A & B Janitorial Service

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Nov 28, 1980

253 N.L.R.B. 508 (N.L.R.B. 1980)

DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Rosa M. Alexander d/b/a A & B Janitorial Service
and Public Service Employees' Local 572, affili-
ated with Laborers' International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, and Olivia Wiggins
and Brenda Bennett and Patricia Patterson
Rosa M. Alexander d/b/a A & B Janitorial Service
and National Association of Government Work-
ers and Public Service Employees' Local 572,
affiliated with Laborers' International Union of
North America, AFL-CIO, Party to the Con-
tract. Cases 5-CA-11612, 5-CA- 11643, 5-CA-
11643-2, 5-CA-11658, and 5-CA-11716
November 28, 1980
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN FANNING AND MEMBERS
PENEI.I.O AND ZIMMERMAN
August 14, 1980, Administrative Law Judge Jo-
sephine H. Klein issued the attached Decision in
this proceeding. Thereafter, Respondent filed ex-
ceptions and a supporting brief.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board has delegated its au-
thority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the at-
tached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief
and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings,'
and conclusions2 of the Administrative Law Judge
and to adopt her recommended Order, as modi-
fied3 below:
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Re-
lations Board adopts as its Order the recommended
Order of the Administrative Law Judge, as modi-
fied below, and hereby orders that the Respondent,
Rosa M. Alexander d/b/a A & B Janitorial Serv-
ice, Portsmouth, Virginia, her agents, successors,
or assigns, shall take the action set forth in the said
recommended Order, as so modified:
1. Insert the following as paragraph 2(e) and re-
letter the subsequent paragraphs accordingly:
i Respondent has excepted to certainl credibility findings made by the
Administrative Law Judge. It is the Board's established policy notl to
overrule an administrative law judge's resolutions with respect to credi-
bility unless the clear preponderance of all of the relevant evidence con-
vinces us that the resolutions are incorrect. Standard Dry Wall Products.
Inc., 91 NLRB 544 (195)), enfd. 188 F2d 362 (3d 1951). We have care-
fully examined the record and find no for reversing her findings.
2In adopting the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that Patricia
Patterson was unlawfully discharged, we find it unnecessary to reach or
pass on her further observation that such conclusion would follow even
if Patterson was found Io be a supervisor. In this connection, we note
that Patterson's nonsupervisory status was stipulated.
a We have modified the Administrative Law Judge's recommended
Order to conform to her findings.
253 NLRB No. 64
"(e) Rescind any existing rule prohibiting solici-
tation by employees at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard
in Portsmouth, Virginia, and remove from the
premises of said shipyard any notice or other docu-
ment containing such prohibition."
2. Substitute the attached notice for that of the
Administrative Law Judge.
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPIOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR REIATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
After a hearing at which all sides had an opportu-
nity to present evidence and state their positions,
the National Labor Relations Board found that I
have violated the National Labor Relations Act, as
amended, and has ordered me to post this notice.
The Act gives employees the following rights:
To engage in self-organization
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choice
To engage in activities together for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection
To refrain from the exercise of any or all
such activities.
I WIIL NOT question you concerning your
attendance at union meetings or your engaging
in any other union activities.
I W.I. NOT do anything that gives the im-
pression that I am keeping a watch on the
union activities of any of my employees.
I Will. NOT threaten that any employees
will be or may be discharged for joining or
failing to join any union or for engaging in any
union activities.
I WILl. NOT promise you any benefits for re-
fraining from engaging in activity on behalf of
any union.
I Wl.l. NOT tell you that any employee has
been, is being, or may be discharged for solic-
iting on behalf of any union or for engaging in
any other union activities.
I WIl.l. NOT issue, maintain, or enforce any
rule or policy prohibiting my employees from
soliciting on behalf of or in opposition to any
union during their nonworking time at the
Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Vir-
ginia.
I w.i. NOT discharge or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any employees for soliciting on
508
A & B JANITORIAL SERVICE
behalf of or against any union during their
nonworking time, or for engaging in any other
union activities.
I WILL NOT recognize Public Service Em-
ployees' Local 572, affiliated with Laborers'
International Union of North America, AFL-
CIO, as representing my employees and I
Wil.l NOT enter or apply any collective-bar-
gaining agreement with that Union unless and
until it is certified by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board as the exclusive collective-bargain-
ing representative of my employees pursuant
to Section 9(c) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, as amended.
I WIl.l NOT deduct or withhold from the
wages of any of my employees any money for
the payment of union dues, fees, or assess-
ments, except pursuant to employees' written
authorizations conforming to the provisions of
the Act.
I WIL.L NOT in any other manner interfere
with, restrain, or coerce my employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed them in Sec-
tion 7 of the Act.
I WItI. offer George P. Williams, Patricia
Patterson, Brenda Bennett, and Olivia Wiggins
immediate and full reinstatement to their
former positions, or, if those positions no
longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority and
other rights and privileges, and I WILL com-
pensate them for any wages they lost, with in-
terest, as a result of my having discharged
them in October 1979.
I wlll. remove from my records and de-
stroy any reference to the discharges of the
persons named above.
I WILL reimburse past and present employ-
ees for any union dues or fees heretofore de-
ducted from their wages, with interest.
I WILL rescind my existing rule prohibiting
solicitation by my employees at the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, and
WI.i. remove from the premises of the Ship-
yaid any notice or other document containing
such prohibition.
ROSA M. AI.EXANDLFR D/B/A A & B
JANITORIAL SERVICE
DECISION
JOSEIPHINE H. KIN, Administrative Law Judge: Pur-
suant to a charge and an amended charge filed by Public
Service Employees' Local 572, a/w Laborers' Interna-
tional Union of North America, AFL-CIO (Local 572),
on October 22 and November 30, 1979,' respectiely, a
complaint was issued on December 10 against Rosa M.
Alexander d/b/a A & B Janitorial Service (herein Re-
spondent), alleging that on or about October 17 Re-
spondent unlawfully interrogated employees in violation
of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act2 and terminated the em-
ployment of George Williams in violation of Section
8(a)(3) and (1). (Case 5-CA-11612.) Pursuant to a charge
filed by Olivia Wiggins on October 29 and amended on
December 12, a complaint was issued on December 13.
alleging that on or about October 18 and 19 Respondent
threatened employees with loss of employment if they
supported the National Association of Government
Workers (NAGW) and on October 22 terminated Wig-
gins' employment in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. (Case 5-CA- 11643.) Then, pursuant to a charge and
an amended charge filed by Brenda Bennett on October
30 and December 12, respectively, a complaint was
issued on December 17, alleging that on October 22 Re-
spondent unlawfully interrogated employees and discri-
minatorily discharged Bennett. (Case 5-CA-11643-2). A
charge and an amended charge filed by Patricia Patter-
son on November 2 and December 10, respectively, led
to the issuance of a complaint on December 20, alleging
that on or about October 17 Respondent discharged Pat-
terson in violation of Section 8(a)(I).a (Case 5-CA-
11658.) A charge and amended charge filed on Novem-
ber 26 and January 11, 1980, respectively, by NAGW
led to issuance on January 22, 1980, of a complaint alleg-
ing that Respondent committed additional violations of
Section 8(a)(l) between October 16 and 19 and on No-
vember 17, and additionally violated Section 8(a)(2) on
November 15 by recognizing Local 572 as the bargaining
representative of Respondent's employees and entering
into a collective-bargaining agreement with Local 572.
(Case 5-CA-11716.) Thereupon, on March 18, 1980, the
complaints were consolidated for hearing. The com-
plaints were amended on April 24, 1980. Answers to the
complaints were duly filed.
Pursuant to due notice, a hearing was held before me
in Norfolk, Virginia, on May 8, 1980. The General
Counsel, Respondent, and Charging Parties Patterson,
Bennett, and Williams were represented by counsel.
Local 572, Charging Party and Party to the Contract,
was represented by its business manager. All parties were
granted full opportunity to present oral and written evi-
dence and argument, and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, oral argu-
ment was waived. Since the hearing, the General Coun-
sel has filed a complete brief and Respondent has filed a
short memorandum addressed only to the issue of the
Board's jurisdiction over Respondent.
Except where otherwise specified, all dates herein are in 197
National Labor Relations Act. as amended. 29 lUSC § 151, e w'q.
' The complaint originally alleged that Patterson as a superisor
When that allegation as denied by Respondent's counsel In his ansxer
to the complaint and orally at the hearing. it was stipulated that I'aier-
son was a nonsupervisory employee and the complaint ",as amended Io
allege Patters)ns termination as violalive of Sec. 8(a)(3)
509
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Upon the entire record,4 together with careful obser-
vation of the witnesses and consideration of the briefs, I
make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
A. The Employer
Respondent, a sole proprietorship, is engaged in pro-
viding janitorial services to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard
in Portsmouth, Virginia (the Shipyard). She has con-
tracts with the Small Business Administration, a United
States Government agency, including a contract valued
in excess of $1,900,000 to perform janitorial services at
the Shipyard, where Navy military ships are maintained
and repaired. Thus, Respondent's operations have a sub-
stantial impact on national defense and the Board will
assume jurisdiction without reference to any other juris-
dictional standards. Geronimo Service Company, 129
NLRB 366 (1960); Ready Mixed Concrete & Materials,
Inc., 122 NLRB 318, 319, 320 (1958).
The General Counsel also established that, as alleged,
during the preceding 12 months, Respondent purchased
products, goods, and materials valued in excess of $5,000
from other enterprises located within the Commonwealth
of Virginia, each of which other enterprises had received
the said "products, goods, and materials directly from
points outside the State of Virginia." Ray Gallop, a sales-
man for G & A Distributing, testified that in May
through December 1979 he sold to Respondent supplies
valued at approximately $52,000, a minimum of about 60
percent of which supplies G & A had received directly
from points outside Virginia. In August 1979 G & A sold
to Respondent one order of goods valued at $20,000,
which was part of shipments valued at $30,000 that G &
A had received directly from points outside Virginia.
Additionally, invoices placed in evidence after the hear-
ing, pursuant to leave granted, show goods valued at ap-
proximately $8,000 apparently shipped to Respondent in
April, May, and July 1979 directly from points outside
Virginia.
Based on these undisputed facts,5 it is found that Re-
spondent is an employer subject to the Act and that it
will effectuate the policies of the Act for the Board to
assume jurisdiction over Respondent. See Trico Disposal
Service, Inc., 191 NLRB 104, 105 (1971), and cases cited
therein. 8
4 As amended by an order issued simultaneously herewith correcting
the transcript in minor respects, including a correction requested in an
unopposed motion by the General Counsel.
5Although it was not essential for the General Counsel to establish the
allegation in the complaints that Respondent had a direct inflow of mate-
rials valued in excess of $50,000 the evidence probably supports that alle-
gation.
6 In opposition to the assumption of jurisdiction in this case, Respond-
ent cites Schauffler v Philadelphia Window Cleaners and Maintenance
Workers Union Local 125, 196 F.Supp. 396 (D.C. Pa. 1961), in which the
court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction an action for an injunction under
Sec. 10(l) of the Act. In the underlying unfair labor practice case, howev-
er, the Board assumed jurisdiction over the Employer on the basis of a
relatively small amount of work performed for the Signal Corps. Phila-
delphia Window Cleaners. etc.. Local 125 (Atlantic Maintenance Col. 136
NLRB 1104, 1107-08 (1962).
B. The Labor Organizations
I. Local 572 is, and was at all material times, a labor
organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the
Act.
2. NAGW is, and was at all material times, a labor or-
ganization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
II1. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Background and Chronology
This section of the Decision contains a summary chro-
nology of the major events involved. The facts here
stated are generally not in dispute. Detailed findings,
with credibility resolutions where needed, are set forth in
the ensuing section 11, B.
Respondent is a subcontractor of the Small Business
Administration pursuant to Section 8(a) of the Small
Business Act.7 The contract here involved calls for jani-
torial services at the approximately 500 buildings in the
Norfolk Naval Shipyard (the Shipyard) in Portsmouth,
Virginia.8 Respondent's contract began on May 1, 1979,
when she replaced the former contractor, Kentucky
Building Maintenance. Respondent's contract was for 1
year, through April 30, 1980, later extended through
April 30, 1981. She employs some 210 to 280 persons for
work at the Shipyard. Alexander herself works full time
at the Shipyard, entrusting supervision under her other
contracts to Winzolla Smith, a contract manager. Direct-
ly under her at the Shipyard are two "contract manag-
ers"-her son, Thaddeus Bennett, and Theron Bumpers.9
There also are three inspectors, who apparently report to
the contract managers. There are 15 persons designated
"supervisors," who are in regular immediate contact
with the employees. Employees clock in and out in Alex-
ander's office and are transported by a bus operated by
Respondent between that location and the buildings
where they work. Alexander's office is several miles
from some of the buildings serviced.
Early in June, employee George Williams spoke to
Helen Artis, business manager of Local 572, concerning
the possibility of organizing Respondent's employees at
the Shipyard. Kentucky Maintenance's employees at the
Shipyard had been represented by Local 572. Williams
received authorization cards from Artis and returned ex-
ecuted cards to her. It does not appear what the cards
said or how many were executed.
In June, having learned of the union activity, Alexan-
der called an employee meeting. In attempting to dis-
15 U SC. Sec. 637(a)(1).
Respondent also holds or held contracts for janitorial services for
Navy commissaries in Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Virginia Beach, Virgin-
ia, from December 1, 1978, through November 30, 1979, extended
through November 30, 1980; Building 3175 at the Naval Amphibious
Base, Little Creek. Virginia Beach. from April 11, 1979, through April
1(1, 1980. then extended through April 10, 1981; Navy Commissary Cen-
tral Meat Plant, Scott Center, Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth,
April 1, 1979, through September 30, 1979.
9 The complaint in Case 5-CA-11716 alleges that Bumpers and Thad-
deus Bennett were supervisors. Although Respondent's answer to the
complaint denied their supervisory status. Alexander's pretrial affidavit
stated that they had authority to hire and fire, and in testifying she in
effect acknowledged their supervisory authority
510
A & H JANITORIAL SERVICE
suade the employees from becoming unionized, Alexan-
der informed them that Local 572's dues were $7 per
month, plus 52 or 53 cents per hour worked. She told
them further that, if they chose to be represented, they
would have to pay the specified union dues retroactively
to May . Because of that information, the employees
abandoned their attempts to seek representation by Local
572.
There was no further union talk or activity until
around October 11,10 when Patterson called Louis Fais-
son, whose identity as president of NAGW she had
learned from employee Brenda Bennett's" t boy friend.
Faisson explained to Patterson the mechanics for obtain-
ing representation and told her to arrange a meeting. At
the Shipyard she circulated a paper on which employees
desiring to attend a meeting signed their names. A meet-
ing was then held on the evening of October 16, attend-
ed by some 30 employees. George Williams did not
attend that meeting. The employees present signed a pe-
tition authorizing NAGW to represent them. Employees
Bennett, Wiggins, and James Lane took additional peti-
tions on which to obtain signatures of employees who
did not attend the meeting.
The next day, October 17, Patterson and Williams
were discharged. Then, also on October 17, Alexander
called a meeting of all employees, where she stated her
reason for having discharged Patterson. Alexander pro-
ceeded to say that, if the employees wanted a union, she
would get them one, and any employee not joining
within 30 days would be terminated.
On the next morning, November 19, Alexander was
visited by two representatives of the Work Incentive
Program of the Virginia Employment Commission
(WIN), with which she had a training contract. Later in
the day, at Alexander's request, the WIN representatives
attended an employee meeting assembled by Alexander.
After some discussion of work problems, the meeting
turned to consideration of unionization. The meeting
generally became very heated, and Wiggins engaged in
an agitated dispute with employee Glen Hicks. On
Monday, October 22, the next working day, Bennett and
Wiggins were discharged.
On November 12, Artis telephoned Alexander. Artis
said she had heard that another union had been given an
opportunity to speak to Respondent's employees and
Local 572 would like "equal time." Alexander replied
that Artis was welcome to speak to the employees
during the shift break. On November 15, three men rep-
resenting Local 572 and the Laborers' District Council
went to the Shipyard, where they met with the employ-
ees in three meetings and obtained signed authorization
cards. The exact number of cards does not appear.
Claiming to have cards signed by a majority, the repre-
sentatives demanded recognition of Local 572. Alexander
granted recognition and thereupon signed the Local 572
collective-bargaining agreement. Sometime thereafter the
recognition and the contract were rescinded.
'o As set forth below, Wiggins mentioned a union meeting scheduled
in August. However, it appears probable that the incident occurred in
June.
II Apparently not related to contract to the contract manager, Thad-
deus Bennett, Alexander's son.
B. The Evidence
1. Preliminary discussion
It may be helpful at the outset to state my conclusion
that Alexander, Respondent's principal witness, 12 was
not reliable or credible.
There were significant unexplained respects in which
Alexander's testimony flatly contradicted pretrial affida-
vits she had given to Board agents. For example, on ex-
amination by counsel for the General Counsel, she testi-
fied that "supervisors" are not authorized to recommend
hiring or firing and a "supervisor can't make that sugges-
tion" and may not impose discipline. But a pretrial affi-
davit says: "The supervisors do not work, they assign
duties and oversee their work, and are responsible for
discipline." An affidavit further says: "They do not have
the authority to hire or fire, but they can recommend
either and I usually go along with this." There are simi-
lar contradictions between her testimony and her pretrial
affidavits concerning the authority of contract managers
Bennett and Bumpers. She testified that the contract
managers could only suspend employees for 3 days and
could not hire or fire. However, her affidavits say that
contract manager Bumpers "has the authority to hire and
fire" and the contract managers "were in charge of the
shop, below" her.
Additionally, there were several important matters on
which Alexander changed her position or contradicted
herself. And frequently her testimony was essentially in-
consistent with statements by her counsel in his opening
statement at the hearing. Not least of the deficiencies in
her testimony is the fact that a large portion of it was
given in response to leading questions by her own coun-
sel. And throughout most of the testimony Alexander
testified at length without providing direct or responsive
answers to the questions put to her.
On the other hand, there is no reason to discredit the
testimony of the General Counsel's witnesses. To be sure
there were some minor discrepancies as to such matters
as precise dates and occasional failures of memory. How-
ever, none of these lapses concerned any crucial matter
and none reflected any apparent self-serving motivation.
And most of the General Counsel's evidence was uncon-
tradicted. In large part, the discredited testimony by Al-
exander concerned her subjective reasons for taking cer-
tain actions, matters as to which the General Counsel's
witnesses could have no personal knowledge and thus
could not testify.
2. Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
a. General observation
The complaints alleges several independent violations
of Section 8(a)(l). However, those allegations concerned
facts inextricably intertwined with the discharges alleged
to violate Section 8(a)(3). Thus the evidence concerning
the 8(a)(l) and 8(a)(3) violations will be presented to-
gether.
