Aelesia C. Pitt, Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJun 22, 2012
0120121583 (E.E.O.C. Jun. 22, 2012)

0120121583

06-22-2012

Aelesia C. Pitt, Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service (Capital Metro Area), Agency.


Aelesia C. Pitt,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service

(Capital Metro Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120121583

Hearing No. 430-2011-00177X

Agency No. 1K-276-0025-10

DECISION

Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405, the Commission accepts Complainant's appeal from the Agency's February 3, 2012 final action concerning an equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint claiming employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

BACKGROUND

During the period at issue, Complainant worked as a Mail Processing Clerk at the Agency's Processing and Distribution Facility, in Rocky Mount, North Carolina.

On October 7, 2010, Complainant filed a formal complaint. Therein, Complainant claimed that she was the victim of unlawful employment discrimination in reprisal for prior protected activity when:

(1) on June 1, 2010, she was told her medical documentation was not acceptable although she was permitted to work since May 30, 2010; and

(2) on June 10, 2010, Complainant was issued a Notice of Removal, effective July 17, 2010, for Unsatisfactory Attendance/ Absent Without Official Leave (AWOL) /Failure to Follow Instructions.1

After the investigation of the accepted claims, Complainant received a copy of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ). On January 30, 2012, the AJ issued a decision without holding a hearing finding no discrimination. The Agency's final action of February 3, 2012, implemented the AJ's decision.

The AJ indicated that the decision that no discrimination had been established was based on the following undisputed facts. Complainant's first level supervisor was the Supervisor of Distributions (SDO). The Manager of Operations (MDO) was her second level supervisor. Complainant had previously filed an EEO complaint against both SDO and MDO.

In October 2009, Complainant suffered an on-the-job injury. Starting in December 2009, Complainant was out of work due to her injury. According to the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs (OWCP) CA-17 Duty Status Report form, Complainant was cleared to return to duty on January 27, 2010, with some restrictions. Complainant informed the Agency of this return-to-work date in a meeting with the MDO. However Complainant did not return to work at that time and was charged with being AWOL.

On February 12, 2010, the Agency issued a Letter of Availability to Complainant requesting medical documentation to cover her absences from work. The letter included an Offer of Modified Assignment to accommodate Complainant's medical restrictions. That letter was unclaimed by Complainant and returned to sender.

The record reflects that another CA-17, dated February 26, 2010, cleared Complainant to return to regular full-time duty without restrictions. However Complainant was again out of work from March 6 - May 30, 2010, and was again charged with AWOL. On March 17, 2010, the Agency scheduled a telephone Investigative Interview to inquire about Complainant's absences from work. The Notice of Investigative Interview was unclaimed by Complainant and returned to sender. On March 22, 2010, the Agency issued complainant a Notice of 14-Day Suspension for her unexcused absence from work.

Complainant returned to work on May 30, 2010, and worked May 30 - June 1, 2010. According to Complainant, she provided her medical documentation to her shop steward when she returned to work and she believed that the medical documentation covered her absences from March 1 - May 29, 2010. Complainant's doctor wrote on the medical documentation "[Complainant] has had frequent appts and testing since March 2010, and should be excused for any missed work days."

On June 7, 2010, the Agency issued Complainant a Notice of Removal effective July 17, 2010, for Unsatisfactory Attendance/Absent Without Official Leave and for Failure to Follow Instructions resulting from her extended absence from work even after she was cleared to return and her lack of medical documentation justifying her absences.

After the Agency issued its final order adopting the AJ's determination that no discrimination had been established, Complainant filed the instant appeal.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

The EEOC Regulations on summary judgment are patterned after Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that a moving party is entitled to summary judgment if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. There is no genuine issue of material fact where the relevant evidence in the record taken as a whole, indicates that a reasonable fact finder could not return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc, 477 U.S.242, 248 (1987). Summary judgment is also appropriate where the party opposing summary judgment fails to establish a genuine issue of fact on an element essential to that party's case and on upon which the party bears the burden of proof. Celotex Corp v. Catrell, 477 U.S.317, 322-323 (1986). A fact is "material" if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case. If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, summary judgment is not appropriate. In the case of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider summary judgment only upon a determination that the record has been adequately developed for summary disposition.

The Commission finds that that the grant of summary judgment was appropriate, as no genuine dispute of material fact exists.

A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). For a complainant to prevail, he or she must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983); Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159 (June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services, EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).

Agency management witnesses articulated legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for the disputed actions. First, the Agency stated that Complainant failed to be regular in attendance from March through May 2010. As such, she received progressive discipline regarding her absences. Secondly, the Agency stated that Complainant failed to provide the medical documentation to support her absences. She was instructed that such medical documentation should contain the following: (1) the date of illness or injury, (2) nature of the illness or injury, (3) statement of inability to perform full or light duty, and (4) duration of absence from work with a return to duty date indicated. According to management witnesses, the removal was the final step in a line of progressive discipline that had started in August 2009, and included the March 2010 14-day suspension. The Agency stated that other employees received notification that their medical documentation was not adequate and that the Agency issued progressive discipline to other employees who failed to be regular in attendance.

The Commission finds that the evidence of record provides ample support for the AJ's determination that the Agency's articulated reasons for its action were legitimate and nondiscriminatory and Complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence to show that the Agency's reasons are unworthy of belief.

After a review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to AFFIRM the Agency's final action, because the Administrative Judge's issuance of a decision without a hearing was appropriate and a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right to File a Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

June 22, 2012

__________________

Date

1 On October 25, 2010, the Agency issued a Partial Acceptance/Partial Dismissal of Formal EEO Complaint wherein one other claim was dismissed. Complainant has not addressed the dismissal of this claim on appeal and we will not further address it herein.

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0120121583

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013