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deciding that the court "lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's claim that the Stipulation of Settlement should be declared null and void"
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00 Civ. 6703 (SAS)
May 23, 2001
Plaintiff (Pro Se), John Lombard, Woodside, New York.
For Defendant, Judge Robert L. Nahman, Lisa Ghartey, Charles F. Sanders, Assistant Attorneys General, New York, New York.
For Lombard Defendants, R. Bruce Claro, Esq., Sea Cliff, New York.
Defendant Michael Wynne (Pro Se), Michael Wynne, Esq., Flushing, New York.
OPINION AND ORDER
Pro se plaintiff John Lombard has sued, among others, his brothers William Lombard, Michael Lombard, and Richard Lombard (the "Lombard defendants"), as well as Surrogate Judge Robert L. Nahman, seeking to challenge the administration of his mother's estate. Asserting a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("section 1983"), plaintiff alleges that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his civil rights. Plaintiff also asserts a claim under New York's real property law, see N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. § 1501 et seq. (McKinney 1979), seeking to compel the determination of his claim to real property.
The complaint purports to base jurisdiction on several statutes in addition to section 1983, including, inter alia, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Truth-in-Lending Act), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations), 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (Voting Rights Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII of the Civil Rights Act), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Americans with Disabilities Act). However, plaintiff expresses only the most conclusory allegations and has merely listed these statutes without providing any factual basis for asserting claims thereunder. Notwithstanding the liberality with which courts must construe pro se complaints, see McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999), these claims must be dismissed for failure to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). In any event, even if plaintiff had adequately pled claims under these statutes, they would be dismissed because this Court lacks jurisdiction over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See infra Part III.A.2
Judge Nahman now moves to dismiss the claims against him pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Specifically, Judge Nahman contends that: (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment; (2) the suit is barred under the doctrine of Younger abstention; (3) as a judge, he is entitled to absolute immunity; and (4) the allegations of the complaint are insufficient to state a section 1983 claim. For the reasons stated below, Judge Nahman's motion is granted and the complaint is dismissed in its entirety as to all defendants.
See infra note 7.
II. BACKGROUND
Mary Lombard, the mother of both plaintiff and the Lombard defendants, died on March 1, 1997, leaving a residence in Woodside, New York ("the family residence"), a Merrill Lynch account worth approximately $325,000, and jewelry and other assets of unspecified value. See Verified Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 3. Prior to her death, Mary Lombard executed a trust agreement, dated August 14, 1991, with Michael Lombard and William Lombard as trustees (the "Trust Agreement"). The Trust Agreement was prepared by Richard Lombard, Esq. and it transferred title in the family residence to the Mary Lombard Trust. See id. ¶ 8.On April 10, 2000, during the proceeding in Surrogate's Court following Mary Lombard's death, plaintiff executed a Stipulation of Settlement with Michael Lombard and Richard Lombard ("Stipulation of Settlement"). See id. ¶ 14. The Stipulation of Settlement was approved by Judge Nahman, before whom the Surrogate's proceeding was then pending. See Memorandum on Behalf of Defendant Surrogate Judge Robert L. Nahman in Support of Motion to Dismiss the Complaint ("Def. Mem.") at 2. In exchange for valuable consideration, including $10,000 and a quarter share of the net proceeds from the sale of the family residence, plaintiff agreed to withdraw his objections to the Executor's accounting, with prejudice, and he agreed that the accounting may be settled on its terms, or
Because Assistant Attorneys General are officers of the Court, I accept this representation in Judge Nahman's memorandum of law. Moreover, plaintiff has not offered any evidence to contradict this representation.
withdrawn at the option of the Executor, and that he will not at any time hereafter make any claim: a. that Mary Lombard's Merrill Lynch brokerage account is not a true joint account
b. that a deed signed by Mary Lombard to the Mary Lombard Trust is not a valid deed
c. that the Mary Lombard Trust is not a valid trust
d. that he has a right to continue to reside in the family residence
e. that he is entitled to compensation for services that he allegedly rendered to Mary Lombard
f. that would in any way prevent or obstruct the sale of the family residence by the trustees of the Mary Lombard Trust.
Stipulation of Settlement, Ex. A to Declaration of Assistant Attorney General Lisa Ghartey, at 1.
Plaintiff moved out of the family residence on May 30, 2000. See Am. Compl. ¶ 12. On October 3, 2000, the family residence was sold. See 10/3/00 Letter from Richard T. Lombard to John F. Lombard ("10/3/00 Richard Lombard Letter"), attached to plaintiff's 4/2/01 Motion for Default Judgment; 1/4/00 Affidavit of John Lombard ¶ 2. Plaintiff's twenty-five percent share of the net proceeds is being held in escrow pending final disposition of this lawsuit. See 10/3/00 Richard Lombard Letter.
A. Procedural History
John Lombard is no stranger to the judicial system. Among the many suits he has brought in this state, two are of particular relevance here. First, in 1996, John Lombard filed an action against Merrill Lynch and the Lombard defendants in New York State Supreme Court, Queens County. On August 4, 1997, Justice Frederick D. Schmidt granted summary judgment to the defendants because, inter alia, John Lombard failed to "come forth with any sufficient evidence of fraud with regard to the execution of" the Trust Agreement and Mary Lombard's October 1979 will. 8/4/97 Short Form Order in Lombard v. Merrill Lynch, No. 14438/96, Ex. D to Lombard Defendants' 5/4/01 Notice of Cross-Motion for an Order Granting Leave To Serve and File a Verified Answer Nunc Pro Tunc ("Lombard Def. Cross-Motion"). Second, John Lombard filed an action against the Lombard defendants which New York State Supreme Court Justice Orin R. Kitzes dismissed on the ground of res judicata because "[t]he issues raised in th[e] case, to set aside a deed on the grounds of a forgery, were already considered and ruled upon in the prior action under index number 14438/96." 3/5/98 Short Form Order in Lombard v. Lombard, No. 21899/97, Ex. D to Lombard Def. Cross-Motion.
B. The Instant Lawsuit
Plaintiff filed this action on September 6, 2000. While the Amended Complaint is difficult to comprehend, it appears that plaintiff primarily seeks to void the Trust Agreement and the Stipulation of Settlement in an effort to gain possession of the family residence. Specifically, plaintiff alleges that Richard Lombard forged Mary Lombard's signature on the Trust Agreement and that plaintiff signed the Stipulation of Settlement under duress. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 9, 14. Plaintiff also seeks an accounting of the estate. See id. ¶¶ 4-5.
III. DISCUSSION A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 1. Applicable Legal Standard
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), a court must accept as true all material factual allegations in the complaint. See Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Balfour MacLaine Int'l Ltd., 968 F.2d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1992). "However, argumentative inferences favorable to the party assessing jurisdiction should not be drawn." Id. When deciding such a jurisdictional motion, the district court may look beyond the allegations of the complaint. See LeBlanc v. Cleveland, 198 F.3d 353, 355 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[W]here jurisdictional facts are placed in dispute, the court has the power and obligation to decide issues of fact by reference to evidence outside the pleadings, such as affidavits."); Reynolds v. Army and Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("If a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . challenges the truth of the jurisdictional facts alleged in the complaint, the district court may consider relevant evidence in order to resolve the factual dispute"); see also Salem v. Paroli, 260 B.R. 246, 253 (S.D.N Y 2001). A district court may also consider public documents in determining whether claims are barred because of an earlier state court adjudication. See, e.g., Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992); Bal v. New York City Loft Bd., No. 00 Civ. 1112, 2000 WL 890199, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 5, 2000).
Where a plaintiff appears pro se, a court must "read the pleadings . . . liberally and interpret them to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest." McPherson, 174 F.3d at 280 (quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, appearing pro se does not relieve a plaintiff from the normal rules of pleading and dismissal. See Gibson v. DiRubbio, No. 99 Civ. 3202, 2000 WL 1159553, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2000), aff'd, 2001 WL 392018 (2d Cir. Apr. 18, 2001); Kadosh v. TRW, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 5080, 1994 WL 681763, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 1994) ("[T]he work product of pro se litigants should be generously and liberally construed, but [the pro se's] failure to allege either specific facts or particular laws that have been violated, renders his attempt to oppose defendants' motion ineffectual.").
2. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Judge Nahman moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Def. Mem. at 5-8. That doctrine bars a federal court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over cases that effectively seek review of state court judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust, 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Only the Supreme Court has subject matter jurisdiction to review state court judgments. See Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199-200). "Rooker-Feldman applies not only to decisions of the highest state courts, but also to decisions of the lower state courts." Salem, 260 B.R. at 254 (citation omitted). See also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York and New Jersey Police Dep't, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992) ("[I]f federal district courts are precluded, as they are, from reviewing the decisions of a state's highest court . . . then federal district courts are certainly also precluded from reviewing decisions of lower state courts, which are subject to correction and modification within the state court system.").
"A challenge under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and may be raised at any time by either party or sua sponte by the court." Moccio v. Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also bars federal courts from reviewing claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with a state court determination. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16. An issue is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision where, in order to grant plaintiff the relief that he seeks, the federal court would be required to find that the state court's decision was wrongly decided. See Moccio, 95 F.3d at 197; see also Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) ("Claims are inextricably intertwined if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.") (Marshall, J., concurring). The Supreme Court's use of "inextricably intertwined" means that "where a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding, subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion." Moccio, 95 F.3d at 199-200. "[T]he fundamental and appropriate question to ask is whether the injury alleged by the federal plaintiff resulted from the state court judgment itself or is distinct from that judgment. If the injury alleged resulted from the state court judgment itself, Rooker-Feldman directs that the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction." Garry v. Geils, 82 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996).
Here, plaintiff alleges that he was under duress when he signed the Stipulation of Settlement and therefore seeks to have it declared void. That Stipulation of Settlement was executed in connection with the proceeding then pending before Judge Nahman. Therefore, plaintiff is directly challenging the outcome of the probate proceeding in the Surrogate's Court.
Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to state court proceedings that are administrative or ministerial — as opposed to judicial — in nature, probate proceedings are judicial in nature. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 477 (stating that a judicial inquiry "investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist") (citation omitted).
This Court, therefore, lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate plaintiff's claim that the Stipulation of Settlement should be declared null and void. See Bal, 2000 WL 890199, at *2-*3 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibited district court from considering plaintiff's section 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated during New York City Loft Board proceedings); Levitin v. Homburger, 932 F. Supp. 508, 514-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing action under Rooker-Feldman doctrine where monetary damages sought by plaintiff as a result of receiver's sale of plaintiff's partnership interest would "[i]n essence . . . undo what . . . happened to [plaintiff] in state court and restore to him the alleged value of his partnership interest").
Plaintiff also requests an accounting of Mary Lombard's estate, a request he explicitly withdrew during the proceeding in Surrogate's Court. See Stipulation of Settlement at 1. An accounting was already conducted in that proceeding and plaintiff cannot now challenge it in federal court. See Johnson, 189 F.3d at 186 (Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district court of subject matter jurisdiction over claims to estate assets that were subject to prior proceedings in Surrogate's Court. Second Circuit stated that "[b]ecause no objection was raised to the final accounting [in New York State Supreme Court] . . ., a federal court lacks jurisdiction to consider the plaintiff's objections almost forty-five years later.").
Plaintiff's allegation that a fraud had been committed on the Surrogate's Court, see Am. Compl. ¶ 18, cannot circumvent the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Levitin, 932 F. Supp. at 514-15 (plaintiff should seek remedy in state court, rather than federal court, to undo a challenged judgment because "[i]t is settled law that a court has inherent power to vacate its own judgment on proof that fraud has been perpetrated on the court") (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991)).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine not only bars the claims concerning the Stipulation of Settlement and the accounting of the estate, but also plaintiff's claim that the Trust Agreement was forged. In the Surrogate's Court proceeding, plaintiff specifically waived any challenge to the validity of the Trust Agreement. See Stipulation of Settlement at 1, ¶ c. To challenge its validity here necessarily requires this Court to revisit the Surrogate's Court proceeding. In addition, plaintiff's claim that the Trust Agreement is invalid has been previously rejected by Justices Schmidt and Kitzes. See supra Part II.A. Indeed, Justice Schmidt concluded that there is no evidence of fraud with respect to the execution of the Trust Agreement. See 8/4/97 Short Form Order in Lombard v. Merrill Lynch, No. 14438/96. Plaintiff cannot now relitigate the outcome of these state court determinations in federal court. See Chiana v. Broadmoor Assoc., No. 94 Civ. 613, 1994 WL 30412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1994) ("[Plaintiff's] requests merely attest to plaintiff's dissatisfaction with the course her litigation has taken in the state courts. Where, as here, the complaint's constitutional claim appears to be nothing more than the plaintiff's state court claims recloaked in constitutional garb, the constitutional claim is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.") (quotation marks and citation omitted). In short, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all of plaintiff's claims.
Although only Judge Nahman has moved to dismiss the complaint, because the Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests this Court of jurisdiction over the action, the entire complaint must be dismissed. Additionally, because plaintiff's action is dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, it is unnecessary to reach the merits of Judge Nahman's other grounds for dismissal.
B. The State Law Claims
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims where "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Because plaintiff's only federal claim cannot survive dismissal, I now decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining state law claim. See Martinez v. Simonetti, 202 F.3d 625, 636 (2d Cir. 2000) (directing dismissal of supplemental state law claims where no federal claims remained).IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Judge Nahman's motion to dismiss is granted. The complaint is dismissed in its entirety. The Clerk of this Court is directed to close this case.SO ORDERED:
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