12 Respondent's only other ,itness w'as Beverkl Cosvinglon who. as set
forth below. testified concerning B Bennett's discharge
511
DE{CISIONS ()F NATIONAL LABOR RLATIONS BO()ARD
Additionally, uncontradicted evidence, received with-
out objection, establishes 8(a)(l) violations not specifical-
ly alleged. Because such evidence was also directly relat-
ed to the Section 8(a)(3) violations, I hold that additional
Section 8(a)(1) violations were fully litigated and may be
found where established in the record.
As set out above, it is alleged that four employees
were discharged in violation of Section 8(a)(3) of the
Act. Each discharge will be discussed in this portion of
the Decision. However, one factor common to all four
allegations should be noted here.
In his opening statement at the hearing, Respondent's
counsel referred to the four alleged discriminatees as
"dissidents." He then said:
[Alexander's] first real test with the dissidents-and
we claim that all four got together as a vengeance,
wholly held together by their own fabrications, to
strike back at this small business lady because she
did, in fact, discipline them for being tardy.
And then with the cohesiveness of the dissidents,
they began to talk unionism....
And everything was going along good, with the ex-
ception of some disciplinary problems that the dissi-
dents persisted in, until it came to pass they had to
be discharged for them.
In the actual hearing of the case, there was no evidence
that any of the four alleged discriminatees had been
guilty of or ever accused of or purportedly disciplined
for tardiness. At no time did counsel or Alexander state
the manner in which the four employees here involved
were "dissidents" or "got together as a vengeance." So
far as appears, the only thing the four employees had in
common was their active desire for unionization.
b. George P. Williams
Williams started to work for Respondent "about
June," apparently early in the month. Around the middle
of June,' 3 he spoke to Artis, business manager of Local
572, about foiming a union. Artis sent him union cards,
an unspecified number of which he had signed and then
returned to Artis.
Thereafter, around the end of June, Alexander called a
general employee meeting. Concerning the substance of
that meeting, Williams testified that Alexander-
. . .stated anyone was crazy who would pay 52
cents per hour to a union and said how the previous
union, how those people belonged in it, and she
didn't have nary one of those peoples.
Other evidence establishes that, according to Alexander,
Local 572's dues were $7 per month plus 53 cents per
hour worked. There is no direct evidence that Alexander
: te estified that it was ill the second week of June.
did not hire any of Kentucky Maintenance employees.
However, in a pretrial affidavit, she said that she had
hired 85 employees through WIN, and the rest "came in
from the street-walk in-and applied for jobs."' 4 And
in a pretrial affidavit she said that she was "afraid or'
Williams and "was warned of this by the previous con-
tractor, who would not hire Williams."
Olivia Wiggins testified that Williams informed the
other employees of a scheduled union meeting, but none
of the employees attended.'" Wiggins proceeded:
"During the time Alexander told [Williams] if she heard
any more about a union meeting, she was going to fire
him." The union referred to apparently was Local 572.
Williams was generally very inarticulate, while Wiggins
was notably articulate and self-assured. Thus, although
Williams did not testify that Alexander threatened to dis-
charge him, I credit Wiggins' uncontradicted testimony
as to such threat.
As noted above, there was no union activity among
the employees until October II11, when Patterson made
contact with NAGW. That was followed by a union
meeting on October 16. On the morning of October 17,
Williams was called to the office, where Alexander dis-
charged him.
Williams testified that Alexander said she had heard
that he was signing up employees to form a union on Al-
exander's time. Williams replied that he was signing up
employees but on his own time. He testified that Alexan-
der further said that she heard he had attended a meeting
the evening before. He maintained that, although he had
been invited, he had not attended the union meeting on
October 16. Other credited evidence establishes that Wil-
liams had not attended. Maintaining that she "had a wit-
ness" to his presence at the meeting, Alexander fired
Williams.
On the next day, October 18, Alexander called em-
ployees Wiggins, B. Bennett, and Rosetta Williams' 6 to
the office. Bennett testified that in the course of the
meeting Alexander said that "she had to get rid of
[George] because of that union thing." As previously
noted, on October 19, two WIN representatives attended
an employee meeting. Richard L. Andrews, supervisor
for the Virginia Employment Commission in the WIN
program, clearly a disinterested witness, testified that in
the WIN meeting Alexander said that Williams was fired
4 In passing, it may be noted that, in his opening statement at the
hearing, Alexander's counsel said that her "conception is to go to welfare
and take from the welfare rolls able-bodied workers and put them into a
productive capacity"; "that she was warned that that work group has an
attrition rate of 80 to 90 percent"; and that "she interviewed . . over
400 applicants through the WIN program. Put over 280 to svork" He
then said that employees "continued to beg [Alexander] to fire them so
they could get back on welfare. They were happier with $383 a month.
rather than every two weeks." However, Alexander testified that a the
time of the hearing she still had some 90 percent of the employees origi-
nally hired, a year before. She said she had sent about 30 to 35 employees
home for 3 days and "practically all of them" returned willing to do their
work WIN representative Richard L. Andrews testified that Alexander
had remarkable success at keeping her enployees.
i5 Although Wiggins placed this incident in August, it appears likely
that it occurred earlier, probably around the end of June The date is not
crucial.
" It does not appear whether Rosetta Williams was related to George
Williams.
512
A & B JANITORIAL SERVICE
for "soliciting at the Navy yard for a union." Employee
Brenda Bennett also testified that Alexander again said
that she "had to get rid of [Williams] on account of the
union." Bennett and Wiggins also testified that Alexan-
der indicated her belief (erroneous) that Williams had
been responsible for Patterson's engaging in union activi-
ties. Alexander did not specifically deny any of the testi-
mony just summarized.
When called by the General Counsel as an adverse
witness, Alexander testified that Williams had difficulty
getting along with people, particularly George Scott,
with whom Williams worked. Williams, who testified
after Alexander, said that he and Scott "got along pretty
good, other than if [Scott] didn't want to work, and then
[Williams] would call Mrs. Alexander and would tell
her." When recalled by her counsel, Alexander did not
deny that Williams had reported to her on deficiencies
by Scott. Scott did not testify.
When called by her own counsel, Alexander testified
that Williams "could not get along with any of the em-
ployees [she] put him to work with." No employees
other than Scott were named. And it does not appear
that she placed sole blame on Williams, since she testified
that she "begged them to please cut this out." (Emphasis
supplied.) According to Alexander, Williams accused her
of discharging him because he went to a union meeting
and, when she denied the accusation, Williams said, "I
am going to get you if it's the last thing I do."
The most noteworthy aspect of Alexander's testimony
concerning Williams was the fact that when she was re-
called as a witness, after the General Counsel's case, in
answer to leading questions by her own counsel, she tes-
tified, in effect, that Williams left her employ for a better
job. 7 But she also testified that she told Williams she
was "tired of [his] bickering and fighting and carrying
on." And in a pretrial affidavit she said, "I told George
Williams, I discharged him because he was creating me
too many problems, job performance is poor, and he
won't follow instructions."
In the same affidavit, Alexander said that she had con-
tract manager T. Bennett, her son, present when she dis-
charged Williams. T. Bennett did not testify.
m7 Ier lestimony \was, in part:
Q. (By Mr ashara): When Mr WVilliams left your employ- he
did leave your employ, did he notl
A Yes, he did
Q D he gise you a reason for leaving?
A. Yes, he did
Q What swas that reason'
A. He had a etter obh
A lady in the employment office called me and told me Mr Wil-
liams had been oer and applied fr a job I did not ask Mr Wil-
liams then, because I felt like if he wanted a better job, that',s hal
we are all working for-h-beltr jobs.
I didn't tell him nrot to g apply for the job, bhut he wenlt on n
time during the time he was at work
c. Patricia Patterson
As previously noted (fn. 3), for the purpose of this
proceeding the parties have agreed that Patricia Patter-
son was a nonsupervisory employee. She was discharged
on October 17, the same day that Williams was terminat-
ed.
So far as appears, Patterson had no connection with
Williams' abortive attempts to organize the employees in
Local 572. It was she, however, who made the initial
contract with NAGW, by calling Louis T. Faisson, its
president, on October II11. She identified herself as a su-
pervisor and then told Faisson that she believed a union
was necessary for Respondent's employees. Faisson ex-
plained the procedure for organizing. Pursuant to Fais-
son's advice, Patterson spoke to other employees the
next day. She circulated a blank piece of paper on which
employees desiring to attend a union meeting could sign
their names. Patterson testified that she engaged in these
activities "before work and at lunch and after work" be-
cause she "felt like [she] could talk to them more . .
when they weren't working." As a result of her efforts,
on the evening of October 16, a meeting was held. at-
tended by about 34 employees. In answer to employee
questions, Faisson said that NAGW dues were $7 per
month, which would provide a $10,000 life insurance
policy and "lawyer's fees." A union petition was circu-
lated and apparently signed by about 30 employees.
The next day Patterson was called to the office, where
she spoke with Alexander in the presence of Thaddeus
Bennett and Alexander's two secretaries, none of whom
testified. Alexander first expressed surprise at Patterson's
involvement in union activities. Alexander testified that
she asked why Patterson was soliciting for a union.
When Patterson replied that the employees were dissatis-
fied, Alexander asked why they did not quit. Alexander
then said she had pictures of Patterson "going from
building to building to building during the day to get
names." Patterson expressed her doubt, saying that she
had solicited only before and after work and during the
lunch break. According to Patterson, Alexander said that
"a union would really benefit" Respondent and that
Artis was her friend. Patterson replied that the employ-
ees did not want Artis' union, Local 572.'9 Patterson's
meeting with Alexander on October 17 ended with Alex-
ander saying she could not keep Patterson because of her
union solicitation.
