Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:18-CV-178
09-14-2020
Denisse VILLAFRANCA, Plaintiff, v. Michael R. POMPEO, Defendant.
Cathy Jean Potter, Law Firm of Cathy J. Potter PLLC, Harlingen, TX, for Plaintiff. Victor M. Mercado-Santana, Pro Hac Vice, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
Cathy Jean Potter, Law Firm of Cathy J. Potter PLLC, Harlingen, TX, for Plaintiff.
Victor M. Mercado-Santana, Pro Hac Vice, US Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
ORDER AND OPINION
Fernando Rodriguez, Jr., United States District Judge
In November 2018, Plaintiff Denisse Villafranca filed a complaint (Doc. 1) seeking a declaratory judgment that she is a United States citizen, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Section 1503(a) permits a plaintiff to file a declaratory judgment action in a district court of the United States "for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence".
In January, Defendant Michael R. Pompeo, in his official capacity as United States Secretary of State, filed a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33), asserting that Villafranca does not meet the residency requirement found in Section 1503(a). The Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant the Motion and deny the Complaint without prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R&R, Doc. 60) Both Villafranca and the Government filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. (Villafranca Objs., Doc. 66; Def. Objs., Doc. 61)
The Court has conducted a de novo review of the Motion, the briefing of the parties, the record in this case, and the applicable law. The Court concludes that the Report and Recommendation reaches the correct conclusion, but also that some of the objections should be sustained. The Court adopts in part and declines in part the Report and Recommendation, and incorporates the adopted portions into this Order and Opinion. I. Background
Villafranca alleges that she was born in Brownsville, Texas, in November 1977 and is a natural born citizen of the United States. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 2) She also has a Mexican birth certificate. The original Mexican birth certificate was registered in August 1977 and reflected a June 1977 birth in Tamaulipas, Mexico. (Mex. Birth Certificate, Doc. 2, 21) In 2012, Villafranca successfully petitioned the Mexican authorities to amend that birth certificate to reflect a November 1977 birth in Brownsville. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 12)
Villafranca testified that she lived in Brownsville from May 2010 until "around 2012 or 2013," when she moved to Tijuana, Mexico, where she worked for her late husband's aluminum manufacturing business. (Villafranca Dep., Doc. 33-8, 10:12–10:18, 12:7–12:19) That business has a "representation office" named California Plating, L.L.C. in San Diego, California. (Id. at 12:9) The representation office is used to facilitate business with United States-based clients who "only work with U.S.-based businesses," although the actual manufacturing occurs in Mexico. (Id. at 12:10–12:11)
In November 2014, the State Department revoked Villafranca's passport, finding that she was actually born in Mexico, based upon her original Mexican birth certificate. (Compl., Doc. 1, ¶ 16)
On October 30, 2018, Villafranca entered the United States from Mexico at the Gateway Bridge in Brownsville, Texas. (U.S. Encounter List, Doc. 33-3, 4) This was the first time she had actually entered the United States since November 2014. (Id. ) At the time that she entered the United States in 2018, Villafranca possessed a Mexican driver's license issued in April 2017 and valid through November 2021, as well as a Mexican voter identification card issued in 2017 and effective through 2027. (Mex. Driver's License, Doc. 33-4; Mex. Voter ID, Doc. 33-5) Both documents listed an address in Tijuana, Mexico. In contrast, Villafranca's Texas driver's license and Texas voter registration card, both of which indicate a Brownsville address, had expired in 2017. (Tex. Driver's License, Doc. 43, 31; Tex. Voter ID, Doc. 43, 32)
Villafranca affies that when she initiated this action, she resided at her "family home" in Brownsville, Texas. (Villafranca Aff., Doc. 43, 27 ¶ 6) Her name is on the cable TV and internet accounts for the apartment. (Cable and Internet Bills, Doc. 43, 51–66; Doc. 43-1, 1–33) And in late 2018, she also used the Brownsville address for a cellular telephone account. (Phone Bills, Doc. 43-1, 34–57)
On November 2, 2018, Villafranca filed her Complaint. (Doc. 31) Two months later, in January, she returned to Tijuana, Mexico. (Villafranca Aff., Doc. 43, 28 ¶ 10) Since then, other than being temporarily paroled into the United States to be deposed for this case, she has remained in Mexico. (Id. at ¶¶ 11–14)
In April 2019, the Court dismissed all claims against the United States of America and Jonathan M. Rolbin, the Director of Legal Affairs and Law Enforcement Liaison of the United States Department of State. (Order, Doc. 23) The Court also dismissed Villafranca's cause of action under the Administrative Procedures Act. (Id. )
On January 27, 2020, the Defendant filed this Motion, arguing that Villafranca lives in Mexico and that when she initiated this action, she did not reside or claim a residence in the Southern District of Texas, precluding jurisdiction with this Court. (Doc. 33)
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a trial court must dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when the Court is without the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc. v. City of Madison , 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998). The party seeking the federal forum bears the burden of proving federal jurisdiction. Stockman v. Fed. Election Comm'n , 138 F.3d 144, 151 (5th Cir. 1998). That party bears the burden of establishing facts supporting jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Vantage Trailers, Inc. v. Beall Corp. , 567 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 2009).
In determining whether jurisdiction exists, the Court may consider: "(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court's resolution of disputed facts." Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). "[A]ll questions of subject matter jurisdiction except mootness [are] determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint". Kitty Hawk Aircargo, Inc. v. Chao , 418 F.3d 453, 460 (5th Cir. 2005) ; see also Burr v. Transohio Sav. , No. 95-20144, 1995 WL 798590, at *2 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1995) ("The relevant date for determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is the date on which the complaint is filed".).
When "factual issues determinative of jurisdiction are intertwined with or identical to factual issues determinative of the merits," a court is required "to assume jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits." Worldwide Parking, Inc. v. New Orleans City , 123 F. App'x 606, 608 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Bell v. Hood , 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) ). Villafranca argues that this principle applies and warrants denial of the Motion. (Response, Doc. 46, 6-8) The Court disagrees. As to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) ’s residency requirement, the Court must determine whether Villafranca resided or claimed a residence within this District at the time she filed this lawsuit in late 2018. That inquiry is wholly different from the central issue on the merits—i.e. , whether she was born in Brownsville in 1977. As a result, the factual issues determinative of jurisdiction are not intertwined with the factual issues determinative of the merits.
B. Defining "Resides or Claims a Residence"
Under Section 1503(a), "a person who is within the United States [who] claims a right or privilege as a national of the United States and [who] is denied such right or privilege" on the grounds that she is not a national of the United States, may file a declaratory judgment action asking the Court to adjudicate her citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). This provision mandates that the action "shall be filed in the district court of the United States for the district in which such person resides or claims a residence." Id. The requirement is jurisdictional. Flores v. Pompeo , 936 F.3d 273, 276 n.2 (5th Cir. 2019).
The parties’ dispute centers on the meaning of the statutory phrase, "resides or claims a residence." The parties agree, and the Court finds, that the phrase is disjunctive, as indicated by the coordinating conjunction "or". See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1141, 200 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018) (explaining that "or" is "almost always disjunctive"). (See also Def. Suppl. Brief, Doc. 52, 5–6; Pl.’s Suppl. Brief, Doc. 55, 7) As a result, Villafranca must establish that she either "resides" or "claims a residence" in the Southern District of Texas. More specifically, she must show that she did so at the time she filed her Complaint.
The Court declines to address the issue of whether the statutory language would permit Villafranca (or any individual) to "reside" or "claim a residence" in more than one jurisdiction simultaneously. The Court finds the resolution of this issue unnecessary to resolve the pending Motion. The Report and Recommendation reaches this issue, and the Defendant objected to it doing so. (Def. Objs., Doc. 61) The Court sustains this objection.
The parties’ agreement ends, however, as to the meaning of the key terms.
"When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain language used by the drafters [and] each part or section of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole." United States v. Uvalle-Patricio , 478 F.3d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 2007) ; see also United States v. Maturino , 887 F.3d 716, 723 (5th Cir. 2018) ("Text is the alpha and the omega of the interpretive process."). The Court assumes that Congress meant the statute's words "to express their ordinary meaning." United States v. Kaluza , 780 F.3d 647, 659 (5th Cir. 2015). "[A] statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant." United States v. Lauderdale Cty., Miss. , 914 F.3d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The Court first looks at the defined words in the statute, as typically, "[s]tatutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words". Nguyen v. Am. Commercial Lines L.L.C. , 805 F.3d 134, 140 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Burgess v. United States , 553 U.S. 124, 129, 128 S.Ct. 1572, 170 L.Ed.2d 478 (2008) ). In the INA, Congress defined "residence" as "the place of general abode; the place of general abode of a person means his principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33). Congress did not define "resides", but in the context of Section 1503, "residence" and "resides" bear close relation to one another, and the definition of "residence" naturally provides guidance as to the meaning of "resides": Persons typically reside in a residence. As a result, based on the definition of "residence", the term "resides" for purposes of Section 1503(a) means to use a specific location as one's principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent. This definition for "resides" is consistent with its ordinary meaning, as evidenced by standard dictionaries, which courts "often look to ... for help in discerning a word's ordinary meaning." Cascabel Cattle Co., L.L.C. v. United States , 955 F.3d 445, 451 (5th Cir. 2020). Such dictionaries provide similar definitions for "reside":
Merriam Webster : "to dwell permanently or continuously: occupy a place as one's legal domicile"
Cambridge : "to live, have your home, or stay in a place"
MacMillan : "to live in a particular place"
Dictionary.com : "to dwell permanently or for a considerable time."
