Opinion
No. 00 CV 4895 (ILG)
April 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This negligence action arises out of a four-car, chain-reaction collision that occurred on the Verrazano Narrows Bridge on August 24, 1998. The lead vehicle was owned and operated by James Ryan ("Ryan"), a non-party to this action. The second vehicle was owned and operated by plaintiff Gregory Maizous ("Maizous"). The third vehicle was owned by defendant LJ Plumbing and Heating Co., Inc. ("LJ"), and operated by defendant Jerome Garraffa, Jr. ("Garraffa"). The fourth and final vehicle was owned by defendant First Union Auto Finance, Inc. ("First Union"), and operated by non-party Randi Placona ("Placona"). The following diagram illustrates the relative positions of the vehicles.
Direction of travel:
Car#4 Car#3 Car#2 Car#1 Placona/First Garraffa/LJ Maizous Ryan After the accident, Maizous sued LJ, Garraffa, and First Union for personal injuries he sustained as a result thereof. Garraffa and LJ, in turn, cross-claimed against First Union, alleging that Placona (the operator of the First Union vehicle) was the cause of the accident, and First Union cross-claimed against Garraffa and LJ, alleging that Garraffa was at least partially at fault.Garraffa and LJ now move for summary judgment. According to these defendants, there is no evidence suggesting that Garraffa was in any way negligent in the operation of his vehicle, and therefore they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because Garraffa and LJ's motion is based on a misreading of the relevant New York law, their motion for summary judgment must be denied.
BACKGROUND
When viewed in the light most favorable to Maizous and First Union, the non-moving parties vis-a-vis the instant motion, the relevant facts are as follows.
At around 12:00 p.m. on August 24, 1998, Ryan, Maizous, Garraffa, and Placona were traveling, in that order, in the left lane of the Verrazano Narrows bridge, headed towards Brooklyn. Traffic conditions on the bridge were "average" or "mild" according to Maizous (see Maizous Dep. p. 24, 11. 16-19); Garraffa testified that the traffic was "moving" (see Garraffa Dep. p. 11, 11. 1-12), while Placona testified that traffic conditions were "medium to heavy" (see Placona Dep. p. 33, 11. 23-25; p. 34, 1.1). More than halfway across the bridge, as each driver approached the exit for Brooklyn (which is located on the left side of the bridge), traffic became heavier and Maizous had to stop his car. (See Maizous Dep. p. 25, 11. 2-11.) Maizous testified that he was stopped for approximately ten seconds when suddenly his car was hit from the rear by Garraffa. (See id. p. 25, 11. 12-18.) Garraffa had, in fact, been hit from behind by Placona, and the impact of Placona's car pushed Garraffa's vehicle into the back of Maizous's car, which in turn rolled forward and hit Ryan's car. (See Schepp Aff. Ex. H.)
However, Placona also testified that Garraffa's vehicle did not slow down or reduce its speed at any time prior to the accident. (See Placona Dep. p. 17, 11. 13-16.) Similarly, Maizous testified that he was traveling at approximately 30 miles per hour across the bridge, and at no time prior to the accident did he slow down because of traffic conditions. (See Maizous Dep. p. 26, 11. 8-21.)
After the police arrived, Placona informed the responding officer that she had hit Garraffa's vehicle because he had stopped suddenly. (See Schepp Aff. Ex. H; see also Placona Dep. p. 15, 11. 24-25; p. 16, 11. 1-10; p. 25, 11. 23-25; p. 26, 11. 1-23.) Garraffa, however, testified that when he stopped his car (or slowed down his car, as First Union contends), he "had complete control." (Garraffa Dep. p. 13, 11. 19-20.) Stated differently, he "had no fear to stop at such a point that [he] was going to get clobbered from behind." (14. p. 13, 11. 20-22.) However, he also testified that he felt he came to "a sudden stop." (Id. p. 13, 11. 22-23.)
Garraffa and LJ now move for summary judgment. alleging that they cannot be liable, under New York law, for negligence in this case, because "the mere allegation of stopping short or suddenly stopping is insufficient" to support a claim of negligence. (Garraffa LJ Mem. at 3.) According to Garraffa and LJ, "the evidence in this case of an allegation by Ms. Placona that the Garraffa vehicle may have stopped short or was suddenly stopping does not raise a triable issue as to whether the Garraffa vehicle was negligent and whether such negligence was a proximate cause of the accident. . . ." (Id. at 4-5.) In their opposition, both Maizous and First Union assert that Garraffa and LJ have misread New York law, and that the proof suggesting that Garraffa stopped short creates a factual issue as to the relative culpability of the parties, precluding summary judgment. (See Baier Aff. ¶¶ 3-7; see also First Union Mem. at 5-8.)
DISCUSSION
I. Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions . . . together with the affidavits . . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A "moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law [if] the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court need not resolve disputed issues of fact, but need only determine whether there is any genuine issue to be tried. Eastman Mach. Co. v. United States, 841 F.2d 469, 473 (2d Cir. 1988). A disputed fact is material only if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. A genuine factual issue exists if there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmovant such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-249 (1986). "In assessing the record to determine whether there is a genuine issue of fact, the court is required to draw all inferences in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought." Ramseur v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 865 F.2d 460, 465 (2d Cir. 1989).
Additionally, summary judgment is "highly unusual" in a negligence case, because such a case requires a determination of the reasonableness of a party's conduct, and "the assessment of reasonableness generally is a factual question to be addressed by the jury." King v. Crossland Say. Bank, 111 F.3d 251, 259 (2d Cir. 1997); accord Hood v. Regency Maritime Corp., No. 99 Civ. 10250, 2000 WL 1761000, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2000); Ortiz v. Rosner, 817 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Nevertheless, "the mere fact that a case involves a claim of negligence does not preclude a granting of summary judgment." Cumminsky v. Chandris, S.A., 719 F. Supp. 1183, 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); accord Hood 2000 WL 1761000, at *2 (citing Cumminsky).
II. Summary judgment must be denied
Resolution of Garraffa/LJ's motion for summary judgment boils down to deciding the following question: may the driver of the lead car in a rear-end automobile accident be found negligent, to any degree, in the face of evidence suggesting that the driver of the lead car stopped short or was suddenly stopping? Garraffa/LJ argue that the answer is no, and that evidence suggesting that the lead driver stopped short is insufficient to establish even the partial negligence of that individual. The Court disagrees.
Under New York law, it is "well established that `[w]hen the driver of an automobile approaches another automobile from the rear, he or she is bound to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed and control over his or her vehicle, and to exercise reasonable care to avoid colliding with the other vehicle.'" Altman v. Bayliss, No. 95-CV-0734E, 1999 WL 782338, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1999) (quoting Power v. Hupart, 260 A.D.2d 458, 458, 688 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195 (2d Dep't 1999)); see also N.Y. Veh. Traf. L. § 1129[a]. Accordingly, when one vehicle strikes another vehicle from the rear, such a collision creates a prima facie case of liability on the part of the driver of the vehicle in the rear, and imposes a "duty of explanation" on that individual to rebut the inference of negligence with a non-negligent explanation for the collision. See, e.g., Santarpia v. First Fid. Leasing Group, Inc., 275 A.D.2d 315, 315, 712 N.Y.S.2d 57, 58 (2d Dep't 2000); Riley v. County of Broome, 258 A.D.2d 899, 899, 681 N.Y.S.2d 851, 851-52 (3d Dep't 1998); see also Brown v. Brenes, No. 99 Civ. 4922, 2001 WL 262683, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2001). It has been repeatedly held that such non-negligent explanations include "mechanical failure, unavoidable skidding on wet pavement, a sudden stop of the vehicle ahead, or any other reasonable cause." Hupart, 260 A.D.2d at 458, 688 N.Y.S.2d at 195 (emphasis added); accord Brenes, 2001 WL 262683, at *2; Ortiz, 817 F. Supp. at 351.
The Court agrees with the parties that New York law applies to this action. A federal court sitting in diversity applies the law of the forum state and, in tort actions, New York courts generally apply the law of the jurisdiction where the tort occurred. See Velez v. Sebco Laundry Sys., Inc., No. 00 CIV 5027, 2001 WL 43609, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2001); Franklin v. Krueger Int'l, Inc., No. 96 CIV 2408, 1997 WL 691424, at *3 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 1997).
Garraffa and LJ direct the Court's attention to a number of cases from the New York courts in which it was held that allegations that the front vehicle suddenly stopped or stopped short were insufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from a rear-end collision. See, e.g., Moustapha v. Riteway Int'l Removal, Inc., 283 A.D.2d 175, 175, 724 N.Y.S.2d 52, 53 (1st Dep't 2001) ("Defendant Pittaro's conclusory statement that he rear-ended plaintiffs vehicle because plaintiff stopped short was insufficient to raise any issue of fact as to whether the accident was attributable to factors apart from Pittaro's failure to maintain a safe distance behind plaintiffs vehicle."); Jeremic v. Tong, 283 A.D.2d 461, 462, 724 N.Y.S.2d 484, 485 (2d Dep't 2001); Espinoza v. Diaz, 280 A.D.2d 639, 720 N.Y.S.2d 841 (2d Dep't 2001) ("The plaintiffs testimony at her examination before trial that the Schwartz vehicle suddenly stopped in traffic was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact."); Colon v. Cruz, 277 A.D.2d 195, 715 N.Y.S.2d 647 (2d Dep't 2000); Longhito v. Klein, 273 A.D.2d 281, 283, 708 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (2d Dep't 2000) ("Contrary to Klein's contention, her deposition testimony that the Longhito vehicle suddenly stopped short in traffic was insufficient to rebut the presumption that she was negligent."); Sekuler v. Limnos Taxi, Inc., 264 A.D.2d 389, 390, 694 N.Y.S.2d 100, 101 (2d Dep't 1999); Mascitti v. Greene, 250 A.D.2d 821, 822, 673 N.Y.S.2d 206, 208 (2d Dep't 1998) ("evidence that the vehicle in which the plaintiffs were riding suddenly stopped in heavy traffic was insufficient to rebut the inference of Greene's negligence and the absence of negligence upon the part of Smith"). The astute reader will note that, with the exception of the Moustapha case, each of these cases came out of the Second Department. Indeed, there appears to be a substantial body of case law in the Second Department suggesting that a party cannot be held negligent for stopping short on a roadway, and the holdings of these cases have been sporadically adopted by other courts, including New York federal courts. See, e.g., Moskovitz v. Dean, No. 99 Civ. 6085, 2001 WL 1442674, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 15, 2001); Norman v. Scott, No. 99 CIV 3067, 2000 WL 37995, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2000); Bekiaris v. United States, No. 96 CIV 302, 1998 WL 418917, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 1998).
The Moustapha case, however, relied on another First Department case which, in turn, relied on three decisions of the Second Department.
Nevertheless, the Court declines to follow these cases, for two reasons. First, although uncited by Maizous and First Union, the Court has discovered an equally substantial body of cases, including cases from the Second Department, suggesting that when a lead vehicle stops short, the driver of that vehicle may be held negligent. See, e.g., Rosa v. Colonial Transit, Inc., 276 A.D.2d 781, 781, 715 N.Y.S.2d 426, 427 (2d Dep't 2000) ("a triable issue of fact exists as to whether the driver of the stopped bus . . . contributed to the accident by making a sudden stop") (citations omitted); Martin v. Pullafico, 272 A.D.2d 305, 707 N.Y.S.2d 891 (2d Dep't 2000) ("In this case, there are triable issues of fact as to whether . . . the plaintiffs' vehicle stopped suddenly, thereby contributing to the accident. Accordingly, the court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment.") (internal citations omitted); Mohamed v. Town of Niskayuna, 267 A.D.2d 909, 910, 700 N.Y.S.2d 551, 552 (3d Dep't 1999) ("Evidence that the vehicle which was rear-ended came to a sudden and abrupt stop will defeat summary judgment.") (citations omitted); Tripp v. GELCO Corp., 260 A.D.2d 925, 926, 688 N.Y.S.2d 829, 830 (3d Dep't 1999) (summary judgment for plaintiff properly denied where defendant testified at deposition "that `plaintiffs vehicle came to an immediate, abrupt and sudden stop', that he immediately `hit' his brakes, but that he was unable to stop prior to striking plaintiffs vehicle"); Niemiec v. Jones, 237 A.D.2d 267, 268, 654 N.Y.S.2d 163, 165 (2d Dep't 1997) ("Where a defendant contends that the vehicle in front of him came to an unexplained sudden stop, questions of fact are raised that should be submitted to the jury.") (citations omitted); DeCosmo v. Hulse, 204 A.D.2d 953, 954, 612 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (3d Dep't 1994) ("we conclude that although defendant was under a duty to maintain a safe distance between these vehicles, plaintiffs alleged sudden stop in traffic conditions then existing would be a sufficient non[-]negligent explanation proffered by defendant to preclude an award of summary judgment"); Kienzle v. McLoughlin, 202 A.D.2d 299, 610 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1st Dep't 1994) ("a reasonable jury could have credited defendant's testimony that plaintiff came to a sudden stop after being cut off by a third vehicle, and found that defendant, therefore, was not negligent in striking plaintiffs vehicle"); Marx v. Pross, 197 A.D.2d 800, 801, 603 N.Y.S.2d 84, 85 (3d Dep't 1993) (affirming jury verdict holding party partially at fault for "suddenly stopping" prior to rear-end collision); see also Roberts v. Hall, 248 A.D.2d 845, 846-47, 669 N.Y.S.2d 745, 746-47 (3d Dep't 1998) (Yesawich, J., dissenting) ("That [the defendant] may have also been negligent can be inferred from the deposition of a nonparty eyewitness, who averred that the collision occurred immediately after [the defendant] abruptly stopped her car; this evidence could support a finding that she, too, failed to use due care in operating her vehicle, and that her negligence . . . contributed to the happening of the accident.") (emphasis in original). These cases are consistent with the principle set forth in Hupart, and in other Appellate Division cases, that a sudden stop of the lead vehicle is one non-negligent explanation for a rear-end collision. See also Filippazzo v. Santiago, 277 A.D.2d 419, 419, 716 N.Y.S.2d 710, 711 (2d Dep't 2000); 8B N.Y. Jur.2d Automobiles and Other Vehicles § 953 (1997 Supp. 2001) ("the trailing driver may not be negligent in striking from the rear the lead vehicle where the lead vehicle stopped suddenly"); 6A Warren's Negligence in the New York Courts, Occurrences § 9.12[2] (Matthew Bender 1994 Supp. 2001) (same). This conclusion also appears to be consistent with New York's comparative negligence statute.
Accord, also, Cardin v. Christie, 283 A.D.2d 978, 979, 723 N.Y.S.2d 912, 913 (4th Dep't 2001); Gildersleeve v. Leo, 274 A.D.2d 547, 712 N.Y.S.2d 399 (2d Dep't 2000); Castellani v. Bagdasarian, 263 A.D.2d 932, 932, 692 N.Y.S.2d 560, 561 (4th Dep't 1999); Maschka v. Newman, 262 A.D.2d 615, 616, 692 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (2d Dep't 1999); Jones v. Egan, 259 A.D.2d 909, 911, 676 N.Y.S.2d 305, 307 (3d Dep't 1998); Aldrich v. Hagan, 243 A.D.2d 432, 432, 665 N.Y.S.2d 277, 278 (2d Dep't 1997); DeVito v. Silvernail, 239 A.D.2d 824, 825, 658 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (3d Dep't 1997); Gross v. Napoli, 216 A.D.2d 524, 525, 628 N.Y.S.2d 407, 408 (2d Dep't 1995); Migdol v. Striker, 215 A.D.2d 358, 626 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1995); Krajewski v. Rosinski, 212 A.D.2d 886, 886, 622 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (3d Dep't 1995).
Second, "[i]n deciding a disputed issue of state law in a diversity case, a federal [trial] court should attempt to discern what the highest court of that state would decide." Rounds v. Rush Trucking Corp., 211 F.3d 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting L-Tec Elec. Corp. v. Cougar Elec. Org., Inc., 198 F.3d 85, 86 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 117 (2d Cir. 2000). While the New York Court of Appeals has never directly addressed the question of whether the lead driver in a rear-end collision may be held at least partially responsible for the accident where there is evidence suggesting that the driver came to a sudden stop, on two occasions the court has implied that the lead driver in such a situation may be held at least partly to blame. In Lenahan v. Goucher, 65 N.Y.2d 1034, 494 N.Y.S.2d 293 (1985), the plaintiffs car was rear-ended by the defendant's truck. The jury found the defendant 65% responsible for the accident and the plaintiff 35% responsible, accepting the defendant's argument that the plaintiff had "needlessly come to a sudden stop without warning." The trial judge, however, granted the plaintiffs post-verdict motion, and vacated that portion of the jury verdict holding the plaintiff partially responsible. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed, with Justice Yesawich dissenting. 111 A.D.2d 546, 489 N.Y.S.2d 418 (3d Dep't 1985). Justice Yesawich asserted that the jury properly could have found the plaintiff partially responsible for the accident, in light of the defendant's testimony that the plaintiff had stopped short. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated the jury verdict, for the reasons stated by Justice Yesawich in his dissenting opinion. 65 N.Y.2d at 1035, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
Similarly, in Zwilling v. Harrison, 269 N.Y. 461 (1936), the plaintiff was injured after the car in which he was riding rear-ended a truck traveling in front of him. The truck made an illegal turn onto a side street, but then stopped short, blocking the vehicle in which the plaintiff was riding. The plaintiff sued the driver of the truck, as well as the driver of the car in which he was a passenger. The Court of Appeals held that it was proper to charge the jury regarding the negligence of the truck driver, but that it was error to assign any fault to the driver of the plaintiffs car. The court stated, "[o]f course, at any time a car ahead may violate the law by a sudden stop without signaling, but when such an event occurs the circumstances constitute, as to the rear car, nothing more than an accident for which its driver cannot fairly be held blameworthy." 269 N.Y. at 463. In light of this holding and the holding in Lenahan, it is fair to infer that the lead driver in a rear-end collision may be held comparatively negligent if the driver stopped short or came to a sudden stop.
The Court notes that the parties dispute whether Garraffa's vehicle was moving at the time it was hit by Placona. Placona testified that Garraffa's car was moving (see Placona Dep. p. 15, 11. 8-11), while Garraffa testified that he had been stopped for approximately three to five seconds before being hit by Placona (see Garraffa Dep. p. 13, 11. 5-10). Maizous has provided inconsistent answers to this question: in response to an interrogatory, Maizous averred that he had "observed" Garraffa's vehicle "stopped directly behind [Maizous] prior to the accident" (Response to Supplemental Interrogatories, ¶ 3 (a copy of which is annexed to the Schepp Aff. as part of Ex. D)), while in his deposition, Maizous testified that he did not see Garraffa's vehicle stop before the accident (see Maizous Dep. p. 37, 11. 13-123; p. 75, 11. 17-25; p. 76, 11. 1-5). This disagreement, however, does not affect the Court's decision. As Garraffa and LJ concede, there does not appear to be any reason to treat a rear-end collision differently in a case where the lead car was stopping short than in a case in which the lead car had stopped short. (See Garraffa LJ Reply Mem. at 5.)
Thus, the Court finds that summary judgment in favor of Garraffa and LJ is inappropriate. The facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Maizous and First Union, suggest that Garraffa stopped short, possibly because he was following too closely behind Maizous's vehicle, or possibly for some other reason (such as failing to pay attention to the fact that Maizous's car had stopped in traffic in front of him). Because these facts would permit a jury to conclude that Garraffa had been negligent with respect to the accident, summary judgment must be denied.
Perhaps the most instructive case in determining that summary judgment must be denied is Lafforthun v. Strauss, 192 Misc. 88, 80 N.Y.S.2d 329 (N.Y. City Ct., Schenectady County 1948). In Lafforthun, a line of cars was proceeding across the Western Gateway Bridge. An "unexplained occurrence" happened a few cars in front of Strauss's, which caused each of the successive cars to stop quickly, including Strauss's. When Strauss stopped, Lafforthun, who was directly behind Strauss, was unable to stop in time, and hit Strauss's car in the rear. Lafforthun then sued Strauss for injuries she sustained in the accident. The court summarized the parties' obligations as follows:
Both the defendant and plaintiff Lafforthun, traveling in this line of cars[,] had a duty imposed upon each at all times, while thus situated, to have his car under control so that he could stop if the forward car stops. Each should be a sufficient distance behind the forward car and each should be traveling at a sufficiently low rate of speed so that he will not cause damage to the car ahead if it stops or to the car behind by stopping suddenly. Each had a duty to use reasonable care under the circumstances to avoid causing damage. To express the duty in another way, it was the duty of each to exercise that degree of care and caution and prudence that an ordinarily careful person would have exercised under the particular circumstances shown to exist in order to avoid causing injury to another, and in order to avoid being injured.
The Court finds that both defendant and plaintiff Lafforthun violated that duty and that its violation was the proximate cause of the accident. The defendant was traveling too close behind the car ahead so that he stopped suddenly, missing the car ahead by inches. The plaintiff Lafforthun was traveling too close behind defendant, so that she did not stop short of defendant, but struck the rear of his car.192 Misc. at 89, 80 N.Y.S.2d at 330 (emphases added). Here, as in Lafforthun, a jury could find, based on the evidence, that Garraffa was traveling too closely to Maizous's car, or was not paying attention to the traffic in front of him, causing him to stop suddenly. Accordingly, summary judgment must be denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Garraffa/LJ's motion for summary judgment is denied. The parties are directed to appear on May 9, 2002 at 10:00 a.m. to set a trial date.