A-1 Door and Building Solutions

National Labor Relations Board - Administrative Judge Opinions

Jan 15, 2008

20-CA-033485 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 15, 2008)

JD(SF)-02-08
Sacramento, CA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
SAN FRANCISCO BRANCH OFFICE
DIVISION OF JUDGES
A-1 DOOR AND BUILDING SOLUTIONS
and Case 20-CA-33485
MILLMEN AND INDUSTRIAL
CARPENTERS UNION, LOCAL 1618,
UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF
CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF
AMERICA
Lucile Lannan Rosen, Esq., San Francisco,
CA, for the General Counsel.
Matthew J. Gauger, Esq., Sacramento,
CA, for the Charging Party.
E. A. Hubbert, Jr., Esq., Sacramento,
CA, for the Respondent.
DECISION
Statement of the Case
Gregory Z. Meyerson, Administrative Law Judge. Pursuant to notice, I heard this
case in Sacramento, California, on November 6, 2007. Millmen and Industrial Carpenters
Union, Local 1618, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the Union or the
Charging Party) filed an unfair labor practice charge in this case on July 5, 2007. Based on that
charge, the Acting Regional Director for Region 20 of the National Labor Relations Board (the
Board) issued a complaint on September 12, 2007. The complaint alleges that A-1 Door and
Building Solutions (the Respondent or the Employer) violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the
National Labor Relations Act (the Act). The Respondent filed a timely answer to the complaint
denying the commission of the alleged unfair labor practices and raising a number of affirmative
defenses.1

1 All pleadings reflect the complaint and answer as those documents were finally amended.
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All parties appeared at the hearing, and I provided them with the full opportunity to
participate, to introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine witnesses, to argue
orally and file briefs. Based upon the record, my consideration of the briefs filed by counsel for
the General Counsel, counsel for the Union, and counsel for the Respondent, and my
observations of the demeanor of the witnesses, I now make the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 2
Findings of Fact
I. Jurisdiction
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that the Respondent is a
corporation with and office and place of business in North Highlands, California, where it has
been engaged in the business of manufacturing and/or supplying doors, windows, hardware,
and millwork to construction contractors. Further, I find that during the calendar year ending
December 31, 2006, the Respondent, in the course and conduct of its business operations, sold
and shipped from its North Highlands, California facility goods valued in excess of $50,000
directly to points located outside the state of California.
Accordingly, I conclude that the Respondent is now, and at all times material herein has
been, an employer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the
Act.
II. Labor Organization
The complaint alleges, the answer admits, and I find that at all times material herein, the
Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
III. Alleged Unfair Labor Practices
A. The Dispute
The Respondent manufactures and supplies interior and exterior doors to contractors in
the construction industry. Additionally, the Respondent has a retail division that sells doors and
hardware to the general public. The finished product manufactured at the Respondent’s facility
is loaded into trucks by the Respondent’s employees and delivered by its drivers to customers.
The Union and the Respondent have had a collective bargaining relationship for
approximately 40 years. During that time they have successfully negotiated numerous
contracts. The parties agree that at all material times the Union has been the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of a unit (the Unit) of the Respondent’s employees
described as: All employees performing work covered by the collective bargaining agreement
between the Respondent and the Union effective for the period from May 1, 2004, to May 1,
2007. There is further agreement among the parties, and I find, that at all times material, the

2 The credibility resolutions made in this decision are based on a review of the testimonial
record and exhibits, with consideration given for reasonably probability and the demeanor of the
witnesses. See NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). Where
witnesses have testified in contradiction to the findings herein, I have discredited their
testimony, as either being in conflict with credited documentary or testimonial evidence, or
because it was inherently incredible and unworthy of belief.
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Unit constitutes a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining within the meaning
of Section 9(b) of the Act, and that based on Section 9(a) of the Act, the Union has been the
exclusive collective bargaining representative of the employees in the Unit. There are currently
approximately 60 employees in the bargaining unit.
The last contract between the Respondent and the Union was effective by its terms from
May 1, 2004 to May 1, 2007. (G.C. Ex. 2.) Negotiations for a new agreement began in April of
2007. Approximately 10 negotiation meetings between the Union and the Respondent took
place between April and September of 2007.3 The principal negotiators on behalf of the
Respondent were the Respondent’s president, Dale Winchester, and its legal counsel, E. A.
Hubbert, Jr. On behalf or the Union, its principal negotiator was David Imus, business
representative.
Preliminarily, it is important to note that the General Counsel is not contending that the
Respondent engaged in bad faith bargaining during the course of these negotiations. Counsel
for the General Counsel made this very clear in both her oral statements at the hearing and in
her post-hearing brief. Further, I will note that in rendering this decision I specifically make no
finding regarding bad faith or surface bargaining by either party to these negotiations. No such
finding is required in order to decide the limited issues alleged in the complaint and litigated
before me.
It is the General Counsel’s contention that the Respondent violated Section (8)(a)(1) and
(5) of the Act by refusing to provide information necessary to the Union’s administration of the
collective bargaining agreement and to its effective negotiation for a successor agreement.
While there are no bad faith bargaining issues to be addressed by me, it is necessary to
consider the course and progress of the parties’ negotiations for a successor agreement. It is in
this context that the Union’s request for information and the Respondent’s response to that
request must be viewed.
The negotiations took place during, and were certainly made more difficult by, a
significant reduction in the residential construction industry. Most of the Respondent’s business
is with contractors in this industry. From the testimony of Imus and Winchester, it appears that
the parties were initially very far apart on economic and other issues. The Respondent initially
proposed a 50% reduction in the profit sharing for unit employees, a reduction in wages for
those same employees, the elimination of union security provisions, and the elimination of the
successorship, sales, and assigns clauses, and offered a contract of only one year duration.
There appears to be no disagreement that during the course of these negotiations the
Respondent’s negotiators repeatedly supported their bargaining proposals by contending that
the Respondent was losing bids for door fabrication in part because it was paying overly
generous benefits to its bargaining unit employees.
The information requested by the Union can best be considered and analyzed when
placed in three separate categories. The first category of requests related to the profit sharing
plan as provided for in the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. The Union’s requests for
information regarding this category, as alleged in paragraphs 7(a) and (aa) of the complaint,
were in the form of two letters sent to the Respondent and dated April 26 and August 8,
respectively. The second category of requests related to job-bid-information. This request for
information, as alleged in paragraph 7(b) of the complaint, was in the form of a letter dated

3 All dates are in 2007, unless otherwise indicated.
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June 18. The third, and last category of requests, related to information about newly hired
employees. This request for information, as alleged in paragraph 7(c) of the complaint, was in
the form of a letter dated July 6.
These requests for information will be discussed at length throughout the remainder of
this decision. The General Counsel and the Union contend that the Respondent’s bargaining
proposals made during the course of negotiations, as well as its conduct, serve as justification
for the Union’s information requests. It is alleged that these requests were necessary to rebut
those proposals and effectively negotiate for a successor agreement, and also to be able to
administer the collective bargaining agreement.4 The Respondent takes the position that it fully
complied with its duty to furnish the Union with the requested information to the extent that the
information was relevant, not privileged, confidential, or private, and did in fact exist. This is the
gavamen of the case.
B. Applicable Law
In a recent case, Disneyland Park and Disney’s California Adventure, 350 NLRB No. 88
(September 13, 2007), the Board recited certain well established legal principles regarding an
employer’s obligation to provide requested information to a union representing the employer’s
employees. As the Board said, “An employer has the statutory obligation to provide, on request,
relevant information that the union needs for the proper performance of its duties as collective
bargaining representative.” The Board cited to a number of Supreme Court decisions including,
NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152 (1956); NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432,
435-436 (1967); and Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979). Further, the Board
added that, “This includes [information need for] the decision to file or process grievances,”
citing to Beth Abraham Health Services, 332 NLRB 1234 (2000).
Specifically, where the union’s request for information pertains to employees in the
bargaining unit, the Board reiterated that the “information is presumptively relevant and the
[r]espondent must provide the information. However, where the information requested by the
union is not presumptively relevant to the union’s performance as bargaining representative, the
burden is on the union to demonstrate the relevance.” Disneyland Park; and cases cited therein
including Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304 (2000); Associated Ready Mixed Concrete,
Inc., 318 NLRB 318 (1995), enfd. 108 F. 3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1997); Pfizer, Inc., 268 NLRB 916
(1984), enfd. 736 F.2d 887 (7th Cir. 1985). The Board went on the say that “[a] union has
satisfied its burden when it demonstrates a reasonable belief, supported by objective evidence,
that the requested information is relevant,” citing to Knappton Maritime Corp., 292 NLRB 236,
238-239 (1988).
Finally, in the Disneyland case the Board repeated its well established principle that it
“uses a broad, discovery-type standard in determining the relevance of requested information.
Potential or probable relevance is sufficient to give rise to an employer’s obligation to provide
information.”5 Still, where the information requested is not presumptively relevant, as not
pertaining to employees in the bargaining unit, “the General Counsel must present evidence
either (1) that the union demonstrated relevance of the nonunit information, or (2) that the

4 While the collective bargaining agreement between the parties had expired, there is no
dispute that certain provisions remained in effect.
5 Other cases have described a union’s burden under these circumstances as “not an
exceptionally heavy one.” Wisconsin Bell, Inc., d/b/a SBC Midwest, 346 NLRB 62, 64 (2005).
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relevance of the information should have been apparent to the Respondent under the
circumstances. [Internal citations omitted] Absent such a showing, the employer is not obligated
to provide the requested information.”
C. Documents Related to Profit Sharing; Letters of April 26 and August 8.
While the General Counsel does not allege bad faith bargaining on the part of the
Respondent, counsel still attempts to portray the Respondent’s negotiators as less than
cooperative. In an effort to “color the case” and set the stage for the later alleged failure to
furnish information, counsel for the General Counsel questioned David Imus regarding a
statement allegedly made to him by Dale Winchester just prior to the first negotiation session.
According to Imus, he and Winchester had a private conversation in Winchester’s office during
which they discussed the fact that “work was down,” and the economic conditions were not
good. Imus testified that he informed Winchester that it was the Union’s goal to reach an
agreement with the Employer with “the least amount of trouble as possible.” Imus contends that
Winchester responded by saying that he did not want “to continue the relationship with the
Union, that it was too much hassle.”
Winchester placed the date of a private conversation in his office with Imus as the day
before negotiations began. Winchester specifically denied saying anything to Imus to the effect
that the relationship between the Employer and the Union was too much of a hassle. However,
he does recall Imus asking him if there were any “surprises” coming from the Employer during
the negotiations. Winchester testified that he told Imus that the only surprises came from Imus,
who allegedly had a habit of arriving at the plant unannounced. According to Winchester, he
informed Imus that he would appreciate it if Imus would check in with Winchester and let him
know what was going on before Imus walked into the plant to speak with employees.
In comparing the demeanor and testimony of Imus with that of Winchester, I did not find
either man to be anymore credible than the other. To some extent, both men seemed to have
selective memory, specifically recalling those events that put them in the best light. Each man
was clearly a partisan on behalf of his respective side in this dispute. I do not believe that either
man was fabricating testimony, but rather tended to exaggerate or embellish events to favor
their respective positions.
In considering the alleged statement by Winchester that he did not want to continue the
relationship with the Union because it was too much of a hassle, I am of the belief that it is more
probable than not that Winchester did in fact make the statement attributed to him by Imus. I
doubt that Imus would make up such a statement “out of whole cloth.” Imus’ version of the
conversation is inherently more plausible than that told by Winchester. Accordingly, I believe
that the words were spoken by Winchester. However, I do not believe that those words
establish that the Respondent held any particular animus towards the Union as would make the
Respondent inclined to refuse to furnish the Union with relevant documents pursuant to a
request for information.
The parties have had a successful 40 year history of collective bargaining. Certainly,
hard economic conditions in the home building industry had made these current negotiations
particularly difficult. Never-the-less, I seriously doubt that an “off the cuff” remark by Winchester
that the Union was a hassle establishes animus such that the Respondent had any sort of a
design or plan to frustrate the Union’s request for information. While I believe that the statement
attribute to him was made by Winchester, I do not believe that it is entitled to any weight in
deciding the issues in this case, and I shall give it none. In any event, it is not necessary to
establish animus or malice in this case in order to find a violation of the Act.
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The expired collective bargaining agreement provided that the Respondent establish a
company wide profit sharing plan for “all salaried and hourly employees.” The “profit sharing
pool” was based on a formula depending on the “net” profit of the Employer. (See G.C. Ex. 2,
page 25.) It is undisputed that early in negotiations, the Respondent proposed reducing this
profit sharing formula from 10% of net profit to 5%.
By letter dated April 26 from Imus to counsel for the Respondent, the Union requested
that the Respondent furnish it with certain financial information. According to the letter, and
Imus’ testimony, he had previously orally asked for this information on two separate occasions,
but the Respondent had failed to comply with his request. The letter seeks the production of
three categories of information, specifically: “1. Gross revenue each year for the last three
years; 2. Net profit each year for the last three years; [and] 3. Total amount of profit distributed
to the employees with the number of employees receiving the distribution each year for the last
three years.” (G.C. Ex. 3.)
According to Imus, he requested item 1, the gross revenue, because the Respondent
had been claiming it was having difficulty competing with other door manufactures, and so the
Union needed to see the gross revenue in order to determine whether the claim was reasonable
or not. Regarding item 2, the net profits, Imus testified that in order to evaluate the
Respondent’s profit sharing proposal and to formulate a counter-proposal, it was necessary to
determine just how much money was available to pay profit sharing to bargaining unit
employees, which was a product of the Respondent’s net profits. As to item 3, profit distributed
to employees, Imus testified that he needed this information in order to administer the contract
and determine whether the bargaining unit employees had been receiving the proper profit
sharing amounts pursuant to the contractual provisions, and also to help in formulating a
response to the Respondent’s proposal to reduce profit sharing.
Imus testified that the only information that he ever received in response to the Union’s
request of April 26 was the amount of profit distributed to bargaining unit employees for the last
three years. He did not receive the amount of profit distributed to non-bargaining unit
employees, which he testified was necessary since the amount of money available for
bargaining unit employees was dependent to some extent on how much profit was distributed to
non-bargaining unit employees. The contract provided that the profit sharing plan was company
wide, meaning that a pool was created from which all employees, unit and non-unit, were paid.
Additionally, he never received the requested information on gross revenue and net profits.
The Respondent’s immediate response to the Union’s request was a letter from counsel
for the Respondent dated April 27. (G.C. Ex. 4.) In that letter counsel recited what would be the
Respondent’s recurring theme throughout negotiations. According to the letter, the Respondent
“has never maintained it’s not a profitable company or that it lacks the financial ability to comply
with your economic demands during these negotiations. We have consistently maintained,
however, that the wages, hours and working conditions of the employees you
represent…should be consistent with other employees in the Sacramento area working in the
same job classifications.”
Counsel for the General Counsel acknowledged at the hearing and in her post-hearing
brief that the Respondent had made it very clear during negotiations that it was not pleading “an
inability to pay.” What all parties agree that the Respondent was arguing during negotiations
was that in order to be competitive with similar door manufactures in the Sacramento, California
area, the wages and benefits paid to its employees had to be comparable to those wages and
benefits paid to the employees’ of competing employers.
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It is the Respondent’s contention that as it has never asserted a financial inability to
meet the Union’s wage demands, nor has it made a “plea of poverty,” that it is not required to
furnish the Union with its financial information concerning gross and net profits. NLRB v. Truitt
Manufacturing Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). The Respondent further argues that an assertion of
“competitive disadvantage” does not by itself constitute a claim of inability to pay. Nielsen
Lithographing Co., 305 NLRB 697, 701 (1991). In his post-hearing brief, counsel for the
Respondent claims that the Respondent did not make a claim of either inability to pay or to
compete. He contends that the Respondent “merely reminded the Union that it was paying
higher wages and benefits than any other comparable employer.” In my view, this is nothing
more than semantics. Throughout negotiations, on many different occasions, the Respondent’s
negotiators made it very clear to the Union negotiators that it was having trouble competing with
its non-Union competitors. While it is clear that the Respondent did not make a general “plea of
poverty,” it is equally clear that it did make a claim of inability to compete, and I so find.
Further, counsel for the Respondent argues that it was only obligated to furnish the
Union with information as to profit distributed to bargaining unit employees, since similar
information for non-unit employees was irrelevant. As another defense, counsel contends that
the Respondent proposed an alternate means of satisfying the Union’s request. At the
negotiation session held on August 31, the Respondent presented the Union with a written
proposal to have the Union select an accountant to examine the Respondent’s books and
records and provide the Union with the following information: 1. Whether the Respondent’s profit
and loss is calculated according to generally accepted accounting procedures and standards,
and, if not, how does it deviate from those procedures and standards; and 2. Whether the
allocation of profit sharing funds between Union and non-Union employees is conducted on an
equal basis, and, if not, in what manner are the allocations unequal. (Res. Ex. 5.) While not
entirely clear from the record, it appears from Imus’ testimony that the proposal was briefly
discussed, after which the parties agreed to further discuss the proposal later. However,
apparently no further discussions were held on this issue. In any event, it is important to note
that the Respondent’s written proposal of August 31 was received by the Union over four
months after the Union’s initial written request of April 26.
The Union contends that as time passed it had reason to request additional information
regarding the administration of the Respondent’s profit sharing program. According to Imus, he
was given a pay stub for John Wilkerson, a non-unit employee, whom Imus thought was a
company salesman.6 Imus testified that his review of the pay stub led him to believe that
Wilkerson was receiving profit sharing or production bonuses far in excess of what a salesman,
as a non-unit employee, should have received. (G.C. Ex. 5.) If accurate, this could adversely
impact on the profit sharing received by bargaining unit employees, as the amounts received by
all employees were interdependent.
Accordingly, by letter dated August 8, Imus requested the following information from the
Respondent: “1. [For] all salaried employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, name,
job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, [and] the date and the amount of profit sharing
distribution for each year for the last three years; 2. [For] all hourly employees, including non-
bargaining unit employees, [the same information as request above]; 3. [The] name of all
salaried or hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, [and] the amount of any

6 In fact, Wilkerson was not a salesman, but, rather, the general manager of the
Respondent’s commercial department, which is a separate profit center not covered by the
collective bargaining agreement with the Union.
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other bonus or bonuses paid to them during each of the last three years; [and] 4. The employee
name and the amount of any other non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly
employees, including non-bargaining unit employees.” (G.C. Ex. 6.)
While not entirely clear from the record, it appears that Imus never indicated to the
Respondent’s negotiators that he was in possession of Wilkerson’s pay stub. In any event,
Imus testified that he never received any of this requested information.
In his post-hearing brief, counsel for the Respondent argues that the information
requested by the Union in its August 8 letter need not have been furnished because the Union’s
reliance on Wilkerson’s pay stub was irrational and unsubstantiated. Further, counsel contents
that the information requested was not produced because it was irrelevant and protected by the
right to individual privacy in the United States and California Constitutions.
Regarding Wilkerson’s pay stub, counsel seems to be suggesting that this was merely a
ruse used by Imus to justify a broad irrelevant request for information that the Union was not
legally entitled to. Imus’ testimony suggests that his “suspicions” regarding the pay stub were
based only on what other employees told him about Wikerson’s job duties and responsibilities.
As counsel for the Respondent points out, it is well established that mere suspicions are not
enough to create a presumption of relevance.7 Anchor Motor Freight, 296 NLRB 944, 949
(1989) (union failed to show anything beyond “mere suspicion” that the information may be
relevant).
Counsel for the Respondent contends that the Union’s request for the names and
financial information regarding the non-unit employees in the August 8 letter was irrelevant and
a violation of the individual right to privacy as protected by the United States and California
Constitutions. Counsel acknowledges that the Board traditionally will balance employees’
expectations of privacy with the Union’s need for the information, but contends as the Union had
no legitimate right to the information concerning non-unit employees, the balance tips strongly in
favor of not disclosing the information. See Aerospace Corp., 314 NLRB 100 (1994); Exxon Co.
USA, 321 NLRB 896 (1996); Silver Bros. Co., Inc., d/b/a Good Life Beverage Co., 312 NLRB
1060 (1993); Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 301 NLRB 1104 (1991); Howard University, 290
NLRB 1006 (1988).
In analyzing the request for information contained in the Union’s letter of April 26 (G.C.
Ex. 3.), it is necessary to determine the use to which the Union would or could put the
information. As expressed by David Imus, the Union needed the information in order to fully
understand the Respondent’s proposal to reduce profit sharing, to prepare a counter proposal,
and to administer the profit sharing clause in the expired contract. The amount of profit sharing
distributed to unit employees is directly dependent on the Respondent’s total net profit, the
number of company employees receiving the money, and the amount each is receiving.
Accordingly, both items 2 and 3 in the letter of April 26, the request for the “net profit each year
for the last three years,” and for the “total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the
number of employees receiving the distribution each year for the last three years,” pertain to,

7 Frankly, I am of the belief that had Imus genuinely wanted to determine who Wilkerson
was, or what role he played with the Employer, it would not have been difficult for him to have
done so. He might have started out with simply asking Wilkerson or Winchester. However,
apparently he did neither.
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among others, employees in the bargaining unit. Therefore, the information is presumptively
relevant and the Respondent must provide it to the Union. See George Koch & Sons, 295
NLRB 695 (1989); Kendell College of Art, 292 NLRB 1065 (1989).
Further, to the extent that the request calls for the profit distributed not only to unit
employees, but also to non-unit employees the information is also presumptively relevant. The
contractual profit-sharing formula for employees covers both non-unit employees and unit
employees. It is an interdependent calculating system. There is no way to accurately
determine or project the profit sharing for unit employees, without also knowing the profit
sharing for non-unit employees. In other words, there is only “one pot,” the Respondent’s net
profits, out of which all employees receive their profit sharing.
Even assuming the information requested for non-unit employees is not presumptively
relevant, it is still extremely relevant for use in the collective bargaining process and contract
administration because, as noted, the profit sharing system for all employees is interdependent.
The Union’s burden to establish relevance is not a heavy one, and is easily met under the
circumstances of this case. The Board allows for the use of a broad discovery-like standard to
measure relevance, and even potentially or probably relevant material would be sufficient to
require production by an employer. US Postal Service, 332 NLRB 635, 636 (2000); Shoppers
Food Warehouse, 315 NLRB 258, 259 (1994); Reiss Viking, 312 NLRB 622, 625 (1993).
Clearly, the Union has met that standard for both unit and non-unit employees as it concerns the
Employer’s profit sharing program. Accordingly, items number 2 and 3 in the Union’s request
for information letter of April 26 must be produced. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this
information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in paragraph
7(a)(ii) and (iii) of the complaint.
However, I do not believe that the Union is entitled to the information requested in item
number 1 of its April 26 letter, the “gross revenue each year for the last three years.” As
mentioned above, the Respondent was not claiming a financial inability to meet the Union’s
contract demands. All parties agree that the Respondent was not making a plea of poverty. As
such, the Respondent was not required to open its financial books to the Union. See Truitt
Manufacturing Co., 351 US 149 (1956); North Star Steel, 347 NLRB No. 119 (2006). Yet, that is
essentially what the Employer would be required to do in producing gross revenue information.
Imus’ testimony regarding the Union’s alleged need for the Respondent’s gross revenue
information made no sense to me. The profit sharing plan is predicated on the Respondent’s
“net” profits. These are, of course, the profits remaining after all the expenses of doing business
are deducted. I have already indicated the relevance of net profit figures and the requirement
that the Respondent produce this information. Gross revenue is neither potentially nor probably
relevant to the profit sharing issue, and the General Counsel and the Union have failed to
establish a reasonable justification for its production. The Respondent’s refusal to produce the
gross revenue figures does not constitute a violation of the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend
that paragraph 7(a)(i) of the complaint be dismissed.
Regarding the Union’s request for information as set forth in its letter of August 8 (G.C.
Ex. 6.), Imus testified that this information was necessary in order to properly administer the
contract and determine whether a salesman was receiving excessive benefits to the detriment
of the profit sharing payments made to unit members, and also to fully evaluate the
Respondent’s profit sharing proposal and to prepare counter proposals. As noted above, Imus
testified that after having viewed the pay stub for John Wilkerson, he became suspicious as to
whether salesmen and perhaps other non-unit employees were receiving excessive benefits.
While I am not entirely confident that Imus was genuinely confused about Wilkerson’s status
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with the Employer, the amount of benefits paid to non-unit employees was a legitimate concern
for the Union, since whatever profit sharing or other benefits they received correspondingly
diminished the net profits available to provide profit sharing to bargaining unit employees. As I
have indicated repeatedly, the profit sharing formula for both non-unit and unit employees was
an interdependent calculating system.
The letter of August 8, in its four paragraphs, essentially requested for all employees,
including unit and non-unit employees, their names, job classifications, the wages paid to them,
and all benefits received by them, including profit sharing, bonuses, and non-wage
compensation, for a three year period. For the same reasons as listed above regarding the
April 26 letter, I find that this information is presumptively relevant as it concerns the Union’s
duty to administer a contact provision, the profit sharing clause, and was the subject of
bargaining proposals. George Koch, supra; Kendell College, supra. Again, even if not
presumptively relevant because it included information on non-unit employees, the
interdependency of the profit sharing formula caused the information on non-unit employees to
be relevant to a determination as to whether the unit employees were being properly
compensated under the expired contract and as it related to contract negotiations. Thus, the
Union has met the relatively light burden of establishing potential or probable relevance. US
Postal Service, supra; Shoppers Food Warehouse, supra; Reiss Viking, supra.
As noted earlier, counsel for the Respondent argued in his post-hearing brief that even
assuming the requested information for non-unit employees was relevant, the Respondent had
offered a legitimate alternative means of satisfying the Union’s request. By this he is referring to
the Respondent’s written offer of August 31 (Res. Ex. 5.), handed to Imus during contract
negotiations. This document proposes allowing an accountant selected by the Union to
examine the Respondent’s books and records to determine whether its profit and loss figures
are calculated according to generally accepted accounting procedures, and, if not, how does it
deviate from those procedures; and whether the allocation of profit sharing funds between unit
and non-unit employees is conducted on an equal basis, and, if not, in what manner is the
allocation unequal.
This “alternative” was offered by the Respondent over four months after the original
request for information was made by the Union in its April 26 letter. While counsel for the
General Counsel did not specifically address whether this offer was “reasonably prompt,” I am
of the view that it was not. The Board has indicated that what constitutes reasonable
promptness must be determined under the totality of the circumstances in each case. There is
no “per se” rule, rather what is required is a reasonable good faith effort to respond to the
request as promptly as circumstances allow. Allegheny Power, 339 NLRB 585, 587 (2003).
Under the circumstances of this case, I believe that a four month delay was not reasonable.
None of the information sought by the Union was particularly complex, and was likely readily
available from the Respondent’s payroll and personnel records, which should have been easily
accessed through its computer system. Samaritan Med. Ctr., 319 NLRB 392, 398 (1995). Such
access to the information by the Respondent should not have required a four month delay
before an alternative proposal was even made. See Regency Serv. Carts, Inc., 345 NLRB No.
44 (2005) (three month delay in circumstances unlawful); Peyton Packing Co., 129 NLRB 1358
(1961) (three month delay too long, even when data are incomplete and necessary persons
absent from work).
However, even if a four month delay in this case from the initial request for the
information was not excessive, I am of the view that the proposal of August 31 (Res. Ex. 5.) was
not an adequate alternative. As an alternative, it provided only that an accountant view the
records and report back to the Union as to whether the Respondent has made its calculations
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and allocations regarding profit sharing according to accepted accounting procedures and on an
equal basis, and, if not, how it deviated from those procedures and equity. That information,
while certainly useful, would not serve as a basis for the Union to fulfill its legal duty as the
exclusive collective bargaining representative to administer the terms of the contract on behalf
of the unit employees. The Union needed to know the specific information requested as it
related to individual employees and how each employee classification was effected by the profit
sharing of the other classifications. Such information was even more necessary in order for the
Union to be in a position to intelligently address the Respondent’s bargaining proposal on profit
sharing and, if necessary, to respond with a counter proposal. Therefore, I conclude that the
Respondent’s proposal of August 31 did not relieve the Respondent of the duty to comply with
the Union’s request for information contained in its letters of April 26 and August 8, as more fully
set forth above.
Finally, counsel for the Respondent argues in his post-hearing brief that the information
requested by the Union, as it related to individual non-unit employees, was irrelevant, and, thus,
protected against disclosure by the United States and California Constitutions as the guarantors
of the individual employees’ privacy rights. However, as noted at length above, I have already
concluded that most of the information requested by the Union was relevant. While counsel for
the Respondent correctly notes that where employees have a legitimate and substantial
expectation of privacy, the Board will balance those interests against a union’s need for the
information,8 I am of the opinion that in this case the balance tips strongly in favor of the Union’s
need for the information.
The Union seeks the names, job titles, wage rates, gross yearly wages, profit sharing
distribution received, other bonuses received, including non-wage compensation, for all
employees, unit and non-unit. Certainly this is sensitive information, for which employees have
a legitimate and substantial expectation of privacy. Never-the-less, the Union has at least as
great an interest in ensuring that the Respondent is abiding by the contract provisions that
establish a profit sharing formula for unit employees. As noted, this formula is interdependent
and involves not only the unit employees represented by the Union, but all other employees of
the Respondent. As the Respondent has yet to offer an adequate alternative to the production
of these documents, the balance tips in favor of releasing this information to the Union. Only in
this way can the Union fulfill its legal duty to administer the contract on behalf of the unit
employees, and to properly carry out its collective bargaining responsibility.
For the reasons expressed, items number 1 through 4 in the Union’s request for
information letter of August 8 must be produced. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this
information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in complaint
paragraph 7(aa)(i), (ii), (iii), and (iv).
D. Documents Related to Job Bids; Letter of June 18
There appears to be no dispute that throughout the course of negotiations the
Respondent took the position that because of superior wages and benefits paid to its
employees, the Respondent was at a competitive disadvantage when bidding for jobs against
other companies performing similar work. Imus testified that at one point during negotiations
the Respondent presented the Union with a list of companies with whom the Respondent
believed it was not competitive. According to Imus, in an effort to determine the basis upon

