Abbott Northwestern Hospital

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Oct 29, 2004

343 N.L.R.B. 498 (N.L.R.B. 2004)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
343 NLRB No. 67
498
Allina Health System d/b/a Abbott Northwestern
Hospital and Minnesota Nurses Association
Allina Health System d/b/a Mercy Hospital and Min-
nesota Nurses Association
North Memorial Healthcare d/b/a North Memorial
Medical Center and Minnesota Nurses Associa-
tion
Methodist Hospital, Park Nicollett Health Services
and Minnesota Nurses Association
Healtheast d/b/a Healtheast Care System and Minne-
sota Nurses Association
Allina Health System d/b/a Unity Hospital and Min-
nesota Nurses Association
Allina Health System d/b/a United Hospital and Min-
nesota Nurses Association. Cases 18–CA–16051–
1, –2, –9, –10, –11, –12, and –13
October 29, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN BATTISTA AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND MEISBURG
On August 2, 2002, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam J. Pannier III issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents filed exceptions and a brief in support of those
exceptions. The General Counsel filed a brief in opposi-
tion to the Respondents’ exceptions and cross-exceptions
and a brief in support of those cross-exceptions. The
Charging Party filed a brief in support of the judge’s de-
cision. The Respondents filed a reply brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs1 and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings, and conclusions, as
modified below, and to adopt the recommended Order as
modified and set forth in full below.2
I.
The Minnesota Nurses Association (the Union) has
represented nurses for decades at Abbott Northwestern
Hospital, Mercy Hospital, North Memorial Medical Cen-
ter, Methodist Hospital, United Hospital, HealthEast
Care System, and Fairview (Fairview Riverdale and
Fairview Southdale). Generally, each hospital is a single

1 The Respondents have requested oral argument. The request is de-
nied as the record, exceptions, and briefs adequately present the issues
and the positions of the parties.
2 We shall modify the judge’s recommended Order in accordance
with Ferguson Electric, 335 NLRB 142 (2001), and to conform to the
violations found. We shall also substitute Apps. B, C, E, F, and G to
conform to our Order.
bargaining unit. However, for many years, the hospitals
negotiated with the Union as part of a multiemployer
bargaining group.
Nurses in the Minneapolis area commonly worked for
more than one hospital. Because of the severe nursing
shortage, all the hospitals were chronically understaffed.
In order to deal with the shortage, the hospitals all util-
ized temporary nurses from staffing agencies. Many
nurses who were regularly employed at one hospital
would register with a staffing agency to pick up addi-
tional shifts at other hospitals.
In preparation for the 2001 negotiations, all of the hos-
pitals abandoned the multiemployer bargaining group
format. Instead, the hospitals formulated a coordinated
bargaining plan. Included in the coordinated bargaining
was Unity Hospital, whose nurses were not organized.3
Pursuant to this plan, the hospitals bargained separately,
but closely coordinated their strategy. They formed an
advisory committee through which they shared informa-
tion and formulated common goals for the negotiations.
The goal of their strategy was to obtain common results,
especially on economic issues. Each hospital, however,
remained free to settle on individual terms.
The members of the advisory committee agreed to help
each other withstand a strike, if one occurred. As part of
their common strategy, the advisory committee members
agreed that if the Union struck any of them, the other
members would refuse to employ any of the striking
nurses during the strike.4
The hospitals negotiated separately with the Union
during the spring of 2001. In mid-May, North Memorial
signed an agreement with the Union. The agreement
included a “me-too clause” on wages. Pursuant to the
“me-too clause,” North Memorial agreed to match the
highest wage rate agreed to by any of the other hospitals.
The Union gave notice to Abbott Northwestern, Mercy,
Methodist, HealthEast, United, and Fairview of its intent
to strike. By the strike deadline, all the hospitals but
Fairview had reached agreements with the Union. The
agreements (including the one at North Memorial) all
included no-strike/no-lockout clauses. In addition, they
did not provide for wage re-openers. The Union com-
menced a strike at Fairview on June 3.
Following the onset of the strike, the hospitals, includ-
ing Unity, contacted their temporary staffing agencies
and instructed them not to refer for temporary assign-

3 Unity, along with Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, and United, are Al-
lina hospitals.
4 There is no allegation that this common strategy was unlawful.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 499
ments any striking Fairview nurses.5 A number of Fair-
view nurses contacted temporary staffing agencies fol-
lowing the commencement of the strike. The temporary
agencies repeatedly told the applicants that they could
not place any striking nurses who did not meet the 3-
month tenure criterion.
The temporary agencies sent several striking nurses on
assignments during the strike who did not meet the 3-
month criterion. The hospitals refused to allow the strik-
ing nurses to work. The hospitals sent them home and
threatened to fire the temporary agencies that supplied
them in contravention of the hospitals’ policy. At least
one nurse applied directly to a hospital for work during
the strike. The hospital required, as a condition of em-
ployment, that the nurse present proof that he had re-
signed from Fairview.
II.
The complaint alleged that the Respondents violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by refusing to consider
or hire for temporary employment nurses employed by
Fairview because they were on strike and by informing
nurses employed by Fairview that they would not hire
them because they were on strike.
The judge found that the Respondents’ refusal to em-
ploy the striking nurses solely because they were on
strike violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). He rejected the
Respondents’argument that their refusals to hire were
lawful because they were not based on any antiunion
animus, but rather were for the purpose of supporting
their coordinated bargaining partner and advancing their
own economic interests. The judge found that the Re-
spondents were motivated by antiunion animus. The
judge then made individual findings regarding each al-
leged act of discrimination.
The Respondents except, contending that because their
policy of refusing to hire striking nurses constituted a
legitimate economic weapon, the judge erred in finding it
unlawful absent a finding of an unlawful intent. The
Respondents argue that they were not motivated by anti-
union animus. Instead, they contend that their only in-
terest in adopting their refusal-to-hire policy was to en-
gender a favorable economic outcome, akin to employers
who lock out their employees. The Respondents also
except to several of the judge’s specific 8(a)(3) findings.
They assert that the judge erroneously failed to require
that the General Counsel affirmatively prove that the
alleged discriminatees would have accepted employment
had it been offered.

5 If a striking nurse worked at a given hospital on a regular basis dur-
ing the past 3 months, the nurse could continue to work for the hospital
on that basis.
For the following reasons, we affirm the judge’s find-
ing that the Respondents’ refusal to hire the striking ap-
plicants violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Conse-
quently, we also affirm the judge’s finding that the Re-
spondents violated Section 8(a)(1) by informing the
Fairview nurses that they would not hire them because
they were on strike. We find merit, however, in some of
the Respondents’exceptions regarding individual allega-
tions of discrimination and dismiss the corresponding
complaint allegations.
III.
Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an
employer to engage in “discrimination with regard to hire
or tenure of employment . . . to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization.” As described,
the Respondents readily admit that they refused to con-
sider for hire or hire the Fairview nurses because they
were on strike, and, indeed, the Respondents expressly
told the nurses as much.
The Respondents, however, have raised the defense
that their admitted discrimination against the Fairview
strikers did not violate the Act because it was motivated
only by a desire to support their coordinated-bargaining
partners and to protect their economic interests. We find
no merit in the Respondents’ argument, for the following
reasons.
As the judge did, we consider the Respondents’ argu-
ment under NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S.
26, 32 (1967). There, the Supreme Court held that “once
it has been proved that the employer engaged in dis-
criminatory conduct which could have adversely affected
employee rights to some extent, the burden is on the em-
ployer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate
objectives.” 388 U.S. at 34 (emphasis in original).
Here, the Respondents’ admitted refusal to consider
for hire or hire the Fairview nurses because they were
engaged in a protected strike clearly “could have ad-
versely affected employee rights to some extent.” It
therefore was the Respondents’ burden to establish that
they had a legitimate and substantial business justifica-
tion for their conduct. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer
Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380–381 (1967). The Respondents
failed to carry this burden.
The Respondents, joined by our dissenting colleague,
claim that they had a legitimate and substantial business
justification for their conduct based on the possibility
that, had the Respondents employed the striking Fairview
nurses, the nurses might have been able to remain on
strike for a longer period of time and thereby might have
been able to negotiate higher wage rates at Fairview.
The Respondents posit that, had this chain of events
played out, it would have adversely affected their ability
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD500
to retain or hire nurses at lower contract rates, particu-
larly given the nursing shortage in the relevant labor
market. Under these circumstances, the Respondents
contend, they were justified in refusing to hire the Fair-
view strikers, analogizing their conduct to a lockout un-
der American Ship Building v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300
(1965).
We reject this analogy and find that the Respondents’
asserted concerns do not constitute a legitimate and sub-
stantial business justification for their discrimination
against the Fairview nurses. Whatever the Respondents’
legitimate economic interests were, they had been re-
solved through collective bargaining with the Union.
The Respondents were not parties to the labor dispute
between Fairview and the Union. The unionized Re-
spondents freely abandoned multiemployer bargaining
with the Union in favor of individual bargaining.6 Each
unionized Respondent thereby limited the scope of its
dispute with the Union to their bilateral negotiations, and
each successfully concluded its negotiations with the
Union.
The only purpose of the Respondents’ refusal to hire
the striking Fairview nurses at that point was to influence
the outcome of the ongoing dispute between Fairview
and the Union. In effect, the Respondents expanded this
bilateral labor dispute by introducing a new front of eco-
nomic warfare. This conduct cannot be reconciled with
the Act’s objective of encouraging collective bargaining
to reduce industrial strife.
This point is highlighted in David Friedland Painting
Co., 158 NLRB 571 (1966), enfd. 377 F.2d 983 (3d Cir.
1967). There, the Board adopted the judge’s decision
finding that the respondent unlawfully laid-off union-
represented employees because their sister local union
had struck an association (of which the respondent was
not a member) of the respondent’s competitors. In so
doing, the Board rejected the respondent’s claim that its
actions were justified because it could be affected eco-
nomically by the outcome of the contract negotiations
between the association and the sister local union:
Respondent was seeking to intrude in a labor dispute
not its own, involving a union other than the one with
which it was then in an untroubled relationship, for the
reason that a settlement of the labor dispute favorable
to that union could have an economic effect upon it.
To allow this collateral or indirect interest in a labor
dispute to be deemed a legitimate business interest suf-
ficient to serve as justification for a lockout of Respon-
dent’s own employees is to arrive at a far-reaching re-
sult never intended by the Supreme Court in American

6 Respondent Unity did not have a relationship with the Union at all.
Ship Building. It would lead to a proliferation of the
use of the lockout so as to render it lawful in any situa-
tion where the employer making use of it against mem-
bers of a certain union could arguably be affected eco-
nomically by the outcome of particular negotiations be-
tween that union and another employer. It would be an
invitation to industrial chaos rather than to industrial
stability which the Act is designed to foster (emphasis
added).
David Friedland Painting, 158 NLRB at 578. If permitted,
the Respondents’ use of economic weapons to influence the
dispute between Fairview and the Union would lead to a
similarly unacceptable expansion of labor disputes at the
expense of industrial stability.
If the Respondent hospitals (other than nonunion
Unity) wanted to protect themselves from the conse-
quences of what any other area hospital might agree to, a
mechanism existed (and, with the Union’s consent, still
exists) that would allow them to accomplish what they
wanted in terms of mutual self-protection. The Respon-
dents had only to remain in their longstanding multiem-
ployer bargaining relationship with the Union, but each
of them deliberately chose to withdraw from the mul-
tiemployer unit in the period from 1995 to 1998, thus,
creating the competitive individual bargaining situation
from which the Respondents now seek relief. This is one
more reason not to permit their dispute-widening conduct
here, even if motivated by common economic concerns.7
We disagree with our dissenting colleague’s view that
the Union was responsible for expansion of the Fairview
labor dispute because the striking employees sought jobs
with the Respondents. The Union did not use any eco-
nomic weapons against the Respondents. The Fairview
strikers asked only that the Respondents treat them in a
nondiscriminatory fashion, as required by Section
8(a)(3).8 If hired, their income could well have permitted
them to remain on strike longer, possibly facilitating a
settlement more favorable to the Union, but this potential
effect falls far short of proving that the Union expanded
its dispute with Fairview to encompass the Respondents.

7 Cf. Longshoremen ILA (Lykes Bros. Steamship Co.), 181 NLRB
590 (1971), enfd. 443 F.2d 218 (1971), where the Board found several
union respondents violated Sec. 8(b)(3), after they reached agreement
for multiemployer bargaining units of longshoremen, by continuing to
strike and refusing to sign the new contract until the employers reached
agreement on a contract for a separate unit of clerks and checkers. The
refusal to hire by the Respondent hospitals in this case represents a
comparable effort to extend their bargaining power and influence be-
yond the bounds of the established bargaining units.
8 Contrary to our dissenting colleague’s suggestion, the Respondents
would not have been “helping” the Union. The Respondents would
only have been complying with Federal labor law by refraining from
disadvantaging the strikers because of their protected union activity.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 501
More importantly, the dissent’s argument has no obvious
limitation. Although this case involves employers in a
coordinated bargaining group, the dissent’s logic would
effectively permit any employer, or at least any employer
who reasonably feared an adverse impact on its business
as the result of another employer’s higher wage settle-
ment with a union, to discriminate against job applicants
solely because they were engaged in a protected eco-
nomic strike against that other employer.9 We cannot
reconcile this result with the Act’s prohibition of dis-
crimination against persons who engage in protected
concerted activity, including a lawful economic strike.
In addition, we find the use of the refusal to hire, as an
economic weapon cannot be condoned as legitimate in
the absence of negotiations between the Respondents and
the Union.10 The Respondents were not members with
Fairview of a multiemployer bargaining group, were not
engaged in collective bargaining with the Union at the
time they refused to consider or hire the Fairview nurses,
and were not subject to the threat that the Union could
strike or use other economic weaponry against them with
respect to wages or other issues in the Fairview negotia-
tions. Of course, Unity’s employees were not even rep-
resented by the Union.
The Respondents contend they are entitled to wield an
economic weapon even though not in support of any bar-
gaining position taken by them in negotiations with the
Union. We disagree. While the Supreme Court has ad-

9 See David Friedland Painting Co., supra. We disagree with our
colleague that the cited case is not controlling because it was decided
before the Board’s decision in Harter Equipment, where the Board held
that the employer lawfully locked out and temporarily replaced its
employees in support of the employer’s position in a bargaining dispute
with the union representative of those employees. The Board applied
principles articulated by the Supreme Court in American Ship Building
Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278
(1965); and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963). Each
of those cases involved Board consideration of an asserted legitimate
employer interest in defense of an action that had a discriminatory
impact on the exercise of protected concerted activity. See also NLRB
v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87 (1957). The
employer in David Friedland Painting relied on these cases in defense
of its lockout, and both the Board and the third circuit found them to be
distinguishable because the employer was not in bargaining negotia-
tions and was not concerned about advancing its own bargaining posi-
tion. Nothing in Harter Equipment suggests that this distinction is no
longer valid.
10 Our dissenting colleague asserts that under Harter Equipment, 280
NLRB 597, 600 fn. 9 (1986), affd. sub nom. Operating Engineers
Local 825 v. NLRB, 829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987), the Respondents must
only establish that their justification was nonfrivolous. However,
Harter Equipment only applied its nonfrivolous standard to the “sub-
stantial” aspect of the Great Dane test. Thus, an asserted justification
may be substantial but still not cognizable as “legitimate.” Here, as
discussed above, the Respondents’ justification contravenes statutory
policy by threatening disruption of labor relations stability and the
collective-bargaining process and, thereby, is not legitimate.
monished that the Board cannot function “as an arbiter of
the sort of economic weapons the parties can use in seek-
ing to gain acceptance of their bargaining demands,”11
“the Board is only forbidden to pass judgment on a par-
ticular economic weapon if that weapon is ‘used in sup-
port of genuine negotiations.’”12 As previously stated,
none of the Respondents were engaged in negotiations
with the Union and they had no bargaining positions to
support. In individual contracts for separate bargaining
units, the Respondents and the Union reached agreement
on wages and other terms and conditions of employment,
without reservation of the right to reopen negotiations in
the event the Union and another employer negotiated
higher wage rates. We find the Respondents, having
concluded their own negotiations, have no legitimate
justification for disrupting the peaceful relations thereby
established with the Union by using the refusal-to-hire
weapon to coerce the Union and its employee supporters
in negotiations with another employer.13

11 American Ship Building v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965), quot-
ing from NLRB v. Insurance Agents (Prudential Insurance Co.), 361
U.S. 477, 497 (1960).
12 Daily News of Los Angeles v. NLRB, 73 F.3d 406, 414 (D.C. Cir.
1996), quoting from NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) (emphasis
added by D.C. Cir.). See also Highland Superstores, Inc., 314 NLRB
146 (1994) (employer lockout unlawful because taken in retaliation
against protected handbilling rather than in support of employer’s bar-
gaining position).
13 Cf. Standard Oil Co., 137 NLRB 690 (1962), enfd. 322 F.2d 40
(6th Cir. 1963), where the Board held that respondent unions in coordi-
nated bargaining with Standard Oil violated Sec. 8(b)(3) by refusing to
sign negotiated agreements at plants in Cleveland and Lima, Ohio, until
the employer and one of the unions reached final agreement at a Toledo
plant. The Board found that the unions had imported an extraneous
issue (the Toledo bargaining) into the previously concluded bargaining
situations at the Cleveland and Lima plants, much like the Respondent
hospitals in this case have done by making the Fairview negotiations an
issue after concluding their own negotiations with the Union. We note
that the Sixth Circuit, in agreeing with the Board in Standard Oil, re-
jected the unions’ reliance on Insurance Agents with the following
observation: “In that case it was claimed that the union sponsored
concerted on-the-job activities by its members of a harassing nature to
interfere with the employer’s business for the purpose of putting eco-
nomic pressure on the employer to accede to the union’s demands. The
court held that economic pressure of this nature was not inconsistent
with good-faith bargaining between the employer and the union. These
harassing activities were going on during bargaining between the em-
ployer and the union. They involved the parties to the negotiations and
not parties negotiating on a separate contract.” 322 F.2d at 45 (empha-
sis added).
Our dissenting colleague argues that the Respondents’ agreement not
to hire strikers was lawful at its inception and, therefore, its implemen-
tation must be lawful. The lawfulness of the agreement at its inception,
when all members of the coordinated bargaining group were beginning
negotiations and faced the possibility of selective strike actions by the
Union, is not at issue here. We address only the legality of the Respon-
dents’ refusal to hire after they completed their own separate negotia-
tions and entered into contracts containing no-strike provisions with the
Union.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD502
We emphasize the limited nature of our decision in this
case. Today, we hold only that employers who, like the
Respondents, are not involved in collective bargaining
may not violate the Section 7 rights of individuals who
are engaged in a strike against another employer who is
engaged in collective bargaining, where the substantial
and legitimate interest asserted is an interest in the terms
and conditions agreed to by the other employer. To hold
otherwise would endorse the expansion of labor disputes
and the accompanying use of economic weapons in an
unprecedented manner.14
Having found that the Respondents failed to prove a
substantial and legitimate justification for their discrimi-
natory refusal-to-hire or consider-for-hire striking Fair-
view nurses, there is no need to reach the issue whether
this discriminatory policy was “inherently destructive”
within the meaning of Great Dane. For the foregoing
reasons, we agree with the judge that the policy violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
IV.
The Respondents, in the alternative, argue that even if
their categorical refusal to consider or hire the striking
Fairview nurses was unlawful, they have valid defenses
specific to several of the discriminatees. We find merit
to several of the Respondents’ exceptions.15
We reverse the judge and dismiss the allegation that
Respondent United unlawfully refused to consider or hire
Christine Navratil. The record shows that Navratil only
applied for positions through the Nursefinders temporary
agency and that United did not use Nursefinders to place
temporary nurses during the relevant time period. Simi-
larly, we reverse the judge and dismiss the allegations
that Respondents United, Mercy, and Unity unlawfully
refused to consider or hire Gwen Friedlund because the
record shows that Friedlund only applied for positions
through the Firstat temporary agency and that United,
Mercy, and Unity did not use Firstat during the relevant
time period.
We also reverse the judge’s finding that Respondent
North Memorial unlawfully refused to consider or hire
Diane Fischer. The complaint does not allege this viola-
tion. We also reverse the judge and dismiss the allega-

14 Because of the facts of this case, and the arguments made by the
General Counsel and the Respondent, we need not address here
whether an employer, in a situation like the Respondents’ could articu-
late an interest which, although aligned with the interest of the struck
employer, was not inextricably intertwined with the terms and condi-
tions to be agreed to in collective bargaining by the struck employer.
Here, the Respondents’ avowed reason for its discriminatory conduct
was so inextricably intertwined.
15 We also find merit in the General Counsel’s exception to the
judge’s apparently inadvertent failure to find unlawful Respondent
HealthEast’s refusal to consider or hire Cheryl Grote.
tion that North Memorial unlawfully refused to consider
or hire Charlenea Bryant-Wolf. The record shows that
shortly before Bryant-Wolf was scheduled to work a shift
at North Memorial, the temporary agency that had se-
cured the shift for her informed her that North Memorial
had cancelled her shift. There is no evidence in the re-
cord that North Memorial cancelled Bryant-Wolf’s shift
because she was a striker or that anyone at North Memo-
rial even knew that the temporary agency had referred a
striker. Moreover, when the temporary agency immedi-
ately offered Bryant-Wolf additional shifts at North Me-
morial, she refused them. At the hearing, Bryant-Wolf
admitted that she was not particularly interested in work-
ing during the strike. Accordingly, the General Counsel
failed to prove that North Memorial refused to hire Bry-
ant-Wolf because she was a striker.16
ORDER
A. Respondent Allina Health System d/b/a Abbott
Northwestern Hospital, Minneapolis, Minnesota, its offi-
cers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) Refusing to consider for temporary employment,
refusing to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise
discriminating against Leslie Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund,
Allison Pennington Haddon, Lorrie LaForge, or any
other employee because of participation in a strike in
support of the bargaining proposals and positions of
Minnesota Nurses Association, or any other labor or-
ganization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Leslie Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund, Allison
Pennington Haddon, and Lorrie L. LaForge whole for
any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a re-
sult of the discrimination against them, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents all payroll records, social

16 Bryant-Wolf’s testimony that she was not really interested in
working during the strike also requires that we reverse the judge and
dismiss the allegation that Respondent HealthEast unlawfully refused to
hire Bryant-Wolf.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 503
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the refusals to consider for
temporary employment and the refusals to hire for tem-
porary employment Leslie Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund,
Allison Pennington Haddon, and Lorrie L. LaForge dur-
ing June 2001, and within 3 days thereafter notify each
of them in writing that this has been done and that those
refusals to consider for temporary employment and tem-
porarily hire will not be used against any of them in any
way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Minneapolis, Minnesota office and place of business,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix A”17
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 18, after being signed by its duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by Allina
Health System d/b/a Abbott Northwestern Hospital and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by it to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, it has gone out of
business or closed its Minneapolis office and place of
business, Allina Health System d/b/a Abbott Northwest-
ern Hospital shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense,
copies of the notice to all current employees and former
employees employed by it at its Minneapolis office and
place of business at any time since June 6, 2001.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Maxim Healthcare
Services, Intellistaff Healthcare, and Firstat Nursing Ser-
vices, if willing, at all locations where notices to their
employees are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–1 be, and it
hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not found herein.

17 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
B. Respondent Allina Health System d/b/a Mercy
Hospital, Coon Rapids, Minnesota, its officers, agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) Refusing to consider for temporary employment,
refusing to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise
discriminating against Rebecca Wegner or any other em-
ployee because of participation in a strike in support of
the bargaining proposals and positions of Minnesota
Nurses Association, or any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Rebecca Wegner whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits suffered as a result of the dis-
crimination against her, in the manner set forth in the
remedy section of this decision.
(b) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the refusal to consider for
temporary employment and the refusal to hire for tempo-
rary employment Rebecca Wegner, and within 3 days
thereafter, notify Wegner in writing that this has been
done and that the refusal to consider for temporary em-
ployment and temporarily hire will not be used against
her in any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Coon Rapids, Minnesota office and place of business,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix B.”18
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 18, after being signed by its duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by Allina
Health System d/b/a Mercy Hospital and maintained for
60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including all
places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure

18 See fn. 17, infra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD504
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
another material. In the event that, during the pendency
of these proceedings, it has gone out of business or
closed its Coon Rapids office and place of business, Al-
lina Health System, d/b/a Mercy Hospital shall duplicate
and mail, at its own expense, copies of the notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by it
at its Coon Rapids office and place of business at any
time since June 4, 2001.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Favorite Nurses-
Favorite Temps and Nursefinders, if willing, at all loca-
tions where notices to their employees are customarily
posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–2 be, and it
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
found herein.
C. Respondent North Memorial Healthcare d/b/a North
Memorial Medical Center, Robbinsdale, Minnesota, its
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) Refusing to consider for temporary employment,
refusing to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise
discriminating against Marie Madsen, Kathy Smedstad,
Laura Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller, Christine
Navratil, Allison Pennington Haddon, or any other em-
ployee because of participation in a strike in support of
the bargaining proposals and positions of Minnesota
Nurses Association, or any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Marie Madsen, Kathy Smedstad, Laura
Scherman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller, Christine Navratil,
and Allison Pennington Haddon whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the refusals to consider for
temporary employment and the refusals to hire for tem-
porary employment Marie Madsen, Kathy Smedstad,
Laura Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller, Christine
Navratil, and Allison Pennington Haddon, and within 3
days thereafter, notify each of them in writing that this
has been done and that the refusals to consider for tem-
porary employment and temporarily hire will not be used
against any of them in any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Robbinsdale, Minnesota office and place of business,
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix C.”19
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 18, after being signed by its duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by North Me-
morial Healthcare d/b/a North Memorial Medical Center
and maintained for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous
places including all places where notices to employees
are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken
by it to ensure that the notices are not altered, defaced, or
covered by any other material. In the event that, during
the pendency of these proceedings, it has gone out of
business or closed its Robbinsdale office and place of
business, North Memorial Healthcare d/b/a North Memo-
rial Medical Center shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, copies of the notice to all current employees
and former employees employed by it at its Robbinsdale
office and place of business at any time since May 25,
2001.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by VitaSTAFF Nursing
Services, Professional Resources Network, Nursefinders,
and Firstat Nursing Services, if willing, at all locations
where notices to their employees are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–9 be, and it
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
found herein.

