Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:01-CV-1237-L.
May 6, 2004
ORDER
Before the court is Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 4, 2004. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, competent evidence, record and applicable law, the court grants Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
This is pro se civil rights case. Plaintiff Del H. Crane ("Crane" or "Plaintiff") is an inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. On June 26, 2001, Crane filed this lawsuit against Jim Bowles ("Bowles"), who is the Dallas County Sheriff, the Dallas County Jail and Dallas County, Texas, alleging violations of his civil rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Crane was incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail.
In this lawsuit, Crane contends that on May 31, 2001, he was handed an empty envelope addressed from an attorney he was attempting to employ. The empty envelope, according to Crane, proves that the Dallas County Jail mail room ("the mail room") confiscated one piece of legal mail. Crane also contends that the mail room illegally opened his legal mail on at least two other occasions. Crane further contends that Dallas County repeatedly denied him envelopes for his legal mail, delayed his legal mail and limited his access to the law library because of his indigence. Crane was incarcerated in the Dallas County Jail from August 2000 until June 2001.
On August 12, 2002, the court dismissed the claims against Bowles and the Dallas County Jail as frivolous. On March 4, 2004, Defendant Dallas County ("Dallas County" or "Defendant"), the only remaining defendant, filed a motion for summary judgment. The court now considers this motion.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000); Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254-55.
Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id.; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
III. Analysis
To obtain relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and (2) a deprivation of that right by the defendant acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978). A governmental entity can be sued and subjected to monetary damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only if its official policy or custom causes a person to be deprived of a federally protected right. Board of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Official policy is defined as:
i. A policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the [county] lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or
ii. A persistent, widespread practice of [county] officials or employees which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents [county] policy. Actual or constructive knowledge of such custom must be attributable to the governing body of the [county] or to an official to whom that body had delegated policy-making authority.Webster v. City of Houston, 735 F.2d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. City of Slidell, 735 F.2d 861, 862 (5th Cir. 1984). A plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity itself and show that his injury was incurred because of the application of that specific policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985). A plaintiff must establish that the governmental entity through its deliberate conduct was the moving force behind the injury or harm suffered and must establish a direct causal link between the governmental entity's action and the deprivation of a federally protected right. Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 403-04.
The court construes Crane's Complaint to allege a denial of judicial access. Access-to-courts claims fall into two categories: claims that "systemic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing suits at the present time," where the suits could be pursued "once the frustrating condition has been removed," and claims of "specific cases that cannot not be tried (or tried with all material evidence), no matter what official action may be in the future." Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413-14 (2002). Regardless whether the claim "turns on a litigating opportunity yet to be gained or an opportunity already lost, the very point of recognizing any access claim is to provide some effective vindication for a separate and distinct right to seek judicial relief for some wrong." Id. at 414-15. The right of access to the courts is "ancillary to the underlying claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out of court." Id. at 415. A claim for deprivation of one's constitutional right of access to the courts must set forth in the complaint (1) "the underlying cause of action, whether anticipated or lost," and (2) "the official acts frustrating the litigation." Id. Moreover, to prevail on an access-to-courts claim, an actual injury must result from the defendant's conduct. Chriceol v. Phillips, 169 F.3d 313, 317 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351-54 (1996)).
Dallas County contends that Crane cannot prevail on his access-to-courts claim because he has not suffered an actual injury. Crane contends that he did suffer an actual injury, as he has been forced to represent himself in the underlying federal lawsuit because the confiscated legal mail contained a referral to an attorney who could have possibly been retained to represent him. Resp. to Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire at 5 ("[T]he lawyer he promised to find to help me is now lost forever in my mail."). He further contends that the opening of his legal mail outside of his presence, the denial of envelopes, the delay in receiving his legal mail and the reduction in his law library hours has caused delays in his underlying federal case resulting in damage to his case that "may never be fully known." Resp. To Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire at 7.
Crane never explains why the referral information was "forever lost." It is apparent to the court that Crane could have written to the attorney who sent the confiscated mail to explain the situation and to request that the attorney resend the referral information, including the name of the attorney who might agree to represent him. Remarkably, Crane never states he took this step.
Crane, however, does not put the court on notice as to the underlying federal lawsuit to which he refers. Herein lies the problem. The court has no way of knowing the nature and parameters of the underlying cause of action, which is necessary to support an access-to-courts claim. As he does not identify or set forth the underlying cause of action that was lost or anticipated, as a matter of law, Crane has not established, or raised a genuine issue of material fact, that he has suffered an actual injury. Accordingly, Dallas County is entitled to summary judgment on Crane's access-to-courts claim. IV. Conclusion
Crane has filed ten cases in federal court, three of which were filed before he filed the instant action.
The court notes that although Crane's response to Dallas County's motion for summary judgment indicates that nine exhibits are attached to the response, exhibits 2 through 5 were not attached to the response. None of these exhibits identifies or describes the underlying cause of action.
As Crane has failed to establish an actual injury, the issue of county liability is irrelevant and quite beside the point. Moreover, even if he could establish an access-to-courts claim, which he cannot, Crane has produced no evidence to establish that the was injured as a result of a custom or practice of Dallas County. Again, the only allegation for which Crane provides specific information is the alleged confiscation of his legal mail on May 31, 2001. Even if true, "[a] customary municipal policy cannot ordinarily be inferred from single constitutional violation." Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 581 (5th Cir. 2001). In this case, there is no indication that the actions of which Crane complains were undertaken by a person with policymaking authority, see Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986) (court held that a single act could impose municipal liability if done by a person with policymaking authority), or undertaken by a person who was implementing a county sanctioned custom or policy. Accordingly, Crane's § 1983 claim fails on this basis also.
For the above stated reasons, no genuine issues of fact exist with respect to Plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, the court grants Defendant Dallas County's Motion for Summary Judgment. The court dismisses with prejudice this action against Defendant. Judgment will issue by separate document as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58.