Opinion
No. SC08-2270.
November 18, 2009.
Lower Tribunal No(s). CR92-473.
Dusty Ray Spencer, a prisoner under sentence of death, appeals from the circuit court's summary denial of his successive motion for postconviction relief, raising four issues. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.851. We previously affirmed Spencer's convictions and sentence of death. See Spencer v. State, 645 So. 2d 377 (Fla. 1994); Spencer v. State, 691 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1996). We also affirmed the denial of his initial motion for postconviction relief and denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Spencer v. State, 842 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2003). In his first claim in this appeal, Spencer contends that Florida's lethal injection procedures violate the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII; art. I § 17, Fla. Const. We have repeatedly upheld these procedures against such constitutional challenges. See Tompkins v. State, 994 So. 2d 1072, 1081 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, No. 08-8614 (U.S. Feb. 11, 2009); Schwab v. State, 969 So. 2d 318, 321-25 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2486 (2008); Lightbourne v. McCollum, 969 So. 2d 326, 349-53 (Fla. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2485 (2008). We also have held the procedures constitutional under the requirements of Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008). See Ventura v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 200 (Fla. 2009) ("Florida's current lethal-injection protocol passes muster under any of the risk-based standards considered by the Baze Court (and would easily satisfy the intent-based standard advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia)."); Henyard v. State, 992 So. 2d 120, 130 (Fla. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 28 (2008). In his second claim, Spencer challenges the constitutionality of section 27.702, Florida Statutes (2006), which prohibits Capital Collateral Regional Counsel from filing claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983. We have repeatedly held that section 27.702 is constitutional. See Ventura, 2 So. 3d at 197 n. 3 (rejecting a constitutional challenge to section 27.702); Cox v. State, 5 So. 3d 659 (Fla. 2009) (rejecting facial and as applied constitutional challenges to section 27.702). In his third claim, Spencer alleges that due to his current and future health, Florida's lethal injection procedures pose a substantial risk of unnecessary and wanton pain in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Spencer's claim is legally insufficient because he failed to identify the medical conditions that would contribute to difficulty gaining venous access and he did not allege that such conditions presently exist. See Freeman v. State, 761 So. 2d 1055, 1061 (Fla. 2000) (holding that conclusory allegations are not sufficient to establish a legally sufficient claim for postconviction relief). In his fourth claim, Spencer challenges the constitutionality of section 945.10, Florida Statutes (2006), which exempts from disclosure as public record the identity of the members of the execution team and the executioners. This claim is without merit. See Henyard, 992 So. 2d at 130. Based on the foregoing, we affirm the circuit court's order summarily denying relief on Spencer's successive postconviction motion. QUINCE, C.J., and PARIENTE, CANADY, POLSTON, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only.