Adobe Systems IncorporatedDownload PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardMay 28, 202014611830 - (D) (P.T.A.B. May. 28, 2020) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/611,830 02/02/2015 KANNAN IYER P5138-US/220601 9233 121363 7590 05/28/2020 Shook, Hardy & Bacon L.L.P. (Adobe Inc.) Intellectual Property Department 2555 Grand Blvd Kansas City, MO 64108 EXAMINER ANDERSON, SCOTT C ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3694 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 05/28/2020 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): IPDocket@shb.com docket.shb@clarivate.com seaton@shb.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte KANNAN IYER, CHAD MICHAEL KRSEK, WALTER W. CHANG, SACHIN SONI, ASHISH DUGGAL, and ANMOL DHAWAN Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 Technology Center 3600 Before MURRIEL E. CRAWFORD, PHILIP J. HOFFMANN, and BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 7–26, which constitute all the claims pending in the application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as “Adobe Inc.” Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER The claimed invention “generally relate[s] to more effectively communicating with consumers,” and is “directed to effectively targeting users with social messages that promote a newer version of a product.” Spec. ¶¶ 4–5. Independent claim 7, reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal: 7. A computerized method for automatically generating and providing custom social reply in response to a social post from a user posted on a computerized social networking service, the computerized method comprising: receiving, via a first computing process, product information describing a newer version of a product and product identifying information that identifies the product; utilizing, via a second computing process, an algorithm to tokenize the product identifying information into different variations of the product identifying information, and storing at least a portion of both the product identifying information and the different variations of the product identifying information; analyzing, via a third computing process, the social post to determine the social post is relevant to the product, wherein the social post is determined to be relevant at least based on a text of the social post corresponding to the product identifying information or a different variation of the product identifying information; based on the social post being relevant to the product, employing, via a fourth computing process, a sentiment analysis engine to determine a user sentiment score associated with the product in the social post; comparing, via a fifth computing process, the user sentiment score to a sentiment threshold, wherein the sentiment threshold is a particular sentiment score; determining, via a sixth computing process, a user sentiment based on the user sentiment score relative to the sentiment threshold; generating, via a seventh computing process, the automated social reply promoting the newer version of the Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 3 product, wherein the automated social reply is customized by selecting content from the product information describing the newer version of the product based on the determined user sentiment; and in response to the social post posted on the computerized social networking service, providing, via an eighth computing process, the automated social reply to the user by communicating the automated social reply over a communication network to the computerized social networking service, wherein the automated social reply is provided as a reply to the social post, wherein the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth computing processes are performed by one or more computing devices. REJECTION The Examiner rejected claims 7–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Claim(s) 35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) 7–26 101 Eligibility OPINION Principles of Law An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 4 and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk.”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191 (1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 5 protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. The PTO has published revised guidance on the application of § 101. 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)). Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 6 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance. Claims 7–17 and 21–23 Prong One of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance Appellant argues independent claim 7 and dependent claims 8–17 and 21–23 together as a group. Appeal Br. 13. We select claim 7 as representative of the group; thus, claims 8–17 and 21–23 stand or fall with claim 7. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). The Examiner determines all claims are “directed to the abstract idea of providing information to someone based on what is known about her,” finding the claims are similar to those found abstract in Affinity Labs of Texas, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 838 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2016) and Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Final Act. 2. Using claim 7 as an example, the Examiner reasons the steps of claim 7 can all be performed mentally, and some involve mathematical operations. Id. at 3–4. The Examiner explains “receiving product information, generating a reply promoting a newer version of a product and sending this to a person are all within the enumerated abstract idea of ‘advertising, marketing or sales activities or behaviors,’” and that “analyzing Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 7 a post by comparing text to known values, determining a score, and comparing the score to a threshold are all mental processes.” Ans. 3–4. Claim 7 recites six steps, recited as being performed by a “second computing process” through a “seventh computing process.” In each case, the process that each “computing process” is recited as performing can be performed mentally. These limitations are as follows: utilizing . . . an algorithm to tokenize the product identifying information into different variations of the product identifying information, and storing at least a portion of both the product identifying information and the different variations of the product identifying information; analyzing . . . the social post to determine the social post is relevant to the product, wherein the social post is determined to be relevant at least based on a text of the social post corresponding to the product identifying information or a different variation of the product identifying information; based on the social post being relevant to the product, . . . determin[ing] a user sentiment score associated with the product in the social post; comparing . . . the user sentiment score to a sentiment threshold, wherein the sentiment threshold is a particular sentiment score; determining . . . a user sentiment based on the user sentiment score relative to the sentiment threshold; generating . . . [a] social reply promoting the newer version of the product, wherein the automated social reply is customized by selecting content from the product information describing the newer version of the product based on the determined user sentiment. The Specification does not define or otherwise limit the meaning of “tokenize,” in the first identified limitation, but describes it as a process to “generate different variations . . . to get individual words.” Spec. ¶ 55. The Specification further describes examples, such as “[i]f a given token is a numeral, its roman numeral is also considered as a token (e.g., for ‘2’, the Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 8 Roman numeral is ‘II’). Different variations of the product version name are generated by producing different combinations of these tokens with and without spaces.” Id. The Examiner determines tokenizing “can be performed mentally and is performed mentally, all the time, in high-school English classes. The most common definition is to ‘break text into individual linguistic units’, according to The Free Dictionary (on line at thefreedictionary.com).” Ans. 5. The Examiner provides an example of mentally tokenizing, “in high-school English class, when the teacher says ‘the quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog’ and asks you where the verb is, and you reply ‘jumps’, you have tokenized a part of the sentence, and it is not likely you used a computer to do this.” Id. The Examiner’s construction of the term is not disputed by Appellant. Appellant does not adequately explain why the Examiner’s interpretation of the tokenizing step as being performed through observation and judgment by mental thought is improper. See Guidance at 52. Further, a process that starts with data, applies an algorithm, and ends with a new form of data is directed to an abstract idea. Digitech Image Techs., LLC v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2014). This alleged “tokenization” is, at best, merely a manipulation of data, which is not sufficient to meet the transformation prong under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71–72 (holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms data from one form to another is not patent-eligible). Similarly, “analyzing . . . to determine the social post is relevant to the product,” “determin[ing] a user sentiment score,” “comparing,” “determining . . . a user sentiment,” and “generating . . . [a] social reply” can Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 9 be performed in the human mind by observing and evaluating data, and forming an opinion or judgment about the data.2 See Guidance at 52. The Examiner provides further examples, which remain undisputed by Appellant, of why the steps of determining a user sentiment, determining relevancy, and generating a reply can be performed mentally in the human mind. Ans. 5–6. In addition to reciting mental processes, we agree with the Examiner that these steps relate to “advertising, marketing or sales activities.” Ans. 3 (quoting Guidance at 52). The Specification, for example, describes that “marketers wish to reach out to customers via social networking services to entice the customers to buy the new versions of the products.” Spec. ¶ 29. The disclosure indicates that “embodiments of the present invention are directed to more effectively targeting consumers with messages regarding newer versions of a product” (id. ¶ 33), and “the automated social replies are messages that promote the newer version of the product” (id. ¶ 65 (cited at Appeal Br. 5–6)). The promotion of a product through response messages is a form of advertising. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that claim 7 recites a judicial exception in the form of mental processes, a certain methods of organizing human activity (advertising), and mathematical concepts. 2 Spec. ¶ 60 (“[T]he sentiment analysis engine 706 identifies the social post as negative, neutral, or positive based on the sentiment score. For instance, if the sentiment score for a social post is below a first threshold, the user sentiment is considered to be negative; if the sentiment score is above a second threshold, the user sentiment is considered to be positive; and if the sentiment score is between the first and second threshold, the sentiment is considered to be neutral”). Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 10 Prong Two of Revised Step 2A of the Guidance Because we determine that the claim recites a judicial exception, the next step is to evaluate whether the claim recites “additional elements,” such that the judicial exception is integrated into a “practical application.” Guidance at 54. We use the term “additional elements” for “claim features, limitations, and/or steps that are recited in the claim beyond the identified judicial exception.” See Guidance at 55 n.24. The “additional elements” in claim 7 are as follows: receiving, via a first computing process, product information describing a newer version of a product and product identifying information that identifies the product;. . . a second computing process,. . . a third computing process,. . . a fourth computing process, a sentiment analysis engine,. . . a fifth computing process,. . . a sixth computing process,. . . a seventh computing process . . . automated,. . . and in response to the social post posted on the computerized social networking service, providing, via an eighth computing process, the automated social reply to the user by communicating the automated social reply over a communication network to the computerized social networking service, wherein the automated social reply is provided as a reply to the social post, wherein the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth computing processes are performed by one or more computing devices. The first limitation of “receiving” product information, describes mere data gathering activity, which is insignificant extra-solution activity. Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g). Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 11 The first part of the last limitation of communicating a reply over a communication network, is a step that essentially generates and delivers output of the judicial exception steps, which is insignificant post-solution activity. Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 610–11 (2010) (“Flook stands for the proposition that the prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment’ or adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.”’) (Quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). Continuing the analysis, we note the method is directed to “targeting users with social messages that promote a newer version of a product” (Spec. ¶ 5; see also id. ¶¶ 33, 87 (“embodiments of the present invention improve marketers’ social networking communications with consumers”)), and as such the claimed method does not improve another technology, because any improvement recited by the claims concerns improvements in the process of targeting users with social messages, which may reflect an improved marketing technique. Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a). The Specification describes that the “social analysis tool 102 may be implemented via any type of computing device.” Spec. ¶ 37; see also id. ¶ 46 (“Each block of the method 200 and other methods described herein comprises a computing process that may be performed using any combination of hardware, firmware, and/or software.”), 82. Because a particular computer is not required for the “computing processes” or “computing device,” the claim also does not define or rely on a “particular machine.” Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(b). Further, the Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 12 method does not transform matter. Guidance at 55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(c). The method has no other meaningful limitations (MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and thus merely recites instructions to execute the recited judicial exceptions on a computer as a tool (MPEP § 2106.05(f)). Guidance at 55. As such, we agree with the Examiner that claim 7 does not integrate the recited judicial exceptions into a “practical application.” Step 2B of the Guidance In Step 2B, we consider whether an “additional element,” or combination of “additional elements,” adds a specific limitation or combination of limitations that are not well-understood, routine, conventional activity in the field, which would be considered “something more” than the judicial exception. Guidance at 56. However, the “additional elements” identified above represent either general-purpose computers, or steps that those computers normally perform, including the receiving and output steps, because the operations of storing, analyzing, receiving, and writing data are primitive computer operations found in any computer system. See In re Katz Interactive Call Processing Patent Litig., 639 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“Absent a possible narrower construction of the terms ‘processing,’ ‘receiving,’ and ‘storing,’ discussed below, those functions can be achieved by any general purpose computer without special programming.”). The “additional elements” thus do not introduce anything which is not already well-understood, routine, and conventional. Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 13 Thus, our analysis of claim 7 leads us to conclude that the claim is directed to an abstract idea without something more. Appellant’s Arguments We do not agree with Appellant that “tokenizing information, regardless of the type of information being tokenized, cannot be done mentally because it is not an observation, evaluation, judgement, or opinion, since such mental processes cannot produce an output of tokenized information, in any form, that is usable to determine user sentiment and generate an automatic reply to a post.” Appeal Br. 10. As we explained above, “tokenizing” involves observing data in a social media post, evaluating the words that are determined to identify a product, and making judgments about the words, such as to produce “different combinations of these tokens with and without spaces” (Spec. ¶ 55); these actions can be performed mentally in the human mind. Guidance at 52. Moreover, as discussed, tokenizing by using an algorithm also falls within the mathematical concepts grouping. See id. We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that “the claimed process for determining relevancy is not a mental process because it is not, e.g., an observation or opinion.” Appeal Br. 10. The Specification describes that a “social post may be determined as relevant to the product based on the user discussing the product (older version or newer version). The social post may also be determined based on being posted on a social webpage associated with the product.” Spec. ¶ 76. This describes a process of observing the post, or the identity of the webpage from which the post originates, and making a judgment about whether the post or website match Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 14 what is considered to be relevant. Observation and judgment are mental steps. See Guidance at 52. Likewise, we disagree with Appellant that “determining a sentiment . . . does not recite a mental process (e.g., judgement or opinion).” Appeal Br. 11. The claim recites that user sentiment is determined “based on the user sentiment score relative to the sentiment threshold,” which involves “comparing . . . the user sentiment score to a sentiment threshold.” The Specification describes that the “sentiment threshold may be, for instance, a particular sentiment score or more simply may be a binary indication of positive or neutral sentiment.” Spec. ¶ 63 (cited at Appeal Br. 5). This determination is thus a mental comparison of data. Appellant next argues these steps in combination “have a practical application,” because they “better identify customers . . . than an ineffective generic message,” are “automatic,” and “more effectively targets individuals, which reduces the number of messages, thereby reducing bandwidth over a network.” Appeal Br. 11–12. We are unpersuaded because providing a mechanism to better identify and more effectively target customers may represent an improvement to the advertising and marketing scheme to which the invention is directed, but Appellant’s identified improvements reflect improvements in the abstract realm, not improvements to computer technology, functionality, or capabilities. Even unconventional or improved abstract ideas are still unpatentable. See SAP Am., Inc. v. Investpic, LLC, 890 F.3d 1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir. 2018). “What is needed is an inventive concept in the non- abstract application realm.” Id. at 1168. Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 15 Further, a method that “reduces the number of messages, thereby reducing bandwidth over a network,” does not necessarily improve network technology. Appeal Br. 12. Automating an abstract process does not convert it into a practical application. See Credit Acceptance v. Westlake Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Our prior cases have made clear that mere automation of manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable improvement in computer technology.”); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada (U.S.), 687 F.3d 1266, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (A computer “employed only for its most basic function . . . does not impose meaningful limits on the scope of those claims.”). Appellant contends the “additional elements” of claim 7, which “include tokenizing information, determining a user sentiment score of a social post, generating the customized social reply based on the user sentiment, and automatically replying to the social post,” are “not well- understood, routine, or conventional.” Appeal Br. 17. In particular, Appellant alleges error by the Examiner for not providing evidence that these identified abstract steps are not well-understood, routine, or conventional. Id. The Examiner responds that the identified steps are part of the abstract idea of the claim, and thus require “no evidence under Berkheimer.” Ans. 8. We agree with the Examiner’s that “Berkheimer does not stand for the position that every single element of a claim has to be customary but only that the additional claim elements, beyond the abstract, must be shown to be customary to sustain this rejection.” Ans. 8. Indeed, the Federal Circuit, in accordance with Alice, has “repeatedly recognized the absence of a genuine Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 16 dispute as to eligibility” where claims have been defended as involving an inventive concept based “merely on the idea of using existing computers or the Internet to carry out conventional processes, with no alteration of computer functionality.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 890 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Moore, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted); see also BSG Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“BSG Tech does not argue that other, non-abstract features of the claimed inventions, alone or in combination, are not well-understood, routine and conventional database structures and activities. Accordingly, the district court did not err in determining that the asserted claims lack an inventive concept.”). On this record, Appellant has not shown the additional limitations individually, or as an ordered combination, ensure that the claim amounts to “significantly more” than the abstract idea. Therefore, we are not apprised of error by the Examiner. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 7 as directed to a judicial exception without something more, including claims 2–17 and 21–23, which fall with claim 7. Claims 18–20 and 24–26 Appellant argues independent claim 18, and dependent claims 19, 20, and 24–26 together as a group. Appeal Br. 13. We select claim 18 as representative of the group; thus, claims 19, 20, and 24–26 stand or fall with claim 18. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Independent claim 18 recites a system with processors that perform steps corresponding to steps recited in claim 7, with the additional steps to “analyze the text of the social post to identify a plurality of feature terms that Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 17 each match a different feature name from the new or improved features of the newer version of the product,” and “determine a user sentiment associated with each feature term.” See Appeal Br. 25–26, Claims App. Appellant argues “as an example, analyzing the social post for feature terms and determining the sentiment of these terms is a practical application because it addresses the issue in which ‘different users . . . use different terms to refer to the same feature.’” Appeal Br. 12–13. We are not persuaded by this argument. The Specification describes that a “social post would be analyzed to determine if the social post contains any feature terms corresponding with the feature names in the list of new/improved features.” Spec. ¶ 69 (cited at Appeal Br. 7). The Specification describes that determining a sentiment for terms permits the system to identify improved features in a new product that either improve on a feature the user did not like in a previous product version, or improve on a feature the user did like in a previous product version. Spec. ¶¶ 66–67. The analyzing of a social post to identify product features, and the sentiment associated with each, can be done mentally by observing the post, and making judgments about the terms. To the extent that the argued steps improve the process of targeting advertising to a user, this reflects an improvement in the judicial exception, and does not provide a “practical application” under the Guidance. See Guidance at 54–55. For these reasons, we sustain the rejection of claim 18 as directed to a judicial exception without something more, and of claims 19, 20 and 24–26 that fall with claim 18. Appeal 2019-006139 Application 14/611,830 18 CONCLUSION The Examiner’s rejection of claims 7–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 is AFFIRMED. DECISION SUMMARY Claim(s) 35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed 7–26 101 Eligibility 7–26 No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation