Summary
noting that it "defies logic to suggest that law enforcement is providing 'conveniences' or 'services'" under the Human Rights Law
Summary of this case from O'Brien v. The City of SyracuseOpinion
134 CA 19–00313
03-20-2020
In the Matter of Deanna LETRAY, Petitioner–Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, City of Watertown Police Department, and Jefferson County Sheriff's Office, Respondents–Respondents.
ERIN BETH HARRIST, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, NEW YORK CITY, FOR PETITIONER–APPELLANT. CAROLINE J. DOWNEY, GENERAL COUNSEL, BRONX (ERIN SOBKOWSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. SLYE LAW OFFICES, P.C., WATERTOWN (ROBERT J. SLYE OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT CITY OF WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT.
ERIN BETH HARRIST, NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION FOUNDATION, NEW YORK CITY, FOR PETITIONER–APPELLANT.
CAROLINE J. DOWNEY, GENERAL COUNSEL, BRONX (ERIN SOBKOWSKI OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.
SLYE LAW OFFICES, P.C., WATERTOWN (ROBERT J. SLYE OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT–RESPONDENT CITY OF WATERTOWN POLICE DEPARTMENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, LINDLEY, NEMOYER, AND BANNISTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Petitioner filed an administrative complaint with respondent New York State Division of Human Rights (SDHR) alleging illegal discrimination during petitioner's arrest and subsequent prearraignment incarceration by respondent City of Watertown Police Department in a facility owned by respondent Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. SDHR dismissed the administrative complaint for lack of jurisdiction, and petitioner then commenced this proceeding to annul that determination as arbitrary, capricious, and affected by an error of law (see generally Executive Law § 298 ). Supreme Court dismissed the petition, and we now affirm.
SDHR has jurisdiction to, inter alia, investigate and adjudicate complaints of unlawful discrimination in the provision of any "public accommodation, resort or amusement" ( Executive Law § 296[2][a] ; see § 295[6] ; Matter of Staten Is. Alliance for Mentally Ill v. Mercado , 273 A.D.2d 36, 36–37, 708 N.Y.S.2d 402 [1st Dept. 2000] ). For purposes of the Human Rights Law, a "public accommodation, resort or amusement" offers " ‘conveniences and services to the public’ " and is "generally open to all comers" ( Matter of Cahill v. Rosa , 89 N.Y.2d 14, 21, 651 N.Y.S.2d 344, 674 N.E.2d 274 [1996] ), and it defies logic to suggest that law enforcement is providing " ‘conveniences’ " or " ‘services’ " to those arrested and detained ( id. ). Nor is arrest and detention "open to all comers" in any sense ( id. ; see generally Carmelengo v. Phoenix Houses of N.Y., Inc. , 54 A.D.3d 652, 653, 865 N.Y.S.2d 43 [1st Dept. 2008], lv denied 11 N.Y.3d 715, 873 N.Y.S.2d 533, 901 N.E.2d 1287 [2009] ). Indeed, it well established that "prison facilities do not cater or offer [their] goods to the general public" ( CHRO ex rel. Vargas v. State Dept. of Correction , 2014 WL 564478, *3 [Conn. Super. Ct. 2014] ). To the contrary, arrest and detention is imposed upon a person by law enforcement and the criminal courts, not provided to those arrested and detained as a service for their benefit. The process of arresting and incarcerating a person is, "by its very nature," a governmentally decreed "separat[ion of] the general public from the individuals who are compelled by our penal system to be confined" ( id. at *4 ).
In short, although we note SDHR's concession at oral argument that governmental entities such as police agencies could provide public accommodations within the meaning of the Human Rights Law under certain circumstances, we join the consensus of courts nationwide in concluding that arrest and incarceration are "properly viewed as the antithesis of a ... ‘public accommodation’ " ( State ex rel. Naugles v. Missouri Commn. on Human Rights , 561 S.W.3d 48, 54 [Mo. Ct. App. 2018] ; see Skaff v. West Virginia Human Rights Commn. , 191 W. Va. 161, 163–164, 444 S.E.2d 39, 41–42 [1994] ; Blizzard v. Floyd , 149 Pa. Commw. 503, 505–507, 613 A.2d 619, 620–621 [1992] ; Vargas , 2014 WL 564478 at *1–9 ; Napier v. State , 2002 WL 32068249, *6–8 [Me. Super. Ct. 2002] ; see also Department of Corrections v. Human Rights Commn. , 181 Vt. 225, 236–241, 917 A.2d 451, 460–463 [2006, Burgess, J., dissenting]; Carmelengo , 54 A.D.3d at 653, 865 N.Y.S.2d 43 ). SDHR therefore properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over petitioner's narrowly-drawn administrative complaint of illegal discrimination in the course of an arrest and subsequent detention, and we agree with the court that SDHR's dismissal of that complaint was thus not arbitrary, capricious, or affected by an error of law (see generally Matter of Tessy Plastics Corp. v. State Div. of Human Rights , 47 N.Y.2d 789, 791, 417 N.Y.S.2d 926, 391 N.E.2d 1007 [1979] ; Matter of Majchrzak v. New York State Div. of Human Rights , 151 A.D.3d 1856, 1857, 57 N.Y.S.3d 606 [4th Dept. 2017] ; Matter of Devaney v. New York State Div. of Human Rights , 135 A.D.2d 713, 714, 523 N.Y.S.2d 414 [2d Dept. 1987], appeal dismissed 71 N.Y.2d 889, 527 N.Y.S.2d 770, 522 N.E.2d 1068 [1988], lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 804, 532 N.Y.S.2d 369, 528 N.E.2d 521 [1988] ).