When first called as an adverse witness by the General
Counsel, Alexander testified unequivocally: "I fired
Patsy Patterson because she was soliciting on the ship-
yard." She added that she fired Patterson because a gen-
eral foreman, unidentified, called and said that Patterson
was "soliciting on government property" and he
"want[ed] her out of this building immediately and off
the shipyard."
'i Further signatures ere obtained hb emploee s iBi Bennetl, ig-
gins, aid James Lane. ho took petitionls fr circulation at the Shipsard.
as discussed helow
1 .Aks Patterson testified: A an employee meeting aroultd Ma., Alex-
ander "put on the blackhoard exactly ho, much t sas going to colI--52
cents tin hour, plu, $7 a month and that's whcr ls- when wec asv hos
much iI ,as going to cost, she liierall> talked ua out of IIt
513
S $
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
Alexander then offered additional reasons for Patter-
son's discharge, namely, that Patterson three times had
taken Alexander's car and left the Shipyard and "every-
time [Alexander] would beep her, she couldn't answer
the beeper." No details were provided and there was no
substantiating or corroborative evidence of these reasons.
In cross-examining Patterson, Respondent's counsel
corroborated Patterson's prior testimony that she was
fired for soliciting for the Union. The cross-examination
was, in part:
Q. (By Mr. Bashara): And you were told by Mrs.
Alexander not to subscribe to or solicit for any
union while on government property?
A. Right.
Q. And contrary to those instructions you did
seek the application of names, according to your
testimony?
A. Yes.
Q. While on government property?
A. Yes.
Q. Mrs. Alexander told you not only had you
violated her specific instructions, but that she would
have to fire you because of same?
A. Right.
Q. Soliciting on government property? . .. It
was her reason to you for letting you go?
A. Yeah, that's what Mrs. Alexander put.
Employees Brenda Bennett and Wiggins testified,
without contradiction, that the next day Alexander told
them that Williams had been the cause of Patterson's dis-
charge. Alexander testified that at the meeting she told
Wiggins that Patterson was fired "for soliciting on the
shipyard, and the shipyard demanded [Alexander] to fire
her." However, Alexander later disclosed that no Navy
representative had requested the discharge-the
"demand" was simply a provision in her contract with
the Navy, which contract was never produced. Brenda
Bennett quoted "supervisor" Covington 20 as having said
that Patterson had been discharged for union activities. It
appears that Alexander believed, erroneously, that Wil-
liams had instigated Patterson's activity on behalf of
NAGW.2 1
When called as a witness by Respondent's counsel, Al-
exander expounded on Patterson's violation of a no-so-
licitation rule. Alexander claimed that Respondent was
bound by a Navy rule which completely prohibited so-
licitation on Shipyard premises. Although she first indi-
cated that such Navy rule was in writing and posted, she
later testified that it appeared only as a provision in her
contract with the Navy. But Alexander then disclosed
2" Covington's status is discussed below in connection with Bennett's
discharge
21 Alexander testified that in the discharge interview Patterson "went
on to tell [Alexander] who was telling her to get the petition going."
However, Alexander's pretrial affidavit says that. when she asked Patter-
son why she was soliciting. Patterson replied: "Some man asked me to do
it " The affidavit continues: "[Patterson] did not identify him and I didn't
ask. I believe that it was George Williams who asked her to do this"
that she could, and did, authorize solicitation at the Ship-
yard. She testified at length that she permitted three rep-
resentatives of Local 572 to meet with her employees
and sign them up for that union on Shipyard premises.
The Shipyard security guards permitted the Local 572
representatives to enter the Shipyard on Alexander's au-
thorization.
As Alexander's testimony proceeded, it became appar-
ent that the only written rules possibly in existence had
been promulgated by her. They read, in pertinent part:
The following actions on your part cannot be toler-
ated and the appropriate disciplinary action will be
taken.
IMMEDIATE TERMINATION
Soliciting on Shipyard
Alexander testified that the rules were posted above
the timeclock in her office. Patterson testified that she
had never noticed any rules posted. It appears probable
that the asserted rules were posted after Patterson was
discharged. This probability stems from the fact that the
General Counsel introduced the rules in evidence as one
page of a two-page document, the second page being a
notice by contract manager Thaddeus Bennett addressed
to all employees and dated November 6. In offering the
document into evidence, counsel for the General Counsel
identified it as a two-page document he had received
from Respondent pursuant to a subpena.
Although at times Alexander suggested that what she
found objectionable in Patterson's conduct was that she
had solicited on Alexander's time, it is indisputable that
the printed rule could not be read as so restricted and
Alexander did not so understand it.2 2 As reflected in his
leading questions, as quoted above, Respondent's counsel
generally made no distinction between working and non-
working time. And Alexander testified that she would
not permit solicitation during an employee's lunch hour.
Wanda Baker, a former employee who had quit be-
cause of illness, testified that contract manager Bennett
had regularly sold candy on the Shipyard premises, in-
cluding, specifically, Alexander's office. Alexander testi-
fied she was unaware of any such activity. I credit
Baker.
One bit of irony may be noted. Alexander testified that
when she was fired Patterson asked if she could apply
for unemployment compensation. Alexander replied that
she would agree to Patterson's receiving such compensa-
tion even though that would cause Alexander's "rates
[to] go up." And then, in answer to a leading question by
her counsel, Alexander said that Patterson left with "no
hard feelings . . . whatsoever."
22 In a pretrial affidavit Alexander said: "When I first started working
I told employees that they could not solicit on government property I
did not distinguish between working time or nonworking time because
employees are not allowed on the property during nonworking time."
514
A & B JANITORIAL SERVICE
d. Brenda Bennett
B. Bennett commenced to work for Respondent on
May 3. She actively supported the NAGW campaign by
assisting in circulating a petition at the October 16 meet-
ing and then taking a petition with her and obtaining sig-
natures thereon at the Shipyard. She testified that, as in-
structed by Faisson at the meeting, she restricted her so-
licitation to nonworking time; i.e., before and after
work. 23
Upon Patterson's discharge early on the morning of
October 17, she was replaced by Beverly Covington as
Bennett's "supervisor." Alexander testified that Coving-
ton was a "supervisor trainee," having all the duties and
functions of a "supervisor," but at a lower rate of pay.2 4
In Respondent's modus operandi, "supervisors" do no
physical work themselves. They have participated in dis-
ciplinary interviews conducted by Alexander. Because
some of the approximately 500 buildings the employees
work in are several miles from Alexander's office and
there is only one "contract manager" on the day shift
and one on the night shift, it appears necessary that there
be supervisors with authority to exercise independent
judgment concerning the work of employees, particular-
ly since it appears that the employees generally are not
well educated and have had little, if any, job training or
experience. Accordingly, I find that Covington was a su-
pervisor within the meaning of Section 2(11) of the Act.
In any event, I agree with the General Counsel's con-
tention that, even if Covington were not a statutory su-
pervisor, she would be an agent of Respondent. She was
held out as a "supervisor" and in dealing with employees
spoke on behalf of Alexander.
B. Bennett testified that on October 17, after Patterson
was discharged, Covington said that she would be Ben-
nett's "new supervisor because Mrs. Alexander had fired
Patricia [Patterson] on account of the union." Bennett
further testified that she had been instructed "to keep a
close eye" on the building in which Bennett worked be-
cause "Mrs. Alexander said she needed something so she
could fire" Bennett and "was going to try to get rid of
her."
The next day, Bennett, Wiggins, and Rosetta Williams
were called to the office. Alexander said she had called
them in because she felt they were upset by Patterson's
discharge and Alexander explained that "she had to get
rid of [Patterson] because she was soliciting on govern-
ment property and was causing trouble." 25 Bennett fur-
ther testified that Alexander said that the three employ-
ees were not getting their work done. Bennett also testi-
fied that she had never before been disciplined or criti-
23 Opportunity for solicitation was provided by the bus trips between
Alexander's office, where employees clocked in and out, and the various
buildings in which they worked.
24 Alexander's pretrial affidavit says that each supervisor "has about 9
or 10 people to direct." However, Patterson testified that she had super-
vised 18 employees. which would accord with testimony that there were
up to 280 employees
2 Bennett, like other employees, accused Alexander of appealing to
racial prejudice, then and at other times, based on the fact that Patterson
was the only white supervisor, whereas most of the employees were
black. Although I credit such employee testimony, which is uncontradict-
ed, it would serve no useful purpose to repeat or summarize it here.
cized and supervisors had twice sent memos to Alexan-
der praising the work of Bennett's group.
Bennett then testified concerning the meeting with
WIN officials, referred to above. According to Bennett,
Alexander there said that "she had to get rid of [Wil-
liams] on account of the union" and "she was going to
fire everybody that had anything to do with the union,
that went to the meeting" on October 16. According to
Bennett, Alexander also stated that "she had the petition
that everybody had signed" and "she was going to get
rid of' all signers.
On October 22, the next working day, Covington took
Bennett to Alexander's office. Thaddeus Bennett was
present in the office with Alexander. Alexander asked B.
Bennett if she had attended the union meeting. B. Ben-
nett testified that she refused to answer, saying that it
was none of Alexander's business because the meeting
was held on Bennett's "own time." Bennett testified that
Alexander thereupon said that "everything that goes on
in the shipyard is her business" and, because Bennett dis-
agreed on that point, Alexander "could not use [her] any
longer."
