Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 2010

355 N.L.R.B. 921 (N.L.R.B. 2010)

ADVANCED ARCHITECTURAL METALS, INC.
355 NLRB No. 166
921
Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc. and its alter egos
Advanced Metals, Inc., Steel Specialties Unlim-
ited, Inc. and AAM, Respondents’ alter ego and
Lori Irish, and Carpenters Local 1780 affiliated
with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of
America and Local 433, International Associa-
tion of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental & Rein-
forcing Iron Workers, AFL–CIO, Party-in-
Interest. Cases 28–CA–20730, 28–CA–20779, 28–
CA–20885, and 28–CA–20918
August 27, 2010
SUPPLEMENTAL DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN LIEBMAN AND MEMBERS SCHAUMBER
AND BECKER
The General Counsel seeks a default judgment or, in
the alternative, partial summary judgment in this case on
the ground that the Respondents have failed to file a
timely or legally sufficient answer to the amended com-
pliance specification. For the reasons that follow, we
grant the motion for default judgment.
On December 27, 2007, the Board issued a Decision
and Order1 that, among other things, ordered the Re-
spondents, Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc. and its
alter egos, Advanced Metals, Inc. and Steel Specialties
Unlimited, Inc., to make whole the discriminatees for
any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from the
Respondents’ violations of Section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5)
of the Act. It further ordered the Respondents to comply
with the terms and conditions of their collective-
bargaining agreement with Carpenters Local 1780 affili-
ated with Southwest Regional Council of Carpenters,
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America
(the Union) and to make all required contributions to the
Union’s various welfare and pension funds as required
by the agreement. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit enforced the Board’s order by un-
published opinion dated August 26, 2008. 2
On October 17, a controversy having arisen regarding
(a) the amounts of backpay and welfare fund payments
due under the Order, and (b) additional alter ego and
individual liability, the Regional Director for Region 28
issued an amended compliance specification and notice
of hearing. The amended compliance specification al-
leged the amounts due under the Board’s Order; named
as additional respondents Lori Irish, an individual, and

1 Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc., 351 NLRB 1208 (2007).
2 All subsequent dates are in 2008, unless otherwise noted.
AAM, an alleged alter ego of the Respondents3; and noti-
fied the Respondents that they should file answers by
November 7, in compliance with the Board’s Rules and
Regulations. The Region served the amended compliance
specification on Irish, the other Respondents, and the
past attorneys for the Respondents. The Region served
Irish at the North Las Vegas, NV Detention Center,
where she is incarcerated. According to the General
Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment and brief in sup-
port, Irish is serving a 60-month sentence for, among
other things, tampering with witnesses and threatening to
kill Federal officials, including the Region’s field attor-
ney who litigated all four of the prior proceedings in-
volving the Respondents.4
None of the Respondents filed an answer to the
amended compliance specification. By letter dated No-
vember 11, the Region re-served Irish with the amended
compliance specification, a letter giving her until No-
vember 17 to file an answer, and a copy of the Board’s
Rules and Regulations. In the letter, copies of which
were sent to all of the Respondents and their past attor-
neys, the Region advised that, unless the Respondents
filed an answer by November 17, the General Counsel
would file a motion for default judgment.
By letter dated November 10, and received by the Re-
gion on November 17, Irish, appearing pro se, asserted
that: (1) she was never in business as an individual; (2) it
was an abuse of process to include her in this proceeding;
(3) all of the Respondents are out of business; (4) she
was never in business during any annual period so as to
meet the Board’s jurisdictional standard; and (5) the Re-
spondents had not met the Board’s jurisdictional standard
during 2008. The letter also accuses the Board of steal-
ing money from the “U.S. Mail” and of engaging in other
criminal acts.

3 The amended compliance specification alleged, in particular, that
“Irish created AAM in order to circumvent the relationship between
Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc. and the Union and to avoid her
obligations under the Act including, but not limited, to the Section 10(j)
Order of the United States District Court for the District of Nevada.”
The specification further alleged that Irish controlled the day-to-day
management, labor relations policies, business operations and financial
resources of the Respondents and AAM, and that Irish commingled the
assets of the Respondents and AAM with her personal assets and other
assets within her control. Based on the those allegations, the amended
compliance specification further alleged that AAM acted as an alter ego
of the Respondents and is liable for the Respondents’ unfair labor prac-
tices, and that Irish individually acted as an alter ego of the Respon-
dents and is personally liable for the Respondents’ unfair labor prac-
tices.
4 See Criminal Indictment for United States of America vs. Lori
Irish, Case 2:08-cr-00117 (April 29, 2008), and Jury Verdict for United
States of America vs. Lori Irish, Case 2:08-cr-00117 (November 6,
2008).
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 922
On December 8, the General Counsel filed with the
Board a Motion for Default Judgment and brief in sup-
port, with exhibits, alleging that the Respondents had
failed to file an adequate answer to the amended compli-
ance specification as required under Section 102.56(b) of
the Board’s Rules and Regulations. Absent a legally
sufficient answer, the General Counsel urged the Board
to grant default judgment.
On December 10, the Board issued a Notice to Show
Cause why the General Counsel’s motion should not be
granted. Irish, appearing pro se on behalf of all of the
Respondents, filed two documents in response, which
were received by the Board on December 24 and 29. In
the December 24 response, Irish contended that her No-
vember 10 letter, which the Board had previously ac-
cepted as her answer to the amended compliance specifi-
cation, was actually only a cover letter, and that the an-
swer she mailed with it had been misplaced either by the
detention center or the Region. Irish also asserted that,
considering that she was incarcerated, she did everything
she could to prepare an answer. Irish included with her
December 24 response the answer that she purportedly
had included with her November 10 letter. In that an-
swer, Irish denied “each and every allegation in the com-
plaint.” She further asserted that three of the discrimina-
tees, Juan Gasca Sr., Juan Gasca Jr., and Cesar Gasca,
own and operate a powder coating business, and that
discriminatee Joseph King is a partner in that business.
In addition, Irish stated that she does not have an attor-
ney because the Region refused to pay her legal bills. In
her second response to the Notice to Show Cause, filed
on December 29, Irish requested that the Board grant her
a 120-day continuance in order to obtain legal counsel,
asserting that she did not have access to her records and
the necessary resources to enable her to properly prepare
an answer. On January 7, 2009, the General Counsel
filed a brief in reply to Irish’s responses to the Notice to
Show Cause.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
Ruling on Motion for Default Judgment
Section 102.56(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regula-
tions provides that a respondent shall file an answer
within 21 days from service of a compliance specifica-
tion. Section 102.56(b) requires that an answer shall
specifically admit, deny, or explain each and every alle-
gation of the specification. Finally, Section 102.56(c)
provides that if a respondent fails to timely file any an-
swer to the specification or sufficiently deny any allega-
tion as required by Section 102.56(b), the Board may,
either with or without taking evidence in support of the
allegation of the specification and without further notice
to the respondent, find the specification to be true and
enter such order as may be appropriate.
Initially, we recognize that the Respondents are pro-
ceeding without legal representation. In determining
whether to grant a motion for default judgment on the
basis of a respondent’s failure to file a sufficient or
timely answer, “the Board has shown some leniency to-
ward respondents who proceed without benefit of coun-
sel.” Nick & Bob Partners, 345 NLRB 1092, 1093
(2005) (quoting Convergence Communications, 342
NLRB 918, 919 (2004)). Because of Irish’s history with
the Agency, however, we decline to accord the Respon-
dents that leniency. As set forth above, Irish threatened
to kill Board agents, she has a history of failing to com-
ply with the orders of the Board and courts, and she has
engaged in fraudulent conduct to avoid the judgments
against her.5 Furthermore, Irish has committed numerous
and egregious violations of the Act, including physically
assaulting her employees and threatening to kill their
children.6 Given this history of misconduct and, in par-
ticular, flagrant disregard and intentional evasion of
Board rules and orders, we cannot attribute Irish’s non-
compliance here to her lack of counsel.
Our dissenting colleague argues that we disregard
Board policy by denying Irish the leniency usually ac-
corded a respondent in default proceedings The dissent,
however, overstates the Board’s policy. Indeed, Board
law is clear that pro se status alone does not establish
good cause for a respondent’s failure to file a timely an-
swer. See, e.g., Sage Professional Painting Co., 338
NLRB 1068 (2003). We find, contrary to our colleague,
that leniency is not warranted in the circumstances of this
case. In rejecting equitable leniency for Irish, it is
wholly appropriate that we take into account both her
prior egregious flouting of Board rules and orders and
the fact that she is no stranger to the Board’s procedural
rules.7
We agree with the General Counsel that the Respon-
dents have failed to file a legally sufficient and timely
answer to the amended compliance specification. Spe-
cifically, Irish’s November 10 letter, itself untimely in
relation to the Board’s rules but filed within the extended

5 On August 21, 2007, the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Nevada issued a 10(j) temporary injunction in this proceeding.
On April 23, 2008, the court held the Respondents, including AAM and
Irish, in civil contempt for their willful noncompliance with that order.
6 See Advanced Architectural, 351 NLRB at 1216.
7 In any event, the Board has held that a pro se respondent’s igno-
rance of the Board’s procedures does not constitute good cause for the
failure to file a timely answer. See, e.g., Newark Symphony Hall, 323
NLRB 1297 (1997) (good cause not established by the fact that the pro
se respondent had not retained labor counsel when the complaint issued
and did not know how to answer the complaint).
ADVANCED ARCHITECTURAL METALS, INC. 923
period afforded the Respondents by the Region, does not
address itself to the amended compliance specification at
all, much less “admit, deny, or explain each and every
allegation of the specification,” as required under Section
102.56(b). We find, therefore, that the November 10
letter is not responsive to the allegations of the compli-
ance specification in any way that raises an issue war-
ranting a hearing.
We further find that Irish’s December 24 submission is
untimely to the extent that it answers any of the allega-
tions in the amended compliance specification. Although
Irish asserted in that submission that her November 10
letter was not actually her answer but merely a cover
letter, there is nothing about the letter or its contents that
supports that assertion. Given Irish’s fraudulent conduct
in the past, we are unwilling to assume based on her as-
sertions alone that the November 10 letter included an
answer. As her assertions are the only evidence that an
answer was, in fact, included with the November 10 let-
ter, we conclude that there was no such answer. In addi-
tion, we reject Irish’s contentions that the Region should
have paid her legal bills and that her incarceration pro-
vided any justification for her failure to obtain counsel or
for the Respondents’ failure to file a timely answer.
Even assuming we were to consider Irish’s pro se
status, we would nonetheless find that the Respondents
have failed to file a legally sufficient and timely answer
to the amended compliance specification. The Board is
hesitant to preclude a determination on the merits if it
finds that a pro se respondent has filed a timely answer
that can reasonably be construed as denying the sub-
stance of the complaint allegations. Clearwater Sprin-
kler System, 340 NLRB 435 (2003). “Similarly, where a
pro se respondent fails to file a timely answer, but pro-
vides a ‘good cause’ explanation for such failure, default
judgment will not be entered against it on procedural
grounds.” Patrician Assisted Living Facility, 339 NLRB
1153 (2003). Applying those principles here, we find
that Irish’s November 10 letter cannot reasonably be
construed as denying the substance of the allegations of
the amended compliance specification, because it does
not address any of the allegations in the specification.8
Our dissenting colleague construes Irish’s November
10 “cover letter” as a general denial of her individual
liability, and, on that basis, would remand that allegation
for a hearing. Even were we to find that any of the
statements in Irish’s November 10 letter generally denied
her individual liability or AAM’s alter-ego status, we

8 See, e.g., Eckert Fire Protection Co., 329 NLRB 920 fn. 1 (1999),
and cases cited (even considering the respondent’s pro se status, the
respondent’s answer was insufficient because it did not address the
substance of any complaint allegations).
observe that the essential factual predicates supporting
those allegations were litigated and resolved in the un-
derlying Board proceeding and the related injunction and
contempt proceedings.9 See generally Convergence
Communications, 342 NLRB 918, 919 (2004), and cases
cited. Thus, a compliance hearing on those issues would
serve no purpose because they have already been de-
cided.10
Our dissenting colleague also finds that the Respon-
dents established good cause for their failure to file a
timely answer and, accordingly, our colleague finds that
Irish has raised certain issues in her untimely December
24 answer that he would remand for a hearing. In so
finding, he relies on the same arguments advanced in his
dissenting opinion in Patrician, supra, and which the
Board fully considered and rejected there. Thus, we
deem it unnecessary to respond point by point to our col-
league’s analysis within that framework here.11
In the absence of good cause for the Respondents’
failure to file an adequate and timely answer, we deem
the allegations in the amended compliance specification

9 For example, in the unfair labor practice proceeding, the Board
found that Irish controlled all of the corporate respondents (except
those that Irish had not yet created), and that those corporate respon-
dents were alter egos of one another. Advanced Architectural Metals,
Inc., supra, 351 NLRB at 1208 fn. 1, 1209–1218. See Overstreet v.
Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc., Cir. No. 2: 07-CV-00781-PMP-
LRL (April 23, 2008) (order of U.S. District Judge Pro adjudging Ad-
vanced Architectural Metals, Inc. and Irish in civil contempt). Our
dissenting colleague’s argument that we should not rely on the District
Court’s contempt order, because it, too, was granted by default, is un-
persuasive. Were we to adopt our colleague’s position, we would be
encouraging litigants to ignore our authority until, on the brink of
judgment day, they request to be heard. In our view, that would delay
justice, as a hearing would here.
10 The Board has held that, even where the allegations in a compli-
ance specification are uncontested, the allegations must set forth a
sufficient factual basis to support a finding of personal liability. See
generally Holt Plastering, Inc., 317 NLRB 451, 452453 (1995) (citing
Omnitest Inspection Services, 313 NLRB 648 (1994)). Here, the
amended compliance specification sets forth a specific and sufficient
factual basis to impose individual liability on Irish.
11 We address two points that our dissenting colleague makes. First,
he states that “the mere fact that a hearing would delay the remedy does
not constitute prejudice.” We will refrain from a debate with our col-
league over the definition of “prejudice,” but we highlight that the
Board has already found, on the merits, that Irish engaged in numerous
and egregious unfair labor practices. The employees, whose Sec. 7
rights were wantonly violated by Irish, have been waiting over 4 years
for a remedy. Most of that passage of time is the result of Irish’s ob-
fuscation and misconduct. Second, our colleague relies on the fact that
the General Counsel did not inform Irish of the deficiencies in her
November 10 letter before the General Counsel moved for summary
judgment. But “[n]either the Board’s Rules and Regulations nor our
decisions require the Region to grant a respondent an opportunity to
amend a defective answer before the General Counsel files for sum-
mary judgment.” Aquatech, Inc., 306 NLRB 975 fn. 6 (1991).

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 924
to be admitted as true, and grant the General Counsel’s
Motion for Default Judgment. Accordingly, we conclude
that the amounts of backpay due the unit employees are
as stated in the amended compliance specification, and
we will order the Respondents to pay those amounts, plus
interest accrued to the date of payment. In addition, we
conclude that the welfare fund payments owed are as
stated in the amended compliance specification, and we
will order the Respondents to pay those amounts to the
funds on behalf of the unit employees, plus interest ac-
crued to the date of payment. Finally, we will hold both
Irish and AAM jointly and severally liable for those
amounts.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board orders that the
Respondents Advanced Architectural Metals, Inc., and
its alter egos, Advanced Metals, Inc., Steel Specialties
Unlimited, Inc., a single employer, and AAM, alter ego,
Las Vegas, Nevada, their officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, and Lori Irish, an individual, shall make
whole the individuals named in the attached Appendix A
by paying them the amounts following their names, plus
interest accrued to the date of payment, as prescribed in
New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987),
minus tax withholdings required by Federal and State
laws. The Respondents also shall make whole those in-
dividuals for payments due the contractual Health and
Welfare and Pension funds by paying to the funds the
amounts set forth in the attached Appendices B and C,
plus the interest specified in the collective-bargaining
agreement for delinquent contributions.

MEMBER SCHAUMBER, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I would deny the General
Counsel’s Motion for Default Judgment. Rather, I would
grant the General Counsel’s alternative Motion for Par-
tial Summary Judgment, for the reasons discussed.
At the outset, I disagree with the majority’s decision
not to consider Irish’s status as a pro se litigant. It is con-
trary to Board precedent. As acknowledged by the ma-
jority, the Board typically shows some leniency toward
respondents who proceed without benefit of counsel.
See, e.g., LBE, Inc., 354 NLRB No. 115, slip op. at 1
(2009). The majority chooses not to do so here because
of Irish’s misconduct before the agency. Irish has indeed
engaged in reprehensible conduct. That is irrelevant,
however, to the determination of the sufficiency and
timeliness of her answer as a pro se litigant. The Board’s
precedent would be rendered meaningless if the Board
could choose not to apply it because it does not approve
of a party or a party’s behavior.1 Therefore, unlike the
majority, I would accord Irish the leniency any pro se
litigant before the Board receives.
My colleagues conclude that Ms. Irish’s November 10
letter is not a legally sufficient answer to the amended
compliance specification. In my view, Irish’s state-
ments—that she cannot be sued individually, that she
“never has done business in excess of $50,000 in on[e]
year so [the Board has] no jurisdiction over” her, and that
it was an “abuse of process to include” her—can rea-
sonably be construed as a general denial in layman’s
language of her individual liability. To this end, Board
precedent holds that a general denial of alter-ego status is
sufficient to warrant a hearing. Pallazola Electric, 312
NLRB 569, 571 fn. 6 (1993) (citing Best Roofing Co.,
304 NLRB 727, 728 (1991)).
Contrary to my colleagues’ assertion, the issues of
Irish’s liability and AAM’s alter ego status have not been
previously litigated. Neither Irish nor AAM were parties
to this case until the General Counsel added them as Re-
spondents when he issued the amended compliance
specification. That is, the Respondents have never had
an opportunity to defend against the allegation that AAM
is an alter ego of the Respondents. To the extent there
was some evidence introduced in the underlying pro-
ceeding that could go to Irish’s individual liability, it
clearly was not fully litigated and the Respondents were
never placed on notice that her individual liability was an
issue. Finally, the United States District Court’s order—
finding, in the absence of any response by the Respon-
dents, that the Respondents, including AAM and Irish,
were in civil contempt of that Court’s prior injunction–is
no substitute for providing the Respondents the opportu-
nity to litigate Irish’s individual liability and AAM’s
alter ego status in this proceeding.2

1 My colleagues state that it is appropriate for the Board to consider
a pro se litigant’s history with the agency in assessing whether to ac-
cord leniency to that litigant. However, they point to no case law where
the Board has denied leniency on that basis and it is a slippery slope for
the Board to start to engage in such an analysis.
2 Convergence Communications, 342 NLRB at 919, cited by my
colleagues, is distinguishable. There, the respondent’s answer to the
compliance specification focused on its conduct that had already been
found unlawful in the underlying proceeding. In finding the respon-
dent’s answer legally insufficient, the Board noted that issues resolved
in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding could not be reliti-
gated in the subsequent backpay proceeding. Id. In this case, the issues
of Irish’s individual liability and AAM’s alter-ego status were not
litgated in the underlying unfair labor practice proceeding.
My colleagues’ claim—that they would be encouraging litigants to
ignore Board orders in the future if they did not consider the findings of
the District Court’s contempt order—is speculative at best. In any
event, they have misconstrued the thrust of my argument. A contempt
order, regardless of whether it was granted by default, is not a substitute
ADVANCED ARCHITECTURAL METALS, INC. 925
I also disagree with my colleagues’ determination that
Irish’s December 24 response to the Board’s Notice to
Show Cause, in which she included an answer to the
amended compliance specification, is untimely. My col-
leagues reason that, even considering Irish’s pro se
status, the Respondents have failed to establish good
cause for their failure to file a timely answer. The major-
ity’s strict construction of the “good cause” requirement
in Section 102.20 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations
is inconsistent with the construction given that same term
by the Federal courts, lacks a sound policy basis,3 and
poses an undue risk of injustice. For reasons fully ex-
plained in my dissent in Patrician Assisted Living Facil-
ity, 339 NLRB 1153 (2003), the Board should apply to
default judgment proceedings the same “good cause”
standard used by the Federal courts in deciding whether
to set aside an entry of default. “In applying that stan-
dard, three factors typically will be material: the reason
or reasons the answer was untimely, the merits of the
respondent’s defense, and whether any party would suf-
fer prejudice were the default set aside.” 4
Here, Irish, who responded on behalf of all of the Re-
spondents, is unrepresented by counsel and not surpris-
ingly may have failed to fully appreciate the significant
consequences in Board proceedings of missing an an-
swering deadline. Moreover, Irish was limited in her
ability to file a timely answer due to her incarceration. I
also find it significant that she made an attempt to com-
ply with the Board’s rules through her November 10 let-
ter, addressed above. Finally, I find it troubling that the
General Counsel failed to inform Irish, a pro se litigant,
that in his view her letter was not a sufficient answer and
failed to give her a further extension to respond. Instead,
he summarily filed for default judgment on December 8.5
Ms. Irish had no reason to know that her November 10
letter was not a legally sufficient answer to the amended
compliance specification until the General Counsel’s
motion for default judgment and had every reason to
believe that she filed a proper response. Indeed, in her
December 24 filing, Irish states that she did everything
she could to prepare an answer considering that she is

for a hearing on the merits of Irish’s individual liability and AAM’s
alter-ego status.
3 See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Star Co., 732 F.2d 974 (D.C. Cir.
1984), and NLRB v. Central Mercidita, Inc., 273 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.
1959) (circuit courts refused to defer to the Board’s harsh application of
its deadlines for filing exceptions to decisions of administrative law
judges).
4 Patrician, 339 NLRB at 1158–1159, citing KPS & Associates, Inc.
v. Designs by FMC, Inc., 318 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2003).
5 Cf. Pearle Express, 342 NLRB 669 (2004) (after receiving an in-
sufficient response to a complaint, the region sent the pro se respondent
a second letter noting that such response was insufficient and extended
the time before it would file for default judgment).
incarcerated. Once she was informed that the General
Counsel claimed that she had not filed an adequate an-
swer, she timely filed responses to the Board’s Notice to
Show Cause. In her December 24 response, Irish, now
having been alerted to some of the defects in her initial
response to the amended compliance specification, made
another attempt to file a more specific answer.
Turning next to the merits of the Respondents’ de-
fense, in her December 24 answer, Irish contends that
three of the discriminatees, Juan Gasca Sr., Juan Gasca
Jr., and Cesar Gasca, own and operate a powder coating
business. She further states that Joseph King was a part-
ner in this business. I find that Irish’s statements place in
issue the interim earnings of these four individuals. Be-
cause interim earnings are generally not matters within
the knowledge of a respondent, a general denial is suffi-
cient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g.,
Dews Construction Corp., 246 NLRB 945, 946–947
(1979), enfd. 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978). Also, in her
December 24 answer, Irish generally denies “each and
every allegation in the complaint.” As I set forth above,
because a general denial of alter-ego status is sufficient
to warrant a hearing, Irish’s response raises an issue as to
her individual liability and the alter ego status of AAM
that should be resolved at a hearing. In sum, if timely
filed, Irish’s December 24 answer would clearly be suffi-
cient to warrant a hearing on the issues of the interim
earnings of the four individuals referenced above, the
individual liability of Irish, and the alter-ego status of
AAM.
Finally, the mere fact that a hearing would delay the
remedy does not constitute prejudice. Conversely, Irish
certainly will be prejudiced if denied the opportunity for
a hearing to defend against those allegations for which
she has raised material issues of fact.6
Based on the foregoing analysis, it is my view that the
Respondents have established good cause for their failure
to file a timely answer to the amended compliance speci-
fication. Accordingly, I would deny the General Coun-
sel’s Motion for Default Judgment. Rather, I would
grant the General Counsel’s Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment against Respondent Advanced Architectural
Metals, Inc. and its alter egos Respondents Advanced
Metals, Inc., and Steel Specialties Unlimited, Inc., with
respect to the gross backpay computations of the

6 The majority observes that employees will suffer prejudice as a re-
sult of any delay caused by a hearing. My colleagues misapprehend my
application of a “prejudice” analysis in this case. I am, of course, not
unmindful of the need to provide remedial relief to employees for the
Respondents’ unfair labor practices. But consistent with the Federal
court’s approach that I adopted in my Patrician dissent, I apply a
“prejudice to any party” legal analysis in determining if a hearing is
necessary for a party to defend against the allegations raised.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 926
amended compliance specification and the net backpay
computations of all of the alleged discriminatees, except
for four individuals, Juan Gasca Sr., Juan Gasca Jr., and
Cesar Gasca, and Joseph King, for whom the issue of
their interim earnings should be remanded to be decided
at a hearing. In addition, I would remand to a hearing the
issues of the individual liability of Irish and the alter-ego
status of AAM. 7

APPENDIX A
NET BACKPAY FOR AAM DISCRIMINATEES

Discriminatees
Net
Backpay
Alvarez, Lurencio $11,170.21
Barrington, John 87,745.36
Bieschke, John 29,370.57
Burdett, Mathew 71,712.97
Corona, Isac 28,562.50
Davis, Glenn 63,138.06
Gasca, Cesar 42,885.59
Gasca, Sr., Juan 84,303.93
Gasca, Jr., Juan 49,525.17
Hernandez, Jose 35,820.32
Hughes, Karlton 42,318.99
King, Joseph 54,609.64
Mendoza, Victor 13,272.58
Torres, Felipe 41,661.77
Vega, Tirso 16,948.45
White, Matthew 58,988.40
TOTAL: $732,034.50
APPENDIX B
FRINGE BENEFIT CALCULATION SUMMARY FOR
AAM DISCRIMINATEES
Claimant
Health and
Welfare
Fund

Pension
Fund

Total Net
Backpay
Alvarez,
Lurencio $15,326.75

$7,798.94

$23,125.69
Barrington,
John 20,810.39

10,650.23

31,460.62

7 See, e.g., Kolin Plumbing Corp., 337 NLRB 234, 235–236 (2001)
(granting partial summary judgment against the respondents where the
issues of interim earnings and alter ego status, among other things, are
remanded to be decided at a hearing).
Bieschke,
John 0.00

0.00

0.00
Burdett,
Mathew 21,279.58

10,858.69

32,138.27
Corona, Isac 19,845.18

10,311.12

30,156.29
Davis, Glenn 0.00 0.00 0.00
Gasca, Cesar 20,536.12 10,638.89 31,175.01
Gasca, Sr.,
Juan 18,840.19

9,856.13

28,696.32
Gasca, Jr.,
Juan 20,574.80

10,836.25

31,411.05
Hernandez,
Jose 20,548.95

10,593.99

31,142.94
Hughes,
Karlton 25,746.17

12,127.48

37,873.65
King, Joseph 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mendoza,
Victor 18,709.97

9,625.23

28,335.20
Torres,
Felipe 19,818.33

10,195.24

30,013.57
Vega, Tirso 19,871.02

10,441.48

30,312.50
White, Mat-
thew 19,550.00

9,942.57

29,492.57
TOTAL: $261,457.44

$133,876.23

$395,333.67

ADVANCED ARCHITECTURAL METALS, INC. 927
APPENDIX C
BENEFIT FUND PAYMENTS FOR SSU,
AMI, AND AAM EMPLOYEES

CLAIMANT
NET
TOTAL
Achrem, Rodney $9,424.14
Aispuro, Jesus M. 1,501.75
Aker, Jr., Michael 2,002.33
Alvarez, Laurencio 13,030.13
Alvernaz, James 323.73
Arnold, Robert 1,633.64
Arnold, Scott 827.31
Arteaga, Mike 21,474.09
Austin, Deleon 443.63
Ayvazyan, Arthur 932.22
Bacum, Pratt 1,936.39
Basuladua, Anthony 1,606.66
Bean, Michael 2,230.14
Begala, Dave 26,518.88
Bluefield, Phillip 740.38
Brown, Tom 479.60
Bruns, August 9,319.23
Burns, Raun 3,225.31
Burges, Curtis 2,826.64
Cabrera, Saul 4,001.66
Cade, Wes 641.47
Caldwell, Maurice 4,843.96
Camara, Jonathan 968.19
Carmona, Gabriel 3,938.12
Carmona, Uriel 854.29
Chase, Richard 15,506.07
Clouthier, Henry 3,015.49
Davidson, Tracie 1,246.96
Delong, Ronald 1,222.98
Dewees, Adam 6,672.44
Dewees, Victor 3,759.46
Dobos, Jared 1,864.45
Duncan, David 26,602.81
Edwards, Amy 1,342.88
Edwards, Michael 23,725.21
Edwards, Timothy 19,432.79
Fajardo, Antonion 671.44
Farlow, Jeremy 16,207.48
Feldman, Eric 7,667.61
Flamar, Christopher 2,790.30
Floyd, Daniel D. 4,799.00
Frankenfield, Ryan 4,694.09
Glover, Ahmed 833.31
Gonzales, Marcus 827.31
Gonzalez, Everardo 2,769.69
Gonzalez, Isidro 1,696.59
Grenvil, Bruce 2,110.24
Gross, John J. 6,078.93
Guerrero, Malia 377.69
Hagedorn, Allen 5,461.45
Hanslmair, Mark 4,304.41
Hartley, Ronald P. 9,250.29
Hauser, Christopher 5,707.24
Herbert, Michael 1,097.09
Herman, Harvey 13,171.02
Herrera, Santos 22,412.31
Hill, Chris 3,740.88
Hines, Mike 131.89
Howes, George G. 911.24
Hubbard, William 2,110.24
Huggins, Sr., Matthew
O. 2,290.09
Ibarra, Roberto 2,886.59
Jimenez, Gilbert R. 3,597.00
Juarez Lopez, Joaquin
J. 6,312.74
Keefer, Todd 4,816.98
Kitt, Larry M. 22,775.01
Kuykendall, James 5,524.39
Lagace, Steven R. 10,707.07
Lenhart, Bill R. 407.66
Lewers, Steven 1,786.06
Loney, James 13,500.74
Lowe, Ralph 5,161.70
Luster, John E. 31,803.48
Maganda, Alfonso 11,618.31
Maldonado, Melissa 191.84
Mangum, Chris 5,164.69
Manning, Rose 1,822.48
Marin, Rolando 26,851.61
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 928
Marlar, Kevin 83.93
Martinez-Rojas, Cesar 3,420.15
Mauro, Patricio 1,849.46
Maxwell, Omar 1,600.67
Mercado, Sauza R. 2,044.30
Michon, Phil 10,662.11
Miranda, Ruben 1,205.00
Montelongo, Oscar 3,779.85
Murphy, Patrick 9,424.14
Neal, Ronald 2,068.28
Newberg, Donald 5,008.82
Norwood, Larry 5,086.76
Olvera, Elpidio 5,380.51
Ortega, Marisol 1,822.48
Osterman, Robert 8,995.50
Palma-Villalobos,
Gonzalo 1,458.58
Paniagua, Antonin 3,536.45
Parisi, Ellen M. 10,290.42
Parisi, Donald 2,140.22
Parmenter, Jr., Mark 10,659.11
Patterson, Dimitria 1,279.93
Pierce, Casey 6,660.45
Pierce, Chris A. 383.68
Pollock, Steve 2,733.72
Prieto, Patricia A. 559.21
Quiroz, Oscar 6,813.32
Ramirez, Alfonso 5,863.11
Ramirez, Leonel S. 2,200.17
Ramos, Juan 5,140.71
Rodriguez, Jose 6,153.87
Rojas, Cesar M. 5,587.34
Ross, Joe 10,095.58
Roth, David 179.85
Ruiz, Abigail 95.92
Runyen, David 4,454.29
Sainz, Julio 3,330.68
Salmon, Gayle 1,750.54
Sandoval, Jose 3,686.93
Sanford, Joseph 4,076.60
Shephard, Robin 35,946.02
Silveroli, Joe 2,086.26
Smith, Grant 2,197.17
Smith, Ronald 89.93
Sonka, John 2,110.24
Stuckey, Bryen 2,805.66
Suazo, Julian 581.52
Thompson, Shilo S. 1,335.69
Valdez, Ricardo 9,205.32
Varga, Peter 17,787.17
Vasquez, Juan 2,766.69
Villegas, Robert 8,131.02
Vu, Matt 15,934.71
Walker, Edwin, E. 9,580.01
Wesley, Cade 479.60
Whitfield, Shaun 15,377.18
Whittenburg, Levi 2,149.21
Wilbanks, Gary 131.89
William, Phillip 1,894.42
Yalovich, Joseph M. 9,813.82
Zapata, Jose 7,862.44
Zaporski, Chris 1,001.17
TOTAL: $807,985.23