JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Holt

Full title: JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Richard L. Holt aka Richard…

Court: Superior Court of Connecticut

Date published: Jan 19, 2018

No. FSTCV085009720S (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2018)

Opinion

FSTCV085009720S

01-19-2018

JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Richard L. Holt aka Richard Holt et al.

Hon. Kevin Tierney Judge Trial Referee

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Tierney, Kevin, J.T.R.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Hon. Kevin Tierney Judge Trial Referee

What is the effect of three promissory notes dated the same date signed by the same borrower secured by the same single mortgage deed on the same real property to the same lender with different endorsements in this one residential mortgage foreclosure action?

This is the third foreclosure action filed concerning this March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note secured by a mortgage on residential property in Norwalk, Connecticut. This was a " Cash-Out Refinance" of existing mortgages by the borrower and, after payment of the prior mortgage loans and closing costs, the borrower received in excess of $170,000 cash. Ex. 18, Ex. 19, Ex. 22.

The first foreclosure action was commenced by Washington Mutual Bank against Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company returnable to the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford on November 19, 2002, Docket Number FST CV 02-0192482 S. That first foreclosure action matter went to judgment on December 22, 2003. (#109.00.) The judgment was stayed by reason of a bankruptcy filing. After the bankruptcy stay was terminated, the plaintiff filed a Motion to Open the Judgment that was granted on May 23, 2005. (#123.00.) The evidence before this court at trial in this third foreclosure action verifies that on August 19, 2005 $99,900.37 was paid to the lender from the trustee account of the attorney for the defendants, attorney Larry F. Ginsberg. Ex. 37, Ex. 117. The check cleared on Friday, August 26, 2005. Ex. 117. That payment prompted the withdrawal of the first foreclosure action. On Monday, August 29, 2005, the plaintiff filed its Motion to Open and Vacate Judgment. (#128.00.) Shortly thereafter on October 17, 2005 the first foreclosure action, FST CV 02-0192482 S, was withdrawn. (#129.55.)

The second foreclosure action was also commenced by Washington Mutual Bank against Richard L. Holt a/k/a Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Nemus, LLC returnable on April 1, 2008 to the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 08-5006915 S. Both defendants were represented by Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg in that second foreclosure, whose appearance was filed on April 10, 2008. That second foreclosure action was withdrawn by the plaintiff on September 24, 2008. (#114.00, #114.55, #116.55.) The court will use the word, WAMU, in this Memorandum of Decision to refer to both Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. and Washington Mutual Bank. Each party was furnished with the Edison docket sheet for the two above two previous foreclosure actions at the beginning of this trial.

The third and current foreclosure action was commenced by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association against Richard L. Holt a/k/a Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company returnable to the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford on December 30, 2008, Docket No. FST CV 08-5009720 S. Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg filed appearances for both defendants on January 2, 2009. Attorney Ginsberg represented Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company since it was formed in 1996. He represented Richard Holt in a variety of legal matters since 1975. He testified that Richard Holt was the manager of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company on March 22, 2000. Attorney Ginsberg had no knowledge of " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company" except for the foreclosure litigation, all three foreclosures. The defendant, Richard Holt, filed his self-represented appearance on October 2, 2013. On February 13, 2014 the defendant, Richard Holt, filed another self-represented appearance in lieu of Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg. A third self-represented appearance was filed by Richard Holt on January 11, 2016 that changed his telephone number. Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company is currently represented by Attorney David A. Scalzi, whose appearance is dated September 29, 2015. Richard L. Holt a/k/a Richard Holt continues to represent himself under his original October 2, 2013 self-represented appearance as modified by his February 13, 2014 appearance and his January 11, 2016 appearance. The heading of various motions identify the defendant, Holt, by the name of Richard L. Holt as well as Richard Holt. The Summons identifies him by using both names. His two filed self-represented appearances identify him only as Richard Holt. The court will refer to the defendant, Holt, as Richard Holt.

On May 6, 2014 the trial of this matter was assigned to the undersigned for both trial and for all other future purposes. (#284.00.) The trial started on May 23, 2014 with a lengthy on the record status conference. The first day of evidence was July 3, 2014. The last day of trial was August 23, 2017 for a total of twenty-eight trial dates.

The court makes the following findings of facts and legal conclusions.

The court finds that this third foreclosure action that is on trial before the undersigned commenced on December 16, 2008 with service on Richard L. Holt a/k/a Richard Holt. See Return of Service in court file filed by State Marshal Mark A. Pesiri. The spelling of the second defendant in the Summons is " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company." Attached to the December 12, 2008 original complaint is Exhibit A, the legal description describing the real property that is the subject of this foreclosure action. That legal description states: " All that certain lot of land, with the buildings thereon, situated in the City of Norwalk in the County of Fairfield and State of Connecticut, known and designated as lot number fifteen (15) on a certain map entitled ‘Map of Dibblecrest at Rowayton, Norwalk, CT., ’ now on file in the office of the Town Clerk of said Norwalk and numbered twenty-two hundred and ninety-one (2291), reference thereto being had"; That same legal description contained in Exhibit B attached to the December 12, 2008 original complaint, being a copy of a Quit Claim deed dated September 16, 1996. That same legal description is attached to the Open-End Mortgage upon which this foreclosure is based, being Exhibit D attached to the original December 12, 2008 complaint. The legal description is contained SCHEDULE A of the Open-End Mortgage. That Open-End Mortgage together with the legal description was recorded in the Norwalk Land Records at Volume 3876 Page 250. That same legal description appears in the December 12, 2008 Notice of Lis Pendens as Exhibit A thereof recorded in the Norwalk Land Records in Volume 6904 Page 155. See Return of Service in the court file.

The operative Complaint is the original December 12, 2008 two-count complaint. Count One seeks reformation of the Open-End Mortgage and Count Two seeks a foreclosure and related remedies. The parties agreed that this foreclosure action commenced on December 17, 2008, the date of the first service on a defendant in the Return of Service in the court file.

Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Count One are incorporated and made paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Count Two. Paragraph 1 of both counts state: " On March 22, 2000, Richard L. Holt a/k/a Richard Holt owed Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. which became known as Washington Mutual Bank and is now known as JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association $308,000.00, as evidenced by a promissory note for said sum dated on said date, and payable to the order of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. which became known as Washington Mutual Bank and is now known as JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association with interest from said date, in monthly installments of principal and interest. A true and correct copy of said Note is attached as Exhibit C."

Paragraph 2 of both counts state: " On said date, by a deed of that date, said Richard L. Holt, a/k/a Richard Holt individually and on behalf of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company, to secure said note, mortgaged to Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. which became known as Washington Mutual Bank and is now known as JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association the premises known as 23 Ridgewood Drive, Norwalk, Connecticut, and described in Exhibit A attached hereto and made a part hereof. A true and correct copy of said Mortgage is attached as Exhibit D." Continuing on with the allegations of Count One seeking reformation, paragraph 6 states: " Due to a scrivener’s error at the closing of said mortgage loan, the above-reference mortgage deed stated that the mortgagor was ‘Dorsum L emus Limited Liability Company, ’ instead of ‘Dorsum N emus Limited Liability Company.’ " The relief requested for reformation in Count One is stated in paragraph 7. " The mortgage should be reformed to state the name of the mortgage to be ‘Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company.’ "

In Count Two seeking the remedy of foreclosure, the allegations of scrivener’s error and Dorsum L emus Limited Liability Company as stated in Paragraph 6 and 7 of Count One are not part of the Count Two pleadings.

Paragraph 4 of Count Two alleges that: " The Plaintiff is the holder of said Note and Mortgage ..." Paragraph 5 of Count Two claims that the note and mortgage are in default by virtue of nonpayment of installments of principal and interest due on September 1, 2005 and each and every month thereafter. Count Two ends with the allegations of paragraph 8 that: " ... the Defendant, Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company is the owner of record and in possession of said premises."

That original December 12, 2008 two-count complaint has not been amended, revised or sought to be amended or revised. The plaintiff is claiming nonpayment for more than twelve years, back to September 1, 2005. To that complaint, Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company filed its June 27, 2013 Amended Answer, Revised Special Defenses, Revised Counterclaims. (#184.00.) This is the operative answer filed by both defendants. As to paragraph 1 of the December 12, 2008 complaint Richard Holt denies owing WAMU $308,000 on March 26, 2000. The court notes that the paragraph 1 of both Counts One and Count Two allege that the $308,000 note is dated March 22, 2000 and Exhibit C attached to the December 12, 2008 complaint also bears a date of March 22, 2000. That note was offered at trial as Exhibit 3 and bears a date of March 22, 2000. This court is at a loss to determine where the defendants obtained the date of March 26, 2000 in their June 27, 2013 answer. No answer to that March 26, 2000 question was offered at trial or in the post-trial Memorandum of Law submitted by both defendants. As to paragraph 2 of both counts the defendant, Richard Holt, denies that he individually and on behalf of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company mortgaged to WAMU the Norwalk, Connecticut premises.

Paragraph 7 of Count One alleges: " The mortgage should be reformed to state the name of the mortgage to be ‘Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company.’ " The defendants have failed to Answer this paragraph 7 of Count One. Both defendants consistently and with deliberation opposed the reformation sought and filed a number of Special Defenses supporting the defendant’s opposition to paragraph 7. In previous Answers both defendants denied the identical paragraph 7. #109.00, #128.00, #129.00, #136.00, #145.00. The parties filed an Agreement as to pleadings on May 28, 2013, #183.00, in which both parties apparently overlooked the lack of an answer to paragraph 7, Count One. The court finds that both defendants have denied paragraph 7, Count One. P.B. § 10-61.

On July 24, 2013 the plaintiff filed a twenty-five-page pleading entitled " Reply to Revised Special Defenses, Answer and Special Defense to Revised Counterclaims." (#187.00.) This was addressed to each of the fifty numbered Special Defenses and the eighteen numbered counterclaims in defendant’s operative Answer. (#184.00.) The defendants filed a Reply on October 11, 2013 addressed to the plaintiff’s two Special Defenses that were addressed to the Counterclaims. (#211.00.) The pleadings were closed. The plaintiff filed a Certificate of Closed Pleadings on form JD-CV-11 Rev. 6-12. (#190.00.)

The court will first address Count One that seeks reformation of the Open-End Mortgage. Exhibit 1 offered at trial was the Open-End Mortgage together with an Adjustable Rate Rider, Exhibit 2 at trial. A certified copy was offered in evidence, which states that the Open-End Mortgage was recorded in the Norwalk land records at Volume 3876 at Page 250 through and including Page 264 on March 27, 2000. Exhibit 1 was Pages 250-58 and Exhibit 2 was Pages 259-64. Most of the language of the Open-End Mortgage is pre-printed but some language is typed in. The date of the Open-End Mortgage is March 22, 2000. The underlying debt is stated to be $308,000 and the same legal description of lot 15 on map 2291 appears in Schedule A in Volume 3876 at Page 250 of the recorded Open-End Mortgage. The second sentence of the Open-End Mortgage states: " The mortgagor is DORSUM LEMUS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (’Borrower’)." The five words in caps was typed in and the remainder of the language was preprinted. The Adjustable Rate Note was offered into evidence. Ex. 3. That too is dated March 22, 2000. Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg testified that he represented Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company at the $308,000 closing held at his offices on March 22, 2000. The court finds that the mortgage loan closing took place on March 22, 2000 and all the documents were executed on March 22, 2000. That is verified by the March 22, 2000 settlement statement. Ex. 22. The plaintiff is not seeking reformation of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. Ex. 3. The name of the Borrower is not typed or printed in the body of this Note until the two signature pages. Each of the signature pages of the Note have the name RICHARD HOLT typed under the signature line with a signature directly above on the signature line. The name " Dorsum Nemus" or " Dorsum Lemus" does not appear anywhere on the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. Ex. 3.

One of the documents executed at the closing on March 22, 2000 was a March 22, 2000 CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESOLUTION. Ex. 4. It was executed by Richard Holt in ink over his printed name. Attorney Ginsberg testified that he asked Richard Holt at the closing if Richard Holt was authorized to sign Exhibit 4. Richard Holt answered Yes. Under his printed name in handwriting is " Manager, Dorsum Nemus, LLC." This Certificate is also attached to the December 12, 2008 complaint as Exhibit E. The first paragraph of the Certificate states: " The undersigned, being all of the members of Dorsum Nemus, LLC (the ‘LLC’) hereby confirm, resolve and consent to the following." What follows are two Resolutions for the LLC to refinance and withdraw equity from the real property in Norwalk, Connecticut and convey a new mortgage to Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. in the amount of $308,000. The Resolution further states that Richard Holt is acting as Manager and " is hereby authorized to execute the Mortgage, Promissory Note, HUD-1 Settlement Statement, Title Affidavit and any documents, as required in connection with said refinance or as required by lender." The court finds that this CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESOLUTION was signed on March 22, 2000 by Richard Holt. Ex. 4. When it was offered as a full trial exhibit as Ex. 4, 1D, Richard Holt interposed seventeen separate objections to its admissibility. The court overruled all seventeen objections in some detail on the record. Exhibit 4 is a full exhibit.

Attached to the December 12, 2008 complaint as Exhibit B is a Quit Claim deed from Richard L. Holt and Lisbet M. Holt to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company dated September 16, 1996. The Quit Claim deed acknowledgment was taken by Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg. This Quit Claim deed was recorded in the Norwalk land records in Volume 3257 at Page 234. Ex. 70. The legal description attached to the Quit Claim deed was lot 15 on map 2291, identical to the legal description contained in the Lis Pendens, Open-End Mortgage and the December 12, 2008 Complaint.

Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg testified at trial that he represented Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company in the March 22, 2000 $308,000 mortgage loan closing. He testified that the mortgage documents including this Open-End Mortgage Deed, had been prepared by the lender, WAMU, and transmitted to his office for signature. When he noticed that the Open-End Mortgage was in the name of " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company, " he told WAMU’s representatives of the " typo" in the letter " L" in the Open-End Mortgage and that the correct spelling used the letter " N." Attorney Ginsberg was told by WAMU representatives during the March 22, 2000 closing that if the borrowers wish to obtain the $308,000 they would have to sign all the documents as prepared and no changes would be permitted and no corrections in the name of the LLC would be permitted. Attorney Natalie Kerler represented WAMU at the March 22, 2000 closing. Thereafter Attorney Ginsberg had Richard Holt execute the documents and the closing was completed. The refinance of $308,000 resulted in the payoff of the first mortgage, the payoff of the second mortgage, the payment of some other expenses, and the payment of mortgage closing costs. Thereafter the excess funds of $171,835.16 from the $308,000 mortgage refinance were paid to the Borrower. Ex. 22, line 1604.

The plaintiff seeks reformation of the Open-End Mortgage from " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company" to " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company." The street name for the mortgaged premise is " Ridgewood." Dorsum Nemus is Latin for Ridge Wood. Lemus was not demonstrated at trial to have any meaning. The court finds that Lemus is not a Latin word.

" Reformation of a deed can be ordered when it has been executed as the result of a mutual mistake and by reason thereof each party has done what neither intended." Patalano v. Chabot, 139 Conn. 356, 359 (1952).

A cause of action for reformation of a contract rests on the equitable theory that the instrument sought to be reformed does not conform to the real contract agreed upon and does not express the intention of the parties and that it was executed as a result of mutual mistake, or mistake of one party coupled with actual or constructive fraud, or inequitable conduct on the part of the other. We have held that this also applies to actions for reformation of a deed ... the function of which is merely to pass title to land, pursuant to the agreement of the parties ... Reformation is not granted for the purpose of alleviating a hard or oppressive bargain, but rather to restate the intended terms of an agreement when the writing that memorializes that agreement is at variance with the intent of both parties ... Equity evolved the doctrine because an action at law afforded no relief against an instrument secured by fraud or as a result of mutual mistake. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Lopinto v. Haines, 185 Conn. 527, 531-32, 441 A.2d 151 (1981).

Reformation is appropriate in cases of mutual mistake- that is where, in reducing to writing an agreement made or transaction entered into as intended by the parties thereto, through mistake, common to both parties, the written instrument fails to express the real agreement or transaction ... [R]eformation is also available in equity when the instrument does not express the true intent of the parties owing to the mistake of one party coupled with fraud, actual or constructive, or inequitable conduct on the part of the other." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Harlach v. Metropolitan Property and Liability Insurance Company, 221 Conn. 185, 190-91 (1992).

Reformation and foreclosure are both equitable proceedings. When a decision in an equitable matter lies within the trial court’s discretion, an appellate court will reverse that decision " ‘only when an abuse of discretion is manifest or where an injustice appears to have been done’ ..." Nevers v. Van Zuilen, 47 Conn.App. 46, 51, 700 A.2d 726 (1997). We do not find an abuse of discretion or injustice in the action of the trial court in the present case.

Derby Savings Bank v. Oliwa, 49 Conn.App. 602, 604 (1998).

The trial judge in the Oliwa contested foreclosure action granted the reformation count. The trial judge placed the correct legal description in the foreclosure documents when the mortgage deed had the incorrect property description. Thereafter the trial court entered a judgment of strict foreclosure on the correctly described real property. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s actions by stating: " The judgment is affirmed and the case is remanded for the purpose of setting a new law day." Id., 604.

A number of trial judges have entered judgments of reformation of mortgage deeds including adding a party that was a nonsignatory to the original mortgage documents. In this case Richard Holt is claiming an unknown entity, a stranger to this transaction, " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company, " executed the Open-End Mortgage and therefore to grant the reformation of the mortgage would require the court to order that a nonsignatory become liable on the mortgage document. Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. The Maidenstone Trust et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket Number CV 08-5004121S (September 28, 2011, Danaher, III, J.). (Plaintiff mortgagee loaned money to an individual defendant named Mark Robinson because the plaintiff believed that Mark Robinson held title to the subject property in Sharon, Connecticut. Title was actually held by RSA, Inc. and Mark Robinson was merely the Secretary of the Corporation. The court granted reformation making RSA, Inc. the mortgagor. " Therefore, reformation is also appropriate in order to effect the intent of the parties and to correct an error by the attorney who prepared the mortgage documents.") Mun et al. v. Doria et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 04-4001719 S (December 20, 2005, Dooley, J.). (The mortgage was executed by Vincent Doria, LLC but the record title owner of the real property was Vincent Doria. The court found that the parties had committed a mutual mistake and granted reformation of the mortgage substituting Vincent Doria individually, as the mortgager for Vincent Doria, LLC.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Pampoukidis et al., Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 05-4005884 S (December 2, 2011, Mintz, J.) (A separate individual who did not execute the mortgage deed was the actual title owner to the property. The trial court denied a motion to strike thus allowing the reformation count to be included in the lawsuit seeking to add that individual to the mortgage deed). The latest foreclosure reformation case confirms the above legal propositions. ARS Investors II 2012-1 HVB, LLC v. Crystal, LLC, 324 Conn. 680, 692 (2017).

Connecticut Standards of Title (1999 Edition), Standard 8.1 holds that the doctrine of " idem sonans" is applicable when there is " variant spelling of names resulting from ignorance, misunderstanding, inconsistency of usage of the same name by the person intended or clerical error." For example, the Supreme Court of Errors held that the name Asahel Morse was intended but the name Asahel Moss was used. The court presumed them to be the same person. Litchfield v. Farmington, 7 Conn. 100, 108 (1828).

No evidence, either testimonial or documentary, was presented at trial that any entity described as " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company" or " Dorsum Lemus, LLC" was ever in existence. The evidence at trial did establish that the owner of the real property under foreclosure and the record title owner since 1996, was Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company and that it was an existing Limited Liability Company. The parties on May 19, 2014 stipulated in open court that the correct name of the LLC is " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company."

The parties stipulated at trial that Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company was created in Colorado and was on file with the Secretary of State of Colorado. No party furnished records of the LLC certified by any Secretary of State. The following documents were presented to this court that had the current name Dorsum Nemus, either LLC or Limited Liability Company; Certificate of Limited Liability Company Resolution dated March 22, 2000 executed at the March 22, 2000 closing, Ex. 4; HUD-1 Settlement Statement for the March 22, 2000 closing, Ex. 22; May 13, 2015 real estate appraisal prepared by Vincent J. Buccanfuso submitted as an exhibit by the plaintiff at trial that contains the City of Norwalk Tax Assessor records, Ex. 7; Quit claim deed from Richard L. Holt and Lisbet M. Holt to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company dated September 16, 1996 and recorded in the Norwalk Land Records in Volume 3257 Page 234, Ex. 70; Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003 stating that the lender’s records note the mortgagor to be Dorsum Nemus, LLC, Ex. 13; Affidavit dated September 25, 2009 by a representative of the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, indicating that " the designation in the Mortgage of Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company as the mortgagee was a clerical error and a mutual mistake between the parties, " Ex. 23; and the EMAP letter dated November 12, 2005 from the plaintiff’s counsel of record addressed to " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company, " Ex. 28. No documents were presented to this court other than the Open-End Mortgage that only contained the name Dorsum Lemus, LLC or Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company.

The essence of the $308,000 refinance was to obtain $308,000 from WAMU, pay off the existing first mortgage and second mortgage on that real property, pay other expenses, and furnish additional cash to the borrower, Richard Holt, the person who signed the Adjustable Rate Note. The intention of all of the parties was to sign the necessary documents to conform to that understanding. A mistake was made by the drafter of the Open-End Mortgage. A simple typographical error was made in which the letter " L" was substituted for the correct letter " N" in a foreign language name. Although Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg became aware of the mistake and attempted to correct it, he and Mr. Holt knew that the mistake had been made at the time that they were executing the documents. The court finds that there was a mutual mistake by all parties to the transaction. This court, invoking its equitable powers, finds that it is appropriate to restate the intended terms of the refinancing agreement. If the court fails to grant reformation, Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company will reap a $308,000 windfall based upon a simple scrivener’s error. The court finds that the plaintiff made the mistake and the resulting windfall to the defendants would be inequitable. The conduct of the defendants in resisting the reformation is found to be continuing inequitable conduct. There is no evidence in this trial of the legal existence of an entity called " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company" or " Dorsum Lemus, LLC." All of the evidence points to a simple scrivener’s error. It is inequitable for the defendants to defend this foreclosure on the basis of a one-letter scrivener’s error. Equity will not countenance such a result.

" Plaintiff’s complaint includes a reformation count for a scrivener’s error in the loan documents which incorrectly refers to the property owner as ‘Dorsum Lemus.’ Neither Holt nor Dorsum Nemus presented any evidence whatsoever that this was anything but a simple scrivener’s error, one that did not produce any actual confusion among the parties." Plaintiff’s Post-Trial Brief dated November 8, 2017. (#496.00, page 2, fn.1.)

The defendants raise a number of other claims in defense of the reformation count. A cause of action for reformation is an equitable action, Lopinto v. Haines, supra, 185 Conn. 531; Patalano v. Chabot, 139 Conn. 356, 360-61 (1952). The plaintiff first claims that the reformation count should be denied since it is in violation of the statute of limitations and statute of repose. P.B. 10-3(a) requires that a special defense of the statute of limitation must be " specifically, identified by its number." No such Special Defense has been alleged directed only to the reformation Count One. The general rule is that statutes of limitations and statutes of repose defenses must be raised by a special defense. Avon Meadow Condominium Association, Inc. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut, 50 Conn.App. 688, 698 (1998). None of the exceptions to the above rule are applicable. The parties disagree as to whether the statute of limitations or statute of repose defense may be applied to a reformation count. The reformation count is not a remedy created by statute in which the time limitation is contained therein. Forbes v. Ballaro, 31 Conn.App. 235, 239-40 (1993). In addition a statute of limitation or a statute of repose is not applicable to equitable actions. Dunham v. Dunham, 204 Conn. 303, 326 (1987). The defendants did plead in their Special Defenses laches. The defendants did not brief the statute of limitation or statute of repose defense to the reformation count in either of their Post-Trial Briefs submitted on November 8, 2017. (#499.00, #500.00.)The defendants did not cite any legal authority that the equitable remedy of reformation is subject to a statute of limitations or statute of repose. See Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth and Seventeenth Special Defenses. (#184.00.)

The second claim, not briefed by either defendant or pled in a Special Defense, is that any reformation count must be presented only by the original lender, WAMU. No legal authority for that proposition has been offered by the defendants to this court. The defendant’s claim is that only WAMU as the original lender and original mortgagee can sue for the equitable relief of reformation. This is not Connecticut Law. Edward Cherkoss was permitted to sue the defendant, George S. Gasser, for reformation based on driveway easement be contained in a deed entered into by his predecessor in title, Mildred Cherkoss. The trial court found that the deed from Mildred Cherkoss to the defendants contained a mutual mistake as to access and use of a driveway between the party’s common property line. Cherkoss v. Gasser, 123 Conn. 368, 370-71 (1937). A few years later this successor right to sue for reformation was confirmed by our Supreme Court of Errors." ... the plaintiffs succeeded to the equitable right to a reformation which their grantor had as against the Giffords." Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 494 (1945). Later Superior Courts have confirmed the viability of the successor in title right to sue for the equitable relief of reformation. Lewis v. Maguder, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham, Docket Number CV 05-4001921 S (May 3, 2006, Martin, J.) (" Hence, the plaintiff has standing to bring this action and privity of contract between him and the defendant is not required").

When the instrument a party seeks to reform is a deed, it is widely accepted that grantees in the chain of title do have standing to raise issues relative to the accuracy of the legal description, inter alia . Proper parties to an action for reformation of a deed include " all persons having an interest in the subject matter which will be affected by a decree reforming [the] instrument ... the original grantee and the parties to whom he conveyed are proper parties plaintiff in a suit to correct a deed"; 76 C.J.S. Reformation of Instruments, § 73. A rationale for this rule is set forth in Am.Jur.2d, Reformation of Instruments, § 60, which explains that as applied to real estate conveyances " [p]rivity is defined as the mutual or successive relationship to the same rights of property, title, or estate. Privity with a party to a deed, for the purposes of determining whether a nonparty to a deed can seek reformation of the deed, refers to successive possessions that are connected by an understanding that the rights of the possessor will be transferred, and a transfer of possession in fact occurs ... A grantee in property succeeds to the grantor’s right to maintain a suit to reform a prior deed ... If a mistake of description occurs in a series of conveyances under circumstances that would entitle any one of the grantees to a reformation as against the original grantor, the equity court will work back through all and give the last grantees a right of reformation against the original grantor." (Emphasis added, in both cases).

Wolchesky v. Wolchesky, Superior Court, judicial district of Windham at Putnam, Docket Number CV 13-6007049 S (November 7, 2013, Boland, J.) .

In a foreclosure when the substitution of a new party in place of the original lender is granted, that substitution relates back to the commencement of the foreclosure action. F.D.I.C. v. Retirement Management Group, Inc., 31 Conn.App. 80, 85 (1993). The substitution of a new party can cure the lack of standing of the original party. Id., 85. This court will find, later in this Memorandum of Decision, that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., has standing, its possession of the blue ink Adjustable Rate Note, has complied with all conditions precedent, has proven that the defendants are in default, and thus the plaintiff is entitled to foreclose. Since foreclosure is an equitable action, the court finds that the plaintiff has standing necessary to prosecute and obtain the relief it seeks in the reformation count. Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, 72 Conn.App. 700, 705 (2002). " The trial court may examine all relevant factors to ensure that complete justice is done. The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court. " Id., 705.

The court finds that the defendants have failed to successfully argue that either the statute of limitation, statute of repose or successor party arguments defeat the reformation count.

The defendant’s Eighteenth Special Defense claims that the lender waived the correction of the documents at the closing and waived any further right to correct the documents after the closing. Attorney Larry J. Ginsberg, when he noticed the misplaced letter L for the letter N, contacted the lender’s attorney just before the closing took place in attempt to correct the typographical error. According to Attorney Gingsberg’s testimony the representative of WAMU told Attorney Ginsberg that if his client wanted the refinance to pay off existing mortgages by closing on the current $308,000 mortgage and the disbursements of the excess cash to the borrower, that the documents must be signed in the fashion that they have been prepared regardless of the letter N and letter L issue. Those facts do not change the court’s equitable decision in granting reformation since it was clear that it was the intention of all of the parties and the lawyers present at the March 22, 2000 closing that the $308,000 mortgage be secured by a first lien on the real property owned by Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company.

Waiver is a question of fact. AFSCME, Council 4, Local 704 v. Department of Public Health, 272 Conn. 617, 622 (2005). " Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege." Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corporation, 292 Conn. 1, 57 (2009). " There cannot be a finding of waiver unless the party has both knowledge of the existence of the right and intention to relinquish it ..." Roy v. Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company, 98 Conn.App. 528, 532 (2006).

Herein the defendants are claiming that they have proven that the lender, WAMU, intended to give $308,000 to Richard Holt without the security of a mortgage on the Norwalk real property in order to pay off two existing mortgages to other lenders and to furnish over $170,000 cash to Richard Holt, all because of the mistake of one letter in one document and of the many documents at the closing that contained the correct spelling. Absolutely no evidence has been shown of waiver by the defendants. The evidence established that it was a mutual error and all parties intended that the $308,000 loan be secured by a first mortgage on the Norwalk real property. In addition the defendants have failed to brief the waiver issue by filing legal authority, facts addressed at trial and applying that legal authority to the facts. The court finds the issue of waiver as applied both equitable count of reformation in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendants claim the equitable defense of estoppel in the Thirty-Seventh Special Defense as to both reformation and foreclosure. " There are two essential elements to an estoppel. The party must do or say something that is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief, and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do some act to his injury which he otherwise would not have done ... It is the burden of the person claiming the estoppel to show that he exercised due diligence to ascertain the truth and that he not only lacked knowledge of the true state of things but had no convenient means of acquiring that knowledge." Reinke v. Greenwich Hospital Association, 175 Conn. 24, 28-29 (1978).

Other than the bare allegations in the Thirty-Seventh Special Defense, the typo of letter " L" and the aforementioned testimony of Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg, no other evidence of any of the above elements and facts of estoppel have been presented to this court. Richard Holt was present at the March 22, 2000 closing and heard or must have heard or should have heard all of the conversations about the typos that occurred at the closing. The defendants failed to adequately brief the Special Defense of estoppel. The defendants claim the typo incident as support for estoppel as applied to both the reformation and foreclosure counts. The defendants have failed to sustain their burden of proof as to the two elements of estoppel. The evidence before this court establishes that both defendants knew the full state of things and possessed full knowledge of the typo at the March 22, 2000 closing and did nothing further, other than direct multiple Special Defenses as to the mistyped letter " L." The issue of estoppel is found for the plaintiff as to the reformation and foreclosure counts.

The defendants claim that the concept of laches prevents the Count One reformation from being granted by the court. " Laches consists of two elements. First, there must have been an inexcusable delay and second, that delay must have prejudiced the defendant ... The mere lapse of time does not constitute laches ... unless it results in prejudice to the defendant, ... as where, for example the defendant is led to change his position with respect to the matter in question." Bozzi v. Bozzi, 177 Conn. 232, 239 (1979); Brock v. Cavanaugh, 1 Conn.App. 138, 140 (1984). Laches has been alleged in the Sixteenth Special Defense. In that Special Defense the delay alleged is: " failed to timely attempt to correct the necessary documents such as the note, mortgage and security instrument." The prejudice alleged that was caused by the above delay was that: " precluded and prejudiced the Defendants from taking timely actions such as suing for rescission and annulment and asserting the legal remedies and to otherwise protect their rights." Sixteenth Special Defense, paragraph 2. (#184.00.)

This is the third foreclosure action brought against the defendants as the $308,000 March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. The first foreclosure was commenced by the original lender, WAMU. Dorsum Nemus, LLC with the letter " N" was a named defendant. The defendant’s closing attorney filed an appearance and represented both defendants from the commencement of this first foreclosure action in November 2002 until it was disposed of on August 2005 and finally withdrawn on October 2005. The Superior Court destroyed the paper file years ago. Some pleadings from the 2002 foreclosure were before this court; Affidavit in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Ex. 13; Writ, summons and complaint, Ex. 17; Amended Answer, Ex. 29; Motion for Judgment of Strict Foreclosure, Ex. 33; Foreclosure worksheet, Ex. 34; and Affidavit of Debt, Ex. 35. The Affidavit, Ex. 13, purports to attach the Open-End Mortgage as Exhibit B but only Exhibit A, the first page is attached to the court’s exhibit. That Affidavit refers to Exhibit B as a mortgage deed by Dorsum Nemus, LLC. The complaint, Ex. 17, seeks only foreclosure in its one-count complaint. The mortgagor defendant is cited as Dorsum Nemus, LLC aka Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Corporation. The Edison docket sheet contains no reference to any request by any party to seek or object to reformation on the basis of the typo letter " L." The defendant’s April 28, 2003 Amended Answer, Ex. 29, contains six Special Defenses all contesting some portion or calculation of the amount of the debt, charges and credits for payments. To the two paragraphs of the complaint that mentioned Dorsum Nemus, LLC the mortgagor, the defendants, cryptically plead: " Deny that actions were undertaken on behalf of Dorsum Nemus, LLC." See paragraph 3 and 4. To the two paragraphs of the complaint that alleged title to the real property, the defendants admit ownership by Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company in paragraph 9 but again cryptically plead to paragraph 2 that alleges the same ownership: " Deny that actions were undertaken on behalf of Dorsum Nemus, LLC." The court finds from this pleading that the defendants and their attorney of record, Larry F. Ginsberg, were aware of the letter " L" typo and were offering a foreclosure defense based on that typo soon after the October 29, 2002 complaint.

WAMU commenced the second foreclosure returnable April 1, 2008. Both defendants appeared by attorney Ginsberg immediately after the return date. It was a one-count complaint. Ex. 26. WAMU, as the plaintiff, did not include a reformation count but did plead both variations of the mortgagor’s name. The summons named as a defendant, " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company A/K/A Dorsum Nemus, LLC." Paragraphs 2 and 8 of the operative complaint, the original complaint dated March 19, 2008, alleged: " Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Lemus, LLC." Some of the pleadings in this second foreclosure can be read on the computer and some are paper pleadings that were destroyed by the court years ago in a routine purging of closed court files. The second foreclosure was withdrawn on November 18, 2008. (#116.55.) Although no reformation relief was sought, the pleadings read by the defendants and their counsel of record should have disclosed to the defendants the typo letter " L" situation. See pleadings #101.00, #102.00, #103.00, #104.00, #105.00 and #110.00 in FST CV 08-5006915 S for the alternative pleading of the name of the mortgagor. The defendant’s May 27, 2008 Answer was filed by Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company even though the complaint only named Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company. See #110.00.

The third foreclosure action, the instant foreclosure, was returnable on December 30, 2008. Shortly thereafter attorney Larry F. Ginsberg, the closing attorney, appeared for both defendants. The entity defendant has always been represented by counsel, either attorney Larry F. Ginsberg or its current attorney, David A. Scalzi.

The court finds that the defendants, Richard Holt, and Dorsum Nemus, LLC, had full knowledge of all facts at the March 22, 2000 closing. From and after that date these defendants could have taken whatever legal, administrative or contract action the defendants deemed necessary or appropriate. No evidence has been offered to this court that the defendants, at any reasonable time after March 22, 2000 ever availed themselves of any rights to which they claimed they were deprived by WAMU and/or the plaintiff from failing to correct the " L" typo. On August 27, 2015 the defendants first attempted to rescind the March 22, 2000 mortgage. (#503.00). In addition WAMU became a failed bank on September 25, 2008, Ex. 24, Ex. 62. The defendants have not disclosed to this court what remedies that they have or would have against WAMU after September 25, 2008. The court finds that the defendants have failed to adequately brief this issue of laches. The issues on the Sixteenth Special Defense sounding in both laches and the statute of limitations are found for the plaintiff.

All of the Special Defenses addressed to Count One Reformation deal with the letter " L" typo. The Superior Court as a court of general jurisdiction has the power and duty to correct clerical errors in any court proceeding, judgment, pleading, or document filed in support of a pleading. Bank of Stamford v. Schlesinger, 160 Conn.App. 32, 34 (2015). " It is axiomatic that courts have the power and the duty to correct judgments that contain clerical errors." Id., 34. The name of the defendant can be rightly understood. State v. Bothwell, 78 Conn.App. 64, 77 (2003); Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn.App. 513, 524, fn.10 (2014). " This court independently of any decision by the Appellate Court and the trial court decision by Judge Grogins, finds that the utilization of the phrase ‘Lease of Time’ is a typographical error of a minor sort that can be rightly understood as ‘lapse of time.’ " Cunniffe v. Cunniffe, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk, Housing Session at Norwalk, Docket Number SNSP 038005 (August 28, 2014, Tierney, J.T.R.); State v. Dayton, 176 Conn.App. 858, 871, fn.13 (2017). The court finds that the typo of the letter " L" is merely a circumstantial defect, not a substantive defect, and there is no evidence that either of the defendants were misled or prejudiced thereby. Gen. Stat. § 52-123; Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 391 (2009); Carpinella v. Weather Shield Manufacturing, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket Number CV 00-0160901 (October 10, 2003, Alvord, J.).

By granting Count One of reformation, the court is not adding a party to the contract and is not creating an entirely new contract, but is merely correcting a simple scrivener’s error of one letter in a foreign word. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee v. Perez, 146 Conn.App. 833, 842-43 (2013), cert. denied, 315 Conn. 542 (2015). The court finds that the plaintiff has proven the elements of reformation in Count One by clear, substantial and convincing evidence. Id., 839-40; Traggis, Trustee v. Shawmut Bank of Connecticut, N.A., 72 Conn.App. 251, 259, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 903 (2002). The court finds that this " reformation is not granted for the purpose of alleviating a hard or oppressive bargain, but rather to restate the intended terms of an agreement when the writing that memorializes that agreement is at variance with the intent of both parties." Blow v. Konetchy, 107 Conn.App. 777, 792 (2008). The court finds that the plaintiff has sustained its burden of proof of reformation. LoPinto v. Haines, supra, 185 Conn. 535. In summation this court finds that this is a typographical error. This fact is plain and obvious. The plaintiff has so proven by clear, substantial and convincing evidence. LoPinto v. Haines, supra, 185 Conn. 534. The general equitable principles regarding similar errors in court pleadings is well-stated. " No writ, pleading, judgment or any kind of proceeding in court or course of justice shall be abated, suspended, set aside or reversed for any kind of circumstantial errors, mistakes or defects, if the person and cause may be rightly understood and intended by the court." Gen. Stat. § 52-123; Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 390 (2009). Gen. Stat. § 52-123 was designed to prevent " the recurrence of the inequities inherent in eighteenth century common law that denied a plaintiff’s cause of action if the pleadings were technically imperfect." Andover Limited Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 399 (1995). This court finds that this typographical error is of a minor sort, where one letter has been replaced by another letter in a foreign word, and it can be rightly understood by anyone who reads the mortgage documents. State v. Bothwell, 78 Conn.App. 64, 77, cert. denied, 266 Conn. 908 (2003); Matthews v. SBA, Inc., 149 Conn.App. 513, 524, fn.10 (2014); State v. Browne, 291 Conn. 720, 733 (2009).

This court finds that the defendants’ litigating and continued litigation of the letters L and N is " hypertechnical" and should not be countenanced by the Superior Court. Jefferson Garden Associates v. Greene, 202 Conn. 128, 145 (1987); Brown v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 150 Conn.App. 405, 413, fn.5, fn.6 (2014).

The court finds the issues on Count One for the plaintiff as against both defendants and orders that the Open-End Mortgage be reformed so that the mortgagor is " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company, " nunc pro tunc.

The plaintiff’s complaint limits its claim for reformation to the correction of the typographical error changing the mortgagor from Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company in Exhibits 1 and 2 to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. When questioned by the court during trial, the plaintiff indicated that no claim for reformation is being made by the plaintiff concerning the street address or legal description for the real property being foreclosed. An issue was raised at trial that there were three separate street addresses used for the mortgaged premises in a variety of the loan documents. The three variations of the street address are: 23 Ridgewood Road, 23 Ridgewood Drive, and Ridgewood Avenue.

The only reference to Ridgewood Avenue in the mortgage documents is contained in the metes and bounds portion of the legal description, wherein the southerly boundary is described: " SOUTHERLY: 60 feet, more or less, by Ridgewood Avenue; and." This legal description is found in the Open-End Mortgage, the December 12, 2008 original and operative complaint, the Lis Pendens, and the Quit Claim Deed. Exhibits 1, 2 and 70. The street number on Ridgewood Avenue is not contained in this legal description.

23 Ridgewood Drive appears in multiple mortgage documents including paragraph 2 of the December 12, 2008 complaint as " the premises known as 23 Ridgewood Drive, Norwalk, Connecticut ..." The first page of the Open-End Mortgage states: " which has the address of 23 RIDGEWOOD DRIVE, NORWALK, Connecticut 06853 (" Property Address"). Ex. 1. The Adjustable Rate Note states above the printed line for (Property Address) " 23 RIDGEWOOD DRIVE, NORWALK, CT 06853." Ex. 3. In the Adjustable Rate Rider attached to the Open-End Mortgage is stated: " located at: 23 RIDGEWOOD DRIVE, NORWALK, CT 06853" above the line that states: " (Property Address)." Ex. 2. 23 Ridgewood Drive also appears in Loan application as 23 Ridgewood Drive. Ex. 18. Ex. 19. " Drive" also appears in Exhibits 12 and 61, which are various items of correspondence issued concerning this loan and offered at trial as full exhibits.

23 Ridgewood Road is the address used by the defendant, Richard Holt, in his three self-represented appearances dated October 2, 2013, February 13, 2014 and January 11, 2016. " Road" also appears in Vincent J. Boccanfuso’s real estate appraisal offered as Exhibit 7 at trial. (#220.00.) It is the address used in the March 22, 2000 HUD-1 Settlement Statement. Ex. 22. Mr. Boccanfuso testified that there is no street in Norwalk, Connecticut known as Ridgewood Drive. Ex. 9, Ex. 7. (#327.00.) He testified Norwalk town records use Ridgewood Road not Ridgewood Drive or any other name. Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg who conducted the March 22, 2000 $308,000 refinance closing also testified that there is no Ridgewood Drive in Norwalk. " Road" was used in a variety of correspondence sent to the defendants by WAMU, Ex. 14, 15, 16. Insurance records for the real property use 23 Ridgewood Road. Ex. 42, 43 and 44. Lizbeth Holt testified on July 10, 2015 at trial and stated her address as 23 Ridgewood Road.

The court asked the parties to stipulate that the property’s mailing address and street address is 23 Ridgewood Road in Norwalk, Connecticut. The court could not obtain such a stipulation from the parties. The court suggested that a copy of the Town of Norwalk recorded Map 2291 be offered into evidence. No party made such an offer. The court further requested that someone from the Department of Public Works of the City of Norwalk come to testify concerning the status of Ridgewood Avenue, Ridgewood Drive and/or Ridgewood Road. No such testimony was offered by any party.

Since the court has the authority to correct a legal description attached to a mortgage deed that contain scrivener’s errors and it can be corrected by the court in a complaint by the parties seeking a reformation of the mortgage deed, the court should be able to correct a simple mis-description of a street address when the street number and name are conceded to be correct. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee v. Plummer, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at New London, Docket Number CV 07-6000628 (January 14, 2010, Devine, J.); AJJ Enterprises, LLP v. Jean -Charles, 160 Conn.App. 375, 381, fn.6 (2015) (The mortgaged real property was 18 Monroe Street, Norwalk, CT yet the note stated: " is secured by real property known as: 18 Meadow Street, Norwalk, CT." The court, in the foreclosure action, deemed it a scrivener’s error that did not prevent the foreclosure of the mortgage).

None of the parties have disputed that the legal description attached to all loan documents describes the property as: " lot number fifteen (15) on a certain map entitled ‘Map of Dibblecrest at Rowayton, Norwalk, CT., ’ now on file in the office of the Town Clerk of said Norwalk and numbered twenty-two hundred and ninety-one (2291), reference thereto being had." The only difference is the street address. " The street address generally located the property and provided useful information, but it did not establish or purport to establish boundaries to the property." Peterson v. McAndrew, 160 Conn.App. 180, 189 (2015). (The court found that the legal description contained in Schedule A describing the property in question as lot three (3) on a certain map recorded in the Office of the Town Clerk of said Norwalk as map number 591 is a clear and unambiguous legal description of the property.) Connecticut Standards of Title (1999 Edition), Standard 10.1 holds that: " Errors, irregularities and deficiencies in property descriptions in the chain of title do not impair marketability unless, after all circumstances of record are taken into account, a substantial uncertainty exists as to the land which was conveyed or intended to be conveyed ..." The legal description in this case uses two different formats; (1) A lot on a recorded map, and (2) A metes and bounds description using the distances measured " more or less." The disputed description of Ridgewood Avenue is found in the metes and bounds description. The recorded map was not offered into evidence, despite this court’s request to do so. The recorded map is a legal description that prevails over courses and distances. Koennicke v. Maiorano, 43 Conn.App. 1, 22 (1996). This court finds that the map description is of greater certainty than the metes and bounds description that uses the phrase " more or less." Barri v. Schwartz Brothers Co., 93 Conn. 501, 503 (1919); Mount Maumee Partnership v. Peet, 40 Conn.App. 752, 755 (1996).

The court further finds that there is no ambiguity concerning the metes and bounds description. A southerly boundary in the metes and bounds description states: " 60 feet, or more less by Ridgewood Avenue." Whether the street is correctly identified as Ridgewood Avenue, Ridgewood Drive, or Ridgewood Road or any other description, does not create an ambiguity in this metes and bounds description since it is clear that the southerly boundary is to a road. " In the construction of a deed or grant, the language is to be construed in connection with, and in reference to, the nature and condition of the subject matter of the grant at the time the instrument is executed, and the obvious purpose of the parties had in view ... If the meaning of the language contained in a deed or conveyance is not clear, the trial court is bound to consider any relative extrinsic evidence presented by the parties for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity ... Furthermore, a reference to a map in a deed, for a more particular description, incorporates the map into the deed as fully and effectually as if copied therein ... The identifying or explanatory features contained in maps referred to in a deed become part of the deed, and are so entitled to consideration in interpreting the deed as though they were expressly recited therein." Simone v. Miller, 91 Conn.App. 98, 108-09 (2005); Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn.App. 658, 665-66 (2013). At the request of this court, the court asked that a Department of Public Works official testify concerning the naming and status of the various highways in the City of Norwalk including Ridgewood Avenue, Ridgewood Drive and/or Ridgewood Road. None of the parties called any such witness or offered any documentary evidence of those roads. The court further requested that a copy of map 2291 be offered into evidence. Neither party offered that document into evidence. No testimony or extrinsic evidence was offered in this trial.

This court finds that the legal description of lot 15 on Map 2291 is the correct legal description. That legal description is consistent throughout all the mortgage documents. It is the legal description contained in the Quit Claim Deed. Ex. 70. The court further finds that the metes and bounds description in which the southerly boundary is Ridgewood Avenue is not ambiguous since the southerly boundary is found to be a road. Whether that road is named Ridgewood Avenue, Ridgewood Drive and/or Ridgewood Road, it remains in any event a highway, which has a specific location. The court therefore finds that the metes and bounds description is not ambiguous and there is no need for a reformation of the legal description.

The court is not considering the effect of Gen. Stat. § 47-36aa(a) known as the validating act. The validating act can correct technical deficiencies in an otherwise valid conveyance. An action must be filed " within two years after the instrument is recorded." Gen. Stat. § 47-36aa(a); Hannaford v. Mann, 134 Conn.App. 265, 276, fn.8 (2012). There was no evidence that a lawsuit was brought over the legal description of the property in question at any time.

This court further has not been asked to rule whether Gen. Stat. § 47-12a, commonly referred to as a statutory affidavit, could be of assistance in resolving any possible legal description problem. Connecticut Standards of Title 12.1 discuss the use of the statutory affidavit, Gen. Stat. § 47-12a, to resolve certain legal description problems.

It is possible that the public highway upon which this property is located was at one time known as Ridgewood Avenue and so described on the records of the Department of Public Works of the City of Norwalk and at some later time the name was changed to Ridgewood Road and has remained Ridgewood Road thereafter. 23 Ridgewood Road was used in the March 22, 2000 CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESOLUTION signed on behalf of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. That document was prepared by the lender and submitted to Attorney Ginsberg for execution at the March 22, 2000 closing. 23 Ridgewood Road is the mailing address that Richard Holt has chosen to use in his three appearance forms. The real estate appraisal cites the address as 23 Ridgewood Road. Ex. 7. Ex. 10. The above documents are very strong evidence that the current correct street address of the property subject to this foreclosure action is 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, Connecticut. Rocamora v. Heaney, 144 Conn.App. 658, 665-68 (2013).

It is noted sometimes the parties refer to the town where the mortgaged property is located as Rowayton, Connecticut. Rowayton is merely a neighborhood located in the City of Norwalk. There are no land records in Rowayton, Connecticut. It is not a separate municipality. The municipality in which the real property in question is located is the City of Norwalk, Connecticut.

The street address is commonly known as the mailing address. In most municipalities in Connecticut the street address is obtained from the Planning and Zoning Commission who upon analysis of the current zoning and the possibility of future subdivisions, assigns a street number to each parcel of real property. The street number is not part of the subdivision. It is not part of any legal description and is not found within Schedule A of the legal description in any of the loan documents. Peterson v. McAndrew, 160 Conn.App. 180, 189 (2015).

This court has found that Schedule A, the legal description contained in Exhibit 1 the Open-End Mortgage, is an accurate legal description of the property as it appears in the Norwalk Land Records. The court finds that it is the correct legal description of the property and contains no ambiguity.

The court now turns to Count Two, the foreclosure action.

" In order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied ..." Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. Trustee v. Strong, 149 Conn.App. 384, 392 (2014).

In RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, supra, 303 Conn. at 231, 32 A.3d 307 our Supreme Court stated that to seek enforcement of a note through foreclosure, a holder must be able to demonstrate it is the owner of the underlying debt. It noted, however, that a holder of a note is presumed to be the rightful owner of the underlying debt, and that unless the party defending against the foreclosure action rebuts that presumption, the holder has standing to foreclose. Id., 231-32, 32 A.3d 307. A holder merely needs to produce the note to establish that presumption. " The production of the note establishes his case prima facie against the [defendant] and he may rest there ... It [is] for the defendant to set up and prove the facts which limit or change the plaintiff’s rights." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.; see also American Home Mortgage Servicing, Inc. v. Reilly, 157 Conn.App. 127, 133, A.3d 500 (2015).

When a holder seeks to enforce a note through foreclosure, the holder must produce the note. The note must be sufficiently endorsed so as to demonstrate that the foreclosing party is a holder, either by a specific endorsement to that party or by means of a blank endorsement to bearer. If the foreclosing party shows that it is a valid holder of the note and can produce the note, it is presumed that the foreclosing party is the rightful owner of the debt. That presumption may be rebutted by the defending party, but the burden is on the defending party to provide sufficient proof that the holder of the note is not the owner of the debt, for example, by showing that ownership of the debt had passed to another party. It is not sufficient to provide that proof, however, merely by pointing to some documentary lacuna in the chain of title that might give rise to the possibility that some other party owns the debt. In order to rebut the presumption, the defendant must prove that someone else is the owner of the note and debt. Absent that proof, the plaintiff may rest its standing to foreclose on its status as the holder of the note.

U.S. Bank, National Association, Trustee v. Schaeffer, 160 Conn.App. 138, 146-47, 150 (2015).

Exhibit 1, the Open-End Mortgage, Exhibit 2, the Adjustable Rate Rider as part of the Open-End Mortgage and recorded with the Open-End Mortgage and Exhibit 3, the Adjustable Rate Note, state that the lender is " Washington Mutual Bank, F.A." and that the $308,000 loan closed on March 22, 2000. " The court found that pursuant to the bank’s April 4, 2005 bylaws, and with the approval of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the bank had the right to do business under the name of Washington Mutual Bank or Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. The court found that the bank’s name was ‘Washington Mutual Bank also known as Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.’ at all times after April 4, 2005, and that both names are existing legal entities." JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Simoulidis, 161 Conn.App. 133, 141 (2015). On September 25, 2008 Washington Mutual Bank also known as Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. was closed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the FDIC the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation was appointed receiver of the bank. The bank was declared a failed bank by the FDIC. On September 25, 2008 the FDIC as the receiver and the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, as the assuming bank executed a Purchase and Assumption Agreement, which states in part that the FDIC conveyed to the plaintiff all right, title and interest of the FDIC into the assets of the bank. Ex. 23, Ex. 24, Ex. 61, Ex. 62, Ex. 63, Ex. 72, Ex. 73, Ex. 81, Ex. 82, Ex. 84. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association v. Simoulidis, supra, 161 Conn.App. 138, 141, 146.

This foreclosure action commenced on December 16, 2008. See Return of Service in the court file. JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association was and now is the owner of this note by reason of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement dated September 25, 2008 and the plaintiff commenced this foreclosure action in its own name. No other entity or person ever owned the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. There was a WAMU-owned loan not an investor-owned loan. Wilkin Rodriguez, an employee of JP Morgan Chase Bank, as a document examiner and home lending officer credibly testified to that effect at trial on December 15, 2015.

The second of the three foreclosure actions, Docket Number FST CV 08-5006915 S, was returnable to the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford on April 1, 2008. This second foreclosure action was commenced prior to the FDIC receivership and prior to the acquisition of the loan by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association. According to Mr. Rodriguez’ examination of the business records, the original March 22, 2000 note went directly from WAMU to foreclosure counsel in that second foreclosure case being Bendett and McHugh, P.C. of 160 Farmington Avenue, Farmington, Connecticut 06032. Bendett and McHugh commenced this instant third foreclosure action on behalf of the plaintiff. The note never went through the typical process that a Chase note would have provided including the application of a swirl or a target stamp on the upper right hand side of the first page of the note.

The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was presented to this court by the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and examined by the counsel for Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company and Richard Holt as well as this court. The court and the parties examined a photocopy of that Adjustable Rate Note on the record and the court noticed some slight differences between the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note and the photocopy, which the court spread upon the record. The court further found that those were differences without distinction. The court found that the photocopy was identical to the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. The court marked the photocopy of the Adjustable Rate Note as a full exhibit. Ex. 3. On the record the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was returned by the court to plaintiff’s counsel. This satisfied the court’s inspection obligation of the Adjustable Rate Note. Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, 310 Conn. 119, 124, 130-31 (2013); Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP v. Creed, 145 Conn.App. 38, 42-43, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 936 (2013). No other blue ink version of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was offered in evidence. Ex. 13, Ex. 59, Ex. 65.

The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note contains a stamped endorsement on the signature page. Ex. 1. The stamp is on the signature page numbered Page 6 of 6. The stamp state:

Pay to the Order of Without Recourse

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A.

By

CYNTHIA RILEY VICE PRESIDENT

The stamped endorsement is undated. The signature that appears above the printed name, CYNTHIA RILEY, is not in blue ink. That undated stamped endorsement appears on the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note returned to plaintiff’s counsel that was examined on the record by all the parties and this court during trial. The court finds that the blue ink March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note was endorsed in blank and was in the possession of the plaintiff at the time of trial. Countrywide Home Loans Services, LP v. Creed, supra, 145 Conn.App. 43; Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 310 Conn. 124, 130-31.

The court finds that the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was in the possession of plaintiff’s counsel, Bendett & McHugh, P.C., when they represented WAMU in the second foreclosure action. The second foreclosure action commenced in April 2008. Bendett & McHugh, P.C. was in possession of the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note from the commencement of that second foreclosure action in the spring of 2008 until the withdrawal of action on November 18, 2008. Washington Mutual Bank v. Richard Holt, Docket Number FST CV 08-5006915 S. (#116.55, Withdrawal of Action November 18, 2008.) As of November 18, 2008 Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. also known as Washington Mutual Bank had already been declared a failed bank. It was placed in receivership by the FDIC and on September 25, 2008 all the assets of WAMU had been conveyed to the current plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, by a September 25, 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement. This instant lawsuit commenced on December 16, 2008. It was commenced by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association by the same law firm that represented WAMU, Bendett & McHugh, P.C. The court finds that Bendett & McHugh, P.C. had possession of the March 22, 2000 blue ink Adjustable Rate Note for WAMU from April 2008 until September 25, 2008 when JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. acquired the assets of WAMU. The court finds that from and after September 25, 2008 Bendett & McHugh, P.C. possessed the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note as the attorney of record for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. through the trial of this matter. Ex. 23. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee v. Thompson, 163 Conn.App. 827, 832 (2016) (" The key question for us to resolve, is when the note came into the plaintiff’s possession." Id., 833); Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Trustee v. Cornelius, 170 Conn.App. 104, 114 (2017). The court finds that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, has standing to commence and maintain this foreclosure action and that this court has subject matter jurisdiction over this foreclosure litigation.

Two versions of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note were offered in evidence before this court; Exhibit 3, the photocopy of the Note that was examined by the court and returned to plaintiff’s counsel, which contains the blank stamped endorsement of WAMU executed by Cynthia Riley, Vice President and Exhibit 59, which contains two different endorsements. The defendants claim that there was a third version of the note. That third version was not presented in evidence but it was available in pleading #457, Exhibit B. The court has examined the two copies in evidence carefully to note any differences between Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59. The court notes that Exhibit 59 contains at the top of each page a bankruptcy filing docket number, 15-22704-rdd, some smudge marks, redaction of the form number of the lower left of each page, a larger redaction of the loan number, and a large ink blot on the last three pages including Page 6 of 6. These matters do not appear in Exhibit 3. The court notes that the font size of Exhibit 59 appears to be slightly smaller than the font size of Exhibit 3. Exhibit 59 has lines on most edges of each page. Exhibit 3 has no such lines. As stated Exhibit 3 contains only one endorsement, an undated stamped endorsement that reads:

Pay to the order of

Without Recourse

WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK, F.A.

By

CYNTHIA RILEY

VICE PRESIDENT.

No other endorsements appear in Exhibit 3.

The Cynthia Riley, Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. endorsement, does not appear in Exhibit 59. Two other endorsements that do not appear in Exhibit 3 are located on signature page of Exhibit 59. The first endorsement on Exhibit 59 reads:

Pay to Order of: JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A.

Without Recourse

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. successor in interest

by purchase from the FDIC, as receiver for

Washington Mutual Bank formerly Washington Mutual Bank, F.A.

By:

Mykisha D. Rush

Vice President.

This endorsement is not dated. It is a specific endorsement by an officer of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

The second endorsement on Exhibit 59 reads:

Pay to the Order of: Without Recourse

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

By:

Mykisha D. Rush/Vice President.

This endorsement is undated and is a blank endorsement.

Exhibit 59 contains an additional stamp on the first page that does not appear on Exhibit 3. Mr. Wilkin Rodriguez described it as a swirl in the upper right hand corner. He also characterized the swirl in his testimony as a " bull’s eye." That stamp is described by this court as four concentric circles, the largest of which is approximately the size of the United States dime.

This court’s initial sentence in this Memorandum of Decision refers to those three Adjustable Rate Notes. The third copy of the Note will be discussed later in this Memorandum of Decision. This court finds that Exhibit 3 and 59 are photocopies of the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. Richard Holt apparently obtained a copy of Exhibit 59 from a bankruptcy filing that was commenced on or about September 2015 while this foreclosure case was on trial. The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note as shown in Exhibit 59 was not presented to this court. This court has not examined the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note with the swirl or the bull’s eye stamp on the upper right hand corner and two endorsements on Page 6 of 6 marked as Exhibit 59 before this court. This court was not presented with the opportunity to inspect such a blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note similar to Exhibit 59. Only a photocopy of that note was furnished to the court and it is marked as full Exhibit 59. No such blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was presented in court at trial, a photocopy of which is Exhibit 59. The defendants represented in court that such a third version existed, but no copy or blue ink version of that third note was submitted as an exhibit to the court. See #457.00, Exhibit B.

Mr. Rodriguez inspected Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59 at trial and compared them with the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. He noted that the difference in the fonts is due only to the photocopy size of Exhibits 3 and 59. He reviewed Exhibit 59 and determined that it was a copy of a copy, or a copy of a scanned image, or a photocopy of a photocopy or a photograph of a second image, all of which typically reduce font size. He also noted the lines around the outside edges of Exhibit 59 would indicate the use of a photocopying process in the preparation of the document. Mr. Rodriguez testified that the " bull’s eye" is the Chase form of identifying documents. He further testified credibly that the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note presented to this trial court as Exhibit 3 did not have the bull’s eye on it because the second mortgage foreclosure complaint was filed prior to September 25, 2008, the date of purchase of the assets by JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., when the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was in plaintiff’s counsel’s possession. Thus Mr. Rodriguez credibly concluded that there would be no swirl or bull’s eye on the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note examined by this court at trial, a photocopy of which is a full exhibit in evidence marked as Exhibit 3. He testified that he found Exhibit 59 in the plaintiff’s computer system. Mr. Rodriguez also testified credibly concerning the process of scanning in various documents into JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.’s computer system. He was fully familiar with the JP Morgan Chase, N.A.’s computer system. State v. Gojcaj, 151 Conn.App. 183, 200-01 (2014).

The court has reviewed Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59 carefully. The court notes that both documents are preprinted forms. The court could not find any difference in the language of the preprinted forms in either Exhibit 3 or Exhibit 59. Certain language including property address, dates, loan amounts, interest rates, and name of borrower under a signature line, are typed on the preprinted form. This court has examined each of these typed-in phrases or words in both Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59 and noted no difference. The court finds that the language of the document, the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, Exhibit 3, is identical to the language of the document, March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, Exhibit 59. The differences are in the endorsements and the " bull’s eye, " which this court has already described. The court requested the defendant, Richard Holt, on the record to inform the court of any differences in the printed or typed language other than the different endorsements. The defendant refused to disclose whether or not there was any language difference between Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59.

Based upon this court’s examination, this court finds Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 59 are identical documents. The court further finds that Exhibit 3 is endorsed in blank. The plaintiff’s counsel had possession of that blue ink Exhibit 3 and presented it to the court during this foreclosure trial. The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note examined by this court at trial has been returned to plaintiff’s counsel. The document that this court examined at trial did not have the bull’s eye. It had the Cynthia Riley stamped endorsement. It did not have the two Mykisha D. Rush stamped endorsements. The question is whether or not the existence of the bull’s eye and two different stamped endorsements, prevents the plaintiff from foreclosing what otherwise is a valid blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note furnished to the trial court?

A third version of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was located in a pleading entitled a Motion for Stay dated October 12, 2016. (#457.00.) On October 6, 2016 Richard Holt filed a civil action against the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United District Court for the Southern District of New York, docket number 1:16-CV-03938-CM. Attached as exhibits to that federal civil action were copies of three versions of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note: Exhibit A, only the first page of a very poorly photocopied version of the Note that is before this court as trial Exhibit 3; Exhibit B, a different version of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note than trial Exhibits 3 and 59 with loan numbers partially redacted and the Cynthia Riley endorsement on Page 6 of 6, and Exhibit C, a third copy of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note identical to trial Exhibit 59 except for the above-referenced Federal, Holt v. FDIC, docket number at the top of each page. (#457.00, Exhibit C.)

The court concludes that the defendants are claiming that #457, Exhibit B is the third different version of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note in existence, although not formally offered as a trial exhibit. The above-mentioned Exhibit B is found in the defendant’s Motion for Stay dated October 12, 2016. (#457.00, pages 33-39 of 60 pages.) The court will consider this third version of the Note as being before this court.

The court will now review this third version of the Note as found in pleading #457.00, Exhibit B at pages 34-38 of 60 pages and compare it to trial Exhibit 3, in a similar comparison that this court has already conducted with trial Exhibits 3 and 59. The court will refer to this third version as " #457.00, Exhibit B."

" #457.00, Exhibit B" contains an endorsement on the signature page of the Adjustable Rate Note at Page 6 of 6. The endorsement is identical to the Cynthia Riley endorsement on trial Exhibit 3, both as to its content, appearance and location on Page 6 of 6. The endorsement is undated and the signature of Cynthia Riley is not in blue ink. It has identical fonts to trial Exhibit 3. The court notes that " #457.00, Exhibit B" contains two double-printed docket numbers at the top of each page each with a pagination marking. One docket number is the same as the Richard Holt v. FDIC docket number 1:16-CV-03938-cm. The second docket number appears to be also a federal district court type docket number, which this court has difficulty reading. To the best of this court’s ability, that second federal district court type docket number is 3:16-CV-00302-SBM. The loan number at the upper right corner of each page is partially redacted by a rectangular redaction made larger so that the last four digits are available for reading. The double overprinted Federal District Court type docket numbers appear on each of the six pages along with the similar rectangular redaction of the loan number, leaving the last four digits unredacted. There is a smudge mark at approximately one inch in length at an angle on the first page just above the (Property Address). There is a much smaller smudge mark in the top left column at pages 2, 3, 4 and 5. The angled one-inch smudge mark on page 1 appears on Page 6 of 6. There is a signature, not in blue ink, just above the signature line on Page 6 of 6 and under the signature line has been typed RICHARD HOLT in all capital letters. The Cynthia Riley undated endorsement appears on Page 6 of 6 in the same location and format as trial Exhibit 3. There is only this one endorsement on this third version. There is no large ink blot on any of the six pages of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note now being discussed as " #457.00, Exhibit B" compared to the large ink blots in trial Exhibit 59. There are photocopy lines that are intermittent at the bottom of each of the six pages of " #457.00, Exhibit B." There are no photocopy lines on the edges of any of the six pages of " #457.00, Exhibit B" as there is in trial Exhibit 59. There is no swirl or " bull’s eye" as does appear on trial Exhibit 59. The font on " #457.00, Exhibit B" is smaller than trial Exhibit 3. This may be due to the normal photocopy process. The form numbers on the lower left of each page have not been redacted.

No blue ink version of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note identical to " #457.00, Exhibit B" was furnished to this court.

The court has reviewed trial Exhibit 3, trial Exhibit 59 and " #457.00, Exhibit B" carefully. The court notes that all are preprinted forms. The court could not find any difference in the language of the preprinted forms in either Exhibit 3 or " #457.00, Exhibit B." Certain language including property address, dates, loan amounts, interest rates, and name of borrower under a signature line, are typed on the preprinted form. This court has examined each of these typed-in phrases in both Exhibit 3 and " #457.00, Exhibit B" and noted no difference. The court finds that the language of the document, the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, Exhibit 3, is identical to the language of the document, March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, " #457.00, Exhibit B." The only differences between those two is the smudge marks and the type of loan number redacted.

Based upon this court’s examination, this court finds Exhibit 3 and " #457.00, Exhibit B" are identical documents. The court further finds that Exhibit 3 is endorsed in blank. The plaintiff’s counsel had possession of that blue ink Exhibit 3 and presented it to the court during this foreclosure trial. The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note examined by this court at trial has been returned to plaintiff’s counsel. The document that this court examined at trial did not have the smudge mark or partial redactions as in " #457.00, Exhibit B." It had the Cynthia Riley stamped endorsement. It did not have the two Mykisha D. Rush stamped endorsements. The question is whether or not the existence in this third copy of the Note of smudge marks and partial loan number redactions, found in " #457.00, Exhibit B, " prevents the plaintiff from foreclosing what otherwise is a valid blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note furnished to the trial court?

Wilkin Rodriguez testified that the original promissory notes that are being foreclosed undergo a number of changes after the closing. Each of those changes occurs at the lender’s facilities. Each copy of the loan documents is capable of being scanned into the lender’s computer system. Therefore multiple copies of the same note each with different changes could appear on the lender’s computer system.

A fair inference from that testimony leads to the following logical factual conclusion. The first change would be the addition of a loan number. The loan number would be added to the blue ink note by the lender after the signed note was returned from the lawyer’s office after the closing. The lender therefore would have had the opportunity to scan into the lender’s computer record keeping system a note without a loan number and then scan into the lender’s computer record keeping system a second version of the note with the loan number. An undated endorsement is placed on the note at some later time after the closing. Maybe the undated endorsement is placed on the scanned version of the note with a loan number or the scanned version of the note without the loan number or both. If both, that would mean that at that time there would be four different versions of the note already scanned into the lender’s computer record keeping system: (1) the note without a loan number; (2) the note with the loan number; (3) the note with the loan number and the blank endorsement; and (4) the note without the loan number and the blank endorsement. Those four versions could very well have been located in the computer record keeping system kept by WAMU prior to September 25, 2008. Thereafter the FDIC took over the note as the receiver and the FDIC may have made scanned images of any of those four documents into the FDIC’s computer record keeping system. On September 28, 2008 JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. acquired this loan. JP Morgan started to make the changes that they deem necessary to convert the loan to their own computer record keeping system. JP Morgan could have used any of the four different versions of the WAMU note that may have been placed into the Washington Mutual Bank’s computer system. The first step would have been to place the Chase bull’s eye on the note. It may have placed the Chase bull’s eye on only one of the notes creating a fifth version of the note or placed the Chase bull’s eye on all four of the WAMU notes creating eight versions of the note. Chase had its own loan number. It was different from a WAMU loan number. Therefore the old loan number from WAMU had to be deleted and a new Chase loan number added. This could have compounded even further the number of copies of the note found in the Chase computer system. It appears reasonable to this court whoever was in charge of scanning in the note into the Chase computer system chose the most pristine copy of the Adjustable Rate Note that was already in existence in the WAMU system; the first version of the note that contained no stamped endorsement. To that pristine copy the bull’s eye was placed as well as the two endorsements shown in Exhibit 59. The two endorsements would have been added to the note after the bull’s eye was placed on the upper right of the note. This appears to be the provenance of Exhibit 59.

The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note executed by Richard Holt has been brought to this court by the plaintiff and examined by this court at trial. It is that blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note that is being foreclosed. Ex. 3. It is the only note that is being foreclosed in this litigation. The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note in the version of Exhibit 59 has not been brought to this court. It has not been examined by this court. That Exhibit 59 version cannot be the subject of a foreclosure, since the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note has not been examined by the court. Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 310 Conn. 124. No blue ink version of any other note has been presented to this court at trial. The court therefore finds that Exhibit 3, with the blank endorsement signed by Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. by Cynthia Riley, Vice President, is a photocopy of the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note and the existence of Exhibit 59 with different endorsements does not prevent the foreclosure of that blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, a photocopy of which is marked before this court as Exhibit 3. 21st Mortgage Corporation v. Schumacher, 171 Conn.App. 470, 486 (2017).

Although we acknowledge that the defendant presented some evidence that called into question the possible existence of other allonges to this note, that evidence, even if credited, does not negate the fact that the plaintiff possesses both the original note specifically endorsed to it and an assignment of mortgage on the defendant’s property, used to secure the note. On this basis, we conclude that the plaintiff had standing to foreclose and that the trial court properly rendered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.

21st Mortgage Corporation v. Schumaker, 171 Conn.App. 470, 486 (2017).

On and after July 1, 2008, a mortgagee who desires to foreclose upon a mortgage which satisfies the standards contained in subdivisions (1), (9), (10) and (11) of subsection (e) of section 8-265ff, shall give notice to the mortgagor by registered, or certified mail, postage prepaid at the address of the property which is secured by the mortgage. No such mortgagee may commence a foreclosure of a mortgage prior to mailing such notice. Such notice shall advise the mortgagor of his delinquency or other default under the mortgage and shall state that the mortgagor has sixty days from the date of such notice in which to (1) have a face-to-face meeting, telephone or other conference acceptable to the authority with the mortgagee or a face-to-face meeting with a consumer credit counseling agency to attempt to resolve the delinquency or default by restructuring the loan payment schedule or otherwise, and (2) contact the authority, at an address and phone number contained in the notice, to obtain information and apply for emergency mortgage assistance payments if the mortgagor and mortgagee are unable to resolve the delinquency or default.

General Statutes § 8-265ee(a).

This third and instant foreclosure action was commenced on December 16, 2008 returnable on December 30, 2008. Acting by its counsel of record, Bendett & McHugh, P.C., the EMAP notice described in Gen. Stat. § 8-265ee(a) was sent to Richard L. Holt aka Richard Holt on November 12, 2008 and to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company on November 12, 2008. Ex. 28 (#367.00). Both Certified Mail Receipt forms prepared by the U.S. Postal Service were attached to each letter in pleading #367.00. A PS Form 3811 signed on behalf of the two LLCs is part of pleading #367.00. The Affidavit of Compliance with the Emergency Mortgage Assistance Program dated September 4, 2015 was marked as Exhibit 28 at trial. (#367.00.)

The court finds that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of General Statutes § 8-265ee(a) prior to the commencement of this December 2008 foreclosure in docket number FST CV 08-5009720 S.

The March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note has the following provisions for a Notice of Default in paragraph 7(C): " If I am in default, the Note Holder may send me a written notice telling me that if I do not pay the overdue amount by a certain date, the Note Holder may require me to pay immediately the full amount of principal which has not been paid and all the interest that I owe on that amount. That date must be at least 10 days after the date on which the notice is delivered or mailed to me ..." Paragraph 8 requires that: " any notice that must be given to me under this Note will be given by delivering it or by mailing it by first class mail to me at the Property Address ..." Paragraph 21 of the Open-End Mortgage requires: " a date, not less than 30 days from the date the notice is given to Borrower, by which the default must be cured; ..."

Two separate Notice of Default and Right to Cure Letters were sent, one to Richard L. Holt aka Richard Holt and the second to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company a/k/a Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company on November 12, 2008. Both were sent by Certified Mail. Ex. 28 (#367.00). Both complied with the time requirements of the Open-End Mortgage paragraph 21 and the Adjustable Rate Note paragraphs 7 and 8. Both complied with the other notice requirements of the Open-End Mortgage and Adjustable Rate Note. Ex. 23, Ex. 41, Ex. 51.

Multiple notices of default and notices of right to cure were sent concerning the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. See Ex. 5 dated February 14, 2008. Those notices were sent in accordance with the mortgage documents. As a result of the failure to cure three separate foreclosure actions were filed. The first was returnable on November 19, 2002 docket number FST CV 02-0192482 S. A Notice of Default and Notice of Right to Cure was sent on June 13, 2002 in the first foreclosure. Ex. 16. That foreclosure was withdrawn on October 17, 2005 (#129.55), after the August 29, 2005 payment of $99,900.37, Ex. 117, which paid off the arrears of interest and real estate taxes and insurance advanced by plaintiff on loan ... 0590. The parties have stipulated that the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was assigned a loan number ending in 0590. Ex. 37. Practice Book § 4-7. A notice of default issued in support of a prior foreclosure action, satisfied the mortgage default notice conditions for the second foreclosure action. Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, supra, 72 Conn.App. 706, 708.

The loan was later declared in default by an August 29, 2005 Notice of Default letter dated February 14, 2008. Ex. 5. Thereafter the second foreclosure action was commenced in returnable April 1, 2008, docket number FST CV 08-5006915 S. That second foreclosure was withdrawn by the plaintiff on September 24, 2008. (#114.55.)

No separate notices of acceleration before any of the three foreclosures were presented to this court at trial. The commencement of the foreclosure action itself is an act of acceleration. Hartford Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Tucker et al., 196 Conn. 172, 180 (1985); Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, supra, 72 Conn.App. 708. The withdrawal of the first two foreclosure actions terminated the acceleration. Id., 708. The court finds that the Notice of Default dated November 12, 2008 was the notice relied on by the plaintiff in commencing and trying this third foreclosure. Based on Connecticut law the plaintiff could have relied on the two prior Notices of Default, Ex. 16 on June 13, 2002 and Ex. 15 on February 14, 2008. All three of these Notices of Default satisfies the requirements of the Adjustable Rate Note and the Open-End Mortgage.

The defendants argue that the parties to the Adjustable Rate Note and Open-End Mortgage deed are incorrect and prevent the plaintiff from obtaining a foreclosure judgment. The court finds that the Borrower is Richard Holt aka Richard L. Holt. The mortgagor is the owner of the real property, Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. Richard Holt applied to Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. for a $308,000 loan in order to pay off two existing mortgages on the real property of 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, Connecticut. Although the title to 23 Ridgewood Road had been in Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company since September 16, 1996, Ex. 70, the loan applications submitted by Richard Holt claimed that he held title or was going to hold title to the real property of 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, CT. Ex. 19 (three different versions of a Uniform Residential Loan Application for this $308,000 refinance loan). Thereafter the internal documents of the lender, mortgage broker and/or loan underwriter noted: " Receipt of preliminary Title Report." Ex. 18, fifth page. In each of these following documents as well as the three Uniform Residential Loan Applications, Richard Holt was always the Borrower. Ex. 18, Ex. 19.

At the March 22, 2000 closing Richard Holt executed the Adjustable Rate Note on Page 6 of 6 above the signature line under which " RICHARD HOLT" had been typed. Ex. 3. The Adjustable Rate Note does not contain the name of either Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company or Dorsum Lemus Limited Liability Company or Dorsum Nemus, LLC or Dorsum Lemus, LLC. The name of the Borrower is not printed or typed in any of the other six pages of the Adjustable Rate Note. The Adjustable Rate Note references in paragraph 1: " BORROWER’S PROMISE TO PAY, " " In the return for a loan that I have received, I promise to pay ..." The word " I" is not defined but according to common understanding refers to Richard Holt whose name and signature appear at the end of the Adjustable Rate Note. The real property that would be the subject of the Open-End Mortgage is described in the Adjustable Rate Note above the preprinted line " (Property Address)."

The Open-End Mortgage refers to the mortgagor as " DORSUM LEMUS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY." The court has already granted the First Count in reformation and thus the mortgagor as reformed by this Memorandum of Decision is " DORSUM NEMUS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY." The Open-End Mortgage specifically refers to " Borrower’s note date the same date." Ex. 1, page 1. The " (" Property Address") listed in the Open-End Mortgage is the same as the Property Address in the Adjustable Rate Note. Ex. 3. The signature page, Page 8 of 8, has a signature line under which is printed the name " RICHARD HOLT" with Mr. Holt’s signature on the signature line. The signature page makes no reference to a Limited Liability Company or an LLC. The representative capacity of Richard Holt in regards to a Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company is not stated in the Open-End Mortgage. Mr. Holt’s signature was witnessed by the two attorneys who attended the March 22, 2002 closing, Mr. Holt’s personal attorney, Larry F. Ginsberg, and the settlement agent, attorney, Natalie S. Kerler. The plaintiff did not sue for reformation of the signature line of the Open-End Mortgage.

The court notes two other documents that were prepared and signed at the March 22, 2000 closing: a HUD-1 Settlement Statement, Ex. 22, and CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESOLUTION, Ex. 4. Both refer to the Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company and Dorsum Nemus, LLC. Richard Holt signed the above mentioned Certificate as Manager of Dorsum Nemus, LLC and he represented that he was " acting as Manager, is hereby authorized to execute the Mortgage, Promissory Note, HUD-1 Settlement Statement, Title Affidavit and any documents, as required in connection with said refinance or as required by the lender. Ex. 4, 3rd paragraph. Lizbeth Holt, aka Lizbeth Holt, Richard Holt’s wife of over thirty years, testified that she and her husband were the only members of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company and in March 2000 Richard Holt was its manager. She stated that she had no basis to believe that they did not get the $308,000 at the March 22, 2000 closing. She identified Richard Holt’s signature on Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. She does not know what Dorsum Lemus, LLC is. The $308,000.00 was paid to Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company at the closing, after closing costs were paid, two prior mortgages, the real property taxes were paid off and $171,830.16 was paid by the lender. Ex. 22, line 1604. The defendants’ claim that Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company did not execute the Open-End Mortgage has not been proven by either of the defendants.

The HUD-1 settlement statement in the box for " Name and Address of Borrower" lists Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company, not Richard Holt. The Borrower signature has been signed by Richard Holt as Manager Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. The March 22, 2006 Adjustable Rate Note names Richard Holt individually as Borrower. He signed the note in his individual capacity. Ex. 3. All of the loan applications presented to the court list Richard Holt individually as Borrower and he signed those loan applications in his individual name. Ex. 19. The slight error naming the LLC as Borrower in Ex. 22 cannot change the fact that the Borrower is and has always been Richard Holt individually.

Paragraph 5 of the operative complaint alleges: " Said note and mortgage are now in default by virtue of nonpayment of the installments of principal and interest due on September 1, 2005 and each and every month thereafter." The evidence before this court shows a payment made on August 19, 2005 and the filing by the plaintiff on August 29, 2015 of a Motion to Open and Vacate Judgment (#128.00) in that first foreclosure action docket number FST CV 02-0192482 S. Ex. 117. See $99,900.37 check dated August 19, 2005 issued by defendant’s attorney of record to plaintiff’s attorney of record on note ... 0590, Ex. 37. See same $99,900.37 check as well as a check to the Committee for Sale appointed in that first foreclosure action with a memo: " WAMU v. Holt ... 2482." Ex. 117. The defendant did offer additional proof of payments along with correspondence and writing documents. Ex. 14, Ex. 15. All of these additional proof of payment documents and checks in those two exhibits are dated in the year 2002. Ex. 14, Ex. 15. None are dated in 2005 or thereafter. An explanatory letter regarding payments and credits is dated November 23, 2004. Ex. 12. There is no reference in that letter of any payments being made on the note in 2005 or later. The affidavit of debt and the other pleadings on file all disclose September 2005 as the date of the last payment. Ex. 23, paragraph 3 and 4, Ex. 36, Ex. 57, " Interest Due From 8/1/05, " Ex. 64, 3rd page and 6th page. The court finds that the defendants are in default of the payments due on the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note since the monthly payment due on September 1, 2005 with interest accruing from August 1, 2005. The court finds that no payments on the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note were made after the $99,900.37 August 2005 payment. No evidence of any payments after August 2005 were presented to this court.

" [I]n order to establish a prima facie case in a mortgage foreclosure action, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it is the owner of the note and mortgage, that the defendant mortgagor has defaulted on the note and that any conditions precedent to foreclosure, as established by the note and mortgage, have been satisfied." Franklin Credit Management Corporation v. Nicholas, 73 Conn.App. 830, 838, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 937 (2003); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Trustee v. Strong, 149 Conn.App. 384, 392 (2014).

This court finds as follows: After reformation, the defendant, Richard Holt aka Richard L. Holt, borrowed $308,000 from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. on March 22, 2000, he is the Borrower, Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company secured that March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note with a first mortgage on the real property described in Schedule A of the Open-End Mortgage, the defendants defaulted in September 2005 by non-payment pursuant to the terms of the Note and Mortgage, no payments have been made on the Note after the $99,900.37 August 2005 payment, a notice of default was duly issued, the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was acquired by JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association by the plaintiff in this foreclosure action from Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. and the FDIC on September 25, 2008 by a Purchase and Assumption Agreement, the plaintiff owns the Note, the plaintiff has standing to enforce the Note, all conditions precedent of the Note and Mortgage have been satisfied by the plaintiff, the EMAP statute has been complied with, and plaintiff’s counsel was in possession of the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note at the commencement of this lawsuit on December 16, 2008 and until the presentation of the Note to this court for its examination and approval, which examination and approval this count has completed, a copy of which was marked as Exhibit 3 in evidence in this case. The court further finds that the defendants have failed to " provide sufficient proof that the holder of the note is not the owner of the debt." U.S. Bank, National Association, Trustee v. Schaeffer, supra, 160 Conn.App. 146-47. The court finds that the plaintiff has proven the allegations of Count Two of its foreclosure complaint. The court now turns to the claims made by the defendants.

The reader of this Memorandum of Decision by this time has a general flavor of the detailed nature of the issues that have been raised including but not limited to the substitution of the letter L for the letter N, the claim of a mis-description of the real property by reason of Ridgewood being described in the alternative as Avenue, Drive or Road, and the location in Richard Holt’s bankruptcy proceedings of different endorsements on a photocopy of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note.

The operative Answer filed by both defendants is the aforementioned Amended Answer that contains fifty numbered Special Defenses and eighteen numbered Counterclaims dated June 27, 2013. (#184.00.) See page 67 of 90 for the Fiftieth Special Defense. See page 88 of 90 for the Eighteenth Counterclaim. (#184.00.) Most of the issues already discussed by this court in this Memorandum of Decision were not raised specifically in any of the Special Defenses or Counterclaims. " ... that counsel thought of every possible claim, from the most meritorious to the most frivolous, and everything in between ..." State v. Davis, 311 Conn. 468, 497 (2014).

The court is well aware of its obligation to allow the defendant, Richard Holt, as a self-represented party, some latitude. The court has tried to do this throughout these proceedings. However, " the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law ... Self represented parties are not afforded a lesser standard of compliance, and although we are solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants ... such a litigant is bound by the same rules ... and procedure as those qualified to practice law." In re Emile L., 126 Conn.App. 283, 285, fn.3 (2011). " This court has always been solicitous of the rights of pro se litigants and, like the trial court, will endeavor to see that such a litigant shall have the opportunity to have his case fully and fairly heard so far as such latitude is consistent with the just rights of any adverse party ... Although we will not entirely disregard our rules of practice, we do give great latitude to pro se litigants in order that justice may both be done and be seen to be done ... For justice to be done, however, any latitude given to pro se litigants cannot interfere with the rights of other parties, nor can we disregard completely our rules of practice." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wasilewski v. Machuga, 92 Conn.App. 341, 342 (2005). Throughout these proceedings this court advised the defendant, Richard Holt, concerning the multiple claims that he is raising and this court attempted to resolve a number of those issues by way of stipulation, compromise or narrowing of the issues. On multiple occasions the court advised the defendant, Richard Holt, of the oft cited rule that: " Multiplicity hints at a lack of confidence in any one issue." Synakorn v. Commissioner of Corrections, 124 Conn.App. 768, 775 (2010) " Multiplying assignments will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save a bad one ... The effect of adding weak arguments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones." Comacho v. Commissioner of Corrections, 148 Conn.App. 488, 496 (2014). " A brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk burying good arguments ... in a verbal mound made of strong and weak contentions ... Indeed, experienced advocates since time beyond memory have emphasized the importance of winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible, or at most on a few key issues ... Most cases present only one, two, or three significant questions." Mozell v. Commissioner of Corrections, 87 Conn.App. 560, 563, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 934 (2005). This court read that specific language to Richard Holt on a number of occasions and he pressed on. This court further read in court the following quote on a number of occasions: " Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate over-issue ... The effect of adding weak arguments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones." Browne v. Commissioner of Corrections, 158 Conn.App. 1, 23 (2015); Ormsby v. Frankel, 54 Conn.App. 93, 113, fn.6 (1999).

" In short, it is no surprise and, indeed, very understandable, that this history of litigiousness and attendant waste of resources could operate to frustrate the court." Zilkha v. Zilkha, 167 Conn.App. 480, 487, fn.2 (2016): Garvey v. Valencis, 177 Conn.App. 578, 594 (2017) (" protracted litigious presentation"): Maris v. McGrath, 58 Conn.App. 183, 191 (2000) (" This was purely recreational litigation ...").

[W]e are not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed ... We consistently have held that [a]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly ... [F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised on appeal ... the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse the judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed ... The parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited ... It is not enough merely to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court to do counsel’s work, create the ossature for the argument, and put flesh on its bones. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Prosper, 160 Conn.App. 61, 74-75, 125 A.3d 219 (2015).

NRT New England, LLC v. Jones, 162 Conn.App. 840, 856 (2016).

" Although we are solicitous of the rights of self-representative litigants ... this court is not required to review claims that are inadequately briefed." Cornelius v. Arnold, 168 Conn.App. 703, 718 (2016); Midland Funding, LLC v. Mitchell -James, 163 Conn.App. 648, 649, fn. 1 (2016). Claims are inadequately briefed when parties do not develop the claims with analysis. Marsala v. Yale -New Haven Hospital, Inc., 166 Conn.App. 432, 436 (2016).

" Common sense does not take flight at the courthouse door." State v. Louis, 163 Conn.App. 55, 65 (2016). " The state contends that the defendant’s constitutional claims were very sparse, repetitive, confusing, and not contained in separate headings, as required by Practice Book § 67-4d. We agree with the state, and conclude that the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the defendant’s constitutional claims were inadequately briefed." State v. Buhl, 321 Conn. 688, 722-23 (2016). " Moreover, the briefing of the defendant’s claims was not only short, but confusing, repetitive, and disorganized. Although she cited the appropriate standard of review and between three and six cases for each claim, she did not state the claims ‘clearly and succinctly, ’ such that the Appellate Court could fully understand them." State v. Buhl, supra, 321 Conn. 726-27. The Appellant failed to place the arguments under appropriate headings and into separate parts of his brief and the court properly declined to review the inaccurately briefed claims. Vertex, Inc. v. Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 563, fn.7 (2006).

" When an issue is merely mentioned, but not briefed beyond a bare assertion of the claim, it is deemed to have been waived ... In addition, mere conclusionary assertions regarding a claim, with no mention of relevant authority and minimal or no citations from the record will not suffice." Miller v. Department of Agriculture, 168 Conn.App. 255, 277 (2016) " Analysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue properly ... For this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of errors raised on appeal ... the parties must clearly and fully set forth their arguments in their briefs. We do not reverse a judgment of a trial court on the basis of challenges to its rulings that have not been adequately briefed ... the parties may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing the relationship between the facts of the case and the law cited ... Assignments of errors which are merely mentioned but not briefed beyond a statement of the claim will be deemed abandoned and will not be reviewed by this court." Paoletta v. Anchor Reef Club at Branford, LLC, 123 Conn.App. 402, 406 (2010).

" Pleadings have their place in our system of jurisprudence. While they are not held to the strict and artificial standard that once prevailed, we still cling to the belief, even in these iconoclastic days, that no orderly administration of justice is possible without them ... The purpose of a complaint or counterclaim is to limit the issues at trial, and such pleadings are calculated to prevent surprise ... It is fundamental in our law that the right of a party to recover is limited to the allegations in his pleading ... Facts found but not averred cannot be made the basis for a recovery ... Thus, it is clear that the court is not permitted to decide issues outside those raised in the pleadings." Petrov v. Gueorguieva, 167 Conn.App. 505, 516 (2016). Pleadings must provide " sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party." Data-Flow Technologies, LLC v. Harte Nissan, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 118, 132 (2008). One court categorized a multitude of issues being filed in the pleadings. " Instead, the plaintiffs essentially dump a grab bag of claims on the court, ask the court to sort them out, and somehow conclude that they amount to a violation of due process." Town of Middlebury v. Connecticut Siting Council, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket Number HHB CV 15-6029869 S (January 12, 2016, Shuman, J.).

Another trial court commented on fifteen allegations of factual claims in a small claims case removed to the Superior Court’s regular docket. " The allegations of this count are verbose in the extreme. The crucial allegations are contained in the lengthy paragraph 21, setting forth the following laundry list of factual claims." Hunt v. Pelliccia, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket Number CV 03-0479776 (September 29, 2009, Blue, J.). Judge Blue characterized the underlying case as a " dispute on steroids." This court has located other Connecticut cases with multiple Special Defenses and Counterclaims and cases when the pleadings have been placed in the " laundry list" category. A 2007 case referred to the twenty-one claims as qualifying for " the laundry list." A 2015 foreclosure pled twenty-eight Special Defenses that was exceeded only by twenty-nine Special Defenses in a Bridgeport foreclosure. The unofficial record appears to be: Deutsche Bank Trust Company America et al. v. Porzio, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 11-6011134-S (April 29, 2014, Tierney, J.T.R.) (Twelve Special Defenses pled plus an additional thirty-one defenses raised at trial and in the Post-Trial Memorandum of Law).

The defendants’ filed fifty numbered Special Defenses and eighteen numbered Counterclaims and they are dated June 27, 2013. (#184.00.) This pleading was the subject of a number of status conferences and discussions in open court during trial. In court the court pointed out the difficulties that this court had in understanding the essence of the Counterclaims and Special Defenses, and the difficulty of using incorporating by reference language from other Special Defenses to plead other Special Defenses and all of the Counterclaims located throughout this ninety-page pleading making it virtually impossible to read. The court noted that both defendants filed Special Defenses and there was no allocation as to whether each Special Defense applied to a single defendant, both defendants or if one defendant, which defendant. A number of the Special Defenses were withdrawn yet pleading #184.00 restated those Special Defenses in its withdrawn status creating further confusion. The court noted that the defendants failed to answer Count One, paragraph 7 but had previously denied those same allegations in previous Answers. The defendants’ Answer contained phrases: " Denies knowledge and information sufficient to plead to the balance of the allegations ..., " which is neither a denial nor inadequate knowledge leaving the plaintiff to its proof. This violates P.B. § 10-48. An unknown pleading entitled " COUNT ONE/COUNT TWO" on the 4th page of the Answer addressing the Statutes of Frauds is not a proper form of pleading since there is no compliance with Practice Book § § 10-6 and 10-10. The court cannot act on this portion of the Answer entitled " COUNT ONE/COUNT TWO." There are dozens of large blank portions of pages in pleading #184.00, which may or may not reference missing language. The Eleventh Special Defense incorporates paragraphs 1 though 7 of the Nineteenth Special Defense and yet the next numbered paragraph in the Eleventh Special Defense is paragraph 7. Why are there two paragraphs 7s? No facts were alleged supporting the Fortieth Special Defense alleging the statute of limitations, which alleges three different statutes. Each statute of limitation should have been alleged as a separate Special Defense each with supporting facts and the statute number. P.B. § 10-3(a). The defendants’ claim of the statute of limitations under Gen. Stat. § 52-576 fails to set forth a subsection, since Gen. Stat. § 52-576 refers to both a three-year statute and a six-year statute. Gen. Stat. § § 52-576(a) and 52-576(b). The court has no knowledge of which subsection or what number of years is being claimed. Gen. Stat. § 42a-3-118 is being claimed as a statute of limitations defense. That statute contains seven separate sections; with a three-, six- or ten-year statute of limitations. No subsection was delineated in the Gen. Stat. § 42a-3-118 Special Defense. The court therefore has no knowledge as to which subsection and number of years is being claimed for the statute of limitations Special Defenses. The incorporation of the Special Defense numbering system in the first Counterclaim is inaccurate in a number of regards. The heading of the Second Special Defense is incomprehensible because it refers to " prior version" and it is partially separated into the Forty-Fifth Special Defense. The First Special Defense is incomprehensible because it states: " prior version partially separated into the Thirty-First Special Defense in regard to the Plaintiff." The First and Second Special Defenses are incomprehensible because of the repetitive claims of $99,900.37 in each Special Defense.

Despite these facts being pointed out on the trial record on a number of occasions to the defendants, no explanation was given or short summation of the defendants’ pleading in the form of a trial brief or adequate correction attempted. The Amended Answer, Revised Special Defenses, Revised Counterclaims filed on January 14, 2016 was not accepted by the court. (#400.00.) That amendment with forty Special Defenses and twenty Counterclaims did not comply with the Practice Book § 10-60 requiring an agreement of the plaintiff or the opportunity for the plaintiff to object. It was only filed, signed and certified by Richard Holt and not by the attorney of record for the second defendant, Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. It was never separately ratified by counsel appearing for Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. In addition it compounded the confused nature of the defendants’ pleadings rather than clarifying them. (#400.00.)

Moreover, because the defendants have asserted various special defenses, we set forth the legal principles regarding defenses to foreclosure actions. " Historically, defenses to a foreclosure action have been limited to payment, discharge, release or satisfaction ... or, if there had never been a valid lien ... The purpose of a special defense is to plead facts that are consistent with the allegations of the complaint but demonstrate, nonetheless, that the plaintiff has no cause of action ... A valid special defense at law to a foreclosure proceeding must be legally sufficient and address the making, validity or enforcement of the mortgage, the note or both ... Where the plaintiff’s conduct is inequitable, a court may withhold foreclosure on equitable considerations and principles ... [O]ur courts have permitted several equitable defenses to a foreclosure action. [I]f the mortgagor is prevented by accident, mistake or fraud, from fulfilling a condition of the mortgage, foreclosure cannot be had ... Other equitable defenses that our Supreme Court has recognized in foreclosure actions include unconscionability ... abandonment of security ... and usury.

Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, 72 Conn.App. 700, 705-06 (2002); U.S. Bank National Association v. Blowers, 177 Conn.App. 622, 629 (2017).

Connecticut limits the types of Special Defenses to foreclosure. " The requirement serves to promote judicial economy through the swift and uncomplicated resolution of foreclosure proceedings while simultaneously allowing for equitable considerations when justice so requires." U.S. Bank, National Association, Trustee v. Blowers, supra, 177 Conn.App. 634.

" Practically speaking, however, neither this court nor our Supreme Court has ever expressed a finite list of equitable defenses available in a foreclosure action." TD Bank, N.A. v. M .J. Holdings, LLC, 143 Conn.App. 322, 327-28 (2013).

Many of the defendant’s Special Defenses are directed toward the alleged conduct of WAM U.See Special Defenses First, Second, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, Twentieth, Twenty-First, Twenty-Second, Twenty-Third, Twenty-Seventh, Thirty-First, Thirty-Fifth, Thirty-Seventh, Thirty-Eighth, Thirty-Ninth, Forty-Second, Forty-Third, Forty-Fourth, Forty-Fifth, Forty-Sixth, Forty-Seventh, Forty-Eighth, Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth of the fifty enumerated Special Defenses. (#184.00.) The defendants have removed or not pled eleven of the fifth numbered Special Defenses. (Removed are Special Defenses 4, 5, 7, 8, 10, 15, 32, 33, 34, 36 and 41.) Of the remaining Thirty-Nine Special Defenses, thirty address actions or wrongful conduct of the original lender WAMU.

We agree with the trial court that, to the extent that the defendants’ counterclaims are based upon alleged mis-dealings with the defendants by AWL, a nonparty to this foreclosure action, those counterclaims all fail as a matter of law because there is no evidence of record that the plaintiff expressly assumed the liabilities of the original lender, AWL, when it took the mortgage from AWL by assignment. Hartford v McKeever, 314 Conn. 255, 258-59, 101 A.3d 229 (2014); Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 370, 143 A.3d 638 (2016).

The Bank of New York Mellon, Trustee v. Mauro, 177 Conn.App. 295, 311 (2017).

" A mortgagor is precluded from bringing counterclaims against an assignee of a note and mortgage if such assignee has not expressly assumed the liability of the original assignor." Id., 310. The law is clear, there is no liability by the assignee for a counterclaim based on the omission or commission of the original lender, albeit the express assumption of liability.

While Connecticut’s appellate courts do not appear to have had an occasion to consider precisely the issue of the liability of an assignee for preassignment breaches by the assignor, numerous other courts have ruled that to be liable for the assignor’s nonperformance of duties under a contract, the assignee must have expressly assumed liability for the prior breaches.

Fremont Investment & Loan v. Santiago, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket Number CV 06-5001151 S (January 13, 2010, Martin, J.).

A line of Superior Court cases hold " that an assignee is not responsible for the acts of an assignor." Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Ganci, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 05 4017440 (April 5, 2006, Satter, J.T.R.) ... In the present case, the plaintiff is an assignee of the note, and there is no evidence that it expressly assumed liability for the assignor’s prior breaches. As a result, the plaintiff may not be held responsible for the alleged wrongful conduct of its successor in interest.

Fremont Investment & Loan v. Santiago, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket Number CV 06-5001151 S (January 13, 2010, Martin, J.).

" Some of our trial courts have found that both defenses and counterclaims can be asserted against the assignee on the basis of the assignor’s conduct prior to the assignment ... Other trial courts have found that to be liable for the assignor’s preassignment conduct, the assignee must have expressly assumed liability for such conduct ... For the following reasons, we adopt the latter conclusion." City of Hartford v. McKeever, 139 Conn.App. 277, 284 (2012), aff’d 314 Conn. 255 (2014). (Assignee cannot be held liable to the defendant for overpayment on the note before it was assigned to the plaintiff).

" In the absence of an express contract provision, an assignee generally does not assume the original responsibilities of the assignor, but he or she may be liable for breach of the terms of the assignment or for his or her failure to perform obligations of the assignor which he or she has assumed." City of Hartford v. McKeever, supra, 314 Conn. 265.

In the foreclosure before this court, the original lender, Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. failed and a receiver was appointed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Ex. 24. As a result of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement entered into between the FDIC as receiver of Washington Mutual and JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association on September 25, 2008, the plaintiff became the owner of the loans of WAMU by operation of law. Ex. 24, Ex. 62, Article III, Section 3.1, page 9; JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Simoulidis, 161 Conn.App. 133, 137-39, fn. 5 (2015). The Purchase and Assumption Agreement contains a lengthy provision that any liability whatsoever " arising in connection with the Failed Bank’s lending or loan purchase activities are specifically not assumed by the Assuming Bank." Ex. 62 Article II, Section 2.5. The Failed Bank is Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. and the Assuming Bank is JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association. In addition to the Purchase and Assumption Agreement of September 25, 2008, Ex. 62, and the two-page FDIC factual affidavit, Ex. 24, this court had before it two Indemnification Obligation letters issued by Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, the attorney for JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. to the FDIC; June 24, 2014, Ex. 73 and September 12, 2014, Ex. 72. Both letters contain the fact that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. did not assume the general liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. by reason of the September 25, 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement. Ex. 62.

Although no Connecticut case has discussed this WAMU successor liability claim, other courts have done so. " The P&A Agreement expressly provided that Chase did not assume borrower claims against WAMU arising prior to September 25, 2008." Aragon v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, No. 2:09-CV-00793-DS (D. Utah, January 28, 2010). This holding has been adopted in Connecticut. Caires v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, 745 F.Supp.2d, 40, 49-50 (September 30, 2010, Bryant, J.). The identical Section 2.5 of the same Purchase and Assumption Agreement was at issue in Caires . The Connecticut District Court dismissed Caires’ claims against JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. based on Section 2.5 of the September 25, 2008 Purchase and Assumption Agreement stating: " Various courts have recently reviewed the efficacy of this very Purchase and Assumption Agreement clause between the FDIC and Chase." Id., 49.

The court finds that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., has not " expressly assumed liability for the prior breaches" of WAMU. In fact the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., has contractually disavowed any such liability in Section 2.5 of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement. Ex. 62. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. FDIC, 109 F.Supp.3d 179, 212, fn.40 (2015). The court finds that each one of the above-mentioned thirty-nine Special Defenses based on the pre-September 25, 2008 conduct of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. and/or Washington Mutual Bank must fail. Regardless of that finding, this court will discuss each of the thirty-nine actually alleged Special Defenses in numerical order. The court finds that neither defendant discussed any of the numbered Special Defenses in their Post-Trial Memorandum of Law dated November 8, 2017 (#499.00, #500.00, #501.00) and thus both have abandoned those legal and factual claims.

The court will now turn to the Special Defenses filed by the two defendants, Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company, on June 27, 2013. (#184.00, pages 5-68.)

First Special Defense

This special defense contains three numbered paragraphs which follow a heading. The heading states: " prior version partially separated into the Thirty-First Special Defense in regard to the Plaintiff." The Thirty-First Special Defense (#184.00) also contains a heading that states: " formerly First Special Defense B." The Thirty First Special Defense accuses JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. of failing to correct errors and failing to take action on August 19, 2005, over three years before JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. acquired the defendant’s loan. The court concludes that the use of headings in this Special Defense and other Special Defenses creates confusion and renders this and other such Special Defense incomprehensible. The court is able to understand and will address the claims raised in the three numbered paragraphs of the First Special Defense, which claims payment. In future discussions the court will disregard the heading portion of each Special Defense.

Payment is a recognized special defense permitted by Practice Book P.B. § 10-50. The First Special Defense alleges that two types of payment were not properly credited to the mortgage loan. The first was the sum of $99,900.37 made on or about August 19, 2005 and the second alleges: " on other occasions rejected payments proffered and misapplied, lost and failed to credit payments." The second set of alleged payments failed to state the date and amount of each specific payment.

Turning to the first claim of $99,900.37, the court heard testimony from Attorney Larry F. Ginsburg. On behalf of the defendants he received a large deposit to his attorney’s trustee account in the summer of 2005 wired from an European account. At that time the first foreclosure action on this March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note and the mortgage secured thereby was pending. Washington Mutual Bank v. Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, docket number FST CV 02-0192482 S. That first foreclosure action was returnable to the Superior Court on November 19, 2002. Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg filed an appearance for both defendants on November 21, 2002 and continued to represent all of the defendants until the plaintiff withdrew the first foreclosure action on October 17, 2005. (#129.55.) In that first foreclosure action a judgment of foreclosure had entered on December 22, 2003. (#109.00.) The bankruptcy filing thereafter prevented the foreclosure from being completed. (#120.00.) The bankruptcy was terminated (#123.00) and thereafter a new judgment of foreclosure by sale entered on May 23, 2005 (#123.00). Attorney Ginsberg testified that he utilized the funds in his attorney’s trustee account and issued an August 19, 2005 check in the amount of $99,900.37 payable to the attorney for the foreclosing lender, Hunt Leibert Trustee. Ex. 37, Ex. 117. That check was endorsed by Hunt Leibert as Trustee to Washington Mutual Bank. Deposit stamps with partially redacted account numbers of " Washington Mutual" appear on the reverse of the check. Ex. 117. Attorney Ginsberg testified that he thought this $99,900.37 payment brought the $308,000 mortgage current and that this $99,900.37 payment caused the first foreclosure action to be withdrawn. Attorney Ginsberg also paid the Committee, Nicholas W. Theiman, Esq., $1,845.41 from his trustee account on the same date. Ex. 37. Immediately thereafter the lender’s attorney filed a Motion to Open and Vacate Judgment on August 29, 2005 after the $99,900.37 check would have cleared. (#128.00). The first foreclosure action was withdrawn in October 2, 2005, also well after the $99,900.37 check would have cleared. This current foreclosure action claims that on or after August 19, 2005 no further mortgage or loan payments have been made.

Although no payment history showing the date and amount of each payment and the credit for those payments toward principal, interest and escrow is before this court, the court has a trial exhibit that is entitled " Chase Detailed Transaction History, " Ex. 36. The court notes that there are 132 payment periods in this Transaction History starting from July 12, 2002 and ending on July 6, 2012. The column entitled " Principal Bal." remains the same for all 132 payment periods in the amount of $296,828.87. This is the exact amount of the " Unpaid Principal Balance" in the September 30, 2015 Payoff Statement. Ex. 57. This is the exact amount of the " Principal due" in the Richard Holt’s bankruptcy filings. Ex. 64, 3rd page of 8 pages. According to the plaintiff’s evidence, the Adjustable Rate Note was signed on March 22, 2000 in the face amount of $308,000 with periodic monthly payments of principal and interest due for 30 years with the first payment due on May 1, 2000. The plaintiff’s complaint claims a default in the monthly payment due September 1, 2005. No balloon or large payment was due according to the terms of the Adjustable Rate Note. It appears reasonable to this court to assume that the monthly payments were made each month or credited for each month from May 2000 to August 2005. Some of these payments reduced the principal amount over that five plus years. It seems reasonable to this court that the principal due on the original $308,000 loan would be reduced over those five years and five months. No mortgage amortization schedule has been produced in evidence to verify the exact reduction in principal due on this thirty-year amortized mortgage loan.

In any event the principal due was in the amount of $296,828.87 as of the first date in the Transaction History. That amount of principal remained the same throughout all of the 132 monthly payment periods in Exhibit 36. The court therefore cannot rely on Exhibit 36 as being a complete and accurate record of any and all payments made by the Borrower on the $308,000 loan. Therefore the fact that a one-time payment of $99,900.37 is not in the Chase Transaction History is not evidence that the $99,900.37 payment was not paid to the lender and credited by the lender. Wilkin Rodriguez testified that his examination of the plaintiff’s corporation records showed the posting of the $99,900.37 payment on August 25, 2005. Other than Mr. Rodriguez’s credible testimony no documents supported that fact other than the back of the check. Ex. 117.

More telling is the documentation and testimony already before this court. As of August 19, 2005, the day the $99,900.37 check was paid by the defendants’ lawyer to the plaintiff’s lawyer with the loan number ... 0509 inserted in the Memo line of the check, the loan had been declared in default and foreclosure litigation had been pending for over three and one-half years. The Superior Court computer system, Edison, can print out a docket sheet with the date and title of pleadings and court orders for the 2002 foreclosure action. The 2002 foreclosure was not an electronic tile and the pleadings cannot be read on that Edison docket sheet. It was paper file. After the withdrawal in late 2005, the paper file was destroyed on December 8, 2006. That fact was furnished to each party by this court on the first day of trial, May 2014. In that 2002 foreclosure both parties were represented by the same attorneys as have appeared in this third foreclosure action. The parties and/or their attorneys should have had access to the records of this 2002 foreclosure file but neither party presented much if any of the records and pleadings from the first foreclosure that commenced in 2002 and was withdrawn in 2005.

It is of importance as to whether or not the $99,900.37 was credited to the outstanding interest and advances made by the plaintiff for real estate taxes and property insurance as of August 2005. The plaintiff alleges a default in monthly payment due as of September 2005 in its complaint. That is a judicial admission by the plaintiff that the loan was current in its periodic payments of principal, interest and escrow for real estate taxes and property insurance as of September 1, 2005. Drieier v. The Upjohn Company, 196 Conn. 242, 248 (1985). The plaintiff submitted a July 11, 2003 Affidavit in the first foreclosure alleging that interest remained unpaid from March 1, 2002 and was accruing additional interest at the rate of 5.48%. The unpaid interest for March 2002 to June 30, 2003 was $23,900.48 and the escrow advances for real estate taxes and insurance paid by the plaintiff was an additional $28,794.08 as of the July 11, 2003 Affidavit. Ex. 13. It is unusual for periodic monthly payments to continue to be made by a borrower after the declaration by the lender of a default, the institution of a foreclosure lawsuit and the hiring of attorneys by both parties in the foreclosure. In any event this court has no evidence, testimony or documents that any payments were made by the defendants on or after July 2003 until the $99,900.37 payment on August 19, 2005. Ex. 37, Ex. 117. The principal due on July 11, 2003 was $315,654.00. The per diem rate of interest was $45.92. Ex. 13. Two more years of interest from July 2003 at that rate brings the debt due as of July 2005 to $86,215 ($45.92 x 365 x 2 = $33,521) ($23,900 + 28, 794 + 33, 521 = $86,215). In addition two more years of property insurance and real estate tax would probably have been advanced by plaintiff, easily bringing the total to $99,900.37.

On November 23, 2004 the Holt’s escrow account had a negative balance of $38,087.70. In addition as of November 23, 2004 the balance due on the loan that was unpaid for periodic payments of principal and interest was $67,344.83. Ex. 12. WAMU agreed on November 23, 2004 to waive just over $10,000 in fees and arrears reducing the above principal and interest arrears to $57,033.51. Thus the total due as of November 23, 2004 was $95,121.21 ($38,087.70 + $57,033.51 = $95,121.21). Some of that November 23, 2004 credit and waiver was a reduction in principal. More interest would have accrued from November 23, 2004 to August 17, 2005 as well as increased escrow advances made by the plaintiff. Easily the sum of $99,900.37 could be computed accurately from this history of arrears. Ex. 12. There is no evidence that any of the $99,900.37 was a reduction in principal. It only paid unpaid interest and escrow advances made by the plaintiff.

The court finds that the entire $99,900.37 was applied to accrued unpaid interest and escrow advances made by the plaintiff for Holt’s nonpayment of real estate taxes and insurance premiums. The court finds that none of the $99,900.37 remained therewith to be applied to a reduction of principal due. The court finds that none of the $99,900.37 was paid to principal and none of the $99,900.37 reduced the principal due.

The payment of $99,900.37 brought the mortgage current. The pending foreclosure was withdrawn so testified attorney Larry F. Ginsberg on direct testimony. Attorney Ginsberg said that the $99,900.37 was a payment on this very Holt $308,000 loan. There was no evidence that the $99,900.37 check did not clear. Ex. 37, Ex. 117. Attorney Ginsberg also testified that he made an approximate $1,000 payment from his Trustee account after August 2005 but the plaintiff never cashed that check. No documents were presented to this court that the $1,000 payment was accepted by the plaintiff and cashed.

This court finds that the above documents as well as the testimony of Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg and Wilkin Rodriguez support this court’s finding that the $99,900.37 was paid by the defendants, accepted by the then lender and applied by the lender as payment in full of the then outstanding real estate taxes and insurance escrow advanced by the lender and the accrued interest that had been unpaid to date. The evidence further confirms this court’s finding that no reduction in principal was made by the payment of the $99,900.37. It paid only back real estate taxes and insurance advanced by the lender as well as unpaid interest on the then outstanding principal. This is further confirmed by the calculation of debt from 2002 to August 2005 using Exhibit 33. The court therefore finds that the sum of $99,900.37 has been properly applied by the lender to the indebtedness as set forth in the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. Therefore the issues as to the $99,900.37 as alleged in the First Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

The defendant also offered a package of documents that are disorganized, duplicative, inconsistent, and contain a lot of handwritten notes. Ex. 14, Ex. 15. The figures on those two exhibits total less than $5,000. Ex. 14, Ex. 15. These documents were offered to support the remaining claims that the defendants made payments on the mortgage and those payments were not credited toward the debt. The court has examined both exhibits carefully and has reached the conclusion that these two exhibits, Ex. 14 and Ex, 15, do not support a specific dollar payment made by the defendants to the plaintiff lender nor the failure of the plaintiff lender to credit any of such payments. All of the documents in Exhibit 14 and 15 are in the year 2002. After the $99,900.37 was credited to this mortgage in August 2005, the next monthly payment was due on September 1, 2005. No such payment was made. No payments were made after August 2005.

Later correspondence between the parties offered in evidence in this case establish that the lender had forgiven a number of late payment charges and had issued further credits to the defendant in resolution of the defendants’ claim that partial payments of interest and principal had been made and not been credited toward the indebtedness. Ex. 12. The letter dated November 23, 2014 was a full exhibit at trial. The court finds that the credits and forgiveness all occurred in 2014, well before the August 2015 payment of $99,900.37. The First Special Defense allege payment, but only partial payment. Partial payment is not a valid foreclosure Special Defense. Fidelity Bank v. Krenisky, supra, 72 Conn.App. 716. The court will review the partial payment claim for the year 2002 when it determines the debt. The court finds that the November 23, 2004 credits and waiver of fees have already been applied by the plaintiff in 2014 and this court at this time will not give any credit based on the November 23, 2004 letter. Ex. 12. The court finds the issues on the entire First Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Second Special Defense

The Second Special Defense incorporates paragraphs one through three of the Third Special Defense, which the court would not yet have been read since it did not precede the Second Special Defense. The Practice Book does not permit the incorporation of language from future pleadings. This incorporation language will be disregarded and discussed when this court discusses the Third Special Defense.

The tenor of the Second Special Defense is that the lender by failing to credit the $99,900.37 made on or about August 19, 2005 and the rejection of other payments is in breach of contract. Those underlying claims of payments have been dealt with by this court in the First Special Defense. This Second Special Defense is merely a reallegation of the defendant’s claim that payments were made and not credited toward the loan which claim this court has already rejected in the First Special Defense. The court finds that the plaintiff has not assumed liability for the commission or omission of WAMU. The court finds the issues on the Second Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Third Special Defense

The Third Special Defense claims that a valid thirty-day curative letter, which is claimed to be a mandatory precedent to filing of a foreclosure action, was not provided by the Plaintiff and was not served upon the defendants either at all or in the matter provided by the note and mortgage. This court has already found the Notice of Default letters and the EMAP letter satisfy the requirements of law. The issues on the Third Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Fourth Special Defense

No Fourth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Fifth Special Defense

No Fifth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Sixth Special Defense

The defendant’s allegations in the Sixth Special Defense relate to a claimed ninety-day moratorium or housing rescue plan dated December 4, 2008. No such document or testimony was furnished to this court concerning that moratorium or housing rescue plan. The defendants have failed to sustain their burden of proof on the Sixth Special Defense. The issues on the Sixth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Seventh Special Defense

No Seventh Special Defense has been pled by either defendant. The defendants claim that what was formerly the Seventh Special Defense has now been replaced by both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Special Defenses. The court notes that there is no Fifteenth Special Defense. This court intends to render a decision on the Fourteenth Special Defense in a separate section of this Memorandum of Decision.

Eighth Special Defense

The defendants have failed to plead an Eighth Special Defense. The court will separately render a decision on the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Special Defense later on in this Memorandum of Decision.

Ninth Special Defense

The defendants are claiming that the name and signature of the owner of the collateral is missing from the " mortgage contract and the security agreement" and this foreclosure action is therefore barred by the Statute of Frauds, General Statutes § 52-550. This court has reviewed carefully the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, a photocopy of which is marked as Ex. 3 at trial. The court has reviewed the Open-End Mortgage, Ex. 1, and the Adjustable Rate Rider, Ex. 2. The borrower is the defendant, Richard Holt, and the owner of the real property securing the Open-End Mortgage is Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company acting by Richard Holt, its manager. At the closing on the $308,000 loan Richard Holt signed a CERTIFICATE OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY RESOLUTION indicating that he was the manager of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company and was authorized to execute all closing documents. Ex. 4. The court finds that Adjustable Rate Note was signed by Richard Holt individually as borrower. The Open-End Mortgage and its Adjustable Rate Rider was signed by Richard Holt as manager for the owner of the real property, Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company. All closing documents were signed by Richard Holt. Richard Holt signed the affirmation that he was acting as manager of Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company in executing the various mortgage documents including the Open-End Mortgage. The court finds that the defendants have failed to sustain their burden of proof as to the Ninth Special Defense. The issues on the Ninth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Tenth Special Defense

No Tenth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Eleventh Special Defense

The defendants are incorporating by reference paragraphs 1-7 of the Nineteenth Special Defense, which incorporation of future pleadings is not a procedure authorized by our Practice Book. In addition this Special Defense contains two paragraphs numbered " 7." The essence of the Eleventh Special Defense appears to be allegations that the lender, Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., failed to comply completely and accurately with its preclosing discovery obligations. As a result the Eleventh Special Defense claims that the " plaintiff’s predecessor in interest ‘WAMU’ is estopped from maintaining the action of foreclosure and reformation herein."

Mortgage disclosure information is required by the federal Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 81601 et seq. Violation of that statute has been held by a number of cases not to be a defense to the later foreclosure of the underlying mortgage documents. Bank of New York, as Trustee v. Conway, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket Number CV 02-0815603 S (December 13, 2006, Freed, J.T.R.), 50 Conn.Supp. 189, 201, fn.6 (2006). Those cases also hold a violation of the statute for nondisclosure result in a lawsuit for money damages but not a defense in the foreclosure. Eastern Savings Bank, FSB v. Mara, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 05-4006305 S (June 5, 2006, Dooley, J.).

The plaintiff in this case is and always has been JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association. This Eleventh Special Defense is alleging wrongdoing not by the plaintiff but by the predecessor entitled Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., who is not a party in this foreclosure action. Allegations of wrongdoing by the predecessor in title in a mortgage foreclosure action is not a defense to the current foreclosure action by the then succeeding plaintiff who has not explicitly agreed to be responsible therefore. The Bank of New York Mellon, Trustee v. Mauro, supra, 177 Conn.App. 311.

The issues on the Eleventh Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twelfth Special Defense

The Twelfth Special Defense contains multiple reasons: (1) The original note has not been provided; (2) There are in existence a number of different versions of the note; (3) The original lender and servicer failed to correct those errors and failed to make restitution; and (4) the original lender has unclean hands and has breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

The blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note was furnished to this court for inspection and a photocopy of that was marked Ex. 3 with the blue ink Note returned to the possession of the plaintiff’s attorney. The court thus fulfilled its inspection obligations in accordance with Connecticut law. Equity One, Inc. v. Shivers, supra, 310 Conn. 124, 130-31. This court already has discussed the issues arising out of multiple versions of the note and has found that that fact does not prevent this plaintiff from foreclosing. The court assumes that the multiple versions of the note are the facts that support the defendant’s allegation of " prior false foreclosure." If so, that issue is decided in favor of the plaintiff.

The defendants have failed to prove that the plaintiff is guilty of unclean hands or has violated the breach of covenant and good faith and fair dealing in regard to the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, the possession thereof by the plaintiff in this litigation, the presentation of that blue ink Note to the court for inspection, the marking of a photocopy as Ex. 3 in evidence, and the court’s explanation of multiple versions of the note that are identical to the blue ink March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note except for the various endorsements. No sinister motive has been demonstrated in this trial by the plaintiff. Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 404-07 (2016). No willful misconduct by the plaintiff has been demonstrated to support an unclean hands defense. Spencer v. Spencer, 177 Conn.App. 504, 523 (2017). The current plaintiff is not responsible for the commissions or omissions of the original lender, WAMU. The defendants have failed to sustain its burden of proof concerning the above-mentioned allegations. The issues on the Twelfth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Thirteenth Special Defense

The Thirteenth Special Defense contains various arguments offered by the defendant why this court should not reform the Open-End Mortgage to correct the typographical error in the Latin name of the owner of the real property from the letter " L" to the letter " N." This court has already found the issues for plaintiff on the First Count of reformation. The court has discussed and decided all of the issues alleged in this Thirteenth Special Defense in an earlier section of this Memorandum of Decision. There is no further need for this court to discuss the allegations in the Thirteenth Special Defense. The court finds the issues on the Thirteenth Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Fourteenth Special Defense

Fourteenth Special Defense claims that three separate statutes of limitations bar this foreclosure action; Gen. Stat. § 52-576, Gen. Stat. § 52-581 and Gen. Stat. § 42a-3-118. The evidence before this court shows that the last payment on account of the $308,000 mortgage was a payment made by Attorney Larry F. Ginsberg of $99,900.37 on August 19, 2005. Ex. 37, Ex. 117. This foreclosure lawsuit was commenced in 2008 and is seeking foreclosure of a mortgage that has a thirty-year maturity date due in the year 2032. The court finds that this foreclosure lawsuit was brought within six years of the last nonpayment, was not brought based upon an oral contract, and was brought prior to the 2032 maturity date and within six years after notice of default. The six-year limitation period on a single note begins to run on the due date set forth in the note, that is the maturity date, not on the date when the borrower first failed to make an installment payment. Fleet National Bank v. Lahm, 86 Conn.App. 403, 408-09 (2004). This is a mortgage foreclosure action, which has no statute of limitations. FDIC v. Owen, 88 Conn.App. 806, 815 (2005); Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Juchniewich, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 11-6028759 S (February 27, 2017, Tierney, J.T.R.).

The issues on the Fourteenth Special Defense alleging various statute of limitations are found for the plaintiff.

Fifteenth Special Defense

No Fifteenth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Sixteenth Special Defense

The defendants attempts to allege a number of issues in the Sixteenth Special Defense. The court has synthesized those issues into one. The original lender failed to attempt to correct the necessary documents such as the note, mortgage and security instrument and reformation is barred by laches. In a separate portion of this Memorandum of Decision the court has already found the issues on the First Count One for reformation for the plaintiff. In addition the court has discussed the minor variations of the last portion of the name of the 23 Ridgewood, a public highway described as either Avenue, Drive and/or Road. The defendant’s Sixteenth Special Defense is addressed to WAMU and this court has already found that the plaintiff has not assumed liability for the commissions or omissions of WAMU. The court finds the issues for the plaintiff on the Sixteenth Special Defense.

Seventeenth Special Defense

The defendants have alleged another version in opposition to the Count One seeking reformation. The allegations are not just that WAMU failed to correct the allegations but in the Seventeenth Special Defense they failed to do so in a timely fashion in violation of the statute of repose. This court has already discussed in detail the issues on the reformation count having found those issues for the plaintiff. The court finds the Seventeenth Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Eighteenth Special Defense

The Eighteenth Special Defense claims that the lender waived the correction of the documents at the closing and waived any further right to correct the documents after the closing. This issue has been discussed and decided earlier in this Memorandum of Decision.

The issues on the Eighteenth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Nineteenth Special Defense

The essence of the Nineteenth Special Defense is that the lender, WAMU, changed the terms and conditions that previously had been disclosed. A risk index was one of the claimed changes. In addition the allegations of the Nineteenth Special Defense allege predatory lending practices. The defendants have the burden of proof to prove this Nineteenth Special Defense. The defendants were represented by counsel before and during the closing and raised no objections at the closing to the terms of the loan and the index upon which the adjustable rate interest was based. The defendants paid the monthly mortgage payments with the adjusted interest rate for years without protest. No documents were furnished to the court by the defendant to demonstrate the changed terms. The defendants have failed to offer adequate proof at trial of this issue and have failed to brief it. In addition the defendants have failed to offer any evidence of predatory lending practices. Bank of America, N.A. v. Aubut, 167 Conn.App. 347, 377-78, 382-83 (2016). The court has already found that the plaintiff has not explicitly assumed liability for the commissions or omissions of WAMU. No facts of wrongdoing as against the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., have been alleged or proven in this Nineteenth Special Defense.

The issues on the Nineteenth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twentieth Special Defense

The Twentieth Special Defense contains further allegation by the defendants that the terms and conditions of the disclosure were different than the terms and conditions of the documents executed at the closing. To the allegations of the Nineteenth Special Defense, the defendants have added the claim of fraud, misrepresentation and violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants have failed to allege any further wrongdoings in the Twentieth Special Defense that were not previously alleged in the Nineteenth Special Defense. The issues on the Twentieth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff based on the reasons contained in the Nineteenth Special Defense.

Twenty-First Special Defense

Essentially the allegations of the Twentieth Special Defense are realleged in the Twenty-First Special Defense with the addition of the phrase in paragraph eight of " fraud in the factum." The underlying factual allegations of the Twenty-First Special Defense have already been addressed by this court in its decision on the Nineteenth and Twentieth Special Defense.

The issues on the Twenty-First Special Defense are found for the plaintiff based on the reasons contained in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Special Defense.

Twenty-Second Special Defense

So too the Twenty-Second Special Defense is identical to that contained in the Twentieth Special Defense with a claim that those facts amount to violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. No sinister motive has been alleged or proven.

The facts are identical to the previous allegations. In addition the violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a defense to a foreclosure action. Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, 53 Conn.App. 11, 17 (1999).

The court finds the issues on the Twenty-Second Special Defense for the plaintiff based on the reasons contained in the Nineteenth, Twentieth and Twenty-First Special Defenses.

Twenty-Third Special Defense

Paragraphs one through seven of the Twentieth Special Defense are realleged in this Twenty-Third Special Defense. The court can discern no difference between these allegations and the prior allegations. The court finds issues on the Twenty-Third Special Defense for the plaintiff based on the reasons contained in Special Defenses Nineteenth, through Twenty-Second.

Twenty-Fourth Special Defense

This Special Defense is directed to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association, and alleges that the bank has entered into a National Mortgage Settlement and signed consent decrees. It further alleges that the plaintiff is attempting to obtain a judgment on robo-signed affidavits, failing to correct prior errors in the foreclosing documents, and failing to send a repudiation letter to the defendants. In summation, the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense alleges negligence and gross negligence. The court has been unable to find any legal authority that claims of allegations of negligence and gross negligence are sufficient to defeat a foreclosure.

A Special Defense is designed to focus narrowly on one specific claim. The Twenty-Fourth Special Defense fails to so focus and gives new meaning to the word " plethora." The defendants have failed to sustain their evidentiary burden of proof on the above alleged issues and they have failed to adequately brief those issues. The issues on the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twenty-Fifth Special Defense

The essential allegations of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense are incorporated by reference in this the Twenty-Fifth Special Defense with the addition that they constitute misrepresentation. For the reasons stated in the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense, the issues on the Twenty-Fifth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twenty-Sixth Special Defense

The defendants are incorporating by reference the essential allegations of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense and then add that they constitute fraud. The issues on the Twenty-Sixth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff based on the reasons of the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth Special Defense.

Twenty-Seventh Special Defense

The defendants alleged that the plaintiff failed to disclose that it is acting under a power of attorney from the FDIC in regard to WAMU and therefore the plaintiff is coming into court with unclean hands and in breach of the covenant of good faith. Although unclean hands is a proper special defense to a foreclosure action, the defendants offered no evidence of the failure to disclose that the plaintiff was acting under any power of attorney with the FDIC in this trial. This court has already found that breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a defense to a foreclosure action. Southbrige Associations, LLC v. Garofalo, supra, 53 Conn.App. 17. The issues on the Twenty-Seventh Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twenty-Eighth Special Defense

The defendants are claiming that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., failed to " make mandatory disclosure after October 2, 2012 in violation of the National Mortgage Settlement" and that it is guilty of both unclean hands and violations of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Although unclean hands is a defense to a foreclosure action, no evidence of the National Mortgage Settlement was offered to this court. The breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a defense to a foreclosure action. Id., 17. The issues on the Twenty-Eighth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Twenty-Ninth Special Defense

Although the Twenty-Ninth Special Defense alleges unclean hands, which is a defense to a foreclosure, the underlying facts indicate that JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. has identified itself in a number of documents on file with this court as formerly known as Washington Mutual Bank. This court finds that such identity is not tantamount to the wrongdoing and does not establish unclean hands. The relationship between the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and the original lender, WAMU, can be rightly understood. The doctrine of unclean hands can be applied to a foreclosure action. Thompson v. Orcutt, 257 Conn. 301, 308 (2001). " Unless the plaintiff’s conduct is of such a character as to be condemned and pronounced wrongful by honest and fair-minded people, the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply." Id., 310.

If the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., in various pleadings or documents filed in this instant foreclosure action by identified itself as formerly known as Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., the plaintiff has offered substantial evidence that they acquired all the assets from WAMU as a failed bank from the FDIC as receiver. In this court’s opinion the plaintiff was merely outlining the history of the plaintiff’s acquisition of its right to foreclose. " Formerly known as" has been acknowledged by court to be a need for " clarity." Boisvert v. Town of Somers, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket Number CV 94-56834 S (May 14, 1996, Rittenband, J.) (footnote 5). The defendant has failed to sustain its burden of proof as to this Special Defense. The issues on the Twenty-Ninth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Thirtieth Special Defense

The allegations of the Twenty-Ninth Special Defense are repled in the Thirtieth Special Defense with the additional allegation that that is an act of misrepresentation. The issues on the Thirtieth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff for the reasons stated in the Twenty-Ninth Special Defense.

Thirty-First Special Defense

The defendants have repled the failure of WAMU to correct errors in the mortgage documents and to accurately apply mortgage payments to the indebtedness as a continued bad act of JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. after they acquired title to the loan on September 25, 2008.

The evidence before this court demonstrates no payments have been made after September 1, 2005, over three years before JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. became the owner of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note. The court has already discussed the issues of whether or not the defendants have been properly credited for all payments. The court finds that the defendants have not alleged that the entire loan has been repaid. They have only alleged the failure to credit the $99,900.37 payment in Ex. 37 and Ex. 117, and other 2002 payments shown in Ex. 14 and Ex. 15. Partial payment of a mortgage loan is not a defense to foreclosure. The partial payments will be considered by this court, when the issue of the amount of debt is considered. The court finds that the defendants have failed to sustain its burden of proof. The issues on the Thirty-First Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Thirty-Second Special Defense

No Thirty-Second Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Thirty-Third Special Defense

No Thirty-Third Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Thirty-Fourth Special Defense

No Thirty-Fourth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Thirty-Fifth Special Defense

The defendants are claiming that " the name and signature of the owner of the collateral are missing on the mortgage contract and the security agreement" and that is in violation of General Statutes § 52-550, the statute of frauds. The Special Defense is addressed toward the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, National Association. Virtually the identical Special Defense was addressed to the original lender, Washington Mutual Bank, F.A., as to the same set of facts and allegations in the Ninth Special Defense. The issues on the Ninth Special Defense were found in favor of the plaintiff. The court finds the issues on the Thirty-Fifth Special Defense for the plaintiff based on the facts, legal authority and reasons stated in its decision on the Ninth Special Defense.

Thirty-Sixth Special Defense

No Thirty-Sixth Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Thirty-Seventh Special Defense

The defendant is incorporating by reference allegations of future Special Defenses, a form of pleading not permitted by our Practice Act. The defendants are claiming estoppel by reason of, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., failure to make the necessary corrections that were previously listed on behalf of Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. and failing to conform the mortgage documents to the information furnished in the preclosing disclosure by Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. The estoppel is addressed to both the claims of reformation and foreclosure. The defendants have failed to sustain their burden of proof concerning these allegations by proof at trial. They have failed to adequately brief those issues. The court has found that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. has not assumed the liabilities of WAMU. The issues on the Thirty-Seventh Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Thirty-Eighth Special Defense

The Thirty-Eighth Special Defense contains repetitive allegations of the plaintiff failing to provide the original note, producing altered notes, introducing robo-signed affidavits, and failing to correct the WAMU mortgage documents. All of those issues have been previously found for the plaintiff in earlier portion of the Memorandum of Decision. The court finds the issues on the Thirty-Eighth Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Thirty-Ninth Special Defense

The Thirty-Ninth Special Defense addresses the issue of reformation from the point of view of the named plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Previous special defenses were addressed to reformation in regards to the original lender, Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. These allegations are virtually identical to the issues alleged by the defendants in the Thirteenth Special Defense. This court has discussed and resolved the issues of reformation alleged in Count One in great detail in this Memorandum of Decision. The issues on the Thirty-Eighth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Fortieth Special Defense

The defendants reallege the allegations of the three statute of limitations; General Statutes § § 52-576, 52-581 and 42a-3-11 in regard to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. This issue has previously been discussed and ruled on by this court in the Fortieth Special Defenses. The statute of limitation is not a defense to a foreclosure action. FDIC v. Owen, supra, 88 Conn.App. 815. The issues on the Fortieth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Forty-First Special Defense

No Forty-First Special Defense has been pled by either defendant.

Forty-Second Special Defense

The defendant have alleged this Special Defense directed toward the plaintiff claiming they have been " stepping into the shoes" of WAMU claiming reformation should be denied by the statute of repose. These same issues were addressed in Special Defenses directed WAMU to no avail. The court finds the issues on the Forty-Second Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Forty-Third Special Defense

This is another " stepping into the shoes" argument addressed to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. As in the Eighteenth Special Defense addressed to WAMU, this Special Defense claims that the plaintiff by commencing the foreclosing action has waived the correction of the documents including the right to seek reformation of those documents. The court finds the issues on the Forty-Third Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Forty-Fourth Special Defense

This is another " stepping into the shoes" Special Defense directed to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., for the plaintiff’s failure to correct WAMU closing and payment documents. The previous similar Special Defenses were addressed to WAMU and rejected by this court in the Thirteenth, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Special Defenses. The issues on the Forty-Fourth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Forty-Fifth Special Defense

The defendants have filed this Special Defense alleging that the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., is " stepping into the shoes" of WAMU and failed to reinstate the mortgage and correct payment records. The defendants claim breach of contract. The defendants allege and incorporate the Thirty-Second Special Defense herein but there is no such Special Defense in pleading. (#184.00.) The court finds the issues on the Forty-Fifth Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Forty-Sixth Special Defense

The defendants have incorporated the first seven paragraphs of the Forty-Fourth Special Defense addressed to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., and further alleged " fraud in the inducement." This court rejected the Forty-Fourth Special Defense. No new facts have been alleged. The plaintiff has not assumed the liability of WAMU. The defendants have failed to adequately brief this issue. Inadequate evidence was offered by the defendant on this issue. The issues on the Forty-Sixth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Forty-Seventh Special Defense

Paragraphs one through seven of the Forty-Sixth Special Defense previously rejected by this court have been incorporated by reference into this Special Defense. The defendants have added the claim of " fraud in the factum." Similar claims raised in prior Special Defenses have been rejected by this court. The court finds the issues on the Forty-Seventh Special Defense for the plaintiff.

Forty-Eighth Special Defense

This is another " stepping in the shoes" Special Defense filed by the defendants addressed to the plaintiff, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Essentially the Forty-Sixth Special Defense has been restated in this the Forty-Eighth Special Defense. This Forty-Eighth Special Defense relies on the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which this court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision, is not a defense to a foreclosure action. Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, supra, 53 Conn.App. 17. The court finds the issues on the Forty-Eighth Special Defense for the plaintiff

Forty-Ninth Special Defense

This penultimate Special Defense is addressed to the plaintiff, claiming that the plaintiff is " stepping into the shoes" of WAMU, alleging that the plaintiff failed to timely correct the previous mistakes in the mortgage documents of WAMU. It alleges laches and the statute of limitations. This court has already rejected the defense of statute of limitation, statute of repose and laches as a defense to the reformation relief sought in Count One in an earlier portion of this Memorandum of Decision. The court has already thoroughly reviewed each of the above claims made by the defendant and has rejected those claims. The issues on the Forty-Ninth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

Fiftieth Special Defense

Paragraphs 1 through 7 of the Forty-Sixth Special Defense, previously rejected by this court, have been incorporated by reference into this Fiftieth Special Defense. The plaintiff is referred to as " stepping into the shoes of WAMU." The additional allegations in this Fiftieth Special Defense has claimed that all of those activities violate the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The defendants are addressing this Fiftieth Special Defense to both counts of reformation and foreclosure.

One of the elements of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is " sinister motive." Alexandru v. Strong, 81 Conn.App. 68, 80-81, cert. denied 268 Conn. 906 (2004). Mere negligence is not sufficient to establish a sinister motive. DeLa Concha of Hartford, Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 269 Conn. 424, 433 (2004).

The defendant has failed to sustain its burden of proof as to violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not a defense to a Connecticut foreclosure action. Southbridge Associates, LLC v. Garofalo, supra, 53 Conn.App. 17.

The issues on the Fiftieth Special Defense are found for the plaintiff.

The June 27, 2013 operative Answer of both defendants is ninety pages in length. (#184.00.) A Fiftieth Special Defense concludes on the sixty-eighth page. On the sixty-ninth page the first of eighteen separate Counterclaims commences. The defendants have not pled the Ninth and Tenth Counterclaim. Four of the counterclaims claim punitive damages pursuant to Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act as well as attorneys fees under CUTPA (Counterclaims First, Second, Eleventh and Twelfth). The remaining twelve Counterclaims each claim punitive damages and attorneys fees without reference to any statute. The First Counterclaim contains sixty-one numbered paragraphs and seeks CUTPA relief. Paragraphs fifty-seven through sixty-one are typical CUTPA allegations but they are not specific as to the facts of this mortgage transaction or foreclosure lawsuit.

The essential factual allegations of all of the Counterclaims have been incorporated by reference of and from the Special Defenses previously filed on the June 27, 2013 Answer. (#184.00.) Although this court cannot find a prohibition for such pleading, it requires the court to continually turn all ninety pages of pleading #184 back and forth and then back and forth in order to be able to read each of the allegations contained in the First Counterclaim. Despite multiple suggestions at trial on the record that the defendants perform that task by restating in narrative form each of the allegations of their Special Defenses and Counterclaims without reference to incorporation, despite the fact that that would mean hundreds of pages of the operative pleading, the defendant has failed to follow the court’s suggestion.

Paragraphs 1-8 of the Eleventh Special Defense has been incorporated as paragraphs 12-19 of this First Counterclaim. It is correct that there are eight paragraphs in the Eleventh Special Defense and paragraphs 12-19 of this First Counterclaim would contain those eight paragraphs. There are two problems with that incorporation. The first is that there are two paragraphs numbered 7 in the Eleventh Special Defense. The court therefore does not know whether all nine of the stated paragraphs in the Eleventh Special Defense are being incorporated or only eight of those paragraphs. The court is not sure whether paragraph number 8 of the Eleventh Special Defense is being incorporated into the First Counterclaim. There are two paragraphs numbered 7. The court is not sure whether one or both of those paragraph 7s are to be incorporated from the Eleventh Special Defense into the First Counterclaim. In addition the Eleventh Special Defense itself incorporates paragraph 1-7 of the Nineteenth Special Defense. The Nineteenth Special Defense has eight correctly consecutively numbered paragraphs of which first seven are being incorporated by reference into the Eleventh Special Defense and therefore will be incorporated by reference into paragraphs 12-19 of the First Counterclaim. The problem the court has with that reference is when it turns to paragraph 42-48 of the First Counterclaim, it notes that paragraphs 1-7 of the Nineteenth Special Defense are being incorporated. It appears that the defendant has incorporated by reference the same seven paragraphs in two different locations in the same First Counterclaim. That is not the only section of the First Counterclaim where there is a duplication. Paragraphs 20-23 of the First Counterclaim has incorporated paragraphs 1-4 of the Twelfth Special Defense. It is correct that there are twelve consecutively numbered paragraphs in the Twelfth Special Defense. The problem the court has is when it starts to read paragraphs 32-35 of the First Counterclaim and notes that paragraphs 1-4 of the same Twelfth Special Defense has been incorporated. The third time this duplication occurs is paragraph 50 of the First Counterclaim which has incorporated paragraph 9 of the Twenty-First Special Defense. There is a paragraph numbered 9 in the Twenty-First Special Defense and it is correctly numbered 9. The next incorporation corporates paragraphs 8-9 of the Twenty-First Special Defense thereby doubling the recitation of paragraph 9 of the Twenty-First Special Defense. Every single one of the above problems is repeated and restated in the Second Counterclaim since the entirety of each of the 61 paragraphs of the First Counterclaim are incorporated by reference in the Second Counterclaim. The same incorporation by reference of the first fifty-nine paragraphs of the First Counterclaim has occurred equally in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Counterclaim. The Fourth Counterclaim claims to incorporate paragraph 1-63 of the First Counterclaim as paragraphs 1-59 of the Fourth Counterclaim, an impossibility for two reasons; 59 and 63 are different numbers and the First Counterclaim has only alleged 61 paragraphs in total.

When the defendants get to the Eleventh Counterclaim which sounds in CUTPA, paragraphs 54-58 are the usual generic CUTPA allegations. Paragraphs 1-53 of the Eleventh Counterclaim contains no original factual allegations and has incorporated each of the allegations from previous Special Defenses contained in pleading #184.00. The allegations of the Eleventh Counterclaim are restated in the Twelfth through Eighteenth Counterclaim. So if there is an error in the Eleventh Counterclaim by the incorporation of various paragraphs of the previous Special Defenses, that error is compounded through the remainder of the Twelfth through Eighteen Counterclaims. There is such a repetitive error.

Paragraphs 16-22 of the Eleventh Counterclaim incorporates by reference paragraphs 1-7 of the Forty-Sixth Special Defense. There are no such numbered paragraphs in the Forty-Sixth Special Defense. The Forty-Sixth Special Defense itself incorporates paragraphs 1-7 of the Forty-Fourth Special Defense and there are in fact seven consecutive numbered paragraphs in the Forty-Fourth Special Defense. Paragraphs 23 and 24 of the Eleventh Counterclaim are to be incorporated from paragraphs 8-9 of the Forty-Seventh Special Defense. There are no paragraphs in the Forty-Seventh Special Defense numbered 8 or 9. The last two paragraphs are numbered 4 and 5 in the Forty-Seventh Special Defense. In addition the Forty-Seventh Special defense creates its own problems because it states: " Paragraphs 1-7 of the Forty-Sixth Special Defense are hereby incorporated as paragraphs 1-7 of this the Twenty-First Special Defense." The Twenty-First Special Defense has not been incorporated in any portion of any Counterclaim before this court yet it is clearly referenced within the Forty-Seventh Special Defense. This then requires the court to look at the Twenty-First Special Defense, which itself incorporates paragraphs 1-7 of the Twentieth Special Defense.

Despite multiple requests on the record during trial and at the May 2014 status conference for the defendants to straighten out these duplications and inconsistencies, no such pleading or assisting Memorandum was filed by the defendant. The specific problems the court had in reading pleading #184.00 was demonstrated by the court on the record in similar detail as contained in this Memorandum of Decision and was met with no response by the defendants who apparently insisted on trying their case " their way" or " my way."