Neither Alexander nor Covington, Respondent's only
witnesses, denied the major portion of Bennett's testimo-
ny. The only disparity in the evidence was between Ben-
nett's and Alexander's testimony concerning their en-
counter on October 22, when Bennett was discharged.
Alexander testified that employee Sheila Uzzle had come
to the office greatly disturbed by the fact that some
other employees, including Bennett, had been spreading
a false rumor that Uzzle had attended a union meeting.
Alexander testified that she said to Uzzle: "Suppose you
were?" and the employee said she did not "want them
lying on me because I'm a supervisor. I'm trying to get
this job as a supervisor." Alexander testified that she
then called Bennett to the office. Alexander did not
reveal what other employees Uzzle had named; nor did
Alexander indicate why she chose to speak only to Ben-
nett. Alexander testified that she first stated that Ben-
nett's attending the union meeting had "nothing to do
with whatever [Alexander was] going to ask," which re-
ferred to Uzzle. Alexander proceeded to charge that
Bennett had been unable to get along with her supervisor
and, without specifics, said that "this is the third time I
have had you in here, but this time it is a little bit differ-
ent." Alexander then proceeded to ask why Bennett did
not like Uzzle. According to Alexander, Bennett replied:
"It's none of your goddamn business what I do when I
leave this MF job." Alexander thereupon fired Bennett
as a "disrespectful employee." Alexander testified that
the only other reason for the discharge was that Bennett
"was giving her supervisor a hard time . ..and she ad-
mitted it." There is no evidence of an "admission."
In testifying, Bennett unequivocally denied that she
had had any difficulty with her supervisor or had been
accused of giving her supervisor a hard time. She also
denied that she had ever cursed Alexander. Patterson,
who had been Bennett's "supervisor" through October
16, also denied that she had had any problems with Ben-
nett. Covington, who was Bennett's supervisor for a day
515
I)lCISI()NS ()F NAII()NAL AI()R REtLATI()NS B()AR1)
or two, did not testify to any problems with Bennett.26;
Most significant was Alexander's testimony that Bennett
said it was no concern of Alexander what Bennett did
after work. he general tenor of Alexander's testimony
on the matter was that there was a work-related dispute
between Uzzle and other employees, including Bennett.
Since Alexander did not indicate that she was puzzled or
surprised by Bennett's reference to her activities after
work, one might reasonably infer that the difficulty, if
any, concerned the Union, an inference bolstered by Al-
exander's testimony that Uzzle's disturbance was caused
by a rumor that she had attended a union meeting. In
testifying, Wiggins listed Uzzle as one of the employees
present at the union meeting. One might also reasonably
infer that Uzzle conveyed to Alexander information con-
cerning the union activities of the employees. That
would help explain why Bennett was the only one called
to the office. Wiggins, the only other ardent union activ-
ist then left in Respondent's employ, was discharged the
same day as Bennett. On October 18, Alexander had ad-
vised Bennett and Wiggins2"' to resign because discharge
would not look good on their records.
It should be noted that Respondent did not call Uzzle
as a witness. Additionally, in a pretrial affidavit, Alexan-
der said that when she "called Brenda [Bennett] into
[her] office to discharge her [Alexander] had Eunice
Thomas, a secretary, to witness what was said," because
Alexander testified that what Bennett said at the October
22 interview was the principal (indeed, the only) reason
for her discharge, Respondent's failure to call Thomas
requires an inference that Alexander's chosen "witness"
would not support Alexander's claim.
e. Olivia Wiggins
As previously noted, Wiggins, like Patterson and B.
Bennett, was very active on behalf of NAGW. Like Ben-
nett, Wiggins solicited signatures on a union petition at
the Shipyard. Like Bennett, Wiggins was called to the
office on October 18, when Alexander expressed her dis-
pleasure at the employees' having "gone behind her
back" to get a union, stated her reason for having dis-
charged Patterson, 2x and advised the three employees to
resign so as to avoid having discharges on their records.
Wiggins testified that Alexander complained of Wiggins'
not being friendly to other employees, to which Wiggins
replied that she had her job to work, not to make
friends.
Wiggins then testified that, later on October 18, Cov-
ington warned Wiggins to "watch out" because Alexan-
der had said that she "want[ed] to get rid of [Wiggins]
some kind of bad." This testimony was not contradicted
by Covington or Alexander.
In her initial testimony, when called by the General
Counsel, Alexander stated three reasons for Wiggins' dis-
21 Covington's testimony concerned principally Wiggins She was not
questioned about Bennell
27 Along ith Rosetta Williams, wshose role is not shown(ii in tihe
record
28 Alexander testified that in his nmeeting she accused the three cm
ployees of causing Patlerson's discharge "I said, 'You girls should be
ashamed of yourselves You have made that girl lose her obh for no
reason You boosted this girl Io (lo something You knew it was vrong.
You know the rules"'
charge: (I) "She kept fighting with the people she
worked with"2" (2) "She wouldn't pay any attention to
nothing I would tell her to do"; (3) "Fighting with the
supervisor every day, and the boy that worked [with
her]-nobody couldn't work with her, and I have had
her under three supervisors."
First, it should be observed that Alexander maintained
that Wiggins' personality problems, which made her a
problem employee, existed throughout her employment.
Yet Alexander also testified that at one time Wiggins
quit and was later rehired. Thus, her alleged difficulty in
personal relationships can hardly be said to have been
the immediate cause of her discharge on October 22.
Second, it should be noted that Alexander did not
identify or call as witnesses any of the "three supervi-
sors" under whom Wiggins had allegedly worked. Pat-
terson, who had supervised Wiggins, denied having had
any difficulty. And Covington, who was Wiggins' super-
visor for a day or two, did not indicate that she had any
problems with Wiggins.
Alexander's principal asserted reason for Wiggins' dis-
charge appears to be two unfriendly exchanges between
Wiggins and Glen Hicks, a young coworker. The first of
these contretemps occurred at the employee meeting on
October 19, attended by two representatives of the WIN
program. Although Alexander and several other wit-
nesses testified to this encounter, nobody actually told
how the dispute arose or even what it concerned.3 0 Al-
though the evidence does not disclose whether Hicks or
Wiggins was (or if both were) at fault, the testimony of
WIN representative Andrews, obviously a disinterested
witness, is illuminating. ()n cross-examination by Re-
spondent's counsel, Andrews testified, in part, as follows:
Q.... Ms. Wiggins used foul, profane words,
curse words, obscene words to Mrs. Alexander;
isn't that true?' Sir, you know that to be true, don't
you?
A. I really can't remember. I can only say that it
was a very heated argument. Verbal words were
coming back. I couldn't say what she said exact-
ly. . .. A number of people just talking out. It was
very heated....
But to say that certain words were said, I just can't
say yes or no, because it was just a lot of things said
at that meeting.
2' Alexander added "I had to send the police down to the building to
get her" Alexander's other estinlor, howsever, indicates that she called
the police only on the day after W'iggins' discharge, hen she returned to
the Shipyard to dcliscr her ID badge Calling the Na,.y police was ap-
parcnrtly unnlecessary. silcc Wiggins had left her badge and departed
before they arrived
" Alexander testified that licks told Bennett that she should not talk
toi Alexan;lder the wsas he as talking N details or amplificattit was
pro\iled.
5
A & JANIT()RIAL SR VIC'I:
Q. Now, this argument you're talking about he-
tween Ms. Wiggins and another gentleman-was
that other gentleman trying to physically restrain
her?
A. They just got in a heated argument. I think
the gentleman would have done bodily harm if he
could have, or tried to. ill my opinion. That's the
way it looked like.
According to Alexander, Wiggins called Hlicks a "god-
damn dog." Wiggins denied having used any curse
words but conceded that she expressed agreement when
Alexander accused her of treating Hicks like a dog.
The second unpleasant exchange between Hicks and
Wiggins occurred at work on Monday, October 22. Cox-
ington, who was then serving as supervisor, testified that
when she entered the building in which they were work-
ing Wiggins pointed out sonic items of work that Hicks
had failed to perform. Blicks approached the two women
"and one word led to another.... It was name calling
back and forth. She called him a queer, names and
things, and he was responding, you know, with little
words." Covington thereafter testified that she "appreci-
ated [Wiggins'] showing [he r] things" that were nrot
being done properly. Covington testified that she and
Wiggins walked over to Hicks arid "I guess he got ex-
cited, and [Wiggins] did too, and one thing led to an-
other." According to Covington, Wiggins was extremely
loud and profane and could not be calmed down. Cov-
ington told Hicks to talk away, and as he did so he
called taunts and challenging remarks to Wiggins.
Covington reported the incident to Alexander. She
told Alexander that "Olivia and Glen were arguing back
and forth, and Olivia was loud as well as Glen. But
[Covington] could not control Olivia mostly." Alexander
instructed Covington to bring Wiggins to the office. Al-
exander testified that, before Wiggins was brought to the
office, Hicks telephoned and said that Wiggins had start-
ed the dispute and that he was "scared to work with this
girl," who was "threatening to kill" him. According to
Alexander, after Wiggins arrived at the office she "start-
ed cursing and saying, 'I don't like this GD job . . . I
don't want this GD job. Give me my check."' Alexander
testified that she then got her checkbook out and wrote a
check, whereupon Wiggins left. 3
There are two particularly noteworthy factors in 'aj:
faire Wiggins; i.e., Alexander apparently did not question
Hicks or otherwise investigate the matter and Hicks was
not called as a witness. Finally, note should be taken of
Alexander's apparent contention that Wiggins quit her
job when informed that she would "have to work with"
Hicks if she was "going to stay down there." As noted
above, in a pretrial affidavit, Alexander had said that she
"called Brenda into [the] office to discharge her."
al Alexander added that Wiggins Irook her 11) badge with her and t's
against the law to take the badge off the shipyard " Ihere wa s o c,i i-
dence that Alexander asked for Wiggins' badge It is inderstandlhle haLt
under the circumstances, such matter would escape rhe attentiotn of bhth
women Wiggins' lapse ohsioulsly played no part in her disc h ilge
3. Section 8(a)(2)
As previously noted, around the middle of May. Alex-
ander dissuaded the employees from choosing to be rep-
resented by Local 572 b informing them that the union
dues were 7 per month plus 53 cents per hour and that
the employees would be required to pay dues from May
I on. Then, in October, some employees, spearheaded by
Patterson, undertook to organize for representation by
NAG VW.
Upon learning of the union activities in October. Alex-
arider complained that employees had gone behind her
back to get a union, and said that. if they wanted one.
she would get them one. She referred to Local 572.
When the employees said they did not want that union.
she threatened to recognize it and sign its collective-bar-
gaining agreement, which she had before her. She in-
formed the employees that, if she signed that contract,
anrty emrployee who did not join the union within 30 days
would be automatically discharged.
She then announced the even stronger position that
the employces were already represented by Local 572
alnd covered by the collective-bargaininig agreement oft
that IrUnion with Kentucky Maintenance. the previous
janitorial contractor. As said by Respondent's counsel in
his opening statement at the hearing, concerning a em-
ployee meeting on October 18, Alexander "explained to
them that the union contractor was already on the job,
whether they x, anited it [or] didn't wrant it. .. :'2
On November 12, Helen Artis, business manager of
l.ocal 572. telephoned Alexander and stated that she had
learned that representatives of another union had been
permitted to talk to A & B's employees on the Shipyard
and local 572 demanded an equal opportunity. Artis tes-
tified that James l.ane, an employee of Respondent, had
informed her of the other union's solicitation. However,
James Lane did not testify and the record is clear that no
outside representative of NAGW ever solicited at the
Shipyard. Nonetheless, Alexander said that Artis would
be welcome to speak to Respondent's employees on non-
working time at the Shipyard. Thereupon, on the next
day, Robert Ashworth, president of the Virginia and
North Carolina Laborers' District Council: . L. Liver-
man, business manager of the Council; and J. Carlin
Taylor, agent for a local (presumably Local 5 7 2 )."a went
to the Shipyard, where they were admitted by the secu-
rity guards on Alexander's telephonic authorization. The
three men spoke to all of Respondent's employees in
three meetings during shift break. Alexander informed
the employees of the meetings as they were waiting to
clock in or out. a4
At the conclusion of each meeting Local 572 authori-
zatioi cards were solicited. Ashworth testified that when
the cards were being signed there were present two
a' Counsel obhsiously was an "agent"'' of Respondent C'f (; ntrl ('art-
age. Inc. 236 NI Rl 1212, 1244 45, 1254 (197;4, enfd h' the Seentlh
('iretilt in all illnpublished order
:: Apparent l l Arti was olhers iste ellgaged that dl,
:4 t is not clear ho'.,, inti lime i any, there .as hels.cii shl'ts Nor
is it lervi hor. ist vwa indicated, the day-shift emrplosees i who were Ica,,
iig c ld 1 ha.c attidenl ieenlilngs before the night-shift emplosees alid
t l:l\ ;ill the i tcliiIsv conidutled on lnolr orkliig lirn
51 7
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
people whom he did not know but who "looked to be
maybe making job assignments." In testifying, Alexander
denied that any representative of Respondent had been
present at the card signings. However, in a pretrial affi-
davit she unequivocally stated that the contract manag-
ers had witnessed the card signings. 35 In view of her
pretrial affidavit, I discredit Alexander's denial that com-
pany representatives witnessed the card signing. It ap-
pears clear that Bumpers and Bennett were the two men
who Ashworth testified had been present.
Ashworth testified that in the first two meetings about
120 cards were signed. He took the cards to Alexander,
said he thought the Union had a majority, and requested
recognition. He thus proceeded to the third meeting. He
did not testify as to how many, if any, cards were signed
at the third meeting. Nor did he testify that he ever gave
Alexander any cards obtained at that meeting. However,
after the third meeting he again requested recognition.
Without counting or examining the cards, Alexander
forthwith executed a written recognition commitment
presented by Ashworth. Then she similarly signed a
Local 572 collective-bargaining agreement.
It appears that thereafter union dues were checked off',
although it does not affirmatively appear that the union
cards contained checkoff authorizations or that separate
checkoff authorizations were ever executed. However,
there is no suggestion that any employees were ever dis-
charged pursuant to the union-security clause in the con-
tract. 36
The General Counsel acknowledges that thereafter Re-
spondent withdrew recognition from Local 572 and the
collective-bargaining agreement was rescinded. In the
course of Alexander's testimony, although not specifical-
ly examined in this regard, she indicated that she has
compensated the employees for union dues deducted
from their wages.
4. Discussion and conclusions
a. Preface
As stated above, supported by representative examples,
I have concluded that Alexander's testimony is totally
unreliable and cannot be credited. Her pretrial affidavits,
which were used for impeachment, contain numerous
substantial admissions. Under the circumstances present-
ed, the affidavits may be considered as affirmative evi-
dence. Alvin J. Bart and Co., Inc., 236 NLRB 242 (1978),
enforcement denied on other grounds 598 F.2d 1267 (2d
Cir. 1979); Snaider Syrup Corporation, 220 NLRB 238, fn.
1 (1975). Cf. Central Cartage, Inc., supra, 236 NLRB at
1251. And, as the General Counsel observes, testimony
3s Excerpts from her affidavit dated December 9 read
[M]y contract manager who has the authority to hire and fire, his
name is Theron Bumpers was watching people sign the cards. I did
not check signature because he was watching people, sign. . . Mr.
Bennett, the daytime contract manager, also watched the dayshift
employees sign the cards. . . [O1ne of the [unionl men let me know
when they finished the meeting and I sent both contract managers
out to watch employees sign cards. Mr Bennett went home after the
dayshift employees signed the cards. Mr. Bumpers stayed and
watched both groups of employees sign cards.
a6 Since Virginia is a right-to-work State, the union-security clause
was unlawful.
by Alexander adduced by "leading questions under
direct examination" is entitled to "minimal weight." H.
C. Thomson, Inc., 230 NLRB 808, 809 fn. 2 (1977). Alex-
ander's testimony, when not flawed by inconsistencies
and when not unwittingly against her own interest, is not
given any weight because "conclusionary in nature" and
"not generally supported by the facts in their fullest con-
text as extensively developed at the hearing." Local
Union o. 673, International Union of Operating Engi-
neers, AFL-CIO (Westinghouse Electric Corporation), 229
NLRB 726 (1977). And, as indicated above, Respond-
ent's failure to call any witnesses who were obviously in
positions to know the facts and her failure to produce
documentary evidence, such as the Navy contract under
which she was operating, require inferences adverse to
her. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company Highway Transpor-
tation Department, 190 NLRB 84, 86, fn. 3 (1971), enfd.
456 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1972); Zapex Corporation, 235
NLRB 1237, 1240 (1978), enfd. 621 F.2d 328 (9th Cir.
1980).
The issues here presented are largely factual. The
credibility resolutions lead directly to the conclusions,
with little need for legal discussion or citation of authori-
ty.
b. Section 8(a)(1)
The complaints allege some 11 independent violations
of Section 8(a)(l) of the Act. With some minor excep-
tions, all these specific allegations were proved by credi-
ble and, in the most part, undisputed evidence. Evidence
presented without objection and not contradicted or dis-
puted establishes numerous violations of Section 8(a)(1)
in addition to those specifically alleged. These additional
8(a)(1) violations are so inextricably bound up with the
8(a)(2) and (3) allegations that they were necessarily fully
litigated. Accordingly, they will be included in the con-
clusory findings here made.
The evidence establishes the following violations of
Section 8(a)(1):
Interrogation: On October 22, Alexander unlawfully
asked Wiggins why employees "had gone behind her
back" to get a union and asked Brenda Bennett if she
had attended the NAGW meeting on October 16.
Threats: I have credited Wiggins' testimony that Alex-
ander threatened Williams with discharge if Alexander
heard any more about a union meeting. Although this
separate threat was not specifically alleged in the com-
plaints, it was clearly relevant to the allegation that Wil-
liams was discriminatorily discharged. Since it behoved
Respondent to deny such testimony if it were untrue, it
is held that the matter was fully litigated and it violated
the Act.
According to the credited testimony of Baker and
Brenda Bennett, it is found that on October 16, 17, and
18 Alexander threatened to sign a contract with Local
572 and that employees who did not join that Union
within 30 days would be fired. Since Local 572 did not
represent the employees, both statements by Alexander
were threats violative of Section 8(a)(l).
Creating the impression of surveillance: When discharg-
ing Patterson on October 17, Alexander stated that she
518
A & B JANITORIAL SERVICE
had pictures of Patterson going from building to building
soliciting employees to join the Union (NAGW). On the
same day, October 17, Covington, then a supervisor, told
Bennett that Alexander had instructed Covington to
watch Bennett carefully because Alexander "was going
to try to get rid or' Bennett. The evidence as a whole
requires the inference, which Bennett drew, that Alexan-
der's instructions were motivated by Bennett's union ac-
tivities. And WIN Representative Andrews testified that
at the October 19 meeting Alexander stated that she had
the names of employees who had attended a union meet-
ing. This evidence establishes that on October 17 and 19
Respondent, through Covington and Alexander, respec-
tively, violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by creating the
impression that employees' union activities were being
kept under surveillance.
Promise of benefits: Wiggins credibly testified that in
the WIN meeting on October 19 Alexander said: "You
be good girls, and at Christmas time I'm going to re-
member you." In the context of that meeting, where
unionization became the chief topic of discussion, Alex-
ander's statement implicitly constituted an unlawful
promise of benefits at the end of the year if the employ-
ees eschewed the Union. Although this statement was
not alleged in the complaints, it was made in the course
of a meeting which was thoroughly litigated.
Statements that employees had been discharged for union
activities: WIN Representative Andrews testified that at
the meeting on October 19 Alexander stated that "she
fired Patterson and George Williams because they were
soliciting at the Navy Yard for a union." Since, as dis-
cussed below, there was no valid no-solicitation rule, Al-
exander's statement was violative of the Act. There was
considerable evidence that Alexander made similar state-
ments on October 17 and 18. It is manifestly coercive
within the prohibition of Section 8(a)(l) for an employer
to inform employees that they and/or other employees
have been discharged for engaging in union activities,
since such statements necessarily constitute a threat that
other employees will meet the same fate if they support a
union.
Unlanful no-solicitation rule and enforcement thereof:
Surprisingly, the complaints do not allege that Respond-
ent violated the Act by promulgating, maintaining, and
enforcing an invalid no-solicitation. However, Respond-
ent injected the no-solicitation rule into the proceedings
as her basic defense to the allegation that Patterson was
unlawfully discharged. The existence and terms of the
no-solicitation rule were fully litigated, primarily by Re-
spondent. Accordingly, consideration of the lawfulness
of the rule is properly an issue in this proceeding.
The only written no-solicitation rule presented was
promulgated by Respondent and was a broad, uncondi-
tional prohibition of solicitation anywhere on the Ship-
yard. No distinction is made between working and non-
working time, and Alexander indicated that no such dis-
tinction was intended or understood. There can be no
doubt that Respondent's no-solicitation rule violated Sec-
tion 8(a)(1) of the Act. a7 Stoddard Quirk Manufacturing
Co., 138 NLRB 615 (1962).
Respondent also violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by
discriminatorily applying and enforcing her no-solicita-
tion rule. Patterson was discharged for soliciting for
NAGW, whereas Alexander arranged meetings at which
outside representatives of Local 572 could solicit em-
ployee memberships. And I have credited former em-
ployee Wanda Baker's testimony that contract manager
Bennett, Alexander's son, had sold candy to Respond-
ent's employees on the Shipyard, including sales in Alex-
ander's office.
Accordingly, I find and conclude that Respondent vio-
lated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by promulgating,3 8 main-
taining, and discriminatorily enforcing an unlawfully
broad no-solicitation rule.
c. Section 8(a)(3)
The subsidiary findings set forth above leave no doubt
of the conclusion that, as alleged, Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging "dissi-
dents" Williams, Patterson, Bennett, and Wiggins for
their union activities.
The evidence establishes that Alexander knew that
Williams initiated the Local 572 organizational activity
and she believed he later induced Patterson to solicit for
NAGW. It is also clear that Alexander opposed both or-
ganizational campaigns, although she found Local 572
the lesser evil.39 Alexander also vacillated as to the rea-
sons for Williams' termination, with none of her explana-
tions supported by credible evidence or able to withstand
analysis.
There can be no doubt of the unlawfulness of Patter-
son's discharge. It is Respondent's own position that Pat-
terson was discharged for violation of a no-solicitation
rule which is invalid on its face. This establishes a viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(1). Daylin Inc., 198 NLRB 281
(1972), enfd. 496 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1974); Glassmaster
Plastics Company, 203 NLRB 944, 950 (1973). It is also
clear that in Alexander's view Patterson's offense was
not solicitation per se, but rather the purpose of the so-
licitation; namely, representation of the employees by
NAGW. Thus Patterson's discharge contravened Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. Sunnyland Packing Company,
227 NLRB 590, 596 (1976), enfd. 557 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir.
1977).4 0
al No opinion is here expressed as to whether this conclusion would
be different if, as Alexander maintained. a complete prohibition of solici-
tation on Shipyard premises had been imposed by the Navy as a term of
her operating contract The contract was not produced And when Alex-
ander was reminded that she had permitted Local 572 representatives to
solicit at the Shipyard, she said that such solicitation did not violate the
Navy rules "once they got permission from security." The only "permis-
sion" they received from the Navy was to enter the Shipyard, given on
Alexander's authorization
a" Since Respondent's Shipyard contract began on May , the rule
must have been promulgated within the 6 months immediately preceding
October 22, the date of the first charge filed herein
'9 Ashworth testified that when Alexander introduced the Local 572
representatises to the employees she said: "You-all kno, I'm not crazy
about any union.
40 If the complaint in Case 5 CA-11658 had not been amended in ac-
cordance with Respondent's denial that Patterson was a supervisor and if
Continued
519
I))ECISI()NS ()F NA IONAI. IABOR RELA'IO()NS H()ARI)
Bennett's and Wiggins' discharges were at least equally
clearly violative of Section 8(a)(3). They had been lead-
ing union activists. That Alexander knew that is clearly
reflected in her calling them into the office and accusing
them of having "gone behind her back to get a union"
and explaining to them that Patterson had been dis-
charged for soliciting for the Union in violation of the
no-solicitation rule.
Bennett's discharge interview started with Alexander's
asking if Bennett had attended the NAGW meeting and
the actual discharge followed Bennett's assertion of her
right not to reply to the question.
In discharging Wiggins, Alexander made no investiga-
tion of the comparative responsibility of Hicks and Wig-
gins for the difficulties between them. There was no evi-
dence that Wiggins had been the instigator of the con-
frontations. Supervisor Covington did not apportion
blame and testified that she appreciated Wiggins' hav\ing
pointed out deficiencies in Hicks' work. Alexander's ex-
planation of the Wiggins' discharge is further weakened
by a belated attempt to show that Wiggins actually had
not been fired, but rather had quit. Finally, it is not with-
out significance that, despite Alexander's claim that Wig-
gins was chronically unable to get along with people, Al-
exander had previously rehired Wiggins after she had
quit. And, as the General Counsel notes, although Alex-
ander testified that she had suspended 30 to 35 employ-
ees for various reasons, Wiggins had never been disci-
plined.
Accordingly, I find that, as alleged, employees George
Williams, Patricia Patterson, Brenda Bennett and Olivia
Wiggins were discharged on October 17 and 22 in viola-
tion of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4
d. Section 8(a)(2)
Little need be said concerning the alleged violation of
Section 8(a)(2).
A plethora of evidence establishes that, when it
became clear that the employees would probably choose
to be represented by NAGW, Alexander threatened to
recognize and execute a collective-bargaining agreement
with Local 572, which she had previously successfully
fended off. She arranged meetings in which nonem-
ployee representatives of Local 572 solicited among all
the employees and then had employer representatives
witness the employees' signing of Local 572 authoriza-
tion cards. Then, without even counting the cards, Alex-
ander formally recognized Local 572 and executed a col-
lective-bargaining agreement.
it were found that she was a supervisor. I should finld that hic discharge
was violative of Sec. 8(a)(1) of the Act as an integral part Respondecn's
overall plan to restrain and coerce emploetes ii derogation of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act DR K' ( orporution d/h, a lro(rhcr Ithre, Cabhi
nets, 248 NI RB 828 (19K(t)
4' Wanda Baker. wtho quit Respondent's employ because of illness. cs-
tified, without contradiction, that she had been a "supervisor and inspec-
tor" but around Ithe end of October "vas demoted for having a lunlilj
petition in [her] possession, and Alexanderl said she ouldn't trust
[Baker] any more. Baker, however, .as aiot the subject of any charge or
complain It does ot appear shehcr her crnploce status was the sanie
as Patterson's, hut Respolndent denied Covinigtoln's supervisory staltus, i
she denied that Patterson was a supervisor (C'ases 5-CA - I 1658 and
CA-11716
This course of conduct clearly constituted unlawful as-
sistance to local 572. Employees certainly cannot be ex-
pected to act according to their free will if they sign
cards solicited at meetings arranged by and conducted
under the watchful eyes of management. This is particu-
larly true here, where Alexander had previously threat-
ened to recognize and contract with Local 572 regard-
less of the employees' wishes and had said that the em-
ployees were already represented by ocal 572, whether
they liked it or not, and would be discharged if they did
not join within 30 days.
Alexander's failure to count the cards is also of great
significance in view of the testimony of Ashworth, repre-
sentative of the Laborers' District Council, that he had
given Alexander about 120 cards and the evidence shows
that there may have been up to 280 employees in the
unit, with Alexander placing the number at 250. Thus,
without counting them, Alexander could not rely on the
cards as showing a majority.
On all the evidence, I find that, as alleged, Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(2) of the Act by giving unlawful as-
sistance to Laborers' Local 572.
CONCILUSIONS 01 LAW
I. Respondent, Rosa M. Alexander d/b/a A & B Jani-
torial Service, is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
2. Public Service Employees' Local Union 572, affili-
ated with Laborers' International Union of North Amer-
ica, AFL CIO, is a labor organization within the mean-
ing of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. National Association of Government Workers is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
4. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(l) of the Act by:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
union activities.
(b) Telling employees that other employees had been
discharged because of their union activities.
(c) Creating the impression that employees' union ac-
tivities were being kept under surveillance.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge for engag-
ing in union activities.
(e) Promising benefits to employees if they refrained
from engaging in union activities.
(f) Promulgating, maintaining, and enforcing an unlaw-
ful rule prohibiting solicitation by employees on behalf of
a union.
(g) Discrimninatorily enforcing a no-solicitation rule.
(h) Threatening to execute a collective-bargaining
agreement with Local 572 whether or not the employees
wanted to be represented by that union.
(i) Threatening employees with discharge if they did
not join I.ocal 572.
5. Respondent violated Section
8 (a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by discharging employees Patricia Patterson,
George Williams, Brenda Bennett, and Olivia Wiggins
because of their uniolon activities
6. Respondent violated Section 8(a)(2) and (1) of the
Act by unlawfully assisting local 572 in obtaining union
designation cards front employees: by recognizing and
520
A & H JANITORIAL. SRVICE'
executing a collective-bargaining agreement with Local
572 when said Union did not represent an uncoerced ma-
jority of the employees in the unit covered thereby by
incorporating in said agreement a union-security clause
requiring employees to become or remain members of an
illegally assisted uion as a condition of continued em-
ployment; and by checking off Local 572 dues from em-
ployees' wages.
7. The aforesaid unfair labor practices are unfair labor
practices affecting commerce within the mealing of Sec-
tion 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
Till- R MEI)'
Having found that Respondent has engaged in unfir
labor practices, I shall recommend that she be required
to cease and desist therefrom and to take certain affirma-
tive action designed to effectuate the policies f the Act.
Since it has been found that Respondent unlawfulh
discharged George Williams, Patricia PIatterson, Brenda
Bennett, and Olivia Wiggins, it will be recommended
that she hbe required to offer them immediate and full re-
instatement and make them whole fr any earnings lost
by them as a result of their discharges, the amount of
backpay to hbe computed in the manner prescribed inl
W Woolworth Company, 90 NLRB 289 (1950). with in-
terest computed in accordance with Florida Steel Corpo-
ration, 231 NR 651 (1j977).42 It is also recommended
that Respondent be required to expunge from her re-
cords all reference to the discharges here involved and
to any asserted violations of Respondent's no-solicitation
rule.
The reinstatement and backpay requirement herein
recommended is specifically made applicable to Patricia
Patterson even if it should be determined in some other
proceeding or at some other time that her position was
and is a supervisory position. Whatever her actual status
her discharge was an integral part of Respondent's
course of unlawful conduct designed to prevent union-
ization of the employees and thus restoration of the
status quo as to Patterson is required. See DR W' Corpora-
lion d/b/a Brothers Three Cabinets, supra, 248 NLRH 828,
where the Board required reinstatement and backpay for
a supervisor in view of a course of conduct by tie em-
ployer similar to that involved in the present case
Normally an order remedying 8(a)(2) violations such
as those here found would require that Respondent with-
draw recognition of the unlawfully assisted union and re-
scission of the collective-bargaining agreement with the
assisted union. However, counsel for the General Coun-
sel has stipulated that such remedial action has already
been taken and accordingly he does not request the in-
clusion of such affirmative requirements in the order to
be issued herein. However, although Alexander testified
that she has already reimbursed the employees for union
dues checked off, the General Counsel has not stipulated
or otherwise conceded that such action has been taken.
Accordingly. because of the general unreliabililx and im-
precision of Alexander's testimony I shall recommend
that the order contain an affirmatise requirement for
such reimbursement to the extent that it has not alre;idx
42 See. general \ , tlit PlunhrnW &{ /caris (,., 11s N Rll '1, (]'Q I )
been effectuated. Such reimbursement shall be made with
interest in accordance with Florida Steel Corp.. supra.
The remaining question concerns the scope of the
cease-and-desist order to he issued.
Respondent's unfair labor practices were widespread
alld bespoke a determination to serve her own self-inter-
est, without regard to her employees' rights under Sec-
tioi 7 of the Act. While the unfair labor practices might
haLve resulted from the absenlce of any previous experi-
encc or knos vledge of the requirements of the Act, Alex-
ander's tcstlimony and demeanor at the hearing failed to
shoa, that she has made any attempt to familiarize herself
swith her responsibilities under the Act or to mitigate her
pursuit of her self-interest, In m opinion, her unfair
labor practices and her conduct in the litigation, includ-
ing the conflicts between her pretrial affidavits and her
subsequent testimony, give reason to fear that there ma5
be future violations. In other words, I find that Alexan-
der has sho)n a proclivity to violate the Act, [and] has
engaged in such egregious [and] widespread misconduct
as to demonstrate a general disregard for the employees'
fundamental statutory rights." Ifickmnott oods, Inc., 242
NI.RI3 1357 (1979). Accordingly I shall recommend is-
sualice of a broad cease-and-desist order.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c)
of Ithc Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDER 4 1
The Respondent, Rosa M. Alexander d/h/a A &
Janitorial Service, Portsmouth, Virginia, her officers
agents, successors, and assigns, shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Coercively interrogating employees concerning
union activities.
(b) Telling employees that any employees have been
discharged because of their union activities.
(c) Creating the impression that employees' union ac-
tivities are being subjected to surveillance.
(d) Threatening employees with discharge if they
engage in union activities.
(e) Threatening to recognize and execute a collectixe-
bargaining agreement with aborers' Local Union 572
unless and until such iabor organization is duly certified
by the Board as the collective-bargaining agent of Re-
spondenl's employees piursuant to Section 9(c) of the
Act.
(0) Threatening employees ,ith discharge if they do
not join aborers' Iocal inion 572 or any other labor
organizationl.
(g) Promulgating, maintaiing, or enforcing any rule
or policy prohibiting employees from soliciting for or
against any union at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard ill
Portsmouth, Virginia, during the emplo,ces' nonworking
time.
I4 t 11 I ",ll nl ll. r pt ls ,t :1 s pr4,aldcd h S ,et 1l2 4 ,1
iIt Ru'lI , Jnd Rcguli.ltrls eT 11 NatillOial I air Rc.latnws Hls td, It(
lil.l ilg. I Ik l iiiNill],, 111 rcc. ,lllll'l die,1 i(r,dcr hcrirl 'Aill , :1i.T i, Tdi.-ldl
]I St 1 t2 4 ,/0 r cl R' ll cguilt s hi ,tdllp -i \ ilt II-,,rcd and
OL1t111 - IlI, llt ,,1 C tlu't11lf:l ;l td r . l] ill [rpcct l
shall tbc t ~ 11rl d a. ' r .l uposes
521
DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
(h) Discharging or otherwise disciplining any employ-
ees for soliciting on behalf of or against any labor organi-
zation on the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Portsmouth,
Virginia, during the employees' nonworking time.
(i) Promising any employees benefits if they refrain
from engaging in union activities.
(j) Assisting or contributing support to Laborers'
Local Union 572 by recognizing or bargaining with such
labor organization as the exclusive representatives of her
employees for the purpose of collective bargaining unless
and until Local 572 is certified by the Board as the col-
lective-bargaining representative of said employees pur-
suant to Section 9(c) of the Act.
(k) Maintaining or giving any force or effect to the
collective-bargaining agreement with Local 572 dated
November 15, 1979, or extension or modification thereof;
provided, however, that nothing in this Order shall au-
thorize or require the withdrawal or elimination of any
wage increase or other benefits or terms and conditions
of employment which may have been established pursu-
ant to the performance of that contract.
(I) Withholding from the pay of any employees union
dues or other union fees or assessments which have been
deducted because of any obligation of membership in
Local 572, and paying to Local 572 any dues, fees, or as-
sessments which have been deducted from the pay of her
employees.
(m) Discharging or otherwise discriminating against
employees with regard to hire and tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment for engaging in
activities on behalf of or against a labor organization.
(n) In any other manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing her employees in the exercise of their rights
under Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
deemed necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Offer George Williams, Patricia Patterson, Brenda
Bennett, and Olivia Wiggins immediate and full reinstate-
ment to their former positions of employment or, if any
such position no longer exists, to a substantially equiva-
lent job, without prejudice to their seniority or other
rights and privileges.
(b)Make George Williams, Patricia Patterson, Brenda
Bennett, and Olivia Wiggins whole for any loss of pay
they may have suffered as a result of the discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth in the section of
this Decision entitled "The Remedy."
(c) Preserve and, upon request, make available to the
Board or its agents, for examination and copying, all
payroll records, social security payment records, time-
cards, personnel records and reports, and all other re-
cords necessary to analyze the amount of backpay due
under the terms of this Order.
(d) Rescind Respondent's no-solicitation rule and
remove from her records and destroy all references to
the discharges of Williams, Patterson, Bennett, and Wig-
gins and to violations of the no-solicitation rule.
(e) To the extent Respondent has not already done so,
reimburse past and present employees for any union dues
or fees heretofore deducted from their wages, such reim-
bursement to bear interest as set forth in the Remedy
section of this Decision.
(f) Post at Respondent's offices in the Norfolk Naval
Shipyard in Portsmouth, Virginia, copies of the attached
notice marked "Appendix." 4 4 Copies of said notice, on
forms provided by the Regional Director for Region 5,
after being duly signed by Respondent, shall be posted
by her immediately upon receipt thereof, and be main-
tained by her for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in con-
spicuous places, including all places where notices to em-
ployees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be
taken by Respondent to insure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(g) Notify the Regional Director for Region 5, in writ-
ing, within 20 days from the date of this Order, what
steps Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
44 In the event that this Order is enforced by a Judgment of a United
States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursu-
ant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board."
522