19 See fn. 17, infra.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 505
D. Respondent Methodist Hospital, Park Nicollet
Health Services, St. Louis Park, Minnesota, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) Refusing to consider for temporary employment,
refusing to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise
discriminating against William Weber, Teresa Weiden-
bacher, Kathy Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary
Hanger, Ed Moeller, Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, Allison
Pennington Haddon, or any other employee because of
participation in a strike in support of the bargaining pro-
posals or positions of Minnesota Nurses Association, or
any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make William Weber, Teresa Weidenbacher,
Kathy Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary Hanger,
Ed Moeller, Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, and Allison
Pennington Haddon whole for any loss of earnings and
other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy sec-
tion of this decision.
(b) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the refusals to consider for
temporary employment and the refusals to hire for tem-
porary employment William Weber, Teresa Weiden-
bacher, Kathy Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary
Hanger, Ed Moeller, Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, and
Allison Pennington Haddon, and within 3 days thereafter
notify each of them in writing that this has been done and
that the refusals to consider for temporary employment
and temporarily hire will not be used against any of them
in any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its St. Louis Park, Minnesota office and place of business
copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix D.”20
Copies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional
Director for Region 18, after being signed by its duly
authorized representative, shall be posted by Methodist
Hospital, Park Nicollett Health Services and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pend-
ency of these proceedings, it has gone out of business or
closed its St. Louis Park office and place of business,
Methodist Hospital, Park Nicollett Health Services shall
duplicate and mail, at its own expense, copies of the no-
tice to all current employees and former employees em-
ployed by it at its St. Louis Park office and place of busi-
ness at any time since June 7, 2001.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Intrepid U.S.A. Inc.
d/b/a/ New Horizons Home Care and Nursing Services,
VitaSTAFF Nursing Services, Professional Resources
Network, Nursefinders, and Firstat Nursing Services, if
willing, at all locations where notices to their employees
are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
E. Respondent HealthEast d/b/a HealthEast Care Sys-
tem, Maplewood and St. Paul, Minnesota, its officers,
agents, successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) Refusing to consider for temporary employment,
refusing to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise
discriminating against Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington
Haddon, Stephanie Schaan, Cheryl Grote, or any other
employee because of participation in a strike in support
of the bargaining proposals and positions of Minnesota
Nurses Association, or any other labor organization.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Make Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington Haddon,
Stephanie Schaan, and Cheryl Grote whole for any loss

20 See fn. 17, infra.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD506
of earnings and other benefits suffered as a result of the
discrimination against them, in the manner set forth in
the remedy section of this decision.
(b) Preserve, and within 14 days of a request, or such
additional time as the Regional Director may allow for
good cause shown, provide at a reasonable place desig-
nated by the Board or its agents all payroll records, social
security payment records, timecards, personnel records
and reports, and all other records, including an electronic
copy of the records if stored in electronic form, necessary
to analyze the amounts of backpay due under the terms
of this Order.
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove
from its files any reference to the refusals to consider for
temporary employment and the refusals to hire for tem-
porary employment Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington
Haddon, Stephanie Schaan, and Cheryl Grote, and within
3 days thereafter notify each of them in writing that this
has been done and that the refusals to consider for tem-
porary employment and temporarily hire will not be used
against any of them in any way.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Maplewood and St. Paul, Minnesota offices and
places of business, including specifically St. John’s Hos-
pital, St. Joseph’s Hospital, and Bethesda Rehabilitation
Hospital, copies of the attached notice marked “Appen-
dix E.”21 Copies of the notice on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 18, after being signed by
its duly authorized representative, shall be posted by
HealthEast d/b/a HealthEast Care System and maintained
for 60 consecutive days in conspicuous places including
all places where notices to employees are customarily
posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure
that the notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pend-
ency of these proceedings, it has gone out of business or
closed any of its Maplewood or St. Paul offices and
places of business, HealthEast d/b/a HealthEast Care
System shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, cop-
ies of the notice to all current employees and former em-
ployees employed by it at the facility, or facilities, that
has, or have, gone out of business or closed at any time
since June 7, 2001.
(e) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by VitaSTAFF Nursing
Services, Nursefinders, and Firstat Nursing Services, if
willing, at all locations where notices to their employees
are customarily posted.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-

21 See fn. 17, infra.
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–11 be, and it
is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the Act not
found herein.
F. Respondent Allina Health System d/b/a Unity Hos-
pital, Fridley, Minnesota, its officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its Fridley, Minnesota office and place of business, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix F.”22 Cop-
ies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector of Region 18, after being signed by its duly au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Allina Health
System d/b/a Unity Hospital and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily placed. Rea-
sonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure that the no-
tices to employees are not altered, defaced, or covered by
any other material. In the event that, during the pend-
ency of these proceedings, it has gone out of business or
closed its Fridley office and place of business, Allina
Health System d/b/a Unity Hospital shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, copies of the notice to all cur-
rent employees and former employees employed by it at
its Fridley office and place of business at any time since
June 4, 2001.
(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Nursefinders, if will-
ing, at all locations where notices to its employees are
customarily posted.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–12 be, and it
is hereby, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not found herein.

22 See fn. 17, infra.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 507
G. Respondent Allina Health System d/b/a United
Hospital, St. Paul, Minnesota, its officers, agents, succes-
sors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Telling employees that it will not consider for tem-
porary employment, and will not employ temporarily,
employees because they are strikers or are on strike
against another employer.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, re-
straining, or coercing employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at
its St. Paul, Minnesota office and place of business, cop-
ies of the attached notice marked “Appendix G.”23 Cop-
ies of the notice on forms provided by the Regional Di-
rector for Region 18, after being signed by its duly au-
thorized representative, shall be posted by Allina Health
System d/b/a United Hospital and maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted.
Reasonable steps shall be taken by it to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other
material. In the event that, during the pendency of these
proceedings, it has gone out of business or closed its St.
Paul office and place of business, Allina Health System
d/b/a United Hospital shall duplicate and mail, at its own
expense, copies of the notice to all current employees
and former employees employed by it at its St. Paul of-
fice and place of business at any time since June 6, 2001.
(b) Sign and return to the Regional Director sufficient
copies of the notice for posting by Nursefinders and
Firstat Nursing Services, if willing, at all locations where
notices to their employees are customarily posted.
(c) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file
with the Regional Director a sworn certification of a re-
sponsible official on a form provided by the Region at-
testing to the steps it has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the consolidated com-
plaint, as amended, in Case 18–CA–16051–13 be, and it
hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges violations of the
Act not found herein.
MEMBER LIEBMAN, concurring.
Like Member Meisburg, I subscribe to the majority
opinion, finding that certain of the Respondents’ hospi-
tals violated Section 8(a)(3) of the Act when they refused
to hire Fairview Hospital’s nurses for available tempo-
rary jobs because the nurses were engaged in a strike
against Fairview Hospital. “The Board has recognized

23 See fn. 17, infra.
that the right to seek interim employment is a vital ad-
junct to the exercise of the right to strike and is itself
protected activity.” Zimmerman Plumbing & Heating
Co., 339 NLRB 1302, 1304 (2003), citing Christie Elec-
tric Corp., 284 NLRB 740, 759 (1987). I write sepa-
rately to express my view that the Respondents’ conduct
here was inherently destructive of the nurses’ Section 7
rights.
In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26
(1967), the Supreme Court summarized its earlier opin-
ions1 dealing with employer motivation in 8(a)(3) cases.
The Court identified two categories of cases: (1) cases
where employer conduct has only a “comparatively
slight” impact on employee rights, such that, if the em-
ployer proves a “legitimate and substantial business justi-
fication” for the conduct, then a violation may be found
only if the General Counsel establishes improper motive;
and (2) cases where employer conduct is “so ‘inherently
destructive of employee interests’ that it may be deemed
proscribed without need for proof of an underlying im-
proper motive.” Id. at 33–34. The Court made clear that,
in the latter category, the fact that the employer may have
business justifications for its conduct is not necessarily a
defense. Id. The “Board may nevertheless draw an in-
ference of improper motive from the conduct itself and
exercise its duty to strike the proper balance between the
asserted business justifications and the invasion of em-
ployee rights in light of the Act and its policy.” Id.
For the purposes of its analysis, the majority opinion in
essence assumes that the impact of the Respondents’
conduct was “comparatively slight” and then correctly
finds that the Respondents did not establish a legitimate
business reason for their refusal to hire the striking Fair-
view nurses, which accordingly was unlawful. Thus, the
majority did not need to reach the question whether the
conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights.
However, I would go further.
The Respondent blacklisted the nurses because they
were engaged in lawful strike activity. This conduct was
inherently destructive of the nurses’ right to strike—one
of the most fundamental Section 7 rights and one ex-
pressly protected by the statute. See NLRB v. Erie Resis-
tor Corp., supra 373 U.S. at 234–235.2 Only the rare

1 American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), NLRB
v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), and NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373
U.S. 221 (1963).
2 The Supreme Court and the Board have always been vigilant in
safeguarding the right to strike. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (employer unlawfully refused to consider
for hire former strikers); Handy Andy, Inc., 313 NLRB 616 (1993),
enfd. in pertinent part, sub nom. Southwest Merchandising Corp. v.
NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Grand Rapids Press of
Booth Newspapers, 327 NLRB 393 (1998), enfd. mem. 215 F.3d 1327
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD508
employee would strike, knowing not only that she could
be permanently replaced by her own employer, but also
that other employers in the same industry could legally
refuse to hire her, simply because she was a striker. In
my view, the need to protect the nurses’ basic right to
strike outweighs whatever legitimate business interest the
Respondents may have had in making common cause
with the struck employer. I would find a violation on
that basis, as well as for the reasons explained in the ma-
jority opinion.
MEMBER MEISBURG, concurring in part.
For the reasons set forth in the majority opinion, I join
Member Liebman in finding that certain of the Respon-
dent hospitals violated the Act when they refused to hire
another hospital’s nurses for available temporary jobs
because the nurses were engaged in a strike against their
employer. I write separately to emphasize my additional
concern about the Respondents’ defense of their action.
For nearly 60 years it has been the statutory policy of
the United States to place limits on the scope of labor
disputes and to provide protections to neutral parties
from involvement in matters that do not directly pertain
to their own labor relations. Statutory language, and
most of the case law interpreting it, focus on the circum-
scription of secondary union activity, but the same fun-
damental policy “of shielding unoffending employers
and others from pressures and controversies not their
own”1 should inform our assessment of the legality of an
employer’s use of coercive weaponry to pursue secon-
dary objectives that affect the statutory rights of employ-
ees.
In my view, the Board should not recognize the legiti-
macy of the Respondents’ defense in this case, because
to do so would broaden permissible economic pressure in
a primary economic dispute in a way that would likely
obscure, in future cases, the traditional boundaries be-
tween permissible primary conduct and impermissible
secondary conduct. If the Board were to recognize the
interest asserted by the Respondents here as justification
for their refusal to hire employees engaged in concerted
protected activity, it would risk significantly expanding
the current limits of primary economic pressure, and
thereby expose to economic injury employers, unions,
and employees with no direct involvement in the primary
bargaining dispute.

(6th Cir. 2000) (employer unlawfully refused to employ substitute
pressmen because they were on strike against another employer);
Grand Rapids Press, 325 NLRB 915 (1998), enfd. mem. 208 F.3d 214
(6th Cir. 2000) (same).
1 NLRB v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (emphasis added).
Essentially, what we hold here today is this: An em-
ployer (Employer A), who is not engaged in active col-
lective bargaining with a union, may not violate the Sec-
tion 7 rights of individuals who are engaged in a strike
against another employer who is engaged in collective
bargaining (Employer B), where the only justification
asserted by Employer A is its interest in the terms and
conditions agreed to by Employer B in bargaining. To
hold otherwise would permit Employer A to make com-
mon cause with Employer B, outside the accepted struc-
ture of multiemployer bargaining, and thereby perhaps
endorse the expansion of labor disputes in a way that is
contrary to our national policy favoring the limitation of
labor disputes to the primary parties.2
CHAIRMAN BATTISTA, dissenting.
Contrary to my colleagues, I disagree with the judge’s
finding that the Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) of
the Act by refusing to hire the striking Fairview nurses
during their strike.
I.
With the exception of Unity, all of the Respondents
were longtime members of a multiemployer bargaining
group. By 1998, the multiemployer group had dis-
banded. During the 1998 negotiations, some employers
reached higher wage agreements than others.
As the Respondents approached the 2001 negotiations,
the Minneapolis area was in the midst of a severe nursing
shortage. The Respondents competed against each other
for nurses. Any increase in wages at one hospital re-
quired a similar rise at the other hospitals in order for
them to remain competitive in the labor market.
In order to ameliorate this situation, the Respondents
changed the structure of their bargaining for the 2001
round of negotiations. They agreed on the need to coor-
dinate their bargaining strategy. The higher wage rates
of some employers had put great pressure on the others
during the term of the 1998 agreements. The parties
wanted to avoid replicating that situation. As a result,
the parties created a coordinated bargaining group. The
purpose of the group was to advance the members’ inter-
est in achieving common terms concerning economic and
major noneconomic matters. Relatedly, another purpose
of the group was to develop a plan to assist any member

2 The dissent states that I would “forbid an employer from protecting
its own interest simply because that interest is related to the events in
another employer’s unit.” (Emphasis added.) Putting aside whether I
would forbid an employer to do that, the Respondent’s actions here are
not simply “related to the events” in another employer’s unit. Rather,
the Respondent—in refusing to consider or hire the striking nurses—
admittedly intended to assist the struck employer in resisting the
nurse’s bargaining demands. The fact that the Respondent thought it
would benefit as a result does not validate its conduct.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 509
in weathering a strike. The members were particularly
concerned that the Union would engage in selective
strikes against some of the hospitals, and the strikers
would then obtain temporary employment at the other
hospitals, thus, prolonging their ability to continue the
strike. The coordinated bargaining partners therefore
agreed that, in the event of a strike against any one of
them, the others would not hire striking nurses. The Re-
spondents believed that such a strategy would help a
struck hospital to resist demands for higher wages. As
discussed, higher wages at one hospital would mean that
the others could lose qualified nurses.
The Respondents maintained the goals of their coordi-
nated bargaining plan throughout the 2001 negotiations.
Shortly before the 1998 contracts were to expire, all the
Respondents except Fairview reached and signed agree-
ments with the Union. The Union struck Fairview. As
previously agreed, the Respondents refused to hire any
striking Fairview nurses during the strike. The Respon-
dents did not take any action against their own nurses.
II.
I agree with my colleagues in the majority that the Su-
preme Court’s decision in NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers,
Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967), provides the appropriate ana-
lytical starting point. As the majority states, the Supreme
Court held that the General Counsel need not adduce
independent proof of antiunion animus in 8(a)(3) cases in
two circumstances: (1) where the employer’s conduct is
inherently destructive of employees’ rights and (2) where
the employer’s discriminatory conduct has only a com-
paratively slight impact on employees’ rights, but the
employer fails to prove that it had a “legitimate and sub-
stantial business justification” for such conduct. Id. at
34. My colleagues conclude that this case presents the
second situation. I disagree. The Respondents have
proved a legitimate and substantial business justification
for their refusal to hire the striking Fairview nurses.
No party disputes that the Minneapolis area was in the
midst of a severe nursing shortage at the time of the
events. The Respondents provided ample evidence that
their ability to retain sufficient nurses to fill their pa-
tients’ needs was directly linked to the wages paid to
nurses at each of the other institutions. The Respon-
dents’ uncontradicted testimony was that the Respon-
dents directly competed with each other for nurses, and
that a wage increase at one hospital would put “extreme
pressure” on the others. Indeed, the judge found that
“there was no evidence to the contrary.”
Moreover, there is no dispute on the other key facts
underlying the Respondents’ justification for their refusal
to hire the striking nurses. Thus, the striking Fairview
nurses’ ability to procure temporary employment would
significantly assist them in sustaining a strike. It is be-
yond dispute that the longer the strike went on, the
greater would be the pressure on Fairview to accede to
the Union’s demands, including demands for higher
wages. In light of this concern, the Respondents did not
wish to do anything to assist the Union in its strike
against Fairview. For, a union victory at Fairview, i.e. a
high wage agreement at Fairview, would inevitably lead
to a loss of nurses to Fairview. Indeed, this concern was
a primary reason for the cooperative arrangement among
the hospitals. If there were a strike against one of them,
the others did not wish to aid that strike by hiring the
strikers.
Significantly, there is no contention that the arrange-
ment was unlawful. Accordingly, I fail to see how the
implementation of the arrangement was unlawful. The
fact that the dispute and strike were ultimately confined
to one employer did not mean that the plan was no longer
operative. There was nothing in the plan to indicate that
it was confined to a situation where all employers re-
mained in dispute with the Union. The plan said that a
strike at any employer would call for a nonhiring of
strikers by the others. And, as discussed, a primary rea-
son for the plan continued, even though all employers
had settled except one.1
I recognize that the economic dispute for the Respon-
dents was over. However, that did not diminish the con-
cern set forth above. Nor did it take away the prime rea-
son for the arrangement as described above. Although
the Respondents had made their deal with the Union,
there remained the danger that Fairview would be forced
to settle for a higher wage package. The Respondents
did not wish to help the Union achieve that goal. To do
otherwise would force a Hobson’s choice on each Re-
spondent if the Union settled for higher wages at Fair-
view—either risk the loss of qualified nurses to Fairview
or raise their own wage rates above those they already
had reached in the negotiations with the Union. Faced
with spiraling health care costs and a nursing shortage,
neither was an enviable prospect.

1 The majority questions the relevance and legality of the arrange-
ment after the dispute with others had been resolved. The relevance is
that the legitimate and substantial interest that rendered the arrange-
ment lawful at its inception remained unchanged throughout the rele-
vant time period. It is true that, at the arrangement’s inception, each of
the Respondents had an interest in securing the support of its coordi-
nated bargaining partners in case it became a strike target. However,
that was not the Respondents’ only interest at the arrangement’s incep-
tion. Because of the severe nursing shortage, from the outset, the Re-
spondents were vulnerable to wage pressure from high wage settlement
at any of the hospitals, regardless of the status of the Respondents’ own
negotiations. Since such an interest was lawful at the outset and that
interest continued, the majority does not adequately explain how the
arrangement became unlawful.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD510
My colleagues contend that all of the Respondent’s
economic interests were resolved in bargaining with the
Union. However, as shown above, this could not be true.
The Respondents had an economic interest in the bar-
gaining at Fairview, and this interest obviously could not
be resolved in the Respondent-Union bargaining.
The Respondents’ justification for their action there-
fore was clearly substantial. As the Board has held,
“substantial,” in this context, means nonfrivolous. See
Harter Equipment, 280 NLRB 597, 600 fn. 9 (1986),
affd. sub nom. Operating Engineers Local 825 v. NLRB,
829 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1987). Given the shortage of
nurses in the area and the competitive market for these
scarce nurses, the Respondents’ interest easily met that
standard. As to whether the interest is “legitimate,” it is
clear to me that a hospital’s interest in retaining its
skilled nurses is not an unlawful one.
My colleagues say that the Respondents could have
protected themselves by retaining the multiemployer
bargaining that once existed. That may be true, but it
does not follow that this is the only way they could pro-
tect themselves. Great Dane requires only that there be a
legitimate and substantial reason for the action. It does
not require that this action be the only way that an em-
ployer can defend itself.
The majority contends that its decision will not compel
the Respondents to “help” the Union because it only re-
quires that the Respondents forbear from violating the
law. The majority’s reasoning is tautological. The Re-
spondents’ conduct here is unlawful only because the
Board says it is. The parties did not dispute the factual
foundation of the Respondents’ assertion that a finding of
a violation would compel them to assist the Union, i.e.
that hiring the striking Fairview nurses will allow the
nurses to sustain the strike for a longer period and that a
longer strike will lead to higher wages at Fairview. Con-
trary to the majority’s insinuation otherwise, the judge
found that there was no dispute on this foundation.
The majority relies heavily on the Board’s decision in
David Friedland Painting Co., Inc., 158 NLRB 571
(1966). David Friedland, however, is distinguishable.
In that case, the employer took the initiative by laying off
its own employees because they were members of a local
that was a sister to a local with a labor dispute elsewhere.
158 NLRB at 575–576. Here, the Respondents did not
take any action against their own employees, but rather
refrained from aiding another employer’s employees.
Moreover, David Friedland was also decided prior to the
Board’s decision in Harter Equipment, in which, as dis-
cussed above, the Board held that to be substantial, an
employer’s interest need only be nonfrivolous. Thus,
David Friedland does not address a critical determina-
tion at issue in this case—whether the Respondents’ in-
terest in the Fairview labor dispute meets the Board’s
definition of substantial. Under these circumstances, I do
not believe that David Friedland is controlling.
The majority argues that to recognize the Respondents’
legitimate interest here would require the Board to permit
discrimination against any striking job applicants. I dis-
agree. My conclusion is limited to facts of the instant
case. Here, the Respondents were coordinated bargain-
ing partners with the struck employer. They formulated
the plan to support each other in the case of a strike
against any one of them. No one has alleged that the plan
was unlawful. There was undisputedly a tight labor mar-
ket. The Respondents here took action to protect their
self interests. That does not mean that any and all em-
ployer responses to strikes at other institutions in differ-
ent circumstances would be lawful.
Contrary to my colleagues in the majority, I do not
agree that the Respondent’s conduct was illegitimate
because it attempted to influence events at another em-
ployer’s workplace or that it “introduc[ed] a new front of
economic warfare.” The Respondents’ conduct and mo-
tivation were wholly focused on their own primary inter-
ests. They made decisions about whom to hire at their
own facilities in order to serve their own interest in re-
taining their own employees and controlling their own
costs. The Respondents did not put pressure on Fairview
to alter its behavior in order to serve the Respondents’
interests. Nor did the Respondents take action against
their own employees as a means of exerting pressure on
the Fairview nurses.
Similarly, the Respondents did not reach out to enmesh
themselves in the Fairview dispute. The Fairview strik-
ers themselves brought the dispute to the Respondents by
seeking temporary employment. The Fairview strikers
essentially asked the Respondents to aid them in weath-
ering the strike by ameliorating the pain that usually ac-
companies employees’ decision to strike—that is, the
loss of wages for the duration of a strike. Thus, the Re-
spondents were faced with a choice between assisting the
Union in bringing about an economic outcome that
would be to the Respondents’ own detriment or acting in
their own economic self-interest by refusing to temporar-
ily hire the strikers. The Respondents made the latter
choice. There is nothing unlawful in that choice. The
Respondents have simply defended against the initiative
of the striking nurses to ameliorate the negative effects
that the strike had on them and to thereby enhance their
use of the strike weapon.
My colleagues say that the Board is not the arbiter of
the use of an economic weapon. I agree. However, it is
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 511
my colleagues, not I, who are condemning the em-
ployer’s “weapon” as unlawful.
Finally, each of my colleagues adds a rationale to the
majority rationale. Neither of these rationales has major-
ity support. In any event, neither rationale is valid.
Member Meisburg would forbid an employer from pro-
tecting its own interest simply because that interest is
related to the events in another employer’s unit. The
argument has no merit. Under Great Dane, the em-
ployer’s interest need only be substantial and legitimate.
There is nothing in Great Dane to suggest that the em-
ployer’s interest is illegitimate simply because it is tied
to external events.2
Member Liebman asserts that she agrees with the ma-
jority that this case is properly analyzed under Great
Dane as a case with a comparatively slight effect on em-
ployees’ Section 7 rights. She also, however, asserts in
her concurrence that she would find that the Respon-
dents’ conduct was inherently destructive of employees’
rights.
Initially, I note that the General Counsel did not allege
the “inherently destructive” theory of violation, and he
did not litigate or brief the case on that basis. Further,
the Respondents’ conduct did not unduly burden the
striking Fairview nurses’ right to strike. A loss of pay is
a risk attendant to the exercise of the right to strike, and
the employees were seeking to avoid that risk. The Re-
spondents simply were unwilling to help them in their
effort to avoid the risk. Indeed, the Respondents’ con-
duct did not even preclude the striking Fairview nurses
from earning an income during the strike. They were
free to seek employment with any hospital that was not a
part of the coordinated bargaining group. Accordingly, I
fail to see how the Respondents’ refusal to hire the strik-
ing nurses during the strike was inherently destructive of
their right to strike.
Therefore, I would reverse the judge and dismiss the
complaint.
APPENDIX B
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.

