Opinion
05-23-01056-CV
04-18-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF K.D., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 199th Judicial District Court Collin County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 199-30076-2022
Before Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Nowell Justices.
OPINION
BILL PEDERSEN, III JUSTICE
The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) placed K.D. in its care approximately one week after she was born because she and her mother (Mother) tested positive for methamphetamines. Mother voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to K.D., and, after a bench trial, the trial court terminated the parental rights of K.D.'s father (Father) as well. Father appeals, contending that the evidence at trial was insufficient to overcome the fit-parent presumption, to support the trial court's four predicate findings under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code, and to support the court's finding that termination of his parental rights was in K.D.'s best interest. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Background
Father and Mother were not living together as a couple before K.D. was born on September 5, 2022. Father had been recently released from jail and was working for a tree trimming business. He came to be with Mother for K.D.'s birth and while she was in the hospital. He believed he was K.D.'s father, although Mother gave the Department both his name and another man's name as possible fathers. The Department filed its petition initiating this suit and seeking custody of K.D. on September 12.
Father had been incarcerated in Collin County on a charge of forging a financial instrument.
The trial court signed its Temporary Order in the case after a September 23 hearing. As to Father, the order included a list of services he was obligated to perform as a "member of the household" and a requirement that he submit to genetic testing to determine if he is K.D.'s biological father. Father did undergo testing, and he was adjudicated K.D.'s father in the trial court's February 21, 2023 Permanency Order. That order adopted the services previously required of Father as his service plan and imposed a support obligation of $100 monthly.
This was Father's second time to be given a plan with services to be performed. Mother gave birth to their first child, a daughter we refer to as P.D., in 2020. P.D. also tested positive for methamphetamine at birth, and the Department obtained custody of her. After Father was unable to complete the service plan in that case, he voluntarily relinquished his rights to P.D. She was placed in a foster home; K.D. was later placed with the same family when she was removed from Mother and Father.
Mother's rights to P.D. were also terminated in that prior suit.
The Department ultimately sought to terminate Father's parental rights to K.D. on four predicate grounds, alleging in essence that he left K.D. and remained away for periods of three and six months, that he constructively abandoned her, and that he failed to comply with a court order establishing what he needed to do to have K.D. returned after her removal by the Department. The case was tried to the court.
The grounds alleged by the Department were that Father:
1. voluntarily left the child(ren) alone or in the possession of another not the parent without expressing an intent to return, without providing for the adequate support of the child(ren), and remained away for a period of at least three months; [Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(B)];
2. voluntarily left the child(ren) alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support of the child(ren) and remained away for a period of at least six months; [Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(C)];
3. constructively abandoned the child(ren) who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than six months, and the department has made reasonable efforts to return the child(ren) to him, he has not regularly visited or maintained significant contact with the child(ren), and he has demonstrated an inability to provide the child(ren) with a safe environment; [Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(N)]; and
4. failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child(ren) who have been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child(ren)'s removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child(ren); [Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).]
The trial judge heard testimony from the Department investigator who oversaw K.D.'s removal, Father, Mother, the current Department caseworker, and K.D.'s Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA). Orders incorporating Father's service plan were admitted into evidence, as were documents evidencing Father's multiple arrests and convictions. The trial court's Final Order found by clear and convincing evidence that Father had engaged in conduct satisfying all four predicate grounds and that termination of his parental rights to K.D. was in her best interest. This appeal followed.
Father had been convicted of multiple charges of failure to identify with fugitive intent, as well as theft of property (from Walmart and from Home Depot), two charges of possession of methamphetamine, and forgery of a check.
Termination of Parental Rights
Father presents six issues in this Court, each contending that an aspect of the Final Order was not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence.
Standards of Review
A court may terminate a parent's right to his child if it finds by clear and convincing evidence both that (1) the parent committed a predicate act prohibited under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1), and (2) termination is in the child's best interest. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). Clear and convincing evidence is "the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established." Id. § 101.007; In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2002). A parent's fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of his child is of constitutional magnitude. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022). Accordingly, before the State may terminate that right, the State must prove the two statutory elements of its case-a predicate act and the best interest of the child-by clear and convincing evidence at trial. Id.
The heightened burden of proof identified by the Texas Supreme Court affects our standard of review in a sufficiency challenge. Id. at 741. When we review a legal sufficiency challenge, we must determine whether "a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true." Id. (quoting J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). We must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so, and disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible. Id. We may not disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding. Id. And, as in any appellate review, we view the factfinder as the sole arbiter of the witnesses' credibility and demeanor. Id.
When the factual sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, we must undertake "an exacting review" of the entire record, always keeping in mind the constitutional interests at stake. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014). We ask whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State's allegations. Id. at 502. The evidence is factually insufficient if, "in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction." Id. at 503 (citing J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).
Subsection 161.001(b)(1)(O)
The Department bore the burden at trial to prove that Father's conduct met one of the predicate acts listed in section 161.001(b)(1). In his fifth issue, Father argues that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination of his parental rights under subsection (O), which provides that the parent:
failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services for not less than nine months as a result of the child's removal from the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child.Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).
The Texas Supreme Court has instructed us to avoid "bureaucratic or mechanical box-checking" in our subsection (O) analysis. In re R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d 370, 381 (Tex. 2023). Instead, our analysis "necessarily requires a nuanced assessment of the parent's conduct and progress toward plan completion in light of the totality of the plan's requirements and overall goal." Id. We must consider the nature and degree of Father's alleged noncompliance as well as the materiality of the challenged plan requirements in achieving the plan's stated goal. See id.
Removal for Abuse or Neglect
We address at the threshold Father's complaint that the Department failed to prove subsection (O)'s requirement that K.D. was "remov[ed] from [Father] under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child." Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). He contends that there is insufficient evidence of specific abuse or neglect by him to warrant the initial removal. And he specifically argues that the record contains no evidence that he was complicit with Mother in her drug use during her pregnancy.
The supreme court has recently explained that "removal" under Chapter 262 is "far broader" than the Department's taking physical possession of a child from a specific person or place. In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. 2023). The action of removal in this statutory context is not just a physical act; it "also includes the transfer by court order of the bundle of rights that the law gives a parent by default from the parent to [the Department]." Id. at 527-28. Given this understanding of the term, it is apparent that K.D. was removed under Chapter 262.
In addition, the words abuse or neglect are "'used broadly' in (O) and 'necessarily include[] the risks or threats of the environment in which the child is placed.'" Id. at 528 (quoting In re E.C.R., 402 S.W.3d 239, 248 (Tex. 2013)). When K.D. was born, Father's parental status was unclear. In addition, he had only recently been released from jail and had charges pending related to the same kind of drug abuse afflicting Mother. Although Mother's conduct was the direct cause of the removal, the Department reasonably concluded that Father could not provide a stable home environment for K.D. at that time. But subsection (O) gives a parent like Father an opportunity to have the child returned to him by demonstrating his parenting ability through compliance with the service plan. See id. at 532. If Father still cannot demonstrate his ability to provide a stable home for the child, then his rights to the child can be terminated, allowing the Department to pursue a permanent placement for the child. See id.
We conclude that K.D. was removed under the provisions of Chapter 262 of the Texas Family Code. We conclude further that she was removed because neither of her parents could, at that time, provide a safe environment for her, free of abuse and neglect. The Department's actions, therefore, complied with subsection (O).
Specificity of the Order
Father also challenges the specificity of the trial court's orders at issue. He correctly asserts that he was constitutionally entitled to notice as to what actions he had to take in order to have K.D. returned to him. See R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 373 ("The predicate ground for termination under (O) cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence if premised on a plan requirement that is unwritten, and thus supplied only by the caseworker's oral testimony, or on one that is written but vague.").
Father's briefing does not identify a particular obligation he was held to without notice. Instead, he contends:
[T]here is testimony about services, but in no case is a specific service in an admitted document referenced with enough specificity to meet this burden.
During Father's testimony at trial, he identified both State's Exhibit 11, the Department's February 13, 2023 Family Plan, and State's Exhibit 12, the trial court's February 21, 2023 Permanency Order. Both the Family Plan and the Permanency Order were admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we examine those documents to be certain that Father's compliance under subsection (O) was focused on clear, written obligations.
The Family Plan addressed the following specific tasks, requiring Father:
• to participate and to complete his parenting classes;
• to complete a substance abuse assessment, to go to substance abuse treatment as recommended by the provider, and to maintain sobriety throughout the span of the case and afterward; and
• to participate in a psychological evaluation and to follow any recommendations provided and to participate in individual counseling and follow any recommendations provided by the counselor.
The Family Plan details the reason each of these obligations was imposed and identifies resources-including contact information-for each service. It also confirms that each of these three services was court-ordered.
The Permanency Order states its requirements in more of a checklist manner, listing the following obligations for Father:
• maintain monthly contact with the CPS worker regarding [his] court-ordered services;
• inform CPS within 72 hours of any change in residence or contact information;
• Father FOCUS program or other parenting education as recommended by CPS;
• psychological evaluation as recommended by CPS;
• provide CPS with a list of all prescription medications and notify CPS in writing of any medication changes;
• counseling as recommended by CPS;
• Moral Reconation Therapy program offered by the Children's Advocacy Center of Collin County, and if accepted, participate in and successfully complete the program;
• drug/alcohol assessment and follow all recommendations;
• participate in and successfully complete a drug treatment program approved by CPS and follow all aftercare recommendations;
• random drug and alcohol urinalysis/hair strand tests/nail tests;
• maintain stable, suitable housing; and
• maintain suitable, stable, legal employment.
Although we address this list of obligations from the February Permanency Order, these same obligations had been in place for Father since the trial court's October 2022 Temporary Order.
Separately, the Permanency Order identified this support obligation:
• OBLIGOR, [FATHER], shall pay CHILD SUPPORT for the subject child [K.D.] of $100.00 beginning MARCH 1, 2023 and on the 1st day of each month thereafter, until modified.
Father testified that he was present at the hearing in February 2023 when he was adjudicated as K.D.'s father. He stated that he remembered the judge and the caseworker at that time going over the services he was required to complete. Because the Permanency Order was not signed until a week after the hearing, we presume that the services discussed with Father were those in the Family Plan. Father also testified at trial that he received and recognized the Permanency Order, which includes the three services addressed in the Family Plan. Accordingly, we conclude that Father received both written, detailed notice and verbal explanation of his obligations to complete a parenting class, a substance abuse assessment and treatment, and a psychological assessment and counseling. As to these services, at a minimum, the trial court's orders were written and the compliance required for each was certain. See R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 373 (plan requirement under (O) cannot be proven by clear and convincing evidence if unwritten or written but vague). They were sufficiently specific to inform Father of his obligations to retain his parental rights to K.D.
The Permanency Order specifically incorporates the Department's service plan into its terms.
Father's Compliance with Specific Material Obligations
Our ultimate inquiry is whether the Department established by clear and convincing evidence that Father's parental rights should be terminated under subsection (O). We consider the nature and degree of his alleged noncompliance and the materiality of the requirement at issue in achieving the plan's stated goal. See id. at 381.
The Department's goal for Father was stated at the outset of the Family Plan:
[Father] will work with the department and use community resources to achieve and maintain sobriety for the duration of the case and for the rest of his life so that he can adequately and appropriately supervise [K.D.].
To be sure, the Family Plan also emphasized services that would improve Father's parenting skills and that would allow the Department to monitor his mental health and coping skills. Accordingly, we review the evidence of all three of those concerns, but we recognize that the plan's ultimate goal was Father's sobriety.
(1) Parenting Class:
Under the heading "Parenting Skills," the Family Plan required:
[Father] will actively participate and complete his parenting classes (skills) provided through FOCUS Fatherhood. [Father] will attend all parenting class sessions. [Father] will need to be able to articulate what he has learned as well as demonstrate a change in behavior and new parenting style. He will demonstrate what he has learned from the parenting skills during visitation and contact with [K.D.]. [Father] will sign any needed release of information forms in order for the caseworker to obtain any needed documentation and or notes required to access the parents.
Father testified that he attended six of ten sessions of a parenting class approved by the Department before his incarceration. He stated further that he was on the waiting list for a parenting class that was available while he was in jail.
Prior to his 2023 incarceration, Father was permitted weekly two-hour visits with K.D. He attended most of those visits, up through April 6, 2023. He had two video visits in July, but otherwise had not visited with K.D. since April. He testified that he had enjoyed all of his permitted visitation with K.D. before his incarceration. The only other testimony concerning Father's parenting abilities was from the CASA advocate, who stated that the visits she observed had gone "really well" and that he and K.D. "interacted very well." She said that Father "is very appropriate with her and [K.D.] enjoyed time with him"; the advocate agreed that a strong bond existed between Father and K.D. at that time.
We conclude that the evidence supports Father's compliance with this material term to the best of his ability under the circumstances.
(2) Coping Skills and Mental Health:
Under this heading, the Family Plan required:
[Father] will participate in his psychological evaluation and follow any recommendations provided so that he can manage any found issues. [Father] will be honest during the evaluation and DFPS will facilitate any services recommended by the provider. [Father] will participate in Individual Counseling and follow any recommendations provided by the counselor.