Reside, Merriam-Webster , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, Cambridge Dictionary , https://dictionary-cambridge-org.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/dictionary/english/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, MacMillan Dictionary , https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, Dictionary.com , https://www.dictionary.com/browse/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
Reside, Merriam-Webster , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, Cambridge Dictionary , https://dictionary-cambridge-org.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/dictionary/english/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, MacMillan Dictionary , https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Reside, Dictionary.com , https://www.dictionary.com/browse/reside (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
The commonality between these definitions is the act of "dwelling" or "living" in a specific location for a period of time—either "permanently", "continuously", or for a "considerable time". That meaning accords with Congress's definition of "residence" in the INA, supporting the conclusion that "resides" and "residence" bear coextensive meanings.
It is true that a defined term in a statute does not necessarily bear on the meaning of similar, undefined words. See Flores v. Pompeo , 936 F.3d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 2019) ("[T]he government assumes that ‘resides’ must be construed coextensively with the express definition of ‘residence.’ But that too requires further analysis.") (citing FCC v. AT&T Inc. , 562 U.S. 397, 402–04, 131 S.Ct. 1177, 179 L.Ed.2d 132 (2011) ("Adjectives typically reflect the meaning of corresponding nouns, but not always. Sometimes they acquire distinct meanings of their own.")). Villafranca argues that "resides" and "claims a residence" play distinct roles in the statute and, as a result, should be given substantially different meanings. (Villafranca Supp. Resp., Doc. 55, 6–7) Along these lines, she proposes that " ‘resides’ includes the concepts of continuity and relative permanence; ‘claiming a residence’ does not." (Id. ) And she further contends that "to reside" means "the place where one is generally living at a given point in time", such as when a plaintiff files a lawsuit under Section 1503. (Villafranca Obj., Doc. 66, 11 n.5)
The Court does not find Villafranca's attempt to disconnect the meaning of "resides" from "residence" persuasive. It is true that the 1952 amendments to Section 503 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, changed the jurisdiction of Section 1503(a) cases, in relevant part, from a judicial district in which a person "claims a permanent residence" to a judicial district in which a person "resides or claims a residence". But contrary to Villafranca's argument, the amendment does not suggest, much less require, that "residence" acquire a permanency element, while "resides" excludes any temporal element. This construction stretches the meaning of the amendments too far. The Court finds it more reasonable to conclude that through the amended language, Congress defined "residence" and left "resides" to its ordinary meaning, which is consistent with the statutory definition of "residence".
The Court agrees that in the current language of Section 1503(a), Congress did not prescribe and courts do not apply a defined time period during which an individual must "reside" or "claim a residence" within a judicial district. Rather, a court looks at all the evidence presented, including the length of time within the district, to determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that she resides or claims a residence in the jurisdiction of the court. The plaintiff's mere physical presence of a few days in the district will be insufficient, unless accompanied by other substantial evidence that demonstrates the alleged residency. At least one court of appeals has concluded as much, and the Court is not aware of any court that has adopted a "mere physical presence" standard. See United States v. Arango , 670 F.3d 988, 997 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that mere physical presence "at the time the complaint was filed does not establish [a plaintiff's] residence there"); see also Chacoty v. Pompeo , 392 F. Supp. 3d 1, 17 (D.D.C. 2019) (explaining that the definition of residence "requires more than physical presence").
Villafranca's proposed emphasis on physical presence for the definition of "resides" also runs counter to the overall statutory scheme of Section 1503(a). First, accepting Villafranca's interpretation would unreasonably allow an individual to file a lawsuit in virtually any district in the United States, as the individual could, for example, simply live with a relative or friend for a day or two and then file while "physically present" in that district. Such a construction negates altogether the residency requirement. In addition, Villafranca's expansive construction would render portions of Section 1503(a) superfluous. The provision initially requires the plaintiff to be "within the United States" when filing the lawsuit. 8 U.S.C. 1503(a). Accepting Villafranca's standard that mere physical presence in a judicial district constitutes "residing" in that district, a person "within the United States" would automatically satisfy the "resides" requirement. The Court rejects this proposed standard, as statutory construction cannot render a clause, sentence, or word "superfluous, void, or insignificant." United States v. Lauderdale Cty., Miss. , 914 F.3d 960, 966 (5th Cir. 2019). In contrast, a wholistic reading of Section 1503(a) requires a plaintiff to both be physically present "within" the United States at the time of filing and either "reside" or "claim a residence" in the district to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement.
Having established the definitions for "residence" and "resides", the Court turns to the meaning of "claims a residence". It is axiomatic that the meaning of "resides" and "claims a residence" for purposes of Section 1503(a) cannot be the same. See, e.g., Gulf Fishermens Ass'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv. , 968 F.3d 454, 464–65 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Aug. 4, 2020) (explaining that the "anti-surplusage" canon "encourages courts to give effect to all of a statute's provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant") (cleaned up). The test for whether a person "resides" in a particular district must meaningfully differ from the test for whether she "claims a residence" there.
Congress did not define "claim", but standard dictionaries again prove helpful:
Merriam Webster : "to assert in the face of possible contradiction"
Cambridge : "to state that something is true or is a fact"
MacMillan : "a statement that something is true, even though you have no definite proof"
Claim, Merriam-Webster , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/claim (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Claim, Cambridge Dictionary , https://dictionary-cambridge-org.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/dictionary/english/claim (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Claim, MacMillan Dictionary , https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/claim_2 (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
Claim, Merriam-Webster , https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/claim (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Claim, Cambridge Dictionary , https://dictionary-cambridge-org.nwulib.nwu.ac.za/dictionary/english/claim (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); Claim, MacMillan Dictionary , https://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/claim_2 (last visited Sept. 9, 2020).
Applying these definitions to "claims a residence" results in the following meaning: The plaintiff must establish that she claimed (asserted or stated) that a particular location is in fact her general place of abode—i.e. , her principal, actual dwelling place—and must have done so in a manner subject to possible contradiction. The claim must have been made to a third party, so as to be subject to contradiction.
In a literal sense, Villafranca in her lawsuit "claims a residence" within the District. But the "claim" cannot occur in the lawsuit itself. Accepting such a definition would allow every individual to automatically "claim a residence" in any district in which suit is filed. This result is patently unreasonable. See, e.g., Sosa v. United States , 550 F.2d 244, 254 n.6 (5th Cir. 1977) (acknowledging that "[l]iteral interpretation of statutes at the expense of the reason of the law and producing absurd consequences or flagrant injustice has frequently been condemned") (quoting Sorrells v. United States , 287 U.S. 435, 446, 53 S.Ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 (1932) (Hughes, C. J.)).
A court weighs the evidence that the parties submit to determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently established that she claimed a residence in the district at the time of filing. The evidence will vary in its nature and weight. For example, using a particular location as one's home address to obtain a voter's registration card has substantial weight, as local laws often require that the applicant have substantial ties to the community to vote in local elections. Similarly, applying for a resident homestead exemption in an appraisal district often requires affirming that the applicant owns and lives in the property at issue. See, e.g., Form 50-114 Residence Homestead Exemption Application , TEX. COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCTS. (Jan. 8, 2020), https://comptroller.texas.gov/search/?site=ctg_collection&q=Residence+Homestead+Exemptio n+Application (requiring the applicant to respond to the question, "Do you own and live in the property for which you are seeking this residence homestead exemption?"). Such evidence would support a finding that the plaintiff "claims a residence" at that address. On the other hand, the use of an address for services—e.g. , utilities, internet, cell phone—bears less weight if the service provider does not require that the service recipient actually reside at that address.
For example, the Texas Election Code requires an individual who registers to vote to make a statement that she "is a resident of that county". Tex. Election Code Ann. § 13.002 (West 2013). That statute defines residence as "domicile, that is, one's home and fixed place of habitation to which one intends to return after any temporary absence." Id. at § 1.015. Based on these requirements, a valid voter registration card would be some evidence that an individual claimed a residence in the judicial district in which she registered to vote. But as voting laws also allow for absentee voting, a voter registration card is not dispositive proof that the person dwells at the registered address.
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Villafranca advances two primary objections regarding the meaning of "claims a residence" as defined in the Report and Recommendation. First, she argues that the "common usage of the meaning ‘to claim’ is broad and general" and "does not require ‘evidence’ beyond an assertion." (Pl. Objs., Doc. 66, 12) Second, she contends that Congress's decision to omit the word "permanent" as a modifier of this phrase necessarily means that a person may file suit in any district where she claims a residence, even if a "temporary" one. (Id. at 13) She is correct, to a point. The focus when considering whether a plaintiff "claims a residence" is the strength of the evidence showing that the plaintiff has asserted that a location within the judicial district is her principal, actual dwelling place. Whether that assertion is true does not bear on this analysis. The focus is the claim itself, and not the truth of the claim. Requiring that a person who "claims a residence" also show that the location actually is her principal dwelling place would render the definition of "claims a residence" synonymous with the definition for "resides". This approach would make "claims a residence" superfluous, as the plaintiff would also have to show that she "resides" in the district. Similarly, the assertion of a claimed residence does not need to satisfy a defined temporal requirement. Rather, the plaintiff must demonstrate that at the time of filing the lawsuit, she claimed that a location in the judicial district was her principal, actual dwelling place, and did so in a manner that could be controverted and probed. The plaintiff's ability to demonstrate that she repeatedly made such a claim over time strengthens her argument that she satisfies the "claims a residence" standard.
An example illustrates the distinction between "resides" and "claims a residence". Assume that a professor owns and has physically lived in a home in Brownville for several uninterrupted years, including at the time of filing a Section 1503(a) lawsuit. The professor files an affidavit affirming these facts. Absent substantial controverting evidence, the professor would most likely satisfy the "resides" standard. If, however, the professor spent a year as a visiting teacher at an Iowa university, living near the Iowa campus throughout that year, then the professor could not file at that time as a person who "resides" in the Southern District of Texas, Brownsville Division. In such a case, the professor could submit evidence that for the past several years up through the filing of the lawsuit, she has claimed a homestead exemption for the Brownsville property under Texas law, has applied a deduction for the interest on her home mortgage on her federal tax return for several years, and is registered to vote and has a valid driver's license using the Brownsville address. Such evidence would support a finding that while the professor at the time of filing does not "reside" at the Brownsville address, she "claims a residence" there. Whether the evidence proved sufficient would be a case-by-case analysis, based on the entirety of the evidence before the court.
Finally, the Court notes that these definitions are consistent with those that other district courts in this District have applied. See, e.g., Castillo v. Kerry , No. 1:16-CV-197, 2017 WL 1293573, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2017) ; Villarreal v. Horn , 207 F.Supp.3d 700 (S.D. Tex. 2016) ; Ortiz-Arriaga v. Castro , No. 1:12-CV-26, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191880, at *18 (S.D. Tex. May 29, 2013). In those decisions, the courts did not focus on the distinctions between "resides" and "claims a residence" in Section 1503(a). But they applied that provision in a manner similar to the standard that the Court applies here. See Castillo , 2017 WL 1293573, at *2 (considering where plaintiff attended school and his passport applications and driver's license); Villarreal , 207 F.Supp.3d at 708 (considering where the plaintiff lived and worked when she filed the lawsuit); Ortiz-Arriaga , No. 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191880, at *21 (considering where the plaintiff "spen[t] the majority of his time and engage[d] in the majority of his daily life activities").
C. Applying the Defined Terms
1. "Resides"
In determining whether a person resides at a location for purposes of the INA, courts look to non-exhaustive factors, such as "whether [the plaintiff] owned or rented a home in that judicial district, where [s]he paid taxes, where any car was registered and licensed[,] where [her] possessions were located, and where [her] family members resided." United States v. Arango , 670 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2012) ; see also Villarreal , 207 F.Supp.3d at 708 (considering where a plaintiff "lives", "works", and "can generally be found" as factors indicative of residence); cf. Flores v. Pompeo , 936 F.3d 273, 276 (5th Cir. 2019) (upholding district court's Section 1503(a) decision that considered where the plaintiff was employed and where he "owned a home [ ] with his wife"). Based on the evidence that Villafranca submits, the Court concludes that Villafranca has failed to demonstrate that when she filed her Complaint in November 2018, she used a specific location within this District as her principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent.
