Summary
holding that plaintiff's claims for medical neglect and failure to diagnose amounted to a claim of negligence or malpractice under state law and did not raise a federal question.
Summary of this case from Reyes v. N.Y. Presbyterian Hosp.Opinion
01 Civ. 3125 (WK)
October 19, 2001
Fanny Ogbunugafor, Yonkers, NY, For Plaintiff (pro se).
John J. Corgan, Schiavetti, Corgan, Soscia, DiEdwards and Nicholson, LLP White Plains, NY, For Defendant The Westchester County Medical Center.
ORDER
Pro se Plaintiff Fanny Ogbunugafor ("Plaintiff") filed this action on April 13, 2001. Having reviewed the Plaintiff's Complaint, we sua sponte dismiss this action for failure to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction.
"The Court is mindful that when construing pro se complaints, a liberal, less stringent standard must be applied than when a plaintiff is represented by counsel." Nachbaur v. Weiss (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001) 2001 WL 83233, *1, aff'd, (2d. Cir. Oct. 1, 2001) 2001 WL 1167820. Pro se complaints should be dismissed only if it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of her claim that would entitle her to relief. See id. Nevertheless, appearing pro se "does not relieve a plaintiff from the normal rules of pleading and dismissal." Lombard v. Lombard (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2001) 2001 W L 548725, *3.
"It is common ground that in our federal system of limited jurisdiction any party or the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, may raise the question of whether the court has subject matter jurisdiction; and, if it does not, dismissal is mandatory." Manway Constr. Co., Inc. v. Housing Authority of the City of Hartford (2d Cir. 1983) 711 F.2d 501, 503 (emphasis added). In other words, this Court "has an independent obligation to ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction." Nachbaur, 2001 WL 83233 at *2. As a result, "[t]he court is required to consider jurisdiction and is therefore obligated to raise the issue sua sponte." Sty-Lite Co. v. Eminent Sportswear, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2000) 115 F. Supp.2d 394, 398. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action").
Although Plaintiff's Complaint is somewhat vague on this point, Plaintiff appears to assert that this Court has jurisdiction on the basis of diversity. Plaintiff alleges that "[t]his court has jurisdiction because both the parties involved; [sic] Plaintiff and Defendant have addresses in Westchester County that is in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York." See Complaint, page 8. However, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in her Complaint which would establish diversity jurisdiction.
"A case falls within the federal district court's `original' diversity `jurisdiction' only if diversity of citizenship is complete, i.e. only if there is no plaintiff and no defendant who are citizens of the same State." Wisconsin Dept. of Corrections v. Schacht (1998) 524 U.S. 381, 388. See also Moore v. New York City Bd. of Education (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2001) 2001 WL 815510, *2 (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) grants diversity jurisdiction "where the plaintiff and defendant reside in different states"). Plaintiff asserts that she is a citizen of New York. See Complaint, page 1. She further asserts that Defendants Leona Borchert and The Westchester County Medical Center ("Defendants") are citizens of New York. See Complaint, page 1. Since Plaintiff alleges that both she and Defendants are citizens of the same state, there is no diversity of citizenship in this case.
Similarly, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts in her Complaint which would establish federal question jurisdiction. "Federal courts have jurisdiction over `all civil actions arising under the . . . laws . . . of the United States." Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns Co. (2d Cir. 2000) 220 F.3d 22, 25, cert. denied, (2001) 531 U.S. 1075, quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331. "Federal question jurisdiction exists where a well-pleaded complaint `establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.'" Greenberg, 20 F.3d at 25.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that she "brings this action" for "medical neglect and failure to diagnose a disease for a period of over 5 years." See Complaint, page 2. These allegations amount to a claim for either negligence, or, at best, medical malpractice under New York law. "A claim sounds in medical malpractice when the challenged conduct `constitutes medical treatment or bears a substantial relationship to the rendition of medical treatment by a licensed physician.'" Sha v. Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000) 2000 WL 1760883, *1, quoting Weiner v. Lenox Hill Hospital (1996) 88 N.Y.2d 784, 788. "State law governs such claims of medical malpractice." Id.
In essence, Plaintiff's claim for negligence or medical malpractice is a state claim and is neither created by federal law nor necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law. There may be certain circumstances in which deliberate indifference by a state agency to a patient's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Estelle v. Gamble (1976) 429 U.S. 97, 104-105. However, "Section 1983 claims are `not to be used to duplicate state tort law at the federal level." Sha, 2001 WL 1760883 at *2. "Allegations of medical malpractice or negligent failure to provide treatment will not suffice to support an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.'" Id. See also Ruffin v. Deperio (W.D.N.Y. 2000) 97 F. Supp.2d 346, 351 ("Mere negligence in providing medical treatment or differences of opinion as to matters of medical judgment do not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim;'") Tomarkin v. Ward (S.D.N.Y. 1982) 534 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 ("`Mere negligence in giving or failing to supply medical treatment alone will not suffice' to support an action under s[ection] 1983.") Rather, "[t]o convert what would be malpractice if tortious in a private context into a constitutional violation in the state agency employee context requires deliberate indifference." Morris v. Hoke (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 1992) 1992 WL 310792, *1.
Actions under Section 1983 also require proof of state action. Sha, 2001 WL 1760883 at *2. Courts generally must consider whether the alleged infringement of federal rights may be "fairly attributable to the State." Id. Private hospitals are not state actors for the purpose of Section 1983. Id. Since we must construe Plaintiff's pro se Complaint under a liberal standard, and since Plaintiff on the face of her Complaint appears to bring this action against a county hospital, we will assume, without deciding, that the defendant hospital is a state actor.
In her Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that she is asserting an action for "medical neglect" and that it was "neglect" which was responsible for Plaintiff's suffering. See Complaint, page 2. Moreover, Plaintiff, throughout her Complaint, continues to mention Defendants' negligent conduct, noting that "Defendant neglected to diagnose Plaintiff's complaints," see Complaint, page 2, asking this Court to "not allow more neglect to happen to her," see Complaint, page 7, and explaining that the attorneys for the defendants do not care about the "neglect" caused by their clients, see Complaint, page 7.
"Deliberate indifference requires more than negligence." Zimmerman v. Macomber (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2001) 2001 WL 946383, *7. "Negligence, medical malpractice, and differences of opinion as to the proper course of treatment are not federal claims and do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Id. Given the lack of any allegations from which this Court could infer deliberate indifference as opposed to mere negligence, Plaintiff's assertions amount, at best, to a state claim of negligence or medical malpractice, not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Morris, 1992 WL 310792 at *2. As Plaintiff has asserted nothing more than a state claim for negligence or medical malpractice, there is no federal question jurisdiction over her action.
Since we lack either diversity or federal question jurisdiction over her claims, we must dismiss Plaintiff's action. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (providing that a court must dismiss an action where it appears that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the subject matter); Manway Constr. Co., Inc., 711 F.2d at 503 (holding that if a court does not have jurisdiction over an action, dismissal is mandatory). We do not hold that Plaintiff failed to state a claim; rather, we instead find that we lack jurisdiction to hear her action and that her claims should have been raised more appropriately, if at all, in state court.
SO ORDERED.