2 The distinction between primary and secondary activity is based on
Sec. 8(b)(4)(B), a provision obviously not involved herein. In any
event, as shown, the Respondents here had a primary interest in retain-
ing nurses.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider em-
ployees for temporary employment, and will not hire
employees temporarily, because they are strikers or are
on strike against another employer.
WE WILL NOT refuse to consider for temporary em-
ployment, refuse to hire for temporary employment, or
otherwise discriminate against Rebecca Wegner, or any
other employee, because of participation in a strike in
support of the bargaining proposals and positions of
Minnesota Nurses Association, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
protected by the Act.
WE WILL make Rebecca Wegner whole for any loss of
earnings and other benefits resulting from our unlawful
refusals to consider her for temporary employment and
from our unlawful refusals to hire her for temporary em-
ployment during June 2001, less any net earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful refusals to consider for temporary employment
and to the unlawful refusal to hire for temporary em-
ployment Rebecca Wegner and WE WILL, within 3 days
thereafter notify her in writing that this has been done,
and that those unlawful refusals, to consider her for tem-
porary employment and to hire her for temporary em-
ployment, will not be used against her in any way.
ALLINA HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A MERCY HOSPITAL
APPENDIX C
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD512
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider em-
ployees for temporary employment, and will not hire
employees temporarily, because they are strikers or are
on strike against another employer.
WE WILL NOT refuse to consider for temporary em-
ployment, refuse to hire for temporary employment, or
otherwise discriminate against Marie Madsen, Kathy
Smedstad, Laura Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller,
Christine Navratil, Allison Pennington Haddon, or any
other employee, because of participation in a strike in
support of bargaining proposals and positions of Minne-
sota Nurses Association, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
protected by the Act.
WE WILL make Marie Madsen, Kathy Smedstad, Laura
Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller, Christine
Navratil, and Allison Pennington Haddon whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from our
unlawful refusals to consider them for temporary em-
ployment and our unlawful refusals to hire them for tem-
porary employment, less any net interim earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful refusals to consider for temporary employment
and to the unlawful refusals to hire for temporary em-
ployment Marie Madsen, Kathy Smedstad, Laura
Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller, Christine
Navratil, and Allison Pennington Haddon, and WE WILL
within 3 days thereafter notify each of them in writing
that this has been done, and that those unlawful refusals,
to consider any of them for temporary employment and
to hire any of them for temporary employment will not
be used against any of them in any way.
NORTH MEMORIAL HEALTHCARE D/B/A NORTH
MEMORIAL MEDICAL CENTER
APPENDIX E
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider em-
ployees for temporary employment, and will not hire
employees temporarily, because they are strikers or are
on strike against another employer.
WE WILL NOT refuse to consider for temporary em-
ployment, refuse to hire for temporary employment, or
otherwise discriminate against Leslie Stoner, Allison
Pennington Haddon, Stephanie Schaan, Cheryl Grote, or
any other employees, because of participation in a strike
in support of bargaining proposals and positions of Min-
nesota Nurses Association, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
protected by the Act.
WE WILL make Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington Had-
don, Stephanie Schaan, and Cheryl Grote whole for any
loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from our
unlawful refusals to consider them for temporary em-
ployment and our unlawful refusals to hire them for tem-
porary employment, less any net interim earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the
unlawful refusals to consider for temporary employment
and to the unlawful refusals to hire for temporary em-
ployment Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington Haddon,
Stephanie Schaan, and Cheryl Grote, and WE WILL within
3 days thereafter notify each of them in writing that this
has been done, and that those unlawful refusals, to con-
sider any of them for temporary employment and to hire
any of them for temporary employment, will not be used
against any of them in any way.
HEALTHEAST D/B/A HEALTHEAST CARE SYSTEM
APPENDIX F
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 513
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider em-
ployees for temporary employment, and will not hire
employees temporarily, because they are strikers or are
on strike against another employer.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
protected by the Act.
ALLINA HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A UNITY HOSPITAL
APPENDIX G
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we
violated Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and
obey this notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your
behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit
and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected ac-
tivities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider em-
ployees for temporary employment, and will not hire
employees temporarily, because they are strikers or are
on strike against another employer.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights
protected by the Act.
ALLINA HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A UNITED HOSPITAL
Timothy B. Kohls and Nicole Burgess-Peel, for the General
Counsel.
Paul J. Zech and Thomas R. Trachsel (Felhaber, Larson,
Fenlon & Vogt, P.A.), of Minneapolis, Minnesota, for the
Respondents.
Phillip I. Finkelstein, of St. Paul, Minnesota, for the Charging
Party.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM J. PANNIER III, Administrative Law Judge. I heard
this case in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on November 5–7, 2001.1
On September 10 the Regional Director for Region 18 of the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) issued an Order
consolidating cases, consolidated complaint, and notice of hear-
ing, based on seven unfair labor practice charges,2 each of
which was filed on June 15, alleging violations of Section
8(a)(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act).
All parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to
introduce evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses,
and to file briefs. Based on the entire record,3 on the briefs that
have been filed, and on my observation of the demeanor of the
witnesses, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction
From the perspective of the General Counsel and the Un-
ion—Minnesota Nurses Association, a labor organization
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act—this case pre-
sents relatively straightforward issues. On June 3 registered
nurses (RNs) employed full time by Fairview Southdale Hospi-
tal and Fairview University Medical Center-Riverside Campus
(Fairview) commenced a strike in support of bargaining pro-
posals and positions, occurring during negotiations for a new
contract between the Union and Fairview. Fairview, six of
Respondents, and other hospitals in the Minneapolis-St. Paul
metropolitan area each employ full-time RNs. Due to a short-
age of RNs in that metropolitan area, however, each one aug-
ments its fulltime staff of RNs with temporarily-employed RNs,
most obtained from temporary staffing agencies, as described in
subsection B below.
Once the Fairview strike began, and throughout its duration
until June 30, each of Respondents refused to consider for hire,
and refused to hire, for temporary employment any of the strik-
ing Fairview RNs. The consolidated complaint, as amended,
alleges that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by that conduct. In addition, it alleges that various state-
ments made to employees—essentially, that strikers would not

1 Unless stated otherwise, all dates occurred during 2001.
2 Against Allina Health System d/b/a Abbott Northwestern Hospital
(Respondent Abbott Northwestern) in Case 18–CA–16051–1; against
Allina Health System d/b/a Mercy Hospital (Respondent Mercy) in
Case 18–CA–16051–2; against North Memorial Healthcare d/b/a North
Memorial Medical Center (Respondent North Memorial) in Case 18–
CA–16051–9; against Methodist Hospital, corrected during hearing to
Methodist Hospital, Park Nicollett Health Services, (Respondent Meth-
odist) in Case 18–CA–16051–10; against HealthEast d/b/a HealthEast
Care System (Respondent HealthEast) in Case 18–CA–16051–11;
against Allina Health System d/b/a Unity Hospital (Respondent Unity)
in Case 18–CA–16051–12; and, against Allina Health System d/b/a
United Hospital (Respondent United) in Case 18–CA–16051–13. Col-
lectively they are referred to as Respondents.
3 The joint motion to amend transcript and the joint motion to further
amend transcript are granted.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD514
be considered for temporary employment and would not be
temporarily employed, because they were strikers or were on
strike at Fairview—independently violated Section 8(a)(1) of
the Act, because such statements naturally tended to interfere
with, restrain, and coerce employees in the exercise of their
statutory right to engage in strikes in support of their bargaining
agents’ proposals and positions during contract negotiations.
Most of the facts are either admitted or, at least, uncontested.
The shortage of RNs in the Twin Cities metropolitan area
obliged each of Respondents to augment their full-time com-
plement of RNs during June. During the strike at Fairview
each of Respondents temporarily employed RNs, for the most
part on a day-by-day basis. There is no argument concerning
the fact that the striking Fairview RNs had been qualified to
perform temporary employment at any of Respondents. But
Respondents refused to temporarily employ, and to consider for
temporary employment, any of those striking Fairview RNs.
The strike at Fairview lasted until it and the Union reached
agreement on terms for a collective-bargaining contract. The
strike ended on June 30. Those facts would seem to support the
discriminatory motivation allegations of the complaint.
Still, Respondents point to certain additional facts and con-
tend that the refusals to consider for temporary employment,
and to temporarily employ, striking Fairview RNs were allowed
under the Act, as a means for achieving coordinated bargaining
objectives, as enunciated most particularly in American Ship
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and in Evening
News Assn., 166 NLRB 219 (1967), affd. sub nom. Newspaper
Drivers & Handlers Local 372 v. NLRB, 404 F.2d 1159 (6th
Cir. 1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 923 (1969). Thus, in their
amended answer, Respondents urge that they had been “privi-
leged to refuse to hire striking Fairview RNs and to refuse to
place striking Fairview RNs supplied by temporary staffing
agencies, as a result of the coordinated nature of the bargaining
between the hospitals.” From that premise, in connection with
the above-mentioned allegations of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act,
Respondents contend affirmatively, “Because . . . Respondents
were privileged to refuse to hire and place striking
RNs . . . they were privileged to communicate any policy or
practice to that effect to employees and applicants.” Respon-
dents deny that their refusals to consider for temporary em-
ployment, and to temporarily employ, striking Fairview RNs
during June had been motivated by any hostility toward those
RNs for striking or, more broadly, toward exercise by employ-
ees of their statutory right to strike in support of their bargain-
ing agent’s proposals and positions during contract negotia-
tions.
I reject those defenses, as discussed more fully in section II,
infra. As shown by the undisputed testimony of employees,
described in subsections E through H below, employees were
told no more than that striking Fairview RNs would not be
considered for temporary employment, and would not be tem-
porarily employed, by Respondents because they were on strike
at Fairview. Not once was any explanation advanced to an
employee concerning coordinated bargaining, or about preserv-
ing an overall bargaining position agreed on by all Twin Cities
metropolitan area hospitals engaged in bargaining with the
Union. Viewed from employees’ perspective, therefore, con-
sideration for employment and employment was being denied
for no reason other than exercise of the statutory right to strike
in support of a bargaining agent’s bargaining proposals and
positions.
With respect to the discriminatory motivation allegations, as
also discussed more fully in section II, infra, the instant case
presents a very different situation than the quite limited ones
involved in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra, and in
Evening News Assn., supra. Despite the coordinated goals
which were agreed upon by all hospitals, each hospital or hos-
pital system bargained separately with the Union. Each was
free to adjust and modify the coordinated goals, to achieve
agreement with the Union. More importantly, Respondent
Unity’s employees are not represented by any union; it was not
engaged in any collective-bargaining negotiations. By June 3
all other Respondents had reached agreement with the Union on
final terms for collective-bargaining contracts. As of that date
there was no impasse between the Union and any of Respon-
dents. And there was no prospect of a strike at any of Respon-
dents, much less any prospect of a whipsaw strike, as covered
in NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local 449 (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S.
87 (1957). Finally, not one of Respondents actually locked out
its own employees represented by the Union. Instead, each one
of them continued operations with its own full-time RNs repre-
sented by the Union, while selectively denying consideration
for temporary employment, and selectively denying temporary
employment, only to RNs who had exercised their statutory
right to strike in support of their bargaining agent’s contractual
demands. In short, this case does not present a lockout situa-
tion. Collectively, those facts so distinguish the instant case
from American Ship Building and Evening News, and the ra-
tionale underlying those holdings, that the only thing left is an
unlawful refusal to consider for hire, and to hire, employees
because they were engaging in a strike against their own em-
ployer. Such conduct violates Sections 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act.
B. Respondents and Their Temporary Staffing Agencies
As is evident from the case caption, there are seven Respon-
dents. Each is alleged and admitted to be a Minnesota corpora-
tion operating an acute care hospital or hospitals in Minnesota
at all material times. Respondent Abbott Northwestern has its
office and place of business in Minneapolis. Respondent
Mercy has its office and place of business in Coon Rapids.
Respondent North Memorial has its office and place of business
in Robbinsdale. Respondent Methodist has its office and place
of business in St. Louis Park. Respondent Unity has its office
and place of business in Fridley. Respondent United has its
office and place of business in St. Paul. Respondent HealthEast
has offices and places of business in Maplewood and St. Paul,
and operates three acute hospitals: St. John’s Hospital, St. Jo-
seph’s Hospital, and Bethesda Rehabilitation Hospital.
Respondents further admit that, at all material times, each
has been an employer engaged in commerce within the mean-
ing of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act. Those ultimate
admissions are based on admitted factual allegations, with re-
spect to each, that, in the course and conduct of the above-
described business operations during calendar year 2000, each
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 515
of the seven Respondents received gross revenues from all sales
or performance of services in excess of $500,000 and, in addi-
tion, purchased goods and services valued in excess of $50,000
which each received at its respective Minnesota facility or fa-
cilities directly from suppliers located outside the State of Min-
nesota.
As must also be evident from the case caption, four of Re-
spondents are owned and operated by Allina Health System
(Allina): Respondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, Unity, and
United. Actually, Respondent Abbott Northwestern and the
Phillips Eye Institute are operated by Allina as one organization
structure, but at two separate locations in downtown Minneapo-
lis. Moreover, while Respondents Mercy and Unity are located
on separate campuses—Coon Rapids, in the case of the former;
Fridley, in the case of the latter—Allina considers them as one
organization for internal purposes. Thus, the two have a single
board of governors, one medical staff with one medical staff
executive committee, and one management leadership team.
On the other hand, the separate campuses of each are located
approximately 10 to 15 miles apart and, of significance to this
proceeding, those two hospitals do not share staff RNs—the
RNs employed fulltime by each of them. Furthermore, as must
further be evidence from the caption, Respondent Methodist is
a part of the Park Nicollett Health Services hospital system.
As mentioned in subsection A above, each of the seven Re-
spondents, as well as other Twin Cities metropolitan area hos-
pitals, has its own staff of full time—and, also, part time and
casual—RNs. But, as in most areas of the country, there is a
shortage of RNs in that metropolitan area. Thus, some full-
time RNs at one or another hospital also work part time or tem-
porarily at hospitals other than the ones at which they are regu-
larly employed, obviously during hours that do not conflict
with their fulltime or regular job. Some obtain part-time or
temporary employment directly with one or more hospitals, for
which those RNs are not regularly employed. For the most
part, however, temporary employment is secured through tem-
porary staffing agencies. Even a cursory review of General
Counsel’s Exhibits 2–8 reveal that a relatively large number of
those agencies exists. Eight are involved in the consolidated
complaint’s allegations: Maxim Healthcare Services (Maxim),
VitaSTAFF Nursing Services (VitaStaff), InteliStaf Healthcare
(InteliStaf), Intrepid U.S.A., Inc. d/b/a New Horizons Home
Care & Nursing Services (New Horizons), Favorite Nurses-
Favorite Temps (Favorite Nurses), Firstat Nursing Services
(Firstat), Nursefinders, and Professional Resource Network,
Inc. (PRN).
There is an admitted allegation that all eight of those agen-
cies supplied “employees, including registered nurses, to fill
temporary and/or permanent vacancies” (underscoring sup-
plied). However, officials of four agencies each testified that
her agency supplies only temporary employees. Thus, Firstat
Director of Nursing and Administrator Jane Hauan testified,
“We are a temporary nursing agency. We supply hospitals,
long term care facilities, assisted livings with temporary nurses,
RN’s [sic], LPN’s [sic], CAN’s [sic] and health aides.” Simi-
larly Wendy Crow, branch director of the St. Paul and Bloom-
ington offices of Nursefinders, testified, “We send nurses, RN’s
[sic] and LPN’s [sic] and nursing assistants, out to hospitals,
nursing homes and clinics throughout the metro area on a tem-
porary basis.” Likewise, “New Horizons Nursing Service is a
temporary nursing agency,” testified Director-Branch Manager
Barbara Heinz. And Staffing Coordinator Joanne R. Blizen of
PRN testified, “We are a temporary staffing agency,” and, dur-
ing cross-examination she reaffirmed—“Correct”—that “PRN
only provides temporary RN’s [sic]” and—“Correct”—that it
“doesn’t place permanent for permanent hire at any of the hos-
pitals[.]”
Apparently, the temporary staffing agencies have contracts
with the hospitals and health care providers, to supply tempo-
rary employees. It further seems that, in an ongoing effort to
secure temporary help, particularly RNs, Respondents each
resort to more than one of the temporary staffing agencies. For
each Respondent, however, the complaint lists only a limited
number of those agencies as joint employers and agents of the
particular Respondent referred to in a given allegation. With
some exceptions, set forth as follows, Respondents admit the
alleged relationships, particularly the joint employer and
agency relationships, for RNs referred by those agencies.
For example, the complaint alleges that “[a]t all material
times, and particularly during June, 2001, [the named one of
Respondents] has requested that [the named temporary staffing
agencies] . . . supply it with registered nurses on a temporary
basis.” Maxim, InteliStaf, Nursefinders, and Firstat are alleged
in connection with Respondent Abbott Northwestern. Respon-
dents admit the allegations for Maxim, InteliStaf, and Firstat,
but deny having “request[ed] and/or need[ed] temporary RNs
supplied by Nursefinders during the relevant time period in-
cluding the month of June 2001.” Of course, that somewhat
begs the question. The fact that no referrals were needed dur-
ing a particular month, of itself, does not mean that there was
no contract for referrals and that referrals were not made pursu-
ant to such a contract during other months. Even so,
Nursefinders Branch Director Wendy Crow, appearing as a
witness for the General Counsel, did not include Respondent
Abbott Northwestern among her enumeration of hospitals with
which Nursefinders had a contract: “Methodist, Mercy, Unity,
HealthEast which includes St. Joe’s, St. John’s and Bethesda.”
Furthermore, RN Cheryl Grote, also a witness for the General
Counsel, testified that she had been told by Nursefinders’
Bloomington Staff Manager Sarah Nietfeld, as the two dis-
cussed locating temporary employment for Grote, that
Nursefinders “did not have a contract with Abbott and so that
wasn’t an option” for temporary employment for Grote through
Nursefinders.
The complaint alleges that Respondent Mercy requested
temporary RNs from Favorite Nurses, Nursefinders, and Firstat
at all material times, particularly during June. Respondents
admit that Respondent Mercy made such requests of Favorite
Nurses and Nursefinders, but “denies that it requested and/or
used temporary RNs [sic] supplied by Firstat during the rele-
vant time period including the month of June 2001.” In fact,
General Counsel’s Exhibit 3, invoices to Respondent Mercy
from temporary staffing agencies for June, contains no Firstat
invoices sent to Respondent Mercy for temporary RN work
during June. Of course, that does not establish unequivocally
that Respondent Mercy and Firstat were not parties to a con-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD516
tract for temporary RN referral, nor that RNs were not referred
by Firstat to Respondent Mercy during other months. But, no
evidence was presented to show either of those facts.
The complaint alleges that, at all material times, particularly
during June, Respondent Unity requested temporary RNs from
Nursefinders and Firstat. Respondents admit that such requests
had been made of Nursefinders, but deny those “allegations as
the relate to Firstat, since Firstat did not supply any temporary
RNs during the relevant time frame.” In fact, General Coun-
sel’s Exhibit 7, the June invoices from temporary staffing agen-
cies for employees referred by it to Respondent Unity, do not
contain any invoice from Firstat.
As to three of the other Respondents, the amended answer
admits the consolidated complaint’s allegations regarding sup-
plying RNs on a temporary basis. “At all material times and
particularly during June,” Respondent North Memorial sought
RNs for temporary employment through VitaStaff, PRN,
Nursefinders, and Firstat; Respondent Methodist sought RNs
for temporary employment through New Horizons, VitaStaff,
PRN, Nursefinders, and Firstat; and, Respondent HealthEast
sought RNs for temporary employment through VitaStaff,
Nursefinders, and Firstat.
In addition to the above-described allegations concerning the
referral relationships between each of those six Respondents
and the named temporary staffing agencies, the complaint also
alleges that, in each instance, each of those six Respondents
“shared and codetermined matters governing essential terms
and conditions of employment of the temporary registered
nurses supplied by” the named agencies. Respondents admit
those allegations, but only with respect to the agencies from
which admittedly each sought temporary RN-referrals during
June.
Based on those admitted allegations, Respondents also admit
that they had been “joint employers of temporary registered
nurses supplied to” each of them by the temporary staffing
agencies which made such referrals during June. Thus, by way
of illustration, Respondents admit that Respondent Abbott
Northwestern had been a joint employer of temporary RNs
referred to it by Maxim, InteliStaf, and Firstat, though obvi-
ously not Nursefinders. And Respondents further admit that,
with respect to each of them, the respectively named temporary
staffing agencies had been agents of that particular Respondent,
within the meaning of Section 2(13) of the Act, based upon the
relationship between them. Thus, by way of illustration, it is
admitted that at all material times VitaStaff, PRN, Nursefind-
ers, and Firstat had been agents of Respondent North Memorial
in connection with temporary RNs referred to the latter by the
former. Similarly, New Horizons, VitaStaff, PRN, Nursefind-
ers, and Firstat had been agents of Respondent Methodist in
connection with temporary RNs referred to it by those agencies.
And VitaStaff, Nursefinders, and Firstat had been agents of
Respondent HealthEast in connection with temporary RNs
referred to the latter by the former.
Those admissions of joint employer and agency status are
not unqualified, however. In a seeming effort to avoid respon-
sibility for statements made by their joint employers and
agents, Respondents deny liability “for any statements made by
employees or agents of any temporary staffing agency and,
further, den[y] that any statements made by employees or
agents of any temporary staffing agency can be used to support
an inference relating to . . . hiring or staffing policies” of Re-
spondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, Unity, North Memo-
rial, Methodist, or HealthEast. This effort to have it both ways
is discussed in section II, infra.
As to Respondent United, Respondents deny in their entirety
the like joint employer and agency allegations pertaining to it.
That is, in contrast to the other six Respondents, Respondents
deny the allegation that, “[a]t all material times, and particu-
larly during June 2001, Respondent United has requested that
Nursefinders and Firstat . . . supply it with registered nurses on
a temporary basis,” deny the allegation that Respondent United
“has shared and codetermined matters governing essential
terms and conditions of employment of the temporary regis-
tered nurses supplied by those entities,” and deny the allegation
that Nursefinders and Firstat have been joint employers with,
and statutory agents of, Respondent United. No question that
Respondent United, like the other six Respondents, has ob-
tained temporary RNs from temporary staffing agencies, as
shown by the June invoices collected in General Counsel’s
Exhibit 8. On the other hand, no question that not among those
invoices is any from either Nursefinders or Firstat.
One final point must be taken into account when considering
the relationship between Respondents and temporary staffing
agencies. There is no evidence that any of Respondents—or,
for that matter, any other hospital—conducts any sort of inde-
pendent qualification-assessment of temporary RNs referred to
it by those agencies. Instead, it is the agencies which conduct
such assessments of RNs whom they then refer to Respondents
and the other hospitals, in response to requests for referral of
temporary RNs.
For example, Branch Director Wendy Crow testified that
RNs applying for employment with, and temporary referral by,
Nursefinders submit applications, are interviewed concerning
their specialties, and are tested “specific to their . . . job knowl-
edge” and “to make sure that they . . . know the job.” Then,
whenever a hospital calls with a request for a particular cate-
gory of RN—medical-surgical, emergency room, intensive
care—Nursefinders would refer the appropriate RN or RNs,
based upon its own qualification-assessment. In like vein, Di-
rector of Nursing and Administrator Hauan testified that when-
ever RNs apply for employment with Firstat, their applications
are reviewed for experience, references are contacted and li-
censing confirmed, and competency testing is administered. At
the conclusion of that process, she further testified, “if they are
qualified they are then placed on our employment” roster and
“facilities call us and give us their needs for the times and we
match them up with who we have available” in the particular
specialty—“CU nurse” or “OB-GYN-OB nurse”—needed by
the requesting institution.
Similar hiring and referral procedures were described by
Branch Manager Brenda Rasmussen of InteliStaf (“we usually
have a meeting to determine what availabilities there are from
the hospital orders and then they are placed”), by Director-
Branch Manager Heinz of New Horizons (“depending upon the
need of that particular facility matching up with the skills of
that employee”), and by PRN Staffing Coordinator Blizen (“I
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 517
look for a position for them . . . or the hospital would call us
looking for nurses and then I would find a nurse to match that
need”). There is no evidence whatsoever of any occasion on
which any one of Respondents had ever conducted its own
separate assessment of qualifications for an RN referred tempo-
rarily by any one of the temporary staffing agencies. So far as
the record discloses, determinations of qualification are left
entirely to the agencies and Respondents accept without reser-
vation RNs referred to them by those agencies for temporary
employment. Of course, presumably were a particular RN to
fail to perform satisfactorily, then the hospital would request
that that RN not again be referred. But, there is no evidence of
any such situation ever occurring.
C. Bargaining History
As pointed out already, to the extent pertinent here, RNs re-
ferred by one or another temporary staffing agency are fulltime
employees of one or another Twin Cities hospital, such as Fair-
view and Respondents. Registered nurses employed by Re-
spondent Unity have never been represented by the Union.
Conversely, RNs working at Fairview and other Twin Cities
hospitals, including the other six Respondents, have been repre-
sented by the Union in “nine RN bargaining units for decades,”
the parties stipulated. Thus, they further stipulated, RNs at
Respondents Mercy, United, North Memorial and Methodist
have been historically represented in separate bargaining units.
Respondent HealthEast RNs at St. Joseph’s Hospital, St. John’s
Hospital and Bethesda Rehabilitation Hospital have been repre-
sented historically in a single overall bargaining unit, encom-
passing all three of those hospitals. According to Rebecca J.
Strange, division vice president for human resources and labor
relations for Allina hospitals and diversified businesses, RNs at
Respondent Abbott Northwestern and at the Phillips Eye Insti-
tute had been historically represented in separate bargaining
units, but became a single bargaining unit—including RNs
employed regularly and full time at both Respondent Abbott
Northwestern and Phillips Eye Institute—”I think in the 1998
negotiations.” Accordingly, by the time of the hearing in the
instant proceeding, regular and fulltime RNs for six of the Re-
spondents have been represented by the Union in six separate
bargaining units.
Of course, the seventh of Respondents, Respondent Unity,
employs RNs who have never been represented by the Union—
a fact that tends to detract somewhat from Respondents’ de-
fense about having to bar from employment, and consideration
for employment, striking RNs, as a means of furthering the
goals of coordinated bargaining. Respondent Unity never was
involved in bargaining, coordinated or otherwise, with the Un-
ion for its regular fulltime and part-time or casual RNs.
With respect to Fairview, when the June 3 to 30 strike oc-
curred, RNs it employed at Fairview Southdale Hospital and at
Fairview University Medical Center-Riverside Campus had
been represented by the Union in a single, overall bargaining
unit. Two other hospitals were involved in 2001 negotiations,
though neither is alleged to have committed any unfair labor
practices: Children’s Hospitals and Clinics-Minneapolis and,
secondly, Children’s Hospitals and Clinics-St. Paul. RNs at
each are represented by the Union in separate bargaining units.
Apparently, neither Children’s Hospital rejected temporary
employment of striking Fairview RNs or, at least, never had the
opportunity to do so.
As pointed out above, the parties stipulated that “for dec-
ades” the Union had represented RNs employed at Respondents
Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, United, North Memorial, Meth-
odist and HealthEast, as well as those employed at Fairview
and at the two Children’s Hospitals. Historically, negotiations
between the Union and those hospitals had been conducted on a
multiemployer basis. According to Attorney Thomas Vogt,
who has been representing health care employers since 1966—
and whose testimony concerning negotiations is the most com-
plete and knowledgeably-based of all witnesses—negotiations
for the hospitals had been conducted by successive multiem-
ployer associations: Twin City Hospital Association, then
Health Manpower Management, Incorporated, then Health
Employers, Incorporated, and now Minnesota Hospital and
Health Care Partnership (MHHP). However, by the time of the
1995 negotiations that situation began to change.
According to Vogt, Respondent Methodist “withdrew from
the association, the labor aspects of it, and also multiemployer
bargaining . . . prior to the ‘95 negotiations.” After those nego-
tiations were completed and contracts reached, he further testi-
fied, “the Allina and the hospitals that were part of the Allina
system [Respondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, United and
the Phillips Eye Institute] withdrew from the multi employer
group.” Consequently, “going in to the 1998 negotiations the
bargaining structure changed,” Vogt testified.
“Allina was bargaining separately. Methodist was bargain-
ing separately,” he testified, while “the remaining members of
MHHP would be bargaining separately although they would be
represented in the bargaining by the association, MHHP,” and
“their bargaining . . . would be coordinated and conducted by
MHHP as the bargaining representative.” In the end, Allina
agreed to collective-bargaining contracts, for its owned and
operated facilities, that differed from the contracts reached by
the other hospitals. Most specifically, Vogt testified, “Allina
ended up with a higher pay scale,” and that “created concerns
from a competitive standpoint,” eventually becoming “an issue
in the 2001 negotiations because they were above the other
hospitals.”
The duration of all of the 1998 collective-bargaining con-
tracts were the same. That is, the parties stipulated that they
“were all effective by their respective terms from 6/1/98
through 5/31/01.” In the late summer of 2000 the hospitals
began to plan their negotiating strategy for successive collec-
tive-bargaining contracts.
D. The 2001 Negotiations
The labor relations aspect of MHHP is handled through its
“sub corporation,” as Vogt put it, Labor Relations Board, In-
corporated (LRB). For the 2001 hospital negotiations, LRB
“act[ed] as the coordinator,” he testified, for all of the hospitals
that would be negotiating, both the remaining MHHP members
and those which were no longer members: Respondent Method-
ist and the Allina-system hospitals. Respondent North Memo-
rial’s vice-president of human resources, James White, testified
that LRB “was designed to set the overall strategy for the nego-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD518
tiations and it identify [sic] areas that we wanted to have com-
mon . . . understanding and maybe common results.” However,
common results were not a given consequence of the intended
negotiations.
None of Respondents and the other negotiating hospitals was
any longer negotiating on a multiemployer basis. Each would
be bargaining separately for a contract to succeed the 1998-
2001 one to which it was a party with the Union. There is no
allegation that any of Respondents did so in bad faith during the
ensuing winter and spring negotiations. What is important to
this proceeding is the manner in which they chose to conduct
their separate negotiations. In that respect, two areas are sig-
nificant.
First, with regard to the substance of their negotiations, the
hospitals attempted to formulate “a coordinated bargaining
plan,” Vogt testified, “on wage issues and all of the cost is-
sues,” as well as for major non-economic issues. Thus, during
separately conducted negotiations they would be advancing
“common demands and [take] action to ensure common de-
mands [were] achieved,” recognizing that each hospital was
free to work out its own separate agreements with the Union for
an overall collective-bargaining contract. For example, per-
centage increases were agreed on among the hospitals for wage
increases, though Respondent North Memorial, according to
Vice President of Human Resources White, “took the position
that moving North Memorial to parity with Allina, which is
roughly a 1 percent increase for us, should not be part of the
parameter discussion as far as we were concerned.”
Still, regardless of disparities in outcomes, the hospitals
shared information with each other about the status of each’s
negotiations, as the negotiations were progressing. They did
that during regularly conducted meetings, commencing even
before negotiations began, under the auspices of an advisory or
steering committee, including both MHHP hospitals and non-
MHHP hospitals, as well as through LRB for MHHP hospitals.
Underlying the above-described approach to 2001 negotia-
tions was the undisputed and commonsense fact that agree-
ments at one hospital would inherently affect employment
terms at others. For example, Allina Vice President Strange
testified “that whatever one [hospital] did from an economic
standpoint very quickly whether or not there was a contract
opening to do so . . . became the expectation of others,” and, in
fact, Allina, itself, had sometimes re-opened collective-
bargaining contracts during their terms “to make financial or
other adjustments in order to remain competitive in the market-
place.” Similarly, Respondent North Memorial Vice President
of Human Resources White testified, “I know how competitive
this market is. We are always under pressure from the econom-
ics of trying to compete [with] each other for a shortage of
nurses,” with the result that, “[a]nything that would drive the
labor rate up in one institution the other institutions would be
under extreme pressure to follow and so that’s a given. We’ve
had to do that in job after job.” There is no evidence to the
contrary.
The second significant area of the hospitals’ negotiating
strategy pertained to reaction should a strike occur at one or
more of the hospitals. In essence, the advisory or steering
committee members were concerned that a strike might be
called against one hospital—or, at least, less than all of them—
and the striking RNs might then seek temporary employment at
non-struck hospitals, either directly or through temporary staff-
ing agencies. As a result, the committee-members felt, any