Father testified that he never had the required psychological assessment. An assessment was scheduled for him, but he did not appear for it; he did not remember why he did not go. He never underwent counseling, although he testified he tried to set up Zoom counseling services and was unable to do so. Father's Department caseworker confirmed that she had never been informed that he had undergone the assessment or attended any individual counseling.
For this material prong of the Family Plan, the only evidence in the record is evidence of non-compliance.
(3) Substance Abuse/Use:
Finally, the Family Plan required:
[Father] will demonstrate the ability to maintain a sober lifestyle free of both drugs and alcohol. [Father] will complete a substance abuse assessment, go to substance abuse treatment as recommended by the provider, and maintain sobriety throughout the span of the case and afterwards. He will be honest about his history of drug use during the substance abuse assessment.
Father testified that he had been arrested three times for possession of amphetamines, including once in Dallas County during the pendency of this case. After that recent arrest, his bond in another case was revoked, and he was incarcerated in Grayson County at the time of trial on the earlier charges of possession of a dangerous drug, possession of methamphetamine, and failure to identify himself truthfully. He professed to have been sober for more than a year, but he had never received treatment at a drug treatment facility. Indeed, he had been incarcerated for most of the time period he identified as his sobriety. He submitted to all drug tests requested by the Department, and he believed the results were all satisfactory to the Department. The caseworker agreed that the Department had negative drug tests for Father, but we do not know when those tests were taken. Father spoke at trial about how difficult addiction was, yet in this most important area, he took none of the affirmative steps he was ordered to take to address his addiction.
We do not ignore the circumstances under which Father was charged with "working the services" of the Family Plan. He acknowledged that he had been incarcerated for almost half of K.D.'s life, and that his own actions were responsible for his incarceration. But he was informed by his caseworker early in this process that he could participate in a number of his court-ordered services while he was incarcerated including Moral Reconation Therapy, Alcoholics Anonymous, parenting classes, and individual counseling. Over the course of this litigation, Father spent time in jail in Collin, Dallas, and Grayson Counties; he testified that he was on a waiting list for a parenting class in each county. However, he acknowledged that he had not attempted to work on any other services while he was incarcerated. We have searched the record in vain for evidence of efforts on his part to address the court order's material issues regarding mental health and substance abuse.
It is not clear from the record whether Father could have undergone his substance abuse assessment or treatment during his months in jail. But participation in any program intended to assist with addiction would have been evidence of his affirmative efforts to comply with the court order. However, Father testified he had not attended any meetings of NA or AA or any other type of meetings that would focus on his addiction while he was incarcerated.
We also know that video visits were possible during this time, based on Father's own testimony. He made only two such visits during his incarceration.
Again, the Texas Supreme Court has stressed that a subsection (O) analysis must look to the material requirements imposed by the court's order, stating that "not all service plan requirements are created equal, and strict compliance with every aspect of every plan requirement is not always the standard." R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 382. Nevertheless, Father's sporadic efforts to participate in a parenting class cannot overcome his complete failure to comply with the material requirements related to substance abuse and psychological assessment and counseling. See id.
In this vein, the R.J.G. court did state: "There may be provisions in particular service plans for which nothing less than strict compliance will suffice to avoid termination. Easy examples are provisions that require a parent suffering from drug addiction to complete a drug treatment program or require a parent just released from prison to refrain from re-offending." 681 S.W.3d at 382. Arguably, then, the supreme court might hold Father to strict compliance in this case. Because Father did not attempt any compliance in the areas we have discussed, we need not opine on the need for strict-versus material-compliance.
We conclude the Department carried its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father failed to comply with material provisions of the court order that specifically established the actions necessary for him to obtain custody of K.D. See Fam. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). We overrule Father's fifth issue.
Because clear and convincing evidence of one predicate act is sufficient to establish the first prong necessary for termination, we need not address Father's arguments concerning other predicate acts under section 161.001(b)(1) in his second, third, and fourth issues. See In re L.C.L., 629 S.W.3d 909, 910 (Tex. 2021) ("[O]ne predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is sufficient to support a termination judgment when there is also a finding that termination is in a child's best interest[.]").
Best Interest of the Child
In his sixth issue, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that termination of Father's rights was in K.D.'s best interest. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The Department bore the burden at trial to establish this second prong of the test by clear and convincing evidence.
Although there is a strong presumption that a child's best interest is served by maintaining the parent-child relationship, In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam), the prompt and permanent placement of the child in a safe environment is also presumed to be in the child's best interest, Fam. § 263.307(a). The best-interest element is child-centered and focuses on the child's wellbeing, safety, and development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).
In Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976), the Texas Supreme Court established a non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining the best interest of a child. Given the age of K.D. and the circumstances of this case, we conclude the following factors are significant to our review in this case: the emotional and physical needs of the child now and in the future; the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody; the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody; and the stability of the home or proposed placement. See id. Both the current caseworker and the CASA advocate had visited K.D. in her foster home, and both witnesses testified that, in their opinion, terminating Father's rights was in the best interest of K.D. Their testimony described the child's positive emotional and physical development. K.D.'s foster parents hope to adopt K.D., which would make her part of a family that already includes her older sister. The Department has had ample time to observe the foster parents, and their parental abilities are undisputed. Father's abilities are largely untested, but his desire to parent K.D. was apparently not strong enough to compel him to comply with the court's order. See A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631 (same evidence may help prove both prongs of the Department's burden).
Father did propose his own plan for K.D.: he would be released from jail, take the well-paying job that a friend was helping him apply for, live for a short time with that friend while he saved money, and ultimately get a place of his own for K.D. and himself. We do not dismiss this proposed plan out of hand, but no step in the plan is certain. Father had "no idea" at the time of trial when he might be released from jail, and he could not even apply for the proposed job until he was released. In this prong of our analysis, we must focus on what is best for the child, not for Father.
We conclude that after hearing all the evidence, a factfinder could form a firm belief that it was in the best interest of K.D. for Father's parental rights to be terminated. See J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264. The evidence is legally and factually sufficient. We overrule Father's sixth issue.
The Fit-Parent Presumption
In his first issue, Father contends that the evidence was insufficient to overcome the fit-parent presumption and his constitutional parenting rights. He relies on the presumption as it was stated in In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. 2020). In that opinion, the supreme court concluded:
a court must apply the presumption that a fit parent-not the court- determines the best interest of the child in any proceeding in which a nonparent seeks conservatorship or access over the objection of a child's fit parent.Id. at 817. Father takes the position that the Department was required to prove not only a predicate ground for termination under section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination of Father's rights was in K.D.'s best interest, but also that Father was an unfit parent in order to terminate his constitutional rights to parent K.D.
We have addressed this same argument recently, explaining that (1) the vast majority of cases citing C.J.C. do so as authority for application of the fit-parent presumption in modification suits rather than termination suits, and (2) termination cases that do rely on C.J.C.'s statement of the presumption discuss the holding within the overall review of the evidence supporting termination. In re A.B., No. 05-23-00667-CV, 2023 WL 8863490, at *11 (Tex. App.-Dallas Dec. 22, 2023, pet. filed; Anders motion to withdraw filed). We have also looked to supreme court opinions issued after C.J.C., and we have found none that treat overcoming the fit-parent presumption as a discrete element of proof necessary to terminate parental rights. To the contrary, over the almost four years since C.J.C. was decided, the supreme court has continued to identify the proper test for termination of parental rights as the two-prong test found in sections 161.001(b)(1) and (2) of the Family Code. See, e.g., In re C.E., No. 23-0180, 2024 WL 875455, at *2 (Tex. Mar. 1, 2024); In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 534 (Tex. 2023); In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 741. In none of these opinions does the supreme court suggest that the test now includes a third prong, i.e., establishing that the parent is not fit.
C.J.C. was a modification case, not a termination of parental rights case.
The supreme court has cited C.J.C. in a single case involving termination of parental rights. See In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 69 (Tex. 2021).The case addresses a parent's ability to make a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel in a termination of parental rights suit. As it began its analysis, the court stated:
The Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children." See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality op.). We have also recognized the fundamental nature of the parental right to make child-rearing decisions. See, e.g., In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 807 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding).But the court refers only to the standard of section 161.001(b) when it identifies the basis for terminating the parent's rights. Id.
This is not to say that the presumption is insignificant; it is not. We recognize that a parent has a constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his child. J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 740; C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 811. And when the government seeks not only to infringe on this fundamental right, but to terminate the right altogether, the action constitutes a "death penalty" of sorts. R.J.G., 681 S.W.3d at 381(judgment terminating parental rights is "death penalty of civil cases"). But the fit-parent presumption is rebuttable. A.B., 2023 WL 8863490, at *11. And under the facts of this case, where an addicted parent has refused to undertake court-ordered services involving substance abuse and mental health care, we conclude that the Department has overcome the fit-parent presumption. See C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 820.
We overrule Father's first issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Justices Molberg and Nowell participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered.