Opinion
01 Civ. 3410 (JSR) (AJP)
August 13, 2002
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pro se plaintiff Daniel Pierce brings this § 1983 action alleging that defendants Louis Marano, Assistant Inspector General of the City Department of Corrections ["DOC"], and Serafina Dolan, Director of Human Resources at St. Barnabas Hospital — Correctional Health Services, deprived him of his position as a nurse for St. Barnabas Rikers Island Health Services when his privileges to work at Rikers Island were revoked by DOC and therefore St. Barnabas terminated him. (Dkt. No. 3: Am. Compl. at 1-3.) Pierce alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, "Freedom of Information Act," and "Unfair Labor Laws," and seeks back and front pay and other relief. (Am. Compl. at 3-4.) Presently before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. Nos. 9-10, 14-17.)
For the reasons set forth below, (1) Pierce's claims under the Freedom of Information Act and "Unfair Labor Laws" should be dismissed with prejudice, and (2) Pierce's claims under § 1983 should be dismissed with leave to amend within ten (10) days of this Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND The Amended Complaint
Plaintiff filed his original complaint on or about September 18, 2000. (Dkt. No. 1.) On April 24, 2001, Chief Judge Mukasey ordered Pierce to submit an amended complaint: "[i]n short, [Pierce] must allege facts to show how defendants violated his federal statutory or constitutional rights." (Dkt. No 2:4/24/01 Order at 3.) Pierce filed his amended complaint on or about June 20, 2001. (Dkt. No. 3.)
The amended complaint alleges the following: Pierce was employed as a registered nurse for Rikers Island Health Services from December 1983 to August 1999, first by Montefiore Hospital through December 1997, and then by St. Barnabas Hospital — Correctional Health Services. (Dkt. No. 3: Am. Compl. at 2.) On October 6, 1998, "upon reporting for work," Pierce "was refused entry [to Rikers Island] and was told [he] was suspended as per Assistant Inspector General Lou Marano pending outcome of an investigation." (Am. Compl. at 2.) After he was refused entry, Pierce "tried to contact Mr. Marano and [St. Barnabas Hospital] Human Resources Director Serafina Dolan but was unable to contact either." (Id. at 3.) Pierce "was never informed by Mr. Marano [of] the nature of the investigation nor termination." (Id.) Pierce was informed of his termination from St. Barnabas Correctional Heath Services in a letter by Dolan dated August 11, 1999, "10 months after [he] was refused entry to Rikers Island by Mr. Marano's orders." (Id. Article I attached thereto.) The letter reads, in relevant part:
For background information about the St. Barnabas — Rikers relationship, see Murns v. City of New York, 00 Civ. 9590, 2001 WL 515201 at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2001).
We were informed by the Department of Correction Inspector General's office that your access to Rikers Island has been revoked as a result of an investigation.
In light of the findings and decision by DOC, we have no alternative but to terminate your employment with St. Barnabas Hospital-Correctional Health Services, effective immediately.
(Am. Compl., Article I: 8/11/99 Dolan Letter to Pierce.)
Pierce's first cause of action alleges deprivation of his constitutional rights by Marano and Dolan. (Am. Compl. at 3.) Specifically, Pierce cites the First Amendment "[r]ight to freedom of speech and right to petition the government for a redress of grievances." (Am. Compl. at 3.)
Pierce also claims that he was "deprived of rights without due process" in violation of the Fifth Amendment when "[n]o case or charges were presented, nor any crime charged warranting an indictment by Grand Jury. . . ." (Id.) Pierce further claims that his Sixth and Seventh Amendment rights were violated because he was "not given the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury because [he] was not informed of the nature and cause of accusation, nor charges, nor confronted with any witnesses against him." (Id.) Pierce also refers to the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Id.)
Pierce's second cause of action is for deprivation of "my position, my accrued benefits, any right to unemployment benefits, and/or other positions, my dignity, and blemished my record heretofor[e] honorable." (Id.) Pierce's third cause of action is that the defendants "denied my petition under FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT . . . for any documents or lists of charges or hearings, or decisions." (Am. Compl. at 3-4.) Pierce's third cause of action "also invokes the UNFAIR LABOR LAWS." (Am. Compl. at 4.)
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss
Defendant Dolan moved to dismiss, arguing that Pierce fails to state a claim: "[i]n order for a claim to arise under Section 1983, the defendant must have violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff 'under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, usage, of any State.' Dolan is not a state actor, and plaintiff has not alleged violation of any constitutional right by Dolan." (Dkt. No. 10: Dolan Br. at 4-6; Dkt. No. 16: Dolan Reply Br. at 2-3.)
Defendant Marano filed an answer (Dkt. No. 12) and also moved to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c):
While defendant Marano, as a DOC Assistant Inspector General, acted under color of state law, plaintiff [Pierce] has failed to identify any constitutional right of federal law that defendant Marano allegedly violated. The only action plaintiff alleges defendant Marano committed is to deny him access to Riker's Island. . . . However, neither the constitution nor any federal law prohibits or restricts, in any way, DOC's decision regarding [Pierce's] access, or lack thereof, onto Riker's Island. Plaintiff simply claims that his access was denied. Plaintiff does not allege that his access to Riker's Island was denied for any impermissible or unconstitutional reason.
(Dkt. No. 15: Marano Br. at 4.) Marano further argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Marano asserts that a "government official who performs a discretionary act is entitled to qualified immunity for civil damages insofar as his conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights." (Id. at 4.) Marano claims that, as Pierce "has neither a constitutional nor statutory right to Riker's Island access. . . . Marano's discretionary decision to revoke plaintiff's access based on an [Inspector General] investigation is entitled to qualified immunity." (Id. at 4-5.)
Both defendants argue that Pierce's Freedom of Information Act claim should be dismissed because such claim is not actionable against an individual and neither defendant works for a federal agency. (Dolan Br. at 6-7; Marano Br. at 5.) Further, defendants assert that Pierce's unfair labor law claim should be dismissed because defendant Marano was not Pierce's employer and because Pierce does not identify the statute defendants allegedly violated or the nature of the violation. (Dolan Br. at 7; Marano Br. at 5.)
ANALYSIS I. THE STANDARD GOVERNING A MOTION TO DISMISS PURSUANT TO FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) AND 12(c)
A district court should deny a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "'unless it appears to a certainty that a plaintiff can prove no set of facts entitling him to relief.'" IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Ryder Energy Distrib. Corp. v. Merrill Lynch Commodities Inc., 748 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1984)), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994). A court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party — here, the plaintiff. Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989). The standard for evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is the same as that for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Irish Lesbian Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998).
Accord, e.g., Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d 127, 131 (2d Cir. 2001); In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 678 (2001); Grandon v. Merrill Lynch Co., 147 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 1998); Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 01 Civ. 4182, 2002 WL 1465907 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2002) (Peck, M.J.); Williams v. Wilmington Trust Co., 01 Civ. 7590, 2002 WL 77081 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (Peck, M.J.); Pantoja v. Scott, 96 Civ. 8593, 2001 WL 1313358 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2001) (Peck, M.J.); Leemon v. Burns, 175 F. Supp.2d 551, 553-54 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (Peck, M.J.); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff Phelps Credit Rating Co., 951 F. Supp. 1071, 1080-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Knapp, D.J. Peck, M.J.); In re Towers Fin. Corp. Noteholders Litig., 93 Civ. 0180, 1995 WL 571888 at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1995) (Peck, M.J.), report rec. adopted, 936 F. Supp. 126 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Knapp, D.J.).
Accord, e.g., Weinstein v. Albright, 261 F.3d at 131; In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d at 69; Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 2002 WL 1465907 at *3; Williams v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2002 WL 77081 at *2; Leemon v. Burns, 175 F. Supp.2d at 554; LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff Phelps, 951 F. Supp. at 1081; In re Towers, 1995 WL 571888 at *11; Macmillan, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 764 F. Supp. 38, 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
Additionally, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion (and, therefore, a Rule 12(c) motion) challenges only the face of the pleading. Thus, in deciding a 12(b)(6) motion, "the Court must limit its analysis to the four corners of the complaint." Vassilatos v. Ceram Tech Int'l Ltd., 92 Civ. 4574, 1993 WL 177780 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 1993) (citing Kopec v. Coughlin, 922 F.2d 152, 154-55 (2d Cir. 1991)).
Accord, e.g., Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 2002 WL 1465907 at *4; Williams v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2002 WL 77081 at *2; Leemon v. Burns, 175 F. Supp.2d at 554; Aniero Concrete Co. v. New York City Constr. Auth., 94 Civ. 3506, 2000 WL 863208 at *31 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2000); Six West Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 WL 264295 at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2000) ("When reviewing the pleadings on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court looks only to the four corners of the complaint and evaluates the legal viability of the allegations contained therein."); LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff Phelps, 951 F. Supp. at 1081; In re Towers, 1995 WL 571888 at *11.
When additional materials are submitted to the Court for consideration with a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court must either exclude the additional materials and decide the motion based solely upon the complaint, or convert the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b); Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2000); Fonte v. Board of Managers of Cont'l Towers Condos, 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988); Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 2002 WL 1465907 at *4; Williams v. Wilmington Trust Co., 2002 WL 77081 at *2 n. 7; Leemon v. Burns, 175 F. Supp.2d at 554 n. 4; LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff Phelps, 951 F. Supp. at 1081; In re Towers, 1995 WL 571888 at *11.
The Court, however, may consider documents attached to the complaint as an exhibit or incorporated in the complaint by reference. E.g., Yak v. Bank Brussels Lambert, BBL (USA) Holdings, Inc., 252 F.3d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949 F.2d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 960, 1125 S.Ct. 1561 (1992)); Rothman v. Gregor, 220 F.3d 81, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) ("For purposes of a motion to dismiss, we have deemed a complaint to include any written instrument attached to it as an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference. . . .").
See also, e.g., Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1994); Brass v. American Film Tech., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Bolanos v. Norwegian Cruise Lines Ltd., 2002 WL 1465907 at *4; Williams v. Wilmigton Trust Co., 2002 WL 77081 at *2; Leemon v. Burns, 175 F. Supp.2d at 554; LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. Duff Phelps, 951 F. Supp. at 1081.
Here, Pierce attached to his complaint a copy of the termination letter he received from Serafina Dolan. (Dkt. No. 3: Am. Compl., Article I.) Therefore, the Court can properly consider that letter in ruling on defendants' motions to dismiss.
The Court's role in deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "'is merely to assess the legal feasibility of the complaint, not to assay the weight of the evidence which might be offered in support thereof.'" Saunders v. Coughlin, 92 Civ. 4289, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1994) (quoting Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 1980)); accord, e.g., Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. 127, 130-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Kaplan, D.J. Peck, M.J.). "'[T]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Saunders v. Coughlin, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974)); accord, e.g., Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. at 131. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be granted "'only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.'" Saunders v. Coughlin, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984)); accord, e.g., Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. at 131.
When reviewing a pro se complaint, the court must use less stringent standards than if the complaint had been drafted by counsel. See, e.g., LaBounty v. Adler, 933 F.2d 121, 123 (2d Cir. 1991); Watson v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. at 131; Saunders v. Coughlin, No. 92 Civ. 4289, 1994 WL 88108 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 1994) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 101 S.Ct. 173 (1980)). However, "[d]ismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper if the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief. . . ." 3 Moore's Federal Practice § 12.34[4][a], at 12-72.7 (2002). Thus, the duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint is not the equivalent of a duty to re-write it for him. Id., § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61; see also, e.g., Joyner v. Greiner, 195 F. Supp.2d 500, 503 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (action dismissed because pro se plaintiff "failed to allege the facts tending to establish" that defendants violated his constitutional rights).
II. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS PIERCE'S § 1983 CLAIM SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE PIERCE DOES NOT ALLEGE FACTS DEMONSTRATING A VIOLATION OF ANY COGNIZABLE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTA § 1983 claim has two elements, a state actor and deprivation of a constitutional right:
A claim upon which relief may be granted to [plaintiffs] against [defendants] under § 1983 must embody at least two elements. [Plaintiffs] are first bound to show that they have been deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution and the laws" of the United States. They must secondly show that [defendants] deprived them of this right acting "under color of any statute" of the State of New York. It is clear that these two elements denote two separate areas of inquiry.
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733 (1978).
A. Pierce Alleged Enough Facts to Support A Claim that Dolan Was a State Actor Under § 1983
In order for Pierce to prove that Dolan acted "under the color of state law," he must show that:
the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to the State. . . . First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible. . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 2753-54 (1982) (emphasis added).
In upholding dismissal of similar-sounding employment claims against the prior medical care provider (Montefiore Hospital) at Rikers Island, the Second Circuit held:
The fact that a municipality is responsible for providing medical attention to persons held in its custody may make an independent contractor rendering such services a state actor within the meaning of § 1983 with respect to the [medical] services so provided . . .; but that fact does not make the contractor a state actor with respect to its employment decisions. . . .
Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Center, 84 F.3d 522, 527 (2nd Cir. 1996) (citing West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2258 (1988) ("Respondent, as a physician employed by North Carolina to provide medical services to state prison inmates, acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 when undertaking his duties in treating petitioner's injury. Such conduct is fairly attributable to the State."); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-43, 102 S.Ct. 2764, 2770-72 (1982) (holding that a private school for maladjusted high school students, supervised in large part by city school committees, was not a state actor where city school committees did not act in concert with school in firing a teacher); Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335-37 (6th Cir. 1992) ("Although [defendant] in this case was under contract to the state, that contract gave the state no input in the personnel decisions of [defendant].")).
In Berweger v. County of Orange, 121 F. Supp.2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), Judge McMahon distinguished Sherlock v. Montefiore Medical Center:
In the present case, the plaintiffs do not have actual knowledge of steps [a county executive] . . . may have taken to deprive them of their employment in retaliation for their exercise of protected speech. They can, however, point to a sequence of events evidencing such a conspiracy, sufficient to allow a jury to decide whether [county prison's private medical provider] was a state actor when it fired plaintiffs.
. . . .
Sherlock is distinguishable from the present case. In Sherlock, there was no evidence of state involvement in the decision to fire the plaintiff. Here, however, there is some evidence that [a county executive] was, in fact, involved with [the county prison's private medical provider's] decision to fire plaintiffs.
Berweger v. County of Orange, 121 F. Supp.2d at 345-46.
See also, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004, 102 S.Ct. 2777, 2786 (1982) ("[O]ur precedents indicate that a State normally can be held responsible for a private decision only when it has exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be that of the State."); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. at 841, 102 S.Ct. at 2771 (finding that the defendant's actions did not constitute state action where "the decisions to discharge [the plaintiffs] were not compelled or even influenced by any state regulation").
Under Sherlock and Berweger, Pierce has alleged enough facts to support a claim that Assistant Inspector General Marano was "involved" in Dolan's decision to fire Pierce: Dolan's termination letter to Pierce acknowledged that Pierce's termination was a direct result of DOC's revocation of his access to Rikers Island. (Am. Compl., Article I: "In light of the findings and decision by DOC, we have no alternative but to terminate your employment with St. Barnabas Hospital-Correctional Health Services, effective immediately.") Pierce's termination, therefore, may be "fairly attributable" to Marano's decision to revoke Pierce's access to Rikers Island. As pleadings are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party, especially a pro se plaintiff, Pierce has alleged enough facts to show that Dolan was a "state actor" for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss.
B. Pierce Has Not Alleged Any Facts to Support A Claim of a Violation of His Constitutional Rights
While Pierce provides a laundry list of the Constitutional amendments he feels were violated by DOC's investigation and his termination (including rights that clearly have no applicability to his firing, such as the Sixth and Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial and the Fifth Amendment right to Grand Jury Proceedings), Piece fails to allege any facts to substantiate the claim that his constitutional rights were violated. (Dkt. No. 3: Am. Compl. at 3.) Pierce fails to allege, for example, that he was terminated because of any comments he made, implicating the First Amendment. Compare Berweger v. County of Orange, 121 F. Supp.2d 334, 339-40, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
Because Pierce does not provide any facts to substantiate his claim that his constitutional rights were violated, his § 1983 claim should be dismissed, but since Pierce is pro se, he will be given one last chance to amend the complaint, if he is able to do so.
Since Pierce's claim is being dismissed for failure to plead facts of any constitutional violation, there is no need to examine Marano's qualified immunity defense.
III. PIERCE'S OTHER CLAIMS SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Claims under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552, can only be directed to federal agencies — not state agencies or private individuals. See, e.g., Stoianoff v. Comm'r of Dep't of Motor Vehicles, No. 00-9090, 12 Fed. Appx. 33, 35, 2001 WL 568129 at *1 (2d Cir. May 25, 2001) (Plaintiff's FOIA claim cannot stand because "it is beyond question that FOIA applies only to federal and not state agencies."), cert. denied, 122 S.Ct. 352 (2001); Germosen v. Cox, 98 Civ. 1294, 1999 WL 1021559 at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999) (FOIA does not apply to "non-government organizations or private individuals"). Because neither Dolan nor Marano (nor their employers) are federal agencies, Pierce's FOIA claim should be dismissed with prejudice.
Pierce also claims that Dolan and Marano violated "Unfair Labor Laws." (Am. Compl. at 4.) However, Pierce does not cite to any specific labor laws, such as the Taft-Hartley Act or the National Labor Relations Act. Pro se petitions are read liberally; however, since Pierce has not cited a single labor law violated by defendants, this claim is too vague and should therefore be dismissed with prejudice. See, e.g., Prince v. Dicker, No. 01-7805, 29 Fed. Appx. 52, 2002 WL 226492 at *2 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Under the Rules' liberal pleading standards, a plaintiff must disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant 'to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.'")).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons cited above, Pierce's claims (1) under the Freedom of Information Act and "Unfair Labor Laws" should be dismissed with prejudice, and (2) under § 1983 should be dismissed, with leave for Pierce to further amend the complaint within ten days of this Report Recommendation. Because Pierce was already ordered to amend his complaint by Chief Judge Mukasey (Dkt. No. 2:4/24/01 Order), this is Pierce's final chance to state a claim; he will not be granted further leave to amend.
FILING OF OBJEIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties shall have ten (10) days from service of this Report to file written objections. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6. Such objections (and any responses to objections) shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court, with courtesy copies delivered to the chambers of the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1340, and to my chambers, 500 Pearl Street, Room 1370. Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Rakoff. Failure to file objections will result in a waiver of those objections for purposes of appeal. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 466 (1985); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Herrmann, 9 F.3d 1049, 1054 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 822, 115 S.Ct. 86 (1994); Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993); Frank v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 300 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038, 113 S.Ct. 825 (1992); Small v. Secretary of Health Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989); Wesolek v. Canadair Ltd., 838 F.2d 55, 57-59 (2d Cir. 1988); McCarthy v. Manson, 714 F.2d 234, 237-38 (2d Cir. 1983); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, 6(a), 6(e).