Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:18-cv-0058-VLB
06-04-2018
ISMET KRASNIQI Plaintiff, v. A BETTER WAY WHOLESALE AUTOS, INC. & SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT [DKT. 16]
Before this Court is a motion for default judgment filed by Ismet Krasniqi ("Krasniqi" or "Plaintiff") against A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc. ("ABW"). Krasniqi properly served ABW on January 22, 2018 and properly served Santander Consumer USA, Inc. ("Sandtander") on January 24, 2018. [Dkts. 9, 10.] Counsel for Santander appeared on February 2, 2018 [Dkt. 11] and Plaintiff and Santander entered into a stipulation of dismissal as to those two parties only on April 17, 2018. [Dkt. 19.] A Better Way failed to appear and the Court granted Plaintiff's motion for an entry of default on February 15, 2018. [Dkt. 14.] Plaintiff thereafter moved for default judgment. [Dkt. 16.] As stated herein, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part this motion.
I. Background
The following facts are taken from the Complaint, and they are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion.
Plaintiff purchased a 2011 Audi A6 (the "Vehicle") on October 29, 2015. [Dkt. 1 (Complt.) at ¶ 10.] Plaintiff agreed to purchase the Vehicle for a cash price of $20,995 and the total cash price delivered, including sales tax and other fees, was $27,418.47. Id. at ¶ 11.
Plaintiff brought the Vehicle to an Audi dealership in summer 2017 for repairs and learned that it had been involved in one or more serious accidents. Id. at ¶ 17. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought the Vehicle to an independent auto body expert, Robert Collins, Jr., for inspection. [Dkt. 16-5 at 6.] The auto body expert, Robert Collins, Jr., went to the Wentworth Institute of Technology and has been a licensed automotive damage appraiser for 40 years. [Dkt. 16-5 at 6.] Mr. Collins has served as an expert witness on issues of collision repair and vehicle values, and has consulted in civil and criminal litigation for both plaintiffs and defendants. Id. Mr. Collins inspected the Vehicle and discovered structural damage rendering it unsafe to drive. Id. at ¶¶ 14, 18. Specifically, he found that the structure of the front of the Vehicle was rendered unsound by prior collisions and would crumple at a faster rate than usual in a subsequent crash, causing the air bag to deploy late and injuring the occupants. [Dkt. 16-5 at 2, 5.] Mr. Collins opined that the Vehicle was not in merchantable condition in October 2015 when purchased by Plaintiff, and that "any automotive profession[al] performing a simple visual inspection c[ould] clearly see that th[e V]ehicle has been wrecked and poorly repaired." Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges based on this report that ABW knew or should have known that the Vehicle had this structural damage at the time it sold the Vehicle to Plaintiff, as ABW was required to perform a safety inspection prior to selling the vehicle under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62(g). [Complaint at ¶¶ 15-16.]
The Complaint asserts three causes of action: (1) breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because the Vehicle was unsafe to drive (Id. at ¶ 24); (2) per se violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act because ABW failed to perform a statutorily required safety inspection (Id. at ¶ 29); and (3) breach of ABW's express warranty for falsely representing that the Vehicle underwent a safety inspection and was safe for operation. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.
Plaintiff's Motion for Default seeks an award of actual damages in the amount of $8,007 and punitive damages in the amount of $25,000, as well as an order for post-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per annum under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a. [Dkt. 16 at 1.]
II. Legal Standard
Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establishes a two-step process for obtaining a default judgment. See, e.g., New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). First, a plaintiff must acquire an entry of default against the defendant in question. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after the default is entered, a plaintiff must either request a default judgment from the clerk or move the court for a default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1)-(2). "The determination of whether to grant a motion for default judgment lies within the sound discretion of the district court." Int'l Brands USA, Inc. v. Old St. Andrews Ltd., 349 F. Supp. 2d 256, 261 (D. Conn. 2004) (citing Shah v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 168 F.3d 610, 615 (2d Cir. 1999)).
"Upon entry of a default judgment for 'failure to plead or otherwise defend' against a complaint, a defendant admits every 'well-pleaded allegation' of the complaint except those relating to damages." Andrade v. Kwon, No. 3:08-cv-479 (SRU), 2012 WL 3059616, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 26, 2012) (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S. Ct. 647, 34 L. Ed. 2d 577 (1973)). Where a plaintiff's claim is susceptible to mathematical computation, the Court "may forgo an evidentiary hearing 'as long as [it] ensure[s] that there [is] a basis for the damages specified.'" Andrade, 2012 WL 3059616, at *3 (quoting Fustok v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 973 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989)).
Courts have "a strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits." New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2005). Because the entry of default is a final judgment, courts must be "circumscribed" in exercising their authority to enter default. Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1177 (2005). The entry of default is appropriate where a duly served defendant fails to appear through counsel. Grace v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of N.Y., 443 F.3d 180, 192 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1114 (2007); Dow Chem. Pac. Ltd. v. Rascator Mar. S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 334-36 (2d Cir. 1986); SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 521 F.2d 585, 589 (2d Cir. 1975); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Cont'l Record Co., 386 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967) (per curiam).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff properly served and provided notice to ABW of the instant action, but ABW failed to timely respond and as of this date still has not appeared in this case. The Court granted Plaintiff's motion for default on February 15, 2018, satisfying step one of the default judgment process. [Dkt. 14.] The Court will now address whether default judgment should be entered against ABW and what damages may be appropriate.
a. Default Judgment Is Warranted
In considering a motion for default, a court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). In determining whether default judgment is warranted, the Court will construe all well-pleaded allegations as having been admitted, particularly where, as here, they are wholly uncontroverted. See "R" Best Produce, Inc. v. DiSapio, 540 F.3d 115, (2d Cir. 2008) (stating "the allegations of a complaint are deemed admitted for adjudication of the merits when a default judgment is entered by a court with jurisdiction"); Andrade, 2012 WL 3059616, at *3. The Court addresses whether Plaintiff adequately alleges each of his three causes of action in turn below.
i. Implied Warranty of Merchantability
First, Plaintiff alleges ABW breached the implied warranty of merchantability as set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-104 by selling a vehicle which was not safe to drive. [Dkt. 16-1 at 6.] Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-314 states "a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind." Goods are merchantable if they "(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description . . . and (c) are fit for the ordinary purpose for which such goods are used. . . ." Id. Any disclaimer of the warranty of merchantability must "mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-316.
"Conspicuous" is defined by General Statutes § 42a-1-201 (10) to mean:
[S]o written, displayed or presented that a reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed it. Whether a term is 'conspicuous' or not is a decision for the court. Conspicuous terms include the following:
I. A heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font or color to the surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and
II. Language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font or color to the surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.
Consistent with Connecticut statute, courts have found that warranty disclaimers must be printed in distinguishing typeface to be conspicuous, whether the distinguishing element be the size of the font, typeface, or capitalization. See, e.g., Web Press Servs. Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc., 203 Conn. 342, 254 (Conn. 1987) (finding disclaimer conspicuous where font was larger than other language on the page); Western Dermatology Consultants, P.C. v. VitalWorks, Inc., 146 Conn. App. 169, 184 (Conn. App. Ct. Oct. 1, 2013) (finding disclaimer conspicuous where the wording was in all capital letters); Emlee Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmisison, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 455, 471 (App. Ct. Ct. 1993) (same); Newkirk Express, LLC v. Freightliner of Hartford, Inc., No. CV010804335, 2008 WL 4150286, at *4 (Super. Ct. Conn. Aug. 13, 2008) (finding disclaimer conspicuous when written in capital letters). In addition, disclaimers visually set apart from other contract provisions have been found to be conspicuous. Yelton v. PHI, Inc., Civ. No. 09-3144, 2010 WL 9097178, at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2010) (applying Connecticut law).
Plaintiff attached a copy of the sales contract to the Motion for Default. [Dkt. 16-3 at 1.] At the top of page three of the contract, in a section titled "Used Motor Vehicle Additional Terms of Agreement," is language stating the purchaser "understand[s] that: no guarantee should be implied that the vehicle is merchantable or fit for any special purpose." [Dkt. 16-3 at 3.] The language is in the same font size, color, and typeface as the other text on the page, is not set apart from other text or in all capital letters, and includes no specific header. Where a disclaimer is "not, in type or otherwise, sufficient to alert the average buyer to its existence or terms," it is "so inconspicuous as to mollify its effect as an attempted disclaimer of liability for an implied warranty of merchantability." Acme Pump Co., Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 32 Conn. Supp. 69, 74 (Hartford Ct. of Common Pleas 1974); see also Koellmer v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 6 Conn. Cir. Ct. 478, 483 (Conn. App. Div. 1970) (finding inconspicuous and unenforceable a disclaimer in the same lettering and the same color as other provisions on the page). Accordingly, the Court finds ABW's disclaimer of warranty of merchantability unenforceable.
As the disclaimer is unenforceable, the Court considers whether Plaintiff has established a breach of the implied warranty. To recover for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, a plaintiff "must prove (1) that a merchant sold goods, (2) which were not merchantable at the time of sale, and (3) injury and damages to the plaintiff or his property (4) [were] caused proximately and in fact by the defective nature of the goods, and (5) [that] notice [was given] to the seller of injury." Nassar v. Wiz Leasing, Inc., No. NNHCV126033894S, 2013 WL 4734851, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 12, 2013) (citing Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-314). Here, Plaintiff has alleged, and the contract attached to the Motion for Default confirms, that ABW is a seller in the practice of selling automobiles and that ABW sold the Vehicle to Plaintiff. [Complaint at ¶¶10-11; Dkt. 16-1 at 1.] Plaintiff has also established that the Vehicle was in two car accidents resulting in serious structural damage before Plaintiff's purchase, is unsafe to drive, and was not in merchantable condition at the time of Plaintiff's purchase on October 29, 2015. [Dkt. 16-5 (Inspection Notice) at 1, 5; Complaint at ¶ 14.]
As to injury, Plaintiff faces either the loss of use of his vehicle or the necessity of costly repairs in order to render the Vehicle usable, as well as the cost of the inspection confirming structural damage. [Dkt. 16-5 (Collins Report) at 1 ("Please be advised that we have inspected the above referenced vehicle, and it is our expert and professional determination that the vehicle is not safe to operate on public roads. . . . Due to the compromised condition of the unibody structure, any future accident or collision will result in excessive intrusion into the cabin area putting the occupants in the vehicle at additional risk of injury or death. For these reasons and others, we recommend that you make immediate arrangements to properly repair the remaining deficiencies in the automobile to eliminate potential deaths or injuries in the operation of this vehicle.").] The injury Plaintiff now faces was directly and proximately caused by ABW's sale of the Vehicle in an unmerchantable state.
Finally, as to notice, Plaintiff states in a sworn affidavit that he "made written demand on ABW . . . through [his] attorney by way of a letter dated November 6, 2017 informing [ABW] of the Vehicle's defects and giving ABW the opportunity to repurchase the Vehicle." [Dkt. 16-2 at ¶ 13.] In addition, Plaintiff alleges ABW knew or should have known of the Vehicle's structural damage before it sold the Vehicle to Plaintiff because it would have been "readily apparent to any automotive professional at ABW performing the safety inspection required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62(g)." [Complaint at ¶ 18; Dkt. 16-5 (Collins Report) at 5.] Plaintiff has accordingly established a violation of the implied warranty of merchantability.
ii. Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act
Plaintiff next alleges breach of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA"). To establish a CUTPA violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110b(a). Connecticut law renders it "an unfair or deceptive act or practice" under CUTPA "for a . . . used car dealer to violate any provision of a federal or state statute or regulation concerning the sale or lease of motor vehicles." Conn. Reg. Agencies § 42-110b-28(b)(23).
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that ABW "failed to perform a safety inspection on the Vehicle as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62 or, if it did perform a safety inspection, it sold the Vehicle notwithstanding the defects and failed to disclose those . . . as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62." [Complaint at ¶ 29.]. In support of those allegations, Plaintiff offers Mr. Collins' statement that the Vehicle "has been involved in events that caused structural damage[,] . . . is unsafe due to structural damage[,] . . . [and] [a]ny automotive profession[al] performing a simple visual inspection can clearly see that [the V]ehicle has been wrecked and poorly repaired." [Dkt. 16-5 at 5.]
Plaintiff has adequately alleged that ABW violated Connecticut law, which requires that "[b]efore offering any used motor vehicle for retail sale, the selling dealer shall complete a comprehensive safety inspection of such vehicle. . . . The selling dealer . . . shall state that the vehicle has undergone any necessary repairs and has been deemed to be in condition for legal operation on any highway of this state." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62(g). Courts have consistently found that violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62 constitutes a violation of CUTPA under Conn. Agency Reg. § 42-110b-28(b)(23). O'Neill v. Country Motors, II, Inc., 3:15-cv-1069, 2015 WL 8779594, at **9-10 (D. Conn. Dec. 15, 2015) (finding complaint alleged a facially plausible CUTPA claim by alleging violation of § 14-62); Locascio v. Imports Unltd., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 267, 271 (D. Conn. 2004) (finding post-trial that defendant violated CUTPA by violating Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62); Freeman v. A Better Way Wholesale Autos, Inc., HHDCV 13604900S, 2015 WL 2037943, at * (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 1, 2015) (finding post-trial that defendant violated CUTPA where plaintiff established violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-62). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately established a claim for relief under CUTPA.
iii. Express Warranty
Plaintiff lastly asserts breach of the express warranty. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42a-2-313 sets forth the analysis for breach of an express warranty:
(1) Express warranties by the seller are created as follows: (a) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. (b) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description . . .
(2) It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as "warrant" or "guarantee" or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty, but the affirmation merely of the value of the goods or a statement purporting to be merely the seller's opinion or commendation of the goods does not create a warranty.
Here, Plaintiff asserts ABW "represented that the Vehicle had undergone a safety inspection and indicated on the Connecticut DMV K-208 form that the frame and chassis, as well as the entire vehicle, was safe for operation." [Complaint at ¶ 34.] However, while Plaintiff offers documentation in support of his other two causes of action, he has not offered the Connecticut DMV K-208 form on which ABW purportedly made its express warranty. Nor does Plaintiff mention the express warranty or the Connecticut DMV K-208 form in his sworn affidavit. [Dkt. 16-2.] Further, the documentation Plaintiff did provide to the Court does not support Plaintiff's assertion that ABW made an affirmation or promise creating an express warranty. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, the purchase contract attempts to disclaim that the Vehicle is merchantable. [Dkt. 16-3 at 3.]
While the Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the Complaint, Plaintiff is only entitled to "reasonable inferences from the evidence offered," and the Court has discretion to "require proof of necessary facts." Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). The contract provided to the Court includes language attempting to disclaim any warranty that the Vehicle is structurally sound, and the Court finds no reasonable inference from that language that supports Plaintiff's breach of express warranty claim. The Court finds that Plaintiff's claim for breach of express warranty is not well-pleaded and does not form a basis for relief through default judgment. However, as Plaintiff has established breach of the warranty of merchantability and violation of CUTPA, the Court proceeds to the damages analysis.
b. Damages
The burden is on the Plaintiff to establish entitlement to recovery of damages with reasonable certainty. Norcia v. Dieber's Castle Tavern, Ltd., 980 F. Supp. 2d 492, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., Div. of Ace Young Inc., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997). Calculating the appropriate amount of damages is a two-step process: (1) "determining the proper rule for calculating damages on . . . a claim"; and (2) "assessing plaintiff's evidence supporting the damages to be determined under this rule." Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir.1999). In a diversity action, damages are assessed according to state law. Norcia, 980 F. Supp. 2d at 500 (citing Consorti v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 103 F.3d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1995)).