Three days before she filed this lawsuit, Villafranca entered the United States from Mexico, where she had been since "around 2012 or 2013". (Villafranca Dep., Doc. 33-8, 10:12–10:18) Other than her physical presence in Brownsville for three days, Villafranca offers scant evidence to show that at the time of filing, the Brownsville address represented her principle, actual dwelling place. In fact, the only relevant evidence supporting her claim is that she is on the account for cable television and internet service at the address. (Cable and Internet Bills, Doc. 43, 51–66; Doc. 43-1, 1–33) She presents other documents, but they do not bear on where she lived in October 2018. For example, she uses the Brownsville address for a Mexican cell phone account, but provides invoices showing this address only since March 2019, well after she filed this lawsuit. (Phone Bills, Doc. 43-1, 34–57) She submits a Texas driver's license and voter registration card with the Brownsville address, but the documents expired in 2017. (Tex. Driver's License, Doc. 43, 31; Tex. Voter ID, Doc. 43, 32) She provides no evidence of renewing those documents with the same address. Similarly, she appears to have registered a vehicle in California using the Brownsville address, but that was in 2014. (Certificate, Doc. 43-1, 67) In January 2018, the Vehicle Registration Renewal Notice continued to denote the Brownsville address (Notice, Doc. 43-1, 66), but Villafranca does not show that she in fact renewed the registration using that address.
In contrast, more substantial evidence shows that in 2018, Villafranca held her principal, actual dwelling place outside of Texas. She acknowledged at her deposition that she had been physically living in Mexico since 2012 or 2013. (Villafranca Dep., Doc. 33-8, 8:11-21) She downplays this testimony, contending that when questioned, she was using the term "lives" synonymous with "resides", in "their common, everyday sense and meaning". (Response, Doc. 46, 14 n. 1) That approach is precisely what statutory construction seeks to apply—i.e. , the ordinary meaning of words. And applying this principle, Villafranca responded that she was living—to her, synonymous with "resides"—in Mexico. In addition, in 2017, she obtained a Mexican driver's license and voter registration card using an address in Tijuana, Mexico. (Mex. Driver's License, Doc. 33-4; Mex. Voter ID, Doc. 33-5) Those documents were valid when she filed suit, and they remain valid. In addition, her 2018 United States federal income tax return listed her "home address" as in San Diego, California. (Fed. Return, Doc. 33-6) For the same year, she filed a "Resident Income Tax Return" for California. (State Return, Doc. 33-7) While Villafranca explains that the actual address on those documents represented a "virtual office" for a business, the filings show that Villafranca acknowledged business ties and a "home address" in California, not Texas.
Based on this evidence, the Court concludes that Villafranca has not carried her burden to demonstrate that she resided in this District at the time she filed her lawsuit.
2. "Claims a Residence"
The same evidence also reveals that Villafranca did not "claim a residence" in the District when she initiated this action. In fact, other than listing the Brownsville address on an internet and cable television account, she offers no proof that in 2018, she claimed in any manner that the Brownsville address represented her principal, actual dwelling place. The payment of an internet and cable television account by itself represents, at best, a weak assertion that the address on that account is an individual's actual dwelling place. Villafranca does not even argue that the service provider required that the person listed on the invoices actually dwell at the address.
Villafranca points to her Texas voter registration cards, a Texas driver's license, and a car registration, in each of which she claimed the Brownsville address. While these documents bear some weight, they expired in 2017, and she does not contend that she renewed them in 2018. As a result, they show only that at some point well before she filed this lawsuit, she claimed a residence in Brownsville. They are not evidence that she claimed the residence as her principal, actual dwelling place when she initiated this action. Villafranca counters that the Brownsville address "remains a home where she can rightfully ‘claim a residence’ " as evidenced by: (1) use of the home to receive "her son's automobile [and] other important mail", (2) contribution to the home's maintenance and upkeep, and (3) previous history of staying there with her family. (Villafranca Objs., Doc. 66, 11) But even accepting these statements as true, they do not show that Villafranca claimed that the Brownsville address represented her principal, actual dwelling place when she filed this lawsuit. In fact, none of those acts required her to claim in any way that she used the apartment as her residence.
III. Conclusion
The Court Adopts in Part and Declines in Part the Report and Recommendation, as explained in this Order and Opinion. It is:
ORDERED that Defendant Michael R. Pompeo's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 33) is GRANTED; and
ORDERED that Plaintiff Denise Villafranca's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE .
The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this matter.