Paragraphs 30-35 of the Eleventh Counterclaim incorporate by reference paragraphs numbered 1-6 of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense. There are six numbered separate paragraphs in the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense. The next five paragraphs incorporate paragraphs 1-5 of the Twenty-Fifth Special Defense. The Twenty-Fifth Special Defense itself incorporates paragraphs 1-4 of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense. Therefore the first five paragraphs of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense are restated twice in consecutive paragraphs in the Eleventh Counterclaim with no explanation from the defendant as to why such allegations occur. The Twenty-Sixth Special Defense contains the next five paragraphs of the Eleventh Counterclaim. Paragraphs 1-5 are not specifically delineated in the Twenty-Six Special Defense, only paragraph 5 is. Paragraph 1-4 of the Twenty-Sixth Special Defense is the same paragraphs 1-4 of the Twenty-Fourth Special Defense. Those four paragraphs have been delineated and repeated three times in the Eleventh Counterclaim. Because each of those paragraphs is reaffirmed and incorporated by reference, that triplicate pleading is also contained in the Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Counterclaim.

None of the Eighteen numbered Counterclaims, sixteen actual Counterclaims, contain any specific factual allegations other than the standard allegations that support a CUTPA claim. None of those standard allegations are factually specific as to this mortgage and foreclosure transaction. The only specific allegations contained in each of the sixteen Counterclaims that are before this court are supported by the factual and legal allegations contained in each of the Special Defenses, each of which has been incorporated by reference. Despite the fact that this court has a monumentally difficult time in reading each of the Counterclaims, for the reasons already stated in this Memorandum of Decision, it is clear to this court that each and every single one of the Counterclaims is supported by the factual and legal claims only found already in a Special Defense in pleading #184.00. This court has rejected each and every single one of the Special Defenses. Likewise the court rejects each and every single one of the Sixteen Counterclaims. The issues on the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Seventeenth and Eighteenth Counterclaim are found for the plaintiff.

This court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision at page 25 for the plaintiff against both defendants, Richard L. Holt aka Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company aka Dorsum Nemus, LLC on Count One reformation. The court in Count One ordered that the Open-End Mortgage in evidence before this court as Exhibits 1 and Exhibit 2 be reformed so that the mortgagor in the March 22, 2000 Open-End Mortgage is " Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company." This court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision on pages 52-53 for the plaintiff against both defendants, Richard L. Holt aka Richard Holt and Dorsum Nemus Limited Liability Company, in Count Two foreclosure. This court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision all of the issues raised in the defendants’ Special Defenses (#184.00) for the plaintiff. This court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision all of the issues raised in the defendants’ Counterclaims (#184.00) for the plaintiff.

This Third foreclosure action was returnable to the Superior Court on December 30, 2008. This foreclosure action has not gone to judgment. There are currently 4, 085 cases on the civil trial docket in the Superior Court, Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford. This case is the twelfth oldest case on the docket. Of the older eleven cases, two are on appeal, eight are in bankruptcy and the oldest has had no pleadings filed since 2003, when the counterclaim and cross complaints were withdrawn. This case was assigned by the Civil Presiding Judge to the undersigned for trial by a May 2, 2014 order. (#278.86.) On May 6, 2014 the Civil Presiding Judge entered the following order: " This case is assigned to Judge Tierney from now on for all future purposes." (#284.00.) Order #284.00 remains in effect. The court held the first day of trial on May 23, 2014. No evidence, exhibits or testimony was offered since the court spent all day on the record reviewing the file, the two previous foreclosure actions, the current pleadings, future pleadings, and the status of the fifty numbered Special Defenses and eighteen numbered Counterclaims filed on June 27, 2013. (#184.00.) The undersigned is a Judge Trial Referee and has been limited due to budgetary consideration to 170 trial days in each fiscal year. As of May 23, 2014 the remainder of this court’s available trial dates in that 2014 fiscal year were either booked for other trials or exceeded the 170-day limit. The court then assigned the trial to reconvene on July 3, 2014, the first available trial day in the next fiscal year. The court has assigned each of the ensuing trial days under the limitation of the 170-day limit and the actual trial schedule of other cases assigned to this court by Stamford Civil Case Flow. The last day of trial was August 23, 2017. The court then ordered simultaneous briefs for October 25, 2017 since the court would be out of the country from late September to October 23, 2017. The court granted the defendants’ Motion to Extend the briefing schedule to November 8, 2017. (#493.01, #494.01, #494.02.) All the parties filed post-trial briefs on November 8, 2017 in compliance with this court’s simultaneous briefing schedule. No reply briefs were ordered nor requested by any party.

The court notes the following filings that delayed the trial of this contested foreclosure:

January 12, 2015 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, District of Connecticut by Richard L.W. Holt. Docket 15-50048. (#308.00, #309.00.) Dismissed by Hon. Alan H.W. Shiff, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge on February 27, 2015. (#310.00, #332.00.) The trial dates of January 13, 14 and 15, 2015 were cancelled as a result of this Bankruptcy filing.

May 19, 2015 Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, District of New York, Southern District of White Plains, N.Y. by Richard L.W. Holt. Docket #15-22704-rdd. (#331.00.) Automatic stay terminated on June 27, 2015 by Hon. Robert D. Drain, United States Bankruptcy Judge. (#333.00.) " ... The Debtor did not commence and is not pursuing this Chapter 13 case in good faith ..." The trial dates of May 21 and 22, 2015 were cancelled as a result of this Bankruptcy filing.

July 8, 2015 Appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court on the basis of trial court procedural error in continuing trial despite mutual filing by both defendants of a Motion to Dismiss. This appeal sought permission to file an interlocutory appeal pursuant to Gen. Stat. § 52-265a. The trial dates of July 8, 9 and 10, 2015 were not cancelled as a result of this Supreme Court filing. (#342.00.) Transferred by S.C. 19517 to the Appellate Court on July 30, 2015, AC 38159. (#354.00.) AC 38159 dismissed by the Appellate Court on December 2, 2015. (#387.00, #388.00.)

January 26, 2016 Appeal to the Appellate Court A.C. 38856. Richard Holt appealed " Decision of court to refuse to open Plaintiff’s case in chief." (#405.00, #408.00, #409.00.) No trial dates were cancelled as a result of the filing of this January 26, 2016 appeal. Appeal delayed due to defendant Holt’s removal to Federal District Court. This appeal was dismissed by the Appellate Court on September 14, 2017 because the method of foreclosure and the amount of the debt had not yet been determined. (#504.00.)

May 24, 2016 Defendants’ removal of this foreclosure action that was on trial to the United District Court for the Southern District of New York. This pleading was filed by defendant, Richard Holt, date stamped May 24, 2016 by the federal court. (#427.00.) Removed case assigned docket number 1:16-CV-03941-CM, assigned to Hon. Colleen McMahon, Chief United States District Judge. Remanded to Stamford Superior Court on July 5, 2016, " any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith ..." by two-page order of Judge McMahon (#430.00). Trial dates of May 25, 26, 27, June 1, 2 and 3, 2016 were cancelled due to May 24, 2016 removal. August 1, 2016 Defendants removed this foreclosure action that was on trial to the United District Court for the District of Connecticut. (#432.00.) Removed case assigned docket number 3:16-CV-1308(SRU) (#437.00) and was assigned to Hon. Stefan R. Underhill. Remanded to Stamford Superior Court on September 14, 2016 by Judge Underhill’s order. (#456.00.) Trial dates of August 2, 3, 4 and 5, September 7, 8 and 9, 2016 were cancelled as a result of the August 1, 2016 removal.

November 30, 2016 Defendant Holt’s removal of this foreclosure action that was on trial to the United District Court for the Southern District of New York at White Plains, New York, date stamped by the federal court on November 30, 2016. (#472.00, #474.00.) Removed case assigned docket number 16-00-9312(CM) and was assigned to Hon. Colleen McMahon, Chief United District Judge. Remanded to Stamford Superior Court on December 9, 2016 by Judge McMahon: " Plaintiff is warned that further attempts to remove this Connecticut litigation directly to this Court will be deemed frivolous and may result in an order barring Plaintiff from filing new civil actions in forma pauperis without prior permission." " ... any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith ..." J. McMahon December 9, 2016 Order. (#477.00.) Trial date of December 2, 2016 was cancelled. Richard Holt also filed a simultaneous bankruptcy that contained its own automatic stay on December 1, 2016. (#475.00.)

December 1, 2016 Richard Holt filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy application in the United States Bankruptcy Court in White Plains, which was assigned docket number 16-23653-rdd assigned to Hon. Richard D. Drain, United States Bankruptcy Judge. (#475.00.) The automatic bankruptcy stay was terminated by Judge Drain on July 17, 2017 in a three-page order that further ordered that no automatic stay would apply to any bankruptcy litigation by Richard Holt for a two-year period of time. " ... the filing of the Debtor’s bankruptcy petition and the Debtor’s pursuit of this Chapter 13 case was part of a scheme to hinder and delay creditors that has involved multiple bankruptcy filings by the Debtor affecting the property." (#481.00.) The trial dates of December 2, 21, 22 and 23, 2016 were cancelled and the court assigned an August 9, 2017 status conference post-bankruptcy to assign the future trial dates of August 17, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 30 and 31 and September 1, 2017.

August 23, 2017 The court held trial on the assigned trial dates of August 17 and August 22, 2017. All parties appeared and participated in the trial. On the morning of August 23, 2017 the plaintiff was present by counsel and the defendant, Dorsum Nemus, LLC, was present by counsel but the defendant, Richard Holt, failed to appear for the duly assigned trial date of August 23, 2017. The court remained in session for the entire day of August 23, 2017 with other counsel present. The court concluded the evidence on the late afternoon of August 23, 2017 and entered a briefing order of October 25, 2017, due to this court’s above-mentioned out of country status. The other trial dates that had been scheduled were thus cancelled.

August 23, 2017 The defendant, Richard Holt, filed a Notice Concerning Removal of Action (#491.00), which stated that the day before, on August 22, 2017, the defendant had removed this foreclosure action to the United District Court for the District of Connecticut. The Notice was date stamped by the Federal District Court on August 23, 2017 at 11:23 a.m., the exact time this court was in session on trial with the other counsel of record in court participating in the previous scheduled foreclosure trial.

The Notice of Removal did not contain any orders of Judge Underhill or any other Connecticut District Court Judge permitting this August 23, 2017 removal by a self-represented litigant in the face of a previous remanded order by the same District Court, Underhill, J., involving the same Connecticut Superior Court foreclosure action that was on trial. The August 23, 2017 removal was assigned docket number 3:17-CV-01423-AWT and was assigned to Alvin W. Thompson, United States District Court Judge on October 12, 2017. The Motion for Remand to the Stamford Superior Court was granted. In addition the October 12, 2017 order stated: " defendants Holt and Dorsum Nemus, LLC are PROHIBITED, whether acting individually or jointly, from removing the state foreclosure action from Connecticut Superior Court unless they request and receive explicit permission from this court to do so." (#495.00.)

In another Connecticut Federal District Court case involving a Connecticut state court foreclosure the trial court found, " In the absence of any objection from either party, Judge Bryant issued an Order remanding the case to state court on September 11, 2012. See. D.Conn. Case #1, Order (Doc. No. 96). As this court already noted in its Order to Remand on September 6, 2017, Judge Bryant’s Order is binding on subsequent stages of the same litigation, including the current matter before the court. See Order to Remand at 4 (citing In re PCH Assocs., 949 F.2d 585, 592 (2d Cir. 1991)." JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Richard Caires, U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut, Docket Number 3:17-CV-1298(JCH) (September 14, 2017, Hall, J.). See State v. J .M.F., 170 Conn.App. 120, 175 (2017) (filing jurisdictionally infirm appeal does not stay trial court proceedings).

The October 12, 2017 remand order of Judge Thompson is on file in this court. (#495.00.) Pleading #495.00 is over 2, 000 pages. The last three pages of pleading #495.00 contain the manuscripted October 12, 2017 order of Judge Thompson. The court found that Richard Holt’s Notice of Removal of August 23, 2017 " is untimely and it is also defective." " In addition, the court notes that defendant Holt has now improperly removed the state foreclosure action twice to the Southern District of New York and twice to this court." (#495.00.)

The defendants filed a December 11, 2013 Motion to Dismiss (#230.00) alleging lack of standing and that this court had no subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed a January 15, 2004 Objection (#243.00). The Objection along with the Motion to Dismiss was duly assigned for a short calendar argument and after argument the Objection was sustained on January 27, 2014 by order of Adams, J.T.R. (#243.86). This order denied the Motion to Dismiss (#230.00).

In addition, the defendants filed eight other Motions to Dismiss after the trial commenced in May 2014 despite the fact that the defendants were represented by counsel since the commencement of this foreclosure action on December 17, 2008. See Return of Service in court file. Those Motions to Dismiss are as follows: March 17, 2015 (#315.00), March 27, 2015 (#324.00), July 7, 2015 (#340.00), July 7, 2015 but filed on August 26, 2015 (#360.00), August 26, 2015 (#362.00), August 27, 2005 redacting (#324.00) (#363.00), October 12, 2016 (#458.00), and November 8, 2017 (#503.00). The court notes that some of the above Motions to Dismiss may be duplicates and some may have been withdrawn by the defendant or refiled to comply with the redaction requirements of P.B. #4-7. The court entered orders effective as to each of the above Motions to Dismiss both on the record and in writing that it would hear the Motion to Dismiss at an evidentiary hearing and that all of the evidence offered at trial both before and after the filing of the Motion to Dismiss would be considered by the court in deciding each Motion to Dismiss. See August 27, 2015 order #324.02 and August 27, 2015 order #362.01, for example. This court is deciding in writing each and every of the above Motions to Dismiss and is issuing simultaneous with this Memorandum of Decision on the case in chief, a separate Memorandum of Decision on each viable Motion to Dismiss.

A number of Motions for Continuance have been filed by all parties plaintiff as well as defendants. Some have been granted but most have been denied. The number of the motions, the reasons stated, parties filing the timing of the motions in relation to a scheduled trial date, and the reasons for the court’s decision on each Motion for Continuance are too lengthy for this Memorandum of Decision.

During trial the court heard testimony and reviewed documents in evidence as well as pleadings addressed to the following issues: fair market value of the land, building and improvements at 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, Connecticut, the principal due on the $308,000 March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, the index used in the Adjustable Rate Note in order to determine the changed interest rates, the use of Index in the Adjustable Rate Note with COF1 numbers from the index, the determination of the periodic monthly interest, late charges, if any, the mathematical calculation of interest due, default interest, if any, the rate of default interest, if any, other costs and expenses permitted by the Adjustable Rate Note and the Open-End Mortgage, the fees for the real estate appraisal, title search and other such fees, the amount of attorney fees, advances of sums by the plaintiff for real estate taxes, insurance and other expenses authorizes by the note and mortgage documents, and the form of a judgment of foreclosure, if any.

Multiple Foreclosure Worksheets were filed in this third foreclosure action. The earliest filed Foreclosure Worksheet is dated December 2, 2013, filed within 6 months prior to the first trial date on May 24, 2014. In that December 2, 2013 Foreclosure Worksheet the fair market value was $850,000, the debt $577,441.04 and attorney fees $61,236.49. (#224.00.) A later Foreclosure Worksheet was filed on March 3, 2014 (#254.00) with the debt and attorney fees increasing. The next was May 1, 2014 (#280.00, #282.00), then January 12, 2015 (#307.00), March 17, 2015 (#319.00), May 19, 2015 (#329.00), and the latest was July 7, 2015 (#334.00). In each the fair market value ranged from $840,000 to $850,000 and the debt and attorney fees increased to a number that was fast approaching the then fair market value.

Vincent J. Buccanfuso testified in September 2015 as an expert real estate appraiser. His appraisals were offered in evidence; May 13, 2015 $850,000 Ex. 7, August 22, 2014 $840,000 Ex. 8 and May 13, 2015 $850,000 Ex. 9. He testified that the fair market value of 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, CT was $850,000. He was cross examined. No other evidence of the fair market value was presented to this court. The court finds that due to the extensive period of over three and one-half years that this court trial has proceeded, this May 23, 2015 real estate appraisal is stale. Cavanagh v. Joseph Richichi, Co-Trustee, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford, Docket Number FST CV 11-6009029 S (September 5, 2017, Heller, J.). The court will assign two days of evidence in order to hear evidence on the fair market value of 23 Ridgewood Road, Norwalk, Connecticut.

That evidentiary hearing is assigned for Tuesday, January 30, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. and Wednesday, January 31, 2018 at 10:00 a.m. in Courtroom 6D, Stamford Superior Court. Notice of Experts, if any, must be filed in accordance with the Practice Book. Vincent J. Buccanfuso is exempt from this Notice of Expert filing since he testified as an expert at trial.

The court will not hear nor entertain any evidence or exhibits on any matters or facts that this court has already found in this Memorandum of Decision. The court anticipates that this evidentiary hearing will involve the items cited on page 103 of this Memorandum of Decision as well as the following:

(1) Is the current principal due on the March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note $296,828.87?

(2) Is the $296,828.87 figure verified by trial Exhibits 36, 57 and 64?

(3) If not so verified, why not?

(4) What other documents verify the current principal due on the March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note and provide these documents to court for the next evidentiary hearing date?

(5) Is the " index" from which the interest rate from March 22, 2000 is determined to date: " The monthly weighted average cost of funds for Eleventh District savings institutes as announced by the Federal Home Loan Bank of San Francisco (the ‘11th District Monthly Weighted Average Cost of Funds Index’)" ?

(6) If not, what is the " index?"

(7) Is that above paragraph (5) " index" available by accessing www.fhlbsf.com/resource-center/cofi/ or some other website, and if another website, state that web address?

(8) Is the above " index" commonly called COFI?

(9) Are the index rates of interest in Exhibit 64, 3rd, 4th and 5th page, accurate?

(10) If not, what are the interest rates of for each month using the " index" in paragraph (5)?

(11) If the index is not that in paragraph (5), what are the rates of interest for each month using the claimed other index?

(12) Are the list of real estate taxes paid by plaintiff listed in Exhibit 64, 6th page?

(13) Does the proof of the attorney fees comply with Smith v. Snyder, 262 Conn. 456, 477, 479 (2014)?

(14) If the above documents do not accurately document advances made by the plaintiff for real estate taxes and insurance, the documents must be produced that verify those advances or payments, which may but are not required to include records of the Tax Collector of the City of Norwalk from January 1, 2004 to date.

(15) The factors needed by the court to determine whether a judgment of strict foreclosure or foreclosure by sale must be presented at the evidentiary hearing.

(16) The parties shall provide adequate evidence to assist the court in determining the proper Law Days or date of the foreclosure sale at the evidentiary hearing.

(17) If the COFI index is no longer in effect, evidence of the failed index and successor index must be presented at the evidentiary hearing.

(18) How is the exact month selected for the COFI index? For example is the effective interest on the outstanding unpaid principal beginning on August 1, 2005 through August 30, 2005 5.722%, which is derived from the index month of May 2005 at 2.622%, upon which the 3.10% is added pursuant to paragraph 4(c) of the March 22, 2000 $308,000 Adjustable Rate Note?

(19) Are the other monthly index rates calculated in the same method as the previous paragraph?

(20) If not, how are the monthly interest rates calculated by using the COFI index or the applicable index?

(21) What reduction in the debt, if any, should the court consider based on trial Exhibits 14 and 15?

(22) What other documents support a reduction of debt other than trial Exhibits 37 and 117, which Exhibits the court has already considered and ruled on in this Memorandum of Decision?

(23) Is there a separate default rate of interest in the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note, Ex. 3?

(24) If so, what is that default rate of interest for each month from August 1, 2005 to date?

(25) Is the default interest rate set forth in the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note the same as the monthly interest rate as determined by the " Index" ?

(26) Is interest calculated in arrears as per paragraph 3(A) of the March 22, 2000 Adjustable Rate Note?

(27) Does the debt claimed by the plaintiff involve a prepayment fee pursuant to the NOTE ADDENDUM. Ex. 3?

(28) If so, what is the amount of the prepayment fee and how is it calculated?

(29) Are late fees being claimed?

(30) If so, state the exact method of calculation of each claimed late fee.

(31) If other costs and expenses are being claimed, as to each such cost and expense, cite the section of the Adjustable Rate Note and/or Open-End Mortgage Deed that authorizes such cost and expense, and support the claims by documents.

This Memorandum of Decision is not a final appealable judgment since the type or method of foreclosure nor the current amount of the debt has yet been determined. Essex Savings Bank v. Fimberger, 26 Conn.App. 80, 80-81 (1991); Sovereign Bank v. Licata, 178 Conn.App. 82, 98 (2017). Any appeal taken from this Memorandum of Decision, which has not established the debt nor determined the type or method of foreclosure, will not stay further trial court proceedings.