______________________________ Cynthia M. Reynolds, Appellant,v.William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region) Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionMar 3, 1999
01972121 (E.E.O.C. Mar. 3, 1999)

01972121

03-03-1999

______________________________ Cynthia M. Reynolds, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region) Agency.


______________________________

Cynthia M. Reynolds, )

Appellant, )

)

v. )

) Appeal No. 01972121

William J. Henderson, ) Agency No. 4-C-190-1040-95

Postmaster General, ) Hearing No. 170-95-8544X

United States Postal Service, )

(Allegheny/Mid-Atlantic Region) )

Agency. )

______________________________)

DECISION

Appellant timely appeals the final agency decision (�FAD�) concerning her

complaint of unlawful employment discrimination, in violation of Title

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.

Appellant alleged that the agency discriminated against her on the bases

of her race (African-American) and sex (female) when: (1) she was placed

on nonduty/nonpay status on October 6, 1994; and (2) she was terminated

on October 24, 1994, for failure to report an accident. This appeal is

accepted in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

For the following reasons, the agency's decision is AFFIRMED.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, appellant was employed

by the agency as a part-time flexible letter carrier in the Elkins Park,

Pennsylvania Post Office (�facility�). The agency hired appellant on

September 3, 1994, and during her first month, provided her training

which included a week of driver's training. After completing her

training, appellant reported to the facility and initially assisted

an experienced carrier in delivering the mail. On October 4, 1994,

appellant was given her first individual route and vehicle. Because the

facility did not have a vehicle ready for appellant, one was borrowed

from the Hunting Park facility. After appellant inspected the vehicle,

she commenced with delivering her route. Later that afternoon, appellant

stated that she was stopped by a gas station attendant and informed that

her vehicle's front wheels were �wobbling.� She parked the vehicle and

telephoned a supervisor at the facility. The Customer Service Supervisor

and another postal employee came out to meet appellant and gave her a

replacement vehicle so she could finish her route. The Customer Service

Supervisor confirmed that the wheels were misaligned and decided to have

the vehicle towed. Appellant finished her route. The vehicle was towed

the following day to the Hunting Park facility, where a facility mechanic

determined that the vehicle had been in an accident. On October 6,

1994, after receiving the information from the Hunting Park facility

about the suspected accident, the Customer Service Supervisor informed

appellant that she was being placed on nonduty/nonpay status pending

investigation of the incident. The facility's Operations Manager sent

appellant a letter dated October 24, 1994, stating that after further

investigation, she was being terminated for failure to report an accident.

Believing that she was the victim of discrimination, appellant sought

EEO counseling and, thereafter, filed a formal EEO complaint on March

14, 1995. Following the agency's investigation of the complaint,

appellant requested a hearing before an Administrative Judge (�AJ�).

After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the

AJ issued a recommended decision (�RD�) finding no discrimination.

Specifically, the AJ found that appellant established prima facie

cases of race and sex discrimination. The AJ then found that the

agency had articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

disputed actions. In her pretext analysis, the AJ found that the

agency's articulated reasons were not credible. The AJ found that

the record revealed many discrepancies in the testimonies of several

agency witnesses and that the agency's determination that appellant

had an accident on October 4, 1994, was based on insufficient evidence.

However, the AJ found that even though the agency's reasons were flawed,

appellant had not met her ultimate burden of proving that the agency's

actions were motivated by a discriminatory animus toward her race or sex.

The agency's FAD adopted the AJ's RD. On appeal, appellant contends that

where the AJ finds that appellant establishes her prima facie case and

rejects the agency's proffered reasons for its action, it is permissible

for the AJ to infer discrimination. Appellant further contends that the

weight of the evidence in this case supports a finding of discrimination.

The agency provides no response to the appeal.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission

finds that the AJ's RD sets forth the relevant facts and properly

analyzes the appropriate regulations, policies and laws. On appeal,

appellant correctly states that where a prima facie case has been

established and the proffered reasons are rejected, the trier-of-fact

can infer discrimination. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on St. Mary's

Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) Number 915.002 (April 12,

1994). However, it is also permissible for the trier-of-fact to find

that notwithstanding the prima facie case and rejected agency reasons,

appellant had failed to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the agency's actions were motivated by unlawful discrimination.

See St. Mary's Honor Center, 509 U.S. at 514-15; Galbraith v. Northern

Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 282-83 (6th Cir. 1991). In this case, the

AJ serving as the trier-of-fact found that the weight of the evidence

did not support a finding of discrimination. Therefore, after a

thorough review of the evidence of record, including arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, the Commission

discerns no basis to disturb the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

Nothing proffered by appellant on appeal differs significantly from

the arguments raised before, and given full consideration by, the AJ.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the agency's

final decision which adopted the AJ's finding of no discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from

the date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil

action is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY

(30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or

to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the

jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil

action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON

WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT

PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may

result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

March 3, 1999

__________________ _______________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations