Opinion
DBDCV176023364S
07-23-2019
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. v. Cecelia LAMPITELLI et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Mintz, J.
The issue before the court is whether there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and therefore, the defendant, Cecelia Lampitelli, is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. On October 15, 2013, the plaintiff bank, JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., filed a previous single count foreclosure action against the defendant and obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure on January 27, 2014. (#120.50) See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lampitelli, Superior Court, judicial district of Danbury, Docket No. CV-13-6013851-S. On December 5, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion to open the judgment nunc pro tunc in order to amend its complaint, seeking to add a reformation count to reform the mortgage to attach a corrected legal description of the property. (#122.00). On June 14, 2017, the court, Russo, J., denied the motion to open. (#122.15). The present action was commenced by the plaintiff on September 29, 2017. The plaintiff filed a four count complaint against the defendant for reformation of the mortgage, equitable foreclosure on the mortgage as reformed, unjust enrichment, and equitable subordination.
Although the complaint includes multiple defendants, the motion for summary judgment concerns only Cecelia Lampitelli. Therefore, the court will refer to her as the defendant from this point forward.
In count one of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On November 30, 1995, the defendant acquired title to an 18.2 acre parcel of land in Redding, Connecticut. On August 21, 1996, the plaintiff caused the original parcel to be subdivided into parcel A and parcel B. A survey reflecting this subdivision is recorded as Map No. 3813. On November 26, 1996, the defendant conveyed the original parcel to B. Richard Giordano (Giordano). On January 7, 1997, Giordano conveyed parcel A to the defendant through a quitclaim deed. On May 29, 1997, the defendant recorded an instrument in the town of Redding Land Records reflecting the combined parcel A and parcel B. The defendant subsequently resubdivided the original parcel into parcel X and parcel Y. On June 4, 1997, the defendant conveyed parcel Y to Giordano. On January 25, 2012, the defendant executed a promissory note in favor of the plaintiff for $249,960. On January 26, 2012, the defendant mortgaged the premises of 36 Whortleberry Hill Road, Redding, Connecticut, and described in exhibit A, to the plaintiff by deed in order to secure the note. The deed was recorded on the Redding Land Records on February 6, 2012, in volume 376 at page 127. The mortgage correctly identifies the premises as 36 Whortleberry Hill Road, Redding, Connecticut, however, it also references an incorrect Schedule A legal description of the secured premises. The mortgage’s Schedule A property description should have included parcel A and parcel B, less and except parcel Y. The correct legal description, submitted as exhibit B, provides an accurate legal description of the mortgaged premises in which the parties intended upon the closing of the loan. Reformation of the mortgage to provide a detailed legal description would not prejudice the defendant or any subsequent encumbrances because the mortgage correctly references the street address of the mortgaged premises and all subsequent encumbrancers were on notice of the property intended to be subject to the mortgage. Further, the defendant acknowledged the intention of the parties in a prior foreclosure action by abiding by the judgment and vacating the premises based upon her belief that the correct Schedule A had been foreclosed.
In the plaintiff’s motion to open nunc pro tunc in the previous action, the plaintiff alleges that Giordano deeded parcel B to the defendant by quitclaim deed, dated January 7, 1997, and recorded on said date in volume 205 at page 936 of the town of Redding Land Records. (#122.00) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lampitelli, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6013851-S. Additionally, in the motion to open, the plaintiff alleges that the deed for parcel A is dated May 16, 1997, and recorded May 22, 1997, in volume 209 at page 107. These allegations are absent from the plaintiff’s present complaint. Under the present complaint, parcel B was never transferred from Giordano to the defendant, however, the plaintiff’s complaint later alleges that the defendant recorded an instrument on May 29, 1997, reflecting parcel A and B being combined.
