Active Transportation Co.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Sep 30, 2003

340 N.L.R.B. 426 (N.L.R.B. 2003)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 426
Active Transportation Company, L.L.C. and Team-
sters Local Union No. 71, a/w International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–CIO. Case 11–
CA–19328
September 30, 2003
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS
LIEBMAN
AND WALSH
On August 8, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Keltner
W. Locke issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief. The General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
adopt the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions and
to adopt the recommended Order as modified2 and set
forth in full below.3
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge as
modified and set forth in full below, and orders that the
Respondent Active Transportation Company, L.L.C., Mt.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board’s established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge’s credibility resolutions unless the clear preponder-
ance of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect.
Standard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362
(3d Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no
basis for reversing the findings.
We also find no merit to the Respondent’s exception to the judge’s
failure to draw an adverse inference from the failure of Sam Carter to
testify. At the time of these proceedings, Carter was no longer an offi-
cial of the Union, and the judge generally discredited Bruce Jackson’s
testimony.
2 The judge recommended that the Respondent be permitted to liti-
gate in compliance the issue whether the contributions due the benefit
funds may be offset by the payments the Respondent made to its own
company provided fringe benefit plans. In adopting the judge’s rec-
ommendation, we note that “[e]mployees have, in addition to a stake in
receiving benefits negotiated on their behalf by their own chosen repre-
sentatives, a clear economic stake in the viability of funds to which part
of their compensation is remitted.” Grondorf, Field, Black & Co., 318
NLRB 996, 997 (1995), enf. denied in pertinent part 107 F.3d 882
(D.C. Cir. 1997). See also Stone Boat Yard v. NLRB, 715 F.2d 441,
446 (9th Cir. 1983) (contributions to union funds are properly ordered
where employer’s “diversion of contributions from the union funds
undercut[s] the ability of those funds to provide for future needs”), cert.
denied mem. 466 U.S. 937 (1984).
Although the above citations reflect current Board law, nothing
herein shall be read to preclude the Respondent from raising such is-
sues in compliance.
3 The judge failed to include the requisite provisions in his recom-
mended Order and notice.
Holly, North Carolina, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order as
modified and set forth in full below.
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing and refusing to execute, on request, a writ-
ten contract incorporating any agreement it has reached
with the Charging Party.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Execute and implement a written contract embody-
ing the agreement it reached with the Charging Party in
September 2001.
(b) Make whole its employees for all losses they may
have suffered because Respondent failed and refused to
execute and implement the agreement on November 1,
2001.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents, all payroll records, so-
cial security payment records, timecards, personnel re-
cords and reports, and all other records, including an
electronic copy of such records if stored in electronic
form, necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Mt. Holly, North Carolina, if that facility remains
open, and at all other places where notices customarily
are posted, copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix B.”4 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 11, after being signed by
the Respondent’s authorized representative, shall be
posted by the Respondent immediately upon receipt and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by the Respondent to ensure that the notices are not al-
tered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the
Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facil-
ity involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall
duplicate and mail at its own expense a copy of the at-
tached notice to every person who was a bargaining unit
4 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
340 NLRB No. 47
ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION CO. 427
employee at Respondent’s Mt. Holly, North Carolina
facility on November 1, 2001.
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps that the Respondent has taken to
comply.

APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we vio-
lated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey
this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist any union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on
your behalf
Act together with other employees for your bene-
fit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected
activities.

WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, rerestrain, or coerce our employees in the exercise
of these rights guaranteed to them by Section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL NOT refuse to sign, on request, a written
contract incorporating any agreement we reach with a
union which is the exclusive collective-bargaining repre-
sentative of any of our employees.
WE WILL sign and implement the agreement concern-
ing health insurance and pensions which we reached in
September 2001 with Teamsters Local Union No. 71,
affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, AFL–CIO.
WE WILL make all employees whole for any losses
they suffered because we unlawfully failed and refused
to execute and implement this agreement on November
1, 2001.

ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, L.L.C.

Donald R. Gattalaro, Esq., for the General Counsel.
C. John Holmquist Jr., Esq., and Emily Robinson, Esq. (Dickin-
son Wright, PLLC), of Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, for the
Respondent.
BENCH DECISION AND CERTIFICATION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
KELTNER W. LOCKE, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
this case on July 11, 2002, in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
After the parties rested, I heard oral argument, and on July 12,
2002, issued a bench decision pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(1)
of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, setting forth findings of
fact and conclusions of law. In accordance with Section 102.45
of the Rules and Regulations, I certify the accuracy of, and
attach hereto as “Appendix A,” the portion of the transcript
containing this decision.1 The conclusions of law, remedy,
recommended Order, and notice provisions are set forth below.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain un-
fair labor practices, I find that it must be ordered to cease and
desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to effectu-
ate the policies of the Act. The Respondent must also post the
notice to employees attached to this decision as appendix B.
In this case, the Respondent discharged the employees af-
fected by its unfair labor practices after one of its customers
gave its business to a competitor. The General Counsel has not
alleged that these discharges violated the Act, and the present
record would not support such a conclusion. Nonetheless, these
employees, who will be affected by the remedy, should be noti-
fied that the Board has found that Respondent committed an
unfair labor practice, and that pursuant to the Board’s order,
Respondent is taking corrective action.
Therefore, I recommend that the Board order Respondent to
mail a copy of the notice to each of the former employees who
worked at Respondent’s Mt. Holly, North Carolina facility on
November 1, 2001, the date of the unfair labor practice. See
Excel Container, Inc., 325 NLRB 17 (1997), modifying Indian
Hills Care Center, 321 NLRB 144 (1996).
Respondent unlawfully refused to sign a written contract
embodying the terms of an oral agreement it had reached with
the Union. This agreement concerned the bargaining unit em-
ployees’ health and pension benefits. As the Board stated in G
& T Terminal Packaging Co., 326 NLRB 114 (1998), “The
normal remedy for an unlawful refusal to sign a contract is to
require the offending party to sign the contract.” Certainly,
Respondent should be required to sign the local agreement it
reached with the Union in September 2001.
Ordering Respondent to sign the agreement necessarily im-
plies that Respondent must comply with its terms. However,
unusual circumstances in this case raise the possibility that
requiring full compliance with the terms of this local agreement
would be punitive rather than remedial. In considering this
possibility, it is helpful to begin by summarizing the pertinent
facts.
Although the Respondent and the Union have enjoyed a bar-
gaining relationship dating back two decades, before September
2001 they had never agreed that a group of Respondent’s em-

1 The bench decision appears in uncorrected form at pp. 178 through
204 of the transcript [omitted from publication]. The final version,
after correction of oral and transcriptional errors, is attached as appen-
dix A to this certification.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 428
ployees, employed in North Carolina, should be covered by the
Central States health and pension plans. Instead, Respondent
provided health insurance for these employees by contracting
first with Blue Cross and later with Humana. To provide pen-
sion benefits for these employees, Respondent made contribu-
tions to a 401(k) plan.
This arrangement was exceptional. Respondent’s bargaining
unit employees at other locations did receive health insurance
and pension benefits through the union-related Central States
funds. Respondent belonged to a multiemployer association,
and the bargaining unit employees of other employers in this
association also received their health and pension benefits
through the Central States funds. Thus, Respondent’s North
Carolina employees were unique.
In 1999, when the Union bargained with the multiemployer
association for a new nationwide agreement, it sought unsuc-
cessfully to have these North Carolina employees covered by
the Central States health and pension funds. Instead, the Union
obtained an agreement that the Respondent would pay no less
for its employees’ health and pension coverage than it would
have had to pay to the Central States funds.
Two years later, the Union made Respondent a persuasive
offer which provided, in part, that if Respondent switched its
employees’ health and pension coverage to the Central States
plans, the Union would guarantee that health insurance rates
would not increase for the next 4 years. Respondent accepted
this offer before it learned that it was losing a major customer
to a competitor. When Respondent received the first indica-
tions of this loss, it balked at signing the agreement and ulti-
mately refused to do so.
If Respondent had not violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to sign the local agreement it had reached with
the Union, it would have placed its employees under the Cen-
tral States health and pension plans on November 1, 2002.
Instead, it continued to cover the bargaining unit employees
with the Humana plan health insurance until it lawfully termi-
nated them, for lack of work, about 3 months later.
Under the national collective-bargaining agreement reached
in 1999, Respondent had to make medical insurance and pen-
sion payments at least equivalent to the payments other em-
ployers had to make, under the agreement, to the Central States
plans. Requiring Respondent to duplicate such payments—by
paying similar amounts now to the Central States funds—
arguably would go beyond a make-whole remedy. However,
the parties have not litigated this issue, and I recommend that
Respondent be allowed to raise it during the compliance phase
of this proceeding.
Similarly, the parties have not litigated the factual question
of whether Respondent’s payments to the health insurance car-
rier and the 401(k) plan did equal the amounts other employers
paid to the Central States funds. Respondent had a contractual
obligation to make such payments, but the present record does
not demonstrate whether or not it fulfilled this obligation.
Therefore, if the Board permits Respondent to raise the legal
argument that such payments should offset its obligation to the
Central States funds, the factual support for this argument
needs also be developed in the compliance proceeding.
Considering that Respondent did cover the employees with
the Humana health insurance, it may be argued that requiring
Respondent to make similar payments to the Central States
health fund imposes a burden on Respondent without providing
a benefit to the affected employees. Such an order might be
considered punitive rather than remedial, but the parties have
not litigated this question. Therefore, I recommend that the
Board allow Respondent to raise and litigate such an argument
during the compliance phase.
In any event, Respondent must undo any actual harm which
employees suffered because it failed to enroll them in the Cen-
tral States health fund, as it had promised to do. For example,
Respondent’s failure to provide this coverage may have made it
necessary for employees to bear medical expenses which the
Central States plan would have covered but which the Humana
plan did not. Respondent must reimburse employees for such
expenses, as determined in the compliance stage of this pro-
ceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent, Active Transportation Company, L.L.C.,
is an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of
Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Charging Party, Teamsters Local Union No. 71, af-
filiated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, AFL–
CIO, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. The Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by failing and refusing to execute a written contract em-
bodying an agreement it reached with the Charging Party in
September 2001, after the Charging Party requested that Re-
spondent sign this written agreement.
4. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor prac-
tices affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication.]
APPENDIX A
Bench Decision in
Active Transportation Company
11–CA–19328
The hearing will be in order. This is a bench decision in the
case of Active Transportation Company, Case 11–CA–19328.
It is issued pursuant to Section 102.35(a)(10) and Section
102.45 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations. I conclude that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act, as al-
leged, by failing and refusing to execute an agreement it
reached with the Union.
Procedural History
This case began on January 8, 2002, when Teamsters Local
Union No. 71, affiliated with International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL–CIO (the “Union” or the “Charging Party”)
filed an unfair labor practice charge against Active Transporta-
tion Company, L.L.C. (the “Respondent”). The Union
amended this charge on February 28, 2002.
ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION CO. 429
After an investigation, the Acting Regional Director (the
“Director”) of Region 11 of the National Labor Relations Board
issued a Complaint and Notice of Hearing (the “Complaint”) on
March 15, 2002. In issuing this Complaint, the Director acted
for and on behalf of the Board’s General Counsel (the “General
Counsel” or the “government”).
Respondent filed a timely Answer to the Complaint, and
amended this Answer orally when the hearing opened before
me on July 11, 2002 in Winston–Salem, North Carolina. On
that day, both the General Counsel and the Respondent pre-
sented evidence, rested their cases, and gave oral argument.
Today, July 12, 2002, I am issuing this bench decision.
Uncontested Allegations
Based on the admissions in Respondent’s Answer, as
amended orally at the hearing, I find that the government has
proven the allegations raised in Complaint paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, and 6. More specifically, I find that the Union filed and
served the charge and amended charge as alleged.
Further, I find that at all material times, Respondent has been
a Kentucky limited liability company with a terminal located at
Mt. Holly, North Carolina, and that it is an employer engaged
in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the
Act. Therefore, it is subject to the Board’s jurisdiction. Addi-
tionally, I find that the Union is a labor organization within the
meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
Complaint paragraph 7 alleged that a number of individuals
were Respondent’s supervisors and agents. Although Respon-
dent initially denied these allegations, at hearing it amended its
Answer to admit that Respondent’s president, Bruce Jackson,
and its vice president—labor relations, Todd Barnum, are its
supervisors and agents within the meaning of Section 2(11) and
2(13) of the Act. I so find.
Also at the beginning of the hearing, the General Counsel
amended Complaint paragraph 8 to allege that the following
employees of Respondent constitute a unit (the “Unit”) appro-
priate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the mean-
ing of Section 9(b) of the Act:

All employees covered under the National Master Automo-
bile Transporters Agreement.

Based on a stipulation entered into by Respondent at the
hearing, and the record as a whole, I conclude that this unit is
appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
Complaint paragraph 9 alleged that at all times since 1980,
the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of
the employees in the Unit, and that recognition of this status
“has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining agree-
ments, the most recent of which is effective by its terms from
the period June 1, 1999 through May 31, 2003.” Respondent
partially admitted these allegations. Its Answer stated as fol-
lows:

Active admits that the Union has been the exclusive repre-
sentative of employees covered by collective bargaining
agreement at its Mt. Holly, North Carolina terminal facility.
It further admits that Active and Teamsters Local 71 were
signatory to a multi–employer multi–local union collective
bargaining agreement which was effected [sic] by its terms
from June 1, 1991 through May 31, 2003. Active denies
remaining allegations in paragraph 9.

Based upon these admissions and other evidence in the re-
cord, including the current collective-bargaining agreement, I
find that the General Counsel has proven the allegations raised
by Complaint paragraph 9. More specifically, I find that by
virtue of Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union has been the exclu-
sive bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees in
the Unit at all times since 1980. Further, I find that such recog-
nition has been embodied in successive collective-bargaining
agreements, the most recent of which is effective by its terms
from June 1, 1999 through May 31, 2003.
Disputed Allegations
This case turns on a single factual question: Did Respondent
agree without reservation to a “rider” to the collective-
bargaining agreement requiring it to provide pension coverage
and health insurance for its bargaining unit employees by mak-
ing contributions to two funds associated with the Teamsters
Union? The General Counsel and the Union contend that Re-
spondent agreed to these terms with “no strings attached” and
that Respondent then violated the Act by refusing to sign a
written document memorializing that agreement. Respondent
asserts that it conditioned agreement on the occurrence of an
outside event—securing a contract to transport vehicles for a
company called Freightliner—and that because this event did
not occur, the terms it discussed with the Union never ripened
into a binding agreement.
For clarity, a discussion of the facts should begin with the
bargaining relationship, which is somewhat unusual. Respon-
dent is one of a number of trucking companies specializing in
transporting new automobiles and trucks under contracts with
the car makers. At the national level, these trucking companies
have delegated their bargaining rights to a committee which
negotiates with a similar committee representing the local un-
ions.
In the national agreement, the employers and unions have es-
tablished a creative and rather elaborate mechanism which
appears to promote cooperation between the companies and the
local unions. Trucking company representatives and local union
representatives sit on joint committees to resolve grievances.
These arbitration committees also serve another purpose, re-
viewing local supplemental agreements, sometimes called “rid-
ers,” negotiated by a single employer and a local union to ad-
dress local problems. The national contract appears to encour-
age such local problem solving, so long as any local agreement
does not conflict with the general terms applied nationwide. To
make sure that such conflicts do not occur, any local agreement
must be submitted to a specified arbitration committee, and
receive the committee’s approval, before it may take effect.
Respondent operates a number of trucking terminals in vari-
ous states and in Canada. The employees who drive the trucks
from these locations are members of the bargaining unit and
covered by the national agreement. However, Respondent’s
employees at various locations do not work under identical
terms and conditions of employment.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 430
For health insurance and pension purposes, almost all of Re-
spondent’s employees have been covered by plans associated
with the Teamsters Union, namely, the Central States Health
and Welfare Plan and the Central States Pension Fund Plan.
However, the employees at Respondent’s facility in Mt. Holly,
North Carolina did not have such coverage. Instead, Respon-
dent paid premiums to a health insurance provider, such as Blue
Cross and Blue Shield. Respondent also made contributions to
a 401(k) plan for each of these employees. Respondent also
paid employees yearly bonuses.
Union officials tried to get Respondent to place these em-
ployees within the coverage of the Central States health and
pension funds, but the Respondent resisted. The federal Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act, or “ERISA,” applies to
these Central States plans. ERISA includes “withdrawal liabil-
ity” provisions which, Respondent feared, might expose it to
severe monetary penalties under certain circumstances. Until
recently, therefore, Respondent had been unwilling to bring its
Mt. Holly employees under the Central States “umbrella.”
Several events changed management’s attitudes about the
desirability of the Central States plans. Because Blue Cross-
Blue Shield raised its rates, Respondent switched to another
health insurance provider, Humana. Employees did not like
this new coverage and began to complain about it.
Additionally, Respondent faced new business challenges. In
2001, it transported 40 percent fewer cars and trucks than pre-
viously, because fewer people were buying vehicles and, there-
fore, the manufacturers had no need to ship them from the fac-
tory to the dealer.
Further, in September 2001, Respondent received word of an
event which could portend either good or ill for the company,
an event which might be called a “double or nothing” opportu-
nity. A company called Freightliner operated two facilities in
North Carolina, in the towns of Mt. Holly and Cleveland. Re-
spondent transported vehicles from Freightliner’s Mt. Holly
facility, and a competitor hauled vehicles from Freightliner’s
Cleveland plant.
Freightliner notified Respondent that it was going to con-
solidate these two operations, and that one trucking company
would be assigned the work at both plants. The losing trucking
company would not have work at either. To win this business,
Respondent had to submit a more favorable bid than its com-
petitor.
Preparing such a bid obviously entailed risk. If Respondent
won the contract by bidding too low, it would wind up with a
lot of work but no profit. Conceivably, in an effort to submit
the lowest bid, management could achieve a Pyrrhic victory, a
contract obligating it to operate at a loss.
Therefore, management needed accurate and reliable esti-
mates of its operating expenses, including labor costs, for sev-
eral years in the future. At this point, Union officials made the
Respondent a proposal which sounded very attractive.
Union representatives told Respondent’s management that
they could lock in the costs of health insurance by switching to
the Central States plan. The Union would agree to a “local
rider” that these rates would not increase until the expiration of
the collective-bargaining agreement after the current one. Re-
spondent’s president understood the Union offer to signify that
it would not have to pay any increase in health insurance pre-
miums until May 31, 2005, when Respondent’s employees
would switch to more expensive health and pension plans also
administered by the Central States funds.
Considering the typical rise in health insurance costs, being
able to avoid premium increases for four years could result in
substantial savings to the Respondent. Also, by knowing its
health care costs for the next four years, management could
make a more informed estimate of its operating expenses, in-
formation it needed to make the most effective bid for the
Freightliner contract.
Additionally, the Union representatives came to Respondent
with another argument. They presented figures showing the
managers that they actually could reduce operating expenses by
switching to the Central States plan and eliminating the alterna-
tives. In other words, the Union representatives argued, it
would cost Respondent less to make the necessary contribu-
tions to the Central States health and pension plans than it
would cost to pay the Humana premiums, support the 401(k)
plans, and pay the yearly bonuses.
The Union’s argument fell on receptive ears. Respondent’s
president, Bruce Jackson, fervently wanted to win the Freight-
liner contract. Moreover, the record suggests that Jackson
faithfully practiced the art of positive thinking and, undoubt-
edly, this combination of zeal and confidence must have
brought success on numerous occasions. So it appears likely
that when the Union showed Jackson how he could reduce his
operating expenses and lock in health care expenditures in the
future, that knowledge gave him even more confidence that his
company would prevail in the bidding war.
The Union’s proposal appears to have made Jackson a con-
vert, at least for a time. Although once wary of the Central
States plans, he now embraced them for the help they could
provide his company at this critical time.
The record clearly shows that both he and the Union repre-
sentatives took the initial steps necessary for Respondent to
switch over to the Central States plans. These steps entailed
getting the employees to ratify the change, and getting the ap-
propriate arbitration committee to approve it.
The record is less clear on exactly what Respondent said to
the Union representatives. He testified that he agreed to the
Union’s proposal upon one condition, namely, that his com-
pany won the Freightliner contract.
Contradicting Jackson, a Union representative, Jimmy D.
Wright, testified that Jackson did not mention such a condition
at the time they negotiated the change, but only raised it much
later, after learning that his company had lost the bidding war
and would not be doing the Freightliner work.
In determining which witness to credit, it is helpful to exam-
ine the various events in the sequence they unfolded. The rele-
vant events actually began during the early period of the par-
ties’ bargaining relationship.
The Complaint alleges and the Respondent has admitted that
the Union has represented Respondent’s bargaining unit em-
ployees since 1980. The record indicates that sometime early
in the bargaining relationship, the Union and Respondent
agreed that the employees would remain under the company-
sponsored health and pension plans, and memorialized this
ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION CO. 431
agreement in a “local rider” to the collective-bargaining agree-
ment.
During the 1999 negotiations for a nationwide collective-
bargaining agreement, the Union committee proposed bringing
Respondent’s employees under the Central States plans, but the
Respondent would not agree. The Union then made a modified
demand, asking that Respondent raise its contributions to the
existing health and pension plans, so that those contributions
would be equivalent to payments other employers were making
under the National Agreement. The parties agreed, and this
proposal became part of the General Monetary Agreement on
June 2, 1999.
The Union later sought to negotiate with Respondent another
“local rider” to require Respondent to brings its employees into
the Central States plans. Respondent took the position that
language in the National Agreement precluded the parties from
bargaining at the local level. This language provided that no
subject matter “negotiated to conclusion and inserted into, de-
leted from or rejected in the National Master Agreement . . .
will be a proper subject for Local Rider negotiations unless
mutually agreed otherwise by the parties. . . .”
Ultimately, in February 2001, a Joint Arbitration Committee
held that Respondent’s position was correct, and that it did not
have to bargain about this matter during the term of the Na-
tional Agreement.
In late August or early September 2001, the Union made Re-
spondent the offer to sign a “local rider” locking in the com-
pany’s health insurance costs for five years, in return for Re-
spondent switching to the Central States health and pension
plans. Respondent’s president, Bruce Jackson and Local 71’s
president, Samuel M. Carter, discussed this offer on September
5, 2001 and the next day, Carter sent some of the paperwork to
Jackson by fax. Specifically, Carter faxed the “participation
agreements” which Respondent would enter into with the Cen-
tral States funds.
Jackson’s office is in Kenosha, Wisconsin. On October 5,
2001, Jackson and Respondent’s vice president of labor rela-
tions, Todd Barnum, flew to Charlotte, North Carolina to meet
with Union officials concerning this proposal. According to
Jackson, he explicitly told the Union officials that Respondent’s
willingness to sign the “local rider” was contingent upon it
keeping the Freightliner contract in Mt. Holly and acquiring the
Freightliner work performed by the competitor in Cleveland,
North Carolina. Jackson testified, in part, as follows:

We made it very clear that the bid was ongoing and that it
would be implemented, the first part, which was the health,
welfare and pension part, would be implemented based on our
getting and retaining the Mt. Holly business and getting the
Cleveland business.

The General Counsel’s only witness, Union Representative
Jimmy Wright, contradicted this testimony.
Respondent’s management did not sign the “local rider” it
received from the Union. However, Respondent did take nec-
essary steps to put this agreement into effect. On October 6,
2001, management discussed the change with its employees,
who approved the contemplated change in a ratification vote
that same day.
Before the “local rider” could become effective, it also had
to gain the approval of an arbitration committee established
under the National Agreement. On October 22, 2001, Respon-
dent sent by facsimile a request to the management and union
representatives of this committee, asking for the committee to
consider the “local rider” when it met during the week of Octo-
ber 29, 2001 at Hilton Head Island, South Carolina.
When the arbitration committee convened and considered the
request, Respondent’s President Jackson, Vice President Bar-
num and one other representative appeared and argued that the
“local rider” should be approved. No court reporter transcribed
this proceeding, but the Committee’s minutes include the fol-
lowing:

Bruce Jackson, Todd Barnum and Frank Prevatt appeared on
behalf of Active USA. They acknowledged both Local Union
71 and the Company have reached, after extensive negotia-
tions, an agreement whereby the Company’s existing private
health care and Company retirement plan will be replaced by
plans and benefits provided by the Central states Health and
Welfare and Pension Plan. This agreement has been reached
in conjunction with the Plan. The parties’ agreement was
submitted for approval and ratification by the affected Mt.
Holly employees which approved same on October 6, 2001.

The arbitration committee’s minutes, which reported a num-
ber of decisions it made concerning grievances and other mat-
ters, begin with the caveat that “The summary of discussion . . .
does not constitute or purport to be verbatim testimony of the
proceedings . . . . Material representations or facts submitted by
some or all of the involved parties may have been inadvertently
omitted from the summary of discussions.” However, I con-
clude that, at the very least, these minutes establish that Re-
spondent’s top management attended the arbitration committee
meeting and argued in favor of the “local rider.”
Respondent’s witnesses testified that Jackson did inform the
arbitration committee that the “local rider” would not take ef-
fect until and unless Respondent won the Freightliner contract.
The arbitration committee’s minutes do not indicate that Union
Representative Jimmy Wright, the General Counsel’s sole wit-
ness in this proceeding, attended the committee meeting.
Rather, another Union representative, who did not testify in the
present case, attended the committee meeting on behalf of the
Union.
The arbitration committee’s minutes do not indicate that Re-
spondent’s representatives told the committee that the “local
rider” was contingent upon Respondent being awarded the
Freightliner work. Considering the brevity of these minutes,
and the disclaimer appearing on them, the minutes do not rule
out that possibility.
By November 1, 2001, Respondent had received a good in-
dication that it would not win the Freightliner contract. By
facsimile on that date, Respondent’s president sent Union Rep-
resentative Wright a letter stating the following:

While Active Transportation has yet to receive official notifi-
cation of the National Joint Arbitration Committee’s decision
regarding our rider change proposal in line with the change to
Central States Health, Welfare and Pension plan, this is to ad-
vise you that the implementation will be subsequent to
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 432
Freightliner’s decision in response to our latest proposal re-
garding Mt. Holly.

As you and I discussed on October 30, 2001, Freightliner re-
sponded to our proposal for Mt. Holly (in addition to Portland
and St. Thomas (CN)) that our proposal was not cost competi-
tive and gave us target prices. We responded October 30,
2001 and at this date do not have a specific timetable for a re-
sponse from Freightliner to date.

That same day, Union Representative Wright sent a reply by
facsimile to Jackson. It stated that some of Respondent’s em-
ployees were concerned that they would have no health insur-
ance, either through Humana or Central States, adding, with
underlined words, “We need to know just where we stand with
the Mt. Holly insurance coverage!” The Union’s letter contin-
ued as follows:

Our understanding was [that] the Central States plans
would go into effect on November 1, 2001, provided the
grievance committee approved the change in that local
rider item. I was told by Doc Conder there would be no
problem since both the Company and the Union has [sic]
agreed to the agreement.
If you plan to renege on our understanding about the
Central States plans, we certainly need assurance that the
Humana plan still covers the Mt. Holly employees. For
this reason, it is urgent that you contact us immediately re-
garding this matter.

The next day, Respondent posted a notice informing its em-
ployees that their Humana health insurance remained in effect.
It also sent a copy of this notice to the Union. The notice also
mentioned Freightliner’s negative letter and Respondent’s fur-
ther effort to obtain the Freightliner business. The notice then
stated, “As a result, the implementation of the Central States
Plan will be delayed pending Freightliner’s decision on our
counter-proposal.”
To determine whether Respondent orally conditioned im-
plementation of the “local rider” on its obtaining the Freight-
liner contract, parol evidence must be used. The rider itself
includes no reference to such a condition. Neither does Re-
spondent’s correspondence with the Union before November 1,
2001.
As already noted, the Union had sent Respondent the “par-
ticipation agreements” in early September 2001. On October
18, 2001, Respondent’s President Jackson gave copies of these
to the labor relations vice president. Jackson also gave Barnum
a memorandum with instructions pertaining to the participation
agreements. The memo asked Barnum to refer to these docu-
ments and do the following:

1. Please verify the numbers are what we agreed to.
2. Check with Human Resources to see if we are required to
give any notice to Humana to remove these employees from
that plan.
3. Determine if there are any issues of removing these em-
ployees from the 401K.
4. It appears the effective dates will have to be changed to co-
incide with November 1 or December 1 start date. This will
need to be communicated to Sam Carter.
5. The Local Rider will have to be changed to CLEARLY
stating that it is the intention of this agreement to not be sub-
jected to negotiations for anything other than the negotiated
increases until the expiration of the next contract that begins
on June 1, 2003 for a period to be determined by negotiation.

(Emphasis in original)

This memorandum does not mention or suggest that execu-
tion of the local rider would be contingent on Respondent win-
ning the Freightliner contract. No documents establish what
action, if any, Vice President Barnum took after receiving this
memo. For example, the record does not establish that Barnum
contacted the Union concerning the memorandum’s fifth para-
graph, which stated that changes were necessary in the “Local
Rider” agreement.
On October 19, 2001, Union Representative Wright signed a
document captioned “Agreement between Active Transporta-
tion Company and Teamsters Local Union No. 71, Local Rider
—Item 2.” This document concerned the changes in pension
and health insurance which the Union’s membership had ap-
proved on October 6, 2001, and which would go before the
arbitration committee later in October.
Respondent never signed this document. However, as al-
ready noted, three representatives of the Respondent, including
its president, attended the arbitration committee meeting at
Hilton Head Island to advocate that the committee approve the
“local rider.” It would seem somewhat unusual for the Re-
spondent’s president to travel from Wisconsin to South Caro-
lina to persuade the committee to approve an agreement if the
parties had not already agreed upon all the terms.
To the contrary, it appears more likely that Respondent had
seized on the “local rider” as a means of stabilizing costs, creat-
ing a “foothold” to use in climbing out of the slump caused by
the sudden loss of business in 2001. The record suggests that
business conditions had reached a desperate level, both because
of the 40 percent reduction in work and because Freightliner
might take away the work which Respondent had been per-
forming and assign that work to a competitor.
Considering this level of desperation, I conclude that it
would be unlikely for Respondent to inform the arbitration
committee that the agreement under consideration was merely
tentative. Respondent would not want to tell this committee
anything that could raise doubts about the agreement.
Moreover, the wording in Respondent’s November 1, 2001
letter to the Union persuades me that before this letter, Respon-
dent had never told the Union that agreement to the “local
rider” was contingent upon it receiving the Freightliner busi-
ness. Respondent’s November 1, 2001 letter announces this
condition by stating “this is to advise you that the implementa-
tion will be subsequent to Freightliner’s decision in response to
our latest proposal regarding Mt. Holly.”
Customarily, people do not use this phrase—“this is to ad-
vise you”—to inform someone else of a fact that person already
knows. Consider this hypothetical illustration: Suppose that a
woman sent her fiance a letter which began, “Dear John, this is
to advise you that we will not get married unless you are first
inoculated against rabies and distemper.” From this language,
ACTIVE TRANSPORTATION CO. 433
it appears pretty likely that the writer is stating a new require-
ment, not something previously discussed.
If the hypothetical engaged couple had reached agreement on
this subject earlier, or had even discussed it, the letter would
not begin, “this is to advise you . . . .” Rather, it would start
“As we previously discussed” or even better, “As you previ-
ously agreed . . . .”
Perhaps it might begin with more tactful language, such as
“John, do you remember how concerned I was that time you
were frothing at the mouth. . . .” In any event, the letter’s
prefatory remarks would not suggest the announcement of a
new fact but would either allude to previous discussion or at
least be silent on that subject. The phrase “this is to advise
you” makes sense only if the writer believes he is telling the
reader something new.
Considering the stated reason for Respondent’s November 1,
2001 letter to the Union, namely, to advise the Union of this
condition, I cannot conclude that Respondent had raised the
subject with the Union earlier. Jackson testified that his secre-
tary may have sent the Union this letter while he was enroute
back from the arbitration committee meeting in South Carolina.
However, there is no reason to conclude that the secretary
would send a letter over Jackson’s signature if he had not first
told the secretary what to say. Indeed, Jackson also testified
that when he notified employees that their Humana health in-
surance remained in effect, he dictated the notice to his secre-
tary, who had it printed and distributed.
Moreover, I do not rely solely on the wording of this No-
vember 1, 2001 letter in concluding that before this date, Re-
spondent had not informed the Union that execution or imple-
mentation of the local rider would be conditioned on some
other event. No letter or fax to the Union either mentioned or
even alluded to such a condition.
Certainly, the Respondent must have told the Union about its
difficulties. It appears beyond doubt that Respondent had de-
scribed to the Union its precarious situation with the Freight-
liner account. But describing how Respondent would be hurt if
it did not win the contract is quite different from expressly con-
ditioning an agreement on that event.
This distinction may be illustrated by an excerpt from Jack-
son’s testimony concerning his appearance before the arbitra-
tion committee and what the Respondent’s representatives told
the committee. When asked if there had been any discussion in
the Respondent’s presentation concerning when the local rider
would become effective, Jackson gave this answer:
Well, in my part of the presentation, I talked to the reason
that we made this agreement, and we made sure that the panel
understood that there was a bid going on, and part of the proc-
ess on the bid, you know, was trying to lock in some costs.
This answer does not establish that Jackson told the arbitra-
tion committee that the local rider was subject to a condition
precedent. Indeed, it does not even disclose what he told the
committee about when the local rider would take effect, which
was the information the questioner sought.
It concerns me that the witness was trying to sidestep the
question, or perhaps create the impression that he told the
committee about such a condition even though his testimony
really stops short of making such a statement. This testimony
may reflect a more general tendency to try to finesse issues
rather than meeting them squarely.
Another example appears in Jackson’s November 1, 2001
letter to the Union representative. Respondent has taken the
position in this proceeding that both the Union and manage-
ment representatives had agreed that the local rider would be
subject to a condition precedent, namely, that Respondent re-
tained Freightliner’s work at Mt. Holly and acquired its work at
Cleveland, North Carolina. However, the November 1 letter
does not come out and say as much. Rather, Jackson writes:

. . . . this is to advise you that the implementation will be sub-
sequent to Freightliner’s decision in response to our latest pro-
posal regarding Mt. Holly.

This statement falls short of declaring that the agreement
they had just negotiated was subject to a condition precedent.
Indeed, it falls short of saying that if Respondent did not re-
ceive the Freightliner business it would not implement the local
rider. Literally, Respondent’s words indicate that it would
implement the local rider after Freightliner made a decision one
way or the other and, presumably, regardless of whether that
decision gave Respondent the contract.
If the Respondent is unwilling even to tell the Union, in plain
words, that the agreement is subject to a condition precedent,
then I am certainly not going to find that to be the case. At
most, the evidence may support a conclusion that when Jackson
and Barnum made statements to the Union about the company’s
serious financial problems and the importance of the Freight-
liner business, they may have believed such statements com-
municated that they were conditioning the agreement on a con-
dition precedent. On the other hand, they may have felt it more
convenient—and safer—to use vague and ambiguous language
rather than plain talk.
In this situation, however, vague and ambiguous language
does not suffice. If a party seeks to condition an agreement on
the happening of some event, it must explicitly make the other
party aware of such a condition.
It would appear quite likely that if Respondent insisted upon
such a material condition, it would have referred to the condi-
tion in correspondence with the Union. Likewise, if Respon-
dent had brought up such a condition during negotiations, it
appears likely that the Union would have made some mention
of it when corresponding with Respondent.
Should this correspondence between the Union and the com-
pany be considered a kind of fossil record, bearing witness to
what happened, then I must conclude that the claimed condition
precedent appeared spontaneously, a whole new species, on
November 1, 2001. The claimed condition precedent affected a
very important matter, namely, the date when and if the agree-
ment would take effect. A matter that important would excite
more communication between the parties than the documents
reflect.
Therefore, I reject the testimony of Respondent’s witnesses
and instead credit that of Business Representative Wright.
Based on this testimony, I conclude that Respondent did not,
during negotiation of the local rider, condition its execution or
implementation on its winning the Freightliner contract.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 434
The question remains as to whether Respondent and the Un-
ion reached a total agreement. The October 18, 2001 memo-
randum from President Jackson to Vice President Barnum indi-
cated that Jackson wanted some changes. However, I do not
view these changes as material alterations in the understanding
reached by the parties but rather as clarifications of language to
assure that the document reflected the meeting of the minds and
that the negotiated changes actually were implemented.
One item in Jackson’s October 18, 2001 memo does state
that it appears the effective dates will have to be changed to
coincide with November 1 or December 1 start date. However,
I do not read this observation as an indication that the parties
had not reached agreement as to dates. Because of the events
of September 11, 2001, there already had been some delay, and
it appears that changing the effective date by one month was
agreeable to all parties.
Additionally, by the time Respondent’s officials appeared
before the arbitration committee less than two weeks later, it is
clear that they were submitting to the committee a complete
agreement for approval.
Incidentally, it may be noted that the particular item regard-
ing effective dates, appearing in numbered paragraph 3 of Jack-
son’s October 18, 2001 memo, makes a statement inconsistent
with the position later taken by Respondent, namely, that the
agreement would not be effective until Freightliner made a
decision on awarding its contract.
In sum, I conclude that Respondent and the Union reached
agreement on all material terms of the “local rider,” but Re-
spondent later refused to execute it.
Section 8(d) of the Act includes, within the definition of the
duty to bargain collectively, the requirement that the parties
execute a written contract incorporating any agreement reached
if requested by either party. Respondent has not satisfied this
obligation. Therefore, I conclude that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act as alleged in the Complaint.
When the transcript of this proceeding has been prepared, I
will issue a Certification which attaches as an appendix the
portion of the transcript reporting this bench decision. This
Certification also will include provisions relating to the Find-
ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Remedy, Order and Notice.
When that Certification is served upon the parties, the time
period for filing an appeal will begin to run.
Counsel in this proceeding demonstrated great professional-
ism and civility, which I truly appreciate. The hearing is
closed.