Opinion
CV. 04-1548-HU.
February 10, 2005
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner, an inmate at FCI Sheridan, brings this habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. For the reasons set forth below, petitioner's habeas petition (#1) is denied and this proceeding is dismissed.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner was convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, and sentenced to a 135-month term of incarceration. Petitioner complains that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has misapplied 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b), thereby depriving him of earned good time credits. Specifically, petitioner contends that the BOP erroneously calculates good time credits based upon actual time served rather than the term of imprisonment imposed.
DISCUSSION
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3624(a), a prisoner shall be released by the BOP "on the date of the expiration of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, less any time credited toward the service of the prisoner's sentence" as provided in § 3624(b). (Emphasis added.) Section 3624(b)(1), in turn, provides the manner in which good time credits are to be calculated:
(1) * * * [A] prisoner who is serving a term of imprisonment of more than 1 year * * *, may receive credit toward the service of the prisoner's sentence, beyond the time served, of up to 54 days at the end of each year of the prisoner's term of imprisonment, beginning at the end of the first year of the term, subject to determination by the Bureau of Prisons that, during that year, the prisoner has displayed exemplary compliance with institutional disciplinary regulations. * * * [ C]redit for the last year or portion of a year of the term of imprisonment shall be prorated and credited within the last six weeks of the sentence.
(Emphasis added.)
The BOP has promulgated 28 C.F.R. § 523.20, interpreting § 3624(b) to mean that "an inmate earns 54 days credit toward service of sentence (good time credit) for each year served. This amount is prorated when the time served by the inmate for the sentence during the year is less than a full year." (Emphasis added). In other words, good time credits are awarded based upon the time actually served, rather than the length of the sentence imposed. Hence, good time credits are retrospective, accruing only as time is actually served.
In Pacheco-Camacho v. Hood, 272 F.3d 1266, 1270-71 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1105 (2002), the Ninth Circuit concluded that § 3624(b)(1) is ambiguous, and that the BOP's interpretation of the statute is reasonable and entitled to deference. Other circuit courts to address the issue agree with the reasoning in Pacheco-Camacho. Perez-Olivio v. Chavez, 394 F.3d 45, 50-53 (1st Cir. 2005); White v. Scibana, 390 F.3d 997, 1002-03 (7th Cir. 2004).
Petitioner argues that this court must adopt the district court's reasoning in White v. Scibana, 314 F.Supp. 2d 834 (W.D. Wis. 2004), to avoid a constitutional violation. Because that decision has been reversed by the Seventh Circuit, petitioner's constitutional claims clearly lack merit. White, 390 F.3d at 1002-03.
Petitioner argues that Pacheco-Camacho was wrongly decided. This court, however, is bound by the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that § 3624(b) is ambiguous, and that the BOP's interpretation of the statute is reasonable. Hasbrouck v. Texaco, Inc., 663 F.2d 930, 933 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982) (district courts are bound by the law of their own circuit and are not to resolve splits between circuits no matter how egregiously in error they may feel their own circuit to be). In light of this precedent, I conclude that the BOP's calculation of petitioner's good time credits, based upon actual time served, is not in error.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, petitioner's habeas corpus petition (#1) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner's motion for appointment of counsel (#3) is DENIED, and this proceeding is DISMISSED, with prejudice.IT IS SO ORDERED.