Adobe Inc.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardFeb 1, 20212020004231 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 1, 2021) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 14/177,385 02/11/2014 Zhenyu Yan 3854US01 1157 108982 7590 02/01/2021 FIG. 1 Patents 116 W. Pacific Avenue Suite 200 Spokane, WA 99201 EXAMINER CIRNU, ALEXANDRU ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3622 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 02/01/2021 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): Fig1Docket@fig1patents.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte ZHENYU YAN, PRAVEEN KRISHNAKUMAR, ABHISHEK PANI, ANIL KAMATH, SUMAN BASETTY, and KUNAL KUMAR JAIN Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 Technology Center 3600 Before JOHN A. EVANS, LARRY J. HUME, and JENNIFER L. MCKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judges. HUME, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24, which are all claims pending in the application. Appellant has canceled claims 5, 6, 9, and 19. See Appeal Br. 26 et seq. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 We use the term “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Adobe Inc. Appeal Br. 3. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE2 The claims are directed to a revenue estimation through ensemble modeling. See Spec. (Title). In particular, Appellant’s disclosed embodiments and claimed invention relate to “[a]n ensemble model . . . that predicts revenue metrics for one or more keywords . . . formed using both a historical model and a user behavior model. The historical model may include historical data indicative of revenue generated from previous advertising instances associated with a keyword whereas the user behavior model may include data describing online user behavior associated with the keyword.” Spec. ¶ 4. Exemplary Claim Claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on Appeal: 1. A method implemented by a computing device, the method comprising: receiving, by the computing device, a search query via a network, the search query including one or more keywords; generating, by the computing device, a historical model that models historical data associated with performance of the one or more keywords regarding advertising instances associated with the one or more keywords; generating, by the computing device, a user behavior model separate and distinct from the historical model that 2 Our decision relies upon Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Appeal Br.,” filed Mar. 5, 2020); Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed May 18, 2020); Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed Apr. 3, 2020); Final Office Action (“Final Act.,” mailed Aug. 9, 2019); and the original Specification (“Spec.,” filed Feb. 11, 2014). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 3 models online user behavior associated with the one or more keywords; estimating, by the computing device, a first prediction of performance for the one or more keywords using the historical model and a second prediction of performance for the one or more keywords using the behavior model; assigning, by the computing device, a weight to the first prediction based, at least in part, on a sparsity value indicating usefulness of the historical model to predict the performance of the one or more keywords; assigning, by the computing device, a weight to the second prediction based on the assigned weight of the first prediction model; forming, by the computing device, an ensemble model based on the assigned weight of the first prediction and the assigned weight of the second prediction from the user behavior model; generating, by the computing device, the search result that includes an advertising instance, the advertising instance configured based on the predicted metrics; and outputting, by the computing device, the search result having the advertising instance for communication via the network. REJECTION Claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because the claimed invention is directed to a judicial exception (i.e., a law of nature, a natural phenomenon, or an abstract idea) without significantly more. CLAIM GROUPING Based on Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 13–24) and our discretion under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv), we decide the appeal of the Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 4 patent-ineligible subject matter rejection of claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20– 24 on the basis of representative claim 1.3 ISSUE Appellant argues (Appeal Br. 13–24; Reply Br. 2–7) the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent- ineligible subject matter is in error. These contentions present us with the following issue: Under the USPTO’s Revised Guidance, informed by our governing case law concerning 35 U.S.C. § 101, has Appellant persuasively argued that the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 is not patent eligible under § 101? ANALYSIS In reaching this decision, we consider all evidence presented and all arguments actually made by Appellant. To the extent Appellant has not advanced separate, substantive arguments for particular claims, or other issues, such arguments are waived. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). We disagree with Appellant’s arguments with respect to claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24 and, unless otherwise noted, we incorporate by reference herein and adopt as our own: (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and (2) the 3 “Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). In addition, when Appellant does not separately argue the patentability of dependent claims, the claims stand or fall with the claims from which they depend. In re King, 801 F.2d 1324, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 5 reasons and rebuttals set forth in the Examiner’s Answer in response to Appellant’s arguments. We highlight and address specific findings and arguments regarding claim 1 for emphasis as follows. PRINCIPLES OF LAW A. 35 U.S.C. § 101 An invention is patent-eligible if it is a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.4 However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012) (brackets in original) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 217–18 (2014) (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 4 This threshold analysis of whether a claim is directed to one of the four statutory categories of invention, i.e., a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, is referred to as “Step 1” in the USPTO’s patent- eligibility analysis under § 101. MPEP § 2106. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 6 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against risk . . . .”). Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes, such as “molding rubber products” (Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))). Abstract ideas may include, but are not limited to, fundamental economic practices, methods of organizing human activities, and mathematical formulas or relationships. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–21. Under this guidance, we must therefore ensure at step one that we articulate what the claims are directed to with enough specificity to ensure the step one inquiry is meaningful. Id. at 217 (“[W]e tread carefully in construing this exclusionary principle lest it swallow all of patent law.”). Examples of claims that do not recite mental processes because they cannot be practically performed in the human mind include: (a) a claim to a method for calculating an absolute position of a GPS receiver and an absolute time of reception of satellite signals, where the claimed GPS receiver calculated pseudoranges that estimated the distance from the GPS Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 7 receiver to a plurality of satellites, SiRF Technology, Inc. v. International Trade Commission, 601 F.3d 1319, 1331–33 (Fed. Cir. 2010); (b) a claim to detecting suspicious activity by using network monitors and analyzing network packets, SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 930 F.3d 1295, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 2019); (c) a claim to a specific data encryption method for computer communication involving a several-step manipulation of data, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (distinguishing TQP Development, LLC v. Intuit Inc., 2014 WL 651935 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2014)) (the specific data encryption method “could not conceivably be performed in the human mind or with pencil and paper”). Whereas a claim limitation to a process that “can be performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper” qualifies as a mental process, a claim limitation that “could not, as a practical matter, be performed entirely in a human’s mind” (even if aided with pen and paper) would not qualify as a mental process.5 In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the Supreme Court held “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent 5 CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1372, 1375– 76 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (distinguishing Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859 (Fed. Cir. 2010), and SiRF Tech., Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 601 F.3d 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 8 protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”). If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘“inventive concept”’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. B. USPTO Revised Guidance In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) published revised guidance on the application of § 101.6 The Manual of 6 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance”) (https://www.govinfo.gov/ content/pkg/FR-2019-01-07/pdf/2018-28282.pdf). In response to formal public comments, the Office issued further guidance on October 17, 2019, clarifying the Revised Guidance. USPTO, October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (the “October 2019 Update”). “All USPTO personnel are, Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 9 Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) now incorporates this revised guidance and subsequent updates at Section 2106 (9th ed. Rev. 10.2019, rev. June 2020).7 Under MPEP § 2106, we first look to whether the claim recites: (1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes) (“Step 2A, Prong One,” referred to herein as “Step 2A(i)”); and (2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application (“Step 2A, Prong Two,” referred to herein as “Step 2A(ii)”).8 MPEP § 2106.04(a)) and § 2106.04(d). Under this guidance, if the claim does not recite a judicial exception (a law of nature, natural phenomenon, or subject matter within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas above), then the claim is patent- as a matter of internal agency management, expected to follow the guidance.” 84 Fed. Reg. at 51; see also October 2019 Update at 1. 7 All references to the MPEP are to the Ninth Edition, Revision 10.2019 (Last Revised June 2020), unless otherwise indicated. 8 “Examiners evaluate integration into a practical application by: (1) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception, and (2) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether the claim as a whole integrates the exception into a practical application, using one or more of the considerations introduced in subsection I supra, and discussed in more detail in MPEP §§ 2106.04(d)(1), 2106.04(d)(2), 2106.05(a) through (c) and 2106.05(e) through (h).” MPEP § 2106.04(d)II. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 10 eligible at Step 2A(i). This determination concludes the eligibility analysis, except in situations identified in the Revised Guidance.9 Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that exception into a practical application,10 do we then look, under Step 2B, to whether the claim: (3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field; or (4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.11 MPEP § 2106.05(d). In the Step 2B analysis, an additional element (or combination of elements) is not well-understood, routine or conventional unless the 9 In the rare circumstance in which an examiner believes a claim limitation that does not fall within the enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should nonetheless be treated as reciting an abstract idea, the procedure described in the MPEP for analyzing the claim should be followed. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(3)(“Tentative Abstract Ideas”). 10 This corresponds to Alice part one where it is determined whether the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. If a claim is “not directed to an abstract idea under part one of the Alice framework, we do not need to proceed to step two.” Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 11 Items (3) and (4) correspond to Alice part two where it is determined “whether the claim contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application” (Alice, 573 U.S. at 221) and continue to be collectively referred to as “Step 2B” of the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 11 examiner finds an evidentiary basis, and expressly supports a rejection in writing with, one or more of the following: 1. A citation to an express statement in the specification or to a statement made by an applicant during prosecution that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . 2. A citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well- understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). 3. A citation to a publication that demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . 4. A statement that the examiner is taking official notice of the well-understood, routine, conventional nature of the additional element(s). . . . See MPEP §§ 2106.05(d)(I)(2); 2106.07(a). If the Examiner or the Board determines under Step 2B that the element (or combination of elements) amounts to significantly more than the exception itself, the claim is eligible, thereby concluding the eligibility analysis. However, if a determination is made that the element and combination of elements do not amount to significantly more than the exception itself, the claim is ineligible under Step 2B, and the claim should be rejected for lack of subject matter eligibility. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 12 ANALYSIS Step 1 – Statutory Category Claim 1, as a method (process) claim, recites one of the enumerated categories of eligible subject matter in 35 U.S.C. § 101. Therefore, the issue before us is whether it is directed to a judicial exception without significantly more. Step 2A(i): Does the Claim Recite a Judicial Exception? The Examiner determined that claim 1 “recites the abstract concept of a commercial activity — i.e. advertising activities or behaviors/business relations —[] which represents a method of organizing human activity, and has been identified as an abstract idea by the Courts,” and further concludes the claims “also recite[] the abstract concept of a mathematical concept — i.e. mathematical relationships/calculations—[] which has been identified as an abstract idea by the Courts.” Final Act. 4. We conclude claim 1 does not recite the judicial exceptions of either natural phenomena or laws of nature. We evaluate whether claim 1 recites an abstract idea based upon the Revised Guidance. First, we look to the Specification to provide context as to what the claimed invention is directed to. In this case, the Specification discloses: An ensemble model is described that predicts revenue metrics for one or more keywords. In one or more implementations, an ensemble model is formed using both a historical model and a user behavior model. The historical model may include historical data indicative of revenue generated from previous advertising instances associated with a keyword whereas the user behavior model may include data describing online user behavior associated with the keyword. In Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 13 one or more implementations, weights are assigned to the historical model and/or the user behavior model based on sparsity of the historical data used to form the historical model. For example, if the historical data is rich (e.g., represents a high likelihood of accurately predicting revenues for the keyword), then a higher weight is assigned to the historical model relative to the weight assigned to the user behavior model. Spec. ¶ 4. Appellant’s Abstract similarly describes the invention as: An ensemble model is described that is usable to predict revenue metrics for one or more keywords. The ensemble model may be formed using both a historical model and a user behavior model. In one or more implementations, weights are assigned to the historical model and/or the user behavior model based on one or more criteria. Various processing techniques of the ensemble model may utilize the historical model and the user behavior model to predict revenue metrics for one or more keywords. Spec. 41 (Abstract). In this phase of the analysis, Appellant presents two Federal Circuit cases discussed in the Revised Guidance in an attempt to distinguish their claims on appeal. OIP Technologies12 OIP Technologies involved an action against an online retailer for infringement of computer-implemented methods for pricing a product for sale. In OIP, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court below and held that the patent involved no more than an abstract idea coupled with 12 OIP Technologies, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2015) Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 14 routine data-gathering steps and conventional computer activity. OIP Technologies, 788 F.3d at 1364. Appellant argues “[i]n contrast to claim 1 in OIP Techs, the subject matter of claim 1 in the current Application describes, in part, a method for generating a search result based on metrics that are predicted using an ensemble model formed based on the historical model and the user behavior model. Generating a search result based on the steps recited in claim 1 is very different from offer-based price optimization.” Appeal Br. 17–18. While we agree with Appellant that the specific claim in question in OIP is different in specifics than claim 1 on appeal, we disagree that the differences in the claims render the Federal Circuit’s holding irrelevant in light of the Revised Guidance, or make claim 1 patent eligible, as discussed below. In re Ferguson13 In Ferguson, the claimed invention focuses on a “method of marketing a product” and a “paradigm for marketing software.” The Federal Circuit held the methods directed toward organizing business or legal relationships in structuring of sales force or marketing company were not tied to a particular machine or apparatus and did not transform particular an article into a different state or thing. Ferguson 558 F.3d at 1365. Similar to the argument concerning OIP, Appellant argues the claims in Ferguson recite “subject matter that is very different from the features recited in claim 1 of the current application. For at least these reasons, 13 In re Ferguson, 558 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 15 contrary to the Examiner’s assertion, claim 1 of the current application does not recite the abstract concept of a commercial activity.” Appeal Br. 18–19. We disagree, as discussed below. In TABLE I below, we identify in italics the specific claim limitations in claim 1 that we conclude recite an abstract idea. We additionally identify in bold the additional (non-abstract) claim limitations that are generic computer components and techniques, and underline limitations representing extra or post-solution activity: TABLE I Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance A method implemented by a computing device, the method comprising: A process (method) is a statutory subject matter class. See 35 U.S.C. § 101. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”). [L1] receiving, by the [L1a] computing device, a search query via [L1b] a network, the search query including one or more keywords; As claimed, a computing device and a network represent conventional computer components and techniques. See Spec. ¶ 26 (“The computing device 102, for instance, may be configured as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device (e.g., assuming a handheld configuration such as a tablet or mobile phone), and so forth.”); ¶ 43 (“The network 114, meanwhile, represents any one or combination of multiple different types of wired and/or wireless networks, such as cable networks, the Internet, private intranets, and so forth.”). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 16 Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance Data gathering (i.e., “receiving . . . a search query”) is merely insignificant extra-solution activity that does not add significantly more to the abstract idea to render the claimed invention patent-eligible. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (“[T]he involvement of the machine or transformation in the claimed process must not merely be insignificant extra-solution activity”); see also MPEP § 2106.05(g); and see buySAFE, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 765 F.3d 1350, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (computer receives and sends information over a network). [L2] generating, by the computing device, a historical model that models historical data associated with performance of the one or more keywords regarding advertising instances associated with the one or more keywords; Generating a model using advertising-related data is an abstract idea, i.e., certain methods of organizing human activity including commercial interactions in the form of advertising, marketing or sales activities. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B); Revised Guidance 52. [L3] generating, by the computing device, a user behavior model separate and distinct from the historical model that models online user behavior associated with the one or more keywords; Generating a model that models user behavior associated with keywords using user behavior data is an abstract idea, i.e., certain methods of organizing human activity including managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(C); Revised Guidance 52. [L4] estimating, by the computing device, a first prediction of performance Mathematical calculations, e.g., estimating first and second predictions using modeling information, is an abstract idea. See MPEP Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 17 Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance for the one or more keywords using the historical model and a second prediction of performance for the one or more keywords using the behavior model; § 2106.04(a)(2)(I)(C); see also SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a “series of mathematical calculations based on selected information” are directed to abstract ideas). [L5] assigning, by the computing device, a weight to the first prediction based, at least in part, on a sparsity value indicating usefulness of the historical model to predict the performance of the one or more keywords; Assigning a weight to a prediction is an abstract idea, i.e., an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion which could be performed as a mental process. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A). [L6] assigning, by the computing device, a weight to the second prediction based on the assigned weight of the first prediction model; Assigning a weight to a prediction is an abstract idea, i.e., an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion which could be performed as a mental process. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A). [L7] forming, by the computing device, an ensemble model based on the assigned weight of the first prediction and the assigned weight of the second prediction from the user behavior model; Forming a model based on different weighted predictions is an abstract idea, i.e., an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion which could be performed as a mental process. See MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III)(A). [L8] generating, by the computing device, the search result that includes an advertising instance, the advertising instance Generating a search result that includes an advertising instance based on predicted metrics is an abstract idea, i.e., certain methods of organizing human activity including commercial interactions in the form of advertising, marketing or sales Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 18 Independent Claim 1 Revised Guidance configured based on the predicted metrics; and activities. See MPEP 2106.04(a)(2)(II)(B); Revised Guidance 52. [L9] outputting, by the computing device, the search result having the advertising instance for communication via the network. Outputting or transmitting information, e.g., the search result, is insignificant post- solution activity. Revised Guidance 55, n.31; see also MPEP § 2106.05(g); and see buySAFE, 765 F.3d at 1355 (computer receives and sends information over a network). Appeal Br. 26–27 (Claims App.). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard,14 we conclude limitations L1 through L9 recite steps that would ordinarily occur when predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords. See Final Act. 4–5; see generally, Ans. For example, using models to predict sales revenue in connection with advertising is an operation that generally occurs when predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords. Further, we conclude limitations L2 through L8 recite various abstract ideas as indicated in TABLE 1, above, whether initiated person-to-person, on paper, or using a computer. 14 During prosecution, claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation when reading claim language in light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under this standard, we interpret claim terms using “the broadest reasonable meaning of the words in their ordinary usage as they would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art, taking into account whatever enlightenment by way of definitions or otherwise that may be afforded by the written description contained in the applicant’s specification.” In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 19 We determine that claim 1, overall, recites a certain method of organizing human activity in the form of commercial interactions relating to revenue generation and advertising that may also be performed by pen and paper. This type of activity, i.e., predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords, as recited in the above-identified limitations, for example, and aside from any computer-related aspects, includes longstanding conduct that existed well before the advent of computers and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human with pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.”).15 Thus, under Step 2A(i), we agree with the Examiner that claim 1’s “method implemented by a computing device” recites a judicial exception. We conclude claim 1, under our Revised Guidance, recites a judicial exception of predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords, i.e., a certain method of organizing human activity in the form of a business 15 Our reviewing court recognizes that “[a]n abstract idea can generally be described at different levels of abstraction.” Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2016). That need not and, in this case does not, “impact the patentability analysis.” Id. at 1241. Further, “[t]he Board’s slight revision of its abstract idea analysis does not impact the patentability analysis.” Id. Moreover, merely combining several abstract ideas does not render the combination any less abstract. RecogniCorp, LLC v. Nintendo Co., 855 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“Adding one abstract idea (math) to another abstract idea . . . does not render the claim non-abstract.”); see also FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1093–94 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (determining the pending claims were directed to a combination of abstract ideas). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 20 activity related to advertising and revenue generation, and thus recites an abstract idea. Step 2A(ii): Judicial Exception Integrated into a Practical Application? If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, as we conclude above, we proceed to the “practical application” Step 2A(ii) in which we determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. With respect to this phase of the analysis, Appellant cites to DDR Holdings to argue subject matter eligibility.16 Analogous to the claims in DDR Holdings, claim 1 addresses a digitally rooted challenge of accurately predicting revenues for keywords based on past user interaction with these words in an online environment. Specifically, claim 1 addresses the challenge of predicting metrics for keywords using an ensemble model that is based on a historical model and a user behavior