such strike could be prolonged because striking RNs would
continue to receive income, from ongoing temporary employ-
ment at nonstruck hospitals, and be able to continue striking.
That could compel the struck hospital(s) to agree to terms ex-
ceeding goals set by the coordinated group, and, in turn, compel
nonstruck hospitals to agree to those same terms exceeding
coordinated goals, to remain competitive.
“Any strike of course involves economic pressures both
ways and to the extent that you provide employment for some-
one that is on strike it may well lengthen the strike,” explained
Vogt, by “eas[ing] the pressure . . . on the employees that are
on strike,” and enabling them to remain on strike longer than
might otherwise be the fact. In like vein, Respondent
HealthEast’s vice president of human resources, Virginia Sulli-
van, testified, “We could in essence be funding the strike, al-
lowing it to go longer, more extended strike.” Park Nicollett
Health Services Director of Employment, Employee and Labor
Relations Dee Spalla testified, “[O]ur interests were that nurses
get back to the bargaining table if they are on strike because we
felt it was imperative that settlements be reached that were
similar in economic scope so that they didn’t disadvantage
Methodist Hospital in recruitment and retention issues.” No
one challenges the legitimacy with which Respondents har-
bored those concerns.
Against the background of those concerns, the advisory or
steering committee agreed not to temporarily employ, and not
to consider for temporary employment, RNs who were on strike
at one or more of the other hospitals involved in the coordi-
nated-bargaining group. That agreement extended both to strik-
ing RNs who applied directly to nonstruck hospitals for tempo-
rary employment and, in addition, to ones who were also em-
ployees of temporary staffing agencies that attempted to refer
striking RNs to nonstruck hospitals. Moreover, as planning
progressed, the committee members also agreed that neither
would nonstruck hospitals accept striking RNs for permanent
employment, unless those RNs or their struck employer-
hospital supplied proof that those striking RNs were no longer
employed by their former now-struck employer. “Yes. That
was a policy that they adopted,” Vogt agreed, when asked
whether committee members all agreed “that they wouldn’t hire
striking nurses at any of the hospitals should a strike occur?”
Initially, Vogt expressed uncertainty about whether that pol-
icy encompassed striking RNs referred by temporary staffing
agencies: “I can’t remember that that was specifically discussed
but the principle would have been exactly the same.” Later,
however he agreed—“That’s correct”—that the hospitals
“would exclude [striking RNs] from applicant pools including
the temporary nurses that the hospitals got through temporary
employment agencies?” Allina Vice President for Human Re-
sources Strange agreed; “It’s a very tight marketplace but we
were not interested in people that were looking either through a
temporary agency or as an independent contractor on their own
of working temporarily for us.” More specifically, Respondent
HealthEast Vice President of Human Resources Sullivan testi-
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 519
fied that it was “correct” that “we had a policy not to . . . place
temporary agency nurses that were striking RN’s [sic] from
Fairview.”
Furthermore, testified Strange, “[W]e talked about and
agreed upon before we would hire someone on a permanent
basis we wanted to see some kind of proof that their intent was
indeed a genuine long term desire to work for our organization
and the only way we felt we could achieve that was through a
letter of resignation to Fairview.” Similarly, Allina Vice Presi-
dent Strange authored guidelines, dated June 7, stating in perti-
nent part, “If a nurse applicant lists [Fairview] as their current
employer, ask for written evidence or verification that they
have permanently resigned their position,” and “a resignation
letter,” of itself, does not satisfy that requirement. There is no
evidence that such a requirement had ever been imposed by any
of Respondents prior to commencing the 2001 negotiations. In
fact, Strange admitted explicitly that it never had been a re-
quirement.
Negotiations proceeded separately until mid-May. By then,
all of the hospitals and the Union agreed to conduct joint meet-
ings, to attempt to reach resolution on four major issues. Two
such meetings were conducted. The effort was unsuccessful for
the most part. But, it did lead Respondent North Memorial and
the Union to eventually reach tentative agreement, during sub-
sequent separate negotiations, on terms for a contract. That
tentative agreement was reached on May 15 or 16. It was rati-
fied by Respondent North Memorial’s RNs on May 17. The
only point of significance about that agreement, for the instant
proceeding, is that, as Vogt testified, “It was a so-called me too
agreement where North agreed that they would match the high-
est salary proposal that was negotiated at any of the other facili-
ties that were engaged in the bargaining.”
Nevertheless, Vogt pointed out, Respondent North Memorial
continued to remain “part of the coordinated bargaining plan.
They participated in the discussions that were taking place.
They briefed every one on the settlement that had taken place
there, their rationale, and continued to be a part of . . . the Labor
Relations Board and the bargaining process.” The obvious
reason for Respondent North Memorial’s continued interest,
testified Vogt, was “the ultimate wage scale that North had was
going to be determined on the basis of what someone else did
in the other bargaining that was going on.”
The other hospitals continued to bargain separately. As May
progressed to conclusion, each made a final offer to the Union.
In turn, the Union served notice on all of intent to strike. As to
that, it should not escape notice that there is no evidence what-
soever that the Union intended to engage in a whipsaw or selec-
tive strike against only some hospitals. Nor, so far as the re-
cord shows, did any of the hospitals harbor a belief that the
Union might resort to whipsaw strikes.
Before the strike deadlines, agreements were reached on
terms for collective-bargaining contracts between the Union
and all hospitals, still negotiating separately, save for Fairview.
Thus, tentative agreement between Respondent HealthEast and
the Union occurred on May 30; it was ratified by Respondent
HealthEast’s RNs on May 31. Tentative agreements for Re-
spondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, United, and Methodist
were reached on June 1; each of those agreements were ratified
on June 2, except for Respondent Methodist’s agreement which
was ratified on June 3.
That left Fairview. Its RNs had rejected its final offer. As
set forth above in subsection A, a strike began there on June 3.
Continued negotiations led to tentative agreement on June 23.
That tentative agreement was ratified by Fairview’s RNs on
June 25. The strike ended on June 30. Efforts by some of the
striking Fairview RNs to obtain temporary employment at Re-
spondents, during June, has led to the unfair labor practice
charges and allegations of the consolidated complaint.
E. Allina Owned and Operated Respondents’ Alleged Unfair
Labor Practices
There is virtually no dispute about what occurred in connec-
tion with some of the striking Fairview RNs’ efforts to obtain
temporary employment during June. A few made direct over-
tures for temporary employment directly to one or another of
Respondents. Most made efforts to obtain temporary employ-
ment through one or another of the temporary staffing agencies.
Various statements were made to those striking Fairview RNs,
as well as to other employees, concerning the reasons for not
temporarily employing them, and for not considering them for
temporary employment. Again, sometimes those statements
were made directly by admitted agents of one or another Re-
spondent. Most were made by personnel of temporary staffing
agencies. They are attributed to Respondents by the complaint
under the joint employer and agency allegations, admitted as to
all Respondents except for Respondent United.
As stated in subsection B, above, Allina owns and operates
Respondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, Unity, and United.
Allina Vice President Strange sent e-mails to all Allina-owned
and operated facilities, most particularly to Respondents Abbott
Northwestern, Mercy, Unity, and United. Those e-mails are
dated June 7, 4 days after the Fairview strike had commenced.
Each begins by making reference to a morning meeting of “rep-
resentatives from all of the unionized metro hospitals,” pre-
sumably the advisory or steering committee described in sub-
section D, above. At that meeting, the e-mails recite, those
representatives “discussed how we were handling issues when
they come up regarding the hiring/use of nurses who are cur-
rently on strike at one of the two Fairview facilities.” They
continue by instructing the recipient-officials in “guidelines that
we in Allina are to be using during this time period.” In short,
Respondents Abbott Northwestern, Mercy, Unity, and United
were all issued the same instructions for handling applications
for temporary employment by, and referrals for temporary em-
ployment of, striking Fairview RNs.
Strange states in her e-mail that, with respect to striking
Fairview RNs already regularly working and scheduled for
work at an Allina-owned and–operated hospital, “We cannot
refuse to schedule them at all,” but nothing requires “us to
schedule them as much as they request to be scheduled.” So,
with regard to those striking RNs, e-mail recipients are in-
structed to audit the number of “shifts per pay period or per
month they tend to usually work for us,” and to, then, “Make
every attempt NOT to schedule them for more shifts than their
usual pattern.”
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD520
The e-mail next addresses RNs referred by temporary staff-
ing agencies. “Ask each agency to NOT send us any nurses
who are currently on strike,” and “require also that they only
send nurses who have worked for a minimum of at least 3
months, as many of the striking nurses have only recently
signed up as agency staff.” “If the agency refuses, avoid the
use of that agency to the extent we can,” continues the e-mail,
and, “If an agency nurse actually arrives to work a shift and it is
learned that she currently is a striking nurse, contact the agency
and ask for a replacement.” In sum, there can be no question
that Allina was instructing Respondents Abbott Northwestern,
Mercy, Unity, and United to “NOT” consider for temporary
employment striking Fairview RNs recently employed by tem-
porary staffing agencies and, further, to “NOT” consider em-
ploying previously-referred striking Fairview RNs beyond their
past pattern of employment, even though those RNs might be
available for extra work and even though one or more of those
Respondents might have need for extra RNs.
In connection with the instructions for temporary RNs from
temporary staffing agencies, quoted in the immediately preced-
ing paragraph, Strange made mention of one of two defenses
that were only lightly touched in the evidence. In the end, both
amount to no more than strawmen—defenses that sound im-
pressive, but which have not been shown to have actually moti-
vated refusals to temporarily employ, or refusals to consider for
temporary employment, striking Fairview RNs.
In her e-mail Strange states, “Having a nurse currently on
strike working on one of our units side-by-side with our nurses
who may or may not have wanted to go on strike themselves
certainly provides an opportunity for the creation of disruptions
or uncomfortableness for staff, patients, or families within our
patient care environment.” Now, at no point did Vogt, White
or Strange, herself, provide any testimony about potential “dis-
ruptions or uncomfortableness” having been even mentioned
during discussions by the advisory or steering committee, nor
during discussions by the LRB. So far as the particularized
evidence shows, that had not been a concern in formulating the
hospitals’ planned response to a strike at one or more of them.
Moreover, while testifying, Strange never explained where she
got the idea to express such a concern in her June 7 e-mail nor,
more importantly, never gave any testimony that would supply
the least legitimate basis for expressing such a “disruptions or
uncomfortableness” concern. In short, so far as the evidence
shows, that had not been a concern of the advisory or steering
committee, nor of the LRB. So far as the record discloses, it
had been no more than some sort of afterthought thrown into
the June 7 e-mail by Strange to justify the instructions she was
issuing to Allina-owned and–operated hospitals.
More is involved, in connection with Strange’s asserted “dis-
ruptions or uncomfortableness” concern, than solely the lack of
any evidence to support legitimacy of her e-mail assertion
about it and the absence of any evidence that it had been any
concern of the advisory or steering committee, or of the LRB.
Advancing it as a basis for barring striking employees from
temporary employment, and from consideration for temporary
employment, contravenes a basic statutory right, in addition to
the statutory right to strike. In effect, Strange was advancing
workplace discussion of statutorily protected activity as the
very reason for barring strikers from consideration for tempo-
rary employment and from temporary employment, so long as
they remained on strike. But, preventing workplace discussion
among employees of statutorily protected activity is prohibited
by a series of Supreme Court decisions.
The Court has viewed workplaces as locations “uniquely ap-
propriate for dissemination of views concerning the bargaining
representative and the various options open to the employees.”
NLRB v. Magnavox Co. of Tennessee, 415 U.S. 322, 325
(1974). Obviously, such dissemination would encompass dis-
cussions among employees about bargaining then in progress
and the wisdom or lack of wisdom of striking in support of a
bargaining agent’s proposals and positions. The right of em-
ployees to engage in such dissemination among themselves
exists no less, as a general proposition, where their employer is
a hospital or other health care institution. See Beth Israel Hos-
pital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978). In short, depriving em-
ployees of consideration for employment, and of employment,
to prevent discussions among them of statutorily protected
activities, of itself, violates the Act.
Of course, employers may impose legitimate restrictions
whenever exercise of the statutory right to exchange views
disrupts production of discipline. See NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113 (1956); Republic Aviation Corp.
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945). But, Respondents pre-
sented no evidence showing that, as of June 7, there was any
reason to even suspect that temporarily-employed striking Fair-
view RNs would disrupt production or discipline at any of Re-
spondents, should those RNs be considered for temporary em-
ployment and employed temporarily during June. Speculation
simply does not trump the statutory right of employees to dis-
cuss their bargaining representative, and striking and alterna-
tives to striking in support of its bargaining proposals and posi-
tions.
Another component of Strange’s June 7 e-mail involved RNs
who chose to apply directly to one of Allina’s hospitals for
permanent employment. No such situation is included among
the complaint’s allegations, all of which involve applications
and referrals for temporary employment. Still, it is worth not-
ing that Strange issued an instruction that, should a striking
Fairview RN apply to an Allina hospital for employment, “Ask
for written evidence or verification that they have permanently
resigned their position” at Fairview and, “only proceed to hire
the applicant if they have permanently resigned their position
from Fairview and if they genuinely are the best candidate for
the position.” The latter criterion was not novel. As pointed
out near the end of subsection D, above, Strange admitted that
the former criterion was novel. Nonetheless, she did advance a
facially neutral defense to justify that particular instruction:
“We also have no interest in going through the time, expense,
and effort of orienting someone to hire them on a temporary
basis, even as a casual, since they are likely to return to their
former employer once the strike is over, given that they then
maintain their seniority, benefit longevity, etc.” (Emphasis
added.) Two points are important in connection with that in-
struction and explanation.
First, there really is no challenge to Respondents’ testimony
about extent of investment of time and money in orienting and
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 521
training their own, directly hired, new employees. It is no more
than common sense for an employer not to want to hire some-
one, train them and, then, have them quit. The testimony re-
vealed a genuine concern about that happening, should striking
Fairview RNs be hired by one or another of Respondents. That
is, there was concern that those employees would be hired and
begin orientation and training, but quit and return to employ-
ment with Fairview once the strike there ended. No one can
sensibly argue that that is not a legitimate concern. But, it does
not extend to temporarily employed or casually employed RNs.
Second, as even a cursory review of the record reveals, many
RNs employed full time by Fairview, as well as at other Twin
Cities metropolitan area hospitals, augment their incomes with
temporary part-time or casual work at other Twin Cities health
care facilities, including hospitals. Obviously, that part-time or
casual work does not interfere with their full-time jobs. That is,
they work full time for Fairview, for example, and part time or
on an on-call basis elsewhere. So, as a matter of logic, even if
trained and oriented in another hospital’s operations, to work
there part time or on a casual basis during the Fairview strike, it
does not follow that a striking Fairview RN would not continue
working part-time or on a casual basis after the Fairview strike,
just as RNs, who had been working both full-time and part-time
casual jobs before the strike, had been doing. And concern
about training and orientation has no place whatsoever in con-
nection with RNs referred by temporary staffing agencies.
As described at the end of subsection B, above, it is the tem-
porary staffing agencies which evaluate and test the qualifica-
tions of RNs they hire and, then, refer. Once referred, there is
no evidence that those RNs undergo any qualification assess-
ments, repeated in full by health care institutions to which they
are referred. Rather, those institutions accept the screening
already performed by the temporary staffing agencies.
It does appear that at least some of Respondents do conduct
some orientation and testing even for RNs referred by tempo-
rary staffing agencies. However, there is no evidence that
whatever orientation is provided for referred RNs is anywhere
as extensive as that provided for RNs actually hired by Re-
spondents or other hospitals. To the contrary, the evidence
shows that orientation for RNs referred by temporary staffing
agencies is relatively brief in duration. For example, RN Lorri
L. LaForge testified that Respondent “Abbott Northwestern
also has a pretty extensive entry when you start there as a tem-
porary nurse. They make you take a few little tests and you
need to complete their compliances.” How “extensive”? “I
mean you need to arrive an hour before your shift,” she ex-
plained, “to take a test for them,” and to “show all your creden-
tials, Xerox copy everything, and then they have to make sure
you pass everything before you go to your unit.”
Inherently, “an hour” hardly seems to involve “the time, ex-
pense, and effort” involved for an RN, or any other employee,
being directly hired by Respondent Abbott Northwestern. If its
orientation for temporary RNs is regarded as comparatively
“pretty extensive”—an explanation never refuted by any other
evidence—it follows that there is no basis for inferring that
testing and orientation of temporarily-referred RNs at any of
the other Respondents is an involved and prolonged process.
Indeed, examination of the numbers of June referrals revealed
by General Counsel’s Exhibits 2–8, alone, is a strong indication
that testing and orientation of referrals by temporary staffing
agencies could hardly be so extensive as to involve the “time,
expense, and effort” on the part of Allina-owned and–operated
hospitals, described by Strange for direct hires, nor on the part
of any of the other Respondents.
1. Unlawful conduct attributed to Respondent Abbott North-
western
For Respondent Abbott Northwestern, the complaint enu-
merates a series of allegedly unlawful statements, all attribut-
able to temporary staffing agency personnel, as opposed to
statutory supervisors or agents employed directly by Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern. The complaint further lists six strik-
ing Fairview RNs who were not considered for hire and were
not hired on a temporary basis, for no reason other than that
each had been a striking Fairview RN: Chris Navratil on June
6, Leslie Stoner on June 7, Allison Pennington on June 8, Diane
Fischer and Lorrie L. LaForge on June 11, and Gwen Friedlund
on an unknown June date. Of course, it follows from what has
been said above about the instructions in Strange’s June 7 e-
mail that, as striking Fairview RNs, none of those employees
were regarded by Respondent Abbott Northwestern as eligible
for consideration for temporary employment, or as temporarily
employable, by it during June. That ineligibility-conclusion is
but reinforced by review of the undisputed testimony concern-
ing what had occurred during June in connection with Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern.
Fairview operating room RN Christine Navratil testified that
she had not been an employee of temporary staffing agency
Nursefinders prior to the strike. But, on June 6 she called that
agency and spoke with Nursefinders St. Paul and Bloomington
Branch Director Wendy Crow. “I told her that I was looking
for employment in a hospital preferably working evenings or
nights,” testified Navratil, and “she asked me if I was a striking
nurse.” When Navratil replied in the affirmative, she testified
that Crow said “unfortunately . . . a lot of hospitals were not
hiring striking nurses at the time,” and “named a bunch of hos-
pitals,” one of which was Respondent Abbott Northwestern.
Navratil acknowledged that she never thereafter filled out a
Nursefinders job application. But, she further testified that,
given what Crow had said, she saw no purpose for doing so. “I
didn’t feel there was a purpose,” testified Navratil, because, “I
wanted hospital work and the hospitals that she rattled
off . . . seemed like they were every hospital in the city and I
just truthfully remember hanging up the phone and thinking we
are screwed. I mean we have no job.” In short, she viewed any
pursuit of employment through Nursefinders as a futile act. On
the other hand, as pointed out in subsection B, above, it is un-
disputed that there was no contract between Nursefinders and
Respondent Abbott Northwestern, for referrals by the former to
the latter.
Also seeking employment through Nursefinders was psychi-
atric RN Diane Fischer. Only Respondent Abbott Northwest-
ern and North Memorial, aside from Fairview, have psychiatric
units, so far as the record discloses. Fischer testified that on
Monday, June 4, she spoke with both Wendy Crow and
Nursefinders Staff Manager Miranda Hanson about obtaining
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD522
temporary employment at one or both of those hospitals’ psy-
chiatric units. According to Fischer, Crow said “that none of
the hospitals were hiring striking [Union] nurses,” and that
Fischer’s only option would be Regions, a non-union facility.
Having heard nothing further from Nursefinders, Fischer
again made contact with it on Monday, June 11. She asked
why she had not received any calls and, further, “which hospi-
tals can I not work at?” Wendy Crow replied, “several,” but
when Fischer “pressed the issue,” by asking for names of hospi-
tals,” Crow “said that was private property” and all she would
say was that Allina had communicated that it was “not accept-
ing striking nurses.”
As with Navratil, Fischer was never referred to Respondent
Abbott Northwestern during the June 3 to 30 Fairview strike.
No question that Respondent Abbott Northwestern temporarily
employed RNs during that strike. Invoices included in General
Counsel’s Exhibit 7 show a number of RN-referrals for tempo-
rary employment at Respondent Abbott Northwestern between
those dates. Yet, the problem for the allegations concerning
refusal to consider for temporary employment, and refusal to
temporarily employ, Navratil and Fischer is that it is uncon-
tested that Nursefinders had no employment-referral contract
with Respondent Abbott Northwestern. So far as the evidence
shows, such contracts are an integral component of temporary
staffing agencies’ referral arrangements with Twin Cities health
care institutions, including Respondents. Therefore, there is no
basis for concluding that Navratil and Fischer had unlawfully
been deprived of employment, and of consideration for em-
ployment, with Respondent Abbott Northwestern.
Absence of a referral-contract is not a problem in connection
with Maxim, InteliStaf, and Firstat, all of whom Respondents
admit were joint employers and agents of Respondent Abbott
Northwestern, given the arrangements between it and those
agencies described in subsection B above. Emergency Depart-
ment RN Leslie Stoner testified that while taking her examina-
tion, as part of the employment application process for Firstat,
she heard about “certain hospitals that weren’t accepting strik-
ing nurses.” Afterward, she spoke about that subject with Day-
Shift Staffing Coordinator Carl Johnson, explaining to him that
she was “currently on strike” at Fairview. Johnson gave her a
list of hospitals to which she could not be referred, including
Respondent Abbott Northwestern, and another list of four hos-
pitals that Fairview strikers “were allowed to work at.” Stoner
was never referred by Firstat to Respondent Abbott Northwest-
ern, even though Firstat made six referrals of RNs to Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern during June.
Critical Care RN Gwen D. Friedlund testified that on Sun-
day, June 3, the day the Fairview strike commenced, she had
been referred by Firstat to Respondent Abbott Northwestern for
Monday, June 4. While working there that day, she received a
message to call Firstat’s other day shift staffing coordinator,
Rochelle Crow. When she placed that call, testified Friedlund,
Crow asked, “had I told anybody that I was a striking nurse,”
and, when Friedlund replied in the negative, Crow said, “Good.
Don’t tell anybody. Finish up your shift and get the heck out of
there.” According to Friedlund’s uncontroverted testimony,
Crow added, “[I]f they found I was a striking nurse they would
relieve me on the spot and . . . [Firstat] could lost [sic] their
contract with Abbott if they found out that they sent me there.”
Friedlund further testified that she inquired if she could be
scheduled in the future at Respondent Abbott Northwestern.
She testified that Rochelle Crow responded, “Absolutely not. I
could not work at any contract hospital,” and explained that,
“[T]he only reason I had gotten that [June 4] shift was it had
been scheduled on a Sunday evening and the sched-
uler . . . working that evening didn’t know what was going on
and that I shouldn’t have been allowed to work there.” In fact,
Friedlund was not again referred to Respondent Abbott North-
western during the Fairview strike, though General Counsel’s
Exhibit 7 reveals that Respondent Abbott Northwestern ac-
cepted referrals of other RNs during June.
There is no allegation that heart center RN Ed Moeller had
been unlawfully denied temporary employment by Respondent
Abbott Northwestern. But, it is alleged, in essence, that he had
been unlawfully told that he could not work at any hospital
affiliated with Allina because he was on strike. In fact, during
a telephone conversation around June 14 with an employee of
Firstat regarding employment at Respondent North Memorial,
as described more fully in subsection F below, Moeller testified
that he had asked about employment at Respondent Abbott
Northwestern, pointing out that it was “a contract hospital,” as
was Respondent North Memorial. According to Moeller, the
unidentified employee asked why he was “telling them you are
a striking nurse”; Moeller replied “[T]hey asked me. I can’t
lie.”
As to Maxim, Flying Squad Department RN Allison Pen-
nington, by the hearing, Haddon testified that she had sought
and obtained employment with Maxim on June 5. “They as-
signed me the 8th, 9th and 10th of June night shifts with Abbott
in the intensive care unit,” she testified. She was instructed to
be there at 10 p.m. for the 11 p.m. shift, “for an orientation,”
Haddon testified. However, “around 9 p.m. on June 8 someone
from Maxim called me,” she testified, “and said the staffing
office at Abbott had called them and said they were canceling
me for that night and the next two shifts . . . because they
wouldn’t accept striking nurses from Fairview.” Maxim was
unable to locate alternative employment for Haddon from June
8–10. And she was not again referred to Respondent Abbott
Northwestern, even though Maxim did refer RN Renne Powell
to it on June 11, 20, 21, and 25–27, as well as a second RN
(Maula Goines) on June 21. Of course, as discussed above, in
addition, other temporary staffing agencies were also referring
RNs to Respondent Abbott Northwestern during June.
The sixth RN alleged to have been discriminated against by
Respondent Abbott Northwestern is Lorrie L. LaForge. It is
alleged that she had been denied temporary employment on
about June 11. In addition to Fairview, LaForge was an em-
ployee of InteliStaf, for temporary employment. Its branch
manager is Brenda Rasmussen.
LaForge had been referred to Respondent Abbott Northwest-
ern for a night shift on June 10. She actually worked that shift
in the telemetry unit. As she was leaving, she testified, the
charge nurse said “they would have availability that night and
probably the rest of the week, and she wanted me to notify
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 523
InteliStaf [sic] . . . to come back to her, to her unit.” That did
not occur, however.
Seemingly on June 11, Rasmussen was telephoned by Linda
Arvidson, Respondent Abbott Northwestern’s float pool man-
ager and an admitted statutory supervisor and agent of Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern. According to Rasmussen’s uncon-
tested testimony, Arvidson “was upset because we had placed a
striking nurse” or, at least, an RN who might be one, given that
LaForge’s CPR card revealed that the course had been given at
Fairview. Rasmussen testified that “in [Arvidson’s] mind that
determined that [LaForge] must be a striking nurse,” and Ar-
vidson said that “she thought they had made it known previ-
ously verbally to us as an agency that they were not taking
striking nurses and as such this person should not have been
placed.”
Both Rasmussen and LaForge testified that, during an ensu-
ing telephone conversation, the former told the latter that Re-
spondent Abbott Northwestern did not want LaForge to return
to work. LaForge testified that Rasmussen had said that Re-
spondent Abbott Northwestern “was asking if I was a striking
nurse or not,” and, when LaForge confirmed that she was, said
“in light of that that they would not take me because I was a
