript, General Counsel's Exhibits Nos 1(A) to
1(HH), inclusive, have been erroneously marked by the reporter as "Board's Exhibits"
Nos 1(A) to 1(1371), inclusive. And, although correctly set forth in the transcript, the
Trial Examiner's rulings admitting exhibits in evidence are in some instances not shown
in the reporter's marking of the exhibits
1294 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
International Union , United Automobile , Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, is, and has been at all times material to the
present case , a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2 (5) of the Act.
III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
The events to be considered in the present cases occurred in 19623 during the
UAW's attempt to establish itself, and bargain collectively with the Respondent, as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's Lake City production and
maintenance employees. An outline of this attempt, which was made by invoking
the Board's representation processes under Section 9(c) of the Act, will provide a
useful frame of reference and permit an understanding of the issues.
On February 27, March 27, and April 5, the UAW held organizational meetings
for the Respondent's Lake City employees. By letter dated April 9, it informed the
Respondent that a majority of the production and maintenance employees had
designated it as their exclusive bargaining representative; requested the Respondent
to institute negotiations with it as such representative; and advised the Respondent
that, if the Respondent failed or refused to do so, the UAW proposed to file a petition
with the Board for certification. On the following day, April 10, the UAW filed such
a petition with the Board's Regional Director in Tampa, in Case No. 12-RC-1437,
hereinafter referred as "the representation case." 4
On April 26, the Regional Director held a hearing on this petition.5 At this hear-
ing, counsel for the Respondent stated that, by letter dated April 16, the Respondent
"declined to recognize [the UAW] without certification by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board." The full text of the Respondent's letter to the UAW on April 16, to
which counsel thus referred, was the following:
Your recent letter requesting recognition as exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for our employees has been received. It is our opinion that our employees
do not desire your union to represent them.
In any event, we must insist that our employees be given an opportunity to
vote on this important matter in an NLRB election before we assume that you
have captured them.
On May 10, the Regional Director issued his Decision and Direction of Election,
holding that a question concerning representation existed in an appropriate unit
consisting of the Respondent's Lake City production and maintenance employees
(with the usual exclusion of office clericals, watchmen, guards, and supervisors) and
directing that an election be held to determine whether they wished to be repre-
sented by the UAW. Thereafter, the Regional Director conducted two such elections
on June 1 and August 10, and in each of them the UAW failed to secure a majority
of the votes cast. But, upon considering objections filed by the UAW, the Regional
Director set aside the first of these elections on July 13 and the second on October 3 6
No further election was conducted in the representation case. For, on October 25,
the UAW filed its first charge in the present case, asserting that the Respondent had
committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act
3 Unless otherwise noted, all date references are for 1962
4 None of the proceedings In Case No. 12-RC-1437 have been published in the printed
volumes of the Board's Decisions and Orders
5 The Regional Director conducted the representation proceeding under the authority
conferred upon him by Sections 3(b) and 9(c) and Sections 102 67, et seq ., of the Board's
Rules and Regulations, Series 8, as amended.
6 These bare findings that the Regional Director set aside elections upon the UAW's ob-
jections are based upon stipulations to that effect during the hearing in the present com-
plaint proceedings. Neither the UAW's objections which were presented to the Regional
Director nor the Regional Director's decisions on such objections, were received in evi-
dence, since their substance would apparently present matters which are in issue in the
present proceedings and upon which the Respondent, in my opinion, is entitled to a trial
and decision de novo In these complaint proceedings. Consistently, on the Respondent's
objection, I denied a motion of the General Counsel, that official notice be generally taken,
of the proceedings in the representation case. Therefore, I have not examined nor re-
terred to the representation case files but have considered only such limited elements of
the representation case as have been brought to my attention by stipulation or admission
in evidence (by testimony or exhibits) on the record in the present complaint proceedings.
AERO CORPORATION 1295
by refusing to bargain collectively with it as the duly designated exclusive represen-
tative of the Respondent 's Lake City production and maintenance employees.?
In substance , the General Counsel and the UAW contend, but the Respondent
denies, that throughout this entire period beginning with the first UAW organiza-
tional meeting on February 27, the Respondent , acting through its officials , super-
visors, and agents, attempted to suppress its Lake City employees ' organizational
activities and to defeat their designation of the UAW as their exclusive bargaining
representative . Thus, according to the allegations of the consolidated complaint and
the General Counsel 's and UAW's view of the evidence , the Respondent continually
interfered with, restrained , and coerced its employees and thereby committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act by: openly keeping,
UAW-employee meetings under surveillance ; telling employees the Respondent knew
which employees were supporting the UAW; interrogating employees concerning
their union membership, activities , and support ; promising employees better jobs if
they "would help keep the union out"; telling employees that, even if the UAW won.
the election , the Respondent would not sign a contract ; and making threats to its
employees that it would discharge or lay off employees who supported the UAW
and that, if the UAW won the representation election, it would close or move its
Lake City operations. In addition , according to the General Counsel and UAW,
the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the Act by discharging nine
employees , in each instance because the employee had joined or assisted the UAW.s
The General Counsel and the UAW further contend that the discharge of one of
these employees ( Roosevelt James ) was attributable to the fact that he had cooper-
ated with and had given evidence to agents of the Board in the representation case,
and that this discharge was therefore also violative of Section 8(a)(4) of the Act.
As already indicated , the Respondent in its answer has denied the commission of
any of these acts which would be violative of Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), or (4) of the
Act, and submitted evidence at the hearing to support its denial.
Finally, the General Counsel and the UAW contend that the evidence shows a
course of conduct on the Respondent 's part, which amounted to an unjustified
refusal to bargain with the UAW in violation of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Thus,
upon their view of the evidence , they argue that: (1) At all times on and since
April 9, the UAW has held the signed bargaining authorizations of a majority of the
Respondent 's employees in an appropriate Lake City production and maintenance
unit; (2) the Respondent 's refusal to recognize the UAW "without certification by
the National Labor Relations Board" was motivated, not by any doubt as to the
UAW's majority, but by a desire and an intention to obtain time and an opportunity
to dissipate this majority if, in fact , it existed ; (3) by its illegal and repressive con-
duct during the representation proceedings , the Respondent sought to destroy the
UAW's majority and twice prevented a free election ; and (4 ) under the applicable
principles established in the Joy Silk Mills case,9 the Respondent 's refusal to recog-
nize and bargain with the UAW without a Board election , coupled with its subsequent
illegal conduct, constituted a refusal to bargain in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of
the Act.
The Respondent 's reply to this argument raises a number of issues . Although the
Respondent concedes the appropriateness of a Lake City production and maintenance
unit, it disagrees with the General Counsel and the UAW is to the inclusion or
exclusion of certain individuals on its payrolls , and denies that the UAW at any.
material time possessed the valid bargaining authorizations of a majority of the
employees in the unit as properly constituted . In addition , it not only asserts its
good faith in insisting upon election and denies interfering with its employees'
freedom to vote for the UAW in the Board 's representation elections but, relying on
the Board 's ruling in the Aiello case,10 it also contends that, even if it had engaged"
in such interference , the UAW's subsequent , unsuccessful participation in the two
elections with apparent knowledge of the Respondent's conduct , would now preclude
findings in the present complaint proceedings that the UAW was in fact the majority-
designee of the employees in the unit and that the Respondent had refused to bargain
with the UAW in violation of Section 8 (a) (5) of the Act.
7 See footnote 1, above.
8 Monroe Lindsay in May 1962; Pearl Hamilton on May 20, 1962 ; Jessie R. Heard on.
June 1, 1962 ; Catherine Williams on August 13, 1962 , Howard C. Wattenbarger on Sep-
tember 28 , 1962; Jack R. Black on September 28, 1962; Elvin Simmons on September 28,_
1962 ; Garfield English on October 17, 1962 , and Roosevelt James on October 26, 1962
9 Joy Silk Mills, Inc, 85 NLRB 1263, modified and enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A D C) ,
cert. denied 341 U.S. 914
10 Louis Aiello , et al. , Co-Partners d/b/a Aiello Dairy Farms, 110 NLRB 1.365.
1296 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In response to this last argument of the Respondent , the UAW contends that the
Aiello principle is unsound and should be overruled and abandoned by the Board.,
The General Counsel, however, argues that the Aiello ruling was based upon, and
should therefore be regarded as limited to, a situation in which the employer had'
thwarted only one Board election and in which the union had proceeded with the
election with full knowledge of the extent of the employer 's preelection interference:
Accordingly , the General Counsel contends that the Aiello case is distinguishable and
that its principle is not applicable to the situation in the present case because (1)
the present Respondent 's conduct twice prevented a fair election , thus demonstrating
the impossibility of the Board's ever conducting an election free from the Respond-
ent's interference and the consequent futility of any reliance by the UAW upon the
Board's representation processes for a fair resolution of the question of representa-
tion; and ( 2) in the present case, it has not been shown that , before proceeding with
either of the two elections , the UAW had "sufficient knowledge of all of the [Respond-
ent's] misconduct" to warrant application of the Aiello rule.
With this understanding of the setting and the issues , we may now turn to a
consideration of the other relevant facts shown by the evidence.
B. The organizational activities of the employees and the Respondent's
knowledge and general reaction
Early in 1962 , Jessie Heard , one of the Respondent 's Lake City aircraft mechan-
ics, discussed the possibility of union representation , with a number of the other
employees , including his brother, Willis Heard, who was then a fellow-employee but
was shortly thereafter made a foreman . As a result , in the beginning of February,
Jessie Heard telephoned Fred Quatrini , an International representative of the UAW,
and, upon Quatrini s visiting his home, arranged a meeting of the employees at
Padgett 's Bar, a mile or so west of the town of Lake City on U.S. Route 90.
According to the varying estimates of the witnesses , from 30 to 50 employees
attended this meeting in the ballroom behind Padgett 's Bar on February 27. Jessie
Heard introduced Quatrini who outlined a possible organizational campaign if they
were interested and passed out UAW "authorization " cards. From the evidence, it
appears that 21 of the employees signed cards at this time.'1
Following the meeting of February 27, Quatrini held eight more meetings with the
Respondent 's employees before the first representation election on June 1. Thus,
three meetings were held on March 27 and April 19 and 26 at the VFW Hall near the'
center of Lake City on Route 41 , two blocks north of its intersection with Route 90;
an intervening meeting was held on April 5 at Padgett 's Bar because at the last minute
it was learned that the VFW Hall was unavailable on that date ; and four meetings
were held on May 10, 19, 24, and 31 at the Oasis Bar, 5 or 6 miles from downtown
Lake City . Finally Quatrini also held an undisclosed number of employee meetings
after the June 1 election and before the August 10 election at Moose Lodge , the Steak
House Restaurant, and at Al 's Drive-In , all of which are also in the vicinity of Lake
City.
At all of these meetings , and in the period embraced by them, the employees con-
tinued to sign and submit UAW authorization cards. Jessie Heard, who started the
organizational drive, was injured at work on March 21 and was unable to attend any
of the meetings after February 27. At the meeting of March 27 , Quatrini selected
an employees ' committee to continue the organization of the employees and to
arrange further meetings . According to Quatrini's testimony , which I credit, the
following employees accepted his appointment to this committee during the meeting:
Catherine Williams , Howard Wattenbarger, Monroe Lindsay, Betty Phillips, Sarah
Waldron, Bill Godwin , John Batchelor , and Cecil Koon . 12 In passing, it should be
noted that the complaint alleges that , in addition to Jessie Heard, three of these com-
mittee members ( Catherine Williams, Howard Wattenbarger , and Monroe Lindsay)
were later discharged by the Respondent because of their participation in, and support
of, the UAW organizational movement.
The Respondent knew from the beginning that its employees were organizing, On
the evening of February 27, Respondent Vice President William Coley arrived in
Lake City on one of his trips from the Respondent 's home office in Atlanta and was
in Padgett 's Bar while the employees were attending their first UAW meeting in,the
back room . According to his testimony , he had not known there was to be such a
11 See Appendix A The cards and the evidence concerning the signatures of employees
obtained on these cards at this meeting and on subsequent dates are discussed at a later
point in this Decision.
U Quatrini's testimony as to the appointment of Koon to this committee and his ac-
ceptance of the appointment , is credited despite Boon ' s denial
AERO CORPORATION 1297
meeting but merely "stumbled" in on it, without intention of spying. Whether or not
this was so (a matter which will later be considered), Coley testified that, while
driving along Route 90 about 9:30 or 10 p.m., he had seen 20 or 30 cars parked out-
side Padgett's Bar, which was "usually a dead place"; that he went into the bar "to
see if there was a party going on and what it looked like"; that, finding no one at the
bar, he asked the bartender "where the activity was," and the bartender said, "Oh, it
is just a group of Aero people getting together and having a party back there"; that,
from the bartender's answer, the apparent fact "that there was a crowd back there,"
and his "previous information that ... we had problems," Coley "suddenly realized"
that there was a union meeting of Aero employees taking place and, for the first time,
an organizational campaign "of any magnitude"; that Coley ordered a beer and stayed
at the bar; that people began coming out of the back room, including (so far as he
recalled) only three employees whom he knew: Howard Wattenbarger, Jack Black,
and Ben Lindsey; that these three men joined Coley at the bar and had several beers
with him; and that, in a 20-minute conversation in which nobody mentioned the word
"union," or referred to the purpose of the meeting, the men (principally Watten-
barger) told Coley "that they had a problem," that Superintendent Carl Price worked
the men too hard and improperly supervised them, and Coley, in turn, said that the
Respondent, too, was having problems in getting aircraft out, that "the Air Force was
on us," and that he would "check into the situation and see what I could find out
about it." 13
On the morning of February 28, Coley passed on his information about the meeting
to Paul Hansen, the Respondent's Lake City plant manager and Superintendent Price's
superior. According to Hansen, Coley told him "how he came upon the meeting the
night before"; that "it looks like we [have] some personnel ... [who] must be dis-
satisfied"; and, although he could not recall Coley's mentioning any of the other
employees he had seen, that Wattenbarger had spoken to him about this dissatisfac-
tion. From the testimony of Coley and Hansen it appears clear, and I find, that the
Respondent knew at the very time of the first UAW meeting that a substantial number
of the Respondent's Lake City employees had attended a "union" meeting and were
organizing in an effort to deal collectively with the Respondent concerning their work-
ing conditions.
As I have noted, the UAW made its claim of majority and its bargaining request in
a letter mailed to the Respondent on April 9. Although this letter was addressed by
International Representative Quatrini to Hansen at Lake City, the Respondent's letter
of reply on April 16, which has already been quoted in its entirety, was written and
signed by Coley as the Respondent's vice president. As the basis for insisting upon a
Board election, Coley gave only the Respondent's "opinion that our employees do not
desire your union to represent them," and its unwillingness to "assume that you have
captured them "
It is the Respondent's position that Coley's letter merely expressed its honest doubt
as to the UAW's majority and thus justified its insistence upon a Board election. This
is one possible interpretation of the letter. But, in reaching its ultimate conclusion as
to the good or bad faith of the Respondent, the Board must also consider another
possible interpretation suggested both by the language of the letter and the circum-
stances in which it was written For one thing, the Respondent's interpretation
ignores Coley's clear indication in the letter of the Respondent's antagonism to the
possible "capture" or unionization of its employees. From this alone, it could
reasonably be inferred that the Respondent was insisting upon an election, at least in
part, because it would afford an opportunity for it to persuade the employees to vote
against representation by the UAW. In addition, the letter did not express in
unequivocal language, any doubt as to whether the UAW possessed bargaining author-
izations from a majority of the employees. All it did was to assert an opinion that the
employees did not "desire" to be repiesented by the UAW. Accordingly, the letter is
susceptible of the interpretation that, regardless of the number of actual signed UAW
bargaining authorizations, the Respondent challenged reliance upon these authoriza-
tions as demonstrating the "desires" of the subscribing employees and, in the time
provided by the Board's election procedures, would attempt to nullify the authoriza-
tions by appeals to the employees to vote against the UAW. Support for this inter-
pretation, which would indicate that the Respondent was not questioning the UAW's
13 At this point, I am concerned only with the Respondent's knowledge of the union
activity of its employees, its reaction, and general attitude, as shown by the testimony of
the Respondent's witnesses and certain admittedly authentic exhibits. At a later point in
this Decision, I consider differences between Coley's testimony and that of the General
Counsel's witnesses, as to which of the employees spoke with Coley that night, what was
said, and how long Coley's and Wattenbarger's conversation lasted.
770-076-65-vol. 149-83
1298 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
majority in good faith but was attempting to gain time to defeat its claim , is provided
not only by Coley's admitted knowledge of the attendance of a substantial number of
the employees at the first organizational meeting on February 27 and of the dissatis-
faction which prompted their attendance and interest in a union to represent them,
but also by the Respondent's admitted "concern" lest the employees vote for the
UAW, and its admitted, carefully organized, and repeated attempts during the pre-
election periods to persuade them not to do so
According to Coley, the Respondent was "concerned" about the UAW organiza-
tional campaign and, although "it was certainly well known how we felt and that we
[could] do as much for employees without the union as the union [said] it [could] for
the employees," the Respondent wanted to be "sure that our employees were given
the full benefit of the way that we saw things" so "that they could make up their
minds to choose . . . [having] the benefit of ... both sides " To accomplish this in the
period before the first election, Coley and Hansen made a series of "speeches" to the
employees and the supervisors in the Respondent's hangar during working time, posted
several cartoons on the bulletin board, and distributed other printed material to the
employees.
In the speeches, according to Coley (the only witness who testified at all as to their
content), the Respondent's officials "pointed out [to the employees] principally what
benefits they already had . . that they probably wasn't aware of ... what the Com-
pany planned-what the Company's plans were as far as future growth and so forth."
At one of the meetings , 2 or 3 days before the election, Manager Hansen handed out
an eight-page pamphlet, which was blank except for the cover, which bore the title,
"What The Union Can Do For You." In the rest of the printed material which it
posted or delivered directly to the employees with their paychecks, the Respondent,
in broad strokes of ridicule, repugnance, and hostility, attacked the insincerity and
futility of the UAW's promises to the employees; 14 the heavy burden of union dues,
fines, and contributions they must expect to pay; 15 and the prospect of "strikes,"
"layoffs," and "unemployment" for the employees covered by a "union contract" 16
while the "Union Boss' lived luxuriously on the "Union dues" paid by them.17
After the first election and in the week preceding the second, the Respondent also
mailed to each of the employees a mimeographed letter, which bore what purported
to be reproductions of the signatures of Coley, Hansen, and all the supervisors
Hansen testified that "no one person wrote this letter" but that it was "just a composite
of ideas that everyone had " He further testified that "most," but not all, of the
apparent subscribers signed the letter, and that "every person whose signature
[appeared on the letter] had read the letter and signed the master [copy] or concurred
with the fact that they would sign it." Consistent with this testimony, Coley testified
that although he had not signed the letter he had known of its content and had author-
ized the placing of his signature on the letter. Similarly, Willis Heard, who had
become a supervisor in the end of February, testified that he had signed the letter.
But, although Hansen testified specifically that Supervisor Jack Brown had either
signed or authorized the use of his signature as it appears on the letter, Brown testified
that he had not signed the letter, authorized the use of his signature, or, for that
matter, discussed the contents of the letter with anyone. None of the other supervisors
whose names appeared as signatories to the letter were questioned on the subject
The full text of the Respondent's letter to each of its employees was the following:
Dear Aero Associates: On Friday of this week you will again decide whether
you are to pay dues to this Automobile Workers Union in Cocoa Beach, or
whether you are to stand on your own two feet and work hand in hand with the
Company to build this new plant into a place of which we can all be equally
proud.
14 One card, with a sketch of a blindfolded employee, stated simply, "Use your eyes.
Don't be blinded by Union Promises" Another card, showing a skater, warned the em-
ployees, "You are skating on thin ice if you fall for union promises "
ss A slip asking the employee "Wanna buy a de-duck " " suggested that he might not have
much of his pay left.
16A cartoon posted on the bulletin board shows a grocer telling a line of employees who
are tendering him a "union contract": "You can't spend contracts here. It takes wages
to buy groceries ! Come back when you get a job ." Chained to the ankles of three of
the employees are balls labeled "Union goons," "Dues, fines," and "Union crooks." Above
the heads of the employees, dark clouds are shown to represent "Strikes," "Layoffs,"
and "Unemployment "
17 Another cartoon shows a cigar -smoking "Union Boss" grasping the greenbacks being
paid by an employee as "union dues ," and at the same time winning a bejeweled female,
while a chauffeured limousine is parked outside under a palm tree.
AERO CORPORATION 1299
This Union drive has been a long one. You-like we-are tired of hearing
about it. However, none of us can forget how vitally important your decision in
this election will be to you, your families, and the Company. During the Union's
drive to capture you it has tried to sell you distrust and resentment toward your
Management. Why? Simply because the Union has nothing else to sell except
strikes and prolonged bitterness. Neither of which is appealing to you or to us.
The Union in its propaganda has attempted to brand your Management as law
breakers, Indian givers liars and bigots. You know us better than the Union does
and we know you and your interests and desires better than the Union does.
Your Management (Bill, Paul, Luis, Jack, Bea, Virginia, Willis, Haywood, Bob
and Jesse) sometimes make mistakes. We wouldn't be human if we did not.
Your Management is simply and sincerely trying[-]with your help-to build a
going concern out of this Lake City plant. We need your help and confidence.
You do not need to pay any union in order to prosper with this Company.
Remember, that Aero's Atlanta operation tried a union but got rid of it since it
served no useful purpose.
We wish to take this opportunity to thank all of your [sic] for your continued
cooperation and support of this plant. Likewise, we wish to thank all of you
who have voluntarily assured us of your support and confidence in the Company.
We can tell you that a vast majority of you are fed up and disgusted with this
Union. Therefore, wouldn't it be wonderful if all of us voted 100% to again
reject this Union sending it back to its work disruptions at the missile plants.
There is no good reason why you should surrender your rights to this Union
and be confronted with economic strikes and resulting job losses through
replacements.
You will recall that the N.L.R.B. ballots contain two squares. One is marked
"YES" and the other is marked "NO." In order to vote for the Company and
against the Union you should place an "X" in the square marked "NO" as a
majority of you did during the last election. It is important that all of you vote
since the results of the election will be determined by only those casting his or
her ballot.
Sincerely yours,
(s) Bill Coley (s) Paul Hansen (s) Jack N. Brown
(s) Haywood Martin (s) Beatrice Bowman (s) J. Luis Mendenez
(s)
(s)
Willis L. Heard
Robt. Martin
(s) Jesse E. Carter (s) Virginia Young
As will be seen later in this Decision, the persons whose names thus appear as
signatories to the letter include all the supervisors whom the complaint and the
employee witnesses charge with specific acts of interference with the employees'
freedom to join, support, and vote for the UAW in the elections.is Moreover, if the
substance of the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses is believed despite the
supervisors' blunt denials, it would appear not only that the supervisors' conduct
reflected the Respondent's general attitude of hostility to which the supervisors as
well as the employees were certainly exposed,'° but also that the pattern of their
illegal conduct sprang from, and was intended by them to implement, the very attitude
and ideas expressed in the Respondent's cartoons and printed campaign material, and
in the letter to the employees which the Respondent had them sign 'as supervisors.
All of the findings and observations made thus far concerning the Respondent's
campaign to defeat the UAW in the representation elections are based upon the
'$ The complaint alleges, and the General Counsel and counsel for UAW contend, that
Frances Dicks whose name did not appear on the letter, was one of the supervisors who
committed unfair labor practices attributable to the Respondent. But, upon the evi-
dence, I hereinafter conclude that Dicks was not a supervisor.
'B The supervisors must have known of the Respondent's attitude, in view of the super-
visors' attendance with the employees at the "speeches" made by Coley and Hansen in
the Respondent's hangar, the Respondent's posting of its antiunion cartoons, and its gen-
eral distribution of the other printed material to which I have referred So clear was
this from the evidence, that only one of the supervisors, Willis Heard, was directly ques-
tioned on the matter, and his testimony strengthens, rather than weakens, the general
conclusion I have reached. Heard, who had originally been interested with his'-brother,
Jessie, in Inviting the UAW to organize the employees just before he became-a supervisor,
admitted with apparent reluctance on cross-examination, that, since February 27, his
"personal feeling" had been that the Respondent was "opposed to the union " He denied,
however, that either Coley or Hansen had told him that this was so but was either un-
able or unwilling to give the basis for his "personal feeling."
1 300 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
testimony of the Respondent's witnesses and exhibits admitted by them to be authen-
tic. No contention is made by the General Counsel or the UAW that this general,
admitted conduct of the Respondent in its campaign constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice. Nor in view of the provisions of Section 8(c) of the Act, would any such finding
be proper 20 But the Respondent's obvious hostility to the organization of its
employees and the intensity and persistence of its anti-UAW campaign, which are so
clearly shown by its admitted conduct, are relevant, and must therefore be considered,
as a substantial factor in evaluating the good or bad faith of the Respondent in insist-
ing upon a Board election, and also the credibility of Coley, Hansen, and the super-
visors in their denials that they committed the individual acts of interference in
violation of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act, of which they are accused in the complaint
and the testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses.21
C. Surveillance
Reference has been made to the allegations in the complaint that the Respondent
subjected the employees' UAW meetings to surveillance. Vice President Coley's
appearance and presence at Padgett's Bar during the first organizational meeting on
February 27 have already been noted In addition, there was testimony given by
employees that Superintendent Price, Manager Hansen, Test Pilot Rudy Glover, and
Supervisors Haywood Martin and Willis Heard were in the vicinity of the VFW Hall
as employees went to and attended meetings, and that Supervisors Martin and Heard
were in the Oasis Bar at the times the UAW held its meetings there Upon the details
of this testimony, rest the General Counsel's and UAW's charges of surveillance
1. Coley's presence at Padgett's Bar on February 27
As I have noted, Vice President Coley testified that he had no previous information
that a union meeting was being held by the employees at Padgett's Bar on Febru-
ary 27, that he "stumbled" in on the meeting, and that he did not intend to spy upon
the employees' activity. According to his testimony, he had checked into a motel in
Lake City upon his arrival that evening, and then drove a rented car west on Route 90
past Padgett's Bar to the Wayside Inn, a tavern 5 miles or so out of Lake City where
he occasionally took customers for a drink. He had several Scotches and sodas, but,
since "there wasn't much going on," he left the Inn to return to Lake City. His ver-
sion of how he happened to stop off at Padgett's while "looking for a party" on the way
back to Lake City and what he saw and did in Padgett's bar, has already been set forth.
Two of the General Counsel's witnesses-employees Howard Wattenbarger and
Jessie Heard-gave testimony concerning Coley's conversation with the employees
at the bar that night. But no testimony was given as to this matter by either Ben
Lindsey or Jack Black, the two other employees with whom Coley testified that he
had talked on this occasion. Ben Lindsey did not appear as a witness and Black's
testimony was limited to other matters
Wattenbarger testified merely that, in the presence of Lindsey and Black, he and
Coley "talked about the conditions at the plant"; that "we told [Coley] what our
feelings were, and . . the reason that things were so bad, what we thought"; and
that Coley said "he knew he had a bad situation and that they were trying to remedy
it, and just over and over, different things, different problems." While Wattenbarger's
version of the conversation was thus essentially the same as that given by Coley, he
testified that the conversation lasted from 9:30 or 10.30 p in. until after midnight,
and in this respect differed with Coley who, it will be recalled, testified that it was only
a 20-minute conversation. Although Wattenbarger made no reference at all to Jessie
Heard in his testimony about his conversation with Coley, Jessie Heard testified that
he was there at the time and overheard Wattenbarger tell Coley there had been "a
union meeting" in the backroom; that Coley then asked what Wattenbarger thought
about it; that Wattenbarger said, "I can only speak for myself" and, turning to Heard
who had not spoken before this, asked, "What about you, Jessie?" and that Heard
thereupon said, "I thought it was a pretty darned good idea." Heard's testimony thus
conflicted with that of Coley, who testified that the only employees whom he knew
and "could recall" seeing at the bar that night were Wattenbarger, Ben Lindsey, and
Tack Black, and that, although he knew Jessie Heard, he could not "recall" seeing
him there.
20 Except possibly the one cartoon of the Respondent showing "layoffs" as one of the
results of the coverage of employees by a "union contract " See footnote 16, above
' See Hendrix Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. N.L R.B., 321 F. 2d 100, 103-104
(CA 5).
AERO CORPORATION 1301
In view of the apparent loquacity of both Wattenbarger and Coley during their
appearances on the witness stand, I credit Wattenbarger 's testimony that his conversa-
tion with Coley lasted for several hours rather than only 20 minutes as Coley testified.
Were I dealing solely with a conflict between Coley 's and Jessie Heard's testimony, I
should also credit Jessie Heard 's testimony concerning his brief conversation with
Coley. But, absent any explanation for the lack of corroboration of Heard's testimony
by Wattenbarger or Black,'`' who were apparently present at the time, I do not feel
that , by submitting only Heard 's testimony , the General Counsel has satisfied the
burden of proof in this particular matter. In accordance with Coley's testimony, I
therefore find that Coley did not question employees as to their support of the Union
on this occasion , nor speak to Jessie Heard.
There remains , of course , the question of whether Coley's visit to, and continued
presence in the bar until the meeting ended, and his subsequent conversation with the
employees at the bar , constituted surveillance . Coley's explanation of his visit to
Padgett's Bar while the UAW meeting was being held , seems to me to be plausible.
1 credit his testimony that he did not know there was a union meeting there when he
entered the bar, and therefore that he did not then intend to spy upon the union activity
of the employees . Accoiding to his own testimony, however , he stayed in the bar
after he "realized" the employees were holding a union meeting in the backroom until
the employees began drifting out of the meeting , and spoke , and had several beers,
with three of the men whom he knew But even so, it would appear from his testi-
mony that the meeting broke up shortly after he entered the bar Whether he had a
reasonable opportunity to withdraw before the end of the meeting and thus avoid the
possible embarrassment his presence may have caused the employees , is therefore
questionable . In view of the fact that his visit to, and his presence at, the bar were
innocent of any intent to intrude or spy upon the employees , I am not critical of his
staying there for a "few beers " with the three men when they came out of the meeting,
especially since it does not appear that he questioned them or made unfriendly com-
ments upon the purpose of their meeting , Accordingly , I conclude upon the evidence
that Coley did not visit nor remain at Padgett 's Bar on the evening of February 27 for
the purpose of spying upon the employees . I therefore dismiss the allegation in the
complaint that the Respondent , through Coley subjected this UAW meeting of the
employees to its surveillance.
2. Manager Hansen and Test Pilot Glover in the vicinity of the
VFW Hall on April 5
The General Counsel and the UAW rely upon the testimony of a number of
employees as showing that Test Pilot Rudy Glover and Manager Paul Hansen spied
upon them as they gathered at the VFW Hall on the evening of April 5 for a UAW
meeting, which was shifted to Padgett 's Bar because it turned out that the VFW Hall
was unavailable. Upon the evidence of these witnesses, the General Counsel and the
UAW argue that on April 5 Glover first appeared alone at the VFW Hall and then
came back with Hansen At the time, Glover was engaged to Hansen 's-daughter,
whom he later married. The General Counsel contends that he was also a supervisor.
The Respondent -denies that Hansen spied upon the employees on this or any other
occasion , that Glover was a supervisor , or that Glover , whatever he may have done
on April 5, was acting as the Respondent 's agent. Glover, who had been divorced
from Hansen's daughter by the time of the hearing, did not testify . But Hansen
testified that he had dinner at a restaurant with two Air Force officers on April 5, that
he received three telephone calls at the restaurant but no one was on the line when
he answered , and that at no time had he ever watched or spied upon any union
meetings. Hansen also testified that he never requested Glover to attend a union
meeting and that Glover never made any report to him of the names of people who
did attend.
The significance of Glover's conduct on April 5, whatever it was, depends, of
course, upon a determination of whether he was a supervisor . It appears that Glover
was the Respondent 's only test pilot and was paid a monthly salary . He worked
directly under Manager Hansen and had no employees working under him . Follow-
ing completion of work on each aircraft and its passing inspection by the inspectors
of the quality control section , Glover would give the aircraft a preliminary ground, or
"walk-around ," inspection and then test it in flight . The foreman of the flight line
section would assign one of his mechanics "to see Mr. Glover off " If Glover's pre-
Ben Lindsey was apparently not available as a witness and evidence of the authen-
ticity of his signature on a UAW "authorization " said was proffered through the testi-
mony of a handwriting expert
1302 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
liminary inspection revealed "discrepancies," he would point them out to the mechanic
who would immediately correct them if they were "small items." If the discrepancies
were not readily correctable but were not "safety items," Glover would make the
flight and note the discrepancies, and any others he might discover in flight, in his
flight report. If they were "safety" or "Red Cross" items, however, Glover would not
make the flight but, with the inspectors, would report these items, the flight line
mechanics or electricians working under their own foreman would correct the hazard-
ous items, and the aircraft would have to pass a reinspection in the quality control
section before being test-flown by Glover. After the test flights, the mechanics would
correct all discrepancies reported by Glover and the craft would then be reinspected
in these particulars, but, unless the quality control section required it, the aircraft
would not be reflown by Glover but would be delivered to the Air Force inspectors.
According to Flight Line Supervisor Jesse Carter, upon whose testimony this summary
of Glover's duties and performance is based, the work necessary to correct the dis-
crepancies reported by Glover was done by the mechanics and electricians in the flight
line section and Glover played no part in seeing that it was done as he thought it
should be done
In his argument, the General Counsel stresses the fact that in every case a mechanic
was assigned to see Glover off on his flight and, when possible before the flight, cor-
rected "small items" pointed out to him by Glover He also relies upon the testimony
of two of his witnesses that Glover at times gave order s to employees Thus, Howard
Wattenbarger, an inspector in the quality control section, testified that Glover told
him to do certain work on one occasion, that Wattenbarger refused, saying it was not
his job and Glover could do it himself, and that shortly thereafter Quality Control
Supervisor Jack Brown told Wattenbarger the incident had been reported to Hansen
by Glover, and warned Wattenbarger that he had been talking too much and should
be careful what he said and to whom he said it And employee Monroe Lindsay
testified he had not only seen Glover giving instructions to employee Cecil Koon to do
a certain checkout on an aircraft, but that Lindsay himself had received orders from
Glover and had obeyed them because he felt that Glover could have "made it hard
for him "
Upon this evidence, I cannot find that Glover had authority responsibly to direct
the work of employees with whom he came into contact and that he was a supervisor
within the meaning of the Act. His general duties and his performance show that
his function, like that of the inspectors, was simply to report "discrepancies" which
were then corrected by the mechanics or electricians woi king under the supervision of
the flight line section The minor repairs made by the flight line mechanic, when
small items were pointed out to him by Glover, were apparently routine. And the
testimony of Wattenbarger and Lindsay as to instances in which Glover did give
orders or instructions do not reasonably support any inference that he had authority
to do so. At most they would indicate Glover's own sense of importance based pos-
sibly not only upon the uniqueness of his job but his personal relationship to Manager
Hansen. I conclude, therefore, that Glover was not a supeivisor.
It is undisputed that Glover attempted to attend the UAW meeting on April 5.
According to the uncontradicted testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses. Glover
walked up to a group of the employees and UAW Representative Fred Quatrini while
they were standing outside the VFW Hall that evening. Introducing himself to
Quatrini. Glover said he wanted to go to the meeting. Quatrini remarked that Glover
was a salaried man, that the UAW would not be representing him, and that Quatrini
did not believe Glover should attend the meeting. Quatrini did not tell Glover, as he
told the other employees, that the meeting would actually be held at Padgett's Bar.
After his conversation with Quatrini, Glover left the VFW Hall and drove south
on Route 41. In view of the testimony as to what happened thereafter, it should be
noted that the VFW Hall stands on a terrace on the west side of Route 41, two short
blocks north of its intersection with Route 90. These two routes are the main
thoroughfares in Lake City and in this area, including the location of the VFW Hall,
Route 41 is a four-lane highway with a dividing strip several feet wide between the
northbound and southbound lanes.
According to employee Wattenbarger, he and employee Cecil Koon followed
Glover in Koon's car but, on being stopped by a traffic light at the intersection of
Routes 41 and 90, they lost sight of Glover. Wattenbarger and Koon then turned east
on Route 90, and thus in the direction they had seen Glover turn, and drove to
Manager Hansen's home Wattenbarger testified that they saw a car standing there,
with its door open, but he did not know whose car it was.
According to several of the General Counsel's witnesses, including Wattenbarger,
a short time later they saw Hansen driving the Respondent's station wagon, a Volks-
wagen, on Route 41. Wattenbarger testified that, as Koon and he were driving north
AERO CORPORATION 1303
on Route 41 and approaching Route 90, they saw Hansen drive into the intersection
from the east on Route 90 (and thus from the general direction of his home), and
turn north on Route 41 toward the VFW Hall, but that they did not follow him
because they turned west on Route 90 to the meeting which they knew was actually
being held at Padgett's Bar. But employee Emma Lou Gray, after showing uncer-
tainty as to whether it was on April 5 or on another occasion when she attended a
meeting at the VFW Hall, testified that as she parked her car in front of the VFW
Hall on the west side of Route 41 on the evening of April 5, she saw Hansen di ive the
Respondent's station wagon slowly north on Route 41 past the VFW Hall, that
Hansen had a passenger who "looked like" Glover, but that it was dark and she could
not be sure it was Glover. Employee Peyton Yopp, the General Counsel's remaining
witness to this incident, testified that about 7:30 or 7:45 p.m. on April 5 he was
standing on the north side of the VFW Hall with a number of other employees be foie
they left for the meeting at Padgett's Bar; that he saw Hansen drive .south on Route
41; that Hansen had a passenger, but Yopp could not say who it was; and that I-iansen
turned right into the street between the VFW Hall and Route 90 and a little later
repassed the VFW Hall, again traveling south on Route 41.
As I have noted, Hansen squarely denied that he spied upon the employees' meetings
on this or any other occasion. Since Route 41 was one of the two main thoroughfares
in town, the mere possibility that Hansen may have been seen driving past the VFW
Hall and even (as Yopp alone testified) repassing the hall, would not in my opinion
indicate that he was spying upon the employees. The significance of the testimony of
the General Counsel's witnesses depends upon whether it shows not only that Hansen
drove past, and then repassed the VFW Hall on April 5, but also that he was accom-
panied by Glover who had unsuccessfully attempted to attend the UAW meeting
earlier in the evening.
The testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses does not furnish a satisfactory
basis for such a finding. Wattenbarger, although suspicious that Glover had driven
directly to Hansen's home to report the union meeting, was unable to testify that the
car he and Koon saw at Hansen's home was Glover's car. Moreover, in spite of his
suspicion and his consequent alertness to the possibility that Glover might be with
Hansen, Wattenbarger testified merely that a short time later he saw Hansen drive
north on Route 41 toward the VFW Hall. Although Gray and Yopp both testified
that Hansen had a passenger when they saw him, neither could identify the passenger
as Glover. Not only did Gray testify that it was too dark for her to see well enough
to be sure, but as I have noted she seemed uncertain even as to whether the incident
which she described occurred on April 5 or on another occasion when she attended a
meeting at the VFW Hall. On this state of the record, I cannot find that, following
his attempt to attend the union meeting, Glover accompanied Hansen. Nor, there-
fore, do I find that, by driving along Route 41 on that evening, Hansen spied upon
the gathering of employees at the VFW Hall
In sum, the evidence does not show that Glover was a supervisor or agent of the
Respondent in attempting to attend the UAW meeting on April 5, that he reported
the meeting to Hansen, or that Hansen' (alone or in the' company of Glover) then
spied upon the gathering of the employees that evening. Accordingly, I conclude that
there has been, no showing that the Respondent, acting through Hansen, Glover, or
both of them, subjected the UAW gathering or meeting of the employees to surveil-
lance I therefore dismiss the allegations of the complaint to this effect.
3. Supervisors Willis Heard and Haywood Martin and the UAW meetings at the
'VFW Hall and the Oasis Bar'
Upon the testimony of their witnesses, the General Counsel and the UAW also
assert that Supervisors Willis Heard and Haywood Martin spied upon the employees'
meetings at the VFW Hall in April and at the Oasis Bar in May.
In the first of these incidents, it appears from both employee Howard Watten=
barger's and Supervisor Heard's testimony that Wattenbarger was standing alone in
front of the VFW Hall on the evening of April 5 before UAW Representative
Quatrini or any of the other employees had arrived, and that Heard, having driven
past on Route 41, came back, spoke briefly to Wattenbarger, and left before Quatrini
and the employees came. Heard testified that Wattenbarger had called to him as he
passed; that he asked Wattenbarger "what in the hell he was doing there"; that
Wattenbarger said they were supposed to have a union meeting but they were planning
to move it to Padgett's Bar; that a car pulled up along side the hall and Wattenbarger
said, "There's the organizer now"; and that Heard then left, saying, "Well, since your
wheels are here, I will go " In his testimony, Wattenbarger did not relate any of the
conversation except Heard's parting remark. At first, he testified that Heard said, "He
1304 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
had better be going, that maybe his brother [Jessie] would come by and see him." On
cross-examination , however, he testified that Heard said he had to leave before "some
of the big gears got there."
No matter which version of the witnesses is accurate , I see no basis in this incident
for a finding of surveillance . The men knew each other ; Wattenbarger was standing
there alone as Heard drove by on the main highway; there is nothing in the evidence
to suggest that Heard knew or suspected there was to be a union meeting there that
night ; and so , without attributing any improper reason to Heard, it was quite natural
for him to stop ( whether Wattenbarger called him or not ) and to ask Wattenbarger
why he was standing there . In my opinion , the evidence does not show that Heard
intended to spy upon a union meeting or gathering of the employees , and I reject
the General Counsel's contention that Heard 's conduct on this occasion constituted
surveillance.
As to another incident on April 26 , employee William Godwin testified that Super-
visor Haywood Martin drove his car around the block, and thus around the VFW Hall,
but the details of his testimony are confusing According to Godwin , while standing
at the door of the VFW Hall that evening , he first saw Martin driving north on Route
41 past the hall which is located on the southwest corner of Madison Street and
Route 41, one block north of the intersection of Route 41 and Orange Street.23
Although Godwin testified that Martin circled the block, he first testified that Martin
turned west on Madison Street , but then he testified that Martin made a U-turn on
Route 41, diove south past the VFW Hall , and came back east on Madison Street
to Route 41.
In his testimony , Martin denied having driven around the block at any time when
he knew a union meeting was being held at the VFW Hall. In any case , even if
Martin had circled the block , his doing so would not indicate that he was spying on
the employees For, although Godwin testified that he believed Martin then lived in
another section of town , it appears clear from Martin 's testimony that, since March 7,
he had been living on Oiange Street and within the same block as the VFW Hall.
There is thus no reasonable basis for inferring from his driving in the neighborhood
on this occasion and even his circling of the block including the VFW Hall, that he
was spying on the employees ' meeting at the VFW Hall I therefore dismiss the
allegation of the complaint so far as this incident may be relied by the General
Counsel
A closer question is presented by Supervisors Heard's and Haywood Martin's
presence in the bar at the Oasis at the times of several of the UAW meetings in May.
It is undisputed that Heard on one occasion , and both of these supervisors on another
occasion , sat and drank in the bar area while a meeting was being held in the rear
room, that employees entered and left the meeting through the bar, and that some of
the employees lingered in the bar and spoke with the supervisors . One of these
employees , Thomas May, testified ( and Heard admitted in his similar version of the
conversation ) that May spoke to Heard; that May "was just kidding [Heard] about
taking my name down where he could turn me in . . . that I just asked him if he got
my name"; and that Heard "made out like he was writing on his pad or something,
on his hand." Payton Yopp , another employee , testified that in another conversation
with both Heard and Martin , during which they offered him a drink , he asked them,
"What you fellows doing out here; aren ' t you lost?" and that they replied , "No,,they
wanted to see what was going on." Martin , however, testified that he had only one
conversation with Yopp at the Oasis Bar, and denied telling Yopp he had just come
out to see what was going on.
Both Heard and Martin testified , and were corroborated by the proprietor of the
bar, that they had been regular weekly patrons of the Oasis Bar for the preceding 6
months, although employee Catherine Williams testified that on the many previous
occasions she and her husband had been there , she had never seen either of them.
Finally, Heard and Martin denied that they knew of the union meetings before they
went to the Oasis on the several occasions with which we are now concerned
Upon consideration of this testimony , I credit the supervisors ' and the owner of the
Bar's testimony that Heard and Martin had been regular patrons of the Oasis Bar
and conclude that their visits to the bar on the occasions of the UAW meetings in
May do not , in themselves , suggest that they were there to spy on the employees. As
for the remarks made by the supervisors , or allegedly made by them to the employees,
I have no doubt that, by this time in May , the employees were uneasy about the
presence of the supervisors because of the Respondent 's open campaign against the
UAW as well as other intervening incidents which I discuss in the next section of this
23 The names of these streets were eventually furnished by other witnesses Godwin re-
ferred to Madison Street as the dirt road immediately adjacent to the VFW IIall
AERO CORPORATION 1305
Decision and which involved these two supervisors and other representatives of the
Respondent. And for this reason, the supervisors' statements at the Oasis Bar may
well have confirmed fears that the supervisors were there to spy upon the employees,
and even have constituted interference violative of Section 8 (a)( 1 ) of the Act. But
the narrow question which must now be decided is whether the supervisors were
actually at the Oasis Bar for the purpose of spying as the complaint alleges When
appraised from an objective standpoint and not from the naturally suspicious stand-
point of the employees, the supervisors' answers to the employees' questions appear to
me to be flip, jocular remarks (albeit injudicious and improper) rather than indica-
tions of an actual sinister intent on the part of the supervisors
Accordingly, although the matter is not free from doubt, I conclude that neither
Supervisors Willis Heard's and Haywood Martin's presence in the Oasis Bar at the
times of UAW meetings in May, nor their remarks to employees on these occasions,
warrant an inference that the Respondent subjected these meetings to surveillance. I
therefore dismiss the allegations of the complaint to this effect. However, I note, in
passing, that the evidence does show that on these occasions the two supervisors did
in fact have the opportunity of learning (if they did not already know) the identity of
a considerable number of the UAW's adherents among the employees
4. Superintendent Carl Price and the VFW meetings on March 27 and
April-19 and 26
The remaining incidents of surveillance alleged in the complaint involved Superin-
tendent Carl Price. Price was employed by the Respondent as superintendent and
was second in chaige of the Lake City plant from sometime in January 1962 until
mid-April 1962. It was principally Price's supervision of the plant and his unsatis-
factory relationship with the employees which were criticized by the employees at the
first UAW meeting on February 27. According to Vice President Coley, he received
many complaints from employees about Price and when he checked into the matter,
he concluded, although without medical opinion, that Price was "suffering ... from
some mental problem." Consequently, after Coley and Manager Hansen conferred,
they "forced" Price to resign in April.
A number of employees testified that while Price was still superintendent, he not
only drove slowly past the VFW Hall while the employees were going to and attend-
ing the UAW meetings on March 27 and April 19 and 26, but parked directly opposite
and also alongside the hall for periods of 20 and 30 minutes, and, while parked,
leaned over from his position at the wheel of the car, thus providing himself with a
better view of the entrance to the hall and the employees who were there 24
Price did not testify. Manager Hansen testified that he never told Price to watch
any union meetings and that Price never reported the names of employees who were
attending the meetings. Hansen admitted, however, that Price did tell him that "he
had observed a meeting being held at the Armory . . [and that] he saw one of the
-girls from the inspection ... [department] come out of the meeting. "
Crediting the substance of the testimony, of the employees, I believe it clear, from
Price's conduct on Maich 27 and April 19 and 26, that he spied upon the employees
attending the UAW meetings at the VFW Hall on these dates. Accordingly, I find
that the Respondent, through its plant superintendent, subjected these meetings to
surveillance and thereby committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of
Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
D. Interference , restraint, and coercion
The complaint alleges that Vice President Coley, Manager Hansen , and the
Respondent 's supervisors and agents interfered with, restrained , and coerced the
employees in the exercise of their right to support and vote for the UAW ,as their
bargaining representative in the elections conducted by the Board on June 1 and
August 10 . It is undisputed that , in addition to Coley and Hansen, all but two of the
persons about whose acts and statements the employees testified , were supervisors
within the meaning of Section 2 ( 11) of the Act . Two two exceptions were Rudy
Glover, the test pilot (who I have already held was not a supervisor ), and Frances
Dicks, who was the tool crib attendant.
The evidence shows simply that Dicks was in charge of the tool crib, issued tools
on requisition , and accepted their return after use . She had no employees working
under her and issued no orders . There was some evidence that in one instance she
za This summary of the employees' testimony is based upon a composite of the con-
sistent and uncontradicted testimony of employees Karen Ash, Harry Lovett, William
Godwin, Patricia Adams, Gaylon Roberts, Catherine Williams, Mildred Easterwood, Jacob
Cathey, Pearl Hamilton , Thomas May, and Nevin Nettles.
1306 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
recommended the hire of two women employees by Manager Hansen, but it seems
clear that in doing so, she did no more than any other employee might have done and
that her recommendations were unsolicited and of no special weight. While there is
also evidence that she was strongly opposed to the UAW, attacked the UAW in con-
versations with other employees, and gave information at times to Hansen concerning
employees who were apparently in favor of the UAW, I credit Hansen's testimony
that this was purely voluntary on her part. In short, I conclude, contrary to the
General Counsel's contention, not only that Dicks was not a supervisor, but that she
did not act as the Respondent's agent in her conduct opposing the UAW and giving
information to Hansen about the UAW's adherents.
Since the evidence also does not show that Test Pilot Glover was acting as a super-
visor or agent for the Respondent, I shall not discuss the evidence of the comparatively
few incidents in which he or Dicks were alleged to have interfered with the employees'
voting and other organizational rights, but shall, without more, dismiss the allegations
of the complaint that, through either of these people, the Respondent committed
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act
Thei e was a great amount of testimony given by employees concerning interference
with, restraint upon, and coercion of the employees by Vice President Coley, Manager
Hansen, and the men who the Respondent admits were its supervisors within the
meaning of the Act. In most of the numerous incidents, Coley, Hansen, or the super-
visors simply denied the accusations; in others, they offered differing versions of
explanations; but, in some cases, the testimony of the employees was undenied.
In evaluating the conflicting testimony, I have consideied not only the demeanor
of the witnesses, but also the accumulation of testimony given by a substantial number
of different employees as to similar but separate incidents involving the same super-
visors In addition, a material background is provided by the Respondent's obvious
hostility to the UAW's representation of its employees, shown by the Respondent's
letter rejecting the UAW's bargaining request, the cartoons it posted on the bulletin
board, the painted material it distributed, and its letter to the employees, signed by its
vice president, its plant manager, and all the supervisors Finally, although the
Respondent avoided making any supporting threats or promises in these tangible,
producible, and therefore undeniable expressions of its hostility, it appears to me that
the overwhelming detail of the employees' testimony reveals a persistent, supple-
mentary pattern of oral interrogation, threats, and promises which, with the greater
freedom encouraged by an anticipated difficulty of proof, were built upon, and
deliberately extended and implemented, the Respondent's more guarded printed or
written expressions. As will appear in my detailed findings upon tte employees' testi-
mony, Coley, Hansen, and the supervisors not only made their threats against the
evident background of the Respondents' hostility, but in a number of instances
developed their threats by basing them upon ideas which the Respondent had
expressed in its cartoon, its printed material, and the letter to the employees, e.g., the
futility of expecting any help from the UAW and the fact (as asserted in the letter)
that "Aero's Atlanta operation tried a union but got rid of it since it served no useful
purpose " 25
Upon the foregoing considerations , I generally credit the testimony of the employees
concerning interference , restraint , and coercion , despite denials or explanations in
many instances by Coley, Hansen, and the supervisors. Upon the testimony of the
employee in each case and despite denials or attempted explanations by the Respond-
ent's witnesses , I make the following findings: 26
Interrogation
1. On February 28, the day after the first UAW meeting at Padgett's Bar, Foreman
Haywood Martin asked employees Jessie Heard and Gene Swilley whether they had
been invited to the meeting and, when they said they had attended the meeting, Martin
asked what they thought about it, how many people were there, and what was said.
^ In effect, Vice President Coley testified that a union which the Respondent had recog-
nized and contracted with for several years in Atlanta had abandoned its representation
of the Atlanta employees. In accordance with this testimony, I find that this union, and
not the Respondent, was responsible for the termination of their relationship. From the
letter to its Lake City employees, however, and from the testimony of several of the em-
ployee witnesses, which I hereinafter credit, it appears to me and I find that, regardless
of the fact, the Respondent in attempting to defeat the UAW at Lake City, intended to
create the impression that the Respondent "had got rid" of the Atlanta union
26 Unless otherwise indicated in the footnote, each of these incidents was bluntly denied
by the particular supervisor or other representative of the Respondent
AERO CORPORATION 1307
2. Foreman Haywood Martin also asked another employees, Wendell O'Steen,
whether he thought the Union could do any good and whether he had attended any
meetings and, upon O'Steen 's affirmative answers, said that he didn't blame O'Steen
for going but he should hear both sides of the story.
3 At the time employee Doyle Devereaux was hired in May, Foreman Haywood
Martin asked him what his "feelings were towards the union or non-union employ-
ment" and Devereaux replied he had had both types of employment and that although
he had been a union member he had not been active.27
4. On August 9, the day before the second Board election, Formean Haywood
Martin asked employee Wendell McKenny, a porter, whether he knew anything about
the Union and, when McKenny said he knew a little bit, Martin said that McKenny
had a year-round job and "if [he] voted for the union, there would be layoffs and
strikes."
5 On the same day, August 9, Foreman Haywood Martin asked employee Elvin
Simmons, another porter, how he felt about the Union. Simmons told Martin that
he knew how Martin felt, that he would help Martin, and that he would speak to
Roosevelt James, another employee who was a good friend Martin asked Simmons
to talk to James, said, "The damn union wasn't no good, they didn't want to do
nothing but get into your pocket"; and said Simmons would get a raise of 10 cents
per hour.
Interrogation and Threats
6. In February or March, Foreman Haywood Martin asked employee Thomas
May what he thought the union would get him and, upon May's saying he thought it
might help a little bit, Martin said that if the Union came in, the Company could
pack up and leave.
7. In April, about the time of one of the UAW's meetings at the VFW Hall, Fore-
man Haywood Martin asked employee Nevin Nettles how he felt about the Union
and, upon Nettles' indicating he was neutral, Martin said "something about the plant
may close down here ... leave Lake City and go back to Georgia or go somewhere." 28
8. In a later conversation before the first Board election on June 1, Foreman Hay-
wood Martin asked the same employee , Nevin Nettles, whether he had been to the
union meetings , and, upon receiving an affirmative answer, told Nettles "that the
company would not sign a contract even if the union came in ... they would keep
holding out . . . [they] would keep their negotiators negotiating . . . and wouldn't
never sign a contract with the union." 29
9 Early in April and at approximately weekly intervals thereafter until sometime
in May, Foreman Haywood Martin asked employee Gaylon Roberts how he felt about
the Union On the first occasion, Roberts said he hadn't decided and Martin said the
union problem had been one of the causes of the Company's leaving Atlanta and
coming to Lake City. In May, Roberts told Martin he thought they would be better
off having a union, and Martin told Roberts, then and also in several later conversa-
tions during the next 2 or 3 weeks, that if the Union came in there the Company would
fold up and leave.
2T Haywood Martin did not deny this particular incident and , on the basis of Devereaux's
testimony , I find that it occurred as I have set it forth in the text
There were two other incidents in which an Amos Ratcliff and a Robert Williams testi-
fied that, upon applying for employment in May, they were questioned about their attitude
toward unions . Rateliff testified he was interviewed by a "Mr . Martin" but could not
otherwise identify him although Ratcliff was hired and worked at the plant for 2 or 3
weeks Williams , who was not hired , testified merely that his interviewer was someone
other than Manager Hansen Foreman Haywood Martin testified that he could not recall
interviewing Ratcliff. Foreman Robert Martin gave no testimony concerning his inter-
views of applicants for employment . Obviously , from Rateliff ' s and Williams ' testimony,
it is impossible to identify the interviewer or interviewers . It might , of course, be in-
ferred from their testimony that , in each case , the interviewer , whoever he was, was the
Respondent ' s agent , whether a supervisor or not. But, in view of my findings of the
many other incidents to which the General Counsel ' s witnesses gave full and definite testi-
mony I do not feel that these two particular incidents are especially important. Although
the matter is not free from doubt , I make no findings that the Respondent ' s interviewer
questioned Ratcliff or Williams concerning their attitude toward unions
28 Martin ' s attention was not directed to this incident during his testimony and he
therefore did not deny it occurred
21 Martin denied telling any employee that the Company would not sign a contract. His
attention was not directed to the fact that such a statement was attributed to him by
Nettles.
1308 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
10. In May, Foreman Willis Heard asked employee Emma Lou Gray why she
hadn't attended one of the UAW meetings at the Oasis Bar . She had attended one
such meeting but missed one.) Gray said she had been unable to go to this meeting
and Heard asked her if she had changed her mind. She said she "hadn't made up [her]
mind one way or the other." The foreman then said he "didn't think the union
would do no good because he thought the plant might [or] would close "
11. Late in May and just before the June 1 election, Foreman Haywood Martin
visited employee Monroe Lindsay at a Sunoco gasoline station where Lindsay was
working on a part-time job.30 There being no customers present at the time, Lindsay
got into Martin's car at the latter's invitation and may have had a drink with Martin.
Martin then asked Lindsay how he felt about the Union and, upon Lindsay's saying
he had always been for it, Martin asked him not to vote in the June 1 election.
Lindsay replied that he intended to vote, whereupon Martin said, "Well, if the union
comes in here, the company will have to leave here or close up this plant." 31
Other Threats
12. Employee Jessie Heard, the instigator of the UAW campaign among the
employees, was hurt at the plant on March 21 and, during a stay at a hospital in
Thomasville, Georgia, was visited by his brother, Foreman Willis Heard. Foreman
Heard, speaking of "the union business," told Jessie "he thought he had it pretty well
talked down"; that "the company had given him authority to fire anyone that he saw
participating in the union activities and . . he intended to carry out his obligations";
that it was "a lot easier to talk it down" with Jessie away; that he "was attending all
of the union meetings, not inside the meeting itself, but close enough . . to where he
could see everyone that did attend"; and that "he was making sure that the company
knew who all did attend these meetings." 32
13. On April 26 employee Bill Godwin told Foreman Haywood Martin he had
been subpenaed for the hearing in the representation case that day. Martin said,
"You can just forget the subpena, that doesn't mean nothing," and asked Godwin
how many cards had been signed. Godwin said that the hearing that day was based
on a vote at a meeting he had attended. Martin left Godwin, walked off toward a
coffee machine where Manager Hansen was standing, and then returned to Godwin
to whom he said, "Bill, that is a good way to get yourself in trouble ... the company
beat the union in Atlanta and it can beat it in Lake City." 33
.;o Monroe Lindsay later cast a challenged ballot in the June 1 election . The Respondent
contends that, at the time of Martin ' s visit at the Sunoco station late in May , Lindsay
was no longer an employee of the Respondent It argues that , because of an indefinite
estimate of the period of Lindsay ' s disability resulting from an injury at work in the
plant in April , Manager Hansen had terminated Lindsay ' s employment earlier in May
In a later section of this Decision , I find and conclude upon the pertinent evidence that
the Respondent , discriminatorily discharged Lindsay because of his support of the UAW
and that, within the meaning of the Act , he remained an employee of the Respondent
although on leave because of his disability Accordingly , I have further concluded that
lie was entitled to vote as an employee in the Board elections on June 1 and August 10
and that , as shown by the incident now set forth in the text, Foreman Martin was con-
cerned as to whether , and how , he would attempt to vote in the June 1 election
31 Lindsay also testified that in this conversation he referred to his recent discharge
(see preceding footnote ), saying , "If they had a union, I wouldn ' t be hurting like I was,"
and that Martin said lie could understand Lindsay ' s position
In crediting Lindsay ' s testimony as to this incident , I have considered and rejected
Haywood Martin's version of the conversation . Martin testified that while driving past
the gas station after work , he saw Lindsay with whom he had had friendly drinks in the
past ; that he stopped to offer Lindsay a drink from a pint he had just bought; that
Lindsay joined him for a drink in the car ; that neither the Union nor the election was
mentioned ; that Lindsay said , "You know , I think I got a rotten deal out there [at the
plant] " ; and that Martin replied , "Well, I don ' t know anything about that "
32 Foreman Heard testified that, on this visit, Jessie spoke about suing the Respondent
and that lie attempted to dissuade Jessie He denied that he made any of the statements
attributed to him by Jessie and found in the text, or, for that matter, that the Union
was mentioned at all.
33 Martin admitted having had many conversations about the Union with employees,
including Godwin , in the course of which he said he did not think "we needed a union
and what I had seen of it . . . brought nothing but trouble ." He also testified that he
knew Godwin had been subpenaed in the representation case, that Godwin had men-
AERO CORPORATION 1309
14 A few weeks before the June 1 election , Vice President William Coley, while
being driven to the Lake City plant by employee Harvard Sandlin , told Sandlin that
he (Coley ) "was in charge of bringing the contracts to Lake City"; that "whether
another contract [was] brought to Lake City depended on whether the union went in
there or not"; and that Coley had had a "bad experience with the union in Atlanta " 34
15 Just before the second election on August 10 , Foreman Willis Heard said to
employee Jack Black , an outspoken union adherent , that "the best way for [him] to get
laid off, was . . . to keep campaigning for the union :" Before this , the foreman had
frequently spoken with Black , mostly during May and July, about "the trouble they
had with the union in Atlanta ," and had said that Black "would be a good company
man if [he] would change over." 35
Promises
16 On or about May 15, employee Jessie Heard, the instigator of the UAW move-
ment, who was recovering from injuries suffered at the plant on March 21 , visited
Manager Paul Hansen at the Lake City plant and asked if his job was available.
Manager Hansen said his job was available whenever the doctor released him and
that a 25-cent -an-hour raise was also waiting for him "providing this union didn't get
voted in, but if the union was voted in, he could move out of the State overnight." 36
17. In May, Foreman Robert Martin invited employee Monroe Lindsay, his lead
elects ician , to have a cup of coffee and asked Lindsay how he felt about the Union.
Lindsay said he thought the Union was a good thing for the Company . Martin then
told Lindsay it would be to Lindsay 's advantage to talk to the employees against the
Union since Lindsay was next in line for the foreman 's position . Lindsay replied that
if the foremen received no more than Martin did , Lindsay did not want the job, and
that there was no use trying "to convince the people against the union because they
have their minds made up." 37
tioned the subpena at lunchtime , and that Godwin had taken time off without permission
although Martin did not report his absence because he knew "that it was something
[Godwin ] had to do ." Finally, Martin denied that lie had any conversation with °-dwin
about the subpena
Although I credit Godwin ' s testimony and make the finding set forth in the text, I make
no finding as to another incident just before or after the Board election on June 1, in
which , according to Godwin , he heard Foreman Haywood Martin asked by several em -
ployees, "What about the sponsors or supporters of the union v ' and Martin ' s reply:
"They would probably be replaced by nonunion supporters " As to this latter incident,
Godwin admitted that he did not hear the beginning of the conversation Although
Martin did not testify concerning this incident , the record does not present the full con-
versation , either through the testimony of Godwin or the testimony of any of the other
employees who may have been present.
This version of the conversation as given by Sandlin is credited . In substance, Coley
testified that he merely told Sandlin "that I had been to St Louis looking at some Army
contracts that we hoped to get " , that "the selling and getting contracts wasn ' t an easy
thing" , that "I would much prefer to be out selling and trying to get contracts . .
[rather] than . . . trying to settle our differences and disputes"; and that "you have
got to have a harmonious operation in order to prove to [the Air Force ] that you have . . .
production when they give you a contract ." Coley further testified that he did not tell
Sandln he could bring the contracts to Lake City or have them performed in Atlanta,
although Sandlin "could easily have drawn [such a] conclusion " from what Coley said.
P Foreman Heard denied that he had any conversation with Black about the Union
although he heard Black talking to the porters in favor of the Union and told him to
stop talking "where they work [and] where he had no damned business" to be
36 The instant finding as to this conversation is based upon Jessie Heard 's testimony.
Foreman Heard, in his testimony , confirmed the fact that his brother , Jessie, visited the
plant in May. Manager Hansen , however , testified that the next , conttict he had with
Jessie Heard after his injury isas on June 1, the date of the election He further testi-
fied that he did not recall Jessie ' s coming to the plant in May, nor any conversation in
which he told Jessie his job was still waiting and he would have a 25-cent -an-hour raise.
He also denied warning Heard that if the Union were voted in, the Company already had
prepared to move out of,the State overnight.
37 Foreman Robert Martin admitted asking Lindsay what effect Lindsay thought the
Union would have on operations and that Lindsay said there would be no difference "be-
cause there was nothing to be done , that people ' s minds were made up and what ever
would be would be " • Martin further testified that this was the full conversation and
denied asking Lindsay how he or other employees felt about the Union. ,
1310 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
18. Two weeks before the June 1 election and just after Monroe Lindsay had been
injured, Foreman Robert Martin made employee Russell Horne his assistant in
Lindsay's place. In telling Horne, Martin said that employment at Aero was "a
hometown thing"; that if the Union came in other people would be "coming over and
taking our jobs"; that if Horne helped Martin "put the union out," he could have
Lindsay's job; and, finally, that making Horne his assistant, he expected Horne to do
what he could to keep the Union out.38
19. After the first election of June 1, Foreman Haywood Martin told employee
Doyle Devereaux he was to receive a 10-cent-an-hour raise and asked Devereaux what
were then his feelings about the Union.39 Devereaux said he thought the Union was
a good thing but added that he would not say whether he intended to vote for the
Union. Martin then asked Devereaux what employee Dave Morris thought and
Devereaux said he did not know. Morris and Devereaux lived at the same place 40
20. On Thursday, August 9, the day before the second election, Foreman Haywood
Martin asked employee Kendrick McGuire, a porter, about the Union. McGuire said
"the union was all right for those who believed in it." After standing there a few
minutes, Martin told McGuire he would get a nickel raise the following Monday.41
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, I conclude that, before the June 1 election and
between that time and the August 10 election, the Respondent, through Vice President
Coley, Manager Hansen, and its foremen, interrogated employees concerning their
interest in and support of the UAW, informed them that their union meetings were
under surveillance, threatened to lay off employees or close or move the plant out of
Lake City if the UAW were successful in the elections, and promised raises and
promotions to employees if they did not vote for the UAW or if they would assist
the Respondent in discouraging other employees from supporting or voting for the
UAW in the elections. I further conclude that the Respondent thereby- interfered
with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the free exercise of their rights
guaranteed by Section 7 of the Act and, specifically, in the free exercise of their right
to support and vote for the UAW in the Board elections, and thus committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.42
38 Foreman Robert Martin denied telling Horne he could try out for Lindsay's job if
lie would help the Company against the Union. He testified that all he told Horne was
that "we was going to need a man to take Monroe Lindsey's [sic] place and that he had
worked with Lindsey [sic] in this position on some occasions, also, I wanted him to try
the position and if he could do it, it would mean a pay increase to him and he would
also be considered the assistant foreman of the night shift "
39 Upon Devereaux's hire in May, Martin had asked him the same question and
Devereaux had said that in previous employment he had been a union member but had
not been active. (See item 1, above )
40 Foreman Haywood Martin denied that there was any reference to the Union when he
notified Devereaux and Morris that they would receive raises or that he asked them at any
time about their union activities or those of any other employee. Martin further testi-
fied, in substance, that the only conversation about the Union in which both he and
Devereaux took part was at Webb's Bar. At that time, according to Martin, Devereaux
and Morris were kidding Jack Black, saying that Black would make a good union steward,
and Martin merely joined in.
41 Foreman Haywood Martin denied that he had any conversation with McGuire about
the Union or union activities. He testified that he informed McGuire of a raise but said
nothing else.
42 In making the basic findings of fact and unfair labor practices set forth in the text,
I have generally credited the testimony of the employee witnesses concerning the Re-
spondent 's interference , except in one instance involving employee Pearl Hamilton and
Foreman Luis Menendez, with which I deal separately in my later consideration of
Hamilton's discharge.
There was credible testimony given by employees concerning other incidents in which
the General Counsel contends the Respondent also interfered with the employees' rights in
violation of Section 8(a) (1) of the Act. Some of this testimony and the incidents to
which it relates, have already been mentioned in the footnotes . In addition , there was
credible testimony that: ( 1) Foreman Luis Menendez warned employee Roy Harden to
drink his coffee somewhere else, the day after Harden had been seen drinking coffee with
UAW Representative Quatrini at a nearby eating place ; (2) the day after a company
meeting for employees , Foreman Menendez , upon being asked by employee Robert McKnight
about his chances for promotion , told McKnight that the Company did not like trouble-
makers, that the Company knew who the troublemakers were, and that Menendez did not
believe McKnight was one of them; (3) certain raises , though promised , were withheld
until the employees insisted upon them before the June 1 election ; ( 4) on one occasion,
AERO CORPORATION -1311
E. Discrimination
As I have noted, the complaint alleges that the Respondent also committed unfair
labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and
thereby further interfered with the conduct of a fair election by the Board, by dis-
criminatorily discharging Jessie R. Heard, the instigator of the UAW movement, and
eight other employees, in each case because the employee had joined, assisted, or
supported the UAW in its organizational campaign.
1. Jessie R. Heard
Jessie Heard is the younger brother of Foreman Willis Heard and, for brevity,
will usually be referred to simply as Jessie . He was hired by the Respondent at Lake
City on December 19, 1961, and, except for a brief . economic . layoff with other
employees in February 1962, he worked there as an aircraft mechanic until he injured
his back on the job toward the end of the workday of March 21, 1962;
Reference has already been made to Jessie's leadership in starting the UAW's
organization of the Respondent's employees by contacting and conferring with Inter-
national Representative Quatrini early in February, by arranging the first UAW
meeting which from 30 to 50 employees attended at Padgett's Bar on February 27,
and by introducing Quatrini to the employees at this meeting with the result that 21 of
the employees, including Jessie, then signed and submitted UAW "authorization
cards." Thereafter, according to his testimony, which I credit, Jessie distributed
cards and secured the signatures of other employees on his way to work and during
lunch breaks at the plant. Although his efforts necessarily came to an end with his
injury on March 21, he arranged and notified the employees of Quatrini's second
meeting with the employees which was held at the VFW Hall on March 27. It
further appears from the evidence and I find, that, of the Respondent's officials and
supervisors, at least Vice President William Coley and Foremen Willis Heard and
Haywood Martin knew of Jessie's activity on behalf of the UAW before Jessie was
hurt on March 21.43
On March 22, the day following his injury, Jessie was examined by the Respondent's
doctor who reported that "it would be all right for him to continue working." Super-
intendent Price thereupon assigned him electrical work in the plenum or engine
chambers of the aircraft but, after working the rest of the day, Jessie complained of
severe pain and the inadequacy of the doctor's examination. Following the sugges-
tion of his brother, Foreman Willis Heard, he picked up his paycheck for the preced-
ing week and told Price he intended to go home to Thomasville, Georgia, for an
examination by his family doctor. Accordingly, Jessie left the plant on March 22,
went to Thomasville, and, upon medical advice, was hospitalized first for 3 days at a
hospital in Donaldsonville, Georgia, and then for a week at another hospital in
Thomasville. Thereafter, he received periodic medical attention while living at his
Foreman Robert Martin said that the Union would go out on strike and the employees
would lose money ; and (5 ) Manager Hansen once said that he would see that nonunion
people could cross the picket line and work even if there were a strike.
In view of the Respondent 's overt hostility to the UAW, it is conceivable that some
of these incidents had, and were intended to have, a repressive effect upon the employees'
support of the UAW. But I have not made any findings of unfair labor practice upon any
of these additional incidents either because the testimony as to several of these incidents
apparently does not provide a complete account of the conversation and the supervisor's
remarks and their immediate background , or because it appears that, at least in isolation,
the supervisor 's remarks in the remaining incidents might well have been directed merely
to the consequences of possible strike action by the UAW and not to any improper, re-
taliatory action by the Respondent . Instead , I have limited my findings of unfair labor
practice to the incidents enumerated in the text , which , in my judgment , constitute an
ample and clear hard core ' of interference , restraint, and coercion violative of Section
8(a) (1) of the Act.
+s Foreman Heard , who admitted that he had originally been interested in organizing
the employees but withdrew when he became a foreman in February, testified that his
brother Jessie had told him he was actively working for the Union . Vice President Coley
testified not only that Foreman Heard had told him of Jessie 's UAW activity, but that
Jessie himself had telephoned Coley and said that several of the employees had asked
him to tell Coley that they were considering the possibility of organizing , that a lot of
them were unhappy about Superintendent Price, and Jessie thought "it was the right
thing for him to call and let [ Coley] know what was going on ....' Finally , as I have
already found , Foreman Haywood Martin had questioned Jessie on February 28 and
Jessie had told him that he had attended the UAW's first organizational meeting the
night before. ( See item 1, in section III, D , above.),
1312 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
home in Georgia, wore a brace to support his back, and received workmen's compen-
sation from the date of his injury on March 21 until September 13. From the evi-
dence to this effect, it appears, and I find, that Jessie was in fact physically disabled by
his injury at the Respondent's plant and unable to return to work for the Respondent
from March 22 to September 13.44
Jessie appeared at the plant and attempted to vote at the June 1 election as an
employee on leave, but his ballot was challenged by the Respondent on the asserted
ground that he had quit his employment with the Respondent by leaving his job on
March 22 and thereafter failing to, advise the Respondent of an intention to return to
work. The Respondent's defense that Jessie had quit and that the Respondent did not
terminate his employment because of his UAW activities, is based principally upon
Manager Hansen's testimony.
In substance, Hansen testified that (1) he had no knowledge of Jessie's role in
organizing the employees for the UAW; (2) he could not recall seeing, or hearing
from, Jessie after Jessie's injury on March 21, until Jessie appeared at the plant to
vote in the Board election on June 1; (3) he received a letter from the Respondent's
insurance company dated April 17, enclosing and rejecting a copy of Jessie's claim for
"weekly accident benefits" because his injury "occurred while on duty," i e., that it
was a workmen's compensation claim not covered by that company's accident policy;
(4) the doctor's report, which was endorsed on Jessie's insurance claim and dated
April 9, estimated his "total" disability would extend until April 16; (5) on April 20
Hansen terminated Jessie's employment (although he did not in fact notify Jessie) by
filling out, signing, and placing in Jessie's personnel file the Respondent's usual
"Personnel Change Form 337," on which he wrote as the reason for Jessie's "Termina-
tion": "Failure to report to work or notify supr. for 3 weeks. Heard was injured on
22nd March. Went to Dr. Arnold who said he was able to work Went to Georgia.
Stayed hospital 2 days and they released him. Said he had sprained back Heard has
not contacted anyone for sick leave or said when he would return"; (6) even so,
Jessie was orally informed on June 1 by Hansen and Vice President Coley, again at
the end of July by Hansen over the telephone, and finally in a letter mailed to him
by Hansen on December 3, that Jessie was "to come on back to see me [Hansen] when
you are able to work so that I could try to reinstate you in your former position"; 45
44 These findings are based upon Jessie Heard ' s testimony as corroborated , in part, by
Foreman Heard . Neither the Respondent ' s doctor nor Jessie ' s personal physicians testi-
fied Nor did Superintendent Price. Although Manager Hansen ' s testimony suggests a
doubt on his part that Jessie 's injury actually incapacitated him for any substantial
period of time , I believe that the evidence requires the finding I have made On the other
hand , I make no finding, as suggested by Jessie ' s testimony , that his examination by the
Respondent 's doctor was less painstaking than it should have been , nor that Jessie's
assignment by Superintendent Price to confining work in the plenum chamber was moti-
vated either by personal or UAW animus, even though Jessie may have thought so In-
stead , I find , as shown by later events , including subsequent medical examination and
care, merely that Jessie was in fact incapacitated from March 21 until September 13.
46 In the December letter to Jessie, from which the quoted language is taken , Hansen
purported to summarize what had happened Respondent 's counsel offered the letter as
proof of an offer to reinstate Jessie. Over the General Counsel 's and the UAW's objec-
tions, I admitted the letter in evidence to complete the evidence of whatever communi-
cations there may have been between the Respondent and Jessie The full text of the
letter, to which I shall again refer in my discussion of the evidence , was as follows.
You will recall that on or about March 22, 1962, you were granted a three week
leave of absence for alleged illness. Under our rules you were supposed to have com-
municated with us to obtain any required extension of this leave of absence How-
ever, we received no word from you for several months and had assumed that you
had quit your job with no intention of returning . We were surprised when you
suddenly appeared to vote in the N .L R B. election on June 1 , 1962. Thereafter,
when you inquired as to whether your job was still available , I asked whether you
were physically able to return to work to the near future . You replied that you
were not. I then told you to come on back to see me when you were able to work
so that I could try to reinstate you in your former position Thus far you have never
presented yourself as being ready , willing, and able to report to work.
In view of these facts. we were surprised to learn that you bad filed charges with
the N.L.R.B. (Cases No . 12-CA-2415 and No . 12-CA-2488 ) alleging that we had re-
lased to reinstate you for reasons of Union activities.
This is to notify you that we have never refused to reinstate you to any rights to
which you may be entitled because of Union activity or any other reason ; and that
you have never notified us that you are ready, willing , and able to return to work
If and when you are ready , willing, and able to return to work, please notify me
personally of your desire for reinstatement to your job.
AERO CORPORATION 1313
and (7 ) Jessie had not replied to the letter and , on the two previous occasions, had
said that he was not yet physically able to return to work.
On the other hand, the General Counsel and the UAW , relying principally upon
Jessie 's testimony , but upon other evidence as well, contend that Jessie had in fact
informed the Respondent on several occasions of his intention to return to work
when his doctor permitted it; that as late as May 15 Manager Hansen told him his
job was awaiting him; that under the circumstances he continued to be an employee of
the Respondent ( although on leave ) and entitled to vote in the representation election
on June 1; and that the Respondent terminated his employment on June 1, and
thereby discriminated against him in violation of Section 8(a) (3) of the Act , because
of his leadership of the UAW movement among the employees and in order to prevent
his voting in the June 1 election . Upon my following consideration of all the relevant
evidence , including that given by Hansen and the Respondent 's other witnesses , I agree
with the General Counsel and the UAW.
The critical points of conflict between Jessie's and Manager Hansen 's testimony
relate to the conversation which Jessie testified he had with Hansen on May 15, but
which Hansen testified he could not recall, and their conversation on June 1 when the
Respondent challenged Jessie 's ballot. But the evidence raises other questions, the
answers to which have an important bearing upon the credibility of the witnesses'
testimony in their two principal points of head -on conflict . As I see them , the substan-
tial, interrelated questions which must be decided, are:
(1) Whether , during the earlier period of his disability , Jessie gave the Respondent
reasonably continuous information as to his condition and his intention to return to
work and was told that he was on leave and should return to work as soon as he could
(2) Whether , as Hansen 's much later letter to Jessie on December 3 asserted,
Jessie 's leave was , by existing company "rule," limited to 3 weeks unless extended
upon the employee 's application
(3) Whether as a matter of fact, on April 20 Hansen had filled in , signed, and filed
a "Form 337 " in order to terminate Jessie's employment on that date
(4) Whether Jessie visited the plant on or about May 15 and was then told by
Hansen that his job was still available with a 25-cent-an-hour increase unless "the
union was voted in," in which case the Respondent could move out overnight.
(5) Whether , in explaining to Jessie the Respondent 's challenge of his ballot on
June 1, Hansen told Jessie he was discharged or made any reference to Jessie's con-
nection with the Union.
(6) Whether Hansen or Vice President Coley, on June 1 or thereafter , had made
an unconditional offer to reinstate Jessie to his job when he was able to return to work.
Jessie's early communications with the Respondent concerning his injury, his condi-
tion , and his return to work whenever he was able are undisputed Jessie told Super-
intendent Price when he left the plant on March 22 that he was going home for
examination and treatment by his family doctor. Foreman Heard also told Manager
Hansen , as both agreed in their testimony , that Jessie had gone home to Georgia for
the treatment of his injury . Jessie, himself, telephoned Office Manager Jim Matthews
twice, the first time telling Matthews that he was going to the hospital for 3 days, and
the second time, that the doctor had found he had torn two ligaments in his back and
that he would have to stay in the hospital again for 7 days. Between these two calls
and during Jessie 's first 3-day stay at the hospital in Donaldsonville , Jessie telephoned
his brother to pick up his last paycheck , and Foreman Heard, having taken the call
in the Respondent 's office, turned the telephone over to Superintendent Price, whom
he then heard say to Jessie that "he would send the check and hoped Jessie would get
along all right and be back to work soon ." Several weeks later, after visiting Jessie at
the hospital at Thomasville , Foreman Heard told Manager Hansen that Jessie was
again in the hospital. Contrary to the impression which portions of Manager Hansen's
testimony might otherwise create, it appears from these facts (shown by both Jessie's
and Foreman Heard 's uncontradicted testimony since neither Superintendent Price
nor Office Manager Matthews testified ) that Jessie did in fact keep the Respondent
informed as to his condition and his intention to return to work and that he was told
by Superintendent Price, in substance , that he was on leave and, specifically , that he
should return to work as soon as he could.
Moreover , contrary to the later statement made by Manager Hansen in his Decem-
ber letter to Jessie,46 it appears from Hansen 's definite testimony before me at the
hearing that ' Jessie's leave was not, by any existing company "rule ," limited to 3 weeks
unless extended upon application . For Hansen testified that the Respondent had no
such "policy with respect to leave from the job as a result of injury ." In contrast he
testified ( as I shall note again in considering Catherine Williams' discharge) that with
49 See footnote 45, above.
770-076-65-vol. 149-84
1314 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR, RELATIONS BOARD
respect to "sick leaves," the Respondent "evolved" a policy of granting "sick leaves"
only for 3 weeks subject to possible 1-week extensions But, according to Hansen,
even this restriction upon "sick leaves" had not "evolved" until June or July, following
pressure exerted upon the Respondent in May by its insurance company to cut down
on excessive sick leaves. Accordingly, it appears clear, and I find, in view of Jessie's
continual advice to the Respondent of his condition and Superintendent Price's recent
statement that he should return to work as soon as he could, that Jessie not only was
on recognized leave-status but that his leave was not limited to 3 weeks.
Furthermore, even omitting consideration of Jessie's testimony as to his conversa-
tion with Manager Hansen on May 15, the evidence strongly indicates that, at least
until June 1, the Respondent in fact regarded Jessie as continuing as an employee on
leave status, and thus serves to contradict Hansen's testimony that he had filed a
"Form 337" terminating Jessie's employment on April 20. Thus Foreman Heard
testified that, a few days before Jessie visited the plant in May, the Respondent's office
girl had asked Foreman Heard what Jessie was going to do about his insurance because
she was carrying him on sick leave. And Jessie testified that, on June 1, just after his
ballot had been challenged, he went to the Respondent's office and asked Office
Manager Matthews whether there was a Form 337 covering him; that Matthews said,
"No, you are still on sick leave, aren't you?"; and that Matthews went to the files and,
upon returning to Jessie, said, "No, you are still on sick leave as far as we are con-
cerned." Finally, it appears from an envelope and its enclosure, which were admitted
in evidence, that on May 31 the Respondent mailed to Jessie the letter (dated May 29
and addressed, "Dear Aero Employees") which the Respondent mailed to all its
employees, advising them of the representation election on June 1, presenting argu-
ments for voting against the UAW, and urging everyone of them to vote. Neither
the office girl nor Office Manager Matthews testified. Nor was any attempt made by
the Respondent to explain why, if Jessie's employment had been terminated on a
Form 337 filed on April 20, he was mailed the Respondent's letter of May 29.
In addition, a comparison of the Form 337 which Hansen testified he filed for
Jessie on April 20, with other Form 337's admitted in evidence and relating to other
employees, also indicates that Hansen did not file the Form 337 for Jessie on April 20
nor, for that matter, at any time on or before June 1. For, as Hansen admitted when
these forms were shown to him on cross-examination by counsel for the UAW,
Jessie's Form 337, though identical in content, differed in format from all the other
forms which were dated before the end of June (including several which were dated
April 23),47 and was in all respects identical only with a single Form 337 bearing the
date of July 30.48 On redirect examination, Hansen offered the explanation that the
forms were mimeographed by the office girl in batches with occasional minor varia-
tions in format; that the forms were then distributed to the supervisors who put them
in their desks for use as occasion required; and that the form he used and filed for
Jessie's termination on April 20 had apparently been obtained by him from one of the
supervisors' desks and from an earlier batch than the ones then currently in use. But
neither he nor any of the Respondent's other witnesses produced any Form 337 which
was identical in format with Jessie's Form 337 and which, by its date, would show
that it had been used on or before April 20.49 Nor did Hansen or any of the Respond-
ent's other witnesses testify that an attempt had been made to locate such a form for
production at the hearing.
4 Hansen specifically admitted the differences in format of the following Respondent's
exhibits bearing the following dates: Respondent's Exhibits Nos. 42 (12-5-61) ; 29(c)
(2-12-62) ; 29(f) (2-12-62) ; 29(d) (3-14-62) 29(g) (3-14-62) ; 29(j) (3-26-62)
29(e) (3-26-62 ) 29(1) (3-26-62) ; 6 (3-26-62) 28(c) (3-27-62) ; 29(a) (3-27-62)
29(k) (4-23-62) ; 29(1) (4-23-62) 39 (5-21-62) ; 30 (5-28-62 ) ; and 43 (6-25-62).
Although Hansen's attention was not directed to the remaining Form 337 ' s among Re-
spondent 's exhibits which were dated earlier than July 1, my examination discloses that
they, too, were obviously different in format from Jessie 's purported Form 337: Re-
spondent's Exhibits Nos. 29 ( m) (3-1-62) ; 28(a) (3-14-62) ; 28 ( b) (3-16-62 ) ; 29(n)
(3-26-62) ; and 39(a) (5-4-62).
48 As a matter of fact, the only Form 337 in evidence which, according to both Hansen's
testimony and my inspection, appears to be identical in format with Jessie's purported
Form 337 was Respondent 's Exhibit No. 17, dated July 30, 1962. Even the later Form
337's, which are in evidence but to which Hansen was not referred , obviously differed in
their format from Jessie's purported Form 337: Respondent 's Exhibits Nos. 31 ( 9-28-62)
33 (10-17-62) ; and 32 (10-26-62).
48 My independent examination of the Form 337's in evidence also shows that all of
the forms which were dated before July 30, including those to which Hansen did not
specifically refer in his testimony, were obviously different from Jessie 's purported Form
337. (See footnote 47, above.)
AERO CORPORATION 1315
Upon this state of the record, and particularly in view of the perviously credited
and uncontradicted evidence indicating these was in fact no Form 337 in Jessie's file
before June 1, Hansen's explanation of his use of the particular Form 337 on April 20
to terminate Jessie's employment is unsatisfactory. Accordingly, upon the evidence
before me and contrary to Hansen's testimony, I conclude that Hansen did not termi-
nate Jessie's employment before June 1 by filing a Form 337 to that puiported effect
on April 20. I also conclude, therefore, that when Jessie appeared at the plant to vote
in the election on June 1, he was still an employee of the Respondent , although on
leave because of his injury.
The fact that Jessie was actually regarded by the Respondent as continuing on leave
status until June 1 is further confirmed by Jessie's testimony concerning his conversa-
tion with Hansen at the plant on or about May 15, which I have already considered
and credited at an earlier point in this Decision.50 As I then found, upon Jessie's
testimony , despite Hansen 's denial, Hansen told Jessie at that time , and thus less than
3 weeks before the election of June 1, that Jessie's job was available whenever his
doctor released him and that Jessie would also receive a 25-cent an hour raise "pro-
viding the union didn ' t get in, but if the union was voted in, he [Hansen ] could move
out of the State overnight." Not only did Hansen thus recognize Jessie's continuing
leave status but in doing so he indicated , by his conditional offer of the substantial
wage increase, that he was concerned about, and therefore attempting to discourage,
Jessie's possible efforts on behalf of the UAW in the approaching election
We come now to a consideration of the events of June 1, the day of the first election.
As I have noted, Jessie appealed at the plant and his ballot was challenged because he
was not on the eligibility list provided by the Respondent According to Jessie's
testimony, which I credit, he stayed at the plant during the rest of the day and, during
the counting of the ballots, he heard Manager Hansen explain the Respondent's chal-
lenge of his ballot on the ground that he had quit. As 1 have already found, Jessie
went to the office immediately and was told by Office Manager Matthews, in substance,
that there was no Form 337 in his file and that, so far as Matthews knew, Jessie was
still on "sick leave." Jessie thereupon sought out Manager Hansen whom he found in
his office with Foremen Willis Heaid and Haywood Martin, Vice President William
Coley, and the Respondent's attorney. According to Foreman Heard, he and Fore-
man Martin had just had a drink at a nearby bar. Coley, too, testified that some of the
men had been drinking that day.
There is no dispute as to the broad outline and general subject matter of the conver-
sation which occurred when Jessie appeared in Hansen's office. It began with Hansen
explaining to Jessie why he had challenged Jessie's ballot Foreman Haywood Martin
then interrupted the conversation and became embroiled in an argument with Jessie
as to whether Jessie, when he left the plant on March 22, had made statements indi-
cating to Martin that he intended to quit. Hansen took no part in this argument and,
since he testified that he could not recall what was said, it is apparent that, in his mind,
it had no bearing on the position he was taking with respect to Jessie.51 In any event,
Foreman Heard stepped between Jessie and Martin, and stopped their argument.
50 See item 16, section III, D, above
61 Surprisingly , Foreman Martin , although testifying as to other matters, gave no testi-
mony as to this conversation or his argument with Jessie Coley testified that Martin
and Jessie argued about whether Jessie 's work had been satisfactory . Foreman Heard
testified merely that a bitter argument started when Martin asked Jessie why he had
told Superintendent Price he wanted to be transferred out of Martin 's crew, but that lie
could not remember Jessie 's reply. The only other account of the argument was given by
Jessie who testified that Martin asked him , "Why don ' t you just tell all of the people
what you told me the day that you left?" and that Jessie answered , "All right. I have
nothing to hide. I said `Carl Price put me in the electrical department which I knew
nothing about . . . and if lie thinks that I am going in there and get fired for ineffi-
ciency, he is crazy.' " Under some circumstances , such a statement might possibly pro-
vide some indication of an intention on the part of Jessie to quit and use his injury as
an excuse . But, as I have found upon the ample evidence already discussed , it appears
clear not only that Jessie actually stopped working because of his injury and did not quit,
but also that lie intended to return to work when he was again able to do so , that he
made his intention known to the Respondent, and that as late as May 15 Hansen ex-
pected him to return Furthermore , as I have noted in part in the text and also earlier
in this footnote , the subject matter of Martin's and Jessie 's argument apparently had no
significant relation to Jessie's status in the minds of Hansen, Foreman Heard, and Coley,
since Hansen could not remember anything of the argument , and Foreman Heard, very
little; and Coley gave a completely different and irrelevant version.
1316 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Jessie then left the office , followed first by Coley and then by Hansen . Outside the
office, the conversation continued , with Coley suggesting the possibility of Jessie's
returning to the plant when he was able to work again.
Hansen, Coley , Foreman Heard, and Jessie all gave their versions of the details of
the conversation , but Foreman Martin, who was also present during the portion of the
conversation which occurred in the office , gave no testimony at all concerning the
incident . The principal conflict is whether , as Jessie testified but Hansen flatly denied,
Hansen , having at first insisted that Jessie had quit, finally told Jessie that he had been
fired because of "union " material which he was carrying in his pocket and that the
Union would be of no help to him. A question is also raised as to what Coley told
Jessie concerning the possibility of his returning to work when he was able.
Hansen 's, Coley's, and Foreman Heard 's testimony would create the general impres-
sion that Jessie actually did not argue strenuously or at any length with Hansen, and
that he made no comment as to Coley 's suggestion that he might return to work for the
Respondent when he was able to do so . Thus Hansen, in recounting his version of the
entire conversation , testified that Jessie asked him "why he had been terminated"; that
Hansen said it was because of "his failure to report "; that they then talked about
Jessie's accident and the fact "that he was on workmen 's compensation"; that Hansen
asked Jessie what his condition was; that Jessie replied that he was not able to work;
and that, when Jessie left the office , Coley followed him, and Hansen , having come to
the door of the office, heard Coley tell Jessie that he should "go on home and when he
recovered sufficiently , that he could come back to work, to come on back and we
would find a spot for him."
Coley, in a similarly brief account of the conversation , testified that Jessie asked
Hansen "why his ballot had been challenged and why he had been fired and what we
had against him and questions along those lines" ; that, without duectly answering
Jessie, Hansen referred to Jessie 's "back trouble ," and asked him, "Are you ready to
come to work , what condition are you in?" that Jessie replied "that he wasn't ready to
come to work and that he was still under the care of a doctor"; that Jessie left the
office and Coley followed him; and that , in order to dissipate any belief by Jessie that
he had been fired , Coley then asked Jessie to let the Respondent know "when he got
to the point of being physically able to work full duty" so that , although "we didn't
know what the situation would be then ," Jessie could "come down to see us and at
that time we could advise him whether we could take him on "
Finally, Foreman Heard, the remaining witness for the Respondent concerning the
conversation , testified that Jessie asked Hansen why his ballot was challenged; that
Hansen said "that he was under the impression [Jessie] had quit"; that Jessie denied he
had quit ; and that, in answer to Hansen's question , Jessie said he was not able and
ready to go back to work. Foreman Heard apparently did not immediately follow
Jessie out of the office nor, therefore , hear any of the conversation between Jessie and
Coley as to the possibility of Jessie 's returning to work when he was able.
Jessie's testimony , on the other hand, is to the effect that he sharply disagreed with
Hansen's statement that he had quit ; that he called Hansen's attention to the absence
of any Form 337 in his file and the accounting department 's understanding that he was
on leave; that Hansen apparently became angry ; that, when Coley spoke to him out-
side the office about the possibility of his returning to work when he was able , Jessie
was skeptical because of the possibility that he might then be offered the minimum
rate; and that , hearing this , Hansen in substance told Jessie he was fired because of
the union "material" in his pocket.
Thus, Jessie's testimony in detail was that, on entering the office, he asked Hansen
"where did he get the infoimation that I had quit"; that Hansen said , "Well, that is
the impression you left me with when you left to go to Georgia"; that Jessie replied
that he had no intention of quitting , that he never talked to anyone about quitting, and
that he felt he was being treated unfairly,' because he had not quit; that Hansen said,
"Well, that's the way it stands"; that Jessie then told Hansen the accounting department
had no Form 337 'for him and was still carrying him on sick leave; that Hansen's
reply was, "I 'm running this place and I don't have to make a 337 on anybody unless
I want to"; that following his argument with Foreman Martin, who had interrupted
at this point, Jessie left the office , followed by Coley and Hansen; that Coley said,
"Why don't you just go ahead and when the doctor releases you, we will have a job
for you"; that Jessie said he "couldn't see it" because the Respondent would then take
him back at the minimum rate it paid other people ; that Hansen said, "Maybe it would
sound better if I said, `You were fired' "; that Jessie said , "If you are firing me; it does
sound better . You just tell me why"; and that Hansen finally said , "Maybe it has
AERO CORPORATION 1317
something to do with the material you [have] in your pocket there [referring to a union
pencil, pen, and protector which was visible in Jessie's pocket]. You don't have the
union to back you up, do you?"
Upon consideration of this testimony concerning the June 1 conversation, I credit
Jessie's testimony as being accurate except for the precise substance of Vice President
Coley's suggestion that he might return to work when able.52 As to that element
alone, I believe Jessie was inaccurate and I credit Coley's testimony since it cor-
responds with Hansen's statement in his December 3 letter that the Respondent's
proposal to Jessie had been the conditional or limited proposal that Jessie "come on
back to see me when you were able to work so that I could try to reinstate you in your
former position." [Emphasis supplied.] 53 Accordingly, I find that when Jessie
questioned Hansen on June 1, as to where Hansen had gotten the information he had
quit and was thus no longer an employee entitled to vote in the election that day,
Hansen at first insisted that this was the impression he had received when Jessie left
the plant; that Hansen then became annoyed both by Jessie's statement that he knew
there was no Form 337 in his file and by Jessie's skepticism concerning Coley's sugges-
tion that he might be taken back to work when he was able; and that Hansen thereupon
told Jessie he had actually been fired because of his connection with the Union and
that the Union could not help him.
Upon the basis of these findings as to the events of June 1, and also upon the basis
of my previous findings as to Jessie's continuing leave status and the Respondent's
hostility to the UAW in the representation proceeding, I conclude that, in challenging
Jessie's ballot on June 1 and informing him that he was discharged, the Respondent
discharged Jessie R. Heard, denied his status as an employee on leave, prevented his
"My appraisal of Jessie's credibility was favorable, and because of this and the sup-
porting context of the evidence, I have generally credited his testimony as my findings
indicate. Specific mention should be made, however, of an attack on his credibility,
which the Respondent has made on the basis of the testimony of his brother, Foreman
Willis Heard, concerning an incident which occurred after Jessie had filed his charge in
this proceeding on July 31
The occasion was a family "fish fry" in the yard at Jessie's home near Bainbridge,
Georgia Jessie and his wife, of course, were there, as were his mother and father, and
Foreman Heard and his wife. Others present were a Bob Shaw and his wife Shaw
was a UAW representative operating in Georgia and South Carolina, and so far as the
record shows had no connection at all with the organization of the Respondent's Lake
City plant or with the proceedings in the present case During the conversation at the
"fish fry" however, it is undisputed that he started an argument with Foreman Heard
about Jessie's charge against the Respondent He made some comment about Foremen
Heard's and Martin's having received a $500 bonus from the Respondent for helping sup-
press the UAW at Lake City. It was a sore point between the brothers because Foreman
Heard believed Jessie had started the rumor and had signed an affidavit on the matter,
although in their conversation Jessie had denied being responsible According to Jessie's
testimony, Shaw urged Foreman Heard to tell the truth about what he knew concerning
the matters which would come up at the hearing in the present case. Foreman Heard,
however, testified that Shaw said to him that if he would testify "that [Jessie] was
terminated because of his union activities, that'he could collect all of his backpay from
the time that he . . first left [the plant] up until they put him back to work"; and
that Shaw further said that "if anything should happen to [Foreman Heard's] job in
Lake City . . . he [Shaw] could fix, him up with a [good] job in North Carolina . . . .
But Foreman Heard further testified not only that he refused to have anything to do
with Shaw's suggestion, but that Jessie, too, said, "No, he wouldn't ask Willis to do,
nothing like that." Both Jessie and Foreman Heard agreed in their testimony that they
and their wives, and even Shaw's wife, stopped the conversation, which had developed
into a sharp argument, as quickly as they could
I have considered the implications of Foreman Heard's testimony, but, in view of his
testimony that Jessie refused to join in Shaw's suggestion and vetoed it, it does not alter
my opinion that, in the testimony,he gave, Jessie was a credible witness. Furthermore,
in view of the fact that Shaw was obviously an intermeddler, without any connection
with the present case, I see no reason for believing or even suspecting that, in prosecut-
ing the present case, and presenting the evidence which I am considering, either Jessie or
the UAW have fabricated evidence or suborned or attempted to suborn any of the
witnesses.
55 See footnote 45, above
1318 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
exercise of the right to vote as an employee in the June 1 and August 10 elections, and
conditioned his rehire or reinstatement upon the availability of his job when he was
able to return to work, all because of his apparent assistance and support of the UAW.
I further conclude, in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, that the
Respondent thereby discriminated against Jessie R. Heard in regard to his tenure and
the terms and conditions of his employment, to discourage membership in, and sup-
port of, the UAW; interfered with its employees' exercise of the rights guaranteed by
Section 7 of the Act, including the right to vote in a representation proceeding con-
ducted by the Board; and, in doing so, committed unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 ( a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
Since Jessie's discharge on June 1, there have been no communications between him
and the Respondent except for a telephone call made by Jessie to Manager Hansen the
day before he filed his charge in this case on July 31, and Hansen's letter of Decem-
ber 3 to which Jessie did not reply. In the telephone call, Hansen told Jessie things
were "just as we left them." And, so far as Jessie's prospect of returning to work was
concerned , Hansen's December letter merely repeated what I have already found, upon
Coley's testimony, was Coley's original conditional offer of June 1, i.e , that upon
Jessie's advising the Respondent he was able to work, Hansen would "try to reinstate
[him] in [his] former position."
Although it appears from Jessie's testimony that he was able to work on Septem-
ber 13, and as a matter of fact, did get another job for a time, he did not notify the
Respondent that he could return to work. On the other hand, the Respondent may be
presumed to have received word that Jessie's payments and disability under the work-
men's compensation award had ended on September 13. In any event, having dis-
criminatorily terminated Jessie's employment status on June 1, in violation of the Act,
it was incumbent upon the Respondent to do what it could to remedy its wrongdoing
by notifying Jessie unconditionally that, when he was able to work again, the Respond-
ent would take him back to work in his old job. And this the Respondent did not
do. Accordingly, I find and conclude upon the state of the facts before me, that,
having discriminatorily discharged and terminated Jessie R. Heard's employment on
June 1, and having thus violated Section 8(a) (1) and (3) of the Act, the Respondent
has since failed and refused to revoke its illegal action and has, since Jessie R. Heard
again became able to work on September 13, failed to reinstate him in his former
position.
2. Monroe Lindsay
Lindsay was another active supporter of the UAW who was discharged by Manager
Hansen following an injury at the plant in May 1962. Like Jessie Heard, he attempted
to vote in the June 1 election, but his ballot was challenged by the Respondent, and he
was thus also prevented from voting in both the June 1 and August 10 elections.
Lindsay was hired by the Respondent as a lead electrician on November 27, 1961,
during the month that the Respondent began its Lake City operations . Except for a
few weeks of leave in January 1962, as the result of an earlier injury , he worked con-
tinuously for the Respondent until his discharge in May 1962 . Before working for the
Respondent , he had had 4 years' experience with the United States Air Force, working
on the electrical systems of a variety of military aircraft including the T-33's which the
Respondent processed at Lake City. In his initial assignment as a lead electrician for
the Respondent , his duties included laying out and assigning work to other electricians.
In January 1962 he was assigned additional work as a "troubleshooter " and in Febru-
ary he was made "power check out electrician " with the responsibility of making
functional and operational tests and "troubleshooting" the electrical systems before
the engines were again installed . By May 1962, when he was injured, he had for
sometime been performing all of these assignments under Robert Martin, foreman
of the electrical department on the night shift. He was then being paid the Respond-
ent's highest rate for electricians , and, as Martin 's assistant , was required to be familiar
with the operation of the entire department since, as Martin testified , he was expected
to take Martin 's place if Martin were ever sick. According to Manager Hansen,
"Lindsey [sic] had always done his work in a satisfactory manner." And Foreman
Martin agreed that Lindsay was a "good electrician " and "above average." In sum,
it is clear from the evidence , and I find, that Lindsay was an experienced , capable
electrician , with special and extensive training in the work he did on the particular
military aircraft processed by the Respondent at Lake City; that his performance for
the Respondent had warranted increasingly responsible assignments ; and that the
Respondent , in making him Martin's assistant and substitute , had obviously regarded
him as being of supervisory caliber.
AERO CORPORATION 1319
Lindsay attended the first UAW meeting at Padgett's Bar on February 27, and
signed and submitted a UAW "authorization card." 54 Thereafter, he attended the
UAW meetings, was appointed to its organizational committee , and distributed author-
ization cards and secured the signatures of employees on these cards.
Although it appears that Lindsay thereby became one of the active leaders of the
UAW movement, the incident which clearly brought his support of the UAW to the
attention and apparent disfavor of the Respondent was one which I have already
discussed as item 17 in section III, D, of this Decision. As I then found upon the
evidence before me, it appears that Foreman Robert Martin asked Lindsay in May
how he felt about the Union; that Lindsay said he thought the Union was a good thing
for the Company; that Martin told Lindsay it would be to his advantage to talk to the
employees against the Union since Lindsay was next in line for the foreman's position;
but that Lindsay refused, saying that if the foremen received no more than Martin
did, he did not want the job, and that there was no use trying to convince the people
against the Union because they had their minds made up. Thus Lindsay, unlike
employee Russell Horne who was similarly propositioned by Martin when he was
promoted to the assistant's job upon Lindsay's injury,55 not only rebuffed Martin's
attempt to enlist his aid against the Union, but in unmistakable terms indicated his
own support and belief in the UAW movement.
About this time, i e., on or about April 30 or May 1,56 Lindsay was hurt when he
slipped on an oil slick while using a ladder to climb out of a cockpit of a plane in the
performance of a functional test. He continued working for the rest of his night
shift but told Foreman Martin he thought he had sprained his left wrist. On the
following day, he went to a Lake City doctor who diagnosed his injury as a possible
sprain and prescribed some tablets to ease his pain . Although his arm felt no better,
he worked 4 consecutive nights after his injury and then, on arrangement made for
him by the Lake City doctor, he was examined on the morning of Monday, May 7, by
a Dr. C. A. Bird, a Jacksonville specialist . Dr. Bird diagnosed his condition as a
radial nerve injury, prescribed a brace for the left wrist, and gave Lindsay a slip or
note, stating that "Mr. Lindsey [sic] is under my care and will only be able to use his
right arm on returning to work." According to Lindsay, Dr. Bird also told him it
might take "two weeks, three weeks, four weeks, five weeks, or six months" for the
injury to clear up.
Although his brace was not ready for him for several days, Lindsay went to work
again on his shift that night, May 7, believing (I am convinced from his testimony)
that despite his injury he would be able to perform his job satisfactorily with the full
use of his right arm and the partial use of his left, as he had on the preceding four
shifts. He did give Dr. Bird 's statement to Foreman Robert Martin, and, after leaving
Lindsay a short time, Martin returned , saying that Manager Hansen had said Lindsay
should "punch out." Lindsay immediately went to Manager Hansen and, as a result
of their conversation , punched the clock and left the plant.
Lindsay's and Hansen 's testimony is in conflict not only as-to the substance of their
conversation that day, but also as to whether they had a further conversation 2 weeks
later . The dispute is whether Manager Hansen discharged Lindsay on May 7 or
merely put him on leave at that time , and then , in a subsequent conversation on or
about May 21, notified Lindsay for the first time that he had been discharged. Lind-
say's and Hansen 's testimony presents a square conflict as to their conversation on
May 7. Only Lindsay testified as to their conversation on or about May 21. Hansen
gave no testimony as to whether this second conversation occurred or not, the
Respondent being apparently content to rest on his testimony that he had already
discharged Lindsay on May 7.
31 Lindsay's and Jessie Heard 's testimony to this effect is credited although the card
was not produced at the hearing . According to Heard, it was one of a number of such
cards which had been lost. Although I credit the testimony that Lindsay actually signed
and submitted a card, I do not count it in determining whether the UAW secured authori-
zations from a majority of the employees . For the latter purpose, and thus as an occa-
sionally necessary substitute for secret ballots cast in an election , only the signed cards
themselves provide an acceptably formal and reliable indication of the employees ' selec-
tion of their bargaining representative . ( See section III, F, below.)
s' See item 18 of my findings in section III, D, above.
se None of the witnesses fixed the exact date of the injury. According to Lindsay's
testimony , he worked 4 consecutive days thereafter until , on May 7, Manager Hansen
told him to "punch out."
1320 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hansen testified that, before he spoke with Lindsay on the evening of May -7,
Foreman Martin informed him that "Lindsey [sic] had returned to work but he was
not fully capable of doing his entire job" because "he wasn't able to use his left arm
at all"; that Hansen told Martin "to have [Lindsay] punch out and to come back when
he was able"; but that Lindsay himself then came to the office. Hansen further testi-
fied that he and Lindsay were the only persons present during their conversation, that
Lindsay gave him Dr. Bird's statement; that Hansen asked how Lindsay was getting
along and the extent of his injury; that Lindsay said "he had suffered some sort of a
damage to a nerve that was in his wrist, ... and that the doctor had told him he would
not be able to work for at least 8 months"; and that Hansen then told Lindsay "that
for an injury of that nature that we would have to have somebody in his job and I
would have to replace him because for an injury of that extent, we just couldn't hold
the job open that long " According to Hansen he discharged Lindsay not only
because of the expected lengthy duration of his current disability, but (although he
did not tell Lindsay) also because Lindsay had been previously injured in January and
thus appeared to be "accident prone."
Before turning to Lindsay's testimony, it should be noted that Foreman Robert
Martin's testimony as to the May 7 incident is puzzling in that, in some elements, it is
inconsistent not only with Lindsay's testimony but also with Hansen's testimony, and
is therefore of doubtful corroborative value with respect to the latter. It is true that,
consistent with Hansen's testimony and contrary to that of Lindsay, Foreman Martin
testified that Lindsay "reported" to Martin that "it would be 8 months before he could
work again " Martin also agreed with Hansen in his testimony that Hansen, having
discussed the matter with Martin, decided to discharge Lindsay not only because of
the expected duration of his current disability but also because "his previous accident
record" showing him to be "accident prone." But, in disagreement with both Hansen's
and Lindsay's testimony, Martin testified that he was present during Lindsay's conver-
sation with Hansen; that the conversation took place near the water cooler in the plant
and not in the office; and that, although Hansen told Martin to "discharge him"
(referring to Lindsay), Martin could not recall whether Lindsay heard this or whether
Lindsay "had already left to go home "
According to Lindsay's testimony, in his conversation with Hansen on May 7 after
Martin had told him to "punch out," he informed Hansen that the doctor told him he
had a "nervous injury"; that the doctor said "he couldn't pinpoint the exact time it
would take for the injury to clear up"; and that, according to the doctor, "it may be
two weeks, three weeks, four weeks, five weeks, or six months." Lindsay further
testified that Manager Hansen said merely that it was "too great a risk in your condi-
tion to work out there"; that Lindsay then punched out and left the plant believing
that "I was supposed to be on sick leave ..."; and that he was not informed that he
was discharged until he attempted to pay his insurance a few weeks later, i.e., on or
about May 21.
According to Lindsay, he went to the office on or about May 21 to make his insur-
ance payments but the office girl refused to take his payment and told him that his file
showed he had-been terminated because he was "unable to work." Lindsay testified
that he thereupon went in to see Hansen; that he asked Hansen why he "had been
terminated instead of put on sick leave"; that he told Hansen, "I understood that I
would be off for six months" and that "the impression I had when I left there or that
the impression I gathered by working at different places, that if a person got hurt on
the job, they were put on, sick leave instead of being terminated"; that Hansen said,
"Well, you said that you would be off for six months or so"; that Lindsay then
reminded Hansen he had said the doctor "couldn't pinpoint the limited time that the
injury would take to heal"; that Hansen replied it was "still too big a risk"; an-d
--
that
Lindsay then left the plant "knowing that I had been terminated at that time "
Neither the girl in the office nor Manager Hansen testified concerning this visit by
Lindsay and their conversations with Lindsay on or about May 21. Nor did the
Respondent produce, or explain its failure to produce, any records from Lindsay's file
showing that he had in fact been terminated on May 7, although Foreman Robert
Martin testified that he had made out Lindsay's "termination papers" on that day.
Indeed, from Lindsay's uncontradicted testimony, concerning a later visit he made to
the office in January 1963 to procure information for his income tax return, it would
appear that his records in fact showed that he had first been placed on "sick leave."
For according to his testimony, while he was talking to the office girl on that occasion
he saw that an entry in his file of "sick leave" had been crossed out and another entry.
"terminated" had been substituted. Here again , the Respondent made no denial and
furnished no explanation.
AERO CORPORATION 1321
Upon this state of the evidence , I credit Lindsay's testimony as to his conversations
with Manager Hansen on May 7 and on or about May 21, and also his testimony as to
his conversations with the office girl first on May 21 and then in January 1963.
Accordingly , with respect to his conversation with Manager Hansen on May 7, I find
that it was clear that Lindsay believed he was able , and wanted , to continue working;
that in answer to Hansen 's question , he then told Hansen the doctor had said merely
that his condition would clear up in from 2 weeks to 6 months but that he could
not "pinpoint the time"; that Hansen did not tell him he was terminated but said
merely that it was too risky for him to continue working; and that it was reasonable
for Lindsay to assume he was being put on sick leave . With respect to the conversa-
tions on or about May 21, I further find upon Lindsay's uncontradicted testimony that
Lindsay was then for the first time informed by the office girl and again by Hansen
that his employment had been terminated Moreover , upon Lindsay 's further testi-
mony concerning his later view of the file in January 1963, and in the absence of any
denial or explanation by the Respondent , 1 also find that the entry , "sick leave," was
first made in his personnel file and then crossed out and the entry "terminated"
substituted.
Of course , there still remains the ultimate question of whether in apparently placing
Lindsay on leave on May 7 and then notifying him for the first time of his termination
on May 21, the Respondent did so because of his support of the UAW and his refusal
to assist the Respondent in suppressing the employee 's union activities , or because of
the indefinite duration of his disability and an "accident proneness " indicated by his
two injuries in January and May. On this general question , in addition to the pertinent
evidence which has already been discussed in this section of this Decision , there was
also Lindsay 's testimony , which I have earlier credited in spite of Foreman Haywood
Martin ' s denial As I found upon this testimony in item 11 , section III , D, even after
Lindsay's "discharge" but just before the June 1 election, Foreman Haywood Martin
visited Lindsay while he was working at a part-time job, asked Lindsay how he felt
about the Union and, upon Lindsay 's saying he had always been for it, asked Lindsay
not to vote in the June 1 election , saying, "Well if the union comes in here , the com-
pany will have to leave here or close up the plant. " From this incident it appears, and
I now find, that Foreman Haywood Martin was uncertain as to Lindsay 's status and,
upon learning that Lindsay favored the Union attempted to persuade him not to vote
in the approaching election. But, as I have already indicated , Lindsay did attempt to
vote in the June 1 election and his ballot was challenged.
In substance , the General Counsel and the UAW contend that the Respondent
discriminated against Lindsay because of his support of the UAW and thereby vio-
lated Section 8 (a) (1) and ( 3) of the Act , first by forcing him to discontinue working
and go on leave on May 7 although he was still capable of performing his work, and
then by later informing him that he had been discharged . For the reasons which I
now set forth I disagree with the first branch of this contention , but agree with the
second.
As I have found, Lindsay believed he was capable of continuing the satisfactory
performance of his job in spite of his injury and did not want to take leave. In support
of their position that Lindsay was capable of continuing to do his work, the General
Counsel and the UAW rely upon the fact that Lindsay did work four shifts after his
injury, as well as upon Lindsay 's testimony describing in detail not only the efficacy of
the brace with which he was fitted within the next few days, but also his ability to do
his normal work with the complete use of his right arm and wrist and with the permis-
sible, though limited, use of his injured left wrist even without the brace. On the other
hand, Manager Hansen and Foreman Robert Martin testified in equal detail that to
perform his job satisfactorily , Lindsay required the full use of both his arms and
wrists. From this conflicting evidence , it would be difficult to decide whether Lindsay
was actually in condition to perform his job. But the material question is not whether,
in the light of the evidence now before us, Hansen appears to have been correct in his
decision that Lindsay was physically unfit to continue working on the job. Instead,
the question is whether , under the circumstances confronting him at the time , Hansen's
refusal to permit Lindsay to continue working appears to have been reasonably based
upon Lindsay's physical condition rather than upon his support of, or connection with,
the UAW . Upon my appraisal of the circumstances shown by the evidence , but with-
out finding it necessary to pass upon whether Lindsay was actually able to do his work
satisfactorily and safely , I believe it was reasonable for Hansen to have decided, as
Lindsay testified Hansen told him, that it was "too great a risk " for Lindsay to work
"in his condition " Accordingly , I conclude that , in merely refusing to permit Lindsay
to work until his condition improved and perhaps until a medical opinion justified it,
1322 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Hansen did not discriminate against Lindsay because of his support of, or connection
with, the UAW, and therefore did not thereby violate Section 8 (a) (1) or (3) of the
Act.
For the reasons which follow, it appears to me, however, that the evidence amply'
supports the General Counsel's and the UAW' s contention that the Respondent first
put Lindsay on leave on May 7 and then, because of his apparent support of, and
connection with, the UAW, notified him on or about May 21 that his employment had
been terminated and thus prevented him from voting in the June 1 and August 10
elections.
As I have found, Lindsay told Manager Hansen on May 7 that, according to his
doctor, his injury would require from 2 weeks to 6 months to clear up. Thus, as
Hansen was informed at that time, although the course and duration of Lindsay's
recovery could not be precisely predicted, it might be a comparatively short recovery
period measurable in weeks. This, then, was the information upon which Hansen
acted on May 7 when he told Lindsay merely to "punch out" because it was "too great
a risk" for him to work "in his condition." In view of Lindsay's obviously satisfactory
work performance for the Respondent, its apparent high regard for his work and his
supervisory potential, the importance of his work as Foreman Martin' s assistant, the
possibility that he would be well enough to work again in a matter of weeks, the
Respondent's practice of granting leaves of even greater duration in injury cases, the
undenied "sick leave" entry in Lindsay's personnel file, and the fact (as I have also
found) that Hansen did not then tell him he was being terminated, I find that Hansen
put Lindsay on leave on May 7 and did not then terminate his employment.
By May 21, when Lindsay was first told he had been terminated, the situation bear-
ing upon his leave status had not changed appreciably. His leave had lasted only 2
weeks and it still did not appear that his recovery would be so lengthy that the
Respondent, for this reason, had changed its mind and terminated his leave.57 More-
over, the Respondent made no attempt to notify Lindsay of termination or, for that
matter, to ascertain his possible improvement . In short, the very factors which made
it reasonable for the Respondent to put him on leave on May 7 as a valuable employee
whose return would be welcomed, were still operative and as forceful on May 21 as
they were on May 7.
What, then, was the reason for Hansen's changing his mind and terminating Lind-
say's leave and employment between May 7 and 21? According to Lindsay' s testi-
mony, which I have credited, Hansen told him on May 21 simply that he had been
terminated because he would have to be off from work for 6 months and, when
Lindsay reminded him that this was not necessarily so, Hansen stood by his decision,
saying again , as he had on May 7, that it was "still too big a risk." Despite Hansen's
and Foreman Martin's testimony, "accident proneness" had nothing to do with
Hansen's decision for, according to Hansen's testimony as well as Lindsay 's, Hansen
made no mention of it in explaining his action to Lindsay either on May 7 or on
May 21. Accordingly, since the situation had not appreciably changed since May 7
when Lindsay was put on leave, a satisfactory explanation of Hansen 's notifying Lind-
say of his termination on May 21 cannot be found in Hansen 's testimony but must be
sought elsewhere.
The only remaining and credible explanation for, Lindsay's discharge on May 21 is
to be found in the fast approaching June 1 election and Hansen 's interim consideration
of Lindsay's UAW support and his refusal to talk to his fellow employees against the
UAW when requested to do so by Foreman Robert 'Martin, with whom Hansen
admitted consulting in making his decision to discharge Lindsay. That this is the
57 Lindsay did testify in the present hearing in February 1963 that he was still receiv-
ing workmen's compensation and that he did not expect to be released by his doctor until
May 1963. But this was not predictable as early as May 21 when Hansen told him he
was discharged And, in evaluating the motive for the discharge, we are now concerned
(as I have pointed out in another connection favorable to the Respondent) with the
situation as it confronted Hansen when he discharged Lindsay. Furthermore, whatever
partial disability may have justified Lindsay's continuing receipt of workmen's compensa-
tion payments and his continuing medical care, it does not appear whether, or when,
Lindsay had in the meantime sufficiently improved so that he could then have returned
to work with the Respondent. Indeed, although this would present an issue in the pos-
sible compliance stage of this case and was therefore not litigated at the present hearing,
it does incidentally appear from Lindsay's testimony that, since his discharge by the Re-
spondent, he has worked not only on a job at a gasoline station (to which reference has
already been made) but, with his doctor's approval of the therapy provided , also as a
truckdriver.
AERO CORPORATION 1323
credible explanation for the discharge furnished by the record, appears upon con-
sideration of (1) the Respondent's unquestionable hostility to the UAW and the
Respondent's continual attempts to suppress the UAW activities of its employees and
to interfere with the freedom of their vote in the Board elections; (2) Lindsay's refusal
to assist the Respondent in these attempts; (3) Lindsay's recognized value and
importance to the Respondent as a capable, experienced electrician and a potential
supervisor; (4) the other factors which I have found originally led the Respondent
to put him on leave on May 7 rather than to dischaige him; (5) the Respondent's
abrupt change of mind as to Lindsay's leave status and the precipitancy of his dis-
charge before the June 1 election; and (6) the Respondent's similar treatment of Jessie
Heard when it appeared that he, like Lindsay, might attempt to vote in the June 1
election.
Accordingly, I find as I did in the case of Jessie Heard, that, by Hansen's informing
Monroe Lindsay on or about May 21 that he had been discharged, the Respondent
discharged Monroe Lindsay, terminated his status as an employee on leave, and pre-
vented his exeicise of the right to vote as an employee in the June 1 and August 10
elections, because of his apparent assistance and support of the UAW and his refusal
to assist the Respondent by talking to his fellow employees against the UAW. I
further conclude, in accordance with the allegations of the complaint, that the
Respondent thereby discriminated against Monroe Lindsay in regard to his tenure and
the terms and conditions of his employment, to discourage membership in and support
of the UAW; interfered with its employees' exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec-
tion 7 of the Act, including the right to vote in a representation proceeding conducted
by the Board; and, in doing so, committed unfair labor practices within the meaning
of Section 8 (a) (1) and (3) of the Act.
3. Pearl Hamilton
Pearl Hamilton was another employee who the General Counsel and the UAW
assert was discharged because of her UAW activities before the June 1 election.
According to the Respondent, she was discharged on May 21 because she was an
employee of limited skills and other women employees repeatedly complained of her
telling false stories about them and threatening one of them
Hamilton was one of five Lake City women hired by the Respondent in its electrical
department as trainees when it began its Lake City operations in October 1961. In
mid-Novembei 1961, the Respondent hired 15 more women, and Beatrice Bowman
and Judy Johnson, 2 of the 5 original women employees, were made leadwomen under
Foreman Luis Menendez of the electrical department. The principal, if not the only,
tasks performed by the women employees were the preparation of wire harnesses and
the installation of these harnesses in the aircraft. According to their individual
assignments, they soldered leads and plugs on the wire harnesses in the electrical
department; covered the harnesses with plastic or "spaghetti" sleeves, at first in a
separate "harness room," and later in the back end of the toolcrib room; and installed
the harnesses in the cockpits and aft sections of their aircraft. Cockpit installation
required soldering but the aft section harnesses were merely laid in the section and
either clipped, clamped, or screwed into position.
In December 1961, two shifts of these women employees were inaugurated in order
to provide a stockpile of harnesses, with the day shift working with Bowman as lead-
woman and the night shift with Johnson. Apparently in January 1962, as enough
harnesses were piepaied and stocked, the harness shop on the night shift was shut
down and the women on the shift were put to work installing harnesses in the aft
sections. In February 1962, the night shift was discontinued and the women on the
shift were laid off, with the exception of Johnson who was given charge of aft section
installations on the day shift. Then in March the night shift was resumed on a
reduced scale and some of the women employees were recalled. But all harnesses
were soldered and coated with plastic on the day shift, and the women on the night
shift worked only on installations. In the critical period beginning in March, Luis
Menendez was the day foreman of the electrical department with Bowman as his
leadwoman, and Robert Martin was the night foreman with Johnson serving as his
leadwoman.
Hamilton was assigned to the night shift with Johnson in December 1961 and
worked in the harness room. When the night harness shop was shut down, apparently
in January 1962, Hamilton was assigned to the toolcrib instead of to installation in the
aft sections as weie the other women She was laid off in February 1962 with the
other women on the night shift. She was recalled on March 14 to the toolcrib on the
day shift and, on March 27, was transferred to the toolcrib on the night shift again.
1324 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
On May 4 , on Foreman Martin's recommendation , she received a periodic raise of 5
cents per hour to which she was entitled as a result of her 6 months ' employment by
the Respondent . During her service on the night shift following her recall, she served
as toolcrib operator at the beginning of the shift and worked the rest of the shift
installing harnesses in the aft sections.
In her testimony , Johnson gave what appears to me to be a reliable summary and
appraisal of Hamilton 's work and temperament - Hamilton was a "willing but com-
plaining worker ." Like four other women employees , she could not solder and her
assignments were therefore limited. She "did real well in the harness room," i.e., in
applying the plastic coating to the harnesses before her layoff and during her short
period in the toolcrib room on the day shift after her recall During her service as
night-shift toolcrib attendant after her recall, she would sometimes wander from the
toolcrib and would not be there when needed She could not make cockpit installa-
tions since they required soldering Although she laid in harnesses "fine" in aft
section installations , the lugs would constantly come off and the installations would
not pass inspection . And, in incidents which will later be discussed , the other women
with whom she worked repeatedly complained about remarks which they said she had
made about them.
Hamilton signed and turned in a UAW "authorization card" on April 5 She
attended two of the organizational meetings at the VFW Hall in April , and two of the
meetings at the Oasis Bar, apparently on May 10 and 19. Foremen Willis Heard and
Haywood Martin may have seen hei at the first of the two meetings she attended at the
Oasis Bar, when they , too, were present , as I have previously found , and Leadwoman
Beatrice Bowman credibly testified that employee Frances Dicks , who was a strong
anti-UAW employee and unfriendly to Hamilton , once told Manager Hansen that
"Pearl was union ," to which Hansen made no comment . But it is clear that before
her discharge , Hamilton did not solicit UAW authorization cards from her fellow
employees , nor play any role of importance or prominence in the organizational
campaign which might have brought her to the attention of the Respondent.
Hamilton testified , however, that she told Foreman Menendez and Manager
Hansen, in separate conversations a week or so apart in the end of April or the begin-
ning of May , that she had attended UAW meetings and signed a UAW card and, in
answer to her questions , was told that employees who had done so would not be
discharged . Because I regard Hamilton as a generally unreliable witness for reasons
which will appear , I credit Foreman Menendez ' flat denial that he and Hamilton had
any such conversation , in which , according to Hamilton , he had also asked her who
the union leaders were , and had said that the Respondent knew which employees
attended the UAW meetings , that the Union was no good , that a union had run him
out of the Respondent 's Georgia plant, and that the Respondent would close its Lake
City plant before it would permit the UAW to come in. Hansen , however, did not
deny having the conversation to which Hamilton testified , but he did testify that
Hamilton "took great pains to inform me on many occasions that she was not for the
union." Again , because I do not regard Hamilton's testimony as being reliable, I do
not credit her testimony as to this conversation in which she says she informed Hansen
in April or early May that she had attended a UAW meeting and had signed a UAW
card.58
Contrary to the General Counsel's and the UAW 's position , it does not appear from
the evidence that the Respondent had any-reason to regard Hamilton as a UAW sup-
porter, much less to single her out for discharge on that basis . In fact , the credible
evidence indicates that, until her discharge , Hamilton was actually timid in her UAW
activity and unlikely to emphasize it, that she certainly did not appear to be an ardent
supporter of the UAW , and that, in her conversations with supervisors and fellow
employees , she attempted to create the impression she did not favor the UAW and
would not vote for it in the election . This appears not only from Manager Hansen's
testimony that Hamilton repeatedly sought to impress him "that she was not for the
union," but also from Johnson 's testimony , which I credit, that , both when they were
alone and when they were with other employees , Hamilton told her on several occa-
sions she had no use for the Union , on other occasions that she was for the Company,
According to Hamilton, Hansen told her not only that it was her "privilege" to join
the UAW and attend its meetings, and that no employee would be fired for joining a
union, signing a union card , or attending a union meeting , but also that , under Floridii's
"right-to-work law . . if a union comes into a place and you are called out on a strike
and it we ask you to return and you didn ' t, well, you are out of the job because we will
replace you " I do not credit Hamilton 's testimony that Hansen made any of the state-
ments thus attributed to him.
AERO CORPORATION 1325
and, on still others, that she would not vote or go on strike for the Union. Foreman
Martin also testified that about a week before her discharge, as well as a number of
times before that, Hamilton tried to start conversations with him about the Union,
with such remarks as "1 don't know why in the world people want an outfit like that
here. They are endangering ... our jobs by trying to get such an outfit as this in here
Believe me, I am [doing] everything in the world I can to stop it." Even Hamilton's
testimony and her demeanor on the witness stand showed her to be a nervous, excitable
woman, who had been so apprehensive about the consequences of her attendance at
the UAW meetings and her signing the UAW card that it is likely she attempted to
conceal her activities as far as she could. Thus, according to her testimony, she and
the other girls with whom she attended one of the meetings at the VFW Hall attempted
to enter the hall by a back door so that they would not been seen by Superintendent
Carl Price who was parked in a car on Route 41 in front of the hall. And, when
Hamilton was questioned by Respondent's counsel, although she denied telling any of
the supervisors she wanted nothing to do with the Union and was voting against it, she
admitted telling Foremen Menendez and Martin that "I was neutral and was taking
no part in it," and even telling Manager Hansen that she was against the Union
Hamilton denied having any friction with Johnson or other women employees
But Johnson, Foreman Robert Martin, and Manager Hansen testified to a series of
complaints made by other women employees, which, according to Hansen, resulted in
his decision to discharge her. According to their testimony, such complaints were
made at various times by employees Frances Dicks, Dorothy Feagle, Inez Roberts,
Betty Phillips, Nan Harrington, Jean Craig, and Mary Witt. None of these women
testified concerning either their complaints or the incidents upon which they were
based, although, before the Respondent's evidence of the complaints was introduced,
Feagle, Roberts, Phillips, and Witt had testified as the General Counsel's witnesses
concerning other elements of his case and Nan Harrington had testified as the Trial
Examiner's witness on the authenticity of her signature to a UAW authorization card.
In his brief, the General Counsel objects to any finding based upon the evidence
concerning the complaints as the explanation of Hamilton's discharge, since the
Respondent produced on evidence-and there was therefore no direct evidence-of
the basic incidents themselves But the issue is whether the Respondent discharged
Hamilton because of the complaints and its belief that there was substance to them
and not whether they were in fact true If the General Counsel had evidence that
the complaints were untrue or that the other employees had made no such complaints,
he could, of course, have produced such evidence through the testimony of the
employees involved even if his recall of several of the witnesses were necessary, and,
on this basis, might have questioned the Respondent's explanation of the discharge.
This he did not do. Nor, when he recalled Hamilton as a rebuttal witness, did he
have her testify concerning the specific complaints which the Respondent's witnesses
said had been made against her. I therefore credit and give due weight to the follow-
ing testimony of the Respondent's witnesses concerning the chain of complaints upon
which Manager Hansen testified he eventually acted in discharging Hamilton.
According to the testimony of the Respondent's witnesses on the point, the com-
plaints of the other employees began in January before the layoff and resumed after
Hamilton and the night employees were recalled in March According to Johnson,
the complaints were generally that Hamilton had falsely quoted an employee's remarks
about a third employee, and in some instances had said an employee was complaining
or unhappy although, when asked about it by Johnson, the employee in question
denied having made any such remark. And, as Foreman Martin testified, Hamilton
"cried every time that somebody accused her of telling stories "
As to specific instances of complaints which Johnson could recall, she testified that:
(1) in January, Dicks complained to her that Hamilton had said Feagle made a
"personal remark" about Dicks, and that when Johnson spoke to her in Hamilton's
presence, Feagle denied it, whereupon all three women participants began crying and
Feagle insisted upon being transferred away from her work with Hamilton; and (2)
shortly before Hamilton was terminated, employees Inez Roberts and Betty Phillips
complained separately to Johnson "about some remark" of Hamilton. Following this
last incident, Johnson asked Foreman Robert Martin to talk to Hamilton, said that
Hamilton "was causing trouble between the girls," and told Martin of the instances of
which she knew and that "it was interfering with the girls' work and that if he
expected full production that he [should] talk to her."
Although Foreman Martin did not testify in detail about complaints which came
to him about Hamilton, he testified that he had known of an occasion when "Pearl was
building up harnesses and all of the other girls were mad at her because they thought
she had been spreading rumors on [them]," and that he "had received word several
times through Judy Johnson . . . that Pearl had been bearing tales on the other girls
1326 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and creating unrest in the wire shop among the girls." He further testified that, just
a few days before Hamilton's discharge , he told Manager Hansen that since Hamilton
could not solder and since work on harnesses was caught up, he "didn 't have any other
work that she could do " and that "she had lots of problems getting along with her
fellow workers ." According to Martin , he told Hansen "that Pearl was continually in
a squabble with some of the other girls about something ... that I continued to get
reports on it since it was always her and one of the girls . And it wasn 't two of the
other girls, and I was drawing the conclusion that Pearl must be at fault."
Manager Hansen testified that he received a report from Johnson on the January
complaints which he thought involved Feagle and Dicks; that Betty Phillips had com-
plained directly to him , as had employee Nan Harrington , in both instances about
Hamilton; that Phillips in her complaint had said she had spoken to Foreman Martin,
but that this had not stopped Hamilton's "continually saying things or repeating
things . . . that weren 't true," such as "about what happened in the lunch hour when
she [Betty Phillips ] ate her lunch in a parked car theie in the parking lot"; and that
he spoke about these complaints with Foreman Martin on two or more occasions
within the month preceding Hamilton's discharge . According to Hansen, however,
he did not decide to discharge Hamilton until he received a final complaint against
her from employee Mary Witt on Monday, May 21, the day of Hamilton's discharge.
On that morning, employee Mary Witt came to Manager Hansen's office in tears
and told Hansen she thought it best that she quit. Asked why, she said she just could
not take any more of Hamilton's stories about her and that , following a visit by
Hamilton to Witt's home during which there were "some personal difficulties ," Hamil-
ton and employee Bobby Walker, one of the men employees, had told her she had
better not go down to the hangar where Hamilton was working on the aft sections or
"they would take care of her when she got down there." Manager Hansen told Witt
he did not want anybody to quit because of threats , assured her she would be safe,
and said that , if she still wanted to quit, he would prefer her to wait until it would not
appear that she had quit because of threats.
Hansen did not speak to Bobby Walker about his allegedly joining Hamilton in
threatening Witt. According to Hansen , he "didn't have a chance" to do so and
"shoitly thereafter" Walker quit. Exactly when this might have been is not clear from
the record which shows simply that Walker was still on the Respondent 's payroll for
the week ending June 3, although no longer on the payroll by August 3.
But an hour or two after Witt had complained to him , Hansen decided to discharge
Hamilton, without first talking with Hamilton, Johnson, or Foreman Martin. He
therefore had her check made out, signed it, and gave it to Foreman Martin for
delivery to Hamilton with notice of her termination . According to his testimony, he
made his decision because "we were rather painfully aware of Pearl 's inability to get
along with most any of the women that were there ... what I believed to be her carry-
ing tales back and forth between the people ... and her very limited skill."