In count two, the plaintiff alleges the following. Upon information and belief, the defendant is the owner of record and in possession of the premises. On April 9, 2013, the plaintiff has been the party entitled to collect the debt evidenced by the note and is the party entitled to enforce the mortgage. The note and mortgage are in default by virtue of nonpayment of the monthly installments of principal and interest due on September 1, 2012, and each subsequent month thereafter. The plaintiff now exercises its right and option to declare the entire balance of the note due and payable. The plaintiff’s prior foreclosure action regarding the incorrect Schedule A was completed by virtue of a judgment of strict foreclosure in 2014. The plaintiff never foreclosed on the correct Schedule A. The following encumbrances of record upon the property sought to be foreclosed are prior in right to the plaintiff’s mortgage and are not affected by this action: Any taxes due to the town of Redding that remain outstanding and properly perfected as of the date hereof pursuant to applicable law. The following interests are claimed on the premises which are subsequent in right to the plaintiff’s mortgage: Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. successor in interest to Wachovia Bank, N.A., may claim an interest in said premises by virtue of a mortgage in the original principal amount of $400,000, dated June 14, 2004, and recorded June 28, 2004 in volume 310 at page 195 of the town of Redding Land Records. The mortgage was subordinated by virtue of a subordination agreement for open-end mortgage, dated January 5, 2012, and recorded February 6, 2012, in volume 376 at page 144 of the town of Redding Land Records.
In count three, the plaintiff alleges the following. The proceeds of the funds advanced by the plaintiff under the mortgage loan transaction subject to this action were utilized to the benefit of the defendant, specifically providing her with financial resources after the closing of the loan, including maintaining her status as record title owner of the premises. Aside from the receipt of these funds, the defendant’s use and enjoyment of the premises and her clear intent to mortgage the premises in accordance with the correct Schedule A, the defendant now resides on the premises under the belief that she is free of the obligations of any mortgage for anything but what is described in the incorrect Schedule A. The defendant has been unjustly enriched as the beneficiary of the proceeds of the loan and directly benefited through owning, using, and occupying the property through the advances made by the plaintiff; all while failing to abide by her obligations to make mortgage payments and comply with the terms of the clear intent of the parties. The defendant has failed or refused upon request to repay the plaintiff in full.
Lastly, in count four, the plaintiff alleges the following. The defendant was closely affiliated with Giordano and entered into a series of conveyances with him, which created confusion on the land records and lead to the attachment of the incorrect Schedule A. The defendant’s affirmative abandonment of the premises in connection with a prior foreclosure action is evidence of the defendant’s own belief as to the operative Schedule A. As a result, the defendant’s interest in the correct Schedule A should be equitably subordinated to the plaintiff’s interest. The plaintiff is left without an adequate remedy at law.
The plaintiff seeks foreclosure of the mortgage; possession of the property; reasonable attorneys fees; costs of suit; interest; a deficiency judgment against the makers of, or obligators on, the note, and their estate; putative damages; and such further relief as the court may deem just and equitable.
On April 25, 2019, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, along with a supporting memorandum of law. On May 22, 2019, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with supporting exhibits. This motion was heard at short calendar on June 3, 2019.
"[S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cefaratti v. Aranow, 321 Conn. 637, 645 (2016); see also Practice Book § 17-49. "The courts are in entire agreement that the moving party for summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue as to all the material facts, which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law. The courts hold the movant to a strict standard. To satisfy his burden the movant must make a showing that it is quite clear what the truth is, and that excludes any real doubt as to the existence of any genuine issue of material fact ... When documents submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment fail to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the nonmoving party has no obligation to submit documents establishing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 320 (2013). "A material fact ... [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 821 (2015). "A genuine issue of material fact must be one which the party opposing the motion is entitled to litigate under his pleadings and the mere existence of a factual dispute apart from the pleadings is not enough to preclude summary judgment." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Straw Pond Associates, LLC v. Fitzpatrick, Mariano & Santos, P.C., 167 Conn.App. 691, 728, cert. denied, 323 Conn. 930 (2016).
"Summary judgment should be denied where the affidavits of the moving party do not affirmatively show that there is no genuine issue of fact as to all of the relevant issues of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 320. "Once the moving party has met its burden, however, the opposing party must present evidence that demonstrates the existence of some disputed factual issue ... It is not enough, however, for the opposing party merely to assert the existence of such a disputed issue. Mere assertions of fact ... are insufficient to establish the existence of a material fact and, therefore, cannot refute evidence properly presented to the court ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferri v. Powell-Ferri, 317 Conn. 223, 228 (2015). "Accordingly, the rule that the party opposing summary judgment must provide evidentiary support for its opposition applies only when the moving party has first made out a prima facie case for summary judgment ... [I]f the party moving for summary judgment fails to show that there are no genuine issues of material fact, the nonmoving party may rest on mere allegations or denials contained in his pleadings ..." (Citations omitted; internal E. quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, supra, 310 Conn. 320-21.
"Although the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion ... a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment ... A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Escourse v. 100 Taylor Avenue, LLC, 150 Conn.App. 819, 829-30 (2014). "In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court’s function is not to decide issues of material fact ... but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, 303 Conn. 224, 233 (2011), overruled on other grounds by J.E. Robert Co. v. Signature Properties, LLC, 309 Conn. 307, 325 n.18 (2013).
In the present matter, the defendant asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact, and, thus, that she is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law based on three grounds. First, the defendant argues that the plaintiff lacks standing to bring this action because the claim is barred pursuant to General Statutes § 49-1. According to the defendant, § 49-1 serves as a bar to any further action on the mortgage debt or note following the previous entry of strict foreclosure. Furthermore, the defendant argues that the plaintiff s entire complaint and each cause of action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata because of the previous judgment of strict foreclosure entered, along with the denial of the plaintiff’s motion to open. In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant requests that this court take judicial notice of the previous foreclosure action involving the defendant and the plaintiff. See JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Lampitelli, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV-13-6013851-S (#120.50, #122.15).
General Statutes § 49-1 provides: "The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure; but the foreclosure is not a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation as to any person liable for the payment thereof upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could not have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure. The judgment in each such case shall state the names of all persons upon whom service of process has been made as herein provided."
In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be denied because genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether this action is barred pursuant to § 49-1. First, the plaintiff argues that it has proper standing to bring the present foreclosure action. Second, the plaintiff argues that § 49-1 does not bar the plaintiff from bringing this action for reformation of the mortgage following a judgment of strict foreclosure because foreclosure is an equitable proceeding. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the doctrine of res judicata is not implicated by the present action because the first judgment of strict foreclosure was not a final judgment on the merits as that term has been applied in regards to this second foreclosure action. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that Judge Russo’s previous decision denying the plaintiff’s motion to open was procedural in nature and not a final judgment on the merits as applied to the present action for reformation.
The court must first address whether the plaintiff lacks standing to bring the present action pursuant to § 49-1. For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the plaintiff has proper standing to bring the present action. "The issue of standing implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and therefore presents a threshold issue for our determination." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Strong, 149 Conn.App. 384, 397, cert. denied, 312 Conn. 923 (2014). "Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy ... [When] a party is found to lack standing, the court is consequently without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause ... In addition, because standing implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, the issue of standing is not subject to waiver and may be raised at any time." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Cornelius, 170 Conn.App. 104, 110, cert. denied, 325 Conn. 922 (2017). "Generally, in order to have standing to bring a foreclosure action the plaintiff must, at the time the action is commenced, be entitled to enforce the promissory note that is secured by the property." Id., 110-11. "It is well settled that the holder of a note secured by a mortgage has standing to commence a foreclosure action, regardless of whether it also holds the mortgage." GMAC Mortgage, LLC v. Ford, 144 Conn.App. 165, 174 (2013). "Because the complaint is part of the mesne process served to commence an action, it is implicit in that factual allegation [in the complaint] that the plaintiff also held the note at the time the action was commenced." Id. "[A] holder of a note is presumed to be the owner of the debt, and unless the presumption is rebutted, may foreclose the mortgage under [General Statutes] § 49-17." RMS Residential Properties, LLC v. Miller, supra, 303 Conn. 231-32.
At issue in the present motion for summary judgment is whether the plaintiff lacks standing pursuant to § 49-1 to bring this present action. Within the plaintiff’s complaint, it alleges that on January 25, 2012, the defendant executed a promissory note for the sum of $249,960 in favor of the plaintiff, and in order to secure this note, the defendant mortgaged the premises of 36 Whortleberry Hill Road, Redding, Connecticut to the plaintiff. Further, the plaintiff alleges that on or before April 9, 2013, it has been the party entitled to collect the debt and entitled to enforce the mortgage. The court has taken judicial notice that on January 27, 2014, Judge Roraback reviewed the pertinent documents and found them to be in order in the previous foreclosure matter.
"When construing a statute ... [General Statutes] § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered ... In determining whether the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, words, and phrases [must] be construed according to the commonly approved usage of the language ... We ordinarily look to the dictionary definition of a word to ascertain its commonly approved usage ... Additionally, we must construe the statute in conformity with prior case law interpreting. If, however, after examining the ordinary meaning of the words used in the statute and considering their meaning in light of prior cases interpreting the statute, the statutory text at issue is susceptible to more than one plausible interpretation, we may appropriately consider extratextual evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Redding Life Care, LLC v. Redding, 331 Conn. 711, 718-19 (2019). General Statutes § 49-1 provides, in relevant part: "The foreclosure of a mortgage is a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation against the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof who are made parties to the foreclosure and also against any person or persons upon whom service of process to constitute an action in personam could have been made within this state at the commencement of the foreclosure ..." "Therefore, once a mortgagee strictly forecloses on a mortgage and obtains title to the property following the running of the law days, § 49-1 extinguishes all rights of the mortgagee with respect to the mortgage debt, note or obligation against persons who are or could have been made parties to the foreclosure, except as provided in [General Statutes] § 49-14." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winthrop Properties, LLC, 312 Conn. 662, 671 (2014).
"Prior to 1833 the foreclosure of a mortgage operated as a bar to any subsequent action on the underlying promissory note." First Bank v. Simpson, 199 Conn. 368, 374 n.4 (1986). "Connecticut enacted its first deficiency judgment statute in 1833 ... Prior to 1818, therefore, there was no such proceeding. At common law, a mortgagee was required to elect between a foreclosure action or an action on the underlying debt ... If the mortgagee recovered successfully on the debt, the mortgage [was] released. If [the mortgagee chose] to take the land and to make it his own absolutely, whereby the mortgagor [was] totally divested of his equity of redemption, the debt [was] thereby paid and discharged: And if it eventually prove[d] insufficient to raise the sum due, it [was] the mortgagee’s own fault, and at his risk." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Voll, 38 Conn.App. 198, 205, cert. denied, 235 Conn. 903 (1995). "It was, therefore, precisely because the entry of judgment of foreclosure precluded any further common law proceedings on the note that the legislature in 1833 created the remedy of the deficiency judgment as the only available means of satisfying a mortgage debt when the security was inadequate to make the plaintiff whole ... In other words, the 1833 statute lifted the bar at common law on any further action on the mortgage debt after foreclosure." (Citations omitted.) Id., 205-06.
"The common law rule requiring a creditor to choose between an action at law on the note and an action at equity by foreclosing remains in effect. It is well established that a mortgagee has two separate and distinct causes of action against a defaulting mortgagor. A mortgagee may pursue an action at law for the amount due on the promissory note, or it may pursue its remedy in equity and foreclose on the mortgage ... The mortgagee may also pursue both of these remedies simultaneously in one consolidated foreclosure suit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 206. "Beginning in 1878, the statutory right to a deficiency judgment was conditioned on making the persons liable for the deficiency parties to the foreclosure action ... In 1957 the legislature adopted the statute that is now designated General Statutes [§ ]49-1. The statute prohibits a second action on the mortgage obligation against persons who could have been made parties to the foreclosure. [Section 49-1] prohibits the foreclosing mortgagee from maintaining a separate action on the underlying mortgage debt, note or obligation against any person liable except those upon whom personal service could not have been made at the outset of the foreclosure ... The legislature’s purpose in adopting [the law] was as clear as the statutory language itself: Actually what we are trying to accomplish is this. A person who may be liable upon a note or upon a foreclosure of mortgage, should be brought into the action if he can be found at the time the action is first brought. It’s good practice not to permit one person to be sued and then someone else might be liable along with it, be left out and then sued a year later or something like that. The intention of this bill and also the technical amendment is to bring in all those parties who are in this state, who can be served and make them respond at that time, and if there’s going to be any deficiency judgment those matters will be determined at that one action at that one time." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) TD Bank, N.A. v. Northern Expansion, LLC, Superior Court, judicial district of Waterbury, Docket No. CV-09-6001534-S (November 22, 2010, Matasavage, J.).
In the present action, the parties are in dispute as to whether § 49-1 bars the plaintiff from bringing a claim for reformation of the mortgage following a previous entry of judgment of strict foreclosure involving the same parties. According to the defendant, there is no genuine issue of material fact that § 49-1 bars the present action, and, thus, the plaintiff lacks standing. In support, the defendant argues that the previous entry of strict foreclosure was a final judgment, and, thus, § 49-1 must apply to bar the present reformation action because the plaintiff is attempting to foreclose on the same note and mortgage subject to the previous action. In response, the plaintiff argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether § 49-1 bars the present action. In support, the plaintiff argues that while § 49-1 normally prohibits any further action upon the mortgage debt, note, or obligation following the foreclosure of a mortgage, § 49-1 does not bar equitable actions brought by the plaintiff concerning its interest in the subject property. Therefore, the plaintiff argues, § 49-1 does not deprive the plaintiff of standing to bring the present action. Furthermore, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant remains in possession of the property due to an error concerning the property description, and now attempts to capitalize upon this error through utilizing § 49-1 to bar any future corrective action by the plaintiff as a means in which to retain possession of the property. Thus, the plaintiff argues, applying § 49-1 to bar the present action would effectively provide the defendant with a windfall, it would allow the defendant to avoid actual foreclosure, and would epitomize an imbalance of both equity and common sense.
"The law governing strict foreclosure lies at the crossroads between the equitable remedies provided by the judiciary and the statutory remedies provided by the legislature ... Because foreclosure is peculiarly an equitable action ... the court may entertain such questions as are necessary to be determined in order that complete justice may be done ... In exercising its equitable discretion, however, the court must comply with mandatory statutory provisions that limit the remedies available to a foreclosing mortgagee ... It is our adjudicatory responsibility to find the appropriate accommodation between applicable judicial and statutory principles. Just as the legislature is presumed to enact legislation that renders the body of law coherent and consistent, rather than contradictory and inconsistent ... [so] courts must discharge their responsibility, in a case by case adjudication, to assure that the body of law- both common and statutory- remain coherent and consistent." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) New Milford Savings Bank v. Jajer, 244 Conn. 251, 256-57 (1998). "The determination of what equity requires in a particular case, the balancing of the equities, is a matter for the discretion of the trial court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People’s United Bank v. Sarno, 160 Conn.App. 748, 754 (2015). Furthermore, "[i]t is an abiding principle of jurisprudence that common sense does not take flight when one enters a courtroom." State v. Otto, 305 Conn. 51, 70 n.17 (2012).
"Reformation is appropriate only when the deed executed by the parties does not reflect the agreement the parties actually intended. A cause of action for reformation of a contract rests on the equitable theory that the instrument sought to be reformed does not conform to the real contract agreed upon and does not express the intention of the parties and that it was executed as the result of mutual mistake ... We have held that this also applies to actions for reformation of a deed ... the function of which is merely to pass title to land, pursuant to the agreement of the parties ... Reformation is not granted for the purpose of alleviating a hard or oppressive bargain, but rather to restate the intended terms of an agreement when the writing that memorializes that agreement is at variance with the intent of both parties ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ARS Investors II 2012-1 HVB, LLC v. Crystal, LLC, 324 Conn. 680, 692 (2017). "[T]here can be no reformation unless there is an antecedent agreement upon which the minds of the parties have met. The relief afforded in reforming an instrument is to make it conform to the previous agreement of the parties. Therefore a definite agreement on which the minds of the parties have met must have pre-existed the instrument in question. The court cannot supply an agreement which was never made, for it is its province to enforce contracts, not to make or alter them." Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. v. Perez, 146 Conn.App. 833, 839 (2013), appeal dismissed, 315 Conn. 542 (2015).
"A court in the exercise of its power to reform a contract must act with the utmost caution and can only grant the relief requested if the prayer for reformation is supported by convincing evidence ... In the absence of fraud, it must be established that both parties agreed to something different from what is expressed in writing, and the proof on this point should be clear so as to leave no room for doubt ... If the right to reformation is grounded solely on mistake, it is required that the mistake be mutual, and to prevail in such a case, it must appear that the writing, as reformed, will express what was understood and agreed to by both parties ... A party seeking the reformation of a contract must show proof justifying reformation by clear, substantial and convincing evidence, meaning evidence that induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, [and] that the probability that they are true or exist; is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 839-40.
Our Supreme Court has held that an action for reformation of a mortgage may be brought by a subsequent purchaser following foreclosure of the property. See Gavin v. Johnson, 131 Conn. 489, 494 (1945). In that case, the defendant, Johnson, owned two adjoining parcels: 31 and 32. Johnson later sold and conveyed lot 31 to the Giffords by a warranty deed, and also entered into a written contract with the Giffords to convey lot 32. The Giffords took possession of both lots, and built a home on lot 32. In order to finance the construction, the Giffords subsequently borrowed money through a mortgage; however, the mortgage description incorrectly pertained to lot 31 instead of lot 32. The mortgages were refinanced into a single mortgage held by a building and loan association, and the association later foreclosed on the mortgage. Following the foreclosure action, the plaintiff bought what they thought to be the lot where the house was located from the association. Within the deed, however, the provisions of the mortgage described lot 31. The plaintiffs consequently brought an equitable action for reformation on the ground of mistake in order to secure title to lot 32 where the house was located, and the trial court rendered judgment in their favor. Id., 491-92.
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Errors, the court recognized in its decision that "[i]f, as the court found, the description in the mortgages of the other lot was the result of a mutual mistake, the mortgagees would have had a right to have the mortgages reformed to carry out the real intent of the parties ... If, however, the Giffords knew the true situation, but nevertheless gave the mortgages on the lot of land other than that on which the house stood, they would not be permitted to defeat the mortgagees’ rights to reformation on the ground that the mistake was not mutual." (Citation omitted.) Id., 493. Additionally, the court held that "[b]oth the association, which after foreclosure deeded lot 31 to the plaintiffs, and they were mistaken in the assumption that the [association] was conveying to the [plaintiffs] the lot with the house upon it; and under these circumstances, the plaintiffs succeeded to the equitable right to a reformation which their grantor had as against the qffords." (Emphasis added.) Id., 494. At the time in which Gavin was decided, foreclosure of a mortgage served as a bar against any further action upon the mortgage debt, note, or obligation pursuant to General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5080, the predecessor to General Statutes § 49-1. See Bridgeport-City Trust Co. v. Hirsch, 119 Conn. 586, 588-89 (1935).
General Statutes (1930 Rev.) § 5080 provides: "The foreclosure of a mortgage shall be a bar to any further action upon the mortgage debt, note or obligation, unless the person or persons who are liable for the payment thereof are made parties to such foreclosure."
After evaluating the court’s decision in Gavin v. Johnson in light of the present matter, this court is not convinced that § 49-1 serves to bar the plaintiff from bringing an action for reformation following a judgment of strict foreclosure. In Gavin, the court held that not only were the plaintiffs entitled to the equitable right of reformation, the court also acknowledged that the plaintiffs succeeded to the equitable right of reformation from which the association possessed against the original mortgagor. Gavin v. Johnson, supra, 131 Conn. 494. Although the plaintiff in Gavin was the subsequent purchaser of the property following the mortgagees’ foreclosure action, logic and reason dictate that if a subsequent title holder succeeds to the equitable right to a reformation which the mortgagee had against the original mortgagor, then that same mortgagee should also have the power to bring an equitable action for reformation despite an entry of foreclosure. Furthermore, in recognizing that foreclosure is an equitable proceeding, the court finds that the balance of equity favors allowing the plaintiff to bring the present action for reformation of the mortgage.
Therefore, based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Gavin, this court finds that the plaintiff does have standing to bring the present action. Furthermore, the court also finds that the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it is unclear whether General Statutes § 49-1 bars the plaintiff from bringing the present reformation action. Thus, the court finds that the defendant is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law as to both their first and second grounds.
The final issue before this court is whether the present action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata, thus entitling the defendant to summary judgment as a matter of law. "[S]ummary judgment is an appropriate vehicle for raising a claim of res judicata ..." Joe’s Pizza, Inc. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 236 Conn. 863, 867 n.8 (1996). "Because res judicata or collateral estoppel, if raised, may be dispositive of a claim, summary judgment [is] the appropriate method for resolving a claim of res judicata." Jackson v. R.G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 712 (1993). "[T]he doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, [provides that] a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim ... The doctrine of res judicata applies if the following elements are satisfied: the identity of the parties to the actions are the same; the same claim, demand or cause of action is at issue; the judgment in the first action was rendered on the merits; and the parties had an opportunity to litigate the issues fully ... Judgment based on the following reasons are not rendered on the merits: want of jurisdiction; pre-maturity; failure to prosecute; unavailable or inappropriate relief or remedy; lack of standing." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, 151 Conn.App. 620, 626, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930 (2014).
"Res judicata bars the relitigation of claims actually made in the prior action as well as any claims that might have been made there ... Public policy supports the principle that a party should not be allowed to relitigate a matter which it already has had an opportunity to litigate ... Thus, res judicata prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, 320 Conn. 146, 157-58 (2016). "The rule that a defendant’s judgment acts as a bar to a second action on the same claim is based largely on the ground that fairness to the defendant, and sound judicial administration, require that at some point litigation over the particular controversy come to an end. These considerations may impose such a requirement even though the substantive issues have not been tried, especially if the plaintiff has failed to avail himself of opportunities to pursue his remedies in the first proceeding, or has deliberately flouted orders of the court." 1 Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19, comment (a), p. 161-62 (1982). "[W]here a party has fully and fairly litigated his claims, he may be barred from future actions on matters not raised in the prior proceeding. But the scope of matters precluded necessarily depends on what has occurred in the former adjudication ... Because the operative effect of the principle of claim preclusion ... is to preclude relitigation of the original claim, it is crucial to define the dimensions of that original claim ... [T]he claim [that is] extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any party of the transaction ... out of which the action arose ... [This] transactional test ... provides a standard by which to measure preclusive effect of a prior judgment, which we have held to include any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made ... [E]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) C&H Management, LLC v. Shelton, 140 Conn.App. 608, 613 (2013).
"[T]he appropriate inquiry with respect to [claim] preclusion is whether the party had an adequate opportunity to litigate the matter in the earlier proceeding ..." (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut National Bank v. Rytman, 241 Conn. 24, 43-44 (1997). "In deciding whether the doctrine of res judicata is determinative, we begin with the question of whether the second action stems from the same transaction as the first. We have adopted a transactional test as a guide." Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., 282 Conn. 594, 604 (2007). "Although res judicata bars claims that were not actually litigated in a prior action, the previous and subsequent claims must be considered the same for res judicata to apply ... Under the transactional test, res judicata extinguishes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose ... What factual grouping constitutes a transaction, and what groupings constitute a series, are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations or business understanding or usage ... [E]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several different kinds of relief, it is still a single cause of action." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wheeler v. Beachcroft, supra, 320 Conn. 159-60. "In applying the transactional test, we compare the complaint in the second action with the pleadings and the judgment in the earlier action." Delahunty v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 236 Conn. 582, 590 (1996).
"[A] judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose ... The rule of claim preclusion prevents reassertion of the same claim regardless of what additional or different evidence or legal theories might be advanced in support of it." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Powell v. Infinity Ins. Co., supra, 282 Conn. 607. "[T]he essential concept of the modern rule of claim preclusion is that a judgment against [the] plaintiff is preclusive not simply when it is on the merits but when the procedure in the first action afforded [the] plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the merits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, 297 Conn. 446, 459 (2010). Furthermore, the decision of "whether to apply [the doctrine of res judicata] in any particular case should be made based upon a consideration of the doctrine’s underlying policies, namely, the interests of the defendant and of the courts in bringing litigation to a close ... and the competing interest of the plaintiff in the vindication of a just claim ... These [underlying] purposes are generally identified as being (1) to promote judicial economy by minimizing repetitive litigation; (2) to prevent inconsistent judgments which undermine the integrity of the judicial system; and (3) to provide repose by preventing a person from being harassed by vexatious litigation." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 460.
In the present matter, the defendant argues that the current action is barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Specifically, the defendant argues the claims presented by the plaintiff in this current action are claims which could have been made in the first foreclosure proceeding. According to the defendant, the same underlying claims on the note and mortgage are at issue in the present matter, and therefore, the four elements for res judicata have been meet. In support of her motion for summary judgment, the defendant requests that this court take judicial notice of the previous foreclosure action.