8 Aerospace Corp., supra; Exxon Co. USA, supra; Silver Bros. Co., Inc., d/b/a Good Life
Beverage Co., supra; Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., supra; Howard University, supra.
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which the Respondent was not competitive, the Union requested certain information from the
Respondent. It was Imus’ contention that if the Union could determine the reasons why the
Respondent was not competitive, assuming that to be accurate, the Union might be able to alter
its bargaining proposals in an effort to provided the Respondent with a competitive advantage.
It was allegedly for this reason that the Union sent a letter to counsel for the Respondent
dated June 18. (G.C. Ex. 7.) The first paragraph of the letter notes that, “During negotiations
the company has repeatedly stated that they were not competitive with other companies. The
workers are willing to negotiate in order to make the company more competitive…. In order to
negotiate responsibility [sic] we need the following information to evaluate the company’s
proposals. All information should be for the last three years.”
The letter then specified 11 separate items the Union was requesting, as follows:
1. Copies of bids received;
2. Copies of new projects bidding;
3. Copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door;
4. The reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid;
5. What company was awarded the bid, not received, and why;
6. How much lower was the competition on each bid not received;
7. Were there any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, if so when;
8. Copies of jobs that you were doing, but now are awarded to another company;
9. Copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed from and the reason for removal;
10. Copies of bids not submitted due to contractors insurance requirements;
11. Copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability.
In response to its request for information, the Union received a letter from counsel for the
Respondent dated June 20. (G.C. Ex. 8.) In part, that letter stated, “I must inform you that your
various requests for information include information that does not exist and information that will
not [be] produced due to the fact that it contains confidential proprietary information.” Further
the letter stated, “…we dispute the necessity for the Employer to produce any of the information
you requested because the Employer has not maintained an inability to comply with the
demands of the Union during the negotiations.”
For all intense and purposes, none of the requested documents were received by the
Union, and apparently no further formal explanation was proffered by the Respondent. In his
post-hearing brief, counsel for the Respondent defends the Respondent’s failure to furnish the
bid related documents on the basis that they were not relevant to negotiations, did not exist,
and/or were confidential, proprietary, and/or constituted trade secrets.
I am of the opinion that all 11 categories of documents requested in the Union’s letter of
June 18 were relevant to the parties’ negotiations. If not relevant on their face, they certainly
became relevant when the Respondent argued during negotiations that it was not competitive
with other door manufactures in the Sacramento area because its wages and benefits paid to
employees were greater than the wages and benefits competitors paid to their employees.
Items number 1-9 and 11 appear to be directly related to the Respondent’s bidding process,
specifically why bids submitted by the Respondent were either accepted or rejected by
contractors. The Union was also seeking information as to whether the Respondent was in a
position to perform the work needed to submit a bid, or whether a lack of production capacity
resulted in a failure to submit a bid on a particular project. Further, the Union wanted to find out
what reasons the Respondent may have been given by contractors or otherwise learned
regarding why it was unsuccessful in bidding for any particular projects. As to item number 10,
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Imus testified that he had been told my Jeff Wilson, one of the Respondent’s managers, that
some contractors were creating such stringent insurance requirements that the Respondent was
declining to bid certain work. This item was requested in order to produce documents as could
establish which jobs the Respondent had declined to bid on because of concerns that insurance
and liability issues were so significant that a profit could not be made on the projects.
Regarding counsel for the Respondent’s contention in his letter of June 20 that much of
the requested information on bids did not exist, Winchester was cross-examined at length by
counsel for the Union. His testimony in this area was a mass of contradictions and
equivocation. He claimed not to understand what the Union was requesting for several of the
items listed, but he admitted not approaching the Union to clarify specifically what was being
requested.9 For many of the listed items he claimed to have had no specific information as it
was allegedly outside his area of responsibility and expertise, but repeatedly acknowledged that
managers Jeff Wilson and Rick Hall likely had such information. Of course, the information
request was made of the Respondent as the employing entity, not of Winchester personally.
The Respondent had the duty to produce relevant documents and information through its
collective knowledge, and that included from Winchester, Wilson, Hall, and any other managers
who could appropriately respond. It was clear from his testimony that Winchester had no
intention of putting forth a good faith effort to respond to the Union’s request. It is obvious to the
undersigned that the letter of June 20 refusing to furnish any information was the only response
that the Respondent intended to proffer.
In his post-hearing brief, counsel for the Respondent argues that the bid information
concerned matters outside the bargaining unit, for which the Union had failed to establish
relevance. The Board has repeatedly taken the position that information requests for similar
documents, such as subcontracting agreements, even those relating to bargaining unit
employees’ terms and conditions of employment, are not presumptively relevant. Therefore, a
union seeking such information must demonstrate its relevance. Disneyland Park, supra, citing
Richmond Health Care, 332 NLRB 1304, 1305 fn. 1 (2000); See Detroit Edison Co., 314 NLRB
1273, 1273-1274 (1994). However, in the case before me, the Union is certainly able to
establish relevance as it was the Respondent itself that raised the underlying issue during
negotiations by alleging difficulty in the bidding process with its non-union competition. Under
these circumstances, the relevance of the information requested should have been apparent to
the Respondent, but, in any event, that relevance was pointed out to the Respondent in the first
paragraph of the Union’s letter of June 18. (G.C. Ex. 7.) Disneyland Park, supra, citing Allison
Co., 330 NLRB 1363, 1367 fn. 23 (2000); Brazos Electric Power Cooperative, Inc., 241 NLRB
1016, 1018-1019 (1979), enfd. in relevant part 615 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1980).
Counsel for the Respondent further argues that it has a legitimate confidentiality and
proprietary interest in protecting the specifics of its contractual and business relationship with
contractors’ soliciting bids. There is no genuine dispute that the Respondent does in fact have
such legitimate interests. However, the Board has repeatedly held that “in dealing with union
requests for relevant but assertedly confidential information, [it is] required to balance a union’s
need for such information against any ‘legitimate and substantial’ confidentiality interests
established by the employer, accommodating the parties’ respective interests insofar as feasible

9 Imus testified that regarding item 1, he should have more accurately used the words:
“Copies of bids awarded”; and regarding item 2, should have more accurately used the words:
“Copy of a list of new projects that A-1 Door is bidding on.” He further indicated that the
Respondent’s negotiators never asked him to explain what was meant by the items in the
request.
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in determining the employer’s duty to supply the information.” Allen Storage & Moving Co., Inc.,
342 NLRB 501, 502 (2004). In the case at hand, the Union needs the requested bidding
information in order to determine both whether the Respondent’s argument is genuine that it has
a problem competing due to the alleged superiority of the wages and benefits it pays, and also
so as to be able to formulate appropriate contract proposals. As Imus testified, the Union might
be willing to adjust its proposals to aid the Respondent in successfully bidding on jobs, if any
proffered information from the Respondent can demonstrate such a need.
In my view, a balancing of these competing interests tips strongly in the Union’s favor.
After all, the Respondent can not “have it both ways.” The Respondent should not be able to
advance the contention during negotiations that it is not competitive in the bidding process and
then be privileged on the basis of confidentiality and propriety interests not to have to produce
any proof of its claim. The information is relevant to the Union’s proposals at the bargaining
table, and, in fact, the Union may be in a position to adjust its proposals to improve the
Respondent’s bidding position. These factors weigh heavily in favor of requiring the
Respondent to produce the requested information.
Counsel for the Respondent argues in his post-hearing brief that the Respondent offered
an alternative method of satisfying the Union’s need for the requested information, that being
the proposal of August 31 (Res. Ex. 5.) to allow an accountant to examine the Respondent’s
books and records regarding its profit and loss calculations and profit sharing allocations.
Frankly, I am at a loss to understand how this proposal has any connection with the Union’s
request for bidding information made in its letter of June 18 (G.C. Ex. 7.). I am unaware of any
alternate proposal that the Respondent made in response to the Union’s request for the bidding
information. Certainly, the letter from counsel dated June 20 (G.C. Ex. 8.), which was the
Respondent’s only official response, makes no mention of any alternate method of satisfying the
Union’s request.
Finally, in counsel’s post-hearing brief, he alleges that the bidding information sought by
the Union is protected from disclosure by the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act. However,
counsel offers no Board or court case holding this to be so. I am unaware of any such case. In
any event, to the extent that the California Uniform Trade Secrets Act would protect the
Respondent’s bidding process from disclosure as a confidential or proprietary interest, I have
already addressed the Board’s position on the balancing of such conflicting legitimate interests.
As I have found, the interests of the Union in addressing this matter through the collective
bargaining process outweigh the Respondent’s interests in keeping it confidential. Also, it would
seem that the Respondent waived any such defense when it raised the issue of competitive
disadvantage during negotiations.
Accordingly, items number 1-11 in the Union’s request for information letter of June 18
must be produced. The Respondent’s failure to furnish this information constitutes a violation of
Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in paragraph 7(b)(i) through (xi) of the complaint.
E. Documents Related to New Employees; Letter of July 6
The expired collective bargaining agreement between the Union and the Employer
contains a “Union Security” provision requiring a newly hired employee to either be a member
of, or join, the Union within a certain period to time. Further, the contract requires that a newly
hired employee will be processed through the union hiring hall and receive a “work referral.”
Whenever a referral is requested, the Employer is required to provide the Union with “a written
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request stating the name, address, classification, rate of pay, Social Security number and
proposed date of hire” of the person to be employed.10 (G.C. Ex. 5, the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, Article 2, Union Security; and “Exhibit D,” Employer’s Notification of Hire.)
Winchester testified that sometime in May the Respondent hired a company called
Huffmaster to provide security services. Huffmaster’s employees remained on the
Respondent’s property for approximately three weeks. According to Winchester, these
individuals were never hired by the Respondent or placed on its payroll. They remained
employees of Huffmaster. Apparently, these individuals were engaged principally for security
purposes to ride along as passengers when the Respondent’s truck drivers made deliveries of
product to construction sites. From Winchester’s testimony, it seems that the use of Huffmaster
personnel coincided with a period of high labor unrest among the bargaining unit members
employed at the Respondent’s facility.
In any event, Imus testified that he became suspicious that Huffmaster personnel might
be performing bargaining unit work, even though they had never been referred through the
union hiring hall. In an effort to determine whether the contract was being violated, and in order
to further respond to the Employer’s negotiation proposals, Imus requested certain information
from the Respondent. He sent Winchester a letter dated July 6 (G.C. Ex. 9.) requesting the
following information for the period from “May 1, 2007, to [the] present”:
1. The name, address, phone number, date of hire, rate of pay of anyone hired.
2. The resume and application for anyone you accepted an application from.
3. Application and/or resume of anyone offered a job but did not take the job.
4. Copies of any and all documents given to new or prospective employees.
5. Copy of any document notifying applicants of the labor dispute in progress.
Counsel for the Employer responded by letter dated July 9, indicating that the
information would be forthcoming, but only to the extent that it concerned bargaining unit
employees. (Res. Ex. 7.) A second letter was sent by counsel dated July 12, enclosing “copies
[of] the Employer’s records concerning employees hired in the bargaining unit during the period
you requested.” Attached to the letter was the personnel information requested by the Union in
item number 1, for 11 of the Respondent’s newly hired employees. (G.C. Ex. 10.)
Imus testified that sometime after he received the Respondent’s letter of July 12, he
went to the Respondent’s facility. While there he was introduced to two bargaining unit
employees, Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas, who informed him that they had recently been
hired by the Respondent. These two employees had not been included in the personnel
information received from the Respondent. Further, Imus testified that while at the facility he
was told by employees that there were 3 other individuals recently hired by the Respondent for
bargaining unit positions, but he was not able to meet with them or lean their names or dates of
hire.
Counsel for the Respondent argues in his post-hearing brief that I should find Imus’
testimony regarding Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas incredible and disregard it, because
counsel for the General Counsel had to refresh Imus’ memory by showing him his affidavit given
to an agent of the Board during the investigation of this case. In my view that is a totally
specious argument. After all, the Respondent offered no evidence to rebut Imus’ contention.

10 No party has claimed that these provisions of the collective bargaining agreement did not
survive the expiration of the contract.
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Winchester did not deny the assertion and no personnel or payroll records were offered to show
that no such persons were on the Respondent’s payroll. The fact that a witness can not recall
the names he learned of approximately four months before the hearing and needs to have his
memory refreshed by use of his earlier affidavit does not by any means establish that he is
incredible.
As Imus’ testimony was unrebutted by the Respondent, I credit that testimony and
conclude that Navarro and Villegas were hired as bargaining unit employees, but not included
as such on the Respondent’s July 12 letter responding to the Union’s information request of
July 6.11 Whether the absence of their payroll and personnel information was intentional or
inadvertent is really not an issue. All that matters is that the information furnished by the
Respondent was incomplete.
Regarding item number 4 in the Union’s July 6 information request, copies of any
documents given to new or prospective employees, Imus testified that the Respondent did
supply him with an “employee handbook” given to new hires, but that he did not receive that
until early August. Later, during cross-examination, he described what he received from the
Respondent as a “new hire packet” that “included an employee handbook.”
It is significant and important to note that the complaint does not allege that the
Respondent should have furnished the Union with all the information requested in the Union’s
July 6 letter. Counsel for the General Counsel represented at the hearing that the General
Counsel was only alleging that the Respondent violated the Act by failing to furnish the
information requested by the Union in items number 2 and 4 of the July 6 letter. In fact, to be
very specific, the complaint (see paragraph 7(c)(i) and (ii)) is even somewhat more restrictive
than that, alleging as a violation of the Act only the failure to furnish:
(i) The resume and application for anyone Respondent accepted an application from
[limited to individuals actually hired].
(ii) Copies of any and all documents given to new employees.
Regarding item (i) above, the resume and application for anyone hired by the
Respondent in a bargaining unit position, this would certainly be presumptively relevant
information. It pertains to the persons hired for bargaining unit positions. The Union has an
interest in administering the collective bargaining agreement and determining that individuals
hired to perform unit work are processed pursuant to the terms of the contract including union
security and hiring hall referral procedures. Apparently, the Respondent did not dispute that
relevance, as counsel’s letters of July 9 and 12 (Res. Ex. 7 and G.C. Ex. 10.) make it clear that
such documents are being furnished for bargaining unit personnel.
Unfortunately, Imus’ testimony establishes that the information furnished by the
Respondent was incomplete, since it failed to include the requested information for at least two
newly hired members of the bargaining unit, namely Mario Navarro and Juan Villegas. I reject
counsel for the Respondent’s argument in his post-hearing brief that such records are protected
against disclosure by the involved employees’ privacy rights. Any employee applying and being
hired for a job where the unit employees are covered by a collective bargaining agreement
containing a union security provision has to assume that basic payroll and personnel information
will be turned over to the Union representing those employees. Without that information, the

11 As Imus’ testimony regarding the possible existence of three other bargaining unit
employees was vague and unsubstantiated, I will not rely on this information.
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Union can not properly administer the contract, nor knowledgeably respond to the Respondent’s
contract proposals. Any balancing of rights tips strongly in favor of the Union’s right to this
information.
Accordingly, the Respondent must furnish the Union with the resume and application for
anyone hired by the Respondent in a bargaining unit position for the period from May 1 to the
present, the time period specified in the Union’s letter of July 6. The Respondent’s failure to
furnish this information constitutes a violation of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as alleged in
complaint paragraph 7(c)(i).
Regarding item number (ii) above, copies of any and all documents given to new
employees, this would also constitute presumptively relevant information. It involves the
documentation given to newly hired bargaining unit employees, and, depending upon what such
documents consists of, may directly impact the relationship between the Union and the
bargaining unit members it represents. Such information may well have a direct bearing on the
Union’s ability to administer the contract as well as present bargaining proposals to the
Respondent.
It appears that the Respondent did not initially disagree, as Imus testified that in early
August the Respondent did provide him with a “new employee packet” that “included an
employee handbook.” Presumably this was the entire set of documents new bargaining unit
employees received from the Respondent at the time of their hire. No evidence was offered to
establish that this was not so. Still, the Respondent did not furnish copies of these documents
until early August, approximately one month after the July 6 request was made. The only
remaining issue, therefore, is whether such a delay constitutes an unfair labor practice. I am of
the view that it does not.
As I noted above, the Board has indicated that what constitutes reasonable promptness
in the production of requested information must be determined under the totality of the
circumstances in each case. There is no “per se” rule, rather what is required is a reasonable
good faith effort to respond to the request as promptly as circumstances allow. Allegheny
Power, supra. In my opinion, one month’s time is not an inordinate delay. Clearly the
Respondent’s managers had other matters to attend to, not the least of which was operating the
business during a period of difficult economic and labor conditions, as well as while preparing
for and engaging in bargaining sessions with the Union.
Under these circumstances, I do not believe that the Respondent’s one month delay in
furnishing the Union with copies of any documents given to newly hired employees constitutes a
violation of the Act. Accordingly, I shall recommend that paragraph 7(c)(ii) of the complaint be
dismissed.
F. Summary
As is reflected above, I recommend dismissal of the following paragraphs of the
complaint: 7(a)(i) and 7(c)(ii).
Further, I find that the Respondent has violated Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, as
alleged in the following paragraphs of the complaint: 7(a)(ii) and (iii), 7(aa)(i) through (iv), 7(b)(i)
through (xi), and 7(c)(i).
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Conclusions of Law
1. The Respondent, A-1 Door and Building Solutions, is an employer engaged in
commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union, Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Union, Local 1618, United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners of America, is a labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
3. All employees performing work covered by the collective bargaining agreement
between the Respondent and the Union effective for the period from May 1, 2004, to May 1,
2007, constitutes an appropriate unit for the purposes of collective bargaining within the
meaning of Section 9(b) of the Act.
4. At all times material, the Union has been, and is now, the exclusive collective
bargaining representative of Respondent’s employees in the above unit within the meaning of
Section 9(a) of the Act.
5. By failing and refusing to provide the following information to the Union since on or
after April 26, 2007, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: Net profit each year for the last three years; and
the total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the number of employees receiving
the distribution each year for the last three years.
6. By failing and refusing to provide the following information to the Union since on or
after June 18, 2007, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: Copies of bids awarded; a copy of a list of new
projects that A-1 Door is bidding on; copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door; the
reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid; what company was awarded the bid not received,
and why; how much lower was the competition of each bid not received; were there any dates
A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, and if so when; copies of jobs that A-1 Door was
doing, but now are awarded to another company; copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed
from and the reason for removal; copies of bids not submitted due to contractors’ insurance
requirements; and copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability. All
information submitted should be for the preceding three years.
7. By failing and refusing to provide the following information to the Union since on or
after July 6, 2007, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: The resume and application for anyone hired by
the Respondent in a bargaining unit position. The information provided should be for the time
period from May 1, 2007, to the present.
8. By failing and refusing to provide the following information to the Union since on or
after August 8, 2007, the Respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice conduct within the
meaning of Section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act: All salaried employees, including non-bargaining
unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the amount of
profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; all hourly employees, including
non-bargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the
amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; names of all salaried
or hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, the amount of any other bonus
or bonuses paid to them during each of the last three years; and the employee name and the
amount of any other non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly employees,
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including non-bargaining unit employees.
9. The above unfair labor practices affect commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6)
and (7) of the Act.
10. The Respondent has not violated the Act except as set forth above.
Remedy
Having found that the Respondent has engaged in certain unfair labor practices, I find
that it must be ordered to cease and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the polices of the Act.12
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the entire record, I issue the
following recommended13
ORDER
The Respondent, A-1 Door and Building Solutions, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union since on or after April 26, 2007, by
refusing to furnish the Union with the following information: Net profit each year for the last
three years; and the total amount of profit distributed to the employees with the number of
employees receiving the distribution each year for the last three years;
(b) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union since on or after June 18, 2007, by
refusing to furnish the Union with the following information: Copies of bids awarded; a copy of a
list of new projects that A-1 Door is bidding on; copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1
Door; the reason why A-1 Door did not receive the bid; what company was awarded the bid not
received, and why; how much lower was the competition of each bid not received; were there
any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned away bids, and if so when; copies of jobs that A-1
Door was doing, but now are awarded to another company; copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was
removed from and the reason for removal; copies of bids not submitted due to contractors’
insurance requirements; and copies of bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability. All
information submitted should be for the preceding three year period;
(c) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union since on of after July 6, 2007, by
refusing to furnish the Union with the following information: The resume and application for
anyone hired by the Respondent in a bargaining unit position. The information provided should