Foreman Martin gave Hamilton her check and notified her she had been discharged,
telling her simply that Manager Hansen had said he had to let her go. According to
Martin, he had asked Hansen what he should tell Hamilton and Hansen had said,
"Well, she has stirred up a lot of stink and, in addition to troubles we had with her
before ... it has just piled up to be too much." But Martin did not tell this to Hamil-
ton because , as he testified , "I didn't know all of the details of his most recent experi-
ences." Instead, when Hamilton questioned him about the reason for her discharge,
he suggested she talk to Manager Hansen. As a result, Hamilton went directly to
Hansen's office with Johnson , whom she asked to accompany her. And Foreman
Martin followed them into the office shortly afterward.
Hamilton testified that when they got to the office, she asked Hansen the reason
for her termination ; that Hansen said, "Well , I don't know what to say"; that she
pressed him for a reason and he still said, "Well , I just don't know what to say that, I
think it is best"; that Hamilton then asked "if the Union had anything to do with it";
that Hansen 's reply was , "No, let 's say agitation ." Although this was her testimony
on direct examination , on cross-examination she added that Hansen also said "the
union could be behind it." On further cross-examinationn , she admitted that in an
affidavit given by her to a Board agent on July 10 , 1962, in connection with the repre-
sentation case, she had said that Hansen would give her no reason why she was termi-
nated and therefore , she did not know why . But, in a later affidavit given to the
General Counsel on October 31, 1963, in connection with the present complaint pro-
ceeding, she had said (as she did at one point in her testimony ) that when she asked
Hansen why she was being discharged , Hansen said , "Let's just say agitating
,employees"; and that Hansen . then got up and -walked to the door , smirked, and said,
"Well,'maybe [the] union is behind this." In a lame attempt to explain the' difference
in her statements in the two affidavits , ,she testified that - when . she ,submitted' the'first
AERO CORPORATION 1327
affidavit, the Board's agent did not ask her about her discharge and the UAW repre-
sentative had instructed her not to say anything about it unless she was asked. Finally,
when recalled as a witness on rebuttal, Hamilton denied that Hansen had said in this
conversation with her on May 21 that union activities had nothing to do with her
discharge, and thus attempted to correct the contrary statement which she had made
on her oiigmal, direct examination during the General Counsel's case-in-chief.
Hansen's version of his conversation with Hamilton was brief and quite different
from that of Hamilton He testified that Hamilton asked why she was being termi-
nated; that he said he "thought it for the best of all concerned, that we should termi-
nate her at this time because of her inability to adjust herself to the people working
there"; that Hamilton asked "what effect the union had on her termination"; and that
Hansen told her "it had no bearing whatsoever on her being terminated " Hansen
denied specifically that at any time during the conversation he had said that maybe the
Union did have something to do with her termination
Johnson corroborated Hansen's testimony as to the substance of the conversation.59
And Foreman Martin, who came into the office after the conversation was under way,
agreed with Hansen's version except that he testified he believed that while he was
there, Hamilton had also said to Hansen that she had always been for the Company
and had not taken part in union activates, and that Hansen had replied, "Pearl, the
union hasn't entered into this at all It has nothing to do with [it]." Martin, like
Hansen and Johnson, also denied that Hansen said maybe the Union had something to
do with Hamilton's discharge.
Shortly after Hamilton left Hansen's office that day, she asked both Johnson and
Foreman Maitin to sign a statement concerning what Hansen had said to her. Hamil-
ton testified that she asked Johnson and Martin at the same time and in the presence
of employee Inez Roberts to sign a paper on which she had written "the reasons foi
termination, agitating employees," which she "wanted ... for a recommendation foi
another job," and that Johnson said she would sign the paper if Maitin did, but that
Martin refused, saying, "I can't do that because . it would be going over Mr.
Hansen's head." Johnson, however, testified that when she left the office with Hamil-
ton, Hamilton asked her in the presence of Inez Roberts to sign a blank piece of
paper, saying that she would fill it in later; that Johnson refused; and that Foreman
Martin was not there at the time. Foreman Martin testified that he walked up to
Hamilton; that Hamilton asked him to sign a paper on which she was wilting "Mr.
Hansen said that I was fired because I was an agitator"; that he refused, saying that
he did not know anything about it; that, although Johnson was there, Martin could
not recall whether she had been there with Hamilton when he came, or whether she
came up later while he was with Hamilton. Inez Roberts did not testify concerning
Hamilton's attempt to secure Johnson's or Foreman Martin's signatures.
Upon consideration of the foregoing conflicts in the testimony, I credit Johnson's
testimony, both in its corroboration of the substance of Hansen's testimony concern-
ing his conversation with Hamilton in the office and in its description of Hamilton's
attempt to have her sign a blank paper I also credit Foreman Martin's testimony as
to Hamilton's request that he sign the statement respecting her discharge. Accord-
ingly I find that, when asked by Hamilton for the reason for her discharge Manager
Hansen told her in substance that it was because of her inability to get along with other
employees, that Hamilton asked whether the Union had anything to do with her dis-
charge, and that Hansen said "it had no bearing whatsoever on her termination " I
further find that Hansen did not say at any point in the conversation that maybe the
Union did have something to do with the discharge. Finally, I find that, on leaving
the office, Hamilton first asked Johnson to sign a blank paper which Hamilton said she
would later fill out; that she then asked Foreman Martin to sign a paper on which she
wrote that she had been fired because she was an agitator; and that, in turn, Johnson
and Foreman Martin refused to sign the paper.
The basic facts as I have found them still leave the ultimate question of why Hansen
really discharged Hamilton. Hansen's discharge of Hamilton without first talking
with her, contrasted with his failure to speak to, or take any action against, Bobby
Walker, strongly suggests that Hansen discharged Hamilton for some reason other
than the series of complaints against Hamilton culminating in Witt's complaint that
morning. For Witt complained that Walker had also been a party to Hamilton's
ce Johnson 's testimony was that "Pearl was crying when we went in . . . and she
asked Mr. Hansen what she was being terminated [for] . . . was it the union, and he
told her no, and she said, `Well, why?' and he told her . . . It would be best for every-
one at that time and that she was causing trouble and conflict between the employees."
Johnson also denied that Hansen said that maybe the Union did have something to do
with Hamilton's discharge.
1328 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
threats against her and Hansen's explanation that he did nothing about Walker
because he did not have a chance is weak, since it would appear from the record that
Walker continued to work for the Respondent for at least another 2 weeks.
But this is the only factor in the evidnece which would cast any doubt upon Hansen's
explanation of Hamilton's discharge. As I have found, the credible evidence other-
wise supports the grounds which Hansen testified led him to discharge Hamilton, and
furnishes no reasonable basis for believing that Hamilton's connection with the UAW
motivated the discharge. Thus, as Hansen credibly testified, with Johnson's cor-
roboration on most points, Hamilton was limited in her abilities, there had been
repeated complaints about her troublemaking among the employees, and Witt's com-
plaint on the morning of May 21, whether actually true or not, was serious and might
well have exhausted Hansen's patience . Furthermore , the evidence furnishes no
reasonable support for any inference or finding that Hansen actually discharged
Hamilton because of her UAW membership or activity or any connection with the
UAW. For, as I have found, Hamilton did not solicit UAW authorization cards nor
play any role of importance or prominence in the organizational campaign which
might have brought her to the attention of the Respondent, and, in view of her
attempts to impress her supervisors and fellow employees that she did not favor, nor
would she vote for, the UAW, there appears to have been no reason for the Respond-
ent to regard her as a UAW supporter, much less to single her out for discharge for
that reason. Accordingly, I conclude from the evidence that, as Hansen testified.
Hamilton was discharged because, in addition to the fact that her skills were limited,
the other women employees in the plant had repeatedly complained about her making
trouble until finally upon Witt's serious complaint on the morning of May 21, Hansen
decided to discharge her. I further conclude that Hamilton was thus discharged for
cause and was not discriminatorily discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. I shall therefore dismiss the allegations of the complaint based upon her
discharge.
4. Catherine Williams
Catherine Williams was the first of six employees whom the complaint names as
having been discharged by the Respondent after the two Board elections because of
their support of the UAW At the time of her discharge on August 13, Williams was
on sick leave as a result of surgery performed on July 2. The Respondent contends
in its brief that her sick leave was terminated and she was discharged because of the
length of her absence from work, her failure to return to work at earlier dates con-
trary to the Respondent's information that she would, the necessity of filling her posi-
tion in view of the Respondent's "production schedules with the United States Air
Force," and "excessive insurance claims which Mrs Williams and her family had
processed under the Respondent's insurance coverage "
Williams was one of the five women employees originally hired by the Respondent
in October 1961. Except for an illness of 2 weeks in December 1961 and a layoff of
a week in February 1962, she worked steadily for the Respondent until her sick leave
began on June 25, 1962. At that time, she worked in the electrical department on the
night shift with Judy Johnson as her leadwoman. Beatrice Bowman was the lead-
woman of the women employees on the day shift and was Johnson's superior. Fore-
man Luis Menendez was day-shift foreman and in overall charge of the department.
According to Manager Hansen, Williams was a "good solderer "
Williams attended the first UAW organizational meeting at Padgett's Bar on Febru-
ary 27 when she signed a UAW "authorization card." She was a member of the
UAW's organizational committee and, in addition to the February 27 meeting, she
attended the UAW meetings at the VFW Hall in April and at the Oasis Bar in May.
From her testimony and that of Foreman Willis Heard, it appears clear that she was
seen by Heard and Foreman Haywood Martin at one or more of the meetings at the
Oasis Bar in May. She solicited signatures on the UAW authorization cards from her
fellow employees, arranged the rental of the VFW Hall for the UAW, and served as
the UAW's observer at the June 1 election. I find that Williams was known by the
Respondent's supervisors and Manager Hansen as a leading supporter of the UAW
movement among the employees.
On June 22, Williams became ill. On June 25, having requested leave through
Johnson, her leadwoman on the night shift, she was placed on sick leave. On July 2
she underwent major surgery and was hospitalized until July 16. Postoperative medi-
cal attention included a return to the hospital from August 2 to 6. In the periods
between and following her -two stays in the hospital , Williams was examined by her
doctor every Monday, to and including August 20 when the doctor released her as
ready to return to work.
AERO CORPORATION 1329
At the hearing, the Respondent produced a Form 337, which Manager Hansen
testified he signed and had placed in Williams' personnel file on June 25, the day
Williams left work. The form was dated June 25, contained the "remark" that
Williams "has to have surgery," and bore the signatures of Foreman Menendez and
Manager Paul Hansen as respectively requesting and approving "sick leave-June 25
through ?" Manager Hansen testified that, before signing this form, he inserted the
question mark rather than a definite duration for the leave, because, shortly before
this, "we had been having a tremendous amount of pressure from the carriers of our
insurance policy regarding the hospitalization ratio here at the Lake City facility"; that
he spoke to Leadwoman Bowman and Foreman Menendez "as to the probable length"
of Williams' illness; and that "they gave me the nature of the surgery and indicated
that it would probably require two to three weeks." Williams, however, was not
informed that the Respondent expected her to return to work in 2 or 3 weeks nor was
a copy of the Form 337 of June 25 ever sent to her.
Sometime in July, while Williams was on leave, Hansen asked Bowman to inform
Williams and Frances Lovett, another employee who was on sick leave, that extensions
of sick leave beyond an original 3 weeks depended upon submission of further doctor's
certificates.°o According to Manager Hansen's testimony, about this time he decided
to limit sick leaves to 3 weeks, subject to review and possible extension in appropriate
cases for additional 1-week periods , because, in May, the company carrying its group
hospitalization and loss-of - income insurance had been critical of excessive leaves.
According to Bowman 's testimony , however, her instructions from Hansen were to
inform Williams and Lovett that, to secure extensions of their leaves, they were
required to "turn in the [doctor's] slips every three weeks ." I credit Bowman's testi-
mony and further find, upon her testimony and that of Williams, that, in accordance
with these instructions , Bowman informed Williams that doctors' certificates would be
required for extensions of leave every 3 weeks.
Williams had no direct contact with , nor communication from , Manager Hansen
during her leave and before she received notice in the mail, on August 14 or 15, that
her employment had been terminated . In accordance with Bowman's advice, how-
ever, she did visit the Respondent 's office on July 30 ( a fact which admittedly came to
Hansen 's attention ) and left with Dorothea Barrett, the Respondent 's insurance and
personnel clerk, a prescription slip signed by her doctor, dated July 23, and certifying
that Williams had been under his care since June 25, was "still unable to return to
her work, and [would] require more care ." 61 It further appears from Williams'
credible testimony , and I find, that she also went to the plant on Monday, August 13,
and spoke about her leave with Leadwoman Judy Johnson and Foreman Menendez 62
after her doctor had informed her earlier that day that she could return to work on the
following Monday, August 20. But a day or so later, on August 14 or 15, she received
a letter from Barrett , dated August 13, and informing her of the termination of her
employment . Only 2 weeks after Williams had left her doctor 's certificate at the
office and without giving Williams any reason to expect his action , Manager Hansen
had discharged her and had instructed Barrett to notify her by mail.
In explanation of his terminating Williams in this manner, Hansen testified that he
had earlier reviewed Williams' situation on July 30 and August 6 and 13, and in each
of the first two of these instances had extended her leave for the limited period of 1
week only, by making entries to this effect under these two dates on a single Form 337
which was placed in Williams ' personnel file. (Respondent's Exhibit No. 17.) This
form (which will be referred to as the July 30 form, although it also contained an
entry dated August 6) was received in evidence , since Hansen testified that it sets
forth the information upon which he acted and the decisions which he made. But
neither a copy of the July 30 form nor the substance of the entries Hansen testified he
made on it on July 30 and August 6 were ever communicated to Williams.
su This finding is based updn Bowman's testimony . Hansen did not testify that Bowman
was instructed to notify Williams of the necessity of applying for a continuation of her
leave, although , as will be noted , he did testify that Bowman reported a visit to Williams
during which Williams said she then expected to return to work on July 30.
a Williams testified that she delivered the slip or certificate either to Bowman or to
Barrett in the latter ' s office on July 23 and that she could not recall visiting the office
on July 30 Bowman testified that Williams took her own papers to the office . Although
Barrett did not testify , a Form 337 In Williams ' personnel file (upon which Manager
Hansen relied in the course of his testimony ) stated that Williams came to the office
on July 30
61 In their appearances as witnesses for the Respondent , neither Johnson nor Menendez
was asked about this visit of Williams to the plant on August 13.
770-076-65-vol. 149-85
1330 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
In the course of a detailed explanation of his entries on Williams' July 30 form,
Hansen testified that before July 30 Leadwoman Bowman had told him Williams said
her "original surgery had been more involved than . . . anticipated, and that she would
require a longer period for recovery ... [but] would be back on the 30th of July."
However, according to Hansen, the July 30 form in evidence was submitted to him on
that day by the Respondent's office for his action, with Bowman's name typed in as
requesting a "1 week extension on previous sick leave," and with the typed remark:
"Catherine came to the office today and stated she should be able to return to work in
1 week. She is still under the Doctor's care and unable to work." According to
Hansen ,-he thereupon affixed his signature authorizing the 1-week extension and, as
would appear from the July 30 form in evidence, wrote in "Only I week extension can
be granted. Terminate after this period."
Still according to Hansen's testimony, having thus extended Williams' leave to
August 6, he again reviewed the matter on that date. He testified that he believed that
in the meantime "Bea Bowman had checked on this and .. [information] was relayed
to me through the office ... that Catherine had some sort of a reaction ... and had
[again] been in the hospital for a couple of days but as soon as that cleared up, which
would be just a few days, she would come to work the following Monday which was
on the 13th of August." Therefore, on August 6, according to Hansen he made the
following, final entry on Williams' July 30 form: "6 Aug. '62 extend one week-
review on 13 Aug. '62-Replacement will be needed if employee cannot return.
P.C.H." Finally, according to Hansen's testimony, since Williams "did not report to
work on the 13th and ...' made no effort to contact us," Hansen filled out and signed
a final, terminating Form 337 on August 13, with directions to Barrett that she was to
mail a copy of it to Williams with a letter informing her of her discharge.
The Form 337 of August 13 which was then mailed to Williams is not to be con-
fused with the July 30 form on which Hansen testified he made the entries extending
Williams' leave for 1-week periods on July 30 and August 6 and which was never
transmitted to Williams. On the terminal Form 337 of August 13 which was trans-
mitted to Williams, Hansen gave as the reason for her termination, "Unsatisfactory
attendance due to illness and/or operation. Employee was given 4 extensions on sick
leave. Replacement is necessary," and under the caption "Remarks," there appeared,
"Employee may be rehired when physically capable to return to work subject to
physical examination and available openings." And, in the letter of the same date
enclosing this August 13 form in accordance with Hansen's instructions, Barrett
informed Williams:
We are very sorry, but due to the extensive contract and amount of work that is
required we felt it was necessary to replace you for the time being. However,
when you become available again, feel free to call.
Summarizing his reasons for his eventual-discharge-of Williams, Manager Hansen
testified at the hearing, "There was a two-fold reason. Now the essential part or the
most significant reason was her poor attendance and unavailability at the time when
we needed her. Secondly, due to the pressure that I mentioned before, our insurance
company, her claims on the insurance company were unreasonable." With respect to
the first of these two reasons, Hansen testified that the Respondent was then negotiat-
ing an extension of its contract with the Air Force; that, in order to maintain its pro-
duction, the Respondent needed qualified solderers like Williams; and that it was'
therefore important to it to replace her on or about August 13. In support of the
second reason, Hansen produced a list of payments made by its insurance company to
Williams. It shows two periods embracing a, week in February and 2 weeks in July
(in this latter instance the full claim had apparently had not yet been established) for
which, by reason of her own illnesses, Williams had been paid a total of $607.10 for
hospitalization and medical expenses, and a total of $90 in indemnity for her loss of
earnings . In addition, insurance payments totaling $637.60 are shown for the hospi-
talization and medical expenses of her two young sons, one of whom according to the
evidence had been seriously ill.63 . I r - -
Just why these claims should be regarded as "unreasonable" does not appear. So
far as the record shows, they were justified and covered by the insurance provided for
e3 In questioning Williams, Respondent's counsel had also-suggested that she had dupli-
cated and collected, claims based upon her sons' illnesses against the Respondent's carrier
and the carrier for her husband's employer. Upon my ruling that this particular matter
should properly be developed in the Respondent's case, the matter was then dropped It
was not pursued by the Respondent' and the 'accusation was therefore not substantiated.
AERO CORPORATION 1331
the employees, including Williams, as one of the elements of their compensation. In
any event, despite Manager Hansen's testimony at the hearing, Mrs. Williams' making
these insurance claims was apparently not a reason for his discharging her since the
only reason given by him on the Form 337 filled out by him and mailed to her on
August 13 as notice of her discharge was "unsatisfactory attendance due to illness
and/or operation. Employee was given 4 extensions on sick leave. Replacement is
necessary."
The question presented by Williams' discharge, therefore, is whether she was dis-
charged for the reason thus given in the August 13 Form 337 mailed to her, or because
she was known to be a leader of the UAW movement which the Respondent and
Hansen vigorously opposed. In seeking an answer to this question, it is necessary to
consider the manner in which Hansen dealt with Williams: why he decided to impose
restrictions on sick leave during her absence; why, although he testified he intended
that extensions should be granted for 1 week only, he had Bowman inform Williams
that extensions were to be for 3 weeks; and why, without notice to Williams and in
spite of his knowledge of the serious nature of her operation, he reviewed her leave
every week beginning with July 30, the day she brought her doctor's certificate to the
office, and, on July 30 and August 6, limited the extension of her leave to an addi-
tional week, merely by making notations on her July 30 form in the Respondent's
personnel file. For, unless the explanation offered by Hansen be persuasive, every
step of his conduct with respect to Williams indicates an intent on his part to find or
develop a colorable basis for terminating her employment without her knowing he was
about to do so, rather than to deal fairly and openly with her. Absent an acceptable
explanation, the conclusion is inescapable that, having developed a colorable basis,
Hansen discharged Williams, not because of the length of her leave and her failure to
return when he expected her and needed her, but because of her apparent leading role
in the UAW movement.
Recognizing the relevance and importance of the inquiries I have posed, Hansen
attempted to answer them in his testimony, and thereby to persuade the Board that
he acted reasonably and considerately in his treatment of Williams and that he
reluctantly discharged her only after he had granted her "4 extensions" of her leave
and it became absolutely necessary to replace her. In short, he attempted to explain
his weekly review of Williams' leave beginning with July 30, his limitation of each of
her extensions to I week, and his failure to give her notice of these limitations and the
imminence of her discharge, in part upon his reliance upon information he testified he
received either directly from Bowman and Foreman Menendez or through the office
as to when Williams would return to work, and in part upon the operation of the new
sick leave rule by which he testified he,had decided to limit original periods of leave
to 3 weeks and extensions to 1 week. But, for reasons which I shall set forth, an
examination of both branches of this explanation has convinced me that neither is
credible or acceptable.
If Hansen's testimony were believed; he first granted Williams an indefinite leave
although he expected her to return in a few weeks, and then, without seeing any
necessity for giving her notice, limited extensions of her leave to two additional
periods of 1 week each by making notations to this effect on the July 30 form which
he placed in her personnel file, all because of his reliance, first upon orignia linforma-
tion from Bowman and Foreman Menendez that Williams would be able to come
back to work in 2 or 3 weeks, and then, when he extended the leave on July 30 and
August 6, upon information he received either directly from Bowman or through the
office on the July 30 form that Williams would return in another week.. But Bowman
testified, and I credit her testimony, that she gave no information as towhen Williams
would return to work and that, although her name appears in type on the July 30 form
she was not the source of the entry therein that Williams said,she would return in a
week. Furthermore, Foreman Menendez, although appearing as a witness for the
Respondent, gave no testimony as to whether he informed Hansen concerning when
Williams would return to work, and the Respondent produced no testimony by Barrett
or anyone else in the office as to how any such information might have reached
Hansen, nor when and how Bowman's name and the entry on the July 30 form might
have been typed in. Certainly, Bowman's denial that she supplied the information
upon which Hansen claimed he relied, was sufficient to raise a question as to whether
and how he actually received it. Because of Bowman's denial (which I have credited),
and the failure of the Respondent to have Foreman Menendez or anyone from the
office corroborate Hansen, and also because of my uncertainty as to the reliability. of
Hansen 's use of any Form 337 as a result of the manner in which he used such a form
1332 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
in Jessie Heard's case, I regard as unsatisfactory, and therefore do not credit, Hansen's
testimony that he received or relied upon any information as to when Williams was to
be expected to return to work. Accordingly, I reject the explanation or justification he
thus offered for his undertaking a weekly review of Williams' leave beginning on
July 30, for his limitation of each of her extensions to 1 week, and for his failure to
give her notice of these limitations and the imminence of her discharge.
Hansen's reliance upon his new rule restricting leaves and extensions as an explana-
tion of his treatment of Williams raises somewhat different questions, but this explana-
tion is also unsatisfactory It may well have been, as Hansen testified, that in view of
pressuie from the Respondent's insurance company he actually decided to tighten up
and limit sick leaves and extensions just after Williams went on leave and that,
although coincident with Williams' absence, the adoption of the new rule was not
primarily nor solely directed against Mrs. Williams. I therefore make no finding that
Hansen's adoption of a new rule limiting leaves and extensions was motivated by a
desire or intent to discriminate against Williams and bring about her discharge. But
the manner in which Hansen apparently adapted and purported to apply the rule to
Williams is an entirely different matter.
So far as the record shows, Hansen made no announcement of the new rule except
in his instructions to Bowman that she notify Williams and Lovett From Hansen's
testimony and Bowman's testimony as to her instructions, it appears that the rule
limited original periods of leave to 3 weeks and required periodic applications for
extension supported by doctor's certificate. According to Hansen's testimony, each of
the extensions was to be for a week only but, as I have already found upon what I
regard to be Bowman's credible testimony, Hansen told her that each extension was
to be for 3 weeks and she so informed Williams. In view of this, I find and conclude
that the rule adopted by Hansen and announced to Williams provided for extensions
of 3 weeks, that Williams after filing her doctor's certificate on July 30 was entitled to
assume her leave would be extended to August 20 and not terminated before that date,
and that Hansen's action without notice to Williams in reviewing her leave every week,
limiting her extensions to 1 week and discharging her on August 13, was a clear and
unjustified departure from his own rule.
For the foregoing reasons, I have concluded that the Respondent has failed to fur-
nish a satisfactory explanation of Manager Hansen's treatment of Williams and that
it therefore appears from the evidence that Hansen, having induced Williams to
believe he leave would be extended for the 3 weeks following her submission of her
doctor's certificate on July 30, deliberately laid the groundwork for her discharge on
August 13 in the manner already described, not (as he testified) because of the length
of her absence from work, her failure to return to work in the meantime in accordance
with any reasonable expectation on his part , nor the necessity for filling her position,
but rather for the only other possible reason shown by the record, i e., her known role
as one of the leaders of the UAW movement to which Hansen and the Respondent
were intensely hostile.64 Accordingly, I further conclude that, in discharging
Catherine Williams on August 13, the Respondent discriminated against her in regard
to her hire and tenure , and the terms and condition of her employment , in order to
discourage membership in and support of the UAW, and that the Respondent thereby
committed an unfair labor practice within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of
the Act.
94 In reaching this conclusion , I have considered the argument of counsel for the Re-
spondent in his brief that "if the Respondent had the illegal motives which the General
Counsel is attempting to impute to it, it would have discharged [Williams] on or before
August 10 . . . and thereby [ have prevented ] her from being eligible to case her vote in
the election [ on June 10 ] " But counsel ignores the force of the evidence and the reasons
upon which I have reached my present conclusion . He also ignores the situation in
which, as I have found , Hansen contrived to discharge Williams without having it appear
that her discharge was based upon her UAW connection . For, having discharged Jessie
Heard and Monroe Lindsay just before the June 1 election and being already aware of
the filing of Heard's unfair labor practice charge, it is unlikely that he would have run
the risk of having it appear that he also discharged a third UAW leader just before the
August 10 election . Furthermore, with respect to Williams ' discharge alone, it would
have been much more difficult for Hansen to justify any discharge of Williams earlier
than August 13, since the situation as he intended it to appear had not had time to
ripen Accordingly, contrary to the Respondent's argument, the fact that Hansen did not
discharge Williams before the August 10 election presents no indication that Williams
was discharged for a reason other than her UAW connection.
AERO CORPORATION 1333
5. Howard C. Wattenbarger
On September 28, 1962, the Respondent discharged a number of employees because
of a reduction of its work under a new Air Force contract.65 Among those discharged
were Jack Black and Howard C. Wattenbarger, two of its six inspectors, who had
worked for the Respondent as inspectors since October 12 and December 5, 1961,
respectively. All "the other inspectors were Wattenbarger's seniors in overall plant
service as well as service in the inspection department.66 Three of the other inspectors
were Black's seniors in the inspection department Aside from Wattenbarger, Ben
Lindsey was also Black's junior in the department but, as the Respondent points out,
Lindsey was one of the only two qualified or "certified welders" in the Respondent's
employ. In addition to the six inspectors employed by the Respondent on Septem-
ber 28, there had been a seventh man, Eugene Murphy, who had been transferred into
the inspection department in May or June but whom the Respondent had transferred
back to the electrical department in the beginning of September.
The General Counsel and the UAW contend that Wattenbarger and Black were
selected and discharged because of their UAW activities. The Respondent denies this.
It contends that Wattenbarger was selected because he had the least service of all the
inspectors and was personally obnoxious to Manager Hansen, and that Black was
selected for discharge as a junior inspector, rather than Ben Lindsey, because of
Lindsey's special, accredited skill as a welder. Because the evidence relating to
Wattenbarger raises somewhat broader questions, 1 shall deal with it first before
turning to Black's situation.
Wattenbarger was hired by the Respondent as a hydraulic mechanic on Novem-
ber 22, 1961. In earlier jobs in the aircraft industry, over a period of 21 or 22 years,
he had worked on a variety of military aircraft and had held responsible supervisory
positions with large well-known aircraft companies as foreman and on one occasion
as superintendent, handling "as high as 400 people." And after his discharge by the
Respondent and at the time he testified in the present case, he was chief of production
of the division of Lear Seagler at MacDill Air Field in Tampa, with supervision of
about 380 people.
Although hired by the Respondent as a hydraulic mechanic, Wattenbarger was
transferred to the inspection department on December 5, 1961. As he put it in his
testimony, "After a few weeks, I transferred to the inspection after I seen that they
didn't have any difficulty with the hydraulic operations." He remained in the
Respondent's inspection department, as I have noted, until his discharge on Septem-
ber 28, 1962. He first served as a production inspector, and became a leadman having
contact with from 10 to 12 inspectors. In the end of February or the beginning of
March 1962, shortly after he attended the first UAW meeting at Padgett's Bar on
February 27, he was transferred to the job of a supply or receiving inspector in which
his contact was limited to four or five other inspectors. In the course of his employ-
ment by the Respondent, he was originally paid $2 an hour and then received raises
aggregating 20 cents per hour, the last 5-cent raise being received by him only 5 or 6
weeks before he was discharged.
Wattenbarger was discontented with Manager Hansen's and Superintendent Price's
supervision of the plant and their treatment of the employees. He was among the
employees who first discussed bringing a union into the plant and, in this connection,
talked with Willis Heard before Heard became a supervisor in February 1962. Heard
was interested at the time and suggested that Wattenbarger might have a union repre-
sentative visit him But, upon becoming a foreman, he told Wattenbarger to forget it.
Shortly thereafter, Wattenbarger attended the first UAW meeting arranged by
Jessie Heard at Padgett's Bar on February 27 and signed a UAW authorization card
As he left this meeting, it will be recalled, he had a long conversation at the bar with
Coley, the Respondent's vice presdient, and told Coley "that things were ... bad at
05 Manager Hansen testified in detail as to the reduction of work tinder the new con-
tract and submitted in evidence a copy of the contract It appears that a reduction in
the Respondent's force was a natural result The General Counsel and the UAW, how-
ever, dispute the Respondent's reasons for selecting some of the men it discharged
06 Wattenbarger was hired as it hydraulic mechanic on November 22, 1961, but in
2 weeks was shifted to the inspection department where he remained until his discharge
Black was hired on October 12, 1961, and was an inspector throughout his employment.
For comparison, the dates each of the six men became inspectois were the following:
Cecil Bonn-September 27, 1961 Jack Black-October 12, 1961
Paul Chastain-September 27, 1961 lien Lindsey-November 21, 1961
Fred Dugger-October 10, 1961 Howard Wattenbarger-December 5, 1961
1334 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
the plant." Thereafter he attended the second UAW meeting at Padgett's Bar and one
of the meetings at the Oasis Bar in May. When Jessie Heard was injured he was one
of the six employees appointed to the organizational committee by International
Representative Quatrini. However, it does not appear that he solicited UAW authori-
zation cards or did anything as a member of the committee other than direct late-
comers to the meeting on April 5 from the VFW Hall to Padgett's Bar to which the
meeting had been transferred at the last minute. At that time it will be recalled,
Foreman Willis Heard saw him standing outside the VFW Hall and he told Heard that
there was to be a union meeting there but that they were planning to move it to
Padgett's Bar.
Despite his early prounion discussion with Willis Heard, his signing a UAW authori-
zation card on February 27, and his attendance of three of the UAW meetings, Wat-
tenbarger testified that "I didn't believe in unions at that time," and that he did not
"fully" change his mind to favor the UAW until June 1, the date of the first election.
His indecisive position in the meantime was apparently reflected in a number of con-
versations he testified he had with Vice President Coley and in a letter which he wrote
on March 28 to Tom Lumbardo, the Respondent's president, at the main office in
Atlanta.
Wattenbarger testified that he could not remember ever telling Coley in these con-
versations, or for that matter any of the Respondent's representatives, that he was in
favor of the UAW. On the contrary, he testified that in several of his conversations
with Coley "I told him that I wasn't in favor of the [UAW], which I wasn't at the
beginning, and I told him that I was going to the [UAW] meeting as a free citizen to
find out what was going on." He further testified, however, that in one conversation
shortly before the election of June 1, Coley said to him, "Wattenbarger, I just can't
see how you can be a union man. You have been in supervision so long You had to
fight the unions and you know what they are," and that Wattenbarger replied, "I am
not for a union, I never have voted for one, and never belonged to one. But it looks
like we will have to have one for protection here, if we work here "
Wattenbarger thus stated a position which he had more fully developed in the letter
he had mailed to President Lumbardo on March 28. After Wattenbarger identified
himself in the letter as an employee to whom Lumbardo had once been introduced, he
wrote: 67
I know this is a little out of line but I have been asked to contact you by several
of the employees and a couple of foremen and also for myself as I feel I am the
goat and accused unfairly.
There has been talk and a couple of meetings to talk union. The most of the
people don't want a union but feel they are being forced into it, by this division
management. These people are good hard workers and do eves ything they have
been told to do and showed how to do. But supervision doesn't take the time or
trouble to show them. Just fire them and hire another to do the same thing to
them. And the way some are talked to is very, very bad. One man quit for
this reason and almost cut Hansen with a knife and almost cut Price up. This
[was] caused by the nasty, loud, rough, and foul talk.
Mr. Lumbardo, I know you have heard . . [about the] Air Force doing this
and that, costing Aero money, etc You just don't know the whole story. I
don't believe you have got the clear picture of this operation. 90% of trouble
between Aero and the Air Force is caused by Hansen and Price. No Company
relations at all. Air Force has bent over backward in lots of cases to help but
[only] to be stabbed in the back by Hansen, the manager.
The town fathers and taxpayers are asking questions. I have tried to let
them know that the company was not aware of the way things were going and I
don't believe you do. You are too smart to let this go on and on.
I believe this operation could be one of the best in the country. It has a good
location. Plenty of room and good manpower if trained Also needs some
planning, more than hour to hour by local management. If Fairchild Aircraft
can have six and seven contracts at a time with not as good a field and hangars as
we have, then there is something wrong.
I believe we can do one of the best jobs in aircraft with the right leadership.
The town people and all employees are ready to dig in and make it the best.
We hope you understand our feeling and help up [sic] as we are your employ-
ees and want to do you and the Company the best job possible.
e7 Omissions not affecting the sense of the letter are indicated Occasional misspell-
ings have been corrected, and punctuation in some instances is supplied to permit easier
reading.
I
AERO CORPORATION 1335
I would like you to pull my application on file here and check it and any
company I have worked with. Talk with Mr. Houston , Air Force Quality Cont
also Mr. Gooden , Mr. Buff and Warren Qualls at St . Augustine, Mr. Ed
Delaney, Temco , Texas. These men know me and can tell you how I feel about
the company I work with and my production records.
I hope this does not affect my job with Aero as I like Lake City and I hope to
spend several years with you. I also would like to talk with you personal if
possible.
Vice President Coley sent a copy of this letter to Manager Hansen, and spoke about
the matter with Wattenbarger during his visits from Atlanta to the Lake City plant.
According to Wattenbarger, Coley said that "there was a lot of truth " in the letter
and that Coley "was doing everything to straighten the situation out."
According to Coley, however , Wattenbarger "seemed to have one thing in mind
[out] of the whole thing and that was to get into management . He really wanted
Mr. Hansen 's job." Thus, Coley testified that , in their conversations Wattenbarger
"told me that he was definitely against the union; that he had been a supervisor before
and had had problems and that he didn't want any part of it Also that he was on our
side and that he would do all that he could to see that the union didn't come in"; that
Wattenbarger 's remarks "centered around him trying to convince me that he was a
company man , that he was on our side"; that Wattenbarger "would interject what he
thought should be done in the way of good management down here. And how he
would run things. And condemning Paul Hansen to me"; that Wattenbarger 's "whole
conversations were principally about him and his relationship with the company.
And what he would like for the relationship with the company to be"; and that Wat-
tenbarger expressed a desire to take Hansen's place . Coley further testified that, in
reply, he "pointed out to [Wattenbarger ] that we hoped to be in business down here a
long time"; that for "people that had experience and capabilities along management
lines ... there would be enough jobs ... but that it was too early to talk about that
now"; and that advancement for Wattenbarger "would have to come from Paul
Hansen" whom Wattenbarger would have to convince that he had the qualifications of
a supervisor . Finally, according to Coley, Wattenbarger also complained to him that
Hansen thought he was supporting the UAW, and Coley therefore reported to Hansen
the substance of his talks with Wattenbarger . Upon consideration of this evidence
against the background of Wattenbarger 's own testimony as to the attitude he took in
his conversations with Coley and in his March 28 letter to President Lumbardo, I
credit Coley 's testimony concerning his conversations with Wattenbarger and his
reporting of their substance to Manager Hansen.
As I have noted , Wattenbarger testified that he finally made up his mind in favor of
the UAW on June 1, the day of the election . According to Wattenbarger 's testimony,
on that day or the previous day, but in any case before the election , Coley met him
and asked him if he were "still with" Coley and the Respondent ,68 a question which
Wattenbarger thought "a little funny " in spite of his having admittedly told Coley a
number of times that he was against the Union.
Although , according to his testimony , Wattenbarger decided about this time to support
the UAW , there is no evidence that he so informed Coley or any of the Respondent's
representative or that he did anything to help the UAW except to cast his secret ballot
in the June 1 and August 10 elections . For there is still no evidence that he solicited
UAW authorization cards or talked to employees in favor of the UAW, nor does it
appear that he went to any UAW meeting after the one he attended at the Oasis Bar
,in May. Furthermore , there is nothing in the record to indicate that after Watten-
barger says he finally decided to support the UAW on or about June 1, he gave the
Respondent any reason to suspect , or for that matter that Hansen or any of the
Respondent's representatives did suspect or believe , that Wattenbarger had eventually
definitely cast his lot with the UAW True, Leadwoman Beatrice Bowman testified
that, not too long before Wattenbarger was made a supply inspector , Manager Hansen
told her "he was sure that Wattenbarger was one of the organizers for the union" but
this was sometime in March, at the latest ,69 and thus before Wattenbarger set out to
convince Coley, and also Hansen through Coley, that he was really against the UAW.
And although Bowman also testified that just before the August 10 election , she over-
heard Manager Hansen tell Foreman Jack Brown to grant a request by Wattenbarger
for time off because that was "a good way of getting rid of him," this would not
68 Coley admitted in his testimony that he might have said to Wattenbarger, "Are you
still right"" or "Are you with its" or "something like that."
6B As I have found upon Wattenbarger's testimony, he became a supply inspector shortly
after his attendance of the UAW meeting on February 27.
1336 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
indicate that Hansen then believed Wattenbarger was a UAW man and had decided
to get rid of him for that reason. For this was well after Hansen had learned from
Coley and from Wattenbarger's letter to President Lumbardo that Wattenbarger was
trying to get his job. Certainly, by this time, Hansen had an understandably strong
reason, other than Wattenbarger's possible support of the UAW, for disliking Watten-
barger and wanting to be rid of him.
Manager Hansen terminated Wattenbarger's employment on September 28 by hav-
ing Foreman Jack Brown hand him a Form 337 with checkmarks alongside "Person-
nel Reduction," and an entry, "Permanent Reduction in Force," under the caption
"Remarks." At the same time, Brown gave Wattenbarger his terminal check with
the notation, "Temp. Lay-off."
Hansen squarely denied that Wattenbarger's union activities had anything to do with
his discharge. According to Hansen, a reduction in force had become necessary
"because of our change in contract requirements," and Wattenbarger was one of the
first he laid off because of his "low seniority in the inspection department" and also
because Hansen "didn't personally like the individual." In explanation of his dislike
of Wattenbarger, Hansen testified that, from the time the Respondent hired him,
Wattenbarger "had continuously complained to supervisors about [Hansen's] activities
without any knowledge . [and] had written letters to the company," and Vice
President Coley had read and sent to him a copy of the letter which Wattenbarger had
written to President Lumbardo on March 28.
Upon the present record, Hansen's explanation of Wattenbarger's discharge is
credible. 1 am satisfied by the evidence that the Respondent's workload under the
new Air Force contract was expected to be less than it had been and that the Respond-
ent naturally released some of its employees. Hansen certainly knew what the
Respondent's personnel requirements under the new contract would been, and the evi-
dence provides no ground for inspectors, nor the reasonableness of his determination
of which of the inspectors should be released and which should be retained, primarily
upon the basis of departmental seniority. Even if Murphy's transfer out of the depart-
ment a few weeks earlier were regarded as a device to save his job for some reason not
shown by the record, his release would not have saved Wattenbarger's job. For, a
reduction of the inspection staff to four on a seniority basis, would still have required
Wattenbarger's release. Accordingly, I find completely credible Hansen's testimony
that he selected Wattenbarger for discharge as part of the reduction in force, primarily
upon the basis of departmental seniority.
Hansen's dislike for Wattenbarger as an additional reason for his discharge, is
equally credible. Moreover, the basis for Hansen's dislike, as shown by the evidence,
serves to sharpen the distinction between the objectionable, unprotected activity in
which the evidence clearly shows Wattenbarger actually engaged and the activity in
apparent, sincere support of the UAW in which the General Counsel and the UAW
contend he engaged and for which they assert he was discharged. By no stretch of
the imagination can it be said, even on the basis of Wattenbarger's testimony, either
that he actually supported the UAW drive for the purpose of establishing the UAW
as the statutory exclusive bargaining representative of the Respondent's employees, or
that he gave the Respondent any reason for believing that he was doing so On the
contrary, his own testimony shows not only that he did nothing to help the UAW
except to sign an authorization card and to vote in the two Board elections, but that
he also took pains to inform the Respondent repeatedly that he was really against the
UAW and that he never informed them, nor by his actions gave them reason to
believe, he changed his mind Instead, he made it clear in his letter to President Lum-
bardo and in his conversation with Vice President Coley (the substance of all of
which was naturally conveyed to Hansen) that he was not interested in having the
UAW represent him and the other employees, that he was using the UAW drive as a
springboard for his own purposes, and that what he was interested in was obtaining a
supervisory job for himself and possibly even supplanting Manager Hansen in his job.
This, of course, and not any activity of Wattenbarger on behalf of the UAW, was the
basis of Hansen's personal dislike and the additional reason Hansen gave for selecting
Wattenbarger for discharge. I find not only that this reason is credible but that the
activity in which Wattenbarger engaged had a purely personal objective, that it was
neither the UAW activity for which the complaint alleges Wattenbarger was dis-
charged nor any such other concerted activity as it protected by the Act.70
Having thus found that Hansen selected Wattenbarger for discharge on Septem-
ber 28 as part of an economic reduction in force, because of his low deparmtental
seniority and Hansen's personal dislike for him rather than because of any UAW or
70 See The R J. Tower Iron Works, Inc, 144 NLRB 445, and cases cited therein in foot-
note 10 of the Intermediate Report.
AERO CORPORATION 1337
other protected concerted activity , I conclude that the Respondent did not discharge
him in violation of Section 8(a)(3) or ( 1) of the Act , and shall therefore dismiss
the allegation of the complaint to that effect.
6. Jack Black
Jack Black , the other inspector discharged with Wattenbarger on September 28,
not only attended two of the UAW meetings and signed a UAW authorization card
on February 27, but spoke in favor of the UAW with all, or almost all, of the
employees in the plant and with Foremen Willis Heard , Haywood Martin , and Jack
Brown. From the foremen 's testimony , as well as his own , there is no question that
he was generally known throughout the plant as an outspoken UAW adherent.
Upon an earlier consideration of the relevant testimony ,71 I have already found
that Foreman Heard had told Black, just before the second election on August 10,
that "the best way for [Black] to get laid off, was ... to keep campaigning for the
union ," and, in still earlier conversations in May and July, had frequently spoken
with Black about "the trouble they had with the union in Atlanta ," and had said that
Black "would be a good company man if [he] would change over."
A few weeks before his layoff on September 28 Black expected there would be a
layoff because of the reduction of the Respondent 's work under the new Air Force
contract . Furthermore , he expected he would be among those laid off because, as
he testified , "I had been laid off once before and I seemed to be the low man on the
totem pole . . . in the inspection department " In explanation, he testified not only
that he "stood up for the union ," but that he "wasn 't the most popular guy in the
inspection department , even with [his] supervisor [Jack Brown] or Mr . Hansen," as
a result of "quite a few disagreements " he had had with Hansen in connection with
his work. Whatever the basis for his expectation of layoff may have been, he told
Foreman Brown, as well as some of the other inspectors , that "if I was going to get
laid off, I wanted to be the first one to get laid off." According to his testimony, he
was not then laid off, but Brown came back in 2 or 3 days and said that Hansen
would oblige him if he "would sign some sort of paper , [a] voluntary layoff," a sug-
gestion which Black rejected.
However , on September 28, just a short time later , Brown called in both Black
and Wattenbarger and discharged them by telling them, "It has been nice working
with you," and handing them their Forms 337 and terminal paychecks As in Wat-
tenbarger 's case, Black 's Form 337 explained his discharge as a "Permanent Reduc-
tion in Force ," although his check bore the notation , "Temp Lay-off."
In this case , too, Manager Hansen denied that Black 's employment was terminated
because of his union activities . Instead, he testified that Black was one of the two
inspectors released in the reduction in force under the new Air Force contract because
"he was the next inspector in line in seniority that had no special skills other than
inspection work As a secondary reason, he had requested that he be among the
first laid off . However, the seniority was the principal reason." According to Han-
sen, he retained Ben Lindsey, the other other inspector junior to Black , because of
Lindsey's other skills which were important to the Respondent , i.e., Lindsey was a
certified welder and a "licensed FAA aircraft and engine mechanic."
Upon consideration of the pertinent evidence , I accept Hansen's explanation of
his selection and discharge of Black as part of the reduction of force of September 28,
rather than the General Counsel's contention that Black was discharged for his
known union activities . Although, in Black's case , unlike Wattenbarger 's. it appears
that he was well known as an ardent adherent of the UAW to which the Respondent
was hostile , and although Black had been warned by one of the supervisors he would
be laid off because of this, I do not believe from the evidence that this was the reason
for his release . Instead, for reasons which I have already discussed in connection
with Wattenbarger , I find that Hansen's selection of Black was based, as Hansen
testified, primarily upon departmental seniority , and that Lindsey was retained as an
exception only because of special and important skills not possessed by Black. I there-
fore dismiss the allegation of the complaint that the Respondent discriminatorily
discharged Jack Black in violation of Section 8(a) (1) or ( 3) of the Act.
7. Elvin Simmons
Elvin Simmons was a porter or laborer whom the Respondent hired on May 28
and discharged with another porter when it reduced its force on September 28. The
See item 15 in section III, D, above.
1338 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
General Counsel and the UAW contend that he was discharged because of his UAW
activity. The Respondent denies this , asserting that he was selected for discharge in
the reduction in force because of unsatisfactory work.
Simmons signed a UAW authorization card on July 24 and attended three or four
UAW meetings at Al's Drive-In. According to the testimony of Simmons and Ken-
drick McGuire, another porter, which I have already credited in spite of Foreman
Haywood Martin 's denials, they were questioned about the union on the' day before
the election of August 10 by Martin , their foreman , and were promised raises.72
McGuire told Martin merely that "The union was all right for those who believed in
it," and was promised a 5-cent raise which he apparently received 73 Simmons, how-
ever, said he knew how Martin felt about the Union and would help Martin by speak-
ing to Roosevelt James, another porter, who was a good friend. Martin thereupon
said Simmons would receive a 10-cent raise 74
It thus appears from what I regard as credible evidence that Foreman Martin was
concerned with the attitude of Simmons and the other porters toward the UAW.
To show that , despite his statement to Foreman Martin, the Respondent knew that
Simmons was in fact a UAW adherent , the General Counsel and the UAW rely upon
uncontradicted testimony by Simmons that he revealed this fact in conversations with
Henry Wilson, who was anti-UAW and who the General Counsel and the UAW con-
tend was a supervisor.
The Respondent , however, denies that Wilson was a supervisor . According to
Hansen's testimony , Wilson was a porter who had worked for the Respondent "much
longer than any of the [other] porters ," who performed manual work himself, and
who had no authority nor power to make effective recommendations concerning the
hire or fire of the other porters, although he did "instruct them how to do their work
in the areas [with] which he [was] familiar ." According to Foreman Martin, Henry
Wilson and Garfield English (who the complaint alleges was later discharged for his
UAW activity ) were both porters who were regarded by the Respondent as co-equal
"head" men of different groups of porters and were therefore paid 10 cents an hour
more than the rest. Consistent with these descriptions of the two men as nonsuper-
visory leadmen , the Respondent had listed them as employees entitled to vote in the
representation elections and their votes had not been challenged.
On the other hand, in order to show that Wilson was a supervisor , the General
Counsel relies upon what he says was new evidence bearing upon Wilson's status,
which came to his attention for the first time during the presen thearing . One element
of this evidence was Simmons ' testimony that, having asked Wilson to get him a job,
he was hired by Manager Hansen at Wilson's request and recommendation . In addi-
tion, the General Counsel relies upon the testimony of porters Garfield English,
Wendell McKenney , and Roosevelt James to the general effect that Wilson told the
other porters what work they were to do, and also upon the testimony of James that,
upon being hired, he was told by Martin he would be working under Martin and
Wilson and "I would do like Henry Wilson said and what he said."
Upon consideration of this evidence relating to Wilson's job, I conclude , in agree-
ment with the Respondent , that Wilson , like Garfield English, was an employee and
not a supervisor . The mere fact that Wilson had gotten Simmons his job is of no
significance . Not only does the evidence show that Garfield English , who all parties
agree was an employee , had also procured a porter's job for his uncle, but , as I noted
in discussing Frances Dicks' status , isolated instances in which a worker successfully
recommends the hire of a friend do not indicate that he has the power or the author-
ity to make effective recommendations and is therefore a supervisor . As to the testi-
mony of the various porters that Wilson gave instructions to them and that Foreman
Martin told one of them he was to do what Wilson told him to do, I regard Manager
Hansen 's description of Wilson's function as more likely to be accurate and therefore
find that Wilson was a nonsupervisory leadman and an employee rather than a
supervisor.
72 See items 5 and 20 In section III, D, above As I also found , another porter , Wendell
McKenney , was also questioned by Martin about the Union on the same day, but was
apparently not offered a raise See item 4 , section III , D, above.
7a As I have already noted , Martin testified he informed McGuire of a raise but said
nothing about the Union.
711 am convinced from the evidence , particularly in view of its parallel to the McGuire
incident of the same day, that Simmons was promised the raise I am not so sure, in
spite of Simmons ' further testimony ( and therefore do not find ), that he actually received
the rase , in view of Foreman Martin's and Manager Hansen ' s denials. In any event, it
is clear that at no time did Simmons receive a merit raise which would have some bear-
ing on the issue of whether his work was satisfactory.
AERO CORPORATION 1339
As a porter, Simmons worked at removing corrosion from the aircraft and also
cleaned the office, washrooms, and latrines. Shortly after the August 10 election,
Foreman Martin told Simmons there was a complaint about his failing to clean the
washrooms properly and that he should check them carefully. Simmons testified
he did so and, upon asking Martin a few days later, Martin told him he had no more
complaints According to Simmons, this was the only time he had any complaints
about his work.
But Foreman Martin and Manager Hansen testified that Simmons had not only
failed to clean the washrooms and latrines properly, but that he was not cleaning
the corrosion off the planes, and that Martin spoke to him about both matters after
Hansen complained to Martin. According to both Foreman Martin and Manager
Hansen, Simmons' work in the washrooms and latrines improved for a short time
but then the washrooms became so bad that Hansen himself showed Martin how he
wanted the wash basins cleaned. According to Martin, Simmons' work on the planes
never did improve much. Martin testified that the other porters, including Garfield
English, said that Simmons was "laying down" on the job. English, however, denied
having made any such comment.
When the reduction in force occurred on September 28, Simmons was among those
who were discharged. Hansen denied that Simmons was selected because of any
union activities or that he knew Simmons had engaged in any such activities. He
testified that he decided to discharge Simmons because of his unsatisfactory work
in cleaning the washrooms and the aircraft.
Upon consideration of the foregoing testimony, I see no basis for concluding that
Hansen or any of the Respondent's representatives knew of Simmons' UAW activity.
Furthermore, I find upon the evidence that Simmons' work was in fact unsatisfactory
and that this was the reason for his discharge Accordingly, I conclude that he was
discharged for proper cause and not in violation of Section 8(a)3) or 1) of the Act.
I shall therefore dismiss the allegation of the complaint to this effect.
8. Garfield English
Garfield English was hired as a porter on May 1, was regarded as a good porter
by Foreman Martin, and on Martin's recommendation was made a leadman with
a 10-cent an hour raise about 2 weeks before the August 10 election. He signed a
UAW authorization card on August 5 and attended five or six UAW meetings at
Al's Drive-In. In the course of organizing the porters, International Representative
Quatrini visited English's home, a fact which admittedly came to the attention of
Foreman Martin.75
The record shows no dissatisfaction on the pait of Martin and the Respondent
with English's work at any time before October 17. On that day, however, Martin
criticized the work of English's crew on the washstand, and English objected to the
criticism as being unfair. During conversations between him and Martin later the
same day, English either quit or was discharged. The General Counsel and the
UAW contend he was discharged for his UAW activity. The Respondent contends
that he quit, and thus his UAW activity was not a factor in the termination of his
employment.
English and Martin both testified that Martin told English, in the presence of two
of the other porters while they were working on the washstand, that the planes were
not being cleaned properly. Although their testimony differed as to the language
used by Martin, it appears from both versions that his remarks were sharp and were
meant for all three men, but that he addressed English, particularly, as the leadman.
English testified that Martin said, "Damn, Garfield, that is not the way to clean them
damn lines; what is wrong with you? This is the way to clean them, get this brush
and get up there and do them like that," and that he then told the other two porters
they all had to do better. Martin's version of his remarks was that he said, "Garfield,
these airplanes are getting through without being cleaned. All the damn treatment,
which is the treatment for corrosion, is no good. The inspectors are turning it down
and we can't clean it after it gets beyond the hangar and it has got to be done here
on the washrack"; that English said, "I was doing the best I can"; and that Martin
replied, "Well, you might be, but I believe there is somebody else that can do it better."
75 English testified that a few days before the August 10 election, he overheard Martin
ask Thomas Perry, another porter who was English's uncle, whether the union repre-
sentative had been at English's home Although Martin denied having questioned Perry,
he testified that, in an attempt to ingratiate himself with Martin, Perry volunteered the
information that he himself had once been a member of a union but no longer was, and
that Quartini had visited English's home
1340 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
At the end of the lunch period, English and Roosevelt James, who had been work-
ing with English , waited for Martin near one of the hangars Here again , it appears
from the testimony of both English and Martin that English objected to Martin's
criticism , that Martin attempted to mollify him; and that the conversation ended with
English and James returning to their work . But their testimony differed as to
whether English simply objected to Martin's unfairness or whether he told Martin
he thought he would have to quit because he was not "able to take it."
English testified that he said , "Mr. Martin , I don't know whether you meant any
harm or not about what you just came out and said awhile ago . You know it is not
that I [don't] want to work, it is the principle about the job . I think that I give you
a fair day 's work and I think you should give me a fair day 's job"; that Martin said
Manager Hansen was giving him hell and he "just [had] to get on somebody, too";
that English replied, ". . . I don't think I am doing any goofing off because I do my
job and I try to do it the best I can"; and that Martin finally said , "Well, if I kind
,of shook you up like I shook you up awhile ago , I didn't mean any harm, because
I want you boys to stay here with me ... you are experienced and I don't want to
hire no new guys." 76
Martin, on the other hand, testified that English started the conversation with the
statement , "Mr. Martin , I don 't believe I am going to take it "; that Martin asked,
"What the hell do you mean ?"; that English replied, "Well , I'm doing the best I can.
It seems like you don 't think so and it looks like I am going to have to quite"; that,
including James as well as English , Martin then said, "Well, Roosevelt , I tell you just
like I told him. I have told you these airplanes have got to go. They are not being
cleaned and you know they are not being cleaned. Go on back down to the wash-
rack. Hell, you have been a good man and you can do it, I know you can."
Shortly thereafter Martin came back to English . English testified that Martin said,
"Look here , Garfield, I don't know what you mean. If you can 't take the
I am giving you, you can hit the road , because I can hire a hundred of you this
evening if I need to"; that English said , "Well, Okay"; that Martin then told him,
"You can pick up your check Friday"; and that English thereupon left the plant.
But Martin testified that, having in the meantime spoken to Hansen, and reached an
agreement on the course he should take , he told English , "Garfield, if it is your inten-
tion to quit that is what 1 want. If you want to continue working, you have a job,
but you will have to do your job "; that after English "thought a minute," he replied,
"Well, I just think I will quit"; and that Martin ended the conversation by saying,
"That suits the hell out of me," and told English he could pick up his check on Friday.
In explanation , Martin and Manager Hansen testified that, before Martin had this
last conversation with English , Martin had told Hansen that English was angry
because of Martin's criticism and had said he "just guess [ed] he was going to have
to quit." According to Hansen , he asked Martin about English 's work and Martin
said "that he was a good worker and that he could do the job if he would do so."
According to both Martin and Hansen , Hansen told Martin, "Well , we don't want
nobody wanting to quit and if he wants to quit, let him quit."
Despite Martin 's and Hansen's testimony , the reason for English 's termination on
October 17 as given in the Form 337 which both Martin and Hansen signed and filed
that day, does not indicate that English quit his job. For the form merely stated that
"Garfield got mad because he could not take orders from his foreman . Not for
rehire." Although the form provided boxes alongside various printed items includ-
ing "Leave of Absence ," "Termination ," and "Resignation ," so that the appropriate
item might be checked , there was no checkmark against any of the items . Nor, for
that matter , was there any other indication on the form as to whether English had
quit or had been discharged.
The foregoing is a summary of all the evidence bearing directly upon English's
termination . It shows that Foreman Martin did in fact know that the UAW repre-
sentative organizing the porters had visited English's home . It also shows that, in
promoting English to the job of leadman, both Martin and Hansen regarded English
as a good worker . Actually, not only is there no indication in the record that there
had ever been any reason to complain about his work before October 17, but it is
clear from Martin's and Manager Hansen 's testimony that, in spite of Martin 's criti-
cism of English on that date , they still felt that English was a "good worker."
se James testified that English told Martin "he didn ' t see no need . . for a cussing
out like that, " and that Martin explained he had "to get on us" because the "man [obvi-
ously Manager Hansen] gets on him " Although James thus corroborated English, he
added that Martin also told English "he could get two more men just like us "
AERO CORPORATION 1341
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary , I assume that there was basis for
Martin's criticizing the work of English and his crew on October 17. Furthermore,
whether we accept English 's or Martin 's version of the language Martin used, it
appears that , although his criticism was sharp and obviously stung English, it was
justified by the situation and gives no indication that Martin, in voicing it in the
rough, shop language not uncommon to some foremen in industrial plants, did so
because he knew or suspected English was involved in the UAW's organization of
the porters . However, although unusual with respect to English, the criticism was
apparently routine and , as both Martin and Hansen testified , Martin still regarded
English as a good worker.
Even so, it is understandable that English , having pride in his work , was hurt by
the criticism and later in the day protested to Martin that it was unfair. It is in con-
nection with the conversation which occurred between the two men at this time, that
their testimony presents the prime material conflict in the evidence . According to
Martin, English said he just could not take criticism and "guessed " he would have
to quit. But, having seen and heard English on the witness stand, 1 think it unlikely
that he spoke of quitting, and therefore credit his testimony that he merely objected
to Martin 's criticism as being unfair , and that he pointed out that he was a good
worker and expected recognition of this and fair treatment from Martin
In any event , it is clear from the testimony of both men that, when English pro-
tested against Martin's criticism , Martin attempted to mollify him. For, as Martin
himself testified , he wound up this conversation by telling English , "Go on back down
to the washrack . Hell, you have been a good man, and you can do it, I know you
can." From the testimony of the two men, therefore, it would appear that at that
time they both felt that the incident was over
But, in spite of this, Martin returned to English a short time later and reopened the
matter. Here again, I credit English's testimony that Martin then told him, "If you
can't take the I am giving you, you can hit the road," rather than Martin's
testimony that he merely said , "if it is your intention to quit, that is what I want.
If you want to continue working, you will have a job, but you will have to do
your job."
Not only did Martin thus unexpectedly reopen the entire matter of his difficulty
with English earlier that day after it had been apparently settled, but he also magni-
fied the incident beyond all reasonable proportions and, in his testimony at the
hearing , attempted to make it appear that English , upon being presented with a defi-
nite choice of quitting or staying on the job and taking orders and reprimands, had
decided to quit and was not discharged. But, as I have found upon English's credible
testimony and contrary to Martin 's testimony , English had not threatened to quit.
He had, therefore , not given Martin , upon reflection , any reason for coming back
and insisting that English make a choice between quitting or obeying orders and
accepting reprimands Nor could English be reasonably expected to understand
from Martin 's final statements to him that he was being given such a choice. Instead,
against the background of what I have found to be the earlier conversations 'that day,
Martin's final remarks to English could have meant to English only that he was being
discharged because he could not take "the " Martin was giving him. Accord-
ingly, English's "Okay" before leaving the plant signified simply his understanding
from Martin 's statement that he was discharged , and not a decision on his part to
quit his job.
In sum, the credible evidence disproves , rather than supports , Martin's and Man-
ager Hansen 's explanation of English 's termination of employment as a voluntary
quitting or resignation . On the contrary , it shows that Maritn discharged English
and that, both in his conversation with English at the time and in his testimony at
the hearing, he tried to conceal the nature of his act and his actual reason therefor
by attempting to make it appear that English either voluntarily quit or was terminated
as a result of a routine difficulty which the two men` had in fact already settled
between them.
The Respondent 's explanation is unsatisfactory and the evidence presents only one
credible explanation for the discharge . As I have found upon the evidence discussed
in detail in an earlier section of this Decision , the Respondent and its representatives,
'including Manager Hansen and Foreman Martin , were hostile to the UAW's attempts
to orgaize its employees and establish itself as their statutory bargaining representa-
tive, and had in other earlier instances. interfered with its employees ' freedom to
support and vote for the UAW, even to the extent of discharging three other strong
UAW adherents . At the time of English 's discharge on October ' 17, the representa-
tion issue was still very much alive, since , on October 3, the Regional Director had
set aside the second election of August 10 and could be expected to direct still a third
1342 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
election. English's difficulty with Foreman Martin on October 17, thus presented
Martin and Manager Hansen an opportunity to discharge still another UAW adher-
ent, whom Martin (according to his own testimony) had reason to believe was
involved in the UAW's organization of the Respondent's porters since Martin knew
he had been visited at his home by the UAW's representative in the organizational
drive preceding the second election. Upon the evidence before me, this appears to
furnish the only credible explanation of English's discharge.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that the Respondent discharged Garfield English
on October 17, 1962, because it suspected that he had engaged in and was engaged
in organizational activities on behalf of the UAW, that it thereby discriminated
against him in regard to his hire and tenure of employment in order to discourage
membership in the UAW, a labor organization, and thus committed unfair labor
practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act.
9. Roosevelt James
Roosevelt James, a 20-year old porter, was hired by the Respondent on June 17
and discharged by Haywood Martin, his foreman, on October 26. On his hire, he
failed to disclose to the Respondent that he was on probation following a conviction
for larceny He signed a UAW authorization card on June 24 and attended all but
one of the UAW meetings at Al's Drive-In. On August 24 he submitted an affidavit
to the Regional Director, apparently in support of the UAW's objections to the
August 10 election, although no attempt was made by the General Counsel to pro-
duce and offer the affidavit in evidence. According to his testimony in the present
hearing, he received three or four "subpoenas" informing him "what date to appear
in the court," again apparently in connection with the representation proceedings.
He did not give oral testimony in those proceedings, however, and the "subpoenas"
were not produced at the present complaint hearing.
The General Counsel and the UAW contend that the Respondent discharged James
on October 26 both because of his UAW activities generally, and also "because he
cooperated and gave evidence to Board agents during the processes of Board investi-
gations and/or gave testimony under the Act." They assert that the Respondent
thereby committed unfair labor practices not only within the meaning of Section
8 (a) (3) and (1) of the Act but also within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (4). The
Respondent denies these accusations and contends that James was discharged because
of his failure to perform his job satisfactorily, culminating in an incident on Octo-
ber 26 in which he spent much more time than he should have in his assigned job of
taping a wheel well preparatory to the removal of corrosion, and even then did not
complete the task.
As in so many cases of this type, Respondent's scienter and its actual motivation
in discharging James must be determined by considering not only (1) whether it
appears from the evidence either that the Respondent has been informed of James'
UAW activities or that the activities were of such a nature that they were likely to
come to the Respondent's attention, but also (2) whether from the evidence of
Respondent's treatment of James and the circumstances in which it occurred, it can
reasonably be inferred that it knew of his UAW activities and discharged James
because of these activities rather than for any actual failure on his part to perform
his work satisfactorily.
Certainly, the Respondent cannot be charged with any knowledge of James' sup-
port of the UAW from the mere fact that he signed a UAW authorization card and
attended five of the six UAW meetings at Al's Drive-In. Nor can the Respondent
be charged with such knowledge on the basis of James' uncontradicted testimony that
he was driven to one of the meetings by Leadman Henry Wilson and told Wilson that
he was in favor of the UAW. For as I have found, Wilson was an employee and not
a supervisor and there is no evidence that he communicated any of his information
about James to the Respondent. To show Respondent's knowledge of James' support
of the UAW, however, the General Counsel and the UAW rely also upon evidence
concerning a conversation between Foreman Martin and James at the time of the
August 10 election, and James' testimony concerning both the "subpoenas" with
which he was served in the representation proceedings and the affidavit which he
submitted to the Regional Director on August 24 in support of the UAW's objections
to the August 10 election.
James' conversation with Foreman Martin took place either on August 9 (accord-
ing to Martin) or on August 10, the day of the second election (according to James),
but in any event just before the election was held and immediately after James' pro-
bation officer had made a routine telephone call to Respondent's office and informed
the Respondent for the first time that James was on probation. In their conversa-
AERO CORPORATION 1343
tion, Martin told James he had just learned he was on probation and that Martin
would not have hired James had he known of it. According to James, Martin then
said that "he would like to keep . . . [James] if he could keep the Air Force from
finding out about it," and that "as long as ... [James went] down the road with him,
he ... [would] go down the road with ... [James]." Martin denied saying this to
James although he testified that he did ask James why he had not told Martin about
his probation, that James merely said "he didn't know what the matter was," and
that Martin then said, "Well, you know I never would have hired you if I had known
you were on probation." From the testimony of both men, it is clear that Martin
made no reference to the Union or to the election.
The General Counsel and the UAW apparently contend that, since it was made
just before the election, Martin's remark, "as long as ... [James went] down the road
with him, he ... [would] go down the road with ... [James]," indicated that he knew
or at least suspected James was a UAW adherent and that he made the remark to
coerce James against voting for the UAW in the election. But there was admittedly
no reference by Martin either to the Union or to the election that day or the next
day. Unlike the General Counsel and the UAW, I see no indication from the remark
(if it were made) that Martin was doing anything more than informing James that
he had just learned of and was displeased by James' failure to disclose his probation,
and that, although he would not discharge James, James should be sure that his con-
duct in the performance of his work was satisfactory. I therefore find no interfer-
ence with James' voting rights nor any indication from any remark Martin may have
made on this occasion, that he knew or suspected James had any connection with,
or was supporting, the UAW.
Nor does the record present evidence that Martin or the Respondent knew that
James had been "subpoenaed" in the representation proceedings or that he had given
an affidavit to the Regional Director to support the UAW's objections to the August 10
election. No attempt was made by the General Counsel to introduce such an affidavit
in evidence, much less to show that the Respondent had been served with a copy of
it in the representation proceedings. The General Counsel did offer a copy of the
Regional Director's report on the objections to the elections, which had been served
upon the Respondent and contended that, although not mentioning James by name,
statements in the report could not have failed to apprise the Respondent that they
were based upon information received from James. But, on the Respondent's objec-
tion, I refused to inspect the Regional Director's report and rejected the General
Counsel's offer of it as an exhibit, noting that the report would apparently present
the Regional Director's decisions on matters which were also in issue in the present
proceedings and upon which the Respondent was entitled to a trial and decision
de novo in the complaint proceedings-77
In sum , although it appears from the evidence that James did sign a UAW authori-
zation card, attend five of the six UAW meetings at Al's Drive-In, and submit an
affidavit in support of the UAW objections to the August 10 election, there is no
evidence in the record that the Respondent knew of any of this or of James' general
support of the UAW unless it can be inferred from the manner in which the evidence
shows the Respondent dealt with James in discharging him on October 26. We turn,
therefore, to the evidence relating directly to James' discharge and the reasons which
the Respondent asserts for the discharge.
Although the General Counsel asserts in his brief (at page 71) that James "was
a conscientious worker and regarded so by Haywood Martin," he apparently bases
this statement solely upon the testimony of Garfield English, to which I have already
referred, that in James' and English's conversation with Martin on October 17,
Martin had attempted to soften his reprimand of the men that day by telling them
both, "I want you boys to stay here with me, because you are experienced and I
don't want to hire no new guys." It is true that James himself also testified that
Martin, Manager Hansen, and Vice President Coley had told James' probation officer
that "I was a good worker." But this was not only obviously hearsay; it apparently
had no actual basis, since Robert Wilkin, the probation officer, testified that he had
spoken only to a girl in the Respondent's office who told him on August 9 merely
that James was performing his work satisfactorily and that the Company then planned
to keep him on indefinitely.
On the other hand, Foreman Martin testified that, on the basis of his personal
observation , he was dissatisfied with James ' work in "cleaning down the aircraft,
stripping a battery right, or whatever he was doing"; that, after Simmons was dis-
charged on September 28, James "laid completely down on the job"; and that, before
he discharged James on October 26, Martin had "warned" James at least five times
77 See footnote 6, above.
1344 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
about his poor work ." Manager Hansen , too, testified that, although James worked
directly under Foreman Martin , Hansen had noticed James took about 20 minutes,
as against a normal 3 or 4 minutes , using a hose to rinse cleanser out of a wheel well.
One of the regular jobs of the porters, including James, was to remove corrosion
from the wheel wells of the T-33 aircraft , and it was while James was engaged in
the first stage of this particular task on October 26 that he was discharged by Fore-
man Martin.
The wheel well and a hinged door on the lower surface of the wing house the wheel
and the components of the mechanism which opens and closes the door and lowers
or retracts the wheel. A strong chemical is used as a cleanser or solvent to remove
the corrosion from the bulkhead of the well itself . To protect the wheel mechanism,
including its wiring and aluminum tubing , and also the interior surface of the door,
they are first cleaned of accumulated grease and masked or taped with oiled paper.
After these parts are thus "taped ," the chemical solvent is hosed into the well under
pressure and, when the chemical has had time to take effect, the corrosion is brushed
and scraped out. The removal of the corrosion is known as "stripping " the wheel
well, although from the use of the term by the witnesses , it also appears that at times
they loosely refer to the entire process , including the "taping," as "stripping" the
well. Under its original contract with the Air Force, the Respondent "stripped" the
entire well , but later, under a new Air Force contract which went into effect before
October 26 , it was permitted to "spot strip " the well , i.e., to confine the "stripping"
to such areas which apparently needed it . Even in "spot stripping ," however, the
"taping" was as extensive as it has previously been.
About 8:30 on the morning of October 26, Foreman Martin told James to "strip"
the two wheel wells of a T-33 which was then on the washstand . James testified
that Martin told him that "he had two wheel wells that he wanted me to strip .. .
and he wanted me to have it done in about an hour's time ", that James told Martin
"there wasn 't no way in the world that I could do that in an hour's time "; that Martin
said that this was Manager Hansen's order , that Martin himself could do it in half
an hour, and that James ought to be able to do it in an hour; and that James finally
said he could not do it but would try. In his testimony , porter Wendell McKinney
agreed with James that Martin told James he expected him to "strip " two wheel wells
in an hour because Manager Hansen had said "You could strip a wheel well in a
half hour's time." But Martin testified that he merely told James he was to tape
and then strip the two wheel wells.
According to James' testimony , Martin came back to him twice , once about 10
minutes later , and the second time after another 10 or 15 minutes . James testified
that, on the first occasion , "I had started taping the wheel well"; that "I had one
[wheel well] practically taped up . . . by the time he left and came back within that
10 minutes time"; that Martin said , "You haven 't got that damn thing taped up yet?"
that James answered , "No, I just started on it"; that Martin left and talked with
Leadman Henry Wilson ; that James passed Wilson in going to the hangar to get
some tape ;' that Wilson asked James if he had a "subpoena "; and that James replied,
"No." As to Martin 's return to him the second time, James testified that "I had to
tape up the other one [the second wheel well] completely •. .. and I didn't get a
chance to finish before he [Martin ] came back on me to check me"; and that Martin
gave him his check and told him he was no longer employed by the Respondent.
According to Foreman Martin, however , he checked James about half an hour
after he was assigned the job , then about an hour later, and, since James had not
completed taping even the first of the two wheel wells in that time , he spoke to
Manager Hansen about it and then discharged James. Thus Martin testified that
about 9 o'clock, he first went back to James and "saw that he had just gotten started
and he had just a very little taping done"; that he told James , "Roosevelt , we have
got to get these damn wheels taped up, we have got to get them stripped , they are
wanting this airplane in the hangar "; that at break time at 10 o'clock he again went
back to James and found that he had still not completed taping the first well; that
Martin told James, "Roosevelt , , we are just going to have to do it,
to get somebody that can do it"; and that Martin then discharged James after talk-
ing with Manager Hansen about it.
In the Form 337, which both Martin and Manager Hansen signed , the reason
given for James' discharge was, "Roosevelt James has been warned at least 5 times
about his poor work in production . Today, he was told to tape up two wheel wells
which is about a 30-minute job and it took him 11/z hours to tape up one wheel well.
I,request not to be rehired " ( Respondent 's Exhibit No. 32.)
A considerable amount of evidence was taken concerning the average or reasonable
time for "taping" and "stripping" a wheel well. It appears that "stripping " a-wheel
well, i.e., performing the entire task, ordinarily takes from 21/2 to 4 hours and that
AERO CORPORATION 1345
if Martin had told James he was to perform this entire job on two wheels in an hour,
the order would have been completely unreasonable . But, I am convinced from the
evidence that Martin gave no such ridiculous order and that the critical points are
the average or reasonable time for "taping" a wheel well, whether Martin allowed
sufficient time for this , and the related question of whether James had made reason-
able progress in taping the wheel or wheels before he was discharged.
During the hearing, the Respondent had porter Wendell McKinney tape a wheel
well, took still photographs of him and also of the interior of the well and the taping
as it progressed , and timed the process. The photographs were introduced in evi-
dence with the testimony of McKinney , Foreman Martin (who directed the test),
and Jack Brown (the inspection foreman who timed the process ). From this testi-
mony, it appears that McKinney 's timed performance took place with respect to an
identical wheel well and under conditions similar to those which existed in connec-
tion with James' performance on October 26, except that McKinney knew his per-
formance was being timed and the weather was somewhat warmer-the latter factor
making some difference in that grease was more easily removed from the wheel
mechanism preliminary to the taping . McKinney was timed at 37 minutes on the job.
In addition to this timed performance , the witnesses gave their own estimates of
the tftne ordinarily required to tape a wheel well. Martin estimated it should take
an average porter 20 or 25 minutes for one wheel well and that he himself could
tape two wells in 30 or 40 minutes. In his original testimony given by him before
he later testified as to his timed performance , McKinney testified that taping a wheel
well required from 30 to 45 minutes . And, surprisingly , James himself testified that
he could tape up a wheel well in from 10 to 15 minutes , and two wheel wells in half
an hour or 40 minutes.
Upon consideration of all of the foregoing evidence , I credit Foreman Martin's
testimony as to the circumstances of and reasons for James ' discharge on October 26.
Accordingly , I specifically find upon Martin 's testimony and upon consideration of
the testimony concerning the average or reasonable time required to tape a wheel
well that ( 1) before October 26 James' work had been unsatisfactory in the respects
detailed in Martin's testimony and that Martin had "warned " James at least five times
about his poor work ; ( 2) on October 26 Martin told James to "tape" and then "strip"
two wheel wells ; ( 3) James had not completed "taping" the first well an hour and a
half later; (4) by the most conservative estimate furnished by the evidence , "taping"
a wheel well should require only 45 minutes ; ( 5) according to James' own estimate
he could have taped a single wheel well in 10 or 15 minutes , and two wheel wells
in half an hour or 40 minutes ; and (6 ) Martin, with Manager Hansen's approval,
discharged James on October 26 because of his generally unsatisfactory work includ-
ing his spending much more time than he should have in taping the wheel well on
October 26.
Accordingly , I conclude that James was discharged for cause , that the evidence
does not show that the Respondent knew of any of his UAW activity, and that his
discharge did not constitute a violation of Section 8(a)(1), (3 ), or (4) of the Act.
I therefore dismiss the allegations of the complaint based upon his discharge.
F. The refusal to bargain
1. The refusal
We turn now to the final question of whether the Respondent refused to bargain
with the UAW in violation of Section 8(a) (5) of the Act. Upon the evidence before
me, I have already found that , in response to the UAW's bargaining request and
claim of majority made in its letter'of April 9, 1962, the Respondent , in its letter of
April 16, 1962, and by its counsel 's confirmation thereof during the representation
hearing on April 26, 1962, "declined to recognize [the UAW] without certification
by the National Labor Relations Board," because , as the Respondent stated in the
letter , it was its "opinion that our employees do not desire your union to represent
them" and it was therefore unwilling to "assume that you have captured them." 78
It thus appears that, with this explanation , the Respondent expressly refused to bar-
gain with the UAW on April 16, and again on April 26 , 1962, and has consistently
maintained this position.
In the present case, the 6 -month limitation prescribed by Section 10(b) of the Act
imposes a somewhat narrower time limitation upon the possibility of finding a
refusal to bargain within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) of the Act than it does
upon the findings of unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1)
78 See sections III, A and B, above
770-076-65-vol. 149-86
1346 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
and (3) which I have already made. 19 Since the original Section 8 (a) (1) and (3)
charge was filed and served on the Respondent on August 3, 1962, the complaint
properly alleges, and I have already found, that some unfair labor practices within
the meaning of these Sections occurred as early as the latter part of February 1962,
and thus clearly within the 6 months preceding the filing and service of this particu-
lar charge On the other hand, a charge of refusal to bargain was first filed by the
UAW on October 25 and served only on October 26, 1961. Accordingly, under
Section 10(b), the question properly presented to the Board by this latter charge is
whether the Respondent committed and is continuing to commit unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8(a) (5) by its refusal to bargain with the UAW on
and since April 26, 1962. However, in determining the Respondent's good or bad
faith in refusing to bargain during this period and the number of valid, continuing
bargaining authorizations which the UAW then possessed, the Board may, and
should, consider all relevant events both before and since April 26, 1962, including
the related unfair labor practices under other sections of the Act, with which it was
timely charged and which I have already found were committed by it.
The record amply supports the General Counsel's and the UAW's contention that,
on and since April 26, 1962, as well as before that date, the Respondent's refusal to
recognize and bargain with the UAW has been motivated, not by any doubt as'to the
UAW's majority, but by a desire and an intention to obtain time and an opportunity to
dissipate this majority if, in fact, it existed. Thus, as I have already noted,89 the
Respondent's letter of April 16, referred to by its counsel at the hearing on April 26
as the continuing basis of its refusal to recognize the UAW, indicates that, regardless
of the number of actual, signed UAW bargaining authorizations, the Respondent
merely challenged reliance upon these authorizations as demonstrating the "desires"
of the subscribing employees, and that it intended to attempt to nullify the effect of
these authorizations by preelection appeals to the employees to vote against the UAW.
Further support for the conclusion that the Respondent did not question the UAW's
majority in good faith but merely sought time to defeat the UAW's claim, is pro-
vided not only by Vice President Coley's admitted knowledge of the attendance of a
substantial number of the employees at the first UAW organizational meeting on
February 27 and of the dissatisfaction which prompted their attendance and interest
in a union to represent them, but also by the Respondent's admitted "concern" lest the
employees vote for the UAW, and its admitted carefully organized, and repeated,
attempts during each of the preelection periods to persuade them not to do so.81
But, if all this were not enough, the final factor which convinces me of the Respond-
ent's lack of an honest doubt of the UAW's majority as the motive for its insistence
upon a Board election, is the course of unfair labor practices to which the Respondent
resorted before and between the two elections and even after the second election when
it seemed possible that a third election would be held, i.e., the acts of its vice president,
its plant manager, its superintendent, and its foremen in (1) subjecting the UAW's
meetings to surveillance in March and April,82 (2) interrogating employees concern-
ing their interest in and support of the UAW, (3) informing them that their union
meetings were under surveillance, (4) threatening to lay off employees or close or
move the plant out of Lake City if the UAW were successful in the elections, (5)
promising raises and promotions to employees if they did not vote for the UAW or if
they would assist the Respondent in discouraging other employees from supporting or
voting for the UAW in the elections,83 (6) discharging Jessie Heard and Monroe
Lindsay, two of the UAW's leaders, just before the June 1 election and thereby pre-
venting them from voting in that election and in the August 10 election,84 and (7) dis-
charging Catherine Williams, another UAW leader on August 13, and Garfield
English, who it also had reason to believe was involved in organizing the porters, on
October 26.85
All of these acts of unfair labor practices were obviously calculated separately and
by their combined weight, to coerce and intimidate the employees against voting for
the UAW in the two elections which were actually held and in any further election that
might be held. Accordingly, in agreement with the General Counsel and the UAW,
79 See footnote 1, above.
eo See section III, B, above.
st Ibid.
° See my findings as to surveillance by Superintendent Price in section III, C, above.
83 For my discussion and findings concerning these miscellaneous acts of interference,
see section III, D, above.
° See sections III, E, 1 and 2, above.
95 See sections III, E, 4 and 8, above. - -- -"
AERO CORPORATION 1347
I conclude that the Respondent's refusal to recognize and bargain with the UAW on
and since April 26, 1962, was not actually motivated by any bona fide doubt on its
part as to the UAW's majority, and that its insistence upon an election was simply a
device adopted by the Respondent to give it the time and the opportunity to defeat the
UAW's claim of representation.86
Contrary to the Respondent's contention, the rule adopted by a majority of the
Board in the Aiello case 87 does not apply to the situation in the present case. In that
decision, the Board held that after proceeding to, and losing, a single representatoin
election with knowledge of the employer's unfair labor practices, a union was barred
from establishing its representative status in a subsequent Section 8(a) (5) proceeding
based upon the same unfair labor practices. In reaching this conclusion, the Board
noted that, upon learning of the employer's unfair labor practices before the election,
the union "could then have filed charges against [the employer] alleging an unlawful
refusal to bargain, or it could [have] pursue[d] the representation proceeding"; that
the union "chose the latter course" and lost the election; that, in formulating "its long
standing practice" with respect to contemporaneous representation petitions and
Section 8(a)(5) charges, the Board had recognized that "both cannot at once be
appropriate [for establishing the Union's status] because they are based on funda-
mentally different premises," i.e., the representation proceeding, upon the premise that
an existing question of representation must be "resolved by an election," and the
unfair labor practice proceeding, upon the premise "that there is no question of repre-
sentation and that the union involved is in fact the exclusive representative with whom
the employer is legally required to bargain." (110 NLRB at 1367-1368.) The Board
then proceeded to its conclusion, dismissing the Section 8(a)(5) allegation of the
complaint based upon the employer's known preelection unfair labor practices, upon
the following reasoning:
Apart from the divergent nature of these processes, sound administrative prac-
tice also requires that the Board refuse to proceed with a representation election
when charges of refusal to bargain have been filed. For the Board, as custodian
of a public statute, should not be compelled to diffuse its energy and expend time
and public funds in useless and repetitive proceedings. The Union in this case
by delaying the filing of its 8 (a)(5) charge circumvented the Board's sound
practice of not conducting a representation election when an 8(a)(5) charge is
pending and caused the Board to conduct a futile election . . . . We see no
reason for permitting a labor organization after it has thus resorted to a repre-
sentation election with knowledge of unfair labor practices to revert to an
8(a)(5) proceeding based upon the same unfair labor practices as a means of
establishing its representative status. We therefore find that the Union may not
now urge facts which took place before the representation election as grounds
for finding a violation of Section 8 (a) (5) ....
Our dissenting colleague disagrees with our dismissal of the 8(a)(5) allega-
tions. However, his comment that the Union's withdrawal of its petition after
the election constitutes a proper selection of remedy and his reference to the
expense of processing a representation proceeding "after an election has been set
aside" indicates a misconceptoin of the majority position. The majority members
are not, as he suggests, desirous of imposing needless restrictions upon a labor
organization's freedom of choice. The Board majority by the rule applied in
this case seeks to protect the Board's procedural machinery from abuse. We do
not here hold that a labor organization having once filed a representation petition
is bound to follow the representation procedure despite unfair labor practices of
an employer. We do not hold that an employer's unfair labor practices, which
we condemn as vigorously as our dissenting colleague, should go unremedied;
and we here order an appropriate remedy for the Respondent's coercion and
discrimination. We do hold that a labor organization having knowledge of an
employer's misconduct must make timely selection as to whether it will in the
face of such conduct participate in an election to establish its representative status
or will file an 8 (a) (5) charge. Our dissenting colleague complains that this
gives the labor organization an illusory choice. We fail to see how it is illusory
or inequitable to afford a labor organization which has knowledge of the facts a
genuine opportunity to select between two procedures either of which will
achieve the result sought by the organization. On the other hand, the Davidson
°Joy Silk Mills, Inc., 85 NLRB 1263, modified and enfd. 185 F. 2d 732 (C.A.D.C.),
cert. denied 341 U S 941.
17 Aiello Dairy Farms Co., 110 NLRB 1365 ( Member Peterson dissenting).
1348 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
rule, which Member Peterson urges the Board to continue , gives the Board no
choice as to whether it shall conduct an election , but transfers to the labor organ-
ization, having full knowledge of unfair labor practices , the judgment as to
whether the Board will proceed with an election . Effectuation of the Board's
practice not to conduct an election when an 8 ( a)(5) charge is pending is thus
made dependent upon the labor organization 's determination as to when it will
file a charge concerning known unfair labor practices . Substitution of the
Union's final judgment for that of the Board in such matters is hardly com-
patible with good administration . If the choice afforded a labor organization by
the principles set forth in this decision is unsatisfactory to labor organizations
as our dissenting colleague suggests , it is unsatisfactory only because it affords an
organization 1 rather than 2 opportunities to demonstrate its majority status.
[110 NLRB at 1368-1369 . Footnotes omitted.]
As I understand the opinion in Aiello, the Board was concerned lest the "sound
administrative practice " it had developed be "circumvented " by a union 's filing an
8(a)(5) charge after it had failed to establish its representative status in a single
representation election The evil to which the Board referred was that the Board, if
it permitted a union "2 opportunities to demonstrate its majority status, " would be
"compelled to diffuse its energy and expend time and public funds in useless and
repetitive proceedings ." The "sound administrative practice " which the Board was
intent upon protecting against abuse by unions , was its general practice of refusing to
conduct an election upon the filing of an 8(a ) ( 5) charge and was based upon "the
divergent nature" of representation and unfair labor practice proceedings . "To pro-
tect the Board 's procedural machinery against abuse ," the majority of the Board
thought it reasonable in the situation it then had before it , "that a labor organization
having knowledge of an employer 's misconduct must make timely selection as to
whether it will in the face of such conduct participate in an election to establish its
representative status or will file an 8 ( a) (5) charge."
In my opinion , the rule of Aiello is purely a procedural rule adopted by the Board,
not for the protection of the employer who has committed unfair labor practices, but
for the general protection of the Board 's processes in the public interest . Accord-
ingly, it is to be applied reasonably and with caution , and only in such a situation in
which it appears , upon a consideration of all the relevant factors, that the possibility
and effect of a union 's abuse of the processes outweigh the competing propriety,
desirability , and fairness of issuing a bargaining order against the offending employer.
Certainly , the Aiello rule was never intended to protect abuse of the Board's processes
by the employer, nor, therefore , to permit the employer by repeated unfair labor
practices , to force the protraction of representation proceedings through an indefinite
number of futile elections.
It is, therefore , not surprising that the Board has never applied its Aiello rule to a
situation in which, like the present , the employer has, by its unfair labor practices,
already prevented a fair election on more than one occasion , and by continuation of
its unfair labor practices after the last election held, has demonstrated the impossibility
of the Board's ever being able to conduct an election free from its interference. In
such a case, it is the employer , rather than the union, which has abused the Board's
representation processes and "compelled [the Board ] to diffuse its energy and expend
time and public funds in useless and repetitive proceedings ," and it obviously should
not be permitted to use the Aiello rule as its shield . This is the situation in the present
case and the Aiello rule has no reasonable application.
In sum , upon the foregoing considerations , I conclude and find that (1) the
Respondent on and since April 26, 1962, has refused to recognize and bargain with
the UAW as the exclusive bargaining representative of its production and maintenance
employees ; (2) the Respondent 's refusal to bargain was not motivated , nor therefore
justified, by any bona fide doubts as to the UAW 's majority; ( 3) the Board's ruling in
the Aiello case is not applicable to the present case; and (4) the UAW is therefore
not barred from establishing its majority and seeking a bargaining order in the
present proceedings.
Accordingly , we turn to a consideration of whether during the period of the
Respondent 's refusal to bargain , the UAW had in fact been designated and selected
as exclusive bargaining representative by a majority of the employees in an appro-
priate bargaining unit.
2. The appropriate unit
The parties agreed at the hearing , 'and I find as did the Regional Director in the
representation case, that all production and maintenance employees at the Respond-
ent's Lake City, Florida , operation , but excluding all other " employees , office clerical
AERO CORPORATION 1349
employees, watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute, and
at all material times have constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
To enable a determination of the numerical and exact composition of this unit on
material dates up to and including August 10 (the date of the second election), the
Respondent, upon subpena and in compliance with the General Counsel's requests
and my directions during the hearing, submitted lists of the persons on its payroll
for each of the weeks ending April 8 (the payroll closest to the filing of the UAW
representation petition), April 29 (the payroll closest to the representation hearing),
May 6 (an intermediate date), and June 3, 1962 (the payroll closest to the first elec-
tion). In addition to these payroll lists, I also received in evidence the list of
employees on August 3, 1962, which the Respondent submitted to the Regional
Director as a list of employees eligible to vote in the August 10 eleciton. Since there
will be repeated necessity for my referring to these five lists, I will refer to them
collectively as "the payroll lists," and, individually, as "the payroll list" of the particu-
lar date. Although, as I have noted, the parties agreed at the hearing upon the general
description and composition of the appropriate unit, they disagreed as to the exclu-
sion or inclusion of certain individuals regardless of whether their names appear upon
these payroll lists. Furthermore, issues arose as to whether, upon the evidence which
I received, it would appear that particular individuals whom I find to have been in the
unit on particular dates, had previously signed and submitted continuing, effective
bargaining authorizations to the UAW. In the following sections of this Decision, I
discuss and resolve these issues. A compendium of my conclusions concerning the
composition of the appropriate unit and the number and identity of the effective
bargaining authorizations on the date of each of the payroll lists is provided in
Appendix A.
3. Disputed inclusion and exclusions
(a) Frances Dicks and Henry Wilson: Having already concluded that Frances
Dicks and Henry Wilson were employees and not supervisors,88 I find that both of
them were in the appropriate unit of the Respondent's production and maintenance
employees.
(b) Rudy Glover: Although I have also concluded that Rudy Glover, the test pilot,
was an employee and not a supervisor,89 the fact that he was a salaried employee and
had a unique job convinces me that his interests were quite different from those of the
hourly paid production and maintenance employees in the unit. Like the Regional
Director I have excluded him from the appropriate unit.
(c) Beatrice Bowman and Judy Johnson: There is dispute concerning the status of
Beatrice Bowman, the day leadwoman, and Judy Johnson, the night leadwoman. In
the representation proceeding, the Regional Director held that Bowman was a super-
visor and, as a result, she did not vote in the elections. The Regional Director made
no finding as to Johnson, and she voted in the June 1 election without challenge,
having been told by Foreman Robert Martin, according to her testimony, that she was
an employee entitled to vote. The ultimate positions taken by the parties during the
present proceeding, however, are that, according to the Respondent, both women were
supervisors, but, according to the General Counsel and the UAW, they were both
employees.
As I have found, both of these women were among the first five women employees
hired by the Respondent in October 1961, and were given raises and made leadwomen
in November 1961. As leadwomen they trained the Respondent's expanding staff of
women, with Bowman becoming day leadwoman and Johnson, night leadwoman.
Neither woman hired nor fired employees and the issue is whether they had such
authority, with sufficient responsibility, to direct the work of the women employees,
to assign work, and to make effective recommendations, as would show that they were
supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 (11) of the Act.
Bowman testified that she checked the work of the girls, assigned them their work,
interviewed job applicants at Manager Hansen's request as late as May 1962, initiated
the discharge of one girl by recommending the discharge to Hansen in January 1962,
and, at Hansen's request before the June 1 election, gave him the names of her "5 best
girls," all of whom thereupon received raises. Lengthier evidence was given concern-
ing Johnson, who, as the night leadwoman, was if anything, subordinate to Bowman.
Johnson testified that Manager Snellen (Hansen's predecessor) told her in November
1961 she had the power to recommend raises and to transfer girls from job to job and
change their shifts; that in February 1962 Superintendent Price told her she did not
88 See sections III, D, and III, E, 8, above
69 See section III, C, above
1350 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
have this authority; that, at Manager Hansen's request in March 1962, she did make
recommendations on Forms 337 as to which girls should be recalled after the Febru-
ary layoff; that she continued to initiate personnel changes by filling out Forms 337
for Foreman Robert Martin's signature; and that, although she worked herself, she
checked the work of the other girls and, if she found their work unsatisfactory, would
either "call" the girl or do the work herself.
With respect to Bowman, Manager Hansen testified merely that the solderers
worked under her direction. As to Johnson, Hansen testified that she was "in charge"
of the girls working in the aft section ; that she would spend about half her time seeing
that they performed their work properly; that she would assign extra girls to a particu-
lar job if necessary; and that, upon approval of her request for overtime work, she
would select the girls for the overtime assignment. Although the General Counsel, in
cross-examining Hansen, sought to develop inconsistencies between this testimony and
the testimony given by him in the representation hearing, he did not succeed. At
most, it would appear that in the representation hearing the Respondent made no con-
tention that Johnson was a supervisor although it did make such a contention with
respect to Bowman. So far as the present record shows , there were no inconsistencies
in the testimony of Hansen with respect to the two leadwomen in the two proceedings.
Although the matter is not free from doubt, I conclude that both Bowman and
Johnson had authority to direct the work of the women employees, to assign work,
and to make effective recommendations; that the exercise of this authority was not
routine; and that they were therefore supervisors within the meaning of Section 2 (11)
of the Act. Accordingly, in agreement with the Respondent, I find that, as super-
visors, they were not employees in the appropriate bargaining unit.
(d) Joe Lashley, Jr.: Joe Lashley's name appears only on the June 3 payroll list.
He signed a UAW authorization card on July 20 and on July 22 left for a 6-month
period of active duty with the Florida National Guard. 1 find that during that 6-
month period he was on military leave from his job with the Respondent and that,
although his name does not appear on the August 3 payroll list, he was still an
employee in the appropriate unit.
(e) Anna Waters: Anna Waters' name appears only on the April 8 payroll list.
She was ill at the time of the hearing. However, it was stipulated that, if able to
appear, she would testify (and the Trial Examiner was therefore free to find) that,
having returned to work from the February layoff before April 8, she was thereafter
advised by her physician not to work during the period of her pregnancy, and that she
"asked [Leadwoman] Bea Bowman if it was necessary to come out and talk with Mr.
Hansen concerning her status ." In view of Manager Hansen's testimony as to the
Respondent's liberality in granting maternity leaves, I find and conclude upon the
stipulated testimony , that Waters was on maternity leave and that , although on leave,
she remained an employee in the appropriate unit during the subsequent period up to
and including August 3, 1962.
(f) Dorothy Feagle: The question presented with respect to Feagle is whether she
was a "temporarily laid off" employee on and after March 26, and therefore to be
included in the appropriate unit after that date. Her name does not appear on any of
the payroll lists in evidence.
According to Leadwoman Judy Johnson's testimony and a notice given to Feagle
by the Respondent cautioning her to maintain her hospitalization , she was "tempo-
rarily terminated" on February 23, 1962, with a group of women employees who had
been working on the night shift. The other women were recalled on March 25, 1962,
but Feagle was not recalled . Leadwoman Johnson had presented a "personnel
change" form for Feagle's recall on March 26, 1962, with the notation: "Has been
tried in several positions and work has been inferior. Very slow." Superintendent
Price disapproved Feagle's recall. Under the circumstances, I conclude that on and
after March 26, 1962, Mrs. Feagle was not "a temporarily laid off employee with
reasonable expectation of future employment ," as the General Counsel contends, and
therefore she was not an employee in the unit on and after March 26, 1962.
(g) Mildred Harrison : Harrison 's name is included on all the payroll lists sub-
mitted by the Respondent except the April 29 payroll list. She testified that she
worked for the Respondent from approximately September 17, 1961, until June 1,
1962, and she is listed by the Respondent as being an employee on "sick leave" on
August 3, 1962. Upon this state of the record, I conclude that Harrison was an
employee of the Respondent in the appropriate unit on all material dates from April 8
to August 3, 1962, inclusive, and that the omission of her name from the list of
employees submitted by the Respondent for April 29, 1962, was inadvertent.
(h) Lillie Tomlinson: Her name appears on the lists of employees which the
Respondent supplied for April 8 and August 3, 1962, but not on those for April 29,
May 6, or June 3, 1962. According to her uncontradicted testimony, she was on
AERO CORPORATION 1351
"sick leave" for several months including June 1, the date of the first representation
election. I conclude that she was an employee of the Respondent in the appropriate
unit in the entire period from April 8 to August 3, 1962, inclusive, and that the omis-
sion of her name from the lists of employees supplied by the Respondent for the
intervening dates was inadvertent.
(i) Betty Jean Phillips and Louise Cumbess: According to their testimony, Phillips
and Cumbess had worked for the Respondent since January 2, 1962, and Novem-
ber 17, 1961, respectively, and both were still working for the Respondent on Febru-
ary 25, 1963, the day they testified. Phillips' name was omitted from the employees'
list submitted in evidence by the Respondent for June 3, 1962, and Cumbess' name,
from the list for April 29, 1962. I conclude that these omissions were inadvertent and
that both Phillips and Cumbess were employees in the appropriate unit and all mate-
rial dates from April 8 to August 3, 1962, inclusive.
(j) James W. Blackburn: James Blackburn's name is omitted from the April 8
payroll list but included on the payroll lists for April 29, May 6, and June 3. Although
Blackburn did not testify, the Respondent submitted copies of his application for
employment and a tax withholding authorization, which indicated he was hired on
November 20, 1961. His omission from the employees' list for April 8, 1962, was
apparently inadvertent. I conclude that he was an employee of the Respondent in the
appropriate unit up to and including June 3, 1962.
(k) James Moore and James Greene: Moore's name appears on the payroll lists
for April 8 and 29 and May 6. Green's name appears on the April 8 payroll list.
Although the General Counsel stipulated at the hearing that the payroll lists submitted
by the Respondent contained the names of persons on its payroll for the dates given,
he reserved the right to contest the inclusion in the unit of particular persons. He
specifically objected to the inclusion of Moore on April 29 and May 6, and to the
inclusion of Greene on April 8. No evidence or further stipulation was offered on
this matter and, in his brief, the General Counsel now contends "that failure of proof
requires" the exclusion of Moore and Greene from the appropriate unit on the dis-
puted dates. I disagree. The stipulation was conclusive as to the persons on the
Respondent's payroll and their inclusion in the unit unless the evidence showed error.
It was incumbent upon the General Counsel to produce such evidence. I include
James Moore and James Greene in the appropriate unit on the dates shown in the
payroll lists.
(1) Jessie Heard and Monroe Lindsay: These were two of the employees who I
found were illegally discharged by the Respondent. Accordingly, I include them in
the appropriate unit for all material dates.
(m) Pearl Hamilton: It has been found, contrary to the General Counsel's and
the UAW's contention, that on May 21 Hamilton was discharged for cause. Accord-
ingly, she is not included in the appropriate unit after that date.
4. The UAW's majority
a. The UAW authorization cards
To establish the UAW's designation as bargaining representative by a majority of
the employees in the appropriate unit, the General Counsel produced printed cards
purportedly singed by the employees. The cards contained blanks for insertion of the
date; the name of the employer; the name, address, classification, shift, telephone
number, and clock number of the employee; and his signature. Under the caption,
"Authorization to UAW," the cards set forth the following complete statement for
adoption by the signatory employee:
I, the undersigned employee of ---------------- authorize UAW to represent
me in collective bargaining.
This is not an application for membership. This card is for use in support of
the demand of (UAW), American Federation of Labor and Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations (AFL-CIO) for recognition or for an NLRB election.