A plaintiff may recover both actual and punitive damages for violation of CUTPA. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110g(a) ("Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b, may . . . recover actual damages . . . The court may, in its discretion, award punitive damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper.); see also, e.g., Tirado v. Ofstein, 2008 WL 902506, at *17 (Super. Ct. Conn. Mar. 14, 2008); James v. Lopez Motors, LLC, 2018 WL 1582552, at *5 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2018) (VLB) (awarding actual and punitive damages for CUTPA claim). As Plaintiff may only recover damages for the same loss once, even though he alleged multiple theories of liability, once the Court awards actual and punitive damages under CUTPA it need not also ascertain their propriety under Plaintiff's warranty or merchantability theory as well. Carlson v. Waterbury Hospital, 280 Conn. 125, 150 n. 30 (2006) ("Connecticut courts consistently have upheld and endorsed the principle that a litigant may recover just damages for the same loss only once."); Rowe v. Goulet, 89 Conn. App. 836, 849 (2005) ("Although a plaintiff is entitled to allege respective theories of liability in separate claims, he or she is not entitled to recover twice for harm growing out of the same transaction, occurrence or event.").
Plaintiff seeks actual damages in the amount of the diminished value of the Vehicle at the date of purchase ($7,357) plus the cost of the Vehicle inspection ($650). [Mot. at 14.] Plaintiff supports his assessment of the diminished value of the Vehicle with Mr. Collins' report, which states the retail value of the Vehicle on the date of purchase was $24,275 and the fair market value of the Vehicle on the date of purchase was $16,918 (which the Court construes as the salvage value of the Vehicle, as it was unmerchantable on the date of sale), the difference between the two figures being $7,357. [Dkt. 16-5 at 5.] The Court finds Plaintiff's calculation of actual damages reasonable, and finds Plaintiff has met his burden of establishing actual damages with "reasonable certainty." Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc., 109 F.3d at 111.
Plaintiff also seeks punitive damages in the amount of $25,000 for his CUTPA claim. Upon finding a CUTPA violation, the court may award discretionary punitive damages. Conn. Gen. Stat. 42-110g(d). When calculating a punitive damages award, the Court may consider whether the defendant's conduct was reckless, intentional or malicious, was taken or omitted in order to augment profit, whether the wrongdoing was hard to detect, the extent of Plaintiff's injury, and the deterrent purpose of punitive damages. Ulbrich v. Groth, 310 Conn. 375, 454 (2013) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493-94 (2008)).
Plaintiff has alleged that ABW acted recklessly in either failing to conduct a safety inspection of the Vehicle or doing so and failing to accurately report the results to Plaintiff before purchase. [Mot. at 11.] The Court agrees that ABW's actions warrant punitive damages; the inspection report Plaintiff provides indicates that if Plaintiff had crashed the Vehicle, the undisclosed structural damage to the Vehicle would have caused Vehicle occupants severe injury or death. The Court's calculation reveals that it is 3.398 times Plaintiff's asserted actual damages.
There are "no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass," and higher ratios between actual and punitive damages "may comport with due process where a particularly egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003). Conversely, "[w]hen compensatory damages are substantial, then a lesser ratio, perhaps only equal to compensatory damages, can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee." Id. The precise award in any case "must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff." Id. (finding the jury's $145 million award of punitive damages excessive, in violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, where compensatory damages were only $1 million.)
The Supreme Court has provided guidance on determining a proper punitive damage award, instructing courts to consider: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages awarded; and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. BMW of N. Am. v Gore, 517 US 559 (1996). In that case, the Supreme Court reversed a $2 million award of punitive damages where the plaintiff suffered only $4,000 in actual damages. Id. The injury was the defendant's failure to disclose that it repainted a new vehicle based on the defendant's policy of not disclosing damage occurring in the manufacture or transportation of new vehicles if the repair cost less than three percent of a vehicle's retail value. Id. The Supreme Court found the punitive damage award violated the due process clause, and specifically noted that the harm inflicted was purely economic and did not affect the vehicle's safety. Id.
Some courts have awarded punitive damages more than three times an actual damage award. See, e.g., Bridgeport Harbour Place I, LLC v. Ganim, 131 Conn. App. 99 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011) (finding award of $120,000, six times the compensatory damage award, was not an abuse of discretion, taking into account the defendant's reprehensible acts and the deterrent purpose of CUTPA punitive damage awards); Behnam v. Wallingford Auto. Park, Inc., 2003 WL 22905163, at **4-5 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 2003) (awarding $35,000 in punitive damages, seven times the compensatory damage award, was appropriate where defendant's false statements were reckless and intentional); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cambell, 123 S. Ct. 1413, 1524 (2003) (finding that punitive damage awards are generally stricken as excessive if they exceed a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages).
Plaintiff has provided the Court with no particular reason to award higher punitive damages here. Nonetheless, the Court finds, in its discretion, that Plaintiff's request for $25,000 in punitive damages, slightly more than three times Plaintiff's actual damages, is reasonable and warranted. The Court finds this award appropriate because the sale of not only an unmerchantable vehicle - but even worse, an unsafe one - is especially reprehensible. While Plaintiff was not physically injured, the condition of the Vehicle exposed him and anyone else driving or riding in the vehicle to a significant risk of serious bodily harm.
Finally, as stated above, the Court has reviewed Plaintiff's submissions and finds there is sufficient documentation to show a clear mathematical formulation of the actual damages it seeks. See Andrade, 2012 WL 3059616, at *3.
Plaintiff also seeks post-judgment interest. Courts have discretion to award post-judgment interest up to 10% per annum. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 37-3a; see also Sikorsky Fin. Credit Union, Inc. v. Butts, 108 A.3d 228, 232 (Conn. 2015) (noting that it is within a court's discretion to determine the rate of post-judgment interest to award under Section 37-3a). Recently, courts within the District of Connecticut have awarded interest under Section 37-3a at a rate of 3.5% or 4% per annum, as consistent with the average bank prime interest rate during the relevant period. See, e.g., Carney v. Beracha, 3:12-cv-180, 2016 WL 10254460, at *3 (D. Conn. July 22, 2016) (Underhill, J.) (awarding interest under Section 37-3a at a rate of 3.5% as reflective of "a rough approximation of the average bank prime interest rate during the relevant period" which extended from 2007 through 2016); Gilmore v. Pawn King, Inc., 3:08-cv-1058, 2016 WL 1180147, at *11 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2016) (Underhill, J.) (awarding interest at a rate of 3.5% per year as reflective of the average bank prime interest rate from July 2008 through March 2016); Nations Roof, LLC v. Carnahan, 3:14-cv-1753, 2015 WL 3849241, at *2 (D. Conn. June 22, 2015) (Meyer, J.) (awarding interest at a rate of 4% per annum "to account for the time-value of the money" from April 1, 2015, and June 22, 2015); Cadle Co. v. Fletcher, 3:11-cv-00794, 2014 WL 362469, at *4 (D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2014) (Underhill, J.) (awarding interest at a rate of 4% per annum as reflective of the market conditions from 2007 through 2010). The current bank prime interest rate is 4.75%. See Selected Interest Rates H.15, FED. RESERVE (June 1, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15. Accordingly, the Court finds post-judgment interest in the amount of 4.75% per annum appropriate in this case.
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court hereby enters default judgment against ABW as to breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and CUTPA, and denies the motion to enter default judgment as to breach of express warranty. The Court enters judgment in the total amount of $33,007.00, including both actual and punitive damages, as well as post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.75% per annum. IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant
United States District Judge Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: June 4, 2018