Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:02-CV-756-L.
July 6, 2004
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 5, 2004 ("MSJ"), has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for hearing, if necessary, and recommendation. Also before the Court are the following pleadings:
(1) Memorandum Brief in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 5, 2004 ("Brf.");
(2) Appendix to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 5, 2004 ("App.");
(3) Plaintiff's Order, filed April 20, 2004; and
(4) Plaintiff's Respond [sic], filed April 22, 2004.
Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings and the evidence submitted therewith, the Court recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.
I. Background
Plaintiff Lonnie Jones, Jr. ("Plaintiff"), a pro se prisoner, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant Kelly Robinett ("Defendant"). Defendant is a doctor employed at the Dallas County Jail to provide medical care to inmates. (Robinett Affidavit ("Aff.") at 1; App. at 72.) Plaintiff seeks damages from Defendant for denial of medical care in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Eighth Amendment while Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee in the Dallas County Jail from October 18, 2001 to May 13, 2002. (Complaint ("Comp.") at 6, ¶¶ 5-7; App. at 6, 22; Sweet Aff. at 2, ¶¶ 4, 8.)Plaintiff was admitted to the Dallas County Jail on October 18, 2001 and underwent treatment in the infirmary unit of the Lew Sterrett Justice Facility. (Sweet Aff. at 2, ¶ 4; App. at 22, 43, 73, ¶ 1.) At that time, he informed the medical staff that he had a history of diabetes, hypertension, and hepatitis C. (App. at 43, 73, ¶ 1.) According to the nurse's notes, Plaintiff also stated that he had no other significant medical history. Id. at 43. He was then administered medication for his hypertension and insulin to treat his diabetes. Id. at 43, 73, ¶ 2. However, Plaintiff was eventually taken off insulin by the medical staff at the Dallas County Jail after testing revealed that his blood sugar levels were at a level at which insulin was not required. Id. at 73, ¶ 3. At that point, the medical staff elected to treat his diabetes with an oral medication. Id. Plaintiff was not treated with insulin or put on a special diet which included daily snacks because he "didn't need it" in the judgment of the medical staff. (Answers to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire ("MJQ") at 1; App. at 8.)
On January 14, 2002, Plaintiff complained of abdominal pain and constipation and informed the treating physician that he had a history of diverticulitis which had resulted in surgery in 1986. (App. at 45.) After evaluation of Plaintiff's condition, the doctor concluded that the abdominal pain was not the result of diverticulitis. Id. Plaintiff was given M.O.M. and Dulcolax for his constipation. Id. at 45-46.
On March 19, 2002, five months after his admission to the Dallas County Jail, Plaintiff filed an inmate grievance, complaining of not receiving proper medical care and a special diet including daily snacks to control his blood sugar. (App. at 22, ¶ 5.) The grievance committee investigated his claim, but ultimately took no corrective action because the medical staff at the Dallas County Jail had informed the grievance officer that the decision not to provide Plaintiff with a special diet was consistent with their policy of limiting the special diet to insulin-dependent diabetics. Id. at 40. The medical staff further informed the grievance officer that Plaintiff was also receiving medication for all of his other conditions. Id.
Plaintiff initially filed this lawsuit against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and an unknown doctor on April 12, 2002, alleging that he was denied medical care for bronchitis, congenital heart failure, arthritis, chronic back pain, and diverticulitis. (Comp. at 6, ¶¶ 5-6; App. at 6.) In response to an MJQ seeking identifying information about the medical staff who allegedly violated Plaintiff's rights, Plaintiff responded, "I don't know her name, but her physical description is as follows: black female doctor. . . ." (Answers to MJQ at 1; App. at 8.) On July 28, 2003, Plaintiff filed a supplement to his answers to the MJQ in which he identified a "Dr. Robrnitt" as the defendant based on an entry in his medical records dated January 14, 2002, which he attached; the January 14, 2002 entry appears to have been signed by a "Dr. Robinett." (Supplement filed July 28, 2003; see also App. at 45.) Defendant Robinett, a white male, moves for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) he was not personally involved in the alleged denial of medical care to Plaintiff, and (2) he did not act with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. (MSJ at 1, ¶ 2.)
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings and evidence on file show that no genuine issue exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. The movant makes a showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by informing the court of the basis of its motion and by identifying the portions of the record which reveal there are no genuine material fact issues. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits, if any, must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).Once the movant makes this showing, the non-movant must then direct the court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. To carry this burden, the "opponent must do more than simply show . . . some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Instead, the non-movant must show that the evidence is sufficient to support a resolution of the factual issue in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
While all of the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the motion's opponent, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970)), neither conclusory allegations nor unsubstantiated assertions will satisfy the non-movant's summary judgment burden. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d 1125, 1131 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 825 (1992). Summary judgment in favor of the movant is proper if, after adequate time for discovery, the motion's opponent fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case and as to which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
Generally, the pleadings of a plaintiff who is proceeding pro se must be liberally construed in his favor. See Hurd v. Doe, 2003 WL 21640569, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 10, 2003). However, "[a] summary judgment nonmovant who does not respond to the motion is relegated to [his] unsworn pleadings, which do not constitute summary judgment evidence." Preston v. Hertz Corp., 2003 WL 22938921, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 26, 2003) (quoting Bookman v. Shubzda, 945 F. Supp. 999, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1996)). Thus:
There is a point at which even pro se litigants must become responsible for the prosecution of their own cases if their claims are to warrant the court's attention. It is not unjustifiably onerous to require pro se parties to respond to proper motions for summary judgment. All summary judgment nonmovants shoulder the same obligation.Id. (quoting Bookman, 945 F. Supp. at 1002). Moreover, under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court does not have an obligation to `"sift through the record in search of evidence' to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment." Crane v. Bowles, 2004 WL 1057771, at *1 (N.D. Tex. May 6, 2004) (quoting Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994)). Instead, "the party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim." Id. (citing Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998)).
In the present case, Plaintiff filed two documents with the court following Defendant's summary judgment motion. However, neither of these documents responds to Defendant's claim that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding certain elements of Plaintiff's cause of action. While this failure to respond does not in and of itself result in the granting of Defendant's motion, the Court may accept Defendant's evidence as undisputed. Preston, 2003 WL 22938921, at *1.
III. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiff brings a claim against Defendant for denial of medical care in violation of Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Defendant moves for summary judgment, alleging no personal involvement in the care of Plaintiff, and a lack of evidence of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs.
A. Personal Involvement on the Part of Defendant
In order for a government official to be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he was deprived of a right that is constitutional or otherwise secured under the laws of the United States, and (2) that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of that right while acting under the color of state law. Priester v. Lowndes County, 354 F.3d 414, 420 (5th Cir. 2004); Grabowski v. Jackson County Public Defenders Office, 47 F.3d 1386, 1392 (5th Cir. 1995). "Because Section 1983 imposes liability only upon those who actually cause a deprivation of rights, `personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.'" Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 264 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Lozano v. Smith, 718 F.2d 756, 768 (5th Cir. 1983) (requiring personal involvement in section 1983 claims). Thus, "[p]ersonal involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action." Thompson v. Steele, 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976)); Hines v. Graham, 2004 WL 1254109, at *6 (N.D. Tex. Jun. 8, 2004). In addition, a government official may not be held vicariously liable for the acts of another under § 1983. Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1987); Wilson v. Horton, 2004 WL 583212, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 23, 2004).
Defendant's first ground for summary judgment is that he was not personally involved in Plaintiff's medical care, as evidenced by the fact that he did not begin his employment with Dallas County until December 2002, after Plaintiff had been transferred. (MSJ at 5, ¶ 11; App. at 74.) This assertion is contradicted by Defendant's own summary judgment evidence, however, which shows that Defendant treated Plaintiff at the Dallas County Jail on or about January 14, 2002. (App. at 45.) According to the medical records for that date, Plaintiff complained of abdominal pain and stated that he had a history of diverticulitis. Id. Defendant evaluated Plaintiff, concluded that the abdominal pain was not the result of diverticulitis, and gave Plaintiff M.O.M. and Dulcolax for constipation. (App. at 45-46.) Denial of treatment for diverticulitis is a basis for Plaintiff's action. (Comp. at 6; App. at 6.)
On the other hand, Plaintiff specifically described the doctor who denied him medical care in violation of his constitutional rights as "a black female doctor, approximately 5'5" tall between 45-60 years old, salt'n pepper hair 145-185 lbs." (MJQ at 1; App. at 8.) Defendant, according to his affidavit, is a white male. (App. at 72, ¶ 4.) Plaintiff did not describe anyone other than the "black female doctor" as having denied him medical care at the Dallas County Jail. Nor has Plaintiff otherwise alleged that Defendant was personally involved in the denial of medical care in deprivation of his constitutional rights.
While the medical staff's policy of limiting special diets to insulin-dependent diabetics could possibly be construed to be a cause of one aspect of Plaintiff's alleged denial of medical care, Plaintiff has not alleged, and the evidence does not suggest, that Defendant was a supervisory official who implemented the policy. "[A] supervisory official may be held liable . . . `if he implements a policy so deficient that the policy itself acts as a deprivation of constitutional rights.'" Johnson v. Ramos, 2003 WL 22946476, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2003) (quoting Cronn v. Buffington, 150 F.3d 538, 544 (5th Cir. 1998)). Therefore, this possible argument does not merit further discussion.
The Court need not decide whether the fact issue regarding Defendant's personal involvement in the provision of medical care precludes summary judgment on the issue of denial of medical care. As discussed below, Plaintiff's complaint fails on the issue of deliberate indifference.
B. Deliberate Indifference
A pretrial detainee has a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for denial of his constitutional right to medical care if he can show that a government official acted with subjective deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); Mace v. City of Palestine, 333 F.3d 621, 625 (5th Cir. 2003); Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 1996). Subjective deliberate indifference is defined as "subjective knowledge of a substantial risk of serious medical harm, followed by a response of deliberate indifference." Narren v. Livingston Police Dept., 86 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 1996); Mace, 333 F.3d at 625-26. Thus, it requires that the defendant knew of a substantial risk, and subsequently disregarded that risk. Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 210 (5th Cir. 2003). Mere negligence, or even gross negligence, is insufficient to establish subjective deliberate indifference. Hare, 74 F.3d at 645; Cotton v. Ryan, 2004 WL 579569, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 4, 2004). Moreover, "[d]isagreement with medical treatment alone cannot support a claim under § 1983." Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2001).
Defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that there is no evidence in the record that he acted with subjective deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's medical needs. Defendant has pointed to evidence that upon Plaintiff's admission to the Dallas County Jail, he was transferred to the Lew Sterrett Justice Facility where he received treatment and medication for his diabetes, hypertension, and hepatitis C. (MSJ at 4, ¶¶ 3-5; App. at 73, ¶¶ 1-2.) In addition, Defendant also pointed to evidence that shows that throughout the course of incarceration at Dallas County Jail, Plaintiff received treatment and medication for all his medical conditions. (MSJ at 5, ¶ 8; App. at 73, ¶ 4.) Defendant has also directed the Court's attention to evidence that neither he nor any other member of the medical staff at the Dallas County Jail deliberately ignored Plaintiff's medical needs. (MSJ at 5, ¶ 10; App. at 73-74.)
Defendant has made a sufficient showing to shift the burden to Plaintiff to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant's alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional right to medical care. Therefore, Plaintiff, the non-movant, must direct the Court's attention to evidence in the record sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. The documents which Plaintiff filed in response to Defendant's summary judgment motion do not mention the treatment he received at the Dallas County Jail, nor do they even mention any of the facts of this case. Because Plaintiff has failed to point to any evidence in the record that would establish that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Defendant's deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's constitutional right to medical care, summary judgment should be granted on this issue.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment be GRANTED.