12 In order to provide a meaningful remedy, the Respondent is directed to furnish the
documents to the Union, as specified in this Order, from the time periods listed in the respective
information request letters to the date by which the Respondent complies with this Order.
13 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Board’s Rules and Regulations,
the findings, conclusions, and recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the
Rules, be adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed waived for all
purposes.
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be for the time period from May 1, 2007, to the present;
(d) Refusing to bargain collectively with the Union since on or after August 8, 2007, by
refusing to furnish the Union with the following information: All salaried employees, including
non-bargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the
amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; all hourly employees,
including non-bargaining unit employees, name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the
date and the amount of profit sharing distribution for each year for the last three years; names of
all salaried or hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, the amount of any
other bonus or bonuses paid to them during each of the last three years; and the employee
name and the amount of any other non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly
employees, including non-bargaining unit employees; and
(e) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in
the exercise of the rights guaranteed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) On request, bargain collectively with the Union by furnishing it with the following
information: Net profit each year for the last three years; and the total amount of profit
distributed to the employees with the number of employees receiving the distribution each year
for the last three years;
(b) On request, bargain collectively with the Union by furnishing it with the following
information: Copies of bids awarded; a copy of a list of new projects that A-1 Door is bidding
on; copies of bids that were not awarded to A-1 Door; the reason why A-1 Door did not receive
the bid; what company was awarded the bid not received, and why; how much lower was the
competition of each bid not received; were there any dates A-1 Door was too busy, and turned
away bids, and if so when; copies of jobs that A-1 Door was doing, but now are awarded to
another company; copies of bids or jobs A-1 Door was removed from and the reason for
removal; copies of bids not submitted due to contractors’ insurance requirements; and copies of
bids not submitted due to a lack of production ability. All information submitted should be for the
preceding three year period;
(c) On request, bargain collectively with the Union by furnishing it with the following
information: The resume and application for anyone hired by the Respondent in a bargaining
unit position. The information provided should be for the time period from May 1, 2007, to the
present;
(d) On request, bargain collectively with the Union by furnishing it with the following
information: All salaried employees, including non-bargaining unit employees, name, job title,
wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the amount of profit sharing distribution for each
year for the last three years; all hourly employees, including non-bargaining unit employees,
name, job title, wage rate, gross yearly wages, the date and the amount of profit sharing
distribution for each year for the last three years; names of all salaried or hourly employees,
including non-bargaining unit employees, the amount of any other bonus or bonuses paid to
them during each of the last three years; and the employee name and the amount of any other
non-wage compensation received by all salaried and hourly employees, including non-
bargaining unit employees;
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(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its facility in North Highlands,
California, copies of the attached notice marked “Appendix.”14 Copies of the notice, on forms
provided by the Regional Director for Region 20, after being signed by the Respondent’s
authorized representative, shall be posted by the Respondent and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places where notices to employees are
customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall be taken by the Respondent to ensure that the
notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In the event that, during the
pendency of these proceedings, the Respondent has gone out of business or closed the facility
involved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and mail, at its own expense, a
copy of the notice to all current employees and former employees employed by the Respondent
at any time since April 26, 2007; and
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the Regional Director a sworn
certification of a responsible official on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
the Respondent has taken to comply.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be dismissed insofar as it alleges
violations of the Act not specifically found.
Dated at Washington, D.C., on January 15, 2008
____________________
Gregory Z. Meyerson
Administrative Law Judge

14 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of appeals, the words in
the notice reading “Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted
Pursuant to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board
An Agency of the United States Government
The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated Federal labor law and has
ordered us to post and obey this Notice.
FEDERAL LAW GIVES YOU THE RIGHT TO
Form, join, or assist a union
Choose representatives to bargain with us on your behalf
Act together with other employees for your benefit and protection
Choose not to engage in any of these protected activities
WE WILL NOT do anything that interferes with these rights. Specifically:
WE WILL NOT refuse to bargain collectively with the Millmen and Industrial Carpenters Union,
Local 1618, United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America (the Union) by refusing to
furnish the Union with information necessary and relevant to the Union’s performance of its
responsibilities in representing employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, restrain, or coerce you in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed you by Federal labor law.
WE WILL, on request, bargain collectively with the Union by furnishing the Union with items
number 2 and 3 of the information request in its letter of April 26, 2007; with items number 1
through 11 of the information request in its letter of June 18, 2007; with item number 2 of the
information request in its letter of July 6, 2007; and with items number 1 through 4 of the
information request in its letter of August 8, 2007.
A-1 Door and Building Solutions
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
The National Labor Relations Board is an independent Federal agency created in 1935 to enforce the National Labor Relations Act. It conducts
secret-ballot elections to determine whether employees want union representation and it investigates and remedies unfair labor practices by
employers and unions. To find out more about your rights under the Act and how to file a charge or election petition, you may speak
confidentially to any agent with the Board’s Regional Office set forth below. You may also obtain information from the Board’s website:
www.nlrb.gov.
901 Market Street, Suite 400
San Francisco, California 94103-1735
Hours: 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m.
415-356-5130.
THIS IS AN OFFICIAL NOTICE AND MUST NOT BE DEFACED BY ANYONE
THIS NOTICE MUST REMAIN POSTED FOR 60 CONSECUTIVE DAYS FROM THE DATE OF POSTING AND MUST
NOT BE ALTERED, DEFACED, OR COVERED BY ANY OTHER MATERIAL. ANY QUESTIONS CONCERNING THIS
NOTICE OR COMPLIANCE WITH ITS PROVISIONS MAY BE DIRECTED TO THE ABOVE REGIONAL OFFICE’S
COMPLIANCE OFFICER, 415-356-5139.