In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the present action is not subject to the doctrine of res judicata because the plaintiff is asserting entirely different claims that were not expressly subject to the first foreclosure action. According to the plaintiff, it obtained a judgment of strict foreclosure in the first action on a different piece of property than that which is the subject of the current action. In support, the plaintiff argues that the foreclosure judgment of the first action was effected against the correct address, but the incorrect property description. Additionally, the plaintiff argues that it did not have an opportunity to fully litigate the issue of reformation in the prior proceeding because neither party was aware at the time of the true state of the property description. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that the relief sought in the present matter is entirely different from the relief obtained in the first foreclosure action as the relief is premised upon a reformed mortgage which is different from the mortgage containing the incorrect property description. According to the plaintiff, the present matter is not a further action on the mortgage debt, but is an action to correct an issue with the mortgage itself. Furthermore, the plaintiff argues that the court’s denial of its motion to open was not a final judgment on the merits because the decision was based upon jurisdictional grounds and the court made no findings on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. Lastly, the plaintiff argues that none of the purposes of res judicata would be accomplished by applying the doctrine to the present case. The plaintiff additionally argues that the current action is not repetitive and it would not result in an inconsistent judgment with the previous foreclosure action.
Upon reviewing the complaint in the present action, along with the pleadings and the judgments in the earlier action, the court concludes that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the present action. First, the court notes that the identity of the parties in both actions are clearly the same. Furthermore, in considering whether the same claim, demand, or cause of action at issue in the previous foreclosure action is at issue in the present matter, the first action asserted a claim for foreclosure on the mortgage. In the present action, the plaintiff is asserting claims for reformation of the mortgage, equitable foreclosure of the mortgage, unjust enrichment, and equitable subordination. Moreover, the plaintiff is alleging in the present complaint that, although the mortgage correctly identified the premises in the previous foreclosure action, it referenced an incorrect property description. According to the plaintiff, the proposed description in the Schedule A attached to the foreclosed mortgage should have included parcel A and parcel B, less and except parcel Y. Thus, the present action is an attempt by the plaintiff to correctly foreclose upon additional property in which the parties intended to be subject to the mortgage.
The court notes that a judgment of strict foreclosure was entered in the previous matter on January 27, 2014. Although a final judgment of strict foreclosure does indeed exist on the merits as to foreclosure on the mortgage, there is no final judgment on the merits as to the plaintiff’s current causes of action asserted in this present action. In the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, she argues that the court, Russo, J., entered a final judgment on the merits as to the present causes of action through the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s motion to open the judgment nunc pro tunc in order to amend the complaint. While the court did indeed deny the plaintiff’s motion to open, the court’s decision was based upon procedural grounds in that the court lacked jurisdiction to open the judgment. Lack of jurisdiction is not a judgment on the merits, and thus, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to the present causes of action. See U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote, supra, 151 Conn.App. 626, Furthermore, even if the doctrine of res judicata applies to the present action, our Supreme Court has recognized "that the application of res judicata can yield harsh results, and, as a result, ... the doctrine should be flexible and must give way when [its] mechanical application would frustrate other social policies based on values equally or more important than the convenience afforded by finality in legal controversies." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Weiss v. Weiss, supra, 297 Conn. 465-66. "[Because] a mortgage foreclosure is an equitable proceeding, either a forfeiture or a windfall should be avoided if possible ... [T]he trial court must exercise its equitable powers with fairness not only to the foreclosing mortgagee, but also to subsequent encumbrancers and the owner." Farmers & Mechanics Savings Bank v. Sullivan, 216 Conn. 341, 354 (1990). As discussed previously in this opinion, the balance of equity favors allowing the plaintiff to bring the present action for reformation of the mortgage. Application of the doctrine of res judicata to the present matter would clearly amount to an inequitable windfall for the defendant.
Therefore, based upon a review of the evidence submitted and the associated pleadings, the court finds that the defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because a question exists as to whether the present action is barred pursuant to General Statutes § 49-1. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata does not bar the plaintiff’s current action. Thus, the defendant’s motion for summary judgment is denied.