The Respondent contends in its brief, as it did at the hearing, that this card on its
face was ambiguous and not an effective bargaining authorization because, in addition
to its clear initial statement of a grant of bargaining authority to the UAW, the card
stated that it was to be used "in support of the [UAW's] demand ... for recognition
or for an NLRB election." At the hearing, counsel for the Respondent attempted to
question employees as to their understanding of the meaning of the card and their
intention when they signed it. But I sustained the General Counsel's and the UAW's
1352 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
objections to such questions ,°° ruling that the card on its face was not ambiguous but
set forth a clear bargaining authorization 91 Despite objections from the General
Counsel and the UAW, however, I permitted the Respondent 's counsel to question the
witnesses as to whether the UAW's representatives or solicitors had informed
employees before they signed their cards that the UAW intended to use the cards only
to obtain a Board election and not to gain recognition 92 The evidence elicited was
uniformly to the effect that no such representation had been made to the employees.
In view of the Board 's decisions cited in the preceding three footnotes , I now confirm
my rulings at the hearing and specifically find that the UAW cards constituted clear
bargaining authorizations ; that there is no evidence to indicate that the employees were
induced to sign them by any representation that they would be used only to obtain a
Board election ; and that, to the extent that the signatures have been properly authen-
ticated, the cards constituted effective designations of the UAW as collective-
bargaining representative of the signatory employees
The Respondent further contends , however, that Leadwomen Bowman and John-
son "actively participated in obtaining [UAW] authorization cards from employees,"
and that since they were supervisors and their efforts "obviously encouraged employees
to sign the cards, " their influence upon the employees was improper and substantial,
and generally invalidated the cards upon which the UAW relies to show its majority.
As the basis for this contention , the Respondent apparently refers to the substance
of a chain of testimony given by employee Jessie Heard, Bowman , Johnson, and Fred
Quatrini , the UAW's International representative. From this testimony , it appears
and I find, that neither Bowman nor Johnson attended a UAW meeting or signed a
UAW card; that within a few days after the first UAW meeting on February 27,
Jessie Heard gave Bowman a batch of cards; that Johnson took them from Bowman
and turned them over to employee Mildred Easterwood ; that 16 signed cards were
returned to Heard through the same channel , i e., Easterwood to Johnson , to Bowman,
and then to Heard; but that although Heard mailed the 16 cards to Quatrini , Quatrini
never received them and they are not among the 84 cards which the UAW otherwise
obtained and has submitted in evidence as the basis of its claim of a continuing
majority during the critical 6-month period in this case.
Upon this state of the record , I cannot agree with the Respondent that the isolated
instance in which such minor supervisors as Bowman and Johnson merely transmitted
a comparatively small number of cards upon which the UAW does not rely, had any
appreciable influence on the employees in the unit , or that it provides a realistic base
for disregarding the numerous authorization cards upon which the UAW does rely
and which the evidence shows were signed and submitted by employees directly to
the UAW at one of the meetings or upon the solicitation of another employee in the
unit. I therefore reject the Respondent 's contention that Bowman 's and Johnson's
transmission of UAW cards in March should invalidate the cards which are in
evidence.
b. Authentication and number of UA W authorization cards
To substantiate the UAW' s claim of majority , the General Counsel produced the
authorization cards purportedly signed by employees in the unit. However, in the
cases of three employees ( Monroe Lindsay , Robert McKnight , and Joe Taylor) he
relies solely upon their testimony that they signed and submitted cards and attempts
to excuse production of their cards on the ground that they were lost. But it is my
opinion that , although the Respondent by its unfair labor practices has made it
necessary to determine whether the UAW was selected as bargaining representative by
a majority of the employees in some manner other than by secret ballots cast in a
Board election , only the signed cards provide an acceptably formal and reliable sub-
stitute. I shall therefore not count Monroe Lindsay , Robert McKnight , and Joe
Taylor as employees who designated the UAW as their representative in spite of the
fact that they testified they had signed UAW cards.
With but few exceptions , to which I will refer in a moment, the signatures and dates
on the authorization cards admitted in evidence were proved either by the testimony
of the signatory witness, by the testimony of another witness as to the date and signing
w Gary Steel Products Corporation , 144 NLRB 1160.
91 The Board has recently held that an almost identically worded authorization, pro-
viding for alternative use of the card in obtaining recognition or a Board election, was
on its Lace a clear and effective bargaining authorization . Peterson Brothers, Inc. 144
NLRB 679
°' Cumberland Shoe Corporation, 144 NLRB 1268 . See also the Peterson Brothers
decision cited in the preceding footnote , and Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc ., and Winn-Dixie
Louisville, Inc ., 143 NLRB 848.
AERO CORPORATION 1353
of the card by the apparent subscriber in the witness' presence, or (in the cases of
caids signed by employees who were not available" to testify themselves) by the testi-
mony of Hairy M. Ashton, a qualified handwriting expeit,33 who stated that, after
examination and comparison, it was his opinion that the apparent signature and (in
most cases) also the date inserted on each of the cards were written by the same hand
as the writing on specimens submitted by the Respondent from the personnel folder
of the apparent subscriber. In each case, the writing specimen assumed by the expert
to be authentic had been submitted by the Respondent under subpena or at my direc-
tion, had been taken by the Respondent from the employee's personnel file, and was
either a signed tax withholding authorization, a signed application for employment, a
signed personnel form of another type which the Respondent regularly used, an
endorsement on a paycheck, or a letter from the employee The Respondent objected,
and has repeated its objection in its brief, to the use of these specimens on the ground
that it could not vouch for their authenticity. However, in my judgment, the nature
and admitted source of the specimens have furnished a reliable guarantee of their
authenticity. With two exceptions to which I shall refer,94 I therefore accept the
specimens taken by the Respondent from its personnel files as authentic and rely upon
the opinions reached and expressed by the handwriting expert on the basis of his
comparison with the writings on the cards.
Upon the foregoing evidence, I am satisfied as to the authenticity of the signatures
on almost all of the cards in evidence and the dates on which they were submitted to
the UAW. There were only the following exceptional situations , which require
further consideration:
(1) Cecil Koon: Employee Cecil Koon was called as the Trial Examiner's witness
and, upon being shown a card purporting to bear his signature, testified that it looked
like his signature, but that he did not know whether it was and could not remember
signing a card. As a reading of his testimony will show, he was an unsatisfactory
and unreliable witness. However, there is no affirmative proof that he actually signed
the card in question. Therefore, I do not find that he designated the UAW as his bar-
gaining representative.
(2) James Morrell: Morrell did not testify. A hand-lettered card, bearing Mor-
rell's handprinted name in the blank provided for "Name of Employee," was submitted
by the General Counsel. No script signature appears on the card and nothing appears
in the blank provided for "Signature of Employee." The handwriting expert testified
that the handlettering on the card was, in his opinion, by the same hand as the hand-
lettering on specimens from Morrell's personnel file. In view of the lack of any
entry in the blank provided for the "Signature of Employee," I feel there is doubt as
to whether Morrell intended to sign the card and thus complete it, and I therefore
do not count this card in support of the UAW's claim.
(3) Bobby Walker: Walker did not testify. On comparison of a script signature
purporting to be his on a card submitted by the General Counsel, the handwriting
expert testified that in his opinion it was the same handwriting as the signatures on a
tax withholding authorization and an application for employment both which were
taken from his personnel file, but not the same as the writing and signature on a letter
purporting to come from him and also taken from his file Relying on this opinion
and on the presumption that the signatures on the tax form and the employment
application, rather than the letter, were authentic, I conclude that Walker signed the
authorization card
(4) William Coarsey: Coarsey did not testify. On comparison of a script signa-
ture purporting to be his on a card submitted by the General Counsel, the handwriting
expert testified that, in his opinion, it was in the same handwriting as the signatures on
a tax withholding authorization and an application for employment both of which
were taken from his personnel file, but not the same as the endorsements, "William
Coarsey" and "(Mrs.) William Coarsey," which appear on one of his wage checks
also taken from his file. Relying on this opinion and the presumption that the signa-
tures on the tax form and the employment application, rather than the endorsements
on the check, were authentic, I conclude that William Coarsey signed the authoriza-
tion card and will count it in support of the UAW's claim of designation.
13 Ashton's testimony concerning his experience and qualifications as an examiner of
questioned documents is impressive and is, of course, set forth in the transcript
us That is, a letter from employee Bobby Walker's file and endorsements on a wage
check taken trom employee William Coarsey's file According to the handwriting expert
the writing on these two papers was, in his opinion, not the same as the presumably
authentic signatures of these employees on their tax withholding forms and applications
tor employment. I deal with this below.
1354 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(5) Undated cards: In this category are included cards with the authenticated
signatures of the following employees:
Perry Andrews: Andrews could not give the date but testified that he signed his
card at a UAW meeting at the Oasis Bar. Since these meetings were all held in May,
I shall count his card on and after May 31, 1962.
Charles Barton: Barton testified that he signed his card on the day of the first
election on June 1 or a day later. But, in a pretrial affidavit, he had stated it was in
the end of August 1962, and thus after the dates which the General Counsel has urged
as the material dates. I do not count his card.
Kenneth Disbrow: Although he did not date his card, he testified, and I find, that
he signed it on July 13, 1962. I shall count his card on and after that date.
Gaylon Roberts: Although the date, "4-4," was inserted and then crossed out on
his card, the Regional Director's time stamp on the back of the card, as well as a list
of employees given to the Regional Director by the UAW, shows that it was among
the cards submitted to the Regional Director on April 10, 1962, in support of the
UAW's petition in the representation case. Moreover, I credit International Repre-
sentative Quatrini's testimony that he had all these signed cards in his possession at
least by April 9, 1962, the day he wrote the letter to the Respondent requesting recog-
nition. I therefore count Roberts' catd on and after April 9, 1962.
Peyton D. Yopp: Yopp testified that he signed and submitted his card at a UAW
meeting which was actually held at the VFW Hall and which preceded the meeting
shifted to Padgett's Bar. Since other evidence has established that the meeting to
which Yopp thus referred was held at the VFW Hall on March 27, 1962, I find that he
signed and submitted his card on that date.
(6) Apparently misdated or incompletely dated cards: In this category are included
cards with the authenticated signatures of George Bullard (dated "4-12-61"), Ray
Lee Harden (dated "5-24-64"), Anthony McGhin (dated "5-10"), and Allamae
Waters (according to whose testimony the date she inserted should have been "4-5-
62" rather than "3-5-62.") The errors are obvious and I accordingly correct them
in Appendix A.
(7) Cards bearing dates which the evidence does not show were inserted by the
subscribers: In this category are included cards with the authenticated signatures of
James E. Bush, Roger Davis, Mildred Easterwood, Lloyd Fox, William Holmes, Ben
W. Lindsey, Edgar Olivent, Garland Rowe, T. E. Weathersby, and Mary Witt. All
these cards, like that of Gaylon Roberts, bear the Regional Director's stamp indicat-
ing that they were submitted in support of the UAW's representation petition. More-
over, as in Roberts' case, International Representative Quatrim's testimony establishes
the fact that these cards were in his possession on April 9, 1962, the day he wrote the
letter to the Respondent requesting recognition. I shall count these cards on and
after April 9, 1962.
The otherwise authenticated cards of Elizabeth Naylor and Bobby Walker also
bear dates which were apparently not inserted by them.
Mrs. Naylor's card bears the date, "4-26-62." However, she testified she.did not
complete the date herself, although it was in April. I will count her card onand after
April 30.
Bobby Walker did not testify and the handwriting expert could give no opinion as
to whether the date inserted on his card was in his handwriting In the absence of
evidence, I can make no finding as to when he signed it and will not count his card
as having been signed and submitted during the critical period.
c. Summary of findings as to the UA W's majority and its status as exclusive
bargaining representative
The substance of the findings I have made with respect to the composition of the
unit and the number of valid, outstanding UAW authorization cards on the dates of
the payroll lists in evidence, is set forth in Appendix A. It appears that the UAW had
received and possessed the valid bargaining authorizations of 50 out of 98 employees
in the unit on April 8; 62 out of 106 on April 29; 65 out of 110 on May 6; 65 out of
120 on June 3; and 60 out of 124 on August 3. Thus, on the dates of all the payroll
lists in evidence except the last, the UAW held the valid bargaining authorizations
of a majority of the employees in the appropriate unit.
Even at that, the totals I have been able to compile and set forth in my table under
each of the dates of the payroll lists in evidence, do not do justice to the actual
strength of the UAW's majority on April 9, nor do they explicitly show the UAW's
majority on April 26. However, the evidence leaves no doubt as to the UAW's sizable
majority on each of these two dates, which are the critical dates in the case. Thus,
because the earliest payroll list supplied was for the week ending April 8, 1 have not
AERO CORPORATION 1355
included in the total shown in the table for that date an additional 11 cards which may
well have been in the UAW 's possession at that time but which , even upon the strict
view I have taken of the credible evidence , were certainly in International Representa-
tive Quatrini 's hands the following day , April 9, when he made the UAW 's claim of
majority and requested recognition from the Respondent 95 Nor does my total for
April 29 show ( although it is evident from the dates of submission of the cards) that
the 62 cards from the 106 employees in the unit during the week ending on that date,
had in fact been in the possession of the UAW before April 26, a midweek date
embraced by the April 29 payroll list.
Accordingly , upon the evidence and the detailed supporting findings I have already
made, I further specifically find that the UAW possessed the valid bargaining authori-
zations of 61 out of the 98 employees in the unit on April 9, and of 62 out of the 106
employees in the unit on April 26 . Since the UAW was thus designated and selected
as representative for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority of the
employees in the appropriate production and maintenance unit of the Respondent's
employees on both April 9, 1962, the date of the UAW's request for recognition, and
upon April 26, 1962, the date of the Respondent 's confirmation of its refusal to bar-
gain, and since the Respondent was then engaged , and continued to engage, in a
course of unfair labor practices to defeat the UAW's claim of majority and its right to
recognition , I conclude that on April 9, 1962, and at all material times since that date,
the UAW was, and has been, the exclusive representative of all the Respondent's
employees in the appropriate unit within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. Conclusions as to the refusal to bargain
Since it has been found that on, and at all material times since, April 9, 1962, the
UAW has been the exclusive representative of all of the Respondent 's employees in a
specifically described unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within
the meaning of Section 9(a) of the Act, and since it has also been found that on and
since April 26, 1962, the Respondent has, without justification , refused to recognize
and bargain with the UAW as such exclusive representative , I conclude that, by its
refusal to bargain with the UAW on and since April 26, 1962, the Respondent has
committed unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of
the Act.
IV. THE EFFECT OF THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES UPON COMMERCE
The activities of the Respondent set forth in section III, above , occurring in connec-
tion with the business operations of the Respondent as described in section I, above,
have a close , intimate , and substantial relation to trade, traffic , and commerce among
the several States, and tend to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing com-
merce and the free flow of commerce.
V. THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practices within the
meaning of Section 8 (a) (1), (3), and ( 5) of the Act , I will recommend that it cease
and desist therefrom and take certain affirmative action designed to effectuate the
policies of the Act.
Having found that the Respondent discriminatorily discharged Jessie R. Heard on
June 1, Monroe Lindsay on May 21, Catherine Williams on August 13 , and Garfield
English on October 17, 1962, I will recommend that the Respondent offer each of
them immediate and full reinstatement , without prejudice to his or her seniority or
other rights and privileges , and make him or her whole for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of the discharge by payment to each of them of a sum of money
equal to that which he or she normally would have earned from the aforesaid date of
discharge to the date of the Respondent 's offer of reemployment , less his or her net
earnings during said period. The backpay shall be computed in accordance with the
formula stated in F. W. Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289. Furthermore , it will
be recommended that the Respondent pay interest on the backpay due to each of these
employees , such interest to be computed at the rate of 6 percent per annum, and,
using the Woolworth formula, to accrue commencing with the last day of each calen-
dar quarter of the backpay period on the amount due and owing for each quarterly
period. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co ., 138 NLRB 716.
w See my findings concerning Gaylen Roberts ' card and the cards of 10 other employees
in the preceding section of this Decision
1356 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact, and upon the entire record in the
case, I make the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Imple-
ment Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of the Act.
2. Respondent Aero Corporation is an employer engaged in commerce within the
meaning of the Act.
3. By subjecting the UAW's meetings to surveillance, by interrogating employees
concerning their interest in and support of the UAW, by informing employees that
their union meetings were under surveillance, by threatening to lay off employees or
close or move its plant out of Lake City, Florida, if the UAW were successful in the
representation elections, and by promising raises and promotions to employees if they
did not vote for the UAW or if they would assist the Respondent in discouraging
other employees from supporting or voting for the UAW in the elections, the Respond-
ent has interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act and has thereby committed unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (1) of the Act.
4. By discharging employees Jessie R. Heard, Monroe Lindsay, Catherine Williams,
and Garfield English, the Respondent discriminated against them in regard to their
hire and tenure of employment in order to discourage membership in and support of
the UAW, thereby committing unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
5 All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Lake City,
Florida, operation, but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees, watch-
men, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act, constitute, and at all material
times have constituted, a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
within the meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
6. On and at all times since April 9, 1962, the UAW has been, and now is, the
exclusive representative of all employees in the aforesaid appropriate bargaining unit
for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning of Section 9(a) of the
Act.
7. By refusing, on and since April 26, 1962, to bargain collectively in good faith
with the UAW as the exclusive representative of its employees in the aforesaid appro-
priate unit, the Respondent has engaged in and is engaging in unfair labor practices
within the meaning of Section 8 (a) (5) and (1) of the Act.
8. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices affecting com-
merce within the meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act.
9. The Respondent has not committed other unfair labor practices as alleged in the
complaint.
RECOMMENDED ORDER
Upon the basis of the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, and upon
the entire record in the case, it is recommended that the Respondent, Aero Corpora-
tion, its officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Subjecting the Union or organizational meetings of its employees to surveil-
lance; interrogating employees concerning their interest in or support of a union;
informing employees that their union meetings are under surveillance; threatening to
lay off employees or to close or move its plant out of Lake City, Florida, if a union
should win a representation election; promising raises and promotions to employees
if they did not vote for a union in a representation election or if they would assist
the Respondent in discouraging other employees from supporting or voting for a union
in a representation election; and in any other manner interfering with, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of the right to self-organization, to form labor
organizations, to join or assist International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, or any other
labor organization, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choos-
ing, and to engage in any other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bar-
gaining or other mutual aid and protection, or to refrain from any of all such activities.
(b) Discouraging membership in the aforesaid labor organization, or any other
labor organization of its employees, by discriminatorily discharging any of its
employees or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their hire and tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment.
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively in good faith concerning wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment with International Union, United Auto-
AERO CORPORATION 1357
mobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-
CIO, as the exclusive representative of all employees in the following appropriate unit:
All production and maintenance employees at the Respondent's Lake City, Florida,
operation, but excluding all other employees, official clerical employees, watchmen,
guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which it is found will effectuate the
policies of the Act: -
(a) Offer to Jessie R. Heard, Monroe Lindsay, Catherine Williams, and Garfield
English immediate and full reinstatement to his or her former or a substantially
equivalent position, without prejudice to his or her seniority or-other rights and
privileges, and make each of them whole for any loss of earnings suffered as a
result of his or her discharge, in the manner set forth in the section entitled "The
Remedy."
(b) -Preserve and, upon request, make available to the Board or its agents, for
examination and copying, all payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary for the deter-
mination of the amount of backpay due under the Recommended Order herein.
(c) Upon request, bargain collectively with International Union; United Automo-
bile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO,
as the exclusive representative of all employees in the appropriate unit, and embody
in a signed agreement any understanding reached
(d) Post at its plant in Lake City, Florida, copies of the attached notice marked
"Appendix B." 96 Copies of said notice, to be furnished by the Regional Director
for Region 12, shall, after being signed by a representative of Respondent, be
posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and be maintained for a period of
60 consecutive days thereafter, in conspicuous places, including all places where
notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by
Respondent to insure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any
other material.
(e) Notify the Regional Director for Region 12, in writing, within 20 days from
the receipt of this Decision and Recommended Order, what steps the Respondent
has taken to comply herewith.97
It is further recommended that the Board dismiss the allegations of the complaint
asserting Respondent's commission of unfair labor practices other than those which
I have herein specifically found.
APPENDIX A
Employee
Date of sub-
mission of
Index to employment in appropriate unit (X) and
to existence of continuing authorization (A)
signed card
4-8-62 4-29-62 5-6-62 6-3-62 8-3-62
Adams, Patricia ...................... 4-5-62 AX
Anderson , John_______________________ 5-1-62 X AX AX
Anderson , Minnie ____________________ 3-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Andrews, Perry _______________________ 5-31-62 AX AX
Ash, Karen --------------------------- 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Barrett, Dorothea ____________________
Barra, Glen R________________________
Barton, Charles _______________________ --------------
X X X
X
------
x
X X
Batchelor , J L_______________________ 2-27-62 AX AX A% AX AX
Black, Jack R________________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Blackburn , James W_________________ 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX
Brock, Sanford _______________________ -------------- X
Brown, Lana _________________________ X X
16 In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , the words "a
Decision and Order" shall be substituted for the words "the Recommended Order of a
Trial Examiner" in the notice In the further event that the Board 's Order be enforced
by a decree of a United States Court of Appeals , the words "a Decree of the United States
Court of Appeals , Enforcing an Order" shall be substituted for the words "a Decision
and Order."
r+In the event that this Recommended Order be adopted by the Board , this provision
shall be modified to read: "Notify said Regional Director , in writing , within 10 days from
the date of this Order , what steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith."
1358 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATION S BOARD
APPENDIX A-Continued
Employee
Date of sub -
mission of
Index to employment in appropriate unit (X) and
to existence of continuing authorization (A)
signed card
4-8-62 4-29-62 5-6-62 6-3-62 8-3-62
Brown, Lee F------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- X ---------- ----------
Brown, Rachel M____________________ 3-13-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Brown, Rebecca______________________ 3-13-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Bryan, Byron S---------------------- 3-27-62 AX ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Bullard, George---------------------- 4-12-62 ---------- AX AX __________ ----------
Burnham, Emma Lee---------------- -------------- X X X __________ ----------
Bush, James E----------------------- 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
Canon, Miles L., Jr___________________ 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX ----------
Cason, Charles E--------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X X
Cathey, Jacob A______________________ 3-14-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Caudill, Raymond____________________ ______________ __________ X X X X
Chastain, Paul M____________________ ______________ X X X X X
Cloud, Daniel M, Jr_________________ ______________ X X X X X
Coarsey, William_____________________ 5-22-62 __________ X X AX ----------
Collins, Julian________________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Collins, Kenneth---------------------- -------------- X ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Collins, Mike W---------------------- 4-19-62 ---------- AX AX ---------- ----------
Craig, Emma T ---------------------- -------------- X ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Graig, Jean--------------------------- -------------- ---------- X ---------- X X
Crews, Mary------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Cumbess, Louise_____________________ 3-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Davis, Roger R_______________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
Denmark, Joe W--------------------- 5-2-62 ---------- X AX AX ----------
Devereaux, Doyle F__________________ 8-2-62 ---------- __________ ---------- X AX
Dicks, Frances________________________ ______________ X X X X X
Disbrow, Kenneth____________________ 7-13-62 X X X X AX
Donaldson, Ronald D---------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X X
Douglas, Henry----------------------- -------------- X X X --------- ----------
Dubose, Jasper C_____________________ ______________ X X X X X
Dugger, Fred------------------------- -------------- X X X X X
DuPree, Holton---------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- X ---------- ----------
Easterwood, Mildred_________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
English, Cleveland---------`--------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- • X ----------
English, Garfield--------------------- 8-1-62 ---------- ---------- ---------- X AX
Everett, Neal_________________________ ______________ X X X X X
Fletcher, Hugh M____________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX ----------
Fowler, Harry------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Fox, Lloyd___________________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
Fulton, Jim--------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Giles, James R_____________'___________ 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Godwin, William L___________________ 2-28-62 AX AX AX AX ----------
Gray, Emma Lou____________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX --AX AX
Green, Willie M---------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ------'-- X ----------
Greene, James------------------------ -------------- X - - -
- 4-26-62 ---------- AX
Hamilton, Pearl______________________ 4-5-62 AX AX AX
Hampton, Jack----------------------- ------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Harden, Roy Lee_____________________ 5-24-62 X X X AX ---
arrington , Nan____________________ 4-24-62 X AX AX AX AX
arns, Kenneth______________________ 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Harrison , Mildred____________________ 3-14-62 AX AX AX AX AX -
Heard, Jessie_________________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Herrera, Juan D______________________ _________ ^__' • X' X X X X
Holmes , William--------------------- 4-9-62 X - --------- ---------- ----=---- ----------
Horne, Russell M_____________________ 2-27-62 AX AX - AX AX --_-____--
Howell, Robert W____________________ ______________' X- X X X X
Howell, Roy Lee--------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X X
Hurst, Yacht------------------------- --- -___-----___ X 'X X X X
James, Roosevelt--------------------- 6-24-62 ----------
------- --- ---------- ---------- AX
Fnhns- Charles_ ----------------- -------------- X X X ^ X X,
AERO CORPORATION
APPENDIX A-Continued
1359
Employee
Date of sub-
mission of
Index to employment in appropriate unit (X) and
to existence of continuing authorization (A)
signed card
4-8-62 4-29-62 5-6-62 6-3-62 8-3-62
Johns, Ray--------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Johnson, Randall_____________________ 4-16-62 __________ AX AX AX AX
Jones, John C------------------------ -------------- ---------- X X X X
Jones, Mary-------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Kay, Ronald ------------------------- 5-1-62 - --------- X AX AX AX
Kelley, James (J. M ) ---------------- 8-2-62 ---------- ---------- --- ------ X AX
Kelsey, Elven ------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Right, Aaron ------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Kirkman, David______________________ 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Koon, Cecil -------------------------- -------------- X X X X X
Krutke, Gerald ------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Kuhn, Barbara--------------- s------ -------------- X X X X ----------
Lashley, Joe , Jr----------------------- 7-20-62 ---------- ---------- ---------- X AX
Lee, Travis--------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Lindsay, Monroe N___________________ ______________ X X X X X
Lindsey, Ben W______________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
Loomis, Billy------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X ----------
Lovett, Frances _______________________ 3-5-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Lovett, Harry ------------------------ 4-5-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Lucas, Virgil ------------------------- -------------- ---------- X ---------- ---------- ---------
Menders, Herbert , Jr -------------- 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Martin, Gaylen_______________________ 2-27-62 - AX AX AX AX AX
May, Thomas ________________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Mayfield, Donald _____________________ ______________ X X X X X
McGhin, Anthony____________________ 5-10-62 -- -------- X X AX AX
McGlew, Samuel --------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X ----------
McGuire, Kendrick------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- X X X
McKenney , Wendell ----- ------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
McKnight , Robert-------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Melton, Lee L------------------------ -------------- X X X X X
Miles, Carl --------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- X X X
Milligan, Zef&e_______________________ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Milton, Bertha _______________________ 3-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Moore, James------------------------- -------------- X X X ---------- ----------
Moore, Warren D (Douglas) ---------- 3-28-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Morrell, James------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X --------'-
Morris, David------------------------ 8-2-62 ----- ----- ---------- ---------- ---------- AX
Moses, Lee--------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Murphy, Eugene _____________________ ______________ X X X - X X
Myer, Katherine _____________________ 3-25-62 AX AX AX AX ----------
Naylor, Elizabeth_____________________ 4-30-62 ---------- AX AX AX
Nelson , Ruth M- -------------------- -------------- ---------- ------ ---------- ---------- X
Nettles, Nevin ________________________ 2-27-62 AX X AX AX AX
Nettles, Roy Lee______________________ --------------- -X X X X X
Norris, Nona -------------------------- -------------- X ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Oaks,Broadway------- --------------- 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Olivent, Edgar________________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX ----------
O'Steen, Wendell _____________________ 2-27-62 AX - AX AX AX AX
Peace, Dale--------------------------- -------------- X X X X X
Perry, Nathan ________________________ ______________ X X X X X
Perry, N Thomas -------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Phillips, Betty________________________ 3-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Powell,James ------------------------- -------------- X X X ---------- ----------
Ratcliff, Amos ------------------------ -----------=-- ---------- ---------- X ---------- ----------
Rentz, Robert ------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Rhoden, Virgil ------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Roberts, Gaylon ______________________ 4-9-62 X AX AX AX AX
Roberts, Inez M______________________ 3-27-62 AX AX AX 'AX AX
Roberts, ( Doris) Marie_ ______________ 4-4-62 AX AX AX, AX AX
R.mv, (lerlen1 - 4-9-62 X
1360 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
APPENDIX A-Continued
Employee
Date of sub-
mission of
Index to employment in appropriate unit (X) and
to existence of continuing authorization (A)
signed card
-
4-8-62 4-29-62 5-6-62 6-3-62 8-3-62
Sandlin, Harvard G------------------ 3-27-62 AX AX AX AX ---- ----
Sealey, Eva-------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---- ---
X
Settles, Jim C ------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---°----
--
----------
Settles, Tun-------------------------- -------------- X X X ---------- ----------
Shepherd, Nathan-------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Simmons, Alvin---------------------- 7-24-62 ---------- ---------- ----------
X AX
Simmons, Johnnie Lee---------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- --------- X ----------
Simmons, Steve---------------------- -------------- ---------- X X ---------- ----------
Sims, Bertha M---------------------- 3-13-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Snyder, Clarence E------------------- -------------- ---------- X X X X
Sperrmg, Thomas--------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- --------- ---- ----
Spohn, Erika------------------------- -------------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------
X
Spohn, Paul-------------------------- -------------- ---------- --------- ---------- ---------- X
Spradley, Linda---------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Starling, O. J------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Stephens, Lydia---------------------- -------------- X ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Stone, Author------------------------ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Super, Louis-------------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Surles, Sammy----------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ----------
X X
Swilley, Willie Gene------------------ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX,
Swilley, Vernon---------------------- -------------- ---------- ----------
------ --- ---------- X
Taylor, Joseph------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ----------
X X
Thomas, Jerry------------------------ -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Thomas, Rayford-------------------- -------------- ---------- X X ---------- ----------
Tomlinson, Lillie--------------------- 3-30-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Tompkins, Marian------------------- -------------- X X X X X
Townsend, Wm C , Jr--------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- X X ----------
Tummond, Leon E , Sr--------------- -------------- X X X X X
Waldron, Sarah----------------------- 2-28-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Walker, Bobby----------------------- -------------- ----------
X X X ----------
Walker, Mittie----------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------
Waters, Allamae---------------------- 4-5-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Waters, Anna------------------------- 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Wattenbarger, Howard--------------- 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Weadon, Robert ------------------ '--_ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Weathersby, T. E-------------------- 4-9-62 X ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Whitman, Charles H----------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ----------
X X
Williams, Catherine------------------ 2-27-62 AX AX AX AX AX
Williams, James---------------------- -------------- X ---------- ---------- ---------- X
Wilson, Henry------------------------ ------------- X
X X X X
Wilson,Jimmy ----------------------- -------------- ---------- ---------- ----------
X X
Witt, Mary--------------------------- 4-9-62 X AX AX AX ----------
Woods, Royce D--------------------- 4-25-62 ---------- AX AX AX AX
Yopp, Peyton D--------------------- 3-27-62 AX AX AX ---------- ----------
SUMMARY:
Number of employees------------- -------------- 98 106 110 120 124
Number of UAW cards----------- -------------- 50 62 65 65 60
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES
Pursuant to the Recommended Order of a Trial Examiner of the National Labor
Relations Board, and in order to effectuate the policies of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended, we hereby notify our employees that:
WE WILL NOT subject union or organizational meetings of our employees to
surveillance; interrogate our employees concerning their interest in or support of
a union; inform employees that their union meetings are under surveillance;
PLUMBERS LOCAL UNION NO. 307, AFL-CIO 1361
threaten to lay off employees or to close or move our plant out of Lake City,
Florida, if a union should win a representation election ; promise raises or pro-
motions to employees if they refrain from voting for a union in a representation
election or if they assist us in discouraging other employees from supporting or
voting for a union in a representation election; nor, in any other manner will we
interfere with, restrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise of their right to
self-organization , to form labor organizations , to join or assist International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America, UAW, AFL-CIO, or any other labor organization, to bargain collec-
tively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in any other
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
and protection, or to refrain from any or all such activities.
WE WILL NOT discourage membership in the aforesaid labor union or any other
labor organization, by discriminatorily discharging and refusing to reinstate any
of our employees, or by discriminating in any other manner in regard to their
hire and tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment.
WE WILL offer to Jessie R. Heard, Monroe Lindsay, Catherine Williams, and
Garfield English reinstatement to their former or substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or other rights and privileges, and we
will make them whole for any loss of pay suffered as a result of their discharges.
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with International Union, United
Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW,
AFL-CIO, as the exclusive representative of the employees in the bargaining unit
described below.
WE WILL, upon request, bargain with the above-named Union, as the exclusive
representative of all the employees in the bargaining unit described below with
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of
employment, and, if an understanding is reached, embody such an understanding
in a signed agreement.
The bargaining unit is:
All production and maintenance employees at our Lake City, Florida,
operation, but excluding all other employees, office clerical employees,
watchmen, guards, and supervisors as defined in the Act.
All our employees are free to become, remain, or to refrain from becoming or
remaining, members of International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and
Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW, AFL-CIO, or any other labor
organization.
AERO CORPORATION,
Employer.
Dated------------------- By-------------------------------------------
(Representative) (Title)
NOTE.-We will notify the above-named employees if presently serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States of their right to full reinstatement upon application
in accordance with the Selective Service Act and the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948, as amended, after discharge from the Armed Forces.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days from the date of posting,
and must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
Employees may communicate directly with the Board's Regional Office, Ross Build-
ing, 112 East Cass Street, Tampa, Florida, Telephone No. 223-4623, if they have any
questions concerning this notice or compliance with its provisions.
Plumbers Local Union No. 307 , AFL-CIO and Warren Zimmer-
man d/b/a Zimmerman Plumbing and Heating. Case No. 13-
CC-400. November 30, 1964
DECISION AND ORDER
On August 31, 1964, Trial Examiner Ivar H. Peterson . issued his
Decision in the above-entitled proceeding , finding that Respondent
149 NLRB No. 118.
770-076-65-vol. 149-87