striking nurse and she said she could send me to a different
hospital.” In addition, Rasmussen testified that she had told
LaForge that InteliStaf “can’t condone that behavior” by Re-
spondent Abbott Northwestern, and that she (Rasmussen)
would be willing to continue referring LaForge there, if La-
Forge wanted to pursue that course. However, continued Ras-
mussen, “[T]he risk is if we send you there they have told us
they will send you home which then you would call me
up . . . and want another shift,” but “for me to do that there
must be a time frame available to do that and if she is calling
me at the last minute I may not be able to find her a shift.”
Seemingly, LaForge was not willing to make cannon fodder of
herself, by pursuing such a course and ending up with neither
employment by Respondent Abbott Northwestern nor any other
hospital on a particular day.
Rasmussen of InteliStaf was not the only temporary staffing
agency representative who described instructions from Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern not to refer striking Fairview RNs.
firstat’s director of nursing and administration, Hauan, testified
that, during a telephone conversation on June 15, Arvidson said
that Respondent Abbott Northwestern “did not want Firstat to
send them any nurses who were on strike,” and “did not want
Firstat to send any nurses that had not been to Abbott before.”
Of course, that instruction would naturally cut off striking Fair-
view RNs, such as Stoner, who became employed by Firstat, or
by any other temporary staffing agency, on or after June 3,
when the strike at Fairview began.
Hauan further testified that when she asked about “nurses
who were on strike that had already been placed at” Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern and had worked shifts there, Arvid-
son first said that none of them were eligible to return. Then,
testified Hauan, Arvidson added “that no nurse who had not
been placed by Firstat prior to the strike could come back. Or
could be shifted there.” Hauan promptly wrote a letter to Ar-
vidson confirming those instructions: “Per our conversation,
you stated that it is the intent of Abbott Northwestern Hospital
to only utilize nurses from Firstat Nursing Services, whom have
already been to ANW previous to the [Union] Nursing Strike.”
So far as the record reveals, Arvidson never wrote back, or
otherwise communicated, that Hauan’s written confirmation
was not a correct recitation of Respondent Abbott Northwest-
ern’s intentions.
Barbara Heinz, director-branch manager for New Horizons,
testified that, during a telephone conversation, Arvidson had
said that it would be alright to refer a striking RN who had
worked in the past on a regular basis for Respondent Abbott
Northwestern, but only “as long as I kept within the same num-
ber of days that she had previously worked per week. Not to
exceed that.” As set forth in the preamble to this subsection,
such an instruction is consistent with one of the instructions
issued by Strange. In addition, testified Heinz, “I do believe
that she did make mention that if they had not worked at that
hospital before that they probably wouldn’t be a good candi-
date.” In fact, they absolutely would not be a candidate, and
would not be considered for employment, under the instructions
in Strange’s June 7 e-mail.
2. Unlawful conduct attributed to Respondent United
As set forth in subsection B, above, Respondent United is
owned and operated by Allina. It also is the one respondent
which denies that it had a joint employer relationship with al-
leged temporary staffing agencies—Nursefinders and Firstat—
as well as being the one respondent to deny any agency rela-
tionship with either of those two agencies. What is clear from
the compilation of June invoices for temporary referrals to it
(GC Exh. 8), however, is that Respondent United does obtain
temporary referrals, including of RNs, from temporary staffing
agencies: Favorite Nurses, New Horizons, and InteliStaf,
among them. Yet, in contrast to Respondent Northwestern, no
evidence was developed that Respondent United did not have
referral-contracts with Nursefinders and Firstat. At no point
did Respondents actually contend that no such contracts ex-
isted, as had been the fact with Respondent Northwestern.
As amended during the hearing, to delete the name of one al-
leged discriminatee, the complaint alleges that Respondent
United refused to temporarily employ, and refused to consider
for temporary employment, three of the RNs named in subsec-
tion E,1, above, in connection with Respondent Abbott North-
western: Navratil, Fischer, and Friedlund. It also alleges
unlawful statements attributable to Respondent United through
representatives of temporary staffing agencies, though not
through any supervisor or agent directly employed by Respon-
dent United.
Described in subsection E,1, above is a June 6 telephone
conversation between striking Fairview RN Navratil and
Nursefinders Branch Director Wendy Crow. As described in
greater detail there, Crow had named for Navratil a number of
hospitals that would not accept Fairview RNs for temporary
employment, so long as those RNs were on strike. Navratil
testified that Respondent United had been one of the hospitals
that Crow had named. As a result, as also pointed out in sub-
section E,1, above, Crow’s statements caused Navratil to aban-
don any further effort to obtain temporary employment through
Nursefinders at the named hospitals.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD524
Fischer was told by Wendy Crow that Allina hospitals were
not accepting striking nurses, as set forth in greater detail in
subsection E,1, above. So, to the extent that Respondent
United is owned and operated by Allina, it would be encom-
passed by that statement by Crow. However, any allegation
that Fischer had been discriminated against by Respondent
United encounters a fundamental problem.
Fischer testified, “I’m a psychiatric nurse” and “not every
hospital has a psychiatric unit so [her opportunity for referral
for temporary employment is] limited from that standpoint.” In
fact, she identified only Respondents Abbott Northwestern and
North Memorial as operating psychiatric units. There is no
evidence that one exists at Respondent United and, based upon
Fischer’s testimony, it is a fair inference that a psychiatric unit
does not exist there. Accordingly, there is no basis for conclud-
ing that Respondent United had unlawfully refused to tempo-
rarily employ her, nor unlawfully refused to consider her for
temporary employment. There was no position in which
Fischer was seeking to become temporarily employed by Re-
spondent United.
As also described in section E,1, above, striking Fairview
RN Friedlund sought June temporary employment through
Firstat. During a June 4 telephone conversation, occurring
while she was at Respondent Abbott Northwestern, she was
told by Firstat Day Shift Staffing Coordinator Rochelle Crow
that she (Friedlund) “could not work at any contract hospital,”
because she was “a striking nurse”. Of course, Respondent
United is a “contract hospital,” though there is no evidence that
it had been named specifically during the telephone conversa-
tion between Friedlund and Rochelle Crow. Still, Respondent
United was one of the Allina hospitals instructed by Strange not
to accept striking Fairview RNs.
3. Unlawful conduct attributed to Respondent Mercy
Two of the three alleged discriminatees at Respondent
Mercy—Diane Fischer and Gwen Friedlund—were striking
Fairview RNs who, so far as the record discloses, did not actu-
ally seek temporary employment at Respondent Mercy. Be-
yond that, as discussed in subsections E,1 and 2, above, Fischer
was seeking employment in a psychiatric unit. There is no
evidence that Respondent Mercy operates such a unit and, to
the contrary, it is a fair inference, from Fischer’s testimony, that
it does not do so.
Nonetheless, Respondents admit that Respondent Mercy ob-
tains temporary RNs through, inter alia, Nursefinders and, fur-
ther, that the two are joint employers and that Nursefinders is
an agent of Respondent Mercy. Fischer was told by Wendy
Crow of Nursefinders on June 4 “that none of the hospitals
were hiring striking [Union] nurses,” and on June 11 that Allina
had communicated that it was “not accepting striking nurses.”
Since Respondent Mercy is owned and operated by Allina, and
inasmuch as Crow’s statements to Fischer essentially track the
instructions to Allina hospitals in Strange’s June 7 e-mails,
Crow’s remarks to Fischer leave for consideration the issue of
whether they interfered with, restrained, and coerced employees
in the exercise of statutory rights, an issue discussed in section
II, infra.
Friedlund was told by Firstat’s Rochelle Crow on June 4 that
she “could not work at any contract hospital,” as discussed in
subsections E,1 and 2, above, in the process of being told to
finish up her shift at Respondent Abbott Northwestern “and get
the heck out of there.” Friedlund had been seeking additional
temporary employment during June.
Invoices for temporary RNs employed during that month by
Respondent Mercy (GC Exh. 3) show that InteliStaf, Favorite
Nurses, Nursefinders, and New Horizons had referred RNs to
Respondent Mercy throughout that month. But, Wendy Crow
of Nursefinders testified that Ruth Keizer of Respondent Mercy
had “told us that Mercy would not be accepting any striking
nurses.” Moreover, “A few days later Sharon Carlson called,”
testified Wendy Crow, “want[ing] to make sure that I . . . was
aware that they were not accepting . . . striking nurses.” Of
course, those statements are perfectly accurate accounts of in-
structions received by Respondent Mercy and other Allina hos-
pitals in Strange’s June 7 e-mails. Those instructions were
reinforced by certain other remarks made by officials of Re-
spondent Mercy, especially those made in connection with the
third striking Fairview RN alleged to have been discriminated
against by Respondent Mercy.
Vice President of Nursing Kathy Wilde and Float Pool Man-
ager Karen Strauman-Raymond is each an admitted statutory
supervisor and agent of Respondent Mercy. The amended an-
swer admits that on June 5 Wilde “left separate voice mail mes-
sages for between one and three RNs employed by Respondent
Mercy, in which she advised those RNs that Respondent Mercy
would not be using striking nurses that were working through
temporary agencies.” The parties stipulated that the recipients
of those messages were LouAnn Uhr and Rozann Bridgeman,
employees of Respondent Mercy and, also, elected tri-chairs of
the Union’s committee.
Those voice-mail messages had been one consequence of a
stipulated incident involving striking Fairview RN Rebecca
Wagner. She had been referred to Respondent Mercy by Fa-
vorite Nurses to work a shift on June 5. But, before the shift
began, she revealed that she was a striking Fairview RN and
she was sent home. More specifically, according to the stipula-
tion, “Wegner made a statement that revealed that she was a
striking Fairview nurse,” and Strauman-Raymond overheard
that statement. The latter “pulled Wegner aside and advised her
that striking RNs working for temporary agencies would not be
placed at Allina hospitals. Wegner was, therefore, not allowed
to work the shift, and she left the facility.” Obviously, tempo-
rary employment had been available for Wegner at Respondent
Mercy. Else, she never would have been referred there by Fa-
vorite Nurses. She was preparing to commence a shift there.
So far as the evidence discloses, she could have worked that
shift, had Strauman-Raymond, an admitted statutory supervisor
and agent of Respondent Mercy, not learned that Wegner was a
striking Fairview RN.
4. Unlawful conduct attributed to Respondent Unity
Two points bear repeating in connection with Respondent
Unity. First, as described in subsection B, above, it and Re-
spondent Mercy are considered one organization or business
unit within the Allina system. Second, as mentioned in subsec-
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 525
tion C, above, Respondent Unity’s RNs are not, and never have
been, represented by the Union. It is a nonunion hospital.
Thus, it had no direct coordinated bargaining position to pro-
tect. Its only actual interest in that bargaining, and in the treat-
ment of striking Fairview RNs, was derived from being part of
the Allina system and, more specifically, from being paired
with Respondent Mercy as a single organization or business
unit.
In addition to certain allegedly unlawful statements, it is al-
leged that Respondent Unity unlawfully refused to hire for
temporary employment, and refused to consider hiring for tem-
porary employment, four striking Fairview RNs: Diane Fischer,
Gwen Friedlund, Vicki Drake, and Marie Madsen.
Throughout June Respondent Unity temporarily employed
an ongoing series of RNs, as is shown by the invoices collected
in General Counsel’s Exhibit 7. It obtained those RNs from
InteliStaf, Favorite Nurses, Nursefinders, New Horizons, and
Med Staff, Inc. Thus, there can be no dispute about the fact
that temporary work for RNs had been available during June at
Respondent Unity.
As already covered in this subsection, Fischer had been seek-
ing temporary employment in a psychiatric unit. She never
claimed that Respondent Unity operated such a unit. To the
contrary, so far as the record shows, there was no such unit at
Respondent Unity. In consequence, as with Respondents
United and Mercy, there is no evidence that Respondent Mercy
had available the type of work that Fischer had been seeking
during the Fairview strike.
On the other hand, as set forth in subsection E,1, above, criti-
cal care RN Friedlund had been told on June 4, by Rochelle
Crow of Firstat, to “get the heck out of” Respondent Abbott
Northwestern, for no reason other than that she “was a striking
nurse” and “could not work at any contract hospital” which, of
course, Respondent Unity is not. Even so, there is no dispute
that Allina Division Vice President Strange’s June 7 e-mail
instructions had applied as much to Respondent Unity’s opera-
tions, as to those of unionized Allina-owned and –operated
hospitals. Beyond that, Respondents Mercy and Unity are
treated as a single organization or business unit within Allina.
Nothing in the record provides a basis for concluding other than
that Keizer and Carlson’s remarks to Wendy Crow, described
in subsection E,3, above, applied with equal force to Respon-
dent Unity, as well as to Respondent Mercy.
As to alleged discriminatees Drake and Madsen, a different
situation is presented than with regard to alleged discriminatees
who sought temporary June employment through temporary
staffing agencies. Both applied directly to Respondent Unity
for temporary June employment. Thus, Madsen testified that
she spoke with “[t]he individual who hires RN’s [sic] within
[Respondent Unity’s] facility,” whose name Madsen did not
recall. According to Madsen, she said that she “was a striking
nurse” who worked at Fairview and “was inquiring if they were
hiring nurses temporarily during the strike.” In response, she
further testified, that unidentified individual “said no,” and,
“That they would not be hiring striking nurses.”
Similarly, Drake testified that she had seen a Sunday, June
10 newspaper advertisement, stating that Respondent Unity was
offering “a sign-on bonus” for applicants whom it hired. Next
day, she testified, she telephoned Respondent Unity and ended
up speaking with someone whose “name was Kelly I believe.”
After saying that she as “looking for employment,” and saying
that she “was working at Fairview,” Drake testified that Kelly
“said they were not hiring striking nurses.”
One perhaps relatively minor problem with Drake’s account
is that there is no evidence that Respondent Unity employed
anyone by the name of Kelly during June. That point was made
specifically in the amended answer. So, clearly the General
Counsel and Union were on notice before the hearing that there
was an issue regarding “Kelly.” Human Resources Generalist
Caity Eggen testified that she was familiar with the individuals
who worked in the human resources department for Respon-
dents Mercy and Unity, but none were, or are, named Kelly.
No effort was made to show the contrary to have been the fact.
Nevertheless, the telephone remarks described by Drake are
consistent with the June 7 e-mail instructions issued to Allina-
owned and–operated hospitals. Thus, other than the name of
the person who spoke with Drake, the message was an accurate
reflection of instructions to Respondent Unity.
On the other hand, Eggen also testified that Respondent
Unity “didn’t have any temporary openings” during June. She
further testified that Respondent Unity had not sought to hire
any RNs for temporary positions during that month, regardless
of whether an RN-applicant was or was not on strike. No evi-
dence was presented to contradict any aspect of her testimony.
That is, there is no evidence that Respondent Unity, itself, had
directly hired an RN on a temporary or casual basis during
June. There is no evidence that Respondent had “any tempo-
rary openings” during that month.
True, Drake had testified about “an ad in the Sunday paper
June 10th,” in which Respondent Unity had sought applica-
tions. Yet, she conceded that she did not “recall” what kind of
nurses Respondent Unity had been seeking through that adver-
tisement. The advertisement appeared in a newspaper pub-
lished only a few months before the hearing. Newspapers ordi-
narily maintain “morgues” of past editions. Yet, no advertise-
ment was produced at the hearing. Given the absence of any
evidence that applicants for temporary positions were sought by
the June 10 advertisement, and given Eggen’s uncontradicted
testimony that Respondent Unity had no openings for tempo-
rary RN-hires during June, and did not itself hire any temporary
RNs during that particular month, a preponderance of the evi-
dence fails to establish that there had been openings for which
Madsen and Drake could have been hired, regardless of what
had been said to each one by personnel of Respondent Unity.
F. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondent
North Memorial
Throughout June Respondent North Memorial obtained tem-
porarily-employed RNs through temporary staffing agencies, as
shown by review of the invoices collected in General Counsel’s
Exhibit 4: from Medical Staffing Network, Nursefinders,
Firstat, VitaStaff, Interim Supplemental Staffing, InteliStaf,
Favorite Nurses, New Horizons, and PRN. With respect to
those agencies, the complaint focuses on VitaStaff, PRN,
Nursefinders, and Firstat, in connection with Respondent North
Memorial. Moreover, as ultimately amended, it lists nine strik-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD526
ing Fairview RNs as alleged discriminatees in connection with
Respondent North Memorial: Laura Schuerman, Kathleen
Smedstad, Leslie Stoner, Teresa Weidenbacher, Cissy Bryant-
Wolf, Allison Pennington, Marie Madsen, Cris Navratil, and Ed
Moeller. It also alleges a number of statements, some by offi-
cials of Respondent North Memorial and most by representa-
tives of temporary staffing agencies, which allegedly violated
Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
As to the statements by officials of Respondent North Me-
morial, the parties stipulated that, on or about May 25, a three-
page memorandum from Chief Executive Officer Scott Ander-
son—an admitted statutory supervisor and agent of Respondent
North Memorial—was distributed to “the majority of employ-
ees employed by North Memorial at is [sic] Robbinsdale, Min-
nesota acute care hospital.” In general, that memorandum ex-
plained the then-existing bargaining situation and the possibil-
ity of a “Metro-Wide Work Stoppage.” It then listed a series of
questions, and answers to those questions, posed as a result of
the bargaining situation and strike possibility. One of those
questions was, “Will North Memorial hire RNs from striking
hospitals?” The answer recited by the memorandum to that
question is, “It is not our intent to hire nurses who are on strike
at other hospitals, or to hire other employees who have been
temporarily laid off from other facilities.”
In fact, Respondent North Memorial had already communi-
cated some aspects of its position to its six human resources
representatives, employees of Respondent North Memorial who
recruit employees for it, and, possibly also, to its two human
resources coordinators, who provide administrative support to
those six representatives. A memorandum, dated May 24, was
distributed to each of the representatives and, possibly also, to
the two coordinators. That memorandum had been written by
Peggy Reimer, Respondent North Memorial’s human resources
manager and, the parties stipulated, a statutory supervisor and
agent of Respondent North Memorial. The memorandum’s
subject was hiring guidelines during a strike by the Union.
It first instructs recipients to tell applicants who only want to
work during the strike, “We are pursuing candidates that are
looking for permanent employment first,” and invite applicants
to apply for such positions. Should one or more of them apply
for permanent employment, the memorandum continues, “Log
these applicants on the attached log sheet,” but, “Slow the proc-
ess down,” by telling them, “Things are in neutral,” or “Other
things are going on,” or “with summer vacations we are sched-
uling less.” Of course, the allegations of discrimination do not
extend to permanent applicants. The issue for each of the
above-named discriminatees is whether Respondent North
Memorial, as well as all other Respondents, refused to consider
for temporary employment, and refused to temporarily employ,
striking Fairview RNs, because they were engaging in a strike
in support of the their bargaining agent’s contract position at
Fairview.
As to that, PRN Staffing Coordinator Blizen testified that,
during May, “Linda and it may be Ferguson” of Respondent
North Memorial had “advised me not to place striking nurses at
their hospital.” During a later conversation with “Linda,”
which may have been during the strike at Fairview, Blizen testi-
fied that “she stated that they would accept striking nurses if
they had worked there [at Respondent North Memorial] in the
past,” thereby eliminating from consideration, for temporary
employment through PRN, RNs who became employed by
PRN during the Fairview strike or in anticipation of that strike.
Turning to what had been said to Nursefinders, the one in-
stance where there is some indication of possible impropriety
by a striking Fairview RN at a nonstruck hospital involved a
Nursefinders-referred RN. Wendy Crow of Nursefinders testi-
fied that, “during the strike,” she had been contacted by “some-
body from staffing” at Respondent North Memorial, “but I
don’t have a name.” Nursefinders had sent a striking Fairview
RN to Respondent North Memorial for temporary employment.
Seemingly, that RN had been allowed to start working there.
The person who contacted Crow, she testified, complained that
that RN “was discussing the strike with North Memorial’s em-
ployees and upsetting them,” specifically by saying such things
as, “We are going to get more than you guys because you set-
tled early,” testified Crow. As a result, she further testified, she
was told that Respondent North Memorial “did not want that
particular nurse back and that they would from then on not be
taking any striking nurses.”
That was not Respondent North Memorial’s last word to
Nursefinders on the subject. “A few days later,” testified
Wendy Crow, “the same person” from Respondent North Me-
morial called and “said just to let you know we are not accept-
ing anyone from your agency unless they have been with you
for three months.”
No firsthand evidence was presented concerning whatever
comments had actually been made by the RN about whom Re-
spondent North Memorial complained to Wendy Crow. Fa-
cially, comments about getting a better contract, by not settling
too early, hardly seem to rise to the level of misconduct that
would strip an employee of the statutory protection for discus-
sion of union-related subjects at the workplace, as described in
the beginning of subsection E above. Even assuming that that
one RN’s comments did rise to the level of misconduct in the
course of engaging in statutorily-protected activity, without
more, that hardly serves as a basis for depriving other striking
employees of their statutory rights to be hired and to engage in
discussion of union-related subjects at the workplace.
Even “acts of violence on the part of individual strikers are
not chargeable to other union members in the absence of proof
that identifies them as participating in such violence” (footnote
omitted), Coronet Casuals, Inc., 207 NLRB 304, 305 (1973).
See discussion, Altorfer Machinery Co., 332 NLRB 130, 141
(2000), and cases cited therein. There is no evidence here that
any other striking Fairview RN ever taunted any nonstriking
RN from another hospital. There is no evidence of a plan by
striking Fairview RNs to engage in any misconduct. Most sig-
nificantly, Wendy Crow identified the RN, about whom Re-
spondent North Memorial had complained, as Anna Selnick.
She is not alleged as a discriminatee.
In sum, there is no firsthand evidence of strike misconduct or
statutorily-improper comments by Selnick. There is no evi-
dence that any other striking Fairview RN made even similar
remarks to a nonstriking RN. There is no evidence of any plan
by striking Fairview RNs to engage in improper or disruptive
conduct. Selnick is not alleged as a discriminatee. The very
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 527
best that can be said, from Respondent North Memorial’s per-
spective, is that whatever occurred had been an isolated inci-
dent. It is not sufficient to give rise to a cognizable justification
for barring other striking Fairview RNs from being temporarily
employed during June because they were on strike.
Striking Fairview operating room RN Marie Madsen testified
that she had telephoned Respondent North Memorial during the
first week of the strike—on June 4, 5, or 6—and had asked to
speak to whoever was in charge of hiring. She was transferred
to someone whose name she did not recall. Madsen testified
that she told that person that “I was a striking nurse and . . . was
inquiring if they were hiring during the strike.” She further
testified that she had been “told that they would not be hiring
striking nurses.”
She also testified that it might have been that unidentified
individual from Respondent North Memorial who further said
“because they were a contract hospital,” that “it has been de-
cided that they would not be hiring striking nurses during the
strike.” In fact, it seems likely that those remarks had been
made to Madsen during her telephone conversation with Re-
spondent North Memorial’s hiring official. The only other
possibility for someone having made such a remark, she testi-
fied, had been during her subsequent telephone conversation
with a representative of Respondent Unity, as described in sub-
section E,4, above. However, Respondent Unity is not a “con-
tract hospital,” and so, none of its representatives were likely to
claim that “they were a contract hospital”.
As described above, PRN Staffing Coordinator Blizen testi-
fied that she had been told by Linda, whose last name Blizen
did not recall, but believed to be Ferguson, “not to place strik-
ing nurses at their hospital,” and, later, that Respondent North
Memorial “would accept striking nurses if they had worked [at
Respondent North Memorial] in the past.” Striking Fairview
recovery room RN Kathy Smedstad, who had also been em-
ployed for temporary work by PRN for a year and a half before
the strike, testified that, during a telephone conversation about
rescheduling a shift, she had asked Blizen to check with Re-
spondent North Memorial about working a shift there. “She put
me on hold,” testified Smedstad, and when she came back on
the line, Blizen said, “That’s interesting. Unless you have
worked here before North Memorial is not taking striking
nurses.” Despite her length of employment with PRN, Smed-
stad testified, “I did not receive any shifts from then on out” at
Respondent North Memorial.
On June 7 striking Fairview heart center RN Laura Schuer-
man told Blizen that she “was willing to work at North Memo-
rial,” but, testified Schuerman, Blizen “said that North Memo-
rial wasn’t taking any nurses who had not worked there through
an agency before the strike began.” Of course, that also is con-
sistent with what Blizen testified that she had been instructed
by Linda of Respondent North Memorial.
Similarly, striking Fairview newborn intensive care RN
Teresa Weidenbacher was told by Blizen that Respondent
North Memorial “was still accepting nurses who had been there
previously but would not take someone who was going there
new,” Weidenbacher testified. Weidenbacher had not previ-
ously worked there. And at no point did Respondents present
any evidence that there had been some legitimate, job-related
distinction between RNs employed by them before the strike
and those newly employed during the strike. Even so, during
redirect examination Weidenbacher gave testimony that oblit-
erated any possibility of her being found a discriminatee in
connection with Respondent North Memorial. She was asked
specifically if she “would . . . have taken a shift at North Me-
morial if one had been available at that point,” and she an-
swered unequivocally, “No.”
Described in subsection E,1, above is a conversation that oc-
curred between striking Fairview emergency department RN
Leslie Stoner and Firstat day shift Staffing Coordinator Carl
Johnson. During it, Johnson gave Stoner a list of hospitals at
which Stoner “wouldn’t work” because she was on strike. One
of the hospitals Johnson listed was Respondent North Memo-
rial.
In like vein, striking Fairview heart center RN Ed Moeller
testified that when Firstat suggested that he be referred to a
shift at Respondent North Memorial, he “asked them if they
would call North Memorial first before” he went there and was
sent home, as had by then already happened to him at Respon-
dent Methodist, as described in subsection G, below. Moeller
testified that he explained to the person at Firstat, who is left
unidentified, that Respondent North Memorial is “a contract
hospital and I didn’t relish going all over to those places and
then not being able to work,” and the Firstat person said, “I will
get back to you and he did.” When he did, testified Moeller, he
said, “[Y]ou are right, they will not hire you,” after which he
suggested Respondent Abbott Northwestern, as described in
subsection E,1, above.4
Efforts of Christine Navratil and Diane Fischer to obtain
temporary employment through Nursefinders have been dis-
cussed, in part, in subsection E, above. Navratil was consider-
ing employment by Nursefinders, so that she could obtain tem-
porary employment during the strike. But, after she told
Nursefinders’ branch director, Wendy Crow, that she (Navratil)
was a striking nurse, Crow said that “a lot of hospitals were not
hiring striking nurses at that time.” Crow “named a bunch of
hospitals,” testified Navratil, one of which was Respondent
North Memorial. As a result, she further testified, Navratil felt
it would be futile to apply for employment with Nursefinders:
“I just truthfully remember hanging up the phone and thinking
we are screwed. I mean we have no job.”
Fischer, it should be remembered, is a psychiatric RN who
was seeking temporary work in a psychiatric unit. Such a unit
is operated by Respondent North Memorial, as mentioned in
section E,1, above. As also set forth there, she had spoken both
with Nursefinders’ branch director, Wendy Crow, and its staff
manager, Hanson, on June 4 about referral for temporary em-
ployment to the psychiatric units of Respondents Abbott
Northwestern and North Memorial. Crow had said then “that
none of the hospitals were hiring striking [Union] nurses,” testi-
fied Fischer. Fischer pursued the issue on June 15. She testi-

4 In his prehearing affidavit, Moeller had stated that the above-
quoted conversation had pertained to Respondent Abbott Northwestern.
He testified credibly, however, that he had confused the two hospitals
and that the above-quoted conversation had actually pertained to Re-
spondent North Memorial.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD528
fied that she went to Nursefinders and asked Crow, “What did
you find out” about temporary employment in a psychiatric
unit. According to Fischer, Crow responded “that North Me-
morial is not taking any Minnesota striking nurses either.”
Left for consideration, are two striking Fairview RNs who
sought temporary employment at Respondent North Memorial
through VitaStaff: Allison Pennington Haddon and Charlenea
Bryant-Wolf. Both of them spoke about that with Brad
McClintock, the owner of VitaStaff. Pennington testified that
McClintock had told her “that there would be possibilities at
North Memorial,” but later indicated that he had contacted
Respondent North Memorial and “that they were also not tak-
ing striking nurses.”
Bryant-Wolf testified that McClintock had hired her, as a Vi-
taStaff RN, “probably the second week in June,” and “told me
that he wouldn’t have a problem placing me.” She further testi-
fied that “a couple days later” McClintock called and “asked
me if I was interested in working a 3 to 11 shift at North Me-
morial and I told him that I was.” However, “about 1 o’clock
in the afternoon,” testified Bryant-Wolf, she received another
call from McClintock who said “that I was not needed for the 3
to 11 and he asked me if I was interested in working . . . 7 p [m]
to 7 a [m] or 11 to 7 the same day and I told him no.”
A subsequent conversation, testified Bryant-Wolf, began
with McClintock telling her that he had placed a striking Fair-
view RN at Respondent HealthEast, but someone from there
had called “that morning because this nurse had divulged that
she was a striking nurse and that they would no longer accept
her.” According to Bryant-Wolf, McClintock complained “that
if we continued to tell people that we were striking nurses that
he would not be able to place us and he would lose his contract
with those hospitals.” He offered, she further testified, to
“place me at North Memorial and . . . at Healtheast but . . . I
had to keep my mouth shut about being a striking nurse.” In
fact, Bryant-Wolf testified, McClintock “asked me if I would
fill out a new application” for VitaStaff so that “if the hospital
came back to him . . . he could say it doesn’t say that on her
application.” To her credit, apparently Bryant-Wolf declined
that offer to, in effect, falsify her application to pull VitaStaff’s
chestnuts out of the fire.
Now, there is no direct evidence that Bryant-Wolf’s second
week of June scheduled referral to Respondent North Memorial
had been canceled because she was then a striking Fairview
RN. Yet, Respondent North Memorial never presented any
evidence concerning its motivation for that cancellation. And
any inference, supplied for Respondent North Memorial, that it
had no need for an RN runs into a significant obstacle. As
pointed out above, invoices for temporary June referrals to
Respondent North Memorial are collected in General Counsel’s
Exhibit 4. The second week of June extends from Sunday, June
10 through Saturday, June 16. During that week, according to
the invoices, Respondent North Memorial temporarily em-
ployed three temporary RNs (Jennifer Aanenson, Pam Graft
and Darla McGrath) referred by VitaStaff on a total of 6 days.
On a total of 5 days it employed three RNs (Anna Selnick, Shirl
Lachapelle, and Candace Crook) referred temporarily by
Nursefinders. On 7 days it temporarily employed RNs tempo-
rarily referred by Interim Supplemental Staffing. On 9 days it
employed RNs temporarily referred to it by InteliStaf. On 17
occasions during that week it temporarily employed RNs re-
ferred by Favorite Nurses. On 21 occasions it temporarily em-
ployed RNs referred to it during that week by New Horizons.
A total of 16 RNs were temporarily referred to Respondent
North Memorial during that week by PRN. Similar figures are
revealed from a review of the invoices for the following week.
Collectively, they remove any possible argument that Respon-
dent North Memorial had no need for Bryant-Wolf as a tempo-
rary RN during the second week of June. The totality of all
those invoices also remove any basis for a contention that Re-
spondent North Memorial had no need for temporary RNs dur-
ing June.
G. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondent Methodist
The parties stipulated that on May 29 Respondent Methodist
sent copies of a letter to New Horizons, VitaStaff, PRN,
Nursefinders, and Firstat. To the extent pertinent, that letter
informed those temporary staffing agencies that, “All RNs that
you provide must not be a [Union] nurse from another [Union]
represented hospital. We expect that you will honor this.” At
the time the letter had been sent to those agencies, there was no
agreement on contract terms for any of Respondents, save Re-
spondent North Memorial, and each of those six other Respon-
dents had received strike notices.
The letter was signed by Scheduling Coordinator Bobbi J.
Hoebelheinrich, whom the parties stipulated is neither a statu-
tory supervisor nor agent of Respondent Methodist. However,
the letter was sent by her at the direction of Susan Henderson,
nurse manager-float pool, who is an admitted statutory supervi-
sor and agent of Respondent Methodist. Henderson testified
that, as of May 29, “we were anticipating that our hospital
would be striking and many of the other hospitals would be also
on strike. So we . . . had a desire not to have any [Union]
nurses from any other represented hospitals who were striking
work at Methodist.” That, of course, is perfectly consistent
with the coordinated bargaining decisions made by the advisory
or steering committee and by LRB, as described in subsection
D, above.
By June 3, of course, all of Respondents had reached final
agreement with the Union on contractual terms. Once that
occurred, testified Henderson, “Bobbi Hoebelheinrich . . . and I
called all the [temporary staffing] agencies that we use and that
we had sent this [May 29] letter to and let them know
that . . . we would not be able to use the striking nurses from
the Fairview system” only. It seems logical that Henderson
would have done that herself in some instances and, further,
that she would have delegated that responsibility to Hoebel-
heinrich in other instances. However, Hoebelheinrich did not
appear as a witness, though there was no evidence or represen-
tation that she was not available to testify about agencies that
she had assertedly contacted. Her nonappearance turned out to
be significant. At least one temporary staffing agency may not
have been contacted with the revised message described by
Henderson.
Wendy Crow of Nursefinders testified that she had been
called by Hoebelheinrich during late May and that Hoebel-
heinrich had said “that Methodist would not be accepting—as
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 529
of June 1st Methodist would not be accepting any [Union]
nurses.” “Yes, it did,” answered Crow, when asked whether
that instruction had remained in effect throughout the strike.
Henderson was asked specifically about that testimony by
Wendy Crow. “No, that’s not true,” she answered. Yet, asked
whether she or Hoebelheinrich had spoken to Wendy Crow,
Henderson equivocated: “I’m not sure who—I didn’t document
who called who,” but she still asserted, “We called all the out-
side pool agencies that we had sent this letter to and let them
know that we . . . were only not wanting to take the striking
nurses from the Fairview system.” Even so, Henderson never
did claim that she had been the one to purportedly convey such
a message to Wendy Crow or Nursefinders. Obviously,
Hoebelheinrich never testified that she had done so.
There is testimony that Director of Nursing Bev Levens had
reported by e-mail “that all the staffing agencies had been con-
tacted regarding the three month requirement,” discussed be-
low. However, that testimony was provided by Park Nicollett
Health Services Director Dee Spalla, not by Levens. And
Spalla conceded that she was “not” exactly aware of who
Levens had actually called or, even, when she would have
called any temporary staffing agencies. The record is left,
therefore, with Wendy Crow’s testimony, uncontested with
particularity, that Nursefinders had been left to operate through
June under instructions communicated by Respondent Method-
ist’s May letter: “All RNs that you provide must not be a [Un-
ion] nurse from another [Union] represented hospital.”
Indeed, as late as June 5 or 6 Respondent Methodist appears
to have been continuing to struggle to refine its policy toward
striking Fairview RNs. Arthur R. LaPoint is its vice president
of human resources. On June 5 he sent an e-mail, concerning
“RN hiring-important,” to various officials, including Spalla.
In pertinent part, that e-mail states, “I want to reiterate that we
should be very careful not to hire nurses that are participating in
the work interruption at Fairview. I’m going to be getting more
information about the legal limits of this policy tomorrow. In
the meantime, please make no decisions about hiring Fairview
Nurses, even if they are resigning their positions at Fairview.”
Spalla testified that she “manage[s] human resource repre-
sentatives, employment assistants, the manager of employee
relations and the manager of work force development,” which
includes Respondent Methodist’s “nine recruiters.” As to them,
Spalla testified that, “The two that primarily do the recruiting at
Methodist Hospital are Kristine Bohl and T.T. Wen Welborn,”
whose actual titles, like that of all recruiters, are “human re-
source representative.” Bohl was alleged to be a statutory su-
pervisor and agent of Respondent Methodist; those allegations
are denied.
In reaction to LaPoint’s June 5 e-mail, Spalla testified that
she issued her own e-mail, on June 7, that “superseded his e-
mail of June 5th.” The e-mail instructs recipients to “note the
following regarding any Fairview RNs who may be looking for
either a regularly scheduled job or a casual job while on
strike.” (Emphasis added.) In point 1 that follows, Spalla di-
rects that, “We will not hire any nurses who work for FV [Fair-
view] while the nurses are on strike for any position.” (Empha-
sis added.) That last underscored portion plainly shows that
Respondent Methodist, like the other Respondents, was unwill-
ing to even consider striking Fairview RNs for any temporary
position so long as they were on strike. The first underscored
portion creates some doubt about the reliability of some of
Spalla’s testimony.
According to her, “there were not” any temporary RN posi-
tions available for direct hire by Respondent Methodist during
the strike. She buttressed that testimony by explaining that “the
orientation process and the hiring process is very, very costly
and minimally even an experienced nurse is going to take a full
month of full time orientation” to become proficient at Respon-
dent Methodist. Yet, the first underscored portion of her June 7
e-mail, quoted in the immediately preceding paragraph, refers
to “casual” positions; that seems a needless remark if there
truly had been no temporary positions for which Respondent
Methodist would be planning to hire applicants during June.
Beyond that, Spalla acknowledged that Respondent Methodist
“did use temporary staffing” during the strike.
It should be remembered that Twin Cities RNs not uncom-
monly worked full time at one hospital and part time or tempo-
rarily at another during the same overall period. Thus, continu-
ing to work full time at, for example, Fairview would not nec-
essarily bar an RN from continuing to work temporarily at, for
example, Respondent Methodist. In short, the orientation and
hiring process was not inherently wasted, when considering
striking Fairview RNs for direct temporary employment.
Furthermore, point three of Spalla’s e-mail raises some fur-
ther doubt about the genuineness of her claim that Respondent
Methodist was not directly hiring casual or temporary RNs for
no reason other than orientation and hiring costs and duration.
Point 3 pertains to casual nurses from Fairview whom Respon-
dent Methodist already employed. Presumably, those were
part-time RNs who had already been through the hiring and
orientation process at Respondent Methodist. Thus, there
would be no further cost to, or effort on the part of, Respondent
Methodist by utilizing those past-employed part-time or casual
RNs more fully during June. Yet, in her e-mail, Spalla dis-
played unwillingness to utilize those RNs, already oriented and
through the hiring process, to any extent beyond that to which
they had been employed by Respondent Methodist: “If the FV
nurse is already a casual or very PT employee of PNHS [Park
Nicollett Health Service], the hours worked at PN must be lim-
ited to what they would normally work. Managers must be
advised that they should not be given any additional hours.”
In sum, in contrast to the situation at Respondent Unity dis-
cussed in section E,4, above, there is considerable objective
basis for doubting the reliability of any testimony that Respon-
dent Methodist had not been directly hiring part-time, casual or
temporary RNs during June.
Point 2 of Spalla’s e-mail directs, “If the nurse states that
he/she has resigned from FV, the resignation and effective date
must be verified with the FV HR department. We will not hire
any RNs who resign from regular positions at FV but remain on
call.” Spalla claimed that she had been “a poor communicator”
with regard to that direction. She testified that her “intention”
had been “simply to say that we would consider hiring any
Fairview nurse,” but Respondent Methodist would be imposing
“the requirement . . . that they would need to resign from their
position at Fairview.” Yet, there is no evidence that Respon-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD530
dent Methodist had ever previously required proof of resigna-
tion at prior employment, to be considered for employment by
it. Beyond that, Respondent Methodist was not simply satisfied
with a verified resignation from Fairview’s employment. To be
hired permanently, a Fairview RN also had to refrain from “re-
main[ing] on call” at Fairview.
The final point in Spalla’s e-mail instructs, “When using
staffing agencies, the agencies should be advised that we will
not accept any RN who has not worked for the agency for at
least 3 months.” Inherently, that instruction bars, from consid-
eration for temporary employment at Respondent Methodist,
any striking Fairview RN who became employed by a tempo-
rary staffing agency in anticipation of, or during, the strike at
Fairview. In fact Spalla admitted as much. She testified that,
by that instruction, she had intended “to mirror what other hos-
pitals were doing,” by “not accepting nurses from agencies who
were striking nurses who just signed up with the agencies be-
cause they were on strike and needed to supplement their in-
come,” with the ultimate objective being to get striking RNs
“back to the bargaining table if they are on strike because we
felt that it was imperative that settlements be reached that were
similar in economic scope so that they didn’t disadvantage
Methodist Hospital in recruitment and retention issues.”
The question of whether or not Respondent Methodist had
truly been unwilling to hire temporary or casual employees,
altogether, during June arises because of the experiences of
some striking Fairview RNs, each of whom applied directly to
Respondent Methodist for employment. For example, striking
Fairview senior intensive treatment program RN William We-
ber testified that he lives near Respondent Methodist and de-
cided to seek employment there, after the strike had begun. He
spoke with someone in business resources, he believed it was
Human Resource Representative Bohl who, as described above,
was operating under direct instructions from Spalla regarding
hiring. He told her that he “was actually interested in whatever
they had,” whether temporary or permanent position, testified
Weber, and Bohl asked about his present employment situation.
When he told her that he “worked at Fairview Riverside she
asked me if I was on strike,” Weber testified. He continued by
testifying that he responded in the affirmative and Bohl replied,
“That she wouldn’t hire me, that I’d have to terminate at Fair-
view. That the hospitals had an agreement that they would not
hire striking nurses.” Weber agreed that his prehearing affida-
vit makes no mention of Bohl having said Respondent Method-
ist was not hiring striking nurses. Yet, he testified that he re-
called that it “came up in out conversation,” and “had to have
come from her because I had no indication from anywhere that
hospitals were not hiring because we were on strike.” That is
not an inherently implausible explanation. There is no evi-
dence regarding the circumstances of the taking of Weber’s
affidavit and, consequently, no basis for concluding that an
omission of part his conversation with Bohl would naturally
show that such a statement could not have been made by her.
In fact, such a remark by Bohl corresponds to the above-quoted
first part of Spalla’s June 7 e-mail and, as well, to the coordi-
nated bargaining agreement among the hospitals, as described
in subsection D above. Weber appeared to be testifying can-
didly and I credit his testimony that Bohl had said “Hospitals
had an agreement that they would not hire striking nurses.”
A somewhat more involved situation arose for striking Fair-
view newborn or neonatal intensive care RNs Weidenbacher
and Kathy Holm. Through PRN, the temporary staffing agency
that also employed her, Weidenbacher had worked at Respon-
dent Methodist in the past, in its “newborn intensive care unit
called a level 2 nursery and I work just exclusively there,” she
testified. Timesheets reveal that she had worked three shifts
during May at Respondent Methodist. A fourth timesheet
shows that Weidenbacher also working an 8-1/2-hour shift
there on June 11.
That came about, testified Weidenbacher, after she had
sought “a lot more hours full time” from PRN. According to
her, she was ultimately scheduled by Staffing Coordinator
Blizen to work a shift in Respondent Methodist’s newborn
intensive care unit on Friday, June 15. Before that date arrived,
however, Weidenbacher directly contacted Respondent Meth-
odist for possible earlier employment. “I called and talked to a
nurse called Chris,” she testified, to “let her know that I would
be available . . . and to keep me in mind if they were short
staffed.”
She missed an opportunity to do so on June 10, when she ar-
rived home too late to respond timely to a message to take a 3
p.m. shift that day at Respondent Methodist. However, Wei-
denbacher testified, “on the 11th they called again just an hour
before the shift began . . . because they had an emergency, an ill
call, and were down staffed.” In essence Respondent Methodist
had directly contacted an RN about temporary employment.
Still, Weidenbacher told the charge nurse who called to clear
the referral through PRN. Blizen approved it. After she arrived
at Respondent Methodist, and had picked up her security badge,
Weidenbacher testified that she overheard a staff nurse asking
evening Charge Nurse Michelle Gransey why Weidenbacher
was being allowed to work. According to Weidenbacher, she
also overheard Gransey respond to the nurse that there was “an
ill call one hour before the shift,” and that “they were short shift
for that night.”
According to Weidenbacher, Gransey asked whether Wei-
denbacher “was too tired to work a double shift,” and the latter
promised to “get back to [Gransey] when the shift progressed a
little.” That request gave Weidenbacher an idea. “Then I hap-
pened to remember a fellow nurse . . . who also worked for
PRN and that she would probably like to get some extra hours
because of the strike,” she testified. “That was Kathy Holm.”
Not only did Weidenbacher inform Gransey about Holm’s pos-
sible availability, but Weidenbacher called Holm, making her
aware of the need that night at Respondent Methodist for neo-
natal intensive care nurses.
Holm had worked temporarily, through PRN, at Respondent
Methodist, without complaint, since 1999. After Weiden-
bacher’s call, Holm telephoned PRN and spoke with “whoever
[was] answering the phones that night,” she testified, mention-
ing the neonatal RN-shortage that night at Respondent Method-
ist. However, testified Holm, the person to whom she spoke
replied, “Well I have a memo saying we are not supposed to
send Methodist any striking nurses.” When Holm said “my co-
worker is there right now,” she testified that the unidentified
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 531
person said, “I don’t know what to say. I’m kind of caught in
the middle. All I know is Joanne [Blizen] has left a note saying
we cannot send any striking nurses to Methodist.” Thus, Holm
was never referred to Respondent Methodist.
At some point thereafter that same evening, Weidenbacher
testified that she was informed by Gransey that Holm “had
been refused because she was a Fairview striking nurse,” and
that left Gransey without any other nurses for the unit. In fact,
so far as the evidence shows, the shortage led to a drastic result.
No one contested Weidenbacher’s testimony that Respondent
Methodist eventually “closed the newborn nursery where the
mothers who are sick and tired and want to put their babies in
the nursery for a while. They went without that nurse that eve-
ning.”
The above-described situation had repercussions beyond
only Holm being denied temporary employment at Respondent
Methodist. Weidenbacher testified that Gransey “did say that
just recently one of the staff nurses on the unit had gotten
reamed out for letting a Fairview nurse slip by and work,” and
that employment of striking RNs “would not be allowed and I
would not be allowed to return.” “I mean I asked if I would be
able to come back” testified Weidenbacher, and, “She said no.”
Weidenbacher finished her June 11 shift. Next morning, she
testified, she was telephoned by Blizen. Blizen said, according
to Weidenbacher, “I am very sorry you got through. I know
you weren’t supposed to be working there. It just slipped my
mind when you called,” adding, “You won’t be able to go back
there and I’m going to have to cancel you for this coming Fri-
day because Methodist is not hiring any striking nurses,” even
ones “who have been previously with them.” Blizen also said,
“[I]f one of us slipped through again that Methodist was refus-
ing to pay [PRN] for us,” Weidenbacher testified. June 11 was
the last date on which Weidenbacher worked for Respondent
Methodist, though the invoices in General Counsel’s Exhibit 5
show that a number of other RNs worked temporarily for it
after that date.
Also seeking work through PRN was striking Fairview heart
center RN Laura Schuerman. She had been canceled by Hen-
nepin County Medical Center for a scheduled 3 p.m. shift. So,
she testified that she told Blizen that she (Schuerman) “would
be willing to work somewhere else if she could please try and
re-book me.” Schuerman testified that when she suggested
referral to Respondent Methodist, Blizen said that “Methodist
wasn’t taking any striking nurses at all,” not even ones whom
had worked there through PRN before the strike began.
Schuerman further testified that, on the following day, she
asked Blizen “if she could tell me who was directing her to
not—Where the direction was coming from as to not taking
striking nurses, was it coming from the agency or was it com-
ing from the hospitals themselves.” According to Schuerman,
Blizen replied, “[T]hat was the direction of the hospitals, that it
wasn’t their agency making those decisions.”
Another striking Fairview RN who was able to obtain a
day’s work at Respondent Methodist, during the Fairview
strike, was neonatal intensive care unit RN Jill Moy. New Ho-
rizons had been referring her for approximately 2-1/2 years,
“mostly at Methodist,” she testified, without incident or com-
plaint about her work there. New Horizons Staffing Coordina-
tor Sherry Klecker referred Moy to Respondent Methodist for a
night shift on Monday, June 4 and, testified Moy, “I did work
it.” However, Moy testified that when she contacted Klecker
“a couple days later,” for another referral there, Klecker “told
me at that time that she could not place me at Methodist any
more because Methodist will not pay . . . New Horizons for my
time.” The record is quite specific with regard to the origin of
that statement by Klecker.
New Horizons Director-Branch Manager Heinz, Klecker’s
supervisor, testified that “one of our nurses did work at” Re-
spondent Methodist and, in turn, that she (Heinz) had received
a telephone call from Nurse Manager Henderson of Respondent
Methodist. According to Heinz, Henderson “let me know that
over . . . a particular weekend, we in fact had sent her a nurse
from a striking hospital and that if this would happen again they
would not be liable for payment of that person’s work.” It
seems that Henderson was referring to Moy.
Of course, Moy had worked on a Monday, not a weekend
day. Yet, it cannot be said, at least on this record, that Respon-
dent Methodist’s referral-request had not been placed over the
weekend for the Monday work to which Moy was referred.
Significantly, Heinz’ description of Henderson’s warning—
”not be liable for payment of that person’s work”—is consistent
with what Klecker then told Moy: “Methodist will not
pay . . . New Horizons for my time.” Furthermore, the above-
described June 11 remark by Gransey to Weidenbacher—”just
recently one of the staff nurses on the unit had gotten reamed
out for letting a Fairview nurse slip by and work”—may well
have pertained to Moy’s June 4 temporary employment at Re-
spondent Methodist.
Significantly, the incident involving Moy had occurred be-
fore Spalla issued her above-described June 7 e-mail. Point #3
of that e-mail allows previously-referred striking RNs to con-
tinue working for Respondent Methodist, albeit “limited to
what they would normally work,” and “not be[ing] given any
additional hours.” But, there is no evidence that Respondent
Methodist had earlier informed its personnel that striking Fair-
view RNs who had worked previously at Respondent Method-
ist, such as Moy, would be allowed to continue temporary em-
ployment there, albeit with limitation.
Striking Fairview oncology RN Mary Hanger testified that
New Horizons had scheduled her for a shift at Respondent
Methodist on Tuesday, June 5. Before she could report, how-
ever, Hanger testified that “Methodist Hospital canceled my
shift,” even though she had worked at Respondent Methodist,
through New Horizons, prior to the strike. “I wasn’t told any-
thing,” she testified, respecting the reason for the cancellation.
Given the events described in the immediately preceding para-
graphs, particularly Henderson’s warning to Heinz, it is a fair
inference that, like Moy, temporary work at Respondent Meth-
odist was prevented for Hanger because it did not want to con-
sider for temporary employment, or to temporarily employ,
striking Fairview RNs. That inference is reinforced by
Hanger’s testimony concerning what she had been told when
she contacted Firstat on June 7 about employment. According
to Hanger, she asked Coordinator Paula Bachinski “if Method-
ist Hospital was not accepting striking nurses and she said yes,
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD532
that’s true that they were not accepting striking nurses for work
there.”
For her part, Bachinski testified that, “some time in June,”
she had spoken with a staffing coordinator at Respondent
Methodist name Nicole, with whom Bachinski had spoken
before. When she asked about referring an RN there, testified
Bachinski, Nicole “asked me if that employee was a striking
nurse.” Bachinski testified that she answered that she did not
know and was told by Nicole, “[I]f I could not reassure her that
that employees was not a striking nurse that she would not staff
that person.”
It is alleged that two striking Fairview RNs were denied
temporary employment, and consideration for temporary em-
ployment, when Firstat sought to refer them to Respondent
Methodist. Striking Fairview heart center RN Ed Moeller testi-
fied that he actually had received a 3 to 11 shift-referral to Re-
spondent Methodist for June 13, had reported there, and had
been assigned to a Kelly—heart monitors—unit. Before he
could begin working, however, he was told by an unknown
woman, “You have been canceled. Report back down to the
staffing office.” When he reported there, he testified, “a differ-
ent lady” asked if he “was a strike nurse from Fairview.” He
answered in the affirmative and testified that the woman “said
we do not hire or allow strike nurses to work here.”
As had Moy’s above-described referral by New Horizons,
Firstat’s referral of Moeller drew a reprimand of the temporary
staffing agency by Nurse Manager Henderson. Firstat Staffing
Coordinator Johnson testified that Henderson had called and
“said that she was very upset that we sent that person,” whom
Johnson identified as having been Moeller. According to John-
son, Henderson continued by saying, “she didn’t appreciate us
sending somebody who was striking at the time and that . . .
Methodist didn’t want to support the strike in any way.”
The other alleged discriminatee from Firstat is striking Fair-
view emergency department RN Leslie Stoner. As already
discussed in subsection E,1, above, she testified that, on June 7
as she applied for employment by Firstat, Staff Coordinator
Johnson had listed hospitals that would not accept her for refer-
ral because she was a striker. One of them was Respondent
Methodist, she testified. Nevertheless, she was able to obtain
one referral there during the Fairview strike.
That had been, “I believe it was the 20th of June,” Stoner
testified. However, she further testified, when she arrived in
“the emergency department one of the other nurses who hap-
pened to be from Fairview Southdale,” whose union sympathies
were not explored during the hearing, eventually told Stoner
and “also another nurse, Rebecca Davidson . . . that we could
not do any nursing until certain people decided whether or not
it was acceptable for us to be there.” “After about an hour,”
according to Stoner, “we were allowed to work the shift,” but,
“I was never called back for work.” No evidence was pre-
sented that would show that Stoner had engaged in any impro-
priety during that shift. Obviously, she was capable of per-
forming the RN-work for Respondent Methodist.
The final two alleged discriminatees, in connection with Re-
spondent Methodist, are striking Fairview heart center RN
Cheryl Grote and already-encountered flying squad critical care
RN Allison Pennington Haddon. The latter testified that Vi-
taStaff Owner McClintock had initially said “[T]here would be
possibilities” for her to be referred to Respondent Methodist.
However, after indicating to her that he had contacted Respon-
dent Methodist, she was not referred there. She testified that
McClintock “mentioned that they [Respondent Methodist] were
also not taking striking nurses.
Grote had applied for employment with Nursefinders in an-
ticipation of the strike. She was hired by it for temporary refer-
ral. But, when the strike began, and she called Nursefinders to
report “I had lots of hours available,” Grote testified that
Bloomington Staffing Manager Sarah Nietfeld said that Grote
would not be able to go to Respondent Methodist “because I
was a striking nurse.”
Without prolonging this decision further, the temporary em-
ployment situation at Respondent Methodist can be summed up
by simply saying that it employed numerous RNs, referred for
temporary employment during June, as review of General
Counsel’s Exhibit 5 discloses.
H. Unlawful Conduct Attributed to Respondent HealthEast
Respondent HealthEast, it should be remembered, operates
three hospitals—St. John’s Hospital, St. Joseph’s Hospital, and
Bethesda Rehabilitation Hospital—which are encompassed by
its collective-bargaining relationship with the Union for RNs.
During June, all three of those hospitals temporarily employed
RNs referred by temporary staffing agencies, as shown by the
invoices compiled in General Counsel’s Exhibit 6. But, it is
alleged, three striking Fairview RNs—Allison Pennington
Haddon, Stephanie Schaan, and Charlenea Bryant-Wolf—were
not among them, because those three RNs had been on strike
during June. They sought temporary employment through Vi-
taStaff. It is further alleged that, through Firstat, Respondent
HealthEast unlawfully refused to consider for temporary em-
ployment, and unlawfully refused to temporarily employ, strik-
ing Fairview emergency department RN Leslie Stoner. Finally,
it is alleged that Respondent HealthEast refused to consider for
temporary employment, and to temporarily employ, striking
Fairview heart center RN Cheryl Grote, through Nursefinders.
As described in subsection E,1, above, on June 7, after she
had finished the application process at Firstat, Stoner had spo-
ken to Day-Shift Staffing Coordinator Johnson. She told him
that she was “currently on strike” at Fairview. He gave her a
list of hospitals to which she could not be referred, because she
was then on strike. Among the names he enumerated to Stoner
were “Bethesda, St. Joe’s, and St. John’s,” she testified.
Allison Pennington Haddon testified that, “after the 8th, 9th,
and 10th” of June, she had contacted owner McClintock of
VitaStaff and he said “that there would be possibilities [for
referral] at . . . St. Joseph’s . . . specifically.” On June 12
McClintock offered her a 7 p.m. shift-referral to St. Joseph’s
Hospital. However, he made that offer at 6:30 p.m., too late for
Pennington to arrive there on time, given the length of driving
time from her home in Brooklyn Park.
McClintock called her later that same evening and offered
Pennington a night shift at St. Joseph’s. She accepted and ar-
rived for work “about 12:30” a.m. In fact, she did work that
shift. As she did so, she testified, she was told by Nursing Su-
pervisor “Patty,” last name unknown, that “they’ve been short
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 533
on that floor, glad to have the help especially on night shifts
and thought that there would be future possibilities there.”
Regardless of whether or not “Patty” was or was not a statutory
supervisor or agent of Respondent HealthEast, no evidence
contradicts her factual remarks to Pennington concerning the
work situation. But, Pennington was never referred again to St.
Joseph’s Hospital during the strike. “After that night Brad from
VitaStaff called me and said I could not—no longer work at St.
Joe’s until after the strike,” testified Pennington.
Striking Fairview intensive care unit RN Stephanie Schaan
testified that, on Monday, June 18, McClintock “called to con-
firm my availability that evening” for a shift at St. John’s Hos-
pital and, later on that same day, told her “that he was going to
contact St. John’s and he would call me back when he . . . got
their answer.” Approximately 10 minutes later, she continued,
he again called “and said the first thing they asked him is if I
was a striking nurse.” According to Schaan, McClintock told
her that he had answered in the affirmative, adding that she
“was willing to work ICU and telemetry,” but was told “they
would have to check on it and get back to him.” Once more,
testified Schaan, she was called by McClintock, “between 9 and
9:30,” and he “said that he was told that they would not take me
for the night shift.” She further testified that the reason given
to her by McClintock had been that, “I was on strike. That they
wouldn’t accept striking nurses.”
Charlenea Cissy Bryant-Wolf’s situation was discussed to an
extent in subsection F, above, in connection with Respondent
North Memorial. She had been scheduled to work there by
McClintock, but had been canceled, as “not needed,” before she
could report there for work. In a later conversation,
McClintock complained about not being able to place RNs who
“continued to tell people that [they] were on strike,” and ap-
pealed for her to “fill out a new application,” omitting any ref-
erence to her employment at Fairview.
During that later conversation, testified Bryant-Wolf,
McClintock said that “he could place [her] at . . . Health East
but . . . I had to keep my mouth shut about being a striking
nurse,” inasmuch as “he had had a call from Health East that
morning because [another Fairview] nurse had divulged that
she was a striking nurse and that [Respondent HealthEast]
would no longer accept her.” Bryant-Wolf declined to fill out
an, in effect, falsified application. And she was never referred
to Respondent HealthEast hospital during June.
The final striking Fairview RN, alleged to have been dis-
criminated against by Respondent HealthEast, is heart center
RN Cheryl Grote. She sought referral through Nursefinders.
Its Branch Director Wendy Crow testified about a “last week in
May” conversation between “my staffing manager” and Barb
Whalen. Crow did not “know [Whalen’s] specific title but she
is normally the one that we negotiate the [temporary staffing]
contracts with.” New Horizons Director-Branch Manager
Heinz testified that Whalen’s “position is that of a contact if
you will with the agencies that Health East works with
throughout the metro” Twin Cities area. Obviously, insofar as
referrals were concerned, Whalen spoke for Respondent
HealthEast.
As to the substance of Whalen’s statements to Nursefinders’
staffing manager, Wendy Crow testified that Whalen had said
“that she trusted that we would not be sending any striking
nurses to any of the Health East facilities.” That instruction
remained in force throughout the strike, testified Crow. Thus, it
is not surprising that when Grote called Nursefinders about
referrals, she was told by Bloomington Staffing Manager Sarah
Nietfeld that, “I would not be able to go to St. Joe’s . . . because
I was a striking nurse.”
To be sure, the “staffing manager,” to whom Wendy Crow
referred, was never called as a witness to give firsthand testi-
mony about what Whalen had said, though there was neither
evidence nor representation that that staffing manager was not
available as a witness. Still, Wendy Crow’s description of what
Whalen had said is consistent with what Respondent had been
telling the temporary staffing agencies during June about refer-
rals of striking Fairview RNs, as described throughout this
Section. Moreover, Crow’s account, of what the staffing man-
ager had reported Whalen having said, is consistent with Heinz’
testimony about what she, personally, had been told by Whalen:
that “it wouldn’t be appropriate to send people from other strik-
ing hospitals” to Respondent HealthEast.
II. DISCUSSION
Among others, Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees
the rights to assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choice, and to engage in
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.
By this stage in the law’s evolution, no one can argue with any
persuasion that those general statutory rights do not encompass
the more specific right of employees to engage in strikes as a
means of supporting and advancing the collective-bargaining
proposals and positions of their designated collective-
bargaining representatives.
The right to strike is not solely one that Congress has con-
ferred in the interest of employees who choose to engage in
strikes. It is a right which also promotes “the practice and pro-
cedure of collective bargaining,” a statutory objective set forth
in Section 1 of the Act, as a means for eliminating obstructions
to the free flow of commerce. “Collective bargaining, with the
right to strike at its core, is the essence of the federal scheme.”
Motor Coach Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74, 82 (1963).
Therefore, “solicitude for the right to strike is predicated upon
the conclusion that a strike when legitimately employed is an
economic weapon which in great measure implements and
supports the principles of the collective bargaining system.”
NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 233–234 (1963).
In sum, the Act protects employees when they engage in strikes
to support their bargaining agents’ negotiating positions and, in
addition, the Act promotes the right to strike as a means for
furthering the ultimate objective of eliminating obstructions to
commerce, through collective bargaining.
To be sure, like other rights guaranteed by Section 7 of the
Act, the right to strike is not without limitation. Most signifi-
cantly in the context of the instant case, “there is nothing in the
statute which would imply that the right to strike ‘carries with
it’ the right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of
all work stoppages.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,
supra, 380 U.S. at 310. Nevertheless, given the Court’s above-
stated explication of the integral role of strikes in the overall
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD534
collective-bargaining process, great care must be exercised in
evaluating any arguments advanced to justify particular conduct
that would inherently limit exercise of employees’ right to en-
gage in strikes. Indeed, Congress has explicitly instructed that
such care be exercised. Section 13 of the Act states, “Nothing
in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifi-
cations on that right.”
Against the background of those underlying general princi-
ples, there simply is no room under the Act for allowing statu-
tory employers to discriminate against employees for no reason
other than that those employees are on strike. Especially is that
so whenever striking employees are applying to be hired. Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibits specifically “discrimination in
regard to hire,” and “[d]iscrimination against union labor in the
hiring of” employees, when aimed at interfering with, imped-
ing, or diminishing the effectiveness of their strikes against
other employers, “undermines the principle which . . . is recog-
nized as basic to the attainment of industrial peace.” Phelps
Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 185 (1941). The Act
draws no distinction between employees applying for perma-
nent jobs and employees applying for temporary or casual posi-
tions. The same level of statutory protection applies to em-
ployees in both categories.
Nevertheless, Respondents contend that the Act allowed
them to refuse to hire the striking Fairview RNs, under the
principles enunciated in American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB,
supra, and in Evening News Assn., supra. Whatever the merit
of that contention under Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, as discussed
below, the fact remains that the statements made to employees
by some of Respondents and, for the most part, by representa-
tives of temporary staffing agencies, as described throughout
section I,E, through G, supra, independently violated Section
8(a)(1) of the Act.
As to that, Respondents contend, as set forth in section I,A,
supra, that “they were privileged to communicate any policy or
practice to that effect [that the refusals to consider for hire and
to hire arose from coordinated bargaining] to employees and
applicants.” The problem with that argument is that there was
no such communication to any employee of such a “policy or
practice,” in any of the numerous statements described in Sec-
tion I,E through H, supra. In essence, employees were told
merely that striking RNs would not, and were not, being hired
because they were on strike or because they were strikers. But,
in not one of those conversations was anything said to any of
those employees about coordinated bargaining or, specifically,
the relationship between not considering for temporary hire, or
temporarily hiring, striking RNs and the coordinated bargaining
objectives or plans of Respondents. The omission is signifi-
cant.
As set forth above, the Act protects the right of employees to
strike, both in the direct interest of statutory employees and,
also, in the direct interest of furthering the collective-bargaining
process. To tell an employee-applicant that she/he is being
excluded from consideration for hire, and from being hired, for
no reason other than that the employee is on strike or is a
striker, is to say something that has a natural tendency to inter-
fere with, restrain, and coerce employee-applicants in the con-
tinued exercise of the statutory right to engage in a strike in
support of her/his bargaining agent’s proposals and positions
during collective bargaining. Lin R. Rogers Electrical Contrac-
tors, 328 NLRB 1165, 1166–1167 (1999); NLRB v. Lucy Ellen
Candy, 517 F.2d 551, 552 (7th Cir. 1975).
After all, nothing in the Act withdraws its protection from
striking employees simply because they seek employment
elsewhere during their strike. To the contrary, Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act prohibits specifically “discrimination in regard to
hire,” and “any individual whose work has ceased as a conse-
quence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute” is
included expressly in the definition of “employee” set forth in
Section 2(3) of the Act. There is simply no room for an argu-
ment that strikers seeking employment during their strike are
somehow regarded differently under the Act—are relegated to
second-class status—than are other employees who happen not
to be striking when they file employment applications with
employers. It violates Section 8(a)(1) for an employer to tell an
employee-applicant that she/he will not be considered for em-
ployment and will not be hired for no reason other than that
she/he has engaged, or is engaging, in a strike elsewhere.
To be sure, assuming arguendo that Respondents’ refusal to
hire striking Fairview RNs had been lawful, the outcome might
be different had Respondents chosen to explain more fully why
they would not hire, and consider for hire, striking Fairview
RNs—had chosen to explain the coordinated bargaining situa-
tion to employee-applicants, instead of saying simply that they
would not be hired because they were strikers or were on strike.
Then, the refusals would have been placed for employees in the
overall context in which Respondents contend justifies those
refusals and the statements to employees about the refusals to
consider for hire and to hire. That did not occur.
One might argue that so prolonged an explanation to em-
ployees has no precedent under the Act. That would be an
incorrect argument. For example, it is unlawful for an em-
ployer to tell employees that scheduled wage or benefit in-
creases are being withheld or, even, postponed for no reason
other than a pending representation election or, more broadly,
an organizing campaign that is in progress. See, e.g., Gossen
Co. v. NLRB, 719 F.2d 1354, 1356-1357 (7th Cir. 1983); Plas-
ticrafts, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 185, 188–189 (10th Cir. 1978);
Free-Flow Packaging Corp. v. NLRB, 566 F.2d 1124, 1129
(9th Cir. 1978). For, it has long been held, “the vice involved
in . . . the unlawful refusal to increase situation is that the em-
ployer has changed the existing conditions of employment. It
is this change which is prohibited and which forms the basis of
the unfair labor practice charge.” NLRB v. Dothan Eagle, Inc.,
434 F.2d 93, 98 (5th Cir. 1970).
A contrary result occurs, however, whenever the employer
accompanies its announcement to employees, that it is with-
holding scheduled wage or benefit increases because of a
scheduled representation election, with the explanation that it is
merely attempting to avoid the appearance of improperly influ-
encing the outcome of that election and, regardless of its out-
come, the scheduled increases will be implemented following
the election. See, e.g., Green Valley Grocery Outlet, 332
NLRB 1449, 1451 (2000). Addition of the explanation nullifies
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 535
the unfair labor practice that would otherwise be found based
upon a terse announcement that scheduled wage and/or benefit
increases are being withheld because of a scheduled representa-
tion election.
In like vein, it violates the Act to interrogate employees
about their union activity. However, if that is done to verify a
union’s claim of majority status or to prepare defenses for liti-
gation, and so long as that purpose is explained to employees,
they are told that they do not need to participate in an interview,
and they are assured that reprisals will not be visited upon them
for nonparticipation or for answers given, then the explanation
nullifies the unlawfulness that might otherwise flow from the
interrogation. See, e.g., Complas Industries, Inc., 255 NLRB
1416 (1981).
Similarly, accepting for purposes of 8(a)(1) analysis the le-
gitimacy of Respondents’ motivation for the alleged violations
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act, there were no explanations to any
employee of the relationship between strikers and coordinated
bargaining goals and implementing actions by Respondents.
Employees were told only that strikers would not be considered
for temporary employment, nor hired for temporary employ-
ment, because they were strikers or were on strike. As dis-
cussed above, such statements, shorn of any further explana-
tion, violate Section 8(a)(1) of the Act, because they naturally
tend to interfere with, restrain, and coerce exercise by employ-
ees of the statutorily-protected right to engage in a strike in
support of their bargaining agent’s collective-bargaining pro-
posals and positions. It matters not under Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act that there had been no actual intention to accomplish those
purposes by statements made to employees. “The Board and
the courts have long held that the test of unlawful interference,
restraint, or coercion does not turn on the employer’s motive, or
on actual effect.” Lee Lumber & Building Material, 306 NLRB
408, 409 (1992). However, Respondents advance still one
additional defense in connection with the unlawful statements
that striking employees would not be considered for temporary
employment, and would not be temporarily employed, because
they were strikers or were on strike.
Even cursory review of the events described in section I,E,
through H, supra, show that, for the most part, those statements
had been made by representatives of temporary staffing agen-
cies, rather than by supervisors and agents of Respondents. In
the Amended Answer, to the extent pertinent, Respondents
deny “liability for any statements made by employees or agents
of any temporary staffing agency, and further den[y] that any
statements made by employees or agents of any temporary
staffing agency can be used to support an inference relating to
[Respondents’] hiring or staffing policies.” In other words,
Respondents argue, the temporary staffing agencies were on
their own, in connection with any statements their employees or
agents made about not considering for hire, and about not hir-
ing, striking Fairview RNs, insofar as positions at Respondents
were involved. Yet, that is hardly a plausible defense in the
circumstances presented here.
In the first place, there were instances where statutory agents
and supervisors of one or another of Respondents actually made
such remarks directly to employees. For example, as described
in section I,E,3, supra, Respondent Mercy’s vice president,
Wilde left voice mail messages for between one and three RNs,
employees of Respondent Mercy and members of the Union’s
committee, saying “that Respondent Mercy would not be using
striking nurses that were working through temporary agencies.”
Described in that same section is Float Pool Manager
Strauman-Raymond’s statement to striking Fairview RN
Wegner that “striking RNs working for temporary agencies
would not be placed at Allina hospitals.” Chief Executive Offi-
cer Anderson notified Respondent North Memorial’s employ-
ees that, “It is not our intent to hire nurses who are on strike at
other hospitals,” as described in section F, supra.
Secondly, Respondents each obtained temporary RNs
through temporary staffing agencies. And with regard to par-
ticular staffing agencies named for each of them, Respondents
admit, for the most part, that those named temporary staffing
agencies are statutory agents of the particular Respondents to
which those admissions extend. Of course, that admitted
agency extends specifically to the agencies obtaining, screening
and referring temporary employees, particularly RNs, to the
Respondents with which that agency relationship admittedly
exists. Now, “a statement by a party’s agent . . . concerning a
matter within the scope of the agency . . . made during the exis-
tence of the relationship,” is “not hearsay” under Fed.R.Evid.
Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Instead, it constitutes an admission by the
party whose agent made that statement. Therefore, to the ex-
tent that Respondents admit the allegations that named tempo-
rary staffing agencies were one or another’s agents, statements
by representatives of those agencies, concerning hiring of tem-
porary RNs, are statements that are attributable to those Re-
spondents.
Beyond that, thirdly, Respondents can hardly deny that, as
part of their coordinated bargaining plan, they decided not to
accept for employment, both directly and through temporary
staffing agencies, any RNs from members of the coordinated
group where a strike was in progress, as described in section
I,D, supra. That decision was communicated to the temporary
staffing agencies, as described throughout section I,E through
H, supra. Those agencies served as gatekeepers for RN-
referrals to Respondents, including Respondent United, as
shown by General Counsel’s Exhibit 8. Therefore, viewing the
matter from the perspective of RNs employed by temporary
staffing agencies, those agencies spoke with apparent authority
when making statements about qualifications and acceptability
of types of RNs who could and could not be referred to Re-
spondents with whom those agencies had referral contracts.
Indeed, all of the statements made by temporary staffing
agency personnel to RNs, immediately before and during the
Fairview strike, were correct reflections of what those agencies
had been told by one or another of Respondents: striking RNs
would not be considered and would not be accepted for tempo-
rary employment. Accordingly, the situation is not simply one
where temporary staffing agency personnel spoke with apparent
authority. In fact, their statements about consideration for hir-
ing and hiring of striking RNs were rooted accurately in what
those agencies had been told by Respondents.
In sum, temporary staffing agencies screened and referred
RNs for temporary employment with Respondents. Respon-
dents made the appropriate agencies, with which they did busi-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD536
ness, aware that striking RNs would not be considered or ac-
cepted for temporary employment. It had to be perfectly fore-
seeable to Respondents that such statements would be commu-
nicated by the agencies to striking RNs, whenever the latter
were told that they could not be referred to one or another of
Respondents.
In fact, it is difficult to accept that Respondents did not want
the agencies to communicate that message to striking Fairview
RNs. After all, Respondents wanted the RNs to understand that
they had only limited opportunity to support themselves during
a strike and would be best advised to return to the bargaining
table and reach agreement with Fairview. In any event, when
told that they were not being considered for temporary em-
ployment at, and would not be employed by, Respondents, the
RNs naturally had to understand that it was Respondents who
had made that decision, not the temporary staffing agencies
which had nothing to gain by not referring qualified RNs, strik-
ing or otherwise, to their client-hospitals. Therefore, I conclude
that statements to RNs by temporary agency personnel, con-
cerning Respondents’ refusal to consider striking Fairview RNs
for temporary employment, and to temporarily employ them,
are attributable to the appropriate Respondents. By those
statements, Respondents violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
Turning, finally, to the alleged violations of Section 8(a)(3)
of the Act, as set forth above that subsection of the Act forbids
expressly “discrimination in regard to hire . . . to . . . discour-
age membership in any labor organization.” Denial of em-
ployment, and of consideration for employment, for no reason
other than that employee-applicants are striking in support of
their bargaining agent’s bargaining proposals and positions,
tend naturally to deter those employees’ statutory right to strike
in support of their bargaining agent’s contract proposals and
positions. In turn, that discourages those employees’ support
for their bargaining agent. As a result, such denial of employ-
ment, and of consideration for employment, inherently under-
mine the policies and purposes of the Act, as described at the
beginning of this section.
Even so, pointing especially to the decisions in American
Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra, and Evening News Assn.,
supra, Respondents argue that the Act allowed them to dis-
criminate in hiring against the striking Fairview RNs, because
Respondents sought to accomplish no more than to preserve
objectives laid down as part of the coordinated bargaining plan,
described in section I,D, supra, and to aid Fairview in resisting
demands that, if agreed upon, might exceed the coordinated
bargaining goals.
A careful reading of those two cases, as well as of others fol-
lowing them, reveals some language that, taken in isolation,
seems to support Respondents’ argument. “Thus, we cannot
see that the employer’s use of a lockout solely in support of a
legitimate bargaining position is in any way inconsistent with
the right to bargain collectively or with the right to strike,”
American Ship Building, 390 U.S. at 310, given that “there is
nothing in the Act which gives employees the right to insist on
their contract demands, free from the sort of economic disad-
vantage which frequently attends bargaining disputes” (id. at
313), and the further fact that “there is nothing in the statute
which would imply that the right to strike ‘carries with it’ the
right exclusively to determine the timing and duration of all
work stoppages.” (Id. at 310.) In like vein, where a “lockout
was preponderantly designed to force the Union to accept the
Company’s bargaining proposals,” Evening News Assn., supra,
166 NLRB at 221, it cannot be said to violate the Act, because
such a lockout is “grounded upon a very real, direct, and imme-
diate bargaining motivation in its own behalf.” (Id. at 222.)
Yet, a careful reading of those two cases also demonstrates that
isolated phrases and scraps of sentences cannot simply be lifted
out of context and, then, applied broadly to myriad situations.
Both the Supreme Court in American Ship Building and the
Board in Evening News were quite explicit in pointing out that
those decisions were limited. “What we are here concerned
with is the use of a temporary layoff of employees solely as a
means to bring economic pressure to bear in support of the
employer’s bargaining position, after an impasse has been
reached. This is the only issue before us and all that we de-
cide.” American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, supra, 380 U.S. at
308. “Our determination is based on the facts of this case and
is not meant to suggest either that all supportive lockouts are
lawful, or that all lockouts which are intended to pressure a
union into accepting an employer’s legitimate proposals are
necessarily lawful.” Evening News Assn., supra, 166 NLRB at
222. The fact is that there are significant differences between
what had been done by the employers in those cases and, in
contrast, the course pursued by Respondents in the instant one.
First and foremost is the fact that the instant case does not
present a lockout situation. None of Respondents locked out
the permanent and temporary, part-time or casual RNs whom
they directly employed. Instead, they selectively excluded
certain employee-applicants of another, separate employer—
striking Fairview RNs—from temporary employment, and from
consideration for temporary employment, so long as their strike
continued, during a month when each of Respondents was ac-
cepting referrals of other employee-applicants for temporary
employment. Yet, in American Ship Building, the Court quite
plainly equated an employer’s lockout with its layoff of its own
employees: “Whether an employer commits an unfair labor
practice . . . when he temporarily lays off or ‘locks out’ his
employees during a labor dispute to bring economic pressure in
support of his bargaining position.” (380 U.S. supra at 301–
301.) “When work . . . was completed on April 15, the News
notified some of its employees that they should not report for
work until further notice,” the Board likewise stated in Evening
News, 166 NLRB at 220. Thus, Respondents are attempting to
justify their selective refusals to hire, and to consider for hire,
striking employee-applicants, by pointing to cases where the
employers involved had laid off, and consequently locked out,
employees which those very employers employed.
No one could plausibly argue that the Act allows employers
to selectively lay off and lock out only employees who advo-
cate a strike in support of bargaining proposals made, and posi-
tions taken, by their bargaining agent during negotiations with
their employer. Such selectivity, based on activity protected by
Section 7 of the Act, would clearly interfere with . . . impede
[and] diminish . . . the right to strike,” contrary to Section 13 of
the Act. In turn, such a selective layoff and lockout would
frustrate, if not destroy, “the process of collective bargaining,”
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 537
American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 309, by allowing employ-
ers to selectively layoff and lockout employees on the basis of
their sympathies for supporting their collective-bargaining
agent during bargaining. In fact, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally exempted from its holding in American Ship Building
situations where “the employer locked out only union members,
or locked out any employee simply because he was a union
member.” (Id. at 312.)
Here, Respondents pursued the same sort of selectivity, only
through their hiring processes. Throughout the Fairview strike,
they accepted temporary referrals from temporary staffing
agencies, excluding only one category of employee-applicants:
those who were striking in support of the Union’s bargaining at
Fairview. The significance of exercise of that statutory right is
discussed above. The policies and purposes of the Act are
compromised by such conduct, since strikers are naturally de-
terred from continuing to support their bargaining agent, upon
learning that they are being barred from employment for engag-
ing in such a strike. Conversely, Respondents were able to
continue their operations without any of the detriment that a
lockout might entail. For, they were not locking out RNs they
employed, in contrast to the situations in American Ship Build-
ing and in Evening News. Thus, there is a significant difference
between the situations in those, and similar, cases and the one
presented here.
Secondly, layoff-lockout was not the only equation drawn by
the Court and the Board in those cases, and ones that follow
them. “The correlative use of the terms ‘strike’ and ‘lockout’
in” certain sections of the Act was pointed out in American
Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 315. In Evening News, the Board
pointed out that, “Teamster President Hoffa had explicitly
threatened a strike against the News, armed at the time with a
strike authorization by the Teamsters membership against both
papers.” 166 NLRB at 222. Indeed, the Supreme Court pointed
out that it was the existence of the very right to strike that did
not “‘carr[y] with it’ the right exclusively to determine the tim-
ing and duration of all work stoppages.” 380 U.S. at 310. Ac-
cordingly, the right of employers to lockout employees, in sup-
port of those employers’ bargaining positions, is one which
arose only in situations where there was a possibility that those
locking-out employers confronted the plausible possibility of
strikes by their employees. That simply was not the situation
presented to Respondents by June 3, when the Fairview strike
began.
RNs employed by Respondent Unity, of course, were not
represented. At no point had it been confronted with the least
possibility that its RNs might go on strike. It had no bargaining
relationship with the Union and engaged in no bargaining with
it. As to the other six Respondents, at one time each one had
confronted the possibility of a strike called by the Union, in the
course of bargaining for a collective-bargaining contract. By
June 3, however, that possibility had been erased for all of
those other six Respondents. Each of them had reached agree-
ment with the Union; each of those agreements had been rati-
fied by the RNs covered by those agreements. One aspect of
each of those six agreements was no-strike and no-lockout pro-
visions. In sum, as of June 3, and afterward, none of Respon-
dents confronted the possibility of a strike. So there was no
basis for concern on the part of any of Respondents about their
own RNs determining “the timing and duration of [any] work
stoppages.” American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 310.
Third, as of June 3 there was no bargaining impasse, surely
at Respondent Unity, but also at the other six Respondents.
Yet, as quoted above, the Supreme Court specifically spoke of
allowing lockouts in bargaining situations “[a]fter an impasse
has been reached.” (Id. at 308.) Obviously, bargaining agents
do not need to wait for impasse to call strikes. Yet, as pointed
out in the immediately preceding paragraphs, by June 3 none of
Respondents confronted the possibility of a strike. No im-
passes existed in any of their bargaining. All—save, of course,
Respondent Unity which was not party to a bargaining relation-
ship for its RNs—had reached agreements on terms for con-
tracts and those agreements had been ratified. Absence of im-
passe serves to further distinguish the instant case from those
presented in American Ship Builders and Evening News.
Finally, for the most part, as of June 3 none of Respondent
can be said to have possessed any “real, direct, and immediate
bargaining,” Evening News Assn., supra, 166 NLRB at 222,
interest in the Fairview bargaining and its outcome. Certainly,
each of them, including Respondent Unity, could justifiably be
concerned with an outcome that so exceeded wages and bene-
fits being paid by Respondents that, as competitors for recruit-
ment and retention of RNs, Respondents might have to begin
paying more than newly agreed-upon contractual levels. In-
deed, some might even be obliged to re-open the newly agreed-
upon contracts. Even so, Respondents’ positions were no dif-
ferent from that of any employer in an “industry,” using the
terminology of Section 1 of the Act, where its competitor or
competitors might reach contractual agreement on wage and
benefit levels exceeding that of the employer. Nothing in the
Act, and no decision under it, has privileged such an employer
to discriminate against striking employees of competitors, then-
engaged in negotiations, as a means for compelling those strik-
ing-employees to accept less generous wages and benefits than
they are seeking through their strike.
The simple fact is that, during June, Respondents were en-
gaging in a form of secondary activity. They chose to involve
themselves in a labor dispute between the Union and Fairview,
by barring the latter’s striking RNs from temporary employ-
ment, and from consideration for temporary employment, to
support Fairview’s bargaining positions. Yet, no one can plau-
sibly contend that Respondents, or any of them, could have
demanded that they be allowed to participate in Fairview’s
negotiations with the Union, as a means for ensuring that Fair-
view did not reach agreements that exceeded coordinated bar-
gaining objectives. Barring striking Fairview RNs from tempo-
rary employment, and from consideration for temporary em-
ployment, in the final analysis amounted to no more than a
parallel avenue for Respondents to enmesh themselves in the
Union’s negotiations with Fairview. True, Fairview might
agree to terms that someday might oblige one or more of Re-
spondents to have to raise contractual levels, or existing levels
in the case of Respondent Unity, to attract and retain RNs, even
to reopen portions of their then-newly-negotiated contracts.
But, someday did not constitute a direct and immediate situa-
tion during June. In fact, it might not even constitute a real
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD538
possibility, depending upon the type of agreement Fairview
eventually did reach with the Union.
Whatever may be said about the other Respondents, they
point to the me-too agreement between the Union and Respon-
dent North Memorial, as described in section I,D, supra. In
essence, they argue, that agreement surely created a “real, di-
rect, and immediate” interest for Respondent North Memorial
in the outcome of the Fairview negotiations. But, that simply
does not follow. In the first place, the me-too agreement per-
tained only to “the highest salary proposal,” according to Vogt.
There is no evidence showing that negotiations between Fair-
view and the Union had reached an impasse confined only to
salaries or wages. To the extent that their impasse concerned
other bargaining subjects, Respondent North Memorial had no
“real, direct and immediate” stake in them. Yet, its refusal to
temporarily employ, and to consider for temporary employ-
ment, supported all aspects of Fairview’s bargaining positions.
And even as to salaries and wages, certainly Respondent North
Memorial could not have demanded to be included in the Fair-
view negotiations, to support its position under the me-too pro-
vision. Neither should it have been able to reach out and sup-
port its position by barring striking Fairview RNs from tempo-
rary employment and from consideration for temporary em-
ployment.
In the final analysis, Respondent North Memorial purchased
labor peace for itself—exemption from being subjected to a
strike—by making a deal that led to a final agreement. That
allowed it to continue operating free from any type of work
stoppage. The deal was partially based upon a contingency: sal-
ary outcomes at other hospitals then engaged in negotiations.
Respondent North Memorial did not have to agree to such a pro-
vision. Having done so, it ceased to be a player and relegated
itself to the sidelines as a spectator. Having done that, it was no
longer allowed under the Act to continue being a participant, as a
secondary in a labor dispute in which it was not involved. Any
direct and immediate interest it had in that dispute was no more
than the consequence of an agreement which it had voluntarily
made, as part of a collective-bargaining contract that Respondent
North Memorial had negotiated. As a consequence, its role be-
came passive, rather than active.
In sum, the direct holdings of American Ship Building Co. and
Evening News, and their progeny, do not apply to the situation
presented here. That leaves for consideration the issue of
whether they should be extended to a situation presenting coordi-
nated bargaining until all members of the coordinated group have
reached final agreement. Had Respondents locked out their RNs
in support of Fairview, that would more closely parallel what
occurred in those cases. After all, nothing in the Act prohibits
specifically lockouts and, as pointed out in American Ship Build-
ing, there is language that does support the propriety of lockouts
under the Act.
In contrast, there is specific language in Section 8(a)(3) that
prohibits employers from discriminating against employees
through refusals to hire. Moreover, as discussed at the beginning
of this section, striking is an integral component of the Federal
scheme of collective bargaining. Thus, to allow Respondents to
discriminate against the striking Fairview RNs, by refusing to
temporarily employ them and to consider them for temporary
employment, would be contrary to an express statutory prohibi-
tion and, in the process, would place a heavy burden on the statu-
tory right to strike—interfering with, impeding and diminishing
the role of that statutory right in the overall statutory scheme of
collective bargaining.
In addition, to license the challenged hiring actions of Respon-
dents under the Act would be to allow employers to make private
arrangements, among themselves, without consent by the af-
fected employees and their bargaining agents. After all, mul-
tiemployer bargaining requires consent by the bargaining agent to
bargaining on such a basis. “The test to be applied in assessing
the status of . . . a multiemployer unit . . . is whether the members
of the group have indicated from the outset an unequivocal inten-
tion to be bound in collective bargaining by group rather than
individual action, and whether the union . . . has been notified of
the formation of the group . . . and has assented and entered upon
negotiations with the group representative.” (Footnote omitted.)
Weyerhaeuser Co., 166 NLRB 299 (1967). While such consent
is not necessarily required for coordinated bargaining, it should
not escape notice that not only did the Twin Cities hospitals not
bargain through a group representative, but each hospital or hos-
pital-system engaged in individual bargaining and was free to
reach whatever agreement it wished, even one which ignored the
group goals of the coordinated group.
More importantly, once each reached agreement with the Un-
ion, there was no longer any threat of a strike. Each one’s direct
and immediate interest in reaching agreement had been satisfied.
Nothing in the Act, and in Board and judicial interpretation of its
provisions, supply any interest for such an employer in continu-
ing to operate, while at the same time discriminatorily refusing to
hire, and to consider for hire, striking employees of other group-
member employers who continue to bargain. To allow such
action is to rewrite an express statutory prohibition.
Still, Respondents have one more string to their bow of de-
fenses. In FES, 331 NLRB 9 (2000), the Board imposed a three-
element test for evaluating allegations of refusal to hire and of
refusal to consider for hire. The first two are obviously met here:
during June each of Respondents had concrete plans to hire, and
did hire, temporary RNs and, secondly, it is uncontested that
striking Fairview RNs had the experience, training, and qualifica-
tions to perform temporary RN duties at each of Respondents,
save for the limited exceptions enumerated below. The third
element is “that antiunion animus contributed to the decision not
to hire the applicants.” Id. at 12. Respondents point to the ab-
sence of any evidence that any one of them had been maliciously
motivated against Fairview RNs for striking or, more generally,
against the concept of employees striking in support of their bar-
gaining agent’s proposals and positions during negotiations.
No question that animus must be shown to establish a violation
of Section 8(a)(3) of the Act: “to set forth a violation under Sec-
tion 8(a)(3), the General Counsel is required to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that animus against protected conduct
was a motivating factor in the employer’s conduct.” Naomi Knit-
ting Plant, 328 NLRB 1279, 1281 (1999). And no question that,
historically, there has been a tendency to confine the definition of
animus to hostility or maliciousness. Indeed, it usually is the
situation that respondents found to violate Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act did harbor hostility or maliciousness toward statutorily pro-
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 539
tected activities and employees who engaged in it. However, the
fact is that so-confined a definition no longer comports with the
Supreme Court’s more-recent definition of animus.
“We do not think that the ‘animus’ requirement can be met
only by maliciously motivated, as opposed to assertedly benign
(though objectively invidious) discrimination.” Bray v. Alexan-
dria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269–270 (1993). To
be sure, that was not a case arising under the Act, nor even a
labor case. Even so, that portion of Bray did involve an assertion
of discrimination. Over the last 30 years, a greater number of
protected classes have emerged, with accompanying prohibitions
of discrimination against them because of their protected status.
As a result, there has been during that period an understandable
effort to align the methodology for evaluating allegations of all
types of discrimination. See, e.g., Schaeff Inc. v. NLRB, 113 F.3d
264 fn. 5 (D.C. Cir. 1997). So, methodological analysis in one
area of discrimination cannot simply be ignored whenever allega-
tions of other types of discrimination, including under the Act,
are addressed. Certainly, nothing inherent in the Act or its inter-
pretation precludes the “motivated by a purpose (malevolent or
benign)” definition of animus from application when evaluating
discrimination allegations under the Act. After all, “a piece of
fruit may well be bruised without being rotten to the core.” Coo-
per v. Federal Reserve Branch of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 880
(1984).
Here, Respondents had an overall objective which is allowable
under the Act and can only be relegated to the category of be-
nign: they sought to coordinate their bargaining so that common
goals could be achieved to the extent possible, through individual
bargaining. Nothing in the Act prohibits parties—employers or
unions bargaining simultaneously for employees of more than
one employer in an industry—from using that approach to bar-
gaining. Rather than attempting to accomplish that through such
allowable action as lockout, however, Respondents agreed to
single out strikers and refuse to hire, and to consider them for
hire, so long as they remained on strike against one or more of
the coordinated group. Had there been a whipsaw strike or had
none of Respondents reached agreement with the Union, refusals
to hire and to consider for hire might have been allowable, al-
though it is important to keep in mind the narrowness of the Su-
preme Court’s and Board’s holding, as quoted above. Those are
situations that need not be resolved, for the situation here is en-
tirely different.
Respondent Unity had no bargaining relationship. All other
Respondents had reached agreement with the Union. No longer
were any of them confronted with a strike situation. While each
has relatively long-term concerns about possible contract terms to
which Fairview might agree, none any longer had a real, direct
and immediate interest in the bargaining outcome between the
Union and Fairview. Hiring discrimination is prohibited ex-
pressly by the Act. Therefore, while the ultimate objective of
coordinated bargaining goals is benign, the challenged actions
taken by Respondents, discrimination only against employees
striking in support of their bargaining agent’s proposals and posi-
tions during negotiations, were not benign. They engaged in
activity prohibited expressly by the Act.
In the context presented by the instant case, there is no statuto-
rily countenanced collective-bargaining policy that would justify
disregarding that express statutory prohibition. Inherently, Re-
spondent’s actions frustrated, and had the potential to destroy,
“the process of collective bargaining.” American Ship Building
Co. v. NLRB, supra, 380 U.S. at 309. Any statutory legitimacy
for those actions is outweighed by the inherent harm to statutory
protection granted employees and the collective-bargaining proc-
ess. Therefore, I conclude that by refusing to consider striking
Fairview RNs for temporary employment and, further, by refus-
ing to temporarily employ them, for no reason other than that
they were on strike at another employer, during a period when
each of Respondents was temporarily employing numerous other
RNs in positions for which no one contends that any of the strik-
ing Fairview RNs were not qualified, Respondent violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(3) of the Act.
That conclusion is not without exception concerning some of
the alleged discriminatees. As set forth in section I,E,1, supra,
Nursefinders had no contract to refer temporary RNs to Respon-
dent Abbott Northwestern. So far as the evidence shows,
Nursefinders did not intend to refer anyone to Respondent Abbott
Northwestern without such a contract. Christine Navratil and
Diane Fischer contacted only Nursefinders for employment at
Respondent Abbott Northwestern. Thus, there is no basis for
concluding that Respondent Abbott Northwestern refused to
consider for temporary employment, or to temporarily employ,
either Navratil or Fischer. In addition, Fischer sought temporary
employment as a psychiatric nurse. But, Respondents United,
Mercy and Unity did not operate psychiatric units. So, there is no
basis for concluding that any one of them refused temporary
employment to Fischer for the position in which she was seeking
to be temporarily employed during the Fairview strike. Further,
no evidence tends to contradict the credible testimony that Re-
spondent Unity was not directly hiring part-time or casual nurses
during June, in contrast to the unreliable like account in connec-
tion with Respondent Methodist, as described in section I,G,
supra. Both Vicki Drake and Marie Madsen applied directly to
Respondent Unity for temporary employment. Inasmuch as there
is nothing contradicts the evidence that Respondent Unity was
not directly hiring part-time or casual employees during June,
there were no positions available there for either Drake or
Madsen. Finally, Teresa Weidenbacher admitted that she would
not have accepted employment at Respondent North Memorial,
even had it been offered to her, as described in section I,F, supra.
Therefore, I shall dismiss these particular discrimination allega-
tions with regard to those striking Fairview RNs.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Allina Health System d/b/a Abbott Northwestern Hospital
has committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce by
refusing to consider for temporary employment and by refusing
to temporarily employ, during June 2001, Leslie Stoner, Gwen D.
Friedlund, Allison Pennington Haddon, and Lorrie L. LaForge
because each of them was on strike against another employer, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by telling
employees that strikers would not be considered for temporary
employment, and would not be temporarily employed, because
they were participating in a strike against another employer, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, it has not been
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD540
shown to have violated the Act by discriminating against Chris-
tine Navratil or Diane Fischer.
2. Allina Health System d/b/a Mercy Hospital has committed
unfair labor practices affecting commerce by refusing to consider
for temporary employment and by refusing to temporarily em-
ploy, during June 2001, Gwen D. Friedlund and Rebecca Wegner
because each of them was on strike against another employer, in
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by telling
employees that strikers would not be considered for temporary
employment, and would not be temporarily employed, because
they were participating in a strike against another employer, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, it has not been
shown to have violated the Act by discriminating against Diane
Fischer.
3. North Memorial Healthcare d/b/a North Memorial Medial
Center has committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce
by refusing to consider for temporary employment and by refus-
ing to temporarily employ, during June 2001, Marie Madsen,
Kathy Smedstad, Laura Schuerman, Leslie Stoner, Ed Moeller,
Christine Navratil, Diane Fischer, Allison Pennington Haddon,
and Charlenea Bryant-Wolf because each of them was on strike
against another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
of the Act, and by telling employees that strikers would not be
considered for temporary employment, and would not be tempo-
rarily employed, because they were participating in a strike
against another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. However, it has not been shown to have violated the Act by
discriminating against Teresa Weidenbacher.
4. Methodist Hospital, Park Nicollett Health Services has
committed unfair labor practices affecting commerce by refusing
to consider for temporary employment and by refusing to tempo-
rarily employ, during June 2001, William Weber, Teresa Wei-
denbacher, Kathy Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary
Hanger, Ed Moeller, Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, and Allison
Pennington Haddon because each of them was on strike against
another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act, and by telling employees that strikers would not be consid-
ered for temporary employment, and would not be temporarily
employed, because they were participating in a strike against
another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act.
5. HealthEast d/b/a HealthEast Care System has committed
unfair labor practices affecting commerce by refusing to consider
for temporary employment and by refusing to temporarily em-
ploy, during June 2001, Leslie Stoner, Allison Pennington Had-
don, Stephanie Schaan, and Charlenea Bryant-Wolf because each
of them was on strike against another employer in violation of
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by telling employees that
strikers would not be considered for temporary employment, and
would not be temporarily employed, because they were partici-
pating in a strike against another employer, in violation of Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act.
6. Allina Health System d/b/a Unity Hospital has committed
unfair labor practices affecting commerce by refusing to consider
for temporary employment and by refusing to temporarily em-
ploy, during June 2001, Gwen D. Friedlund because she was on
strike against another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act, and by telling employees that strikers would
not be considered for temporary employment, and would not be
temporarily employed, because they were participating in a strike
against another employer, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the
Act. However, it has not been shown to have violated the Act by
discriminating against Diane Fischer, Vicki Drake, or Marie
Madsen.
7. Allina Health System d/b/a United Hospital has committed
unfair labor practices affecting commerce by refusing to consider
for temporary employment and by refusing to temporarily em-
ploy, during June 2001, Christine Navratil and Gwen D. Fried-
lund because each of them was on strike against another em-
ployer, in violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act, and by
telling employees that strikers would not be considered for tem-
porary employment, and would not be temporarily employed,
because they were participating in a strike against another em-
ployer, in violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. However, it has
not been shown to have violated the Act by discriminating
against Diane Fischer.
REMEDY
Having concluded that each of Respondents has engaged in
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that each one be or-
dered to cease and desist therefrom and, further be ordered to
take certain affirmative action to effectuate the policies of the
Act. With respect to the latter, each of Respondents shall be
ordered to make whole the employees named for it in the Con-
clusions of Law above for any loss of earnings and other bene-
fits suffered as a result of the discrimination against her or him,
with backpay to be computed on a quarterly basis, making de-
ductions for interim earnings, F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB
289 (1950), and with interest to be paid on amounts owing, as
computed in New Horizons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173
(1987). Each of Respondents also shall, within 14 days from
the date of this Order, remove from its files any reference to the
unlawful refusals to consider for temporary employment and
the unlawful refusals to temporarily employ each of the em-
ployees named for it in the Conclusions of Law above and,
within 3 days thereafter, notify that employee or those employ-
ees in writing that this has been done and that those refusals
will not be used against her/him in any way. Finally, because
almost all of the unlawful discrimination involved temporary
staffing agencies, each of Respondents shall sign and return to
the Regional Director for Region 18 sufficient copies of the
notice, which each of Respondents is posting, for posting by the
temporary staffing agencies, they being willing, involved in its
refusal to consider for temporary employment and to temporar-
ily employ striking RNs, as described with specificity in the
Order.
[Recommended Order omitted from publication, except ap-
pendices A and D.]
APPENDIX A
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
ABBOTT NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL 541
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider employees
for temporary employment, and will not hire employees tempo-
rarily, because they are strikers or are on strike against another
employer.
WE WILL NOT refused to consider for temporary employment,
refuse to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise dis-
criminate against Leslie Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund, Allison
Pennington Haddon, Lorrie L. LaForge, or any other employee,
because of participation in a strike in support of bargaining
proposals and positions of Minnesota Nurses Association, or
any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce you in the exercise of your rights protected by
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make Leslie Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund, Allison
Pennington Haddon, and Lorrie L. LaForge whole for any loss
of earnings and other benefits resulting from our unlawful re-
fusals to consider them for temporary employment and from
our unlawful refusals to hire them for temporary employment
during June 2001, less any net interim earnings, plus interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the unlawful
refusals to consider for temporary employment and to the
unlawful refusals to hire for temporary employment Leslie
Stoner, Gwen D. Friedlund, Allison Pennington Haddon, and
Lorrie L. LaForge, and WE WILL, within 3 days thereafter, no-
tify each of them in writing that this has been done, and that
those unlawful refusals, to consider any of them for temporary
employment and to hire any of them for temporary employ-
ment, will not be used against any of them in any way.
ALLINA HEALTH SYSTEM D/B/A ABBOTT
NORTHWESTERN HOSPITAL
APPENDIX D
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated
Federal labor law and has ordered us to post and obey this no-
tice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and
protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities.
WE WILL NOT tell you that we will not consider employees
for temporary employment, and will not hire employees tempo-
rarily, because they are strikers or are on strike against another
employer.
WE WILL NOT refuse to consider for temporary employment,
refuse to hire for temporary employment, or otherwise dis-
criminate against William Weber, Teresa Weidenbacher, Kathy
Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary Hanger, Ed Moeller,
Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, Allison Pennington Haddon, or
any other employee, because of participation in a strike in sup-
port of bargaining proposals and positions of Minnesota Nurses
Association, or any other union.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain or coerce you in the exercise of your rights protected by
the National Labor Relations Act.
WE WILL make William Weber, Teresa Weidenbacher, Kathy
Holm, Laura Schuerman, Jill Moy, Mary Hanger, Ed Moeller,
Leslie Stoner, Cheryl Grote, and Allison Pennington Haddon
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits resulting from
our unlawful refusals to consider them for temporary employ-
ment and our unlawful refusals to hire them for temporary em-
ployment during June 2001, less any net interim earnings, plus
interest.
WE WILL remove from our files any reference to the unlawful
refusals to consider for temporary employment and to the
unlawful refusals to hire for temporary employment William
Weber, Teresa Weidenbacher, Kathy Holm, Laura Schuerman,
Jill Moy, Mary Hanger, Ed Moeller, Leslie Stoner, Cheryl
Grote, and Allison Pennington Haddon, and WE WILL within 3
days thereafter notify each of them in writing that this has been
done, and that those unlawful refusals, to consider any of them
for temporary employment and to hire any of them for tempo-
rary employment, will not be used against any of them in any
way.
METHODIST HOSPITAL, PARK NICOLLETT HEALTH
SERVICES