Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-2668-L.
July 10, 2003.
ORDER
Before the court are Defendant Laskie's Motion to Dismiss, filed September 3, 2002 ("Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss); Defendant Jim Hamlin's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed September 20, 2002; two separate Reports from the Magistrate Judge, filed November 6, 2002; Defendants John Doe (Warden C. Keeton) and John Doe's (Counselor Joe Razo) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, filed March 25, 2003; Defendant Laskie's Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b), filed February 10, 2003 ("Laskie's Second Motion to Dismiss"); Defendant Hamlin's Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order, filed April 10, 2003; and Laskie's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 24, 2003. Upon consideration, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss; grants Defendant Hamlin's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denies, except as herein stated, Defendants Keeton and Razo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; denies as moot Defendant Hamlin's Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order; and grants Defendant Laskie's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The term "Report" refers to the "Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge," filed on November 6, 2002.
I. Background
Plaintiff Dietrich D. Hurd ("Hurd" or "Plaintiff"), who is proceeding pro se, filed this civil lawsuit on December 18, 2001, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Defendants Jim Hamlin, Dallas County District Clerk; "Jane Doe, Records Supervisor," later identified as Terry Laskie ("Laskie"); "John Doe, Dawson State Jail Counselor," later identified as Counselor Joe Razo ("Razo"); and "John Doe, Dawson State Jail Warden," later identified as Warden C. Keeton ("Keeton"), asserting claims for an alleged violation of his civil rights. Specifically, Hurd alleges that Keeton and Razo violated his civil rights by causing him to be detained forty-five days past the expiration date of his state court sentence; that Laskie intentionally failed to update his records to reflect that his sentence had expired and that he was being held beyond his release date, and failed to have a policy or procedure in place to allow a person with authority update inmate records when she was absent from work; and that Hamlin failed to forward a Nunc Pro Tunc Order, which granted him credit on his sentence, to the proper authorities, namely, the Records Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. The Defendants have all moved to either dismiss this action by judgment on the pleadings or by summary judgment.
II. Defendants' Motions
A. Hamlin's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
On September 30, 2002, the court referred Hamlin's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings to the United States Magistrate Judge for proposed findings and recommendation for disposition. The Conclusions and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge were filed on November 6, 2002, to which no objections were made. Having reviewed the pleadings, file and record in this case and the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge, the court determines that the findings and conclusions are correct and hereby accepts them as those of the court. Accordingly, Hamlin's Motion to Dismiss for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted, and Plaintiff's claims against this Defendant are hereby dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) for failure to state a claim.
B. Keeton and Razo's Motion to Dismiss for Judgment on the Pleadings
1. Legal Standard for Judgment on the Pleadings
Any party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the pleadings are closed and when it would not delay the trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A motion brought pursuant to Rule 12(c) "is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not in dispute and a judgment on the merits can be rendered by looking to the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts." Hebert Abstract Co., Inc. v. Touchstone Properties, Ltd., 914 F.2d 74, 76 (5th Cir. 1990). If, however, matters outside the pleadings are also presented to the court for consideration, a Rule 12(c) motion must be treated as one for summary judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c); Darlak v. Bobear, 814 F.2d 1055, 1064 (5th Cir. 1987). "Like a motion for summary judgment, a 12(c) motion should be granted only if there is no issue of material fact and if the pleadings show that the moving parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Perez v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 967 F. Supp. 920, 924 (S.D. Tex. 1997). A ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is reviewed under the same standard as a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. GATX Leasing Corp. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 64 F.3d 1112, 1114 (7th Cir. 1995); see also St. Paul Ins. Co. of Bellaire, Tex. v. AFIA Worldwide Ins. Co., 937 F.2d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1991).
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) "is viewed with disfavor and is rarely granted." Lowrey v. Texas AM Univ. Sys., 117 F.3d 242,247 (5th Cir. 1997). A district court cannot dismiss a complaint, or any part of it, for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Blackburn v. City of Marshall, 42 F.3d 925, 931 (5th Cir. 1995). Stated another way, "[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (quoting Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984)). In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996). In ruling on such a motion, the court cannot look beyond the pleadings. Id.; Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1229 (2000). The pleadings include the complaint and any documents attached to it. Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000). Likewise, "`[d]ocuments that a defendant attaches to a motion to dismiss are considered part of the pleadings if they are referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and are central to [the plaintiff's] claims.'" Id. (quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir. 1993)). The ultimate question in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is whether the complaint states a valid cause of action when it is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and with every doubt resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 247. A plaintiff, however, must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations, to avoid dismissal. Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1992).
2. Analysis
Defendants Keeton and Razo move to dismiss Hurd's substantive due process claims against them, contending that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts demonstrating that they engaged in any intentional misconduct which caused his extended incarceration. They further contend that the extended incarceration of a prisoner caused by negligent, rather than intentional, conduct does not constitute a substantive due process violation as a matter of law, and cite Martin v. Dallas County, 822 F.2d 553, 555 (5th Cir. 1987), in support of this contention. In the alternative, Keeton and Razo contend that Hurd's claims are barred as a matter of law because an adequate post-deprivation remedy was available to him under state law, in particular, a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. Hurd did not file a response to the motion.
Hurd's allegations with respect to Keeton and Razo are as follows. On or about July 1, 2000, Plaintiff was transferred from the Hutchins State Jail to the Dawson State Jail. He was later notified on July 9, 2000 that counselors were available at the Dawson Jail to assist inmates with administrative, social or stress related issues. Hurd met with Razo on July 10 or 11, 2000, at which time he told Razo that his paperwork was in error, and that he should have already been released. On July 12, 2000, Razo obtained certain of Plaintiff's records from the Dallas County District Clerk's Office, including documentation showing that his sentence had expired. Plaintiff contends that Keeton and Razo intentionally failed to release him despite their knowledge that his sentence had expired, and acted indifferently toward him and his situation.
Plaintiff's pleadings are inconsistent on this issue. In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he met with Razo on July 10, 2000, one day after he learned that there were counselors available. In his responses to the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire, he states that he met with Razo on July 11, 2000. Since Hurd was not released until July 14, 2000, the date on which he actually met with Razo is not relevant to the court's analysis.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States and demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law violated that right. Leffall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). Keeton and Razo allege that Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts which show that they intentionally held him past his release date or in any way contributed to his extended incarceration. The court disagrees.
In analyzing Plaintiff's Complaint, the court must bear in mind that Plaintiff is pro se, and as such, his complaint is to be liberally construed. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Plaintiff specifically alleges that although Razo and Keeton learned on July 10 or 11, 2000 that his sentence had expired, they intentionally held him for an additional 3 1/2 days. If Plaintiff establishes that Defendants knew that his sentence had expired, and intentionally continued to incarcerate him, he would be able to recover damages and other relief as appropriate against these Defendants. Although Plaintiff's Complaint is inartfully pled and somewhat conclusory, the court is convinced that he has stated sufficient facts against these Defendants, which if proved would entitle him to relief. Whether Plaintiff's Complaint could withstand summary judgment is unknown; however, Plaintiff has alleged enough to survive the pleadings stage. The court therefore denies Keeton and Razo's motion to dismiss on this ground.
In the alternative, Razo and Keeton argue that Hurd's claims are barred as a matter of law because an adequate post-deprivation remedy was available to him under state law. They explain that the deprivation of a liberty interest is cognizable under § 1983 only if an adequate post-deprivation remedy is not available to the plaintiff under state law. They contend that because there exists a proper remedy under state law, specifically, a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, see Martin, 822 F.3d at 555, Hurd's § 1983 claims against them are barred as matter of law. In support of their argument, Defendants cite Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
It is not altogether clear from Hurd's Complaint whether he is asserting a claim of illegal detention based on a violation of his procedural due process rights; however, to the extent that the complaint may be liberally construed as asserting such a claim, the court agrees with Razo and Keeton that it would be barred by the doctrine established by the Supreme Court in Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984). These cases stand for the proposition that a plaintiff may not assert a § 1983 claim for deprivation of procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendment where adequate state remedies exist. See O'Quinn v. Manuel, 773 F.2d 605, 608 (5th Cir. 1985). The Fifth Circuit has held that a § 1983 plaintiff has an adequate state remedy while an alleged illegal detention is underway, as well as for post-deprivation compensatory relief. In particular, a plaintiff may seek habeas corpus relief pursuant to Tex.Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 11.01 or tort recovery for false imprisonment. Martin, 822 F.3d at 555.
According to his Complaint, Hurd was released from custody on July 14, 2000. The court fails to see how seeking habeas corpus relief would have provided him an adequate post-conviction remedy. See Tex.Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 11.01 ("The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy to be used when any person is restrained in his liberty."). In any event, because an adequate state tort remedy — false imprisonment — exists for a claim based on illegal detention in violation of a person's procedural due process rights, Martin, 822 F.3d at 555, any purported § 1983 claim based on a deprivation of procedural due process must be dismissed as a matter of law.
Hurd's Complaint, however, also includes allegations that he was deprived of his substantive due process rights. "Violation of a substantive, as opposed to a procedural due process, constitutional right does not fall within the limitations of Parratt/Hudson." Martin, 822 F.3d at 555 (citing Augustine v. Doe, 740 F.2d 322, 326-27 (5th Cir. 1984)). Therefore, the court must deny Razo and Keeton's motion to the extent it seeks a dismissal of Hurd's claim for violation of his substantive due process rights.
For the reasons stated, Defendants Keeton and Razo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied, except as herein stated.
C. Defendant Laskie's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's allegations with respect to Laskie are that she intentionally failed to update his state jail records, and failed to have established procedures in place to allow other persons in her department to update inmate records when she was absent from work. He further alleges that as a result of Laskie's failure to update his records, he had to serve 45 more days than his sentence required. Laskie has moved for summary judgment, requesting summary dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims against her based on her entitlement to qualified immunity. Plaintiff did not file a response to Laskie's summary judgment motion.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455,458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
2. The Doctrine of Qualified Immunity
Laskie asserts that she is entitled to qualified immunity. Government officials who perform discretionary functions are entitled to the defense of qualified immunity, which shields them from suit as well as liability for civil damages, if their conduct does not violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). A defendant official must affirmatively plead the defense of qualified immunity. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). Laskie has affirmatively pled the defense of qualified immunity.
In deciding a motion for summary judgment that raises the defense of qualified immunity, the court must first decide "whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation." Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 526, 290 (1999), citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1991); see also Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 339 (5th Cir. 1999). The second prong of the test requires the court to make two separate inquiries: whether the right allegedly violated was clearly established at the time of the event giving rise to the plaintiff's claim, and if so, whether the conduct of the defendant was objectively unreasonable. Evans v. Ball, 168 F.3d 856, 860 (5th Cir. 1999). Although many cases continue to state that the determination of the qualified immunity issue requires the application of a bifurcated test, the analytical framework for resolving issues of qualified immunity necessarily requires, or may require, a three-step analysis. See Kerr, 171 F.3d at 339; Evans, 168 F.3d at 860; Hare v. City of Corinth, Mississippi, 135 F.3d 320,326 (5th Cir. 1998); Eugene v. Alief Indep. Sch. Dist., 65 F.3d 1299, 1305 (5th Cir. 1995).
Whether a defendant acted within the scope of his authority performing a discretionary function and whether a reasonable official in his position would have deemed his conduct unconstitutional are not to be considered by the court unless each part of the three-step inquiry has been answered affirmatively on behalf of the plaintiff. Kerr, 171 F.3d at 339. In other words, only after a plaintiff demonstrates the existence and violation of a clearly established constitutional or statutory right is the defendant required to show that he was performing a discretionary function and that a reasonable official would not have considered his actions to be unconstitutional at the time of the incident in question. Id. at 338.
3. Analysis
As stated before, to state a claim under § 1983, Hurd must allege a violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States and demonstrate that a person acting under color of state law violated that right. Leffall, 28 F.3d at 525. Hurd alleges that Laskie was the records supervisor for the Texas Depart of Criminal Justice. "Supervisory officials may be held liable [under § 1983] only if: (i) they affirmatively participate in acts that cause constitutional depravation; or (ii) implement constitutional policies that causally result in plaintiff's injury." Baker, 75 F.3d at 199. In some instances, supervisory officials maybe held liable for acts of omission, such as a failure to train or supervise. Id. (a supervisory official's failure to supervise or train his subordinates may amount to deliberate indifference which may cause the violation of constitutional rights).
The deprivation must have been caused by intentional, rather than negligent, conduct. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) ("Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty or property."); see also Jackson v. Procunier, 789 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1986). Thus, supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent a subordinates' misconduct cannot be held liable under § 1983. The supervisor must act either knowingly or with deliberate, or reckless indifference. Southard v. Texas Bd. of Criminal Justice, 114 F.3d 539, 551 (5th Cir. 1997) ("a supervisory official may be liable under § 1983 if that official, by action or inaction, demonstrates a deliberate indifference to a plaintiff's constitutionally protected rights.").
Although Hurd alleges that Laskie intentionally failed to update his records, he does not allege, nor does the record establish, that she affirmatively participated in any acts which caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights. There are no allegations that Laskie knew that Hurd's records had not been updated to reflect that his sentence had expired, or that she knew of any misconduct by her staff. Instead, Hurd alleges that Laskie should have had procedures in place that would have allowed others to update inmate records, as necessary, when she was absent from work. Hurd's pleadings, however, are devoid of facts which show that Laskie deliberately or recklessly failed to correct a known deficiency that would result in a violation of constitutional rights.
Indeed, according to the record, Laskie did not calculate time for offenders incarcerated in State Jails, such as Hurd, and she had no responsibility or involvement in the calculation of Hurd's State Jail offenses. Hurd has not presented any evidence to contradict Laskie's evidence, or to raise a genuine issue of material fact, that she or her staff was actually responsible for updating his records.
Moreover, even if Laskie, or persons under her supervision, failed to update Hurd's records, there is nothing in the record to indicate that such failure was more than a mere oversight, or simple negligence, which cannot be the basis for a substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Simply put, nothing in the record intimates or implies that such failure was intentional or the result of deliberate indifference. The court cannot infer from the facts alleged that Laskie or anyone in her office was aware or should have been aware that failure to timely update his records would cause him to be held beyond his release date. Accordingly, Hurd has failed to state or establish a constitutional claim. As Plaintiff has failed to state or establish a constitutional claim, there can be no violation of clearly established law, and Laskie is therefore entitled to summary judgment on the basis of her qualified immunity defense. Defendant Laskie's Motion for Summary judgment is granted. III. Remaining Motions
Also before the court are Defendant Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss, filed September 3, 2002; Defendant Laskie's Second Motion to Dismiss, filed February 10, 2003, and Defendant Hamlin's Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order, filed April 10, 2003. The court disposes of these motions as follows.
Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss was referred to the United States magistrate judge for hearing, and to submit to the court proposed findings and recommendation for disposition. On November 6, 2002, the Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge were filed, to which there were no objections. The magistrate judge recommended that the court grant the motion to the extent it sought dismissal of any claim asserted against Laskie in her official capacity as Supervisor of Records for the Texas Department of Criminal Justice; deny the motion to the extent it sought dismissal of the action as frivolous; and deny the motion without prejudice in all other respects. The court determines that the findings and conclusions of the magistrate judge are correct and hereby accepts them as those of the court. Accordingly, Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The magistrate judge also recommended that the court permit Plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a) Reply to address Laskie's assertion of qualified immunity; however, the court finds that this is unnecessary in light of Laskie's summary judgment motion, and Plaintiff's failure to either respond to the motion, or otherwise request an opportunity to address the issue of qualified immunity. In light of the court's ruling on Laskie's Motion for Summary Judgment and her First Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff's claims against her shall be dismissed.
Laskie's Second Motion to Dismiss and Hamlin's Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order are both moot, and accordingly denied. IV. Conclusion
For the reasons herein stated, Defendant Laskie's First Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part; Defendant Hamlin's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted; Defendants Keeton and Razo's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied, except as herein stated; Defendant Laskie's Second Motion to Dismiss is denied; Defendant Laskie's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; and Defendant Hamlin's Motion to Vacate Scheduling Order is denied. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Hamlin and Laskie are hereby dismissed with prejudice. The only claim remaining for trial is Plaintiff's § 1983 substantive due process claim against Defendants Keeton and Razo.