model. The historical model is generated using historical data indicative of revenue generated from previous advertising instances (e.g., a displayed advertisement, a displayed webpage, a displayed search result, a promoted webpage, and so forth). In contrast, the user behavior model is generated using data describing online user behavior associated with the keyword such as, e.g., time spent on webpage, webpage viewed, bounce rate, and other such after users click the advertisement associated with the keyword. Use of this data to generate an ensemble model solves the digitally rooted challenge of accurately predicting keywords based on user 16 DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 21 interaction with these keywords. In part because the ensemble model is used to generate a search result that includes an advertising instance that is based on metrics that are predicted using this data. Appeal Br. 20–21 (footnotes omitted). Appellant’s reliance on DDR (Appeal Br. 20–21; Reply Br. 3 n.5) is misplaced as the recited claims do not improve the computer. In DDR, the claims at issue involved, inter alia, “web pages displays [with] at least one active link associated with a commerce object associated with a buying opportunity of a selected one of a plurality of merchants” (claim 1 of US 7,818,399). The Federal Circuit found the claims in DDR to be patent- eligible under step one of the Alice test because “the claimed solution is necessarily rooted in computer technology in order to overcome a problem specifically arising in the realm of computer networks.” DDR Holdings v. Hotels.com, 773 F.3d 1245, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Specifically, the Federal Circuit found the claims addressed the “challenge of retaining control over the attention of the customer in the context of the Internet.” Id. at 1258. We find the rejected claims in this Appeal are dissimilar to DDR’s web page with an active link, and the Specification does not support the view that the computer related claim elements are unconventional. See Spec. ¶ 26 (“The computing device 102, for instance, may be configured as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device (e.g., assuming a handheld configuration such as a tablet or mobile phone), and so forth.”). Appellant further argues: It is reasonable to conclude that such data cannot be gathered and analyzed by a human alone, as a human cannot view and track which webpage is being viewed at a particular Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 22 time by various users, how long multiple users spend viewing a webpage, and what portions of the webpage is being viewed by a particular user without access to a computing device. Consequently, for at least the reasons discussed above, claim 1 is directed to a specific implementation of a solution to the problem of accurately predicting revenues for keywords based on past user interaction with these words in an online environment. Appeal Br. 21 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument because it is not commensurate with the scope of the claim. Contrary to Appellant’s argument, claim 1 does not explicitly recite determining “which webpage is being viewed at a particular time by various users,” “how long multiple users spend viewing a webpage,” or “what portions of the webpage is being viewed by a particular user.” Turning back to TABLE 1, and as to the specific limitations, we find limitation L1 (“receiving . . . a search query”) recites insignificant data gathering. See MPEP § 2106.05(g). Data gathering, as performed by the step or function in Appellant’s claims, is a classic example of insignificant extra-solution activity. See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom, Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010). We also find limitation L9 (“outputting . . . the search result having the advertising instance for communication via the network”) recites insignificant post solution activity. The Supreme Court guides that the “prohibition against patenting abstract ideas ‘cannot be circumvented by’ . . . adding ‘insignificant postsolution activity.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. at 610–11 (quoting Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191–92). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 23 On this record, we are of the view that Appellant’s claims do not operate the recited generic computer components in limitations L1a (“a computing device”) and L1b (“a network”) in an unconventional manner to achieve an improvement in computer functionality. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). Appellant does not point to any specific limitation or limitations which might arguably be construed as integrating the abstract ideas in claim 1 into a practical application of that idea. We find each of the limitations of claim 1 recite abstract ideas, estra or post-solution activity, or generic computer components and functionality as identified in Step 2A(i), supra, and none of the limitations integrate the judicial exception of predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords into a practical application as determined under one or more of the MPEP sections cited above. The claim as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Under analogous circumstances, the Federal Circuit has held that “[t]his is a quintessential ‘do it on a computer’ patent: it acknowledges that [such] data . . . was previously collected, analyzed, manipulated, and displayed manually, and it simply proposes doing so with a computer. We have held such claims are directed to abstract ideas.” Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 916 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2019); see also Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Though lengthy and numerous, the claims do not go beyond requiring the collection, analysis, and display of available information in a particular field, stating those functions in general terms, without limiting Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 24 them to technical means for performing the functions that are arguably an advance over conventional computer and network technology.”). Therefore, the claim as a whole merely uses instructions to implement the abstract idea on a computer or, alternatively, merely uses a computer as a tool to perform the abstract idea. Thus, on this record, Appellant has not shown an improvement or practical application under the guidance of MPEP section 2106.05(a) (“Improvements to the Functioning of a Computer or to Any Other Technology or Technical Field”) or section 2106.05(e)(“Other Meaningful Limitations”). Nor does Appellant advance any arguments in the Brief(s) that are directed to the Bilski machine-or-transformation test, which would only be applicable to the method (process) claims on appeal. See MPEP §§ 2106.05(b) (Particular Machine) and 2106.05(c) (Particular Transformation). Therefore, we conclude the abstract idea is not integrated into a practical application, and thus the claim is directed to the judicial exception. Step 2B – “Inventive Concept” or “Significantly More” If the claims are directed to a judicial exception, and not integrated into a practical application, as we conclude above, we proceed to the “inventive concept” step. For Step 2B we must “look with more specificity at what the claim elements add, in order to determine ‘whether they identify an “inventive concept” in the application of the ineligible subject matter’ to which the claim is directed.” Affinity Labs of Tex., LLC v. DIRECTV, LLC, 838 F.3d 1253, 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In applying step two of the Alice analysis, our reviewing court guides we must “determine whether the claims do significantly more than simply Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 25 describe [the] abstract method” and thus transform the abstract idea into patentable subject matter. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 772 F.3d 709, 715 (Fed. Cir. 2014). We look to see whether there are any “additional features” in the claims that constitute an “inventive concept,” thereby rendering the claims eligible for patenting even if they are directed to an abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. Those “additional features” must be more than “well-understood, routine, conventional activity.” Mayo, 566 U.S. at 79. Limitations referenced in Alice that are not enough to qualify as “significantly more” when recited in a claim with an abstract idea include, as non-limiting or non-exclusive examples: adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with an abstract idea17; mere instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer18; or requiring no more than a generic computer to perform generic computer functions that are well-understood, routine and conventional activities previously known to the industry.19 With respect to this step of the analysis, Appellant argues: Appellant submits that even assuming arguendo that claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception, which it is not, the claims are nonetheless patent eligible. At least one reason is because the claim includes a specific limitation or a combination of limitations that are not well understood, routine, or conventional. Specifically, claim 1 recites features of a 17 Alice, 573 U.S. at 221–23. 18 Alice, 573 U.S. at 222–23, e.g., simply implementing a mathematical principle on a physical machine, namely a computer. 19 Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (explaining using a computer to obtain data, adjust account balances, and issue automated instructions involves computer functions that are well-understood, routine, conventional activities). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 26 method that solve a particular technological problem present in conventional systems, namely the problem of generating a search result based on metrics that are predicted using an ensemble model that is formed based on a historical model and a user behavior model. The manner in which this technological problem is solved is recited in the steps of claim 1. Appeal Br. 23. However, we note Appellant does not point to any specific limitation or limitations that might arguably be construed as offering significantly more than the abstract ideas recited in claim 1. Evaluating representative claim 1 under step 2 of the Alice analysis, we conclude it lacks an inventive concept that transforms the abstract idea of predicting revenue metrics for one or more keywords into a patent-eligible application of that abstract idea. The patent eligibility inquiry may contain underlying issues of fact. Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d. 1314, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In particular, “[t]he question of whether a claim element or combination of elements is well-understood, routine and conventional to a skilled artisan in the relevant field is a question of fact.” Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2018). As evidence of the conventional nature of the recited “computing device,” and “network” in method claim 1, the Specification discloses: [0026] The computing device 102, for instance, may be configured as a desktop computer, a laptop computer, a mobile device (e.g., assuming a handheld configuration such as a tablet or mobile phone), and so forth. . . . [0043] The network 114, meanwhile, represents any one or combination of multiple different types of wired and/or wireless Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 27 networks, such as cable networks, the Internet, private intranets, and so forth. . . . Spec. ¶¶ 26, 43. Although not argued separately by Appellant, the variously recited “modules” in system claim 8, and “means for” limitations in system claim 14 are also carried out by conventional computer components and techniques. The Specification further describes these limitations: [0025] Generally, any of the functions described herein can be implemented using software, firmware, hardware (e.g., fixed logic circuitry), or a combination of these implementations. The terms “model,” “module,” “functionality,” and “logic” as used herein generally represent software, firmware, hardware, or a combination thereof. In the case of a software implementation, the module, functionality, or logic represents program code that performs specified tasks when executed on a processor (e.g., CPU or CPUs). The program code can be stored in one or more computer readable memory devices. The features of the techniques described below are platform-independent, meaning that the techniques may be implemented on a variety of commercial computing platforms having a variety of processors, as further described in FIG. 6. Spec. ¶ 25. Thus, because the Specification describes the additional elements in general terms, without describing the particulars, we conclude the claim limitations may be broadly but reasonably construed as reciting conventional computer components and techniques, particularly in light of Appellants’ Specification, as quoted above.20 20 Claim terms are to be given their broadest reasonable interpretation, as understood by those of ordinary skill in the art and taking into account Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 28 The MPEP, based upon our precedential guidance, provides additional considerations with respect to analysis of the well-understood, routine, and conventional nature of the recited computer-related components. Another consideration when determining whether a claim integrates a judicial exception into a practical application in Step 2A Prong Two or recites significantly more than a judicial exception in Step 2B is whether the additional elements amount to more than a recitation of the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) or are more than mere instructions to implement an abstract idea or other exception on a computer. As explained by the Supreme Court, in order to make a claim directed to a judicial exception patent-eligible, the additional element or combination of elements must do “‘more than simply stat[e] the [judicial exception] while adding the words ‘apply it’”. Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, 573 U.S. 208, 221, 110 USPQ2d 1976, 1982-83 (2014) (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. V. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72, 101 USPQ2d 1961, 1965). Thus, for example, claims that amount to nothing more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea using a generic computer do not render an abstract idea eligible. Alice Corp., 573 U.S. at 223, 110 USPQ2d at 1983. See also 573 U.S. at 224, 110 USPQ2d at 1984 (warning against a § 101 analysis that turns on “the draftsman’s art”). . . . . In Alice Corp., the claim recited the concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. The Court found that the recitation of the computer in the claim amounted to mere instructions to apply the abstract idea on a generic computer. 573 U.S. at 225-26, 110 USPQ2d at 1984. The Supreme Court also discussed this concept in an earlier case, Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70, 175 USPQ 673, 676 (1972), where the claim recited a process for converting binary-coded-decimal (BCD) numerals into pure binary numbers. The Court found that the claimed process had no whatever enlightenment may be had from the Specification. In re Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 29 meaningful practical application except in connection with a computer. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72, 175 USPQ at 676. The claim simply stated a judicial exception (e.g., law of nature or abstract idea) while effectively adding words that “apply it” in a computer. Id. MPEP § 2106.05(f) (“Mere Instructions To Apply An Exception”). We conclude the claims fail the Step 2B analysis because claim 1, in essence, merely recites various computer-based elements along with no more than mere instructions to implement the identified abstract idea using the computer-based elements. Therefore, in light of the foregoing, we conclude, under the Revised Guidance, that each of Appellant’s claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24, each considered as a whole, is directed to a patent-ineligible abstract idea that is not integrated into a practical application and does not include an inventive concept. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s § 101 rejection of independent claim 1, and grouped claims 2–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24 which fall therewith. See Claim Grouping, supra. REPLY BRIEF To the extent Appellant may advance new arguments in the Reply Brief (Reply Br. 2–7) not in response to a shift in the Examiner’s position in the Answer, arguments raised in a Reply Brief that were not raised in the Appeal Brief or are not responsive to arguments raised in the Examiner’s Answer will not be considered except for good cause (see 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2)), which Appellant has not shown. Appeal 2020-004231 Application 14/177,385 30 CONCLUSIONS Under our Revised Guidance, governed by relevant case law, Appellant has not persuasively argued that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims 1–4, 7, 8, 10–18, and 20–24 as being patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and we sustain the rejection. DECISION SUMMARY Claims Rejected 35 U.S.C. § Basis / References Affirmed Reversed 1–4, 7–8, 10–18, 20–24 101 Eligibility 1–4, 7–8, 10–18, 20–24 FINALITY